Started by Pioneering Academics Such As David Denver, Gordon Hands

The Liberal Democrat approach to campaigning

Started by pioneering academics such as David Denver, Gordon Hands and Justin Fisher,1 there is now a well-established tradition of research into the impact of local campaigning on British election results. This work, however, tends to be cross-party and to rely heavily on evidence such as officially recorded spending figures, election results, questionnaire findings and statistical analysis of all three. As a result, there is still very little written about the development of particular campaign techniques, especially where they were specific to one party for a long period of time. By Mark Pack.

6 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 The Liberal Democrat approach to campaigning

his article fills part of elections, and accusations that it (by the margin of seventeen to six that gap in the histori- was being dumbed down into an in 1983, and by seventeen to five in Tcal record, by considering election-only approach, was a regu- 1987). For all the importance the the Liberal Democrat (and before lar feature of Liberal Party debates SDP attached to bringing a sense that Liberal Party) campaign tech- over the future of the idea. As one of professionalism to the (as they niques, and the evolution of party of its seminal texts warned (and saw it) amateurish approach of the strategies and structures to support note that its authors felt the need to Liberals, when it came to votes them.2 issue this warning): ‘Community being counted it was the Liberal politics is not a technique. It is an Party approach that consistently ideology, a system of ideas for social did better. The Liberal Democrat transformation. For those ideas to It is no surprise, therefore, that inheritance from its become a reality there is a need for a comparing the different campaign predecessor parties strategy of political action. For that manuals produced for the two pre- The techniques, strategies and strategy to be successful it needs decessor parties, for the Alliance structures were not all created to develop effective techniques of and then for the Liberal Democrats afresh when the party was formed political campaigning. Those tech- reveals a strong continuity in both out of the merger of the Liberal niques are a means to an end. If they content and authors from the Lib- Party and SDP. Rather, the merged become an end in themselves, the eral Party through to the Liberal party inherited most of its initial ideas they were designed to pro- Democrats.4 Indeed, in many cases approach from its predecessors. mote will have been lost’.3 large pieces of text were copied over In establishing a campaign tradi- By contrast, the SDP’s roots were and then updated for new editions tion for their merged successor to predominantly in national politics or nominally new titles, so that even inherit, the Liberal Party had two and national issues, which did not where the author’s names and titles big advantages over the SDP: it had in the same way lead naturally to a are new, the continuity is still there.5 been around, doing campaigning, distinctive approach to local cam- Some of the SDP election manu- for longer and, at least as far as local paigning. A Labour MP who left als did have a distinctive approach campaigning was concerned, had his party for the SDP over Europe, from the contemporary Liberal been seen even by many in the SDP trade union power or voting rights Party ones. For example, the SDP’s as being the more skilled party. at a national party conference did firstLocal Government Election Hand- Moreover, in adopting com- not as a result adopt a different book, published in January 1982, munity politics in the 1970s, the approach from that of other par- highlighted the importance of Liberal Party had taken both a phil- ties to grassroots politics in the same ‘Policy Formulation’, which fea- osophical and a practical approach way that a Liberal attracted to com- tures as early as page 2, giving it a that venerated local activity and munity politics did. prominence that equivalent Liberal regular communication. It was Moreover, the relative results Party publications of the time did about being active on the doorsteps of the two parties in 1983 and 1987 not grant. But subsequent Liberal and via letterboxes all year round reinforced the existing percep- Democrat publications followed and not simply (as was traditional tion of the Liberal Party as being the Liberal Party and not the SDP with election campaigns) in the few the skilled exponent of grassroots choice of emphasis. weeks before a polling day. Elec- political campaigning. Despite a Liberal Democrat This documentary and authorial tions were, in the old Liberal Party tortuous process to ensure a ‘fair’ campaigning: trail from the Liberal Party through saying, but the punctuation marks allocation of seats between the two Brent Central in to the Liberal Democrats was also in community politics. Alliance partners, at both elections the 2010 election reflected in the nature of the grass- The degree to which community the Liberals were far more effec- (photo: Liberal roots campaigning that the Lib- politics should be about winning tive at winning seats than the SDP Democrats). eral Democrats specialised in. The

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 7 the liberal democrat approach to campaigning various techniques described below campaigns and careful targeting to Chris Ren- Also, for local council elections, all had antecedents in Liberal Party win local elections was well estab- targeting usually meant asking activities. It is hard to identify a lished and, in many parts of the nard liked to people to travel less far than for tar- distinctive SDP contribution, save country, successful. However, it geting at parliamentary elections. for perhaps one crucial one: many had not achieved similar levels of tell the story Parliamentary constituencies are in the SDP viewed themselves as success at a national level. considerably larger, and winnable taking the fight for Westminster of how he constituencies fewer. As a result, constituencies seriously, in a way going to your nearest target con- that the Liberal Party, with its – in Targeting met with the stituency might even mean travel- their view – undue concentration Part of the reason for this distinc- ling 100 miles or more. By contrast, on local councils, had not.6 tion between local level success and Liberal Par- going to your nearest target ward Westminster-level disappointments ty’s 1987 Gen- usually meant only a short trip, save was the difficulty of applying tar- for the most rural of areas. The need for leaflets geting effectively at parliamentary- eral Election Moreover, at a national level Central to this inheritance for the level elections. many believed that very little could Liberal Democrats was the role of At the local level, the Liberals Campaign be done to influence the chances leaflets. If one image can sum up in particular in their most success- in individual seats, if indeed that the approach to campaigning taken ful areas had honed a very strict Commit- was even the point of a national by the Liberal Democrats across approach to targeting, pouring campaign. Thomas (Jack) Daniels, twenty-five years, it would be a efforts into winnable wards whilst tee and was the Liberal candidate for Luton in piece of paper on a doormat embla- neglecting other wards – often 1966, recounted11 how despite his zoned with a bar chart and a head- in those doing no more than put- firmly told very low prospects of victory, he line screaming that ‘Only the local ting a candidate’s name on the bal- received an election visit from then Liberal Democrat can beat Party X lot paper, if that. But when it came that, ‘which Liberal leader Jo Grimond because round here’.7 to general elections, it was far less Grimond simply thought it was the Then Liberal Party MP David common for candidates and their seats the right thing for him to do to visit Penhaligon coined the phrase that helpers to similarly abandon no- everyone who was standing as a many activists have since quoted, ‘If hope seats and move instead to help party won candidate. you believe in something, write it on in winnable constituencies.9 (Par- That sort of attitude lasted over a piece of paper and stick it through liamentary by-elections were an at a general the decades. Chris Rennard liked a letterbox’. However, it was Chris exception to this due to the paucity to tell the story of how he met with Rennard, first as the Liberal Demo- of other elections usually taking election was the Liberal Party’s 1987 General crats’ Director of Campaigns and place on the same day – and it was just a matter Election Campaign Committee Elections, and then subsequently as no coincidence that this made it and was firmly told that, ‘which Chief Executive, who turned it into easier to encourage large volumes of luck, com- seats the party won at a general an effective seat-winning tactic at of help and that the party devel- election was just a matter of luck, general elections for the party.8 oped something of an expertise at pletely out of completely out of the control of the Both when Penhaligon first winning such contests.) central campaign’. That was a belief coined the phrase and during Ren- The relative reluctance on the control that he did not share and set out nard’s time in charge of the party’s the part of activists to move dur- to change, and during his time in campaigning, the party suffered ing general elections was in part of the central charge of the party’s campaigning from not only an absence of favour- because Westminster elections it did change radically. able newspaper owners but also a came with elements that made it campaign’. The most notable example of paucity of coverage on impartial harder for candidates to turn their the party’s improved ability to win radio and TV channels. As a result, back on their own seat and con- seats under the British electoral sys- the Liberals and subsequently Lib- centrate on helping someone who tem was 1997. At that election the eral Democrats had turned to could win. Public meetings may party’s vote share fell, and was less intensive and local leafleting to get be in a long-term decline in Brit- than the party’s previous 1974 peak. out the party’s message. ish politics, but most candidates Yet the number of seats the party Moreover, the workings of Brit- felt they had to turn up for those won went up, to more than three ain’s first past the post electoral sys- in their own seat. Similarly, the times the number of seats won dur- tem required that leafleting – and provision by the Royal Mail of a ing the two 1974 elections. other campaigning – be tightly tar- free delivery service for one elec- geted geographically in order for tion leaflet to every voter encour- support to be turned into seats. That aged candidates and their teams to A semi-autonomous campaign is because, outside of parts of the feel that they had to ‘show the flag’ organisation Celtic fringe, the third party’s vote and at least get one election address Under Chris Rennard, targeting was usually fairly evenly distrib- out. Although the Royal Mail did also meant strong central control, uted around the country, which is the delivery of the freepost elec- with funds and staffing under his not the route to winning under first tion address, its production could direction pointed towards a limited past the post. Only by concentrat- still require significant local cam- number of seats. ing on building up support within paign effort, such as to address and To be successful, this required particular seats could votes secured stuff envelopes to hold the election two internal debates to be won, be turned into actual seats won. address, reducing the amount of repeatedly. First, the ability of a By the time of the Liberal Dem- time available to help in winnable well-resourced targeting opera- ocrats, the idea of intensive leaflet constituencies.10 tion to win seats was so important

8 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 the liberal democrat approach to campaigning that the party should dedicate more also specially created, autonomous in accordance with the Medium resources to target seat campaign- structures for running the 1992 and Term Review appointed Ren- ing. Second, that the selection of 1997 election campaigns, under nard as a ‘Chief Executive of the target seats should be sufficiently Des Wilson and Richard Holme General Election’ (he was not then narrow to make it meaningful – respectively. Those separate general party Chief Executive). This both and so only giving target seat sta- election structures came with their simplified the structures and solidi- tus to those performing at a level own budgetary autonomy. fied Rennard’s influence, which which could bring victory. All this caused some in the vol- had spread from key seats in 1992 Rennard therefore believed that untary party’s democratic struc- to an increasingly important role effective targeting also required tures to complain about lack of in deciding messaging in 1997 to him to have significant power and clarity or control over what was being the day-to-day person in discretion within the party organi- being spent, by who and on what charge for 2001. sation. It meant he argued both for basis. A significant part of the par- Alongside this integration of an increasing share of the party’s ty’s federal (UK-wide) funds were, budgets and structures around gen- resources to be dedicated to the key for example, put into a campaign eral elections, the Parliamentary seats operation and for him and the fund and a by-election fund, whose Office of the Liberal Democrats (the party’s campaign staff working for income (in particular, its sources operations in parliament, funded him to have substantial autonomy of fundraising) and expenditure by public money and employing over the key seat operation. This had far less detailed scrutiny from much of the party’s London-based was only partly tempered by a need the party’s elected committees and staff) became more integrated with to cooperate with other parts of conference than the main federal the federal HQ’s operations. Such the party in order to bring in their party budget. The general elec- integration brought many ben- resources to the operation. As a tion budget itself received even less efits for the party and its ability to result, the selection of target seats scrutiny from the party’s demo- make the best use of its resources. in England in the run-up to the cratic processes.12 It also meant that Chris Rennard’s 1997 general election, for example, There was a significant benefit role was an increasingly powerful involved regional parties in help- for the party’s campaigning from one – a trend strengthened by the ing to evaluate seats against per- this opacity. It protected ‘com- need to fill the vacuum caused by formance criteria such as level of mercially confidential’ informa- Charles Kennedy’s lack of inter- members and regularity of leaflet tion from the prying eyes of other est in organisational details and delivery. Central party staff and parties, such as over the relative by his health issues at the time.13 funding resources were only avail- amount of resources put into con- Consequently, whatever benefits able for those seats and regions that testing different seats and whether these changes brought, they did not complied with the scheme. or not any particular parliamentary assuage – and if anything increased Supporting activity in key seats by-election was going to see a seri- – the concerns of some critics about became an increasingly important ous campaign launched. the semi-autonomous nature of the funding priority for the party, with The party’s Medium Term campaigning control he exercised. the £120,000 allocated to the Cam- Review following the 1997 cam- Some steps were taken by Chris paigns Department for key seats in paign decided that the party’s elec- Rennard in response to these con- 1992 growing to £1m in 1997 and tion campaigns should in future cerns – such as the creation of a new continuing to grow subsequently. be more accountable to the main- senior management team to take on Controversy came from the three stream party structure and that some of the powers newly concen- different sources of financial power the Campaign & Communications trated at party HQ. There were also for the 1992 and 1997 general elec- Committee Chair should chair the many vocal and passionate defend- tions. There was the mainstream election campaigns. Tim Razzall ers of his approach, especially from federal (UK-wide) party budget. was elected to this position fol- the party’s organisers, agents and There was Rennard’s growing lowing Charles Kennedy’s elec- candidates. In part this came from a campaign operation. There were tion as leader and he in turn and simple record of success (see Table 1) that seemed to justify this approach and which suggested that the more Table 1: Liberal, Alliance and Liberal Democrat general election performance of the party’s funds that went on Election Seats won Share of the vote Votes:seats ratio campaigning, and the more that 1970 6 8 0.8 was under Rennard’s control, the 1974 Feb 14 20 0.7 better the party did. It also reflected the mixed repu- 1974 Oct 13 19 0.7 tation of the party’s Federal Execu- 1979 11 14 0.8 tive (FE) and Federal Finance and 1983 23 26 0.9 Administration Committee (FFAC) who had control over the federal 1987 22 23 0.9 budget and were therefore sidelined 1992 19 18 1.1 when funds went elsewhere. Com- 1997 46 17 2.7 ments such as ‘it’s the worst com- 2001 52 19 2.8 mittee I’ve ever served on’ were common from FE members during 2005 62 22 2.9 this time, and spanning several dif- 2010 57 23 2.5 ferent FE chairs.

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 9 the liberal democrat approach to campaigning

Moreover, there was a more credited by many with helping to elections than simply delivering subtle, cultural factor at work, aris- save the party after the traumas of leaflets. He set out his campaigning from the way that election law merger, and all through the next ing style most clearly in a guide to requires individual ward or con- two decades, high profile by-elec- winning local elections, originally stituency election campaigns to be tion victories gave the party much written for the Liberal Party but conducted. By making the candi- needed bursts of publicity and anticipating the merger.21 He used date and their election agent legally credibility.19 to offer would-be candidates a bet: responsible for all the campaign They often also helped set the he was so sure that if they did eve- activities carried out on behalf of political mood, helping to shift the rything in the book they would a candidate and their party, elec- journalistic consensus as to what win, that if they followed every- tion law encourages a very central- the party’s fate was likely to be. thing in the book and failed to win, ised approach to election campaign For example, after the 1997 general he would refund the cover price. management, which was widely election gains, the media generally According to the tales, he never had reflected in the party’s general elec- assumed the next general election to make a refund. The book covers tion agent manuals and similar would be about the Liberal Demo- more than just leafleting, includ- publications for local elections.14 crats trying to minimise the degree ing a key place for a regular ‘resi- The logic was simple: if someone to which they slipped back – until dents’ survey’, asking people what is going to be legally responsible, the Romsey by-election victory in issues are important to them and then they should be in charge and 2000 set the political story as being what problems in the area needed other bodies – such as the local one in which the party would make fixing. Find out what the public party executive – should not have further progress. is concerned about, then tackle it power, otherwise they would be and report back regularly through making decisions for which some- repeated leaflets was the formula. one else then has to carry the legal More than just leaflets It was both a winning formula responsibility. Although there was Chris Rennard’s approach to win- and became a controversial one for no directly similar legal require- ning parliamentary constituencies its focus was on volume of activ- ment to concentrate power at the was always heavily rooted in local ity and populism, taking up issues national level for elections,15 the campaigns and leaflets. When in that concerned people rather than culture that elections are run by a subsequent years he recounted his preaching political philosophy small number of individuals who role in achieving the biggest swing at them. It was clearly effective have complete control did seep against the Tories in the country in but always risked, especially in over from local to the national 1983 with David Alton’s re-election untrained or naive hands, lapsing level, especially as many of those in Liverpool Mossley Hill, it was into crude populism without a dis- involved at the national level in the number of leaflets and the size tinctive liberal tinge. This point election campaigning first learnt of the swing that most frequently is explored further below (see The their skills at the local level.16 featured, even though an intensive Rennard strategy). Finally, there was also a tra- door-knocking campaign and a dition dating back to the Liberal A typical bar growth in the volunteer base from Party days of general election cam- chart / two-horse 100 to 600 were also key parts of the Bar charts paigns or key seat activities being race leaflet, from campaign.20 Both the electoral effectiveness and run in semi-autonomous ways.17 Broadland in the Yet there was always more to ideological doubts of this approach When this was added to the SDP 2010 election Rennard’s approach to winning were heighted by the heavy heritage, with its revulsion at the way Labour’s cumbersome committees had mismanaged elections, and a continuing tradition of Lib- eral Democrat leaders liking to put general election campaigns outside the party’s usual democratic structures,18 there was a very open door for Rennard to push at with his actions to have centralised, semi- autonomous control.

Parliamentary by-elections This applied first with parliamentary by-elections and then with constituency campaigning for general elections. As with the Alliance and before them the Liberal Party, parliamentary by-elections played a large role in the party’s fortunes, especially in its early days. The Eastbourne by-election victory in 1990 was

10 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 the liberal democrat approach to campaigning emphasis on appealing to tactical normally give a conventional polit- The prob- being copied by the other parties. voters. It was an effective way of ical leaflet a second glance. Indeed, by the time of the Cheadle turning the disadvantages the third The delivery of a newspapers, lem was not by-election in 2005, not only were party faced under first past the post including one over the last week- the Conservatives closely copying on their head, making the electoral end of the campaign containing so much the the campaign tactics of previous system count against one of the an extremely strong tactical vot- Liberal Democrat by-elections, but other main parties within a partic- ing message, became a staple of the lack of policy many of the standard phrases and ular constituency. party’s electioneering for decades wording used in them were also Where the third party was in until reductions in printing prices, consistency being copied. It led to increasingly second place (or could plausibly more generous expense limits and questions over whether the party’s argue that it had moved into second imitation from other parties made across dif- campaign techniques were fresh place since the previous election), a newspapers spill over into repeated ferent seats, enough and modernising at a pace strong appeal could be made to the appearances during a campaign. to keep up with the other parties. supporters of the major party that As with other techniques, such for there was found itself in third place, arguing newspapers often showed up the they should switch their votes to variation in skill levels amongst high con- The Rennard strategy the Liberals/Alliance/Lib Dems, as campaign teams. The newspa- Part of these criticisms was a view their favoured party could not win per produced for high-profile by- sistency at that Rennard-style campaigning but by switching they would at least elections usually had production added up to less than the sum of its be able to stop the other main party quality matching the independent Rennard’s parts. By fighting a series of very winning. Moreover, in making the local media. However, the format intensive local constituency cam- tactical voting case, the party was of the item showed up particularly instiga- paigns, each shaped by the varying also implicitly making the case that harshly any falling short of such particular issues and concerns in the the party could win, at least in that standards, with local campaign tion, but individual constituencies – so the seat, which was also an effective tac- teams not in receipt of direct cen- argument went – the party was fail- tic for appealing to voters, many of tral artwork support not infre- rather that ing to build up a clear, consistent whom were willing to vote for the quently producing newspapers image of itself or carve out a clear party as long as it would not end up so amateurish in appearance as to the ‘we’re core vote. Instead, it was accumulat- being a wasted vote.22 undermine the concept. ing different sets of diverse support- A key part of making this point Yet such newspapers continued nice, hard ers in various seats, with the only effectively was to present it graphi- to be produced because, as with bar possible progress coming from put- cally, in the shape of a bar chart. charts and other parts of the suc- working and ting together new bespoke coalitions The origins of the first bar charts cessful campaign paraphernalia, concerned of supporters a few seats at a time. on leaflets painting a contest as a in less skilled hands they became This criticism can be overdone, two-horse between the party and totemic concepts to copy. Copying about the for the party’s polling actually its main rival, with the other party concepts is much easier, of course, found rather similar results across or parties labelled as unable to win than copying quality – and with the same issues its different key seats. The typical are lost to history although most rationale behind such paraphernalia key-seat constituency polls with a likely date to the late 1970s.23 By the rarely discussed widely in the party, as you’ mes- sample size of around 450 found a early 1980s Chris Rennard was pro- it became easy for people to copy consistent pattern – both around moting tactical voting, authoring a poorly without understanding why sage was not the country and across the years – guide for the Association of Liberal what they were doing was inferior. of voters liking hard-working Lib- Councillors that included advice sufficiently eral Democrats, with strong local on how to use what he then called credentials, who concentrated on ‘block diagrams’. By the time of the ‘Blue ink’ letters distinctively the issues that the public told the Liberal Democrats the use of tacti- In the search to find formats that pollsters were the most important cal voting appeals illustrated by bar would result in voters actually liberal. to their family. These were usually charts was a major part of the par- reading political literature, hand- health, crime and education, with ty’s target seat campaigns. addressed envelopes containing a issues such as constitutional reform reproduced handwritten letter also and Europe as a result being heavily became common. Typically the let- downplayed. Tabloid newspapers ters used blue paper and envelopes, If anything, the problem was Another distinctive feature of Lib- with the printed handwriting often not so much the lack of policy eral Democrat campaigns, less in dark blue ink, giving them the consistency across different seats, remarked on than bar chart but as name ‘blue ink letters’. The first for there was high consistency at with them ending up widely cop- such blue ink letters were invented Rennard’s instigation, but rather ied by other parties, was the use by Rennard when he was organ- that the ‘we’re nice, hard work- of four-page constituency news- ising the Liberal breakthrough in ing and concerned about the same papers. Given a non-party mast- Leicester in the 1980s. issues as you’ message was not suf- head to encourage readership, and As with other campaign tech- ficiently distinctively liberal. As a with no prominent logo on the first niques, such as the old Liberal Par- result, the party’s pitch was one any page, these newspapers made clear ty’s habit, born in 1970s Liverpool, other party could – and sometimes who they were from but were writ- of delivering a ‘Good Morning’ did – copy and match. By concen- ten in a third-person local newspa- leaflet before voters had woken up trating on promoting the virtues per style and designed to attract the on polling day, they started as a of individual candidates, their interest of people who would not distinctive technique and ended up local connections and their local

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 11 the liberal democrat approach to campaigning campaigns, the approach built up Namely that the best results in PR so that the ground war took place support for individuals who hap- elections, where votes were counted against a more welcoming back- pened to be Liberal Democrats, up over a much larger area than a drop. As a result, and in one of the rather than for the party in its own single Westminster constituency, least frequently commented on right. This made it hard to trans- were garnered by concentrating episodes during Rennard’s time at fer that support to their successors activity on the strongest constituen- party HQ, the party’s press team28 as candidates. Where an incum- cies and wards within those larger was roughly doubled in size. The bent MP was standing down, there areas. Rennard-style concentrated ground tactics changed little, for was some scope for them to sup- campaigning generated more votes as in 1997 there was a compellingly port the building up of their suc- overall than alternative approaches clear and neat pattern of the seats cessor. However, where the party to spread the party’s activity more which followed the standard Ren- had come close but not won and thinly over wider areas.24 nard campaign template winning the defeated candidate retired, or A related criticism frequently and those that did not, losing. where an MP was defeated and a made, especially in the pages of For 2005, the pattern was much new person was seeking to regain Liberator magazine, was that by less clear cut, and as a result the the seat next time round, it was concentrating party resources on a campaign activity template that extremely hard to pass on the accu- limited number of target seats, the seats were expected to follow mulated support for their predeces- party failed to grow in other parts underwent significant changes, sor to the new person. of the country and instead was left including a big increase in the vol- Rennard’s response to this was to whither. In truth, though, the ume of direct mail. This was in partly that it was a better approach number of seats being seriously part a reaction to the large Con- than anything that anyone else had fought by the party doubled across More widely servative direct mail operation in tried or suggested, in that it did at the 1997, 2001 and 2005 parliaments 2005, although whilst the latter least get Lib Dem MPs elected in before Chris Rennard’s departure in the party relied overwhelmingly on postage, far greater numbers than before. He as Chief Executive.25 the lower-budget Lib Dem opera- also argued that there was a long- this still left tion was reliant on hand-delivered term strategic element to it: the aim direct mail. was to build up the number of seats Post-2005 reviews a sense that More widely in the party this the party could win until it was big Following the 2005 election, within still left a sense that further mod- enough to force a hung parliament. the Campaigns Department there further modernisation of campaign tactics was At that point, he hoped, the party was a limited review of the general required. Such modernisation was would be able to get the rules of the election result and revision of the ernisation part of Ming Campbell’s pitch for game changed, with a new voting party’s template campaign strat- the party leadership in 2006 and, system and party funding reform egy for target and held seats. More of campaign after he won, a campaign review then letting the party fight future generally there was debate in the tactics was headed up by Ed Davey MP was elections on a level playing field party over how the general election carried out. This included a study with the other main parties. was conducted, and whether the required. trip to Canada and the US to learn On that basis, the election- result constituted a missed oppor- lessons from sister parties there. fighting part of the strategy almost tunity given the political dam- Such mod- Before there was a chance to see the delivered in 2010. But the math- age to Labour thanks to the fallout result of these changes at a general ematics of the hung parliament did from the Iraq war.26 The party had ernisation election, Chris Rennard departed not make a Labour–Lib Dem deal some dramatic wins from Labour, as Chief Executive. feasible, and so the party’s negoti- such as in Manchester Withington was part of ating position for electoral reform and in Hornsey & Wood Green, but was weakened. That plus the sub- should there have been more given Ming Camp- Post-Rennard sequent disastrous AV referendum the political environment offered The new Chief Executive, Chris campaign meant the strategy did up by the Iraq war and resulting bell’s pitch Fox, set out to organise party HQ not end in triumph. widespread centre-left disenchant- in a very different style (more flip Where the party did succeed ment with Tony Blair? for the party charts and less bar charts was the in changing the rules of the elec- Within the Campaigns Depart- quip). His Director of Campaigns, toral game – with electoral reform ment the thinking was much more leadership Hilary Stephenson, nonetheless for Scotland, Wales, London and about how the party had performed took an approach to campaigning the European Parliament elections against the Conservatives, and the in 2006 and, that was very rooted in the mode – this simply extended the contro- failure to win a string of seats that of the 1997 and 2001 successes, and versy. For critics of Rennardism, on paper were promising prospects after he as a result the focus was on fighting the party’s failure to shine in those and appeared to have run the sort won, a cam- those sorts of campaigns better and ballots conducted by versions of of campaign which had in the past on a larger scale rather than signifi- proportional representation showed resulted in victory. paign review cant changes in the party’s cam- its limitations. If the party could not After the 2001 general election, paigning style.29 do well in elections of the very sort the implicit27 lesson drawn by the headed up by The 2010 general election saw a it wanted, freed from the shackles of party was that a very effective key- huge bump in the opinion polls for first past the post, what long-term seats operation could only get the Ed Davey MP the party after the first TV Lead- future for the party was there? party so far, and in addition to an ers’ Debate, and as a result the party The answer to that, for Ren- effective ‘ground war’, the party was carried started putting effort into a much nardism’s defenders, was that the needed to be better at the ‘air war’ wider range of seats. In addition, future required more of the same. in the national media and the like out. the focus of party campaigners on

12 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 the liberal democrat approach to campaigning targeting weakened, as more activ- What is British political campaigning. It was Campaigning in your community. The ists started staying at home to work both a tribute to the success of its origins of parts of the text can be their own seats, thinking they already clear tactics and a frustration to its further traced back through to 1970s Liberal could win, rather than travelling to success that other parties ended up Party publications. near-by more marginal seats.30 is that the so heavily copying its techniques. 6 ‘There were many areas of Liberal As a result, when the votes Whether it is the regular appear- local government strength where lit- came in the 2010 election was the third party ance of a leaflet outside of election tle or no attempt was made to convert worst for the party since 1992 when time, heavy focusing of resources this to parliamentary elections and judged by the campaign machine’s did remake on a limited number of target seats, indeed even those with much experi- ability to turn national vote share emphasis on the local roots and local ence of local election success had not into actual seats (see Table 1). For British politi- campaign record of candidates or much idea of how to adapt commu- pessimists this was the result of cal cam- the widespread use of bar charts, nity politics techniques for parlia- the Conservatives in 2005 having electoral politics in Britain has fol- mentary elections. In contrast many largely cottoned on to how to do paigning. It lowed where the third party led. of the seats we did hold were not intensive key-seat campaigning, and really bastions of community poli- by 2010 Labour doing so too, leav- was both a Dr Mark Pack worked at Liberal Dem- tics. Campaigning in Liberal-fought ing the party’s ability to out-per- ocrat HQ from 2000 to 2009, and prior to South Leicester and SDP-fought form the national picture in selected tribute to the that was frequently a volunteer member Watford in 1985–87, I found the for- constituencies hugely reduced. of the Parliamentary By-Election team. mer more dynamic in terms of win- One issue that was clear is success of its He is co-author of 101 Ways To Win An ning council seats, but the latter more that the party called several seats Election and of the party’s General Elec- focused on the parliamentary elec- wrongly in the last few days before tactics and a tion Agents Manual. tion,’ said Iain Sharpe, now a Watford polling day, misdirecting resources borough councillor, to the author at as a result. For example, a great deal frustration 1 For example, see David Denver and the Liberal Democrat autumn federal of effort was directed to Oxford Gordon Hands, Modern Constitu- conference, September 2013. East on polling day, which Labour to its further ency Electioneering: Local Campaign- 7 The same image would also cover the held on to by a significant margin – ing in the 1992 General Election (Frank predecessor Liberal Party’s approach 4,581 votes – whereas, had the effort success that Cass, 1997) and Justin Fisher, David to campaigning over several decades been directed instead to neighbour- Denver and Gordon Hands, ‘Unsung too. The distinctive features of the ing Oxford West & Abingdon, other par- Heroes: Constituency Election party’s approach to campaigning, Evan Harris would not have ended Agents in British General Elections’, leaflets, bar charts and all, came over- up losing by just 176 votes.31 ties ended British Journal of Politics and Interna- whelmingly from the merged party’s The party’s own official review up so heavily tional Relations, vol. 8, no. 4, 2006. Liberal, rather than SDP, heritage. was a relatively low-key affair. It 2 This gap is not unique to the Lib- 8 Director of Campaigns and Elections made many detailed recommenda- copying its eral Democrats or the tactics that 1989–2003 and then Chief Executive tions, and some significant organi- party pioneered. Phil Cowley, now 2003–9. He was created a life peer in sational ones – particularly that the techniques. co-author of the Nuffield general 1999. party should change its computer election series, has made the point 9 This reluctance to move resources database software for fighting elec- to the author that he and his col- and people in order to concentrate on tions.32 In addition, the increasing leagues know very little about direct target seats is one the other main par- emphasis in the Labour Party on the mail’s impact on election results even ties have encountered too, and indeed virtues of canvassing has rubbed though it is clear from his conversa- is a reason why even as they saw the off on the Liberal Democrats, with tions with campaign organisers that success of targeting for the third a switch from viewing canvassing they put much time and money into party they were not able to match it as a data-gathering opportunity, producing it. As a result he has pos- because of greater resistance to mov- where a virtue is made of talking to ited, half in jest but also half seri- ing effort between seats from within each person for as little time a possi- ously, ‘Cowley’s Law’, namely that their own organisations. ble, to an attempt to get into longer the level of media attention given to a 10 Technology has increasingly made conversations about issues. campaign technique is in inverse pro- readying a candidate’s freepost elec- Whether such changes are the portion to the importance given to it tion address a less labour-intensive right ones and are radical enough, by campaign organisers. operation than it used to be. The abil- remains to be seen with the 2015 3 Bernard Greaves and Gordon Lish- ity to print names and addresses and election yet to cast its verdict. man, The Theory and Practice of Com- to automatically fold and stuff litera- munity Politics (Association of Liberal ture into envelopes has made their Councillors, 1980). production increasingly something Conclusion 4 The most notable of the names that for machines rather than volunteers. The Liberal Party, then the Alliance provides continuity from the Liberal The impact of this on the willingness and subsequently the Liberal Demo- Party through to the Liberal Demo- of volunteers therefore to move to crats all set out to remake British crats is Chris Rennard. However, help in a different constituency is an politics. With the post-2010 coalition there are others too, such as Tony unresearched area. government not yet run its course, it Greaves. 11 Conversation with the author, Lib- would be premature for historians to 5 This applies to some of the Liberal eral Democrat autumn federal con- cast a verdict on the extent to which Democrat campaign publications ference, September 2013. this aim was achieved. which have my own name on the 12 For example, the autumn 1996 federal However, what is already clear cover, such as the 2011 pamphlet conference in Brighton had presented is that the third party did remake co-authored with Shaun Roberts, to it a draft outline federal budget for

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 13 the liberal democrat approach to campaigning

1997, a draft outline campaign to Chris Rennard. people voted tactically. The add up to a coherent overall mes- development fund budget for 19 The Eastbourne by-election debate was fuelled in part by sage or image for the party. Chris 1997 and a by-election fund state- was also the first by-election to disagreements over how tacti- Rennard himself afterwards ment of income and expendi- make use of a relatively small cal voting should be precisely likened the process to being like ture for 1995. The 1997 federal sample constituency poll, of defined for the purposes of aca- having had all the right ingredi- budget envisaged expenditure of the sort that became a regular demic research. However, the ents for a meal but not a recipe. £1,487,300. The campaign devel- staple of key-seat campaigning party’s own polling in mar- 27 Implicit in that there was not opment fund was at £292,000 under Chris Rennard. American ginal seats consistently showed a specific post-election review and the previous year’s by-elec- political consultant Rick Ridder that being able to win over the which came to this conclu- tion fund had spent £149,909. had first introduced very limited supporters of the third-placed sion. However, it was conclu- In addition, there was a general polling to the party at the end party, along with a more gen- sion that Chris Rennard came election fund mentioned but with of the Richmond by-election eral message showing that the to and communicated to others, no details provided. Moreover, campaign, but Eastbourne saw party was able to win at all, was and subsequent budget decisions very little detail was provided for the first poll carried out early an extremely important part of flowed from this. either the campaign fund or the enough in the campaign to be building up a winning share of 28 This is a somewhat imprecise by-election fund, each only get- used to help make decisions the vote in such seats. term as many of the press team ting one side of summary figures. on messages and tactics. See 23 The earliest bar chart the author were formally employed by The mainstream federal budget, Rick Ridder, ‘How Margaret has located is on a Richmond, the Parliamentary Office of the by contrast, came with more Thatcher Advanced My Con- London leaflet from 1979 (http:// Liberal Democrats and reliant than a dozen pages of detail on sulting Career’, Campaigns & www.markpack.org.uk/35442/ on state funding, which limited expenditure in the previous year. Elections, May/June 2013. the-first-bar-chart-richmond- the range of activities they could 13 The different personalities of suc- 20 Systematic analysis over decades in-1979-possibly/). However, engage in. However, as far as the cessive party leaders also played of the volume of leaflets deliv- despite questioning several of the outside world was concerned a role. As the Helen Morrissey ered during election campaigns main campaigning experts from there was a group of press offic- report, Process and Culture within is absent from British politics. the 1970s, the answer to who ers based in the party’s HQ and the Liberal Democrats and recommen- However, there are plenty of started the use of bar charts, when this was seen – and in practice dations for change (2013) put it, ‘The fragments of evidence that sub- or where, has not been identified. acted as – the party’s press team. relatively relaxed management stantiate anecdotal claims about Anyone able to beat the 1979 date 29 Nick Clegg’s commitment dur- style of the party leader, Charles Liberal Democrat campaigns with an earlier example is most ing his successful run for party Kennedy, compared with Paddy featuring a tidal wave of paper welcome to contact the author on leader to double the number of Ashdown who has a military being pushed through letter [email protected]. the party’s MPs added to this background, also contributed to boxes. For example, the Nuf- 24 However, it should be noted that sense that what was needed was Chris Rennard’s power base.’ field general election series pub- in the first European elections to fight more seats to the tradi- 14 It was also reflected in similar lications for the 1960s and 1970s by PR, in 1999, Rennard him- tional intense template rather publications in the other main show how even in marginal self was a supporter of trying out than to change what the tem- parties too. seats two or three leaflets in total some thin, blanket activity. He plate contained. 15 This changed somewhere fol- were the norm during a general was instrumental in securing the 30 A defence of this dissipation lowing the Political Parties, election campaign. By the time funding to ensure that election of effort is that 2010 appeared Elections and Referendums Act of the Liberal Democrat elec- addresses via the Royal Mail’s to offer a once in a generation 2000 with its introduction of tion guides for the twenty-first election freepost facility went opportunity to win new seats. national expenditure controls. century, campaigns were being out to the whole electorate. This The party may have gambled 16 The most common route to advised to use that many leaflets produced little apparent ben- and lost by spreading its effort recruitment by the Campaigns simply on election day itself. efit for the party, and in future thin, but in the face of such an & Elections Department during 21 Chris Rennard, Winning Local European elections the party opportunity it is only hindsight the Chris Rennard period was to Elections (Association of Liberal increasingly moved towards that tells us going for the big first have been a winning elec- Councillors, January 1988). The concentrating its funds on more prize was the wrong move. tion agent. Even those who did central importance of leaflets is and better election addresses in 31 Some in the party blamed poor not follow this route, such as the revealed by the explanation of its stronger areas, with lower constituency polling for these author, usually had other local strategy in the book’s foreword: quality, cheaper and fewer elec- misjudgements. However, given campaigning credentials. ‘The book explains a strategy tion addresses elsewhere. the availability of data also from 17 This was particularly a feature for building a campaign. Not 25 This is based on the (unpub- other sources, simply blaming the of Jeremy Thorpe’s leadership, just what leaflets should say lished) lists of seats circulated polling is unfair on the pollsters. during which there was secretive but when, how and why – with within the Liberal Democrat 32 It did. After a competitive pitch fundraising for campaign activi- examples’. This quote illustrates Campaigns Department during process, the old EARS pro- ties with the wider party kept both the key features of Ren- this time. gramme was replaced not by a out of the loop. nard’s very successful approach 26 The party’s use of ten we pro- new product from the same team 18 For the early general elections in to winning elections and also pose/we oppose statements but by a product called Con- the Liberal Democrats’ history, a two of the features that most during the 2005 election was a nect, based on NGPVAN, a US separate general election organi- often attracted criticism – ‘strat- particular cause of debate. Each programme used by the Barack sation was created. Integrating egy’ meaning a campaign plan of the ten individual pairs had Obama presidential campaigns the general election campaign for a specific election and cam- been market researched heavily and by many other Democrat into the party’s usual operations paigning meaning leafleting. ahead of the election and each was campaigns as well as by the at subsequent general elections 22 As tactical voting became more generally popular both within Canadian Liberals. By 2014, only was seen across the party as a talked about in the 1980s and the party and with the public. a small number of local parties sensible reform – and one which early 1990s there was a lively However, many people felt that continued to use EARS. therefore also gave more power academic debate on how many the ten individual policies did not

14 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014