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The 1988 Leadership Campaign Following this year’s leadership election for the Liberal Democrats, Harriet Smith looks back to the party’s first such election.

At .pm on Thursday  July , Paddy scared to say what he thought, frequently got into trouble as a result of indiscreet conversa- Ashdown MP was declared as first leader of the tions with the press, and displayed boundless, newly-merged Social & Liberal Democrats. He won indefatigable energy. He was widely recognised .% of the votes cast in the ballot, while his only within and outwith the party as someone to   keep a (wary) eye on. opponent, MP, polled . %. Turnout was Alan Beith was a complete contrast — a % of a total membership of ,. quiet Methodist lay-preacher, he embodied tra- ditional Liberal values and beliefs and was seen The results of the election for the first Presi- as someone who would guard the Liberals’ po- dent of the party were also announced on the litical integrity. He was also a very strong Par- same day. The winner was , liamentary performer. Other potential candi- a senior figure in the former SDP, who beat dates talked about within the party and men- Des Wilson and Gwynoro Jones, both Liber- tioned by the press and media were Russell als. Although this result was closer than the Johnston, and Robert leadership, there was an inevitability to it — Maclennan, briefly leader of the SDP at the eleven years ago, there was a strong feeling that time of merger. In the end, however, they all the two most senior figures in the party should decided not to stand and Bruce became Chair represent both old parties, although this feel- of Ashdown’s campaign. , as out- ing was not always shared, particularly among going Liberal leader, and Jim Wallace, as Chief some ex-Liberals. Whip, stayed strictly neutral throughout the campaign. Merger and after The election was an all-member ballot us- ing the alternative vote system. This was a The build-up to the leadership campaign be- unique method for electing a leader among gan as soon as the party was formally merged the major political parties in the UK. In both in March  — David Steel had made it clear the Labour and Conservative parties, leaders that he did not want to continue as leader af- were (and still are) elected by MPs and other ter the struggles of the Alliance days, and David sections of the party using electoral colleges, Owen had gone off into his own wilderness. and in the case of the Conservatives, a com- At that stage in the party’s development, there plicated series of ballots. The one-member- were still serious divisions between former Lib- one-vote system of election used in the Lib- erals and former SDP members. eral Democrats’  leadership election at- Potential candidates for the leadership were tracted considerable attention from the press identified almost immediately. because of this. was already well-known in the party before he As with the  election, there was an ar- became an MP in , mainly as a result of tificial ‘cold war’ period before the serious elec- the Youth Charter he formulated as a result of tion period started, but as there was no mora- his experience of working with unemployed torium on campaigning before the official cam- youngsters. His unusual background (for a Lib- paign, the period was used for intensive be- eral) as a soldier and diplomat also attracted hind-the-scenes negotiations with potential attention. Once elected, he quickly made a supporters. Because of the recent merger, it was name for himself as someone who was not seen as essential for leadership candidates to

18 journal of liberal democrat history 24: autumn 1999 have support from ex-SDP members but with a few differences. In , This enabled Ashdown and Beith as well as ex-Liberals. Both teams hustings did not begin until after to articulate clearly their policies on also spent their time planning their nominations closed, and every mem- these areas, plan press releases and press and media strategies, the time- ber of the party received notification maximise publicity for their policy table for keynote speeches and hus- of the date of the hustings. Each hus- positions and their views of the par- tings, and general publicity. tings — there were seven — had a ty’s future. It was an effective way of Just before the real contest started, specific policy area as a theme to enabling the candidates to set out Alan Beith’s campaign got off to an which each candidate spoke, fol- their vision for policy development, unfortunate start when one of his lowed by general questions. The sub- then giving members a chance to ask supporters — reputedly Alex Carlile jects were: questions about their more general — released a list of fifteen reasons Local government/environment concerns. why Ashdown was not fit to be Constitutional reform In addition to the official hus- elected. Beith eventually condemned Health tings, other groups in the party held the letter after intervention from Economy and industry their own. There were Green and David Steel and other senior party Education Women’s hustings (on the same day), members, but the move had intro- Home Affairs and Association of Liberal Council- duced a sour note. Foreign Affairs and Defence lors’, Young Social & Liberal Demo- crats’ and Parliamentary Candidates’ The campaign begins conferences. Ashdown By the time nominations closed on  June , both candidates had attracted a strong list of supporters. Ashdown’s key lieutenants were Malcolm Bruce MP, Archy Kirkwood MP, Tim Clement-Jones, Des Wilson (deus ex machina) and Alan Leaman. Other MPs who sup- ported Ashdown included Matthew Taylor, Richard Livsey, Ronnie Fearn and . Tom McNally, Lindsay Granshaw, Anne Sofer, Denis Sullivan and David Marquand were his high-profile SDP backers, later joined by and . Beith’s team was chaired by Geraint Howells MP; supporters in- cluded , Alex Carlile MP, MP, Lord (George) Mackie, Richard Wain- wright, Annette Penhaligon, Andrew Gifford and Rev. Roger Roberts. The contrast between a radical, cross-party approach to the development of the new So- cial & Liberal Democrats, and the more traditional approach to per- petuating old-style Liberalism in the new party could not have been more marked. Ashdown launched his cam- paign in his constituency, Yeovil, on  June. Beith followed the next day, launching his effort from the cottage in where he was born. The elec- tion process was similar to this year’s, journal of liberal democrat history 24: autumn 1999 19 and Beith used these opportunities ALDC tradition — leaflet distribu- ment of political forces. This is a pity, to make speeches on the future of tion, telephone canvassing and, for since what we need is a fresh assem- the party and on policies relevant to the first time in a leadership elec- bly of new ideas.’ the audience. A never-to-be-forgot- tion, extensive use of the press and He argued throughout the cam- ten hustings was the Liberal Move- media. paign that a united, democratic, new ment’s in Wolverhampton, where a party should not be afraid to re-think large number of radical Liberals (in- policies where necessary in order to cluding members of Ashdown’s Political differences ‘make the message forward looking’ team) got together to make very A year before the election, Ashdown (Ashdown’s phrase). His underlying clear their hostile views about the had already begun to articulate the theme throughout was that choice former SDP. Ashdown was given a political creed which he espoused and individual freedoms were the hard time whereas Beith was wel- throughout his leadership, and which entitlement of every citizen, but that comed openly. eventually led to the development of with that entitlement must come In addition to formal and infor- the Joint Cabinet Committee with rights and responsibilities. New mal hustings, both candidates used New Labour in . He began an thinking should include looking at invitations from local associations as article in  with the words: ‘The the social security/benefits/welfare opportunities to put across their realignment of the Left in Britain has system, putting green politics at the views on various concerns. There always been seen in terms of realign- top of the agenda, and using the was also — as in , and in good market wherever possible to pro- mote prosperity. In , these were new, challenging ideas, and were a conscious effort to move forward from the ideas and policies of the Grimond era. This did not mean that the Grimond legacy was rejected; the opposite was true. Grimond’s clar- ity of thinking, new ways of look- ing at politics in his day, and his de- termination to succeed were crucial to the development of Ashdown’s political philosophy. He felt, however, that the new party was the ideal, and possibly only, opportunity to expand and redirect those ideas in keeping with a different political age. Eleven years ago, those ideas challenged conventional political wisdom; eleven years on, they have become common currency. Beith’s message was based on more traditional Liberal thinking. By nature a less radical figure than Ashdown, he appealed to members who felt threatened by the centrist, professional, non-inclusive approach of the former SDP. Although both candidates shared a fundamental be- lief in Liberal values, Beith harked back to the former Liberal Party as his vision for the future. Unlike Ashdown, he rejected the idea of overtaking Labour, saying, ‘The Leader should set the party the chal- lenge of developing policies for the next general election based on those values and on our traditional belief in achieving a free and fair society, creating a safer planet and sustain-

20 journal of liberal democrat history 24: autumn 1999 able future and decentralising and for the party’s short title symbolises devolving power.’ Differences in his attitude … Mr Ashdown, on the temperaments other hand, does not conceal his dis- like of harking back and is quite Relations with Labour This difference in approach and happy with “Democrats” … He is Ashdown wanted to lead a party that, character was picked up by the me- the risk-takers’ choice, and not much at that time, he genuinely believed dia. Ashdown was accused of run- is achieved in politics without risk.’ could become a natural alternative ning a slick American-style cam- A less contentious point of dif- government to a Labour Party then paign. One example of this was his ference between the candidates was in a state of chaos. Neil Kinnock was campaign Focus, which was distrib- their handwriting! In an effort to being battered on all sides by oppos- uted to all party members, and con- discredit Ashdown, Andrew Gifford ing forces within the Labour move- tained his formal manifesto. It was a (one of Beith’s lieutenants) had ex- ment, and their credibility had mixture of the traditional and the amples of their handwriting analysed reached an all-time low. In October new, using colour, clear pictures, a in the hope that the result would , Ashdown wrote: ‘… Labour specially designed letterhead and prove that Ashdown was completely was determined to conduct a major eye-catching graphics. Beith’s was a unsuited to be leader. Unfortunately rethink. It was also evident that they more traditional black-and-white for the Beith campaign, it backfired. intend to move back to the centre presentation that stressed his politi- The graphologist interpreted ground as fast as their little legs and cal experience and his long history Ashdown’s writing as being that of left-wing will allow. If they succeed, of commitment to the Liberal Party. a natural leader; Beith’s was that of a they will at last arrive at where we Ashdown was also accused of cautious, careful person who did not were twenty years ago. The Labour running ahead of the rest of his team, like taking risks and did not have Party is about to learn again, and taking decisions and then informing strong leadership potential. Some- painfully, that Thatcherism will not them of what he had decided, and how or other this information found be defeated by defending the past.’ of impromptu unscripted media its way into various broadsheet dia- He believed then that as long as briefings which left his supporters ries and tabloid gossip columns … Labour was vulnerable, there was a wondering what was coming next. It was ultimately Ashdown’s de- chance that a strong Liberal Demo- Beith ran a less flamboyant, more sire to take risks with the future that crat party could overtake them at the controlled campaign which took few ensured his success. His approach was polls. The key to achieving that was risks and emphasised continuity. more acceptable to the ex-SDP ele- to build what he described as an ef- The candidates’ widely differing ment (which at that time made up ficient, modern party of teamwork campaign styles and their basic points less than one-third of party mem- that could develop and promote of disagreement were epitomised by bers) and to those ex-Liberals who radical policies, and not be afraid to the debate over the party name. It feared that a traditional Liberal-style take on the new challenges posed by was an important and potentially di- leader would restrict the new par- new technology, globalisation and visive issue in the new party, unim- ty’s appeal to potential new mem- the communication revolution. He aginable though it is today. The long bers and voters. The press also played wanted to create an effective, coher- title was the cumbersome Social & a role in promoting the vision of a ent party which was capable of Liberal Democrats, which inevitably radical new party at a time when achieving real power. became ‘the Salads’. Ashdown was British politics was in a state of tur- Beith took a different view of happy to adopt the short title moil, with Thatcher increasingly be- how the party could achieve electoral ‘Democrats’, not a very popular view ing seen as a threat to the country’s success. At the launch of his campaign, among his campaign team, let alone future, the Labour Party at odds with he said: ‘I am not prepared to see the among the party as a whole. Beith itself, and the nationalists and Greens next general election handed on a — with foresight — preferred Lib- beginning to attract attention. plate to Mrs Thatcher or her succes- eral Democrats. This issue was to sor while we conduct a battle for sec- become one of Ashdown’s biggest 1988 and 1999 ond place with the Labour Party …’ problems at his first conference, and His style was to do things through continued to haunt him until the  compared the party in the traditional Liberal party finally (in ) became the  way; he contrasted his experience as Liberal Democrats. The campaign was very differ- Deputy Liberal Leader and former A Leader in the Times com- ent from the recent one. People then Chief Whip with Ashdown’s politi- mented: ‘Mr Beith stands very much were looking for something new and cal inexperience and impetuous ap- for the apostolic succession of the exciting, a leader who could drag the proach. The implication of this was old Liberal tradition. His expressed new party out of the doldrums cre- that Ashdown was the risky choice, regret at the adoption of the short ated by the Alliance. Ashdown came someone who was likely to take de- trade description “Democrats”, and along at exactly the right moment.  cisions without consulting first. his wish to rescue the word Liberal In , after eleven years of his lead- journal of liberal democrat history 24: autumn 1999 21 ership, most members were at a loss community poli- to know what they wanted. He had tics. It was based succeeded in leading the party to on classic ALC greater heights than for nearly sev- techniques, with enty years, had embraced a new style the added ingre- of politics in his relationship with dient of using the Labour and was without doubt one media to reach of the most dynamic politicians in the members Britain. The new leader would be (and therefore someone very different to him, and the general pub- someone who had a very hard act lic), something to follow. that had not The  electoral mechanism been seriously was less agile than in : the hus- tried in previ- tings process was more laborious and ous leadership began before nominations closed, elections. went on for much longer, and the Ashdown also way it was organised meant that can- used the con- didates had less opportunity to talk test as an op- in any detail about where they portunity to wanted to take the Lib Dems. This articulate his was compounded by having five political vi- candidates, only two of whom, sion on is- Kennedy and Hughes, were serious sues which contenders. Inevitably there was less politicians time for contenders to articulate were un- their visions, and the system whereby willing to each had to answer the same ques- tackle — tion in turn made it almost impos- for example sible for anyone to stand out, or to reform of express radically different views from the social security system. The cam- a year later feelings still ran the others. The debate about the par- paign was sometimes controversial, high. ty’s future and direction went round and frequently exhausting, but it was  Tim Clement-Jones was past Chair of in circles, with all the candidates ba- an exciting time, as were the some- the Liberal Party; Des Wilson was an out- standing campaigner for social justice is- sically agreeing about general poli- times fraught but interesting and ul- sues; Alan Leaman was co-author of the cies with few specifics mentioned. timately successful years that fol- Youth Charter and an active Young Lib- It was also more difficult to en- lowed. Where next? eral. Tom McNally (formerly Jim gage the media, who assumed it Callaghan’s speechwriter), Lindsay Harriet Smith was Paddy Ashdown’s would be a Kennedy walk-over un- Granshaw, Anne Sofer, Denis Robertson Press Officer during and after the  Sullivan and David Marquand were lead- til near the end when Hughes be- leadership election. ing lights in the SDP. gan to gain ground. The media’s  Richard Wainwright was a former Lib- main concern, unlike in  when Notes: eral MP, Annette Penhaligon was David they scented a genuine battle be-  The turnout in the  leadership elec- Penhaligon MP’s widow and an influ- tween differing philosophies, was on tion was .% of a membership of over ential figure in the Liberal Party in her   the Liberal Democrat relationship , . There will be many explanations own right, Andrew Gifford was previ- for this, but the most likely one is that ously David Steel’s Head of Office, and with Labour. The only candidate in , members were voting for the Rev. Roger Roberts was an eloquent, who might have stimulated a real new leader of a new party, and the con- influential, Welsh Liberal. debate about ‘the project’(as the Joint test was based on principles, ideas and  In the  hustings, each candidate was Cabinet Committee became the future of a party that was still reel- given five minutes to explain in general known), was Don Foster who ing from the wreckage of the Alliance. terms why they would be the best leader, By , the party was established and and then another five minutes to answer openly espoused closer links with successful, and the leadership election questions. After a short break, three or Labour, but he withdrew his candi- more of a quasi-presidential contest than four pre-prepared questions were asked dacy before nominations closed. a battle about new ideas. of all the candidates in turn. In , Ashdown and his team  At the general election the previous year,  The Liberal Movement was established took the opportunity in his cam- the Alliance had polled .% of the after merger to campaign for Liberalism votes, and had  MPs. The campaign within the SLD. It lasted for about four paign to exploit the Liberal ability had been characterised by difficult ex- years as an effective voice in the new to win hearts and minds through changes between Owen and Steel, and party.

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