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2012
Two Cheers for Burma’s Rigged Election
Neil A. Englehart Bowling Green State University, [email protected]
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Repository Citation Englehart, Neil A., "Two Cheers for Burma’s Rigged Election" (2012). Political Science Faculty Publications. 1. https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/poli_sci_pub/1
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Two Cheers for Burma’s Rigged Election
Abstract
Burma’s recent election was clearly not free and fair. However, it can also be seen as improving a uniquely unrepresentative government, creating greater pluralism, and institutionalizing differences within the ruling junta. Even the rigged election may have created opportunities for further opening in the future.
Keywords: Burma, Myanmar, elections, democracy, SPDC
Burma/Myanmar’s 2011 elections represented a great success for the country’s military rulers, producing the “right” results with no significant upsets. The military’s favored party won an overwhelming majority in Par- liament, and former generals and regime loyalists were elected to all the positions of power. Thein Sein, a member of the ruling junta, was elected president, and other members secured powerful positions. These results were achieved through an election process that was clearly not free and fair, and that was roundly condemned by international observers and exiled democ- racy activists. Critics have asserted that these rigged elections and the new Parliament will change nothing in the country, which has been a military dictatorship since 1962. They emphasize that the same people who dominated the junta before the election are still running the country. Despite the unfairness of the election, however, this view is short-sighted: it assumes that the institutions created by the country’s military rulers will function exactly as they wish, it fails to ask why they saw the need to hold elections in the first place, and it as- sumes that the elections and the new Parliament are indelibly stained with the original sin of their conception. This view is dangerous insofar as it prevents
Neil A. Englehart is Associate Professor of Political Science at Bowling Green State University in Bowling Green, Ohio, U.S.A. He wishes to thank Melissa K. Miller, participants in the October 2010 South East Asian Human Rights Network human rights conference in Bangkok, and an anonymous reviewer for the journal for their helpful comments. Email:
Asian Survey, Vol. 52, Number 4, pp. 666–686. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2012 by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permis- sion to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2012.52.4.666.
666 ENGLEHART / BURMA’S RIGGED ELECTION • 667 activists, scholars, and others concerned with governance in Burma/Myanmar from recognizing the changes the elections brought and discourages them from looking for opportunities in the new political context. Even undemo- cratic elections and imperfect democracy may represent an improvement in a sufficiently bad status quo and may also lead to consequences not anticipated by the authoritarian rulers who sponsored them. Tocqueville wrote long ago that “the most perilous moment for a bad government is one when it seeks to mend its ways.”1 The past 20 years have provided ample proof that the observation is still relevant.
The Rigged Election
The election process was skewed from beginning to end in order to ensure the victory of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which was created for the election by the junta, known as the State Peace and Develop- ment Council (SPDC). The USDP was allowed to evade, bend, or break the election rules, while the government at every turn obstructed, harassed, and intimidated opposition parties. Prior to the election, the junta created constitutional structures designed to perpetuate its influence, impeded the registration of opposition parties, and hampered their campaigns. During the election, it manipulated early voting, intimidated voters, and closed polling places in areas where the USDP was unlikely to win. After the election, it manipulated the counting of ballots, eliminating a number of opposition candidates who appeared initially to have won. Even the constitutional ground rules for the election were designed to fa- vor the junta and protect it from an adverse outcome. The Constitution was passed in a controversial referendum in 2008, after 20 years during which the country had no Constitution at all and the junta simply ruled by decree. The Constitution reserves one-quarter of the seats in both houses of the legislature for military representatives appointed by the commander-in-chief, who must be a serving military officer. The president is elected by an electoral college composed of three groups, one each from the upper and lower houses and one appointed by the commander-in-chief. Each group elects a vice presi- dent, and then all three jointly elect the president from among the three vice presidents. This guarantees that the commander-in-chief, who has substantial
1. Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, Stuart Gilbert, trans. (New York: Doubleday, 1955), p. 177. 668 • ASIAN SURVEY 52:4 powers in his own right, will at a minimum get to select one vice president. In addition, certain cabinet posts including the minister of defense and minister of home affairs are reserved for military officers. These provisions would be difficult to change: amending the Constitution requires a three-fourths vote in the legislature, effectively giving the military a veto if its appointed rep- resentatives vote as a bloc and they can obtain at least one additional vote.2 During the campaign, the SPDC violated its own laws through its support of the USDP, which is an offshoot of a government-organized social welfare organization, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA). Sometimes described as a government-organized non-governmental organiza- tion (GONGO), it is actually difficult to regard the USDA as an NGO of any kind because it has always drawn on government financing, personnel, office space, vehicles, and other assets. In addition, it has served as a mechanism for government suppression of opposition activities, most notoriously the 2003 Depayin Incident in which USDA-recruited thugs violently broke up a rally by opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.3 In practice, the USDA always served the purpose of a mass party in an authoritarian state, functioning as a mechanism of social control and mobilization for the government. The Political Parties Registration law prohibits the use of state property or funds for campaigning. Yet, the USDP, led by then-Prime Minister Thein Sein, benefited from the use of government-owned USDA offices, vehicles, services, and media, as well as the time of government employees. In an effort to reduce the flagrancy of these violations, the government in July 2010 turned all USDA property over to the USDP, in effect privatizing the organization.4 Party and candidate registration was made difficult and expensive, deter- ring many smaller parties. The Amsterdam-based NGO Transnational Insti- tute has calculated that to contest seats in all 498 constituencies represented in the national Parliament would cost US$250,000 in candidate registration fees alone, far beyond the means of nearly all parties.5 In addition, there was
2. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008. Yangon, Ministry of Informa- tion,
6. The government has not released official counts, forcing analysts to rely on reporting by foreign news agencies and exile groups. It appears that the USDP contested all but a handful of the 1,163 total seats in the upper and lower houses of the national Parliament and the 14 regional parliaments. The next largest party was the National Unity Party (NUP), which contested 999 seats altogether. BBC, “Burma Election: The Parties,”
Although parties were theoretically permitted to campaign, in practice numerous obstacles were placed in their way. For instance, police were pres- ent at opposition campaign events, which had a chilling effect because many potential supporters feared getting in trouble with government officials. The exile publication The Irrawaddy quoted a member of the SNDP: “As soon as a walkie-talkie beeps, the people know that intelligence personnel are among them, so they leave.”10 The government decided in September to close a number of polling places in areas where they could not secure the vote. Most notably, these were areas controlled by various ethnic insurgent groups. Many of these groups have ceasefire agreements with the government, but the military recognized that it would not be able to control many of the polling places in their territory; it was widely assumed that these areas would tend to vote for political parties fielded by minority communities.11 These various restrictions led many international observers to condemn the elections even in advance. Human Rights Watch, for instance, wrote that the election “will likely do little to alter the military’s continued po- litical dominance, albeit in ostensibly civilian guise, and a repressive state apparatus that will not change significantly.”12 Despite its ongoing policy of engagement with Burma/Myanmar, U.S. State Department spokespersons repeatedly said that the election would lack legitimacy and hinted that they would not recognize the election of Senior General Than Shwe as head of state.13 This eventuality never came to pass because he unexpectedly retired from all formal positions. The conduct of the election itself was also deeply problematic. Prior to the election, there had been reports of voter lists being inflated with phantom voters. Burmese election law allows voters to cast advance ballots if they will not be present in their home constituency on election day. These ballots are held and counted after the in-person ballots are cast on election day. False
10. Ba Kaung, “Fighting for Scraps.” 11. Htet Aung, “Questioning the EC Definition of ‘Free and Fair’,” Irrawaddy, September 17, 2010; Saw Yan Naing and Lawi Weng, “EC Afraid of Losing Poll in Ethnic Areas,” ibid., September 17, 2010; Agence France-Presse (AFP), “Myanmar Deprives ‘Millions’ of Vote in Ethnic Areas,” September 17, 2010; and BNI, Hobson’s Choice. 12. Human Rights Watch, Universal Periodic Review Submission: Myanmar (Burma),
14. “Vote List Fraud Exposed,” Irrawaddy, October 29, 2010; Htet Aung, “Advance Voting Abuses Rampant,” ibid., November 4, 2010; Associated Press (AP), “Complaints Mount on Eve of Elec- tions,” ibid., November 6, 2010; “Burmese Opposition Says Voter Being Cheated,” The Nation (Bangkok), November 7, 2010,
The Election as Progress
The real question is not whether the election was free and fair, which under the circumstances was always impossible; it is rather whether the election created opportunities that will make future progress more likely. Did it cre- ate conditions more favorable to the establishment of the rule of law and accountability than those that existed prior to the election? To make this judgment, one must appreciate the country’s uniquely weak position in terms of civil and political rights. After independence in 1948, there was a decade of democracy in Burma, dominated by local bosses affiliated with the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL). This was a time of corruption and civil war. AFPFL bosses were often given government administrative positions that enabled them to control their localities, making central government officials effectively power- less to intervene in local affairs. Exploiting their positions, these local bosses controlled smuggling, the black market, and other criminal activities. Often they captured control of police forces and military units as well as controlling ENGLEHART / BURMA’S RIGGED ELECTION • 673 militia groups and gangs of thugs. These sources of local power allowed them to dominate local politics, buying or intimidating voters and rigging elections. Despite regular elections, the quality of this democracy was poor, and the exercise of civil rights for most voters, particularly in rural areas, was severely curtailed.17 The situation resembled that described by O’Donnell in some Latin American countries, where local powers negate or coopt the au- thority of the national government. They create “systems of private power (or better, privatized power, since some of the main actors hold state positions), where some rights and guarantees of democratic legality have close to nil ef- fectiveness.” In such areas, “[T]he obliteration of legality deprives the regional power circuits, including those state agencies, of the public, lawful dimension without which the national state and the order it supports vanish.”18 This chaotic period ended with the 1962 coup that brought Ne Win to power. There has been no real democracy and little in the way of civil rights since that time. The only politics between the 1962 coup and the 2010 election was factional conflicts within the military and violent conflict with insurgent groups.19 After the Ne Win regime collapsed in 1988, the country was ruled by a military junta, initially called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), and then, after a reorganization in 1997, the SPDC. There was no Constitution for a full 20 years between 1988 and the 2008 referendum, and no way to hold the political leadership accountable for its actions. Decades of military rule have been disastrous for the country. Purging and undermining the civil service and judiciary in order to neutralize them as sources of potential opposition, the military has exacerbated problems of cor- ruption and incompetence, leading to an inability to deliver basic services and make coherent policy. Tax collections have plummeted from an already low 10% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the 1970s to 2% in 2001, according
17. See John Cady, A History of Modern Burma (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958); Manning Nash, “Party Building in Upper Burma,” Asian Survey 3:4 (April 1963); Melford Spiro, Anthropological Other or Burmese Brother? Studies in Cultural Analysis (New Brunswick, N. J.: Trans- action Publishers, 1992); Balwant Singh, Independence and Democracy in Burma, 1945–1952: The Turbulent Years (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, 1993); Mary P. Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003); Englehart, “Is Regime Change Enough for Burma?” 18. Guillermo O’Donnell, “On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Post-Communist Countries,” World Development 21:8 (August 1993), p. 1359. 19. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Power and Factional Struggles in Post-Independence Burmese Govern- ments,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 39:1 (February 2008). 674 • ASIAN SURVEY 52:4 to the most recent reliable data available; even the World Bank considers the tax collections alarmingly low.20 At the same time, the military has made itself indispensable, as seconded officers educated in the military’s separate educational system provide the most competent and well-trained administra- tors in the crippled civil service. The SLORC held an election in 1990, which was won in a landslide by the NLD under Aung San Suu Kyi despite SLORC harassment and government favoritism for its own NUP.21 The SLORC refused to recognize the results of the election, did not convene Parliament, arrested many elected members of Parliament (MPs), and placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest. The military then ruled by decree for over 20 years, unchecked by any constitu- tion, legislature, judicial system, or even a civil service capable of informing or moderating its policies. Sanctions by the U.S. and E.U. were ineffective at bringing about change or even seriously handicapping the regime.22 The economy continued to stagnate because of inept policymaking and insecure property rights, but new natural gas revenues improved the regime’s balance sheet. Neighboring countries, including China, India, and the ASEAN (As- sociation of Southeast Asian Nations) states have been happy to trade with Burma/Myanmar despite the sanctions. In this context, it is remarkable that the military sought any change at all. Before the election, it was in a position of total dominance. Prior to the 2008 constitutional referendum—the product of a process begun in 1990 and stalled for over a decade—there was no legal basis to challenge any govern- ment activity whatsoever, and no organized group was able to do so. There was no Constitution, no legislature, no political parties, and the judiciary and civil service were corrupt and subservient.
20. World Bank, Myanmar: Policies for Sustaining Economic Reform (Washington, D.C.), October 16, 1995; see also Englehart, “Is Regime Change Enough for Burma?” 21. The NLD won 59.9% of the vote in the 1990 election, while the NUP won only 21.2%. The highly disproportionate SMPD (single member plurality district) electoral system translated this into 392 NLD seats in the 492-seat legislature, with only 10 going to the NUP. See James F. Guyot, “Myanmar in 1990: The Unconsummated Election,”Asian Survey 31:2 (February 1991), p. 210. This extremely disproportionate result may have contributed to the SLORC’s decision not to recognize the election results. The SMPD was retained for the 2010 election, in which similar disproportional- ity appears to have helped the USDP. Since raw vote counts have not been released, however, it is impossible to determine exactly how disproportional those results were. 22. Morton B. Pedersen, Promoting Human Rights in Burma: A Critique of Western Sanctions Policy (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008). ENGLEHART / BURMA’S RIGGED ELECTION • 675
At the same time, the regime was dangerously alienated from society. The military had formerly been an avenue for social mobility, but the officer corps has assumed an increasingly caste-like character, with ex- tensive intermarriage. Officers’ children receive a special education and other benefits. Promotion from the lower ranks has become unusual. In the meantime, the rank and file has been poorly paid and badly treated, lowering morale.23 Furthermore, the country’s intelligence apparatus appears to be less ef- fective since the 2004 purge of former security chief Khin Nyunt. Most important, the 2007 Buddhist monk-led protests, the so-called “Saffron Revolution,” illustrated how far the intelligence apparatus had deteriorated: the dissent caught the government completely by surprise, and it resorted to extensive arrests and torture to find the ringleaders.24 The 2007 dem- onstrations shocked the junta, not just because they signaled widespread opposition but also because their vehemence posed a spiritual threat. Many members of the junta are notoriously superstitious and subscribe to an interpretation of Buddhism that suggests that sufficient generosity to the Buddhist clergy can erase the negative karmic effects of officials’ sins. If the clergy refuse to cooperate by accepting donations and performing the ap- propriate ceremonies, however, the generals will be condemned to exhaust their spiritual power (pon) in this life and suffer for their actions in future lives.25 The “Saffron Revolution” was therefore more profoundly threaten- ing for many members of the junta and their families than purely political demonstrations would have been. Despite their dominance, the military leaders of Burma/Myanmar see an uncertain future; the political reforms they have undertaken are intended to secure that future while surrendering as little real power as possible. Yet, it is unclear whether they will be able to control the new institutions they have created, which are radically different than the system of poorly institutional- ized but total authority that preceded them.
23. Andrew Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces: Power without Glory (Norwalk, Conn.: Eastbridge Books, 2002). 24. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Challenging the Authoritarian State: Buddhist Monks and Peaceful Protest in Burma,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 32 (Winter 2008). 25. Bruce Matthews, “The Present Fortune of Tradition-Bound Authoritarianism in Myanmar,” Pacific Affairs71:1 (Spring 1998); Ingrid Jordt, Burma’s Mass Lay Meditation Movement: Buddhism and the Cultural Construction of Power (Athens, Oh.: Ohio University Press, 2007). 676 • ASIAN SURVEY 52:4
Changes in the Status Quo
The 2008 Constitution and the 2010 election process changed the status quo markedly. They forced the SPDC to permit the formation of opposition political parties while creating institutionalized divisions within the regime. These changes have increased the pluralism of the political system, which prior to the election was effectively nil. Furthermore, the military leadership will have to work through a (mostly) elected legislature, rather than ruling by decree. These changes set in motion new dynamics that the regime may not be able to control.26 The election process compelled the junta to permit the legal formation and operation of opposition political parties. Since 1990, the only opposi- tion party that functioned at all was the NLD, which was subject to greater or lesser restrictions according to the whim of the SPDC. The NLD was banned as a political party in the run-up to the 2010 election because of its refusal to register for the election. The decision to boycott the election was controversial even within the NLD, and ultimately prompted a split within the party. A new party, the National Democratic Force (NDF) was formed by renegade NLD leaders who disagreed with Aung San Suu Kyi and wished to contest the election. In the end, it emerged as the fourth largest party in the People’s Assembly, albeit with only eight seats, all from Yangon (see Table 1). A number of other opposition parties sprang up to contest the election, a hopeful sign given the desperate need for rejuvenation of the opposition leadership and the decrepit state of the NLD even before it was banned.27
26. Note that the structure of the new political system could potentially create checks within the government, although under current conditions it seems unlikely that this potential will be real- ized. There are two houses of Parliament, which are largely coequal. In the lower house, or People’s (Pyithu) Assembly, seats are allocated by population, while in the upper house, or Nationalities (Amyotha) Assembly, they are allocated in equal numbers to each state or region. Both must pass legislation for it to become law; if one house passes a bill and the other does not, they sit in a joint session to break the deadlock, with the larger People’s Assembly carrying more weight because it has nearly twice as many members as the Nationalities Assembly (Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Article 95 [b]). In practice, however, the newly elected state and regional assemblies seem to be taking a more active role in defining relations with the central government than the Nationalities Assembly. Surprisingly, the Constitution does not provide for a presidential veto: the president can return bills to Parliament for reconsideration, but Parliament can affirm them with a simple majority vote (ibid., Article 106). 27. The NLD had been unable to recruit new members or elect new officers for years until the preparations for the election began. As a result, its Central Committee consisted almost entirely of octogenarians and was