Bowling Green State University ScholarWorks@BGSU Political Science Faculty Publications Political Science 2012 Two Cheers for Burma’s Rigged Election Neil A. Englehart Bowling Green State University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/poli_sci_pub Part of the Political Science Commons Repository Citation Englehart, Neil A., "Two Cheers for Burma’s Rigged Election" (2012). Political Science Faculty Publications. 1. https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/poli_sci_pub/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at ScholarWorks@BGSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@BGSU. NEIL A. EnGLEHART Two Cheers for Burma’s Rigged Election ABSTRacT Burma’s recent election was clearly not free and fair. However, it can also be seen as improving a uniquely unrepresentative government, creating greater pluralism, and institutionalizing differences within the ruling junta. Even the rigged election may have created opportunities for further opening in the future. KEYWORDS: Burma, Myanmar, elections, democracy, SPDC Burma/Myanmar’s 2011 elections represented a great success for the country’s military rulers, producing the “right” results with no significant upsets. The military’s favored party won an overwhelming majority in Par- liament, and former generals and regime loyalists were elected to all the positions of power. Thein Sein, a member of the ruling junta, was elected president, and other members secured powerful positions. These results were achieved through an election process that was clearly not free and fair, and that was roundly condemned by international observers and exiled democ- racy activists. Critics have asserted that these rigged elections and the new Parliament will change nothing in the country, which has been a military dictatorship since 1962. They emphasize that the same people who dominated the junta before the election are still running the country. Despite the unfairness of the election, however, this view is short-sighted: it assumes that the institutions created by the country’s military rulers will function exactly as they wish, it fails to ask why they saw the need to hold elections in the first place, and it as- sumes that the elections and the new Parliament are indelibly stained with the original sin of their conception. This view is dangerous insofar as it prevents Neil A. Englehart is Associate Professor of Political Science at Bowling Green State University in Bowling Green, Ohio, U.S.A. He wishes to thank Melissa K. Miller, participants in the October 2010 South East Asian Human Rights Network human rights conference in Bangkok, and an anonymous reviewer for the journal for their helpful comments. Email: <[email protected]>. Asian Survey, Vol. 52, Number 4, pp. 666–686. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2012 by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permis- sion to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2012.52.4.666. 666 ENGLEHART / BURMA’S RIGGED ELECTION • 667 activists, scholars, and others concerned with governance in Burma/Myanmar from recognizing the changes the elections brought and discourages them from looking for opportunities in the new political context. Even undemo- cratic elections and imperfect democracy may represent an improvement in a sufficiently bad status quo and may also lead to consequences not anticipated by the authoritarian rulers who sponsored them. Tocqueville wrote long ago that “the most perilous moment for a bad government is one when it seeks to mend its ways.”1 The past 20 years have provided ample proof that the observation is still relevant. THE RIGGED ELECTION The election process was skewed from beginning to end in order to ensure the victory of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which was created for the election by the junta, known as the State Peace and Develop- ment Council (SPDC). The USDP was allowed to evade, bend, or break the election rules, while the government at every turn obstructed, harassed, and intimidated opposition parties. Prior to the election, the junta created constitutional structures designed to perpetuate its influence, impeded the registration of opposition parties, and hampered their campaigns. During the election, it manipulated early voting, intimidated voters, and closed polling places in areas where the USDP was unlikely to win. After the election, it manipulated the counting of ballots, eliminating a number of opposition candidates who appeared initially to have won. Even the constitutional ground rules for the election were designed to fa- vor the junta and protect it from an adverse outcome. The Constitution was passed in a controversial referendum in 2008, after 20 years during which the country had no Constitution at all and the junta simply ruled by decree. The Constitution reserves one-quarter of the seats in both houses of the legislature for military representatives appointed by the commander-in-chief, who must be a serving military officer. The president is elected by an electoral college composed of three groups, one each from the upper and lower houses and one appointed by the commander-in-chief. Each group elects a vice presi- dent, and then all three jointly elect the president from among the three vice presidents. This guarantees that the commander-in-chief, who has substantial 1. Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, Stuart Gilbert, trans. (New York: Doubleday, 1955), p. 177. 668 • ASIAN SURVEY 52:4 powers in his own right, will at a minimum get to select one vice president. In addition, certain cabinet posts including the minister of defense and minister of home affairs are reserved for military officers. These provisions would be difficult to change: amending the Constitution requires a three-fourths vote in the legislature, effectively giving the military a veto if its appointed rep- resentatives vote as a bloc and they can obtain at least one additional vote.2 During the campaign, the SPDC violated its own laws through its support of the USDP, which is an offshoot of a government-organized social welfare organization, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA). Sometimes described as a government-organized non-governmental organiza- tion (GONGO), it is actually difficult to regard the USDA as an NGO of any kind because it has always drawn on government financing, personnel, office space, vehicles, and other assets. In addition, it has served as a mechanism for government suppression of opposition activities, most notoriously the 2003 Depayin Incident in which USDA-recruited thugs violently broke up a rally by opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.3 In practice, the USDA always served the purpose of a mass party in an authoritarian state, functioning as a mechanism of social control and mobilization for the government. The Political Parties Registration law prohibits the use of state property or funds for campaigning. Yet, the USDP, led by then-Prime Minister Thein Sein, benefited from the use of government-owned USDA offices, vehicles, services, and media, as well as the time of government employees. In an effort to reduce the flagrancy of these violations, the government in July 2010 turned all USDA property over to the USDP, in effect privatizing the organization.4 Party and candidate registration was made difficult and expensive, deter- ring many smaller parties. The Amsterdam-based NGO Transnational Insti- tute has calculated that to contest seats in all 498 constituencies represented in the national Parliament would cost US$250,000 in candidate registration fees alone, far beyond the means of nearly all parties.5 In addition, there was 2. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008. Yangon, Ministry of Informa- tion, <http://www.burmalibrary.org/doc5/Myanmar_Constitution_2008-en.pdf>. 3. Network for Democracy and Development (NDD), The White Shirts: How the USDA Will Become the New Face of Burma’s Dictatorship (Mae Sariang, Thailand: NDD, 2006). 4. Nayee Lin Latt, “Regime Separates Assets of the USDA and USDP,” Irrawaddy (found at <http://www.irrawaddy.com>), July 8, 2010; Ba Kaung, “Fighting for Scraps,” ibid., August 1, 2010. 5. Transnational Institute, Burma’s 2010 Elections: Challenges and Opportunities (Amsterdam: International Institute, 2010), p. 4. ENGLEHART / BURMA’S RIGGED ELECTION • 669 a total of 665 seats up for election in the 14 state legislatures. The USDP was the only party able to contest nearly all of these 1,163 constituencies in both the national and local legislatures.6 The second largest party, the NUP, was able to contest 999 seats, about 85% of the total. The next largest parties, the National Democratic Front (NDF) and Shan National Development Party (SNDP) were each only able to contest less than 15% of the seats. An ad- ditional deterrent was the significant fine imposed on parties that contested the election but did not win any seats. The approval of party registration ap- plications was slow, and some were denied for apparently arbitrary reasons.7 Because of these obstacles and a conviction that the elections would not be free and fair, Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), the leading opposition party and winner of the annulled 1990 election, decided not to register or contest the election.8 Particularly problematic for the NLD was a requirement that parties not have convicted criminals as members. This would have required the expulsion of Aung San Suu Kyi, who was con- victed for violating the terms of her house arrest when she briefly sheltered an American who, in a bizarre incident, swam to her house. The NLD also would have had to expel other party leaders who have been convicted of political crimes.9 The government also harassed opposition parties and candidates during the campaign.