REALITY OF PAKISTAN’s COUNTER AIR STRIKE OF 27 FEB 2019 A DEMONSTRATION THAT FAILED BY GP CAPT GD SHARMA, VSM (RETD), SENIOR FELLOW CENJOWS

Prologue

1. After 14 Feb 19 Suicide attack by a Jaish-e- Mohammed (JeM) operative in which 40 CRPF troops lost their lives, Indian Government promised retribution at a time of its choosing. Pakistan expecting a major retaliation by the Indian forces mobilised its troops along the Eastern border/ LoC. Indian Air Force with a daring predawn pre-emptive Miarge 2000 strike achieved a tactical surprise by hitting at Balakot beyond Pakistan Occupied (POK), one of its major terrorist training camp in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, located nearly 70+ km from (LoC). Pakistan retaliated the very next day (27 Feb 19) between 0900- 1000 hrs with a massive air strike with reported 20+aircraft. The strikes were estimated to comprise eleven F16 ac and balance Mirage III/Vs and JF 17s. The Pak counter strike was unexpectedly early but, it did not catch the Indian air defences unaware, as forces were on high state alert after Pulwama attack. In fact, Pakistani response too was expected after its military and political leadership repeatedly told that it too would respond if India acts militarily in response to 14 Feb JeM suicide mission at Pulwama.

2. Possibly some constituents of the strike (three F16s) violated the Indian Air Space by 7 -10km in /Naushera area of and Kashmir and were intercepted by a Bison air defence CAP ex . In the ensuing air combat, one Bison flown by Wg Cdr Abhinandan Varthman shot down an F 16 and then ejected with in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) after his own aircraft was hit by Pakistani fire. He was repatriated from Atari Indo- Pak border after two days despite stiff local opposition. Ignoring the opposition, Pakistani PM announced the repatriation of Wg Cdr Abhnandan in Pakistani Parliament as a peace gesture

Some Questions.

3. Pakistani Air strike during the morning hours on 27 Feb 2019 have raised some questions which need detailed examination:-

(a) Whether Pak air strike on the very next day after Indian Pre-emptive air strike at Balakot on 26 Feb 19 was really an answer to Indian bold strike as it failed to damage any installation/ facility on the Indian side and even lost its F-16 a superior aircraft to a third generation Bison?

(b) What was the objective of Pakistani strike mission? Did it achieve it?

(c) Why was strike planned the very next day (27 Feb 19) between 0900- 1000h at medium level?

(d) Why did Pakistan repatriate Wg Cdr Abhinandan Varthman without extracting any advantage in return opposing a local clamour for the retribution?

Prevailing Environment Then!

4. One needs to consider the rightness of Pakistan response in the light of the prevailing environment which severely limited Pakistani capability to respond:-

(a) Tough Stance of Indian Leadership. Indian leadership vowed to respond to Pulwama strike at an appropriate time. Accordingly, both Indian and Pakistani armed Forces were expected to be on a high state alert after the Pulwama attack.

(b) Pakistan in Severe Economic Crunch. Facing severe economic crunch Pakistan could ill afford any military escalation with India. Along with the mounting debts, ,the country’s foreign reserves had fallen to USD 8.12 billion, which was below the minimum level that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) prescribe and reserve was just sufficient for seven weeks of imports. Prime Minister Imran Khan visited , and the UAE to arrange emergency loans to avoid a looming loan default. Pakistan has secured cumulative USD 14.5 billion worth of commitments from these three countries.1

(c) Pakistani Leadership’s Deceptive Card. Pakistan was anxious about the possibility of Indian military response to Pulwama terror strike as before. Its leadership repeatedly warned India of escalation and that it would positively respond to Indian strike if any.

(d) International Consensus on Terrorism. Of late there is consensus internationally against terrorism and Pakistan’s role as sponsor of terror. Financial Action Task force (FATF) a non-official grouping has kept Pakistan in Grey list and on notice of being black listed unless it does substantial to curb terrorism. Hence, Pakistan is eager to show some positive action in this regard lest it will create difficulty in procuring future loans from international monetary bodies such as IMF and World Bank.

(e) India’s Right of Self Defence. India had expressed its resolve to act against the terror in conformity to its right of self defence under the UN Charter. US, and Israel supported India’s right of self-defence. China and too showed understanding of the Indian concern but, were non- committal in response.

(f) Will Pakistan Abandon its Unconventional War? Despite being internationally isolated to the issue of terrorism, Pakistan still seems in no mood to abandon its unconventional war of bleeding India and Its PM Imran Khan and his government let it known of their continued support to the Kashmir terrorism.

(g) No More Strategic Restraint. After 2016 Uri attack, India has shed its policy of strategic restraint and is now following a new norm of zero tolerance to terror and would respond to the terror groups even in Pakistan if attacked. After IAF Balakot strike, the reality of new norm has probably sunk in mind of Pakistani leadership. Hopefully, this will result in deterring them from being sponsor of Kashmiri terrorism.

Pakistani Response on 27 Feb 19.

5. Was Pakistan in Position to Escalate? From the foregoing circumstances it quite clearly establishes that Pakistan was not in position to escalate and risk any armed conflict with India .Its leadership repeatedly told Indian leadership to desist from taking any provocative action after the Pulwama attack, or else Pakistan would have no option but to escalate and respond. The main reason for this was

1https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/china-to-provide-usd-2-5- billion-loan-to-pakistan-to-boost-foreign-cash-reserves/articleshow/67805085.cms the impression created by Pakistani army amongst its gullible masses of its strength and invincibility. It therefore wanted to avoid landing in an irretrievable situation of proving its strength. It is for this reason Pakistan never admitted to the occurrence of the 2016 surgical strike.

6. Failed Demonstration! On the morning of 27 Feb 19, just one day later than pre-emptive Indian strike on the JeM training camp, Pakistan Air Force(PAF) launched massive air strikes in three packages between 0900h to 1000h. As emerged from the IAF media briefing and open source material that strikes were estimated to comprise 20+ aircraft with 11 F16’s , rest Mirage III’s /V’s and JF 17’s. Here again it deceived its masses. It tried to mis-represent that it carried out a most audacious strike on Indian positions. But the reality was that the strike was executed at the medium level (height band reported in the media 7000’-10000’). Then, only three F-16 from the package of 11 F-16 ac violated Indian air space in Rajouri/ Naushera sector and were challenged by a Indian air defence CAPs of Bison (upgraded MiG 21) and pair of SU30’s. F-16’ were chased by a pair of Bison and the Pakistani returned with minus one F-16 which was shot down by one lower generation Bison.

7. F-16’s failed to deliver their arsenal (Laser guided bombs) at any of the target of significance which was just ejected in open areas in the vicinity of army installations. Other F-16’s from the package stayed on their side in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and are known to have fired several Advance Medium Range Air to Air Missiles (AMRAAM) Beyond visual range missiles but, all except the one which probably hit Bison flown by Wg Cdr Varthman, missed their mark. F- 16’s fearing Indian SU30’s never ventured to violate the LOC. They fired AMRAAM from the maximum ranges and were made ineffective by evasive manoeuvring of SU 30’s and their use of Electronic Counter Counter measures (ECCM).

8. The other two packages comprising Mirage III and Mirage V and JF 17’s on being challenged by Indian Mirage 2000 pair, also stayed with in Pakistan air space/POK and turned back without carrying out any significant activity.

Indian Response to Pakistani Air Strike.

9. A Muscular Response. After the Pulwama attack Indian armed forces in the sector opposite Pakistan/ POK were on high alert with Bison air borne CAP at Srinagar and SU30 CAP in the general area East of Jammu. All Air Defence sensors and AWACS were maintaining a heighted watch for any misadventure from Pakistan. Pakistani strike at medium level was picked up by sensors with warning time of 10 -12 min. This early warning gave an opportunity to Indian air defences to react appropriately which resulted in a successful interception of F-16’s. In all, IAF scrambled 6 Bison aircraft four SU30’s and two Mirage 2000 ac.

ANALYSIS

Pakistan’s Primary Objective.

10. Why Pakistan Responded the Very Next Day of Indian Strike? It appears that Pakistan did not want escalation of the situation with India. Firstly, they could ill afford any armed conflict with the economic crunch faced by them. Secondly, Pakistan is aware that they are no match to India in the conventional conflict but were encouraged by false bravado and with intention to misguide their masses, the strike was launched as demonstration of will and not to attack Indian military and civil assets. This impression gets reflected by the nature of their strike and its results. If you don’t have to attack, there is no advantage in delaying the response. This was the reason to launch the strike the very next day after the Balakot strike by Indian Air Force.

11. Questionable Strike Planning. From the available data, it appears that Pakistan planned strikes at 7000-10000’. Clearly this had denied them of stealth approach and also gave Indian Air defence a warning time of 10-12min. As against this, even though we have good low level cover with AWACS/AEW and tethered radars, strikes planned at lower levels, could have remained undetected for a larger portion of their flight.

12. Strike Lacked of Surprise. From available open source data Pakistan had launched the strike at the Indian AWACS change over time which means that they were aware of our alert status hence, it is more perplexing as why strike approached Indian air space at medium level unless it was an intentional act. Planning of strike at 9000h-1000h is militarily illogical as strikes are planned at a time to achieve surprise. At late morning hours, air defences could be expected to be at their best performance augmented by visual observers to detect flights which escape the radar detection.

13. Profile and its Timing Intentional? The timings and the flight profile of the strike suggests that Pakistan Air Force wanted the flight to be detected probably with an aim to draw Indian fighters to combat and cause attrition as a retribution for Balakot strike. In this endeavour it failed as it lost its own superior aircraft to a lower generation interceptor.

14. Objective not to Hit the Targets on the Ground. Only three F-16 attempted shallow ingress of less than 10 km and then exited with Bison on the tail. There was no damage to any installation in India as arsenal was dropped at most unlikely places in the field. According to informed sources, the area is densely populated with military installations and personnel. Missing a target is difficult unless the intention is not to hit. The only inference one can draw either poor state of training or intended drop of arsenal was not meant to hit any military or civilian target. This was supported later by the Pakistani leadership, who said that they merely showed their capacity to react hence, did not want to hit any military or civil target. Unlike India which scrupulously avoided military and civilian targets and only struck on the Jaish training camp, what option Pakistani strike had if their intention was to avoid civil and military targets?

15. No Use of EW. There is also no evidence of Pakistani strike employing any electronic warfare measures which could have indicated Pakistani seriousness in attacking target systems in India or when being intercepted.

16. Early Repatriation of the Pilot. The third reason that supports the view of Pakistan’s reluctance to escalate the military situation was hurried announcement on 28 Feb 2019 by Prime Minister of Pakistan to repatriate Wg Cdr Abhinandan Varthman as a goodwill gesture in the Pakistani parliament. He was eventually repatriated on 01March 2019 despite significant opposition with in Pakistan. However, It is also reported in the media that IAF pilot’s release took place after some behind the scene manoeuvring by the international community especially, US, UAE and Saudi Arabia.

17. Assessed Objective of the Event. In final analysis, it is evidently clear from the precarious Pakistan’s financial situation, Pakistan in no case could afford any armed conflict with India. At the same time, it did not want to present an impression to its masses that it has chickened out of the prospective conflict, hence it carried out a massive strike at medium level in response to Indian strike to showcase its military prowess yet at the same time maintain safe military situation with India.

18. Our Strategy Has Deterrence Value. Despite being castigated for Pakistani support to the terror groups, Pakistan will not change its policy of active interference in Jammu and Kashmir. But our consistent proactive strong responses have the potential to deter Pakistan to mend its ways. This indication emanates from recent Prime Minister Imran Khan’s reaction in Iran which too lost 40 Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRG) to a suicide attack. Iran had also threatened Pakistan to conduct Indian type military response. It seems that financial strangulation along with neighbours adopting a punitive approach to terror can bring change in Pakistan’s behaviour of soft peddling terror groups against its neighbours. Disclaimer: Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of CENJOWS.