Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 2 Global Taiwan Brief Vol 5. Issue1 2 Fortnightly Review Russell Hsiao Taiwan’s Pacific Stronghold in Palau I-wei Jennifer Chang The Necessity of Reestablishing Port Calls to Taiwan Robert D. Eldridge The Case for a US-Taiwan Bilateral Trade Agreement Amy Huang The Coronavirus Outbreak Spotlights Taiwan’s Exclusion from International Organizations Michael Mazza Forthnightly Review The Global Taiwan Brief is a By: Russell Hsiao bi-weekly publication released every other Wednesday and pro- Russell Hsiao is the executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) and editor-in-chief of the vides insight into the latest news Global Taiwan Brief. on Taiwan. Will KMT Reform after the 2020 General Elections? Editor-in-Chief Russell Hsiao In the aftermath of the Nationalist Party’s (Kuomintang or KMT) second-consecutive de- Staff Editor feat in the 2020 presidential election and its lackluster performance in the Legislative Katherine Schultz Yuan election on January 11, Chairman Wu Den-yih (吳敦義, b. 1948) and other senior party officials resigned en masse. The party’s next chairman and central standing com- The views and opinions expressed in these articles are those of the mittee (中常會) members will be elected on March 7. At the time of this writing, four authors and do not necessarily re- candidates have thrown in their hats to be the ailing party’s next chairman. There are flect the official policy or position several potential candidates but only a few have formally declared their candidacy thus of the Global Taiwan Institute. far. Those who have formally declared include Chang Ya-chung (張亞中, b. 1954), Wu Chih-chang (武之璋, b. 1942), Hau Lung-bin (郝龍斌, b. 1952), and Johnny Chiang (江 To view web sources cited in the 啟臣, b. 1972). Other possible and non-exhaustive list of candidates reported on in the published papers (underlined in local media include KMT Tainan chapter head Hsieh Lung-chieh (謝龍介, b. 1961), Kaoh- printed text), visit http://global- taiwan.org/2020/01/vol-5-is- siung Mayor Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜, b. 1957), New Taipei City Mayor Hou You-yi (侯友宜, sue-2/. b. 1957), and Legislator Chiang Wan-an (蔣萬安, b. 1978). After the devastating 2016 general elections, the KMTflirted with a shift towards a more Global Taiwan Institute 1836 Jefferson Place NW, conservative and radical orientation by electing their botched 2016 presidential candi- Washington DC 20036 date, Hung Shiu-chu (洪秀柱, b. 1948). Four months into her presidential run and a little [email protected] over three months before the 2016 elections, Hung was replaced by Eric Chu in an ex- traordinary party election that saw her benched in a last-minute attempt to salvage the To subscribe, visit election. After Chu and the KMT’s categorical defeat in the presidential and legislative http://globaltaiwan.org/sub- elections, Chu resigned as chairman of the KMT. The vacancy paved the way for support- scribe/. ers of the dismissed presidential candidate to hoist Hung up to the helm of the party in © 2020 · Global Taiwan Institute a provisional election that saw Hung defeating her closest opponent by a decisive 23 Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 2 2 percent. the KMT that would like to be the ‘Taiwan Kuo- mintang,’ not the ‘China Kuomintang’—that may Wu Den-yih’s victory as party chairman in May 2017 be a bridge too far in the immediate future. But with 52.24 percent of the votes appeared to point to they have to figure out their messaging and their the party’s return to a mainstream orientation and a policies, and, of course, fundamentally have to victory for the “establishment wing” of the KMT that examine what their policies going to be going had been withering. According to Lauren Dickey in ref- forward towards Beijing. Are they simply going erence to Wu’s victory, “his win is an important turning to stick with the ‘1992 Consensus’ or are they go- point as the opposition party seeks to redefine itself. ing to come up with new policies? If they do not In terms of cross-Strait relations, it suggests a return revise their policies going forward, then I doubt to an outlook far more moderate than blatant support that they will be able to win support. The most for unification.” A native Taiwanese, Hakka-minority, important thing is [sic] KMT reform and genera- and part of the party’s local faction (本土派), Wu was tional change.” ostensibly elected because he was seen as capable of speaking to and playing to these political advantages The KMT’s Central Standing Committee—the real locus and appeal to a general audience—especially com- of the party’s decision making—will be elected on the pared to Hung. At first glance, the party’s sweeping same date as the party chairman. According to the Par- electoral success in the 2018 local elections suggest- ty Constitution, the Central Standing Committee con- ed that Wu could be a strong contender as the par- sists of 39 members, 32 of whom are elected by party ty’s presidential candidate for 2020. Yet, the incredible representatives. Five members will be designated by surge in popularity of the Kaohsiung mayor and then the party chair, and the remaining two positions are KMT presidential candidate clearly derailed those fore- filled by the heads of the party’s Youth League and its casts. Department of Youth Affairs. It is worth remembering that even with Wu, Beijing It remains to be seen whether the “establishment had its doubts about his political reliability. According wing” of the party will lead or become further mar- to Dickey: “His (Wu’s) emphasis on the ‘different inter- ginalized within the KMT. As Shattuck nicely sums up: pretations’ clause of the so-called ‘1992 Consensus’ “The danger lies in that if the KMT does not reform its is widely interpreted as a warning signal for Beijing. cross-Strait policy and identity, the country’s youth will Moreover, unlike Hung who overtly supports unifica- continue to view the KMT as an old, backward party, tion with the PRC, Wu sees both Beijing’s ambitions forcing them to vote for the DPP as the only other vi- for unification under ‘one country, two systems’ and able major party. The world has changed, and China Taiwanese pursuit of independence as destabilizing has changed, so why shouldn’t the KMT’s policies also options.” reflect these changes?” According to FPRI Research Associate Thomas Shat- The main point: The KMT will elect a new chairman tuck: “The KMT has two primary issues: an aging sup- and central standing committee members in March port base and a perceived outdated policy on China.” 2020. These elections will determine the direction of Indeed, as Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic and the party and indicate whether or not the KMT will un- International Studies noted at a conference co-hosted dertake the necessary reforms to remain a viable party. by Global Taiwan Institute and The Heritage Founda- tion: Senior Chinese Official Calls for More Effective Prefer- “The real question is whether the party [KMT] ential Measures after Taiwan’s General Elections itself reforms. Whether some of the older gen- eration people move aside [and] make way for On January 19, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) the younger generation. Whether they try to held its “2020 Taiwan Work Conference” (2020年對 redefine themselves as an indigenous party. 台工作會議) in Beijing. The annual conference is the There are younger people that I’ve talked to in first major policy meeting laying out the CCP’s policy Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 5, Issue 2 3 and approach toward Taiwan since the island-democ- Taiwan affairs] in a spirit of time‘ and tide wait for no racy had its general elections on January 11. The re- man; seize the day, seize the hour’ [emphasis added].” sults of the elections saw the incumbent president, For the “soft” measures, Beijing would expand cross- Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), and her ruling party, the Dem- Strait economic and cultural cooperation; deepen ocratic Progressive Party (DPP), win a second-term the development of cross-Strait economic and social as president and maintain an absolute majority over integration; gradually give equal treatment to Taiwan the country’s Legislative Yuan, respectively. This clear nationals studying, starting businesses, working, and blow to Beijing comes amid the intensification of its living in the People’s Republic of China; and encourage “soft-hard” measures over the past several years to people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to promote diplomatically isolate and coerce the central govern- Chinese culture and their “spiritual affinity.” ment in Taiwan while at the same time lure people and According to the People’s Daily—the CCP’s official businesses from Taiwan through a raft of preferential mouthpiece—Wang noted that cross-Strait relations economic measures (such as the 31 measures released and Taiwan work will become more complicated and in February 2018 and later 26 measures in November severe in 2020. Repeating his call from the 2019 work 2019) that provide equal if not special treatment for conference, Wang called on party cadres in the PRC’s Taiwan entities. Taiwan work-related system to strengthen the “four The work conference was attended by the deputy di- consciousnesses” (四個意識)—political consciousness rector of the inter-agency policy-coordinating body, (政治意識), overall situation consciousness (大局意 the CCP’s Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group (TALSG)— 識), core consciousness (核心意識), and awareness of which is the highest-level party organ responsible for alignment (看齊意識)—strengthen the “four self-con- developing the party-state’s Taiwan policy—Wang fidences,” and achieve “two safeguards,” and earnestly Yang (汪洋).