Tems-In-Political-Security Council Affairs (PSCA) Analysis - China - Volume 1 (See List of Items, Appendix No

UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title Page 25 Date 17/05/2006 Time 3:35:46 PM

S-Q881-OOQ2-03-00001

Expanded Number S-0881-0002-03-00001

|tems-in-Political-Security Council Affairs (PSCA) Analysis - China - Volume 1 (see list of items, appendix No. 16)

Date Created 06/11/1962

Record Type Archival Item

Container s-0881-0002: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant - PSCA Analysis (Political-Security Council Affairs)

Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit P.S.G.A. Department Papers ASian Affairs and China

BB. 28) Note on The Proposals for Cessation of Hostilities Between India and the People's Republic of China - 6 November 1962 29) Note on the Statement of 21 November 1962 by the People's Republic of China on Cessation of Hosilities on the India- China Border 30) Note On The Initiatives of Non-Aligned States Regarding the Sino-Indian Conflict - 4 December 1962 31) Note On A Possible Approach to Negotiations Between India and the People's Republic of China - 5 December 1962 32) Note on The Mission of Non-Aligned States to Promote a Peaceful Settlement of the Dispute Between India and the People's Republic of China - 10 January 1963 33) Note on the Progress of Discussions Concerning the India-China Boundary Dispute - 10 February 1963 34} Note on Pakistan's Border Agreement with China - 7 March 1963 35) Note on the Question of Chinese Representation in the United Nations, with Special Reference to Africa - 27 January 1964 36} Note on Premier Chou En-Lai's Visit to South Asia - 9 March 1964 37) Question of the Representation of China in the United Nations - 4 October 1965 38 The China Question - 1 April 1966 39 The China Question - 1 April 1966 40 Note on the External Relations of the People's Republic of China - 15 August 1966 41) Note on the External Relations of the People's Republic of China - 16 September 1966 42) Proceedings of the General Assembly on the Question of Chinese Representation (Item 90) - 18 January 1967 43) Note on the Present State in the "Cultural Revolution" in the PRC - 7 February 1967 44 Developments in the PRC - 17 February 1967 45 The People's Republic of China - 16 June 1967 46 The People's Republic of China - 20 September 1967 47 Relations of the People's Republic of China with the Rimland: India, Pakistan,, Burma, Nepal, Cambodia,, Indonesia, Japan, Hong-Kong, The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, The People's Democratic Republic of Korea, The Mongolian People's Republic - 14 November 1967 48) The People's Republic of China - Internation Political Developments 6 March 1968 49 Developments in the People's Republic of China - 13 June 1968 50 The People's Republic of China - 17 July 1968 51 The People's Republic of China - 21 August 1968 52 The People's Republic of China - 2 October 1968 - continued -

BB. 53) The People's Republic of China - 8 November 1968 The People's Republic of China - 20 December 1968 General Debate - 23rd Session of the General Assembly - Chinese Representation - 23 December 1968 The People's Republic of China - 6 March 1969 The Ninth Party Congress in China - 5 May 1969 Survey of Attitudes of the People's Republic of China Toward the United Nations - 9 June 1969 59) American Attitudes toward the People's Republic of China - 4 December 1969 60) General Debate - 24th Session of the General Assembly - Chinese Representation - 12 December 1969 P.S.C.A, Department Papers Agian Affairs and China

BB. 28) Note on The Proposals for Cessation of Hostilities Between India and the People's Republic of China - 6 November 1962 29) Note on the Statement of 21 November 1962 by the People's Republic of China on Cessation of Hosilities on the India- China Border 30) Note On The Initiatives of Non-Aligned States Regarding the Sino-Indian Conflict - 4 December 1962 31) Note On A Possible Approach to Negotiations Between India and the People's Republic of China - 5 December 1962 32) Note on The Mission of Non-Aligned States to Promote a Peaceful Settlement of the Dispute Between India and the People's Republic of China - 10 January 1963 33) Note on the Progress of Discussions Concerning the India-China Boundary Dispute - 10 February 1963 34} Note on Pakistan's Border Agreement with China - 7 March 1963 35; Note on the Question of Chinese Representation in the United Nations, with Special Reference to Africa - 27 January 1964 36J Note on Premier Chou En-Lai's Visit to South Asia - 9 March 1$64 37) Question of the Representation of China in the United Nations - 4 October 1965 The China Question - 1 April 1966 The China Question - 1 April 1966 Note on the External Relations of the People's Republic of China - 15 August 1966 Note on the External Relations of the People's Republic of China - 16 September 1966 Proceedings of the General Assembly on the Question of Chinese Representation (Item 90) - 18 January 1967 Note on the Present State in the "Cultural Revolution" in the PRC - 7 February 1967 Developments in the PRC - 17 February 1967 The People's Republic of China - 16 June 1967 The People's Republic of China - 20 September 1967 Relations of the People's Republic of China with trie Rimland: India, Pakistan,, Burma,, Nepal, Cambodia., Indonesia, Japan, Hong-Kong, The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, The People's Democratic Republic of Korea, The Mongolian People's Republic - 14 November 1967 48) The People's Republic of China - Internation Political Developments 6 March 1968 49) Developments in the People's Republic of China - 13 June 1968 501 The People's Republic of China - 17 July 1968 51) The People's Republic of China - 21 August 1968 52) The People's Republic of China - 2 October 1968

- continued - - continued -

BB. The People's Republic of China - 8 November 1968 The People's Republic of China - 20 December 1968 General Debate - 23*"d Session of the General Assembly - Chinese Representation - 23 Bfecember 1968 The People' s Republic of China •- 6 March 1969 The Ninth Party Congress in China - 5 May 1969 Survey of Attitudes of the People's Republic of China Toward the United Nations - 9 June 1969 American Attitudes toward the People's Republic of China 4 December 1969 General Debate - 24th Session of the General Assembly - Chinese Representation - 12 December 1969 P.S.C,A« Department Papers Agian Affairs and China

BB. 28) Note on The Proposals for Cessation of Hostilities Between India and the People's Republic of China - 6 November 1962 29) Note on the Statement of 21 November 1$62 by the People's Republic of China on Cessation of Hosilities on the India- China Border 30) Hote On The Initiatives of Non-Aligned States Regarding the Sine-Indian Conflict - 4 December 1962 31) Hot© On A Possible Approach to Negotiations Between In3ia and the People's Republic of China » 5 December 1962 32) Hofce on The Mission of Han-Aligned States to Promote a Peaceful Settlement of the Dispute Between India and the People's Republic of China - 10 January 33) Note on the Progress of Discussions Concerning the India-China Boundary Dispute - 10 February 1563 34) Kote on Pakistan's Border Agreement, with China - 7 March 1C63 35} Note on the Question of Chinese Representation in the United Nations, with Special Reference to Africa - 27 January 1964 36) Hote on Premier Chou En-Lai's Visit to South Asia - ? March if 64 37) Question of the Representation of China in the United Nations - 4 October 1965 The China Question «* 1 April 1966 The China Question - 1 April 1966 Hote on the External Relations of the People's Repuolic of China - 15 August 1966 41) Note on the External Belafclons of the People's Republic of China « 16 September 1966 42) Proceedings of the General Assembly on the Question of Chinese Representation (Item 90) - 18 January If 67 43) Hote on the Present State in the "Cultural Revolution" in the PRO • 7 February 1967 44) Developments in the PEC - 17 February 1567 43) The People's Republic of China - 16 June 1967 46) The People's Republic of China - 20 September 1567 47) Relations of the People's Republic of China with t e Rimland India, Pakistan., Burma., Nepals Cambodias Indonesia, Japan, Hong-Kong, The Democratic Republic of Vlet-DJam, The People's Democratic Republic of Korea, The Mongolian People's Republic - 14 November 1967 48) The People's Republic of China - Internation Political Developments 6 March 1968 49 Developments in the People's Republic of China - 13 June If 68 50 The People's Republic of China - 17 July 1968 51 The People's Republic of China - 21 August 1968 52 The People's Republic of China - 2 October 1968

» continued - », continued -

BB, The People's Republic of China » 8 November 1968 The People's Republic of China - 20 December 1968 General Debate - 23rd Session of the General Assembly ~ Chinese Representation - S3 leceraber 1968 The People's Republic of China - 6 March 1£6£ The Ninth Party Congress in China - 5 May 1969 Survey of Attitudes of the People's Republic of China Toward thetfnibe d Nations - 9 June 1969 American Attitudes toward the People's Republic of China 4 December 1969 General Debate - 24th Session of the General Assembly - Chinese Representation * 12 December 1£;59 CR.13 (4-59) ROUTING SLIP

Comments for the record should not be written on this slip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.108 should be used instead. TO: U Thant Acting Secretary-General

APPROVAL YOUR INFORMATION MAY WE CONFER? AS REQUESTED

YOUR SIGNATURE FOR ACTION NOTE AND FILE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE

NOTE AND RETURN PREPARE DRAFT 1 YOUR COMMENTS ATTACH RELATED PAPERS

DATE: FROM: 'E.D. Kiselev OF POLITICAL AND COHFIDEHTIAL SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

6 November 1962

HOPE OM THE BROPOSALS FOR CESSATION OF ES BETWEEN IHDIA AMD THE PEOPIiE'S EEHJHLIC OF CHIHA

Copy No. HOPE OH TIB PROPOSALS FOR CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN INDIA ATO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

1. Since the outbreak of widespread hostilities between India and the People's Eepublic of China, several proposals have been advanced - by the two parties, by the 1J.A.R. and by the USSR - for a cessation of hostilities. Hie last two proposals have not been published, and are known only through press reports. None of these proposals has so far proved acceptable to the two parties. This paper is meant to analyze the proposals in the context of the attitudes of the two parties.

The Background 2. The boundary dispute between India and the People's Republic of China is mainly concerned with the Western sector (separating Ladakh from Sinkiang and Tibet) and the eastern sector (MeMahon Line). The People's Republic of China claims 33*000 square kilometres in the western sector and 90,000 square kilometres in the eastern sector within the territory claimed by India. 3- Between 1957 sai 1959> Indian patrols found Chinese troops in the disputed areas in the western sector, which are mostly uninhabited and mountainous. By the fall of 1959* the advanced Chinese posts covered most of the territory claimed by Peking in that region. The People's Republic of China seems to attach particular importance to the Aksai Chin area; the Sinkiang-Tibet highway, built on an ancient caravan route, passes through it. Chinese forces have apparently been in this area since 19^-9 • b. In the east, India claims that the boundary is the MeMahon Line of 191^ which runs along the crest, of the Himalayas. The People's Republic of China claims that the MeMahon Line is illegal and that the traditional boundary extends to the foothills in the south. Until the recent conflict, however, - 2 - the People's Republic of China announced that its forces had been ordered not to cross the McMahon Line. Part of the disputed area here is uninhabited, while the rest is inhabited by various hill tribes. India has exercised greater control over this area than over the disputed area in the west. 5. Since 1959* "when the Peopled Republic of China made formal claims and called for negotiations, indications were that she was willing to accept the McMahon Line with minor modifications in return for acceptance of her claims to areas in the western sector, particularly Aksai Chin. 6. After some violent incidents in 1959* which severely marred India-China relations, Premier Chou En-lai visited India in 1960. Though no agreement could be reached, both sides have maintained a tenuous peace for two years while strengthening their communications. During the spring and summer of 19^2, however, serious incidents recurred in the western sector, as both sides began to increase their military posts. India, for her part, completed roads, acquired aircraft and set up a greater number of posts, some between and behind Chinese posts. In this process, she "recovered1* some 2,500 square miles of territory. 7. On 8 September 1962, a conflict developed on the eastern sector at Chedong (Dhola) which each side claimed was on its side of the McMahon Line. After four weeks of localized fighting with severe casualties, the conflict expanded greatly with Chinese advances on several fronts. 8. Since 1959* both sides have expressed a desire for interim arrangements to avoid conflict as a preliminary to negotiations, but could not agree on a formula. The People's Republic of China proposed a withdrawal of 20 kilometres by each side from the "actual line of control11. India felt that no withdrawal was necessary in the eastern and middle sectors, and that the Chinese proposal would leave Chinese forces in Indian territory in the western sector. She proposed withdrawal of both sides from the disputed area in the western sector. The People's Republic of China rejected it on the ground that it would require her - 3 - forces to withdraw from a large area while Indian forces would have to vacate a small area.

9. In correspondence since July 1962, the two sides had agreed on a meeting of representatives to discuss arrangements to create a suitable climate for negotiations. After fighting broke out at Chedong (Dhola), however, India felt

that such talks could not be held until Chinese forces withdrew from the area.

Chinese and Indian proposals

10. On 24 October, the People's Republic of China again proposed that both parties agree to settle the boundary question peacefully by negotiations, to respect the "actual line of control" and to withdraw 20 kilometres from that Line.

If this was agreed in principle, officials could discuss a cease-fire and disengagement. Subsequently, the boundary dispute itself would be discussed by the Prime Mnisters.

11• In a statement on the same day, the Indian Government rejected acceptance of the actual line of control "created by the aggression since the beginning of

September" and asked for a return to the status quo on the eastern sector as of

8 September 1962 prior to talks and discussions at any level "to arrive at agreed measures which should be taken for the easing of tension and correction of the situation created by the unilateral forcible alteration of status quo along the India-China boundary". 12. The Indian response was apparently meant for public consumption as the

People's Republic of China would hardly have accepted discussion on the basis indicated. India's present position would seem to be that stated in a note of

16 October, in which she demanded withdrawal to the positions on 8 September, as a precondition for discussion on interim arrangements to create appropriate

climate for talks on "the differences between the governments of India and

China on the boundary question". - 4~

13. Subsequently, on 26 October, the People's Republic of China announced that she was not proposing a return to "the actual line of control" as at present, but the Line as it was in 1959 'when she first made the proposal. Such a line would be more in line with Indian demands as to the eastern sector but would involve Indian withdrawal from the territory "recovered" by India this year in the western sector, 14. Premier Khrushchev was reported to have proposed an immediate cease- fire and talks. The press reports do not indicate whether he called for any immediate withdrawal, and suggest that his proposal had been rejected by India, Pravda of 25 October 1962, however, supported the Chinese pro~ posal, interpreting it as requiring only a Chinese withdrawal of 20 kilometres from the actual line of control, (The People's Republic of China claimed that from 1959 to July 1962, her forces had unilaterally stopped patrolling within 20 kilometres of the actual line of control), 15. President Nasser of the UAR was reported to have proposed to Peking a withdrawal to the & September positions as a preliminary to talks. The purpose of the talks proposed, however, is not clear. After several meetings with the UAR Ambassador, Chinese officials were reported to have rejected the proposal, (Indian papers reported that President Nasser had sponsored the Indian formula, and had contacted the heads of other non-aligned States, with a view to condemning the People's Republic of China if she rejected the proposals^

Conclusion l6» It would seem that a cessation of hostilities between India and the

People's Republic of China would require agreement on three questions: (a) the cease-fire Line; (b) interim arrangements necessary to create a suitable

climate for negotiation of the dispute (e.g. disengagement); and (c) basis

for negotiations on the boundary problem. - 5 -

17. These three issues, however, cannot be easily separated as a cease-fire Line or interim boundary is likely to have a great effect on the nature and outcome of negotiations on the boundary* The People*s Republic of China has been anxious to obtain Indian acceptance of negotiations on the entire border without "preconditions". India, on the other hand, has been resisting such negotiations as she contends that (a) the Indian frontiers are well-known, and indisputable, and only minor adjustments can be negotiated; and (b) no fruitful negotiations can be held so long as Chinese forces remain on Indian soil., India has so far agreed orQy to negotiations on interim arrangements, seeking thereby to obtain Chinese withdrawal, as a precondition to discussion of substantive matters. After the recent military advances, the People's Republic of China would seem to be more reluctant than earlier to accept withdrawal from all disputed territory. 18, As to the cease-fire lane, India presumably would find it difficult to accept any line other than that of B September 1962. The difference betiireen this line and the 1959 line is in a small area in the eastern sector near Chedong (Dhola) and in several military posts established by India in the western sector last summer* As the location of the Chedong area with respect to the McMahon Line is disputed, and as the Indian Army seems to have found the area militarily indefensible, it may be that the demilitarization or neutralization of the area may prove acceptable. The area involved in the western sector is larger (about 2,500 sq, miles), but all the Indian military posts seem to have been overtaken by the Chinese forces, It is not known whether a return to the posts would be practicable in the winter.

I/ India has always taken a firm position on the McMahon Line. However, in 1959 when a -conflict took place at Longju and its location with respect to the McMahon lane was disputed, both sides agreed not to establish a military post in that area. DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AM) CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS .

21 November 1962

NOTE ON

TUB STATEMENT OF 21 NOVEMBER 1962 BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHUM. ON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES ON THE INDIA-CHINA BORDER

Copy No. NOTE OH THE STATEMENT OF 21 NOVEMBER 1962 BT THE PEOPLE*S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES ON THE INDIA-CHINA BOEDER

1, The proposals advanced by the Peoplers Republic of China on 21 November are essentially no different from the Peking position since 1959 on a temporary arrangement pending settlement of the border dispute with India, The only new element in the statement is the announcement of a cease-fire and •withdrawal, even if India does not promptly accept the proposals, 2« The People*s Republic of China would seem to feel that the military operations to date have served the purpose of dissuading the Indian Govern- ment from further "provocations" or affronts to China's status and that the offer would convince world opinion that the responsibility for any further bloodshed is entirely India*s» The People1s Republic of China would, in the meantime, continue to maintain a position of strength in any future negotiations of the boundary dispute. 3. The proposal would seem to place India in an extremely difficult position as acceptance would be, in effect, a reversal of a position re~ iterated repeatedly over the past three years and, therefore, humiliating, India may, however, be obliged to acquiesce in a cessation of hostilities in view of the difficult military position, 4. The issues involved in the Chinese and Indian proposals were analyzed in an earlier note of 6 November 1962. These are briefly recapitulated here with specific reference to the present proposals. 5. Taking the present Indian maps as the basis, the position may be described as follows. By 1959, several Chinese posts had been established in the Ladakh region of Kashmir State. A line drawn through the posts meant a Chinese occupation of nearly 15,000 square miles of Indian territory. India demanded Chinese withdrawal as a pre-condition to negotiation of the border, and offered that Indian forces would not enter the area. The People1s Republic of China proposed a withdrawal of 20 kilometers by both sides from the "actual line of control" all over the border. She rejected the Indian proposal"on the grounds that the area was important to China (because of the Sinkiang-Tibet highway), that the Indian proposal covered only one disputed area (and not the 35,000 square miles south of the McMahon Line which was controlled by India), - 2 -

and that a withdrawal would mean acquiescence in Indian claims. India could not accept the Chinese counter-proposal as that -would leave Chinese forces on Indian territory in Ladakh and would require abandonment of Indianmilitary posts close to the McMahon lane* 6. The situation was seriously aggravated this year by two developments, In the Ladakh area, between April and August, India set up a number of advanced military posts, thus "recovering" some 2,500 square miles. This movement led to a number of incidents and accentuated tension. In the eastern sector, in August and September, the Chinese forces resumed forward patrolling and came into conflict with Indian forces because of the divergent interpretations of the McMahon Line, (in 1914 when the "McMahon Line" had been drawn on a sketch map and initialled, Sir Arthur McMahon had submitted a verbal description. Subsequently, the British Indian Government revised the line on the basis of surveys of the terrain in the light of this description). On 8 September 1962, Chinese forces entered the Kechilang River area, which is north of the line on the initialled map but south of the subsequent revision. Six weeks of fighting in this area preceded the large-scale Chinese invasion of 20 October, During the fighting, the People's Republic of China undid the Indian advances in Ladakh during the year and occupied some additional area, 7, After 20 October, India demanded return to the 8 September line. The People*s Republic of China repeated her 1959 proposal, and the latest statement is essentially a reiteration of that proposal. The difference between the two sides is as follows: (a) The Indian proposal would mean Chinese withdrawal from 2,500 square miles in the Ladakh region and from Kechilang river area. For India, the principle of undoing the aggression would seem to be more important than the military value of the territory itself> (b) The People's Republic of China has suggested disengagement with a 40 kilometer demilitarized zone, but India rejected it mainly because it would mean removal of Indian posts in the middle and eastern sectors; (c) The People's Republic of China calls for negotiations on the boundary dispute after the cessation of hostilities, India is apparently prepared to negotiate only further measures to create an appropriate climate for substantive negotiations, that is, the modalities for complete Chinese withdrawal from Indian soil. -3 -

8. The latest statement by the People's Republic of China is significant only because it is unilateral. The 20-kilometre demilitarized zone would involve Chinese military withdrawal from the Kechilang river area and from much of the 2,500 square mile area in Ladakh, It would require Indian acquiescence to the extent of (a) abandonment of several Indian military posts near the lines; and (b) establishment of Chinese civilian check-posts on the Chinese side of the demilitarized zone, including the Kechilang river area* The Chinese statement again calls for negotiations on the boundary but negotiations are not a condition to cease-fire and withdrawal* Negotiations would seem most unlikely in the near future* 9. The statement of the People's Republic of China is also significant in that an offer of unilateral cease-fire and withdrawal by the stronger side in an international conflict is uncommon. The move may seem to imply on the one hand a sensitivity to -world opinion and, on the other, the limits of Chinese objectives in the conflict with India. The emotional atmosphere aroused by the conflict is such, however, that a cessation of hostilities is itself not certain. VEBBKBSEaSfS OF POLITICAL MD COHFIDMTIAL SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

k December 1962

NOEE ON THE INITIATIVES OFCTOET-ALIGME D STAO?ES EEGARDI1TG THE SIHO-ZHDIAISF CONFLICT

Copy BTo. NOTE ON THE INITIATIVES OF HOM-ALIGHED STATES REGARDING THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT

1. Diplomatic activity toward a peaceful settlement of the Indian-Chinese conflict is now centered on the proposed meeting of a group of non-aligned States in Colombo. Ceylon has invited Burma, Cambodia, Ghana, Indonesia and the United Arab Republic to attend the meeting which is expected to take place on or around 10 December. Representatives of India and the People's Republic of China will be present in Colombo during the meeting. 2. The People's Republic of China has encouraged the recent initiatives of the non-aligned countries, though rejecting some of their proposals, in the belief that their pressure for negotiations and compromise would essentially serve her purposes. 3. India, for the same reason, has shown some anxiety about the attitudes and actions of the non-aligned countries. She has been disappointed that most of them (except for a few like Cyprus and Nigeria) have not condemned Chinese aggression, and have treated the two sides alike. Without studying the problem, some of them hastened to suggest formulas unacceptable to India. The Indian press has expressed fear that the forthcoming meeting may cause embarrassment to the Indian Government if it seeks to suggest new formulas. It is somewhat reassured/ however, by the presence of the U.A.R. which has sponsored proposals favourable to India..- Ghana is reported to have recently given full support to the U.A.R. initiatives. Ij-. The three proposals, which have so far been publicized, show the reasons for Indian concern. (a) Guinean proposal of 6 November The Guinean proposal calls for withdrawal of 20 kilometers from the "natural boundary". The "natural boundary", however, is obscure, and India has consistently rejected the 20 kilometer withdrawal on the - 2 -

grounds that it would require the abandonment of Indian posts on Indian territory and -would leave Chinese forces on Indian territory. Guinea's call for immediate negotiation of the dispute would, therefore, run counter to the Indian position that substantive negotiations can take place only after the Chinese forces have vacated Indian territory. Finally, Guinea's call for "condemnation of foreign intervention" might imply a condemnation of India's efforts to obtain arms from abroad.

(b) Tanganyika proposal of 6 November

Tanganyika's proposal calls for a Chinese withdrawal beyond the line claimed by India in all sectors and an Indian withdrawal beyond the lines claimed by China. While satisfying the Indian demand that the Chinese forces should vacate some 15,000 square miles claimed by India in Ladakh, it would require an Indian withdrawal from 45,000 square miles south of the McMahon Line.

India has proposed, for three years, the withdrawal of both sides from the disputed area in Ladakh, but Peking has rejected the proposal as involving mainly a Chinese withdrawal, since India did not apply the formula to the larger disputed area south of the McMahon Line. It is interesting that Premier Chou En-Lai, in his reply to Prime Minister Kawawa, described the proposal as "fair" but unacceptable to India.

The other proposals of Tanganyika call for a commission to observe a cease-fire and another to study the historical facts relating to the boundary, as a preliminary to direct negotiations. Premier Chou En-Lai described these proposals as "well-intentioned" but contended that the question can only be settled by direct negotiations.

The U.A.E. proposal is the closest to that of India as it calls for withdrawal to the positions of 8 September 1962. It proposes a demilitarized zone, but does not conflict with the Indian position as it does not lay down any fixed width for the zone.

The final point of the U.A.R. proposal calls for negotiations "to settle all points relating to the border dispute by peaceful means". This would be somewhat different from the Indian position that while preliminary questions would be negotiated after re-establishment of the status quo, the Chinese forces must fully vacate Indian territory before negotiations on the boundary.

5. The unilateral Chinese cease-fire and withdrawal to the "line of

7 November 1959" has tended to create further misunderstanding, India claims that China has drawn that line in such a way as to encompass thousands of spare miles of additional territory. Moreover, she channot accept the 20 kilometre withdrawal which would require abandonment of many important military posts. 6. As India has refused to accept the Chinese proposals, the immediate prospect would seem to be a tenuous truce, while India tries to increase her military strength and China maintains a threat of renewed conflict. Negotiations under the circumstances are rejected by India, and the truce itself may be extremely difficult to maintain. 7. With the present gulf in the attitudes of the two parties and the even more serious problem of emotions aroused by the conflict, it is difficult to see what type of joint action can be pursued by the non-aligned countries. It would seem that the projection of any formula would be fruitless and may even exacerbate the situation. The meeting may serve a useful purpose if it were to find means to explore avenues of agreement in consultation with the two parties. The recent Soviet statements on the conflict may be .an encouragement for active efforts in that direction. The People's Republic of China, for her part, seems to have shown anxiety for speedy negotiations and may be willing to concede on the cease-fire arrangements. Some suggestions as to a possible approach towards negotiations will be outlined in a separate paper. 'T* \ \h-3l

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AHD CONFIDENTIAL SECUEITY GOUHCIL AFFAIRS

5 December 1962

HOTE OH A POSSIBLE APPROACH TO IJIEGOTIATIOCTS BETOEM 1MDIA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Copy Ho. ? NOTE ON A POSSIBLE APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN INDIA MD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

1. It "would be useful to examine with some care the positions which have been stated by India and the People's Republic of China in order to ascertain whether there are possibilities of agreement which have not as yet been explored by the parties or embodied in the specific proposals of non-aligned States. The most urgent requirement would seem to be arrangements which would contribute towards avoiding renewal of the conflict. This might offer some prospect of promoting a step-by-step progress towards a settlement.

2. The two salient elements in the Indian position are:

(a) That the Chinese forces must withdraw to the 8 September 1962 positions before any negotiations; and

(b) that negotiations on the border cannot be held until Chinese forces

have completely vacated Indian territory. On the latter condition, however, the Indian position does not, at present, appear to be rigid.

3. In the past, India has taken the position that, while talks may take place before Chinese withdrawal beyond the boundaries claimed by India, negotiations on the boundary could only be held after the withdrawal. The Indian note of

27 July 1962 proposing talks to ensure a proper climate for negotiations

(i.e. modalities of further Chinese withdrawal) seemed to reflect a more flexible position, but the previous position was reiterated during the Parliament session in August when opposition was expressed to any weakening of the Indian position.

The more recent statements by Prime Minister Nehru seem to indicate that, in spite of pressures from the opposition parties and some of his supporters, he is leaving open the possibility of negotiations after a return to the 8 September line. These negotiations possibly could involve both interim arrangements and the boundary issue itself. - 2 - k. India's insistence on the 8 September 1962 line is based on the principle that China should not derive any fruits of aggression, and that India cannot negotiate under pressure. China, for her part, claims that the 8 September line is the result of advances by India. China has explained her rejection of the Indian demand on the ground that the line was such as to lead to conflict.

This argument has perhaps some merit as the military posts on that date were too close to each other. Some Indian posts in Ladakh were even set up behind Chinese posts. 5. The controversy over the lines is, in fact, somewhat artificial. There are really no lines, but only a number of military posts. The dispositions i/ at any given date are not indisputable. A line suitable for the purpose of promoting negotiations may perhaps be found outside the framework of the supposed lines at any previous date so long as it does not reward China for "aggression" and ensures adequate disengagement. Such a line would require further Chinese withdrawal in L.adakh and an Indian undertaking not to restore certain advanced military posts in the Galwan and Chip Chap river valleys in Ladakh. 6. The possibility of a mutually acceptable interim arrangement and of any progress beyond such an arrangement would seem to depend on a drastic reduction of Chinese claims and an Indian agreement to negotiate without other preconditions. 7. In India's view, the problem is not a normal boundary dispute but a territorial claim over some 60,000 square miles. The People's Republic of China, however, seems to have maintained this large claim, pending negotiations, for bargaining I/ Indian reports claim that the 195& Chinese map included over 10,000 square miles of Ladakh territory in China, and that a 1960 map included an additional 2,000 square miles. They state further that the real 1959 "line" and the 8 September 1962 "line" correspond more or less to the 195^ map* The 1959 "line", according to China, corresponds more to the 1960 map. - 3 - purposes: she has repeatedly offered to surrender claims over k5,QOO square miles near the McMahon Line in return for some 15,000 square miles in Ladakh. A unilateral withdrawal of claims in the east, except for minor boundary readjustments, would constitute an effective reassurance to India and a gesture towards peace. 8. India's foremost interest is, indeed, in the McMahon Line. The danger of large-scale conflict between the two Powers would be greatly reduced if the parties could find a way to undertake to demarcate the boundary in that area. Though China does not recognize the McMahon Line, she has offered to take into account both the Line and the sentiments of the two countries with regard to the Himalayas. The difficulty has been her desire to use her claims in this area as a lever to force negotiations and obtain concessions in Ladakh. It may be that she might be induced to agree to a step-by-step solution starting with the McMahon Line, if there was a cease-fire and disengagement in Ladakh and if India agrees to negotiations. Disengagement in Ladakh would, in fact, serve Chinese objectives, with or without a "no-war" declaration, as both sides would then find it difficult to attempt to change the status quo by force. Meanwhile, a settlement of the eastern border would greatly reduce tension between the two countries and allay Indian apprehensions. 9. A de jure settlement in Ladakh would seem unlikely in the near future, as Peking apparently attaches great value to the roads in the area under her control. It is, significant, however, that Peking regards the present division of the state of Jamtnu and Kashmir as temporary. She has made it clear that her negotiations with Pakistan are only to set up a temporary border, subject to readjustment after a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. As she has not recognized Indian sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir, the establishment of a de facto or temporary border may satisfy her position without undermining the Indian legal position. Moreover, in the

course of negotiations, it may be possible to reduce the scope of the dispute if the areas in which China is most interested were exchanged for certain other areas to which the Indian title is not without doubt. 10. [Though the situation is now critical, there are several factors which seem to constitute hopeful elements: (a) the refusal of Prime Minister Nehru, despite strong domestic opposition, to take more rigid positions and his statements against hatred of the Chinese people and calls for the liberation of Tibet; (b) his insistence on continued non-alignment and friendship with

the Soviet Union; (c) the interest of the Soviet Union and the non-aligned countries in a peaceful settlement; (d) the apparent disinterest of the Western Powers in a renewed conflict which might lead to incalculable consequences; (e) the statements by Chinese leaders that China does not need additional territory, that China will be reasonable in negotiations, that China pays great attention to the long-term future relations between the Chinese and Indian peoples, and that China is anxious to settle its southern frontiers in order to avoid conflicts on two fronts. CR.13 (4-59) ROUTING SLIP

Comments for the record should not be written on this slip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.108 should be used instead. TO: The Secretary-General

APPROVAL YOUR INFORMATION MAY WE CONFER? AS REQUESTED

YOUR SIGNATURE FOR ACTION NOTE AND FILE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE

NOTE AND RETURN PREPARE DRAFT YOUR COMMENTS ATTACH RELATED PAPERS

DATE: E.D. Kiselev J( -•.

DEPARTMENT OP POLITICAL MB SECURITY COIMCIL AFFAIRS

10 January 1963'

JTOTE ON THE MISSION OF NON-ALIGMED STATES TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMEETT OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN" BIDIA AND THE PEOPLE'S EEPUBLIC OF CHOTA

Copy IOTE Oil TEE MISSION OF NOH-ALIGKBD STATES TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN INDIA AID THE PEOPLE'S BEPUBLIC OF CHINA

1. Opinion in India, on the eve of the visit of the Ceylonese Prime Minister to Ifew Delhi, seems to have swung in favour of the efforts of the six non-aligned States to secure the ceasefire on the India-China border and prepare a basis for negotiation of the border dispute. A

number of internal and international developments have contributed to a change in attitude. 2. It may be recalled that Indian reaction to the meeting of the six non-aligned States in Colombo -was not enthusiastic. India expressed disappointment that the participants had shown an inclination to place the "aggressor" and the "victim" on the same plane, and entertained misgivings that any compromise proposals would involve an Indian retreat from the principle that no advantages should be gained by Peking from military action. After the decision of Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaraiiaike to visit the two capitals on behalf of the non-aligned States, India was reported to have indicated that India could consider the proposals only when Peking had accepted them in full. 3. Mrs. Bandaranaike visited Peking on 31 December and was joined in that phase of the talks by Foreign Minister Subandrio of Indonesia. The Chinese leaders gave a warm welcome to her and announced a "positive V response" to the proposals. It is not clear, however, whether Peking has fully accepted the proposals. Mrs. Bandaranaike is due to arrive in Hew Delhi on 10 January and will be joined by Premier Ali Sabry of the TJ.A.R., whose position on the conflict has been greatly appreciated in India.

4. Though the proposals, which had been conveyed to both governments - 2 -

earlier by a Ceylonese ambassador, have not "been, disclosed, press reports indicate that they involve military disengagement with civilian posts in the demilitarized belts. a. In the eastern sector, the McMahon Line, as drawn on the original map in 1914» would he taken as the basis. This -would involve an Indian concession on certain small areas between the line and the watershed,particularly the area where the fighting flared before 20 October. b. In the middle sector between Uepal and Kashmir, there will be no change as there had been no fighting and the dispute is limited to a few localities* e. In the western sector (Ladakh), the proposals are said to accept the Chinese offer to withdraw twenty kilometres from the "actual line of control" of November 1959- India would undertake not to restore posts close to the Chinese lines which had been overrun in the recent conflict, but would not be obliged to vacate any existing posts (particularly the post at Chushul). Civilian posts would be established in the demilitarized area. 5. Acceptance of the proposals by both sides would end the threat V contained in the Peking's ceasefire declaration of 20 November reserving the right to resume military action unless India complied with certain conditions. It would satisfy the insistence of Peking that a demilitarized belt is essential to maintain peace, and that India should not restore military posts near the actual line of control in Ladakh. Prime Minister Nehru has already indicated that India would not seek to re- establish these posts. 6. The gulf between Indian and Chinese positions centers mainly on the line in Ladakh. India claims that Peking has unilaterally defined the "actual line" of 1959 i*1 such a way as to cover much additional territory occupied during the recent military action. While insisting that the line as existing before the recent hostilities should be restored, India has left the door open for any other formula which does not involve one-sided

concessions. - 3-

7. Reports from India in the last few days indicate that she may "be willing to accept an "approximation" to the position "before the hostilities. Though she may desire clarification of the proposals of the non-aligned countries on several questions, she is likely to take a friendly attitude towards them. Many considerations seem to have contributed to this trend. 8. First, the stability of the ceasefire to date has somewhat calmed public feelings and increased the tendency to look at the problem in a long-range perspective, in economic and political, rather than purely military, terms. The adjournment of Parliament and the disciplinary control in the Congress party have contributed to this end. Prime Minister Nehru has reasserted his leadership, insisting on the continuance of the policy of non-alignment and a redoubled effort for planned economic development. 9. Second, the change in the attitude of the Soviet Union since October in favour of the Indian position, the reported offers of Soviet assistance and the criticism of the People's Republic of China by several ms,jor communist parties have been regarded as significant and helpful elements in the situation. They have given rise to some feeling that India should avoid undue rigidity in order to enhance sympathy and support from the Communist bloc. The view has been expressed, though not widely, that Peking may attempt to conciliate India as a result of the developing controversy with the Soviet Union* 10. Third, while India appreciates the prompt assistance from the Commonwealth and the United States, reports of discussions at the Nassau Conference and related developments have created misgivings that longer-range assistance by the United States and Britain would not be entirely without strings. In particular, India would be expected to contemplate serious concessions on the Kashmir dispute in order to placate the sentiment in the ¥est. - 4 -

11. Mean-while, the India-Pakistan ministerial talks held in Rawalpindi from

28 to 31 December have indicated little hope for an agreement or a swift improvement of relations. Pakistan insists that Kashmir is the central problem

"between the two countries and must "be settled "by reference to the wishes of the people through a plebiscite or "by other equally acceptable means. India, on the other hand, is willing to discuss all questions, but is not prepared to contemplate a radical change in Kashmir. She is thinking only in terms of an adjustment of the ceasefire line and a long—term approach to the improvement of relations.

12. India has expressed strong displeasure at the announcement, on the eve of the Rawalpindi talks, of an agreement in principle between Pakistan and the

People's Republic of China on their present border in Kashmir. India has also reacted strongly to alleged Anglo-American pressure on the Kashmir question and to suggestions that a condominium should be contemplated. India, moreover, does not see any possibility of "joint defense" against China, as apparently envisaged by the ¥est, in view of Pakistan1s attitude toward the recent conflict and official statements that friendship with India would not mean enmity towards the People's Republic of China. While India may continue talks with Pakistan in order to placate sentiment in the United States and the United Kingdom, it would seem unlikely that she would be able to accept or offer proposals satisfactory to Pakistan.

13» These developments seem to have encouraged a more positive attitude towards the efforts of the non-aligned powers to replace the present tenuous ceasefire by a more secure arrangement. Substantive negotiations or an agreement with the

People's Republic of China, however, remain remote. As indicated in the previous note on this question, progress in that direction would seem to depend on a

•willingness by Peking to accept the MeMahon Line in principle and a reciprocal willingness by India to undertake not to disturb the actual line in Ladakh by military means. ROUTING SLIP

Comments for the record should not be written on this slip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.108 should be used instead. TO: The Secretary-General

APPROVAL YOUR INFORMATION MAY WE CONFER? AS REQUESTED

YOUR SIGNATURE FOR ACTION NOTE AND FILE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE

NOTE AND RETURN PREPARE DRAFT YOUR COMMENTS ATTACH RELATED PAPERS

DATE: .D. Kiselev DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL CONFIDENTIAL AMD SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

]J3 February 1963

MOTE ON THE PROGRESS OF DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING' THE INDIA-CHINA BOUNDARY DISPUTE

Copy No. NOTE ON THE PROGRESS OF DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING THE INDIA-CHINA BOUNDARY DISPUTE

1. The efforts of the six non-aligned countries to promote a basis for negotiations between India and the People's Republic of China on their boundary dispute have succeeded greatly in narrowing the gap between the positions of the two governments. Certain important differences of interpretation with regard to the demilitarized area and civilian posts, however, remain to be resolved before direct negotiations are undertaken. 2. This paper is intended to describe in brief the progress made so far and the differences which remain. 3. It may be recalled that on 21 November 1962, the People's Republic of China declared a cease-fire and offered to withdraw twenty kilometers beyond the "actual line of control" as of November 1959* She reserved, however, her freedom, of action if Indian forces advanced to within twenty kilometers of that line. 4. India rejected Peking's conditions on the grounds that they required abandonment of certain posts and territory which she retained even after the fighting - notably Chushul (Ladakh) and a large area in the middle sector. Moreover, India claimed that Peking described the actual line in such a way as to encompass thousands of square kilometers of additional territory in Ladakh. 5. India, for her part, insisted that Chinese forces should withdraw beyond the line of 8 September 1962, that is, the line before the recent conflict. She hinted that she would not seek to re-establish certain military posts near the line in Ladakh. 6. The proposals of the non-aligned Powers were intended to ensure a stable cease-fire and prepare a basis for direct negotiations between the two parties. - 2 -

They were deliberately left somevihat general, but were designed to satisfy the following considerations. First, India was not required to withdraw from any area she held on 21 November 19-62. Second, the Chinese forces were to withdraw almost to the & September line in Ladakh. (They would withdraw beyond that line in other sectors under Peking's proposals). Third, Indian forces would not advance to the 3 September 1962 line in Ladakh so that a large demilitarized aone would be established in the area. Both sides would establish civilian posts in the demilitarized area by mutual agreement. 7. In the discussions held by the non-aligned Powers with the two parties, both sides agreed in principle to accept the proposals as a preliminary basis for direct negotiations. But agreement could not be reached on various matters of detail, concerning particularly the area in which Indian posts could be restored. The People's Republic of China, for her part, stated certain interpretations and called for direct negotiations without prejudice to the interpretations and reservations of either side. India, on the other hand, obtained various "clarifications" in discussions with the leaders of Ceylon, U.A.R. and Ghana. The proposals, together with the clarifications, were then tacitly approved by the Indian Parliament. Prime Minister Nehru announced that no direct negotiations could be held until Peking accepted the proposals and clarifications in totp, &. The status of the "clarifications" is somewhat unclear. They were set out in a memorandum sent by Prime Minister Nehru to Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike after discussions with Ceylon, U»A.R. and Ghana, and placed before the Indian Parliament on 21 January, It is not certain, however, that all the six non- aligned Powers regard these "clarifications" as the authoritative interpretation - 3 - of the proposals. There may well be certain differences among them. The U.A.R. has generally supported the Indian view, but Burma and Cambodia have been anxious not to appear to oppose Peking1s views. The Justice Minister of Ghana, Kofi Asante Ofori-Atta, participated in the Delhi discussions but, on 23 January, signed a joint communique in Peking that the tvro parties should immediately undertake direct negotiations "without prejudice to any reservations" on the Colombo proposals. Foreign Minister Subandrio of Indonesia expressed a similar view in Calcutta on 29 January. 9. The present status of agreement and disagreement between the two parties may be summarized as follows: a) Peking has agreed to withdraw militarily beyond the 8 September 1962 line in all sectors, except in a small area west of Spanggur in Ladakh. Chinese forces will be twenty kilometers beyond most of the line. The withdrawal is acceptable to India. b) India can re-establish control in the eastern sector up to the McMahon Line, As to Longju and Thagla Ridge, two small areas (7 and 25 square miles) whose location in relation to the line is in dispute, Peking has agreed not to establish civilian posts in these two areas if India refrains from establishing any posts. India seems to prefer bilateral discussion on these two areas, c) India can recover almost all her forward posts in Ladakh, but she has to man them with civilians. India is willing to accept the condition as these posts had been manned by small numbers of soldiers and were meant mainly to "show the flag". - 4-

d) The main difference between the two sides concerns Peking's demand that India should not re-establish military posts in the eastern sector (Northeast Frontier Agency area •which had been occupied by Chinese forces in the recent conflict) but should only send civilian personnel carrying arms for self-defence as she had done until about 1959. This is not acceptable to India as it affects perhaps 30,000 square miles of area -with great strategic significance, e) Another disagreement concerns the 20 kilometer id.de area to be vacated by the Chinese forces in Ladakh. The Indian position, based on the "clarifications" is that it should be administered by an equal number of civilian posts of each side. Peking claims that India has no right to this area, but is vailing to refrain from establishing her civilian posts. f) There is also a difference with regard to civilian control over Barahoti (Wuje), but this is of little consequence. 10. As India has rejected negotiations until the above differences are settled, the non-aligned countries are presumably continuing their efforts to bridge the gap. The differences are perhaps not insurmountable when viewed in relation to the concessions made by the two sides so soon after a bitter conflict, Peking has progressively agreed to a -withdrawal to positions demanded by India. Prime Minister Nehru, for his part, has moved increasingly tomrds a negotiated settlement in the face of strong domestic opposition. Despite statements that all of the Indian territory would be recovered, he has accepted an interim settlement •which would perhaps mean acquiescence in the 1959 status quo in Ladakh. - 5 -

11, An editorial in the Peking People's Daily of 28 January 1963 seems to hold out hope that Peking may not insist too rigidly on her reservations, especially vti.th regard to military posts in the eastern sector, and that Peking is anxious to speed negotiations. Perhaps of great significance in this editorial is the stress on the paramount importance of the principle that no territory should be acquired by armed force. This principle had been underscored by Prime Minister Mehru in connexion vdth his demand for the restoration of the & September line. The People's Daily seems to apply it for a longer period* MNEX I

TEXT OP THE PROPOSALS MADE BY SIX KOK-ALIGNEI) STATIONS HEETCTO IS COLOMBO IK DECEMBER 1962

>fif (published in Colombo on 19 January 1963) lo The conference considers that -the existing de facto cease-fire period is a good starting point for a peaceful settlement of the Indian-Chinese conflict,, 2e (a) With regard to the western sector;, the conference would like to make an appeal to the Chinese Government to carry out their 20 kilometres (about 12 miles) withdrawal of their military posts as has "been proposed in the letter of Prime Minister Chou En-lai to Prime Minister Fehru of November 21 and November

28, 1962D (b) The conference vould make an appeal to the Indian Government to keep their existing military position. (c) Pending a final solution of the border dispute, the area vacated "by the Chinese military withdrawal will "be a demilitarized zone to "be administered

"by civilian posts of both sides to be agreed upons without prejudice, to the rights of the previous presence of both India and China in tha+- area^

3° With regard to the eastern sectors the conference considers bhafc the line of actual control in the areas recognized by both the Governments could serve as a cease-fire line to their respective positions,, Remaining areas in this sector can be settled in their future discussions, 4° With regard to the problems of the middle sector, the conference suggests that they will be solved by peaceful meanss without resorting to force. 5. The conference believes that these proposals, which could hel- in consolidating the cease-fires °^ce implementedj should pave the way for discussion between representatives of both parties for the purpose of solving problems entailed in the cease-fire position. 6. The conference xrould like to make it clear that positive response for the proposed appeal will not prejudice the position of either of the two Governments as regards its conception of the final alignment of the boundaries,, "Upon request frcsi the Government of India the following clarifications of paragraphs 2S 3 and 4 of the Colombo conference proposals ware given by the delegations of Ceyl®ns UeA0R0 and Ghams

(1) Withdrawal of Chinese forces proposed by the Colombo conference be 20 kilometers as proposed by Prime Minister Chou Ea-lai to Prim® Minister Nehru in the statement of the Chinese Government dated 21st 8 Novoaber and in Primo Minister Chou En«lai s letter of NovEraber 2&$ 1%25 that is from the line of actual control between the two sides as of Hero-ember 7S 1959$ as defined in maps three and five circulated by tha Government of China,, (2) The existing military posts which the forces of the Government of India will keep to5 will be on and up to the line indicated in (1) above,, (3) The demilitarized gone of 20 Idlcsaeters created by the Chinese military withdravials -will be administered by civilian posts of both sides0 This is a substantive part of the Colombo confereeic® proposals,. It is as to the location,, number of posts and their composition that there has to be an agreement between the two Governments of India and China,,

ladiau foress csn9 in accordance with the Colcmbo conference proposals5 saw© right up to the south of the line of actual control^ that, is the McMahon Iine5 except for two areas on which there is difference of opinion bstwesn the Governments of India and China,, The Chinese forces similarly can move rigjit up to the north of th® McMahon Line except for these two aroaso The tiso areas referred to as the remaining areas in the Colombo conference proposals^ arrangements in regard to inihieh ar© to be settled bertt-^3®;! the Governments of India and China5 according to the Colombo eon«» feren

The Colombo conference desired that the status°°quo in this sector should be maintained and neither side should do anything to distrub the status-quo c, AHNEXJIII

FROM PREMIER CHQU EN«»LAI*S LETTER OF

In view of Your Excellency's conviction expressed in paragraph four of your letter of 14

Comments for the record should not be written on this slip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.108 should be used instead. TO: The Secretary-General

APPROVAL X YOUR INFORMATION MAY WE CONFER? AS REQUESTED

YOUR SIGNATURE FOR ACTION NOTE AND FILE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURI

NOTE AND RETURN PREPARE DRAFT YOUR COMMENTS ATTACH RELATED PAPERS

DATE 11/3/63 ' ' E.D. Kisele^// DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

7 March 1963

NOTE ON

PAKISTAN'S BORDER AGREEMENT WITH CHINA

Copy NO. / IHB/kd 7 March 1963

Pakistani bolder agreement with China

1. On 2 March 1963, the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and the People's Republic of China signed a border agreement in Peking, The agreement concerns the area extending from the trijunction of Afghanistan, Sinkiang and Pakistan in a southeast direction up t© Karakorum Pass, 2, The agreement is another milestone in China's relations with its neighbours. Having successfully concluded border treaties with Burma and Nepal, its agreement with Pakistan would be used for further pressure on India for direct negotiations. Just as China conceded Nepal's claim to Mount Everest, it also agreed to recognize Pakistan's claim over the world's second highest peak, K2, Meanwhile, China has improved its relations with Afghanistan through diplomatic channels and by extending trade credits. China has also asked Afghanistan to start negotiations for a border agreement. China has again asked India to begin direct talks to .settle the Sino*-Indian border dispute, 3» In its preambular part the agreement stated that the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Pakistan, having agreed, with a view of ensuring the prevailing peace and tranquillity on the border, to formally delimit and demarcate the boundary between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas, the defense of which was under the control of Pakistan, in a spirit of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation and on the basis of the tea Bandung principles and being convinced that this would help Asian and world peace, had resolved to conclude the present agreement. The agreement also stated that the boundary between Sinkiang and the contiguous areas under the control of - 2 «

Pakistan had never been formally delimited and, therefore, the two parties had agreed to delimit it on the basis of the traditional, customary boundary line, including natural features. The agreement then gave the alignment of the entire boundary line between Sinkiang and the contiguous areas which in summary is as follows: Commencing from its northwestern extremity (the trijunction), the line runs generally eastwards and then southeastwards strictly along the main watershed, passing through Kilik Pass, Mintaka Pass, Kharhanai Pass, Kutejulga Pass, Parpik Pass and Upto Khunjerab Pass. A little to south of Khunjerab Pass, boundary line leaves main watershed so as to include Oprang Valley within Pakistan side as well as the Salt KLning Areas above Darwaza/Darban pocket to east of Shimshal Pass. Darwaaa pocket is also included within Pakistan side. Boundary then joins Karakorum Range main watershed at a certain peak (longitude 75 degrees 57 minutes east and latitude 36 degrees 03 minutes north) and thence boundary line runs generally southwards and then eastwards strictly following Karakorum Range main watershed, passing through east Mustagh Pass, the top of Chogri Peak (K2), the top of Broad Peak, the top of Gasherbrum Mountain and top of Teram Kangri Peak and reaches its southeastern extremity at Karakorum Pass. 4. The agreement also provided for the setting up of a joint boundary commission which was charged with the responsibility to conduct necessary surveys of the boundary area on the ground, with a view to setting up boundary markers at appropriate places, to delineate the boundary line on the jointly prepared maps, and to draft a protocol setting forth in detail the alignment of the entire boundary line and the location of all the boundary markers and prepare and get detailed maps to attach to the protocol* The agreement further stated that the two parties had agreed that any dispute concerning the boundary which might arise after the delimitation of the boundary line actually existing between the two countries would be settled peacefully between the two parties through friendly consultations. The agreement concluded by stating that - 3 - the two parties ha.d agreed that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute, the sovereign authority concerned would reopen negotiations with the Government of the People's Republic of China on the boundary so as to sign a formal boundary treaty to replace the present agreement, provided that, in the event of that sovereign authority being Pakistan, the provisions of the present agreement and the protocol to be drafted would be maintained in the formal boundary. 5» The area in dispute from the overlapping borders shown on the maps of the two countries was about 3,400 square miles. A study of the agreement revtals that the compromise now agreed upon left about two-thirds of it (about 2,500 square miles) on the Chinese side, Pakistan, however, did not concede any area that was at present under its actual control. The Chinese and Pakistan claims diverged from a point just south of the Khunjerab pass. According to China's maps, the border there should run almost due south to the Karakoram mountains before turning eastward; Pakistan's maps showed the border running roughly south-east from that point to the sharp bend in Ifaztagh river* The agreed border would follow Pakistan's claim. The 750 square miles of territory gained by Pakistan was under Chinese administrative control in the Oprang valley and salt mining areas above the Darwaza/Darban

4 pocket to the east of the Shimshal Pass. The K2 peak in the Karakoram range to which China had laid claim would also remain with Pakistan. Three-quarters of the mountainfaces Pakistan, and the route of ascent has all along been under Pakistan control. 6. Talks culminating in the present agreement had started as early as March 1961 when Pakistan had expressed a desire to enter into negotiations with the People's Republic of China to demarcate the boundary south of the ,- 4-

Chinese province of Sinkiang and the contiguous areas, the defense of waich was the responsibility of Pakistan. In response, China, after pointing out that the boundary in question was an "undelimited" one and had been "left over by history", expressed the hope that it would be ready to attain with Pakistan "an agreed comprehension of the location and alignment of this boundary". The Chinese note added that pending settlement of the Kashmir dispute, China and Pakistan should reach an agreement of a provisional nature, 7. As a result of further exchange of notes, it was officially announced on 3 May 1962 that Pakistan and China had a greed to conduct negotiations for the delimitation and demarcation of the common border and to sign a provisional agreement. This announcement brought forth strong protests from India both to China and Pakistan, India declared that it would never agree to any arrangement., provisional or otherwise, between the Governments of China and Pakistan r egarding territory which constituted an inalienable part of the Indian Union* India maintained that neither China nor Pakistan had legal or constitutional locus standi to negotiate with any other country on the territory in question and that there was no need for any border delimitation. Hovrever, in the course of the talks of the Sino-Indian border dispute while India wished to include the "boundary between China* s Sinkiang and Kashmir west of the Karakoram pass" China had constantly refused to include that boundary in the discussions just as it had declined to discuss with India the boundaries between China and Sikkim. and between China and Bhutan,

8. India's protest over the negotiations was rejected both by China and Pakistan, China stated that talks for a provisional boundary agreement did not at all involve the question of ownership of Kashmir and that India had ignored the existence "not only of areas the defense of which is under the control of Pakistan" but also of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. 9. Pakistan stated that India1s protest against the negotiations was based on its claim that the State of Jammu and Kashmir constituted an "integral" and "inalienable" part of the Indian Union. That claim had never been recognized by Pakistan nor by the United Nations. Pakistan added that Jaramu and Kashmir was a territory in dispute and the question of its accession was to be decided in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of its people. 10. The agreement has been welcomed both by Pakistan and China, Pakistan's foreign minister, Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, described it as "a profound historic development in the Sino-Pakistan relations". Marshall Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, cited it as another example of settling issues through negotiations between countries with different social systems. He expressed a hope that India would also "respond positively to the peaceful proposals of the Chinese Government", China's agreement with Pakistan follows the pattern that it had already established in the border treaties with Burma and Nepal, 11. In the case of the Sino-Burmese boundary treaty, Burma, for the loss of a small portion of territory, had obtained what it had desired, namely the British defined boundary and, even more important, a boundary recognized by China,^ Similarly, Pakistan has obtained a boundary which

I/ The Sino-Burmese boundary treaty, Pacific Affairs, Summer 1961, - 6 -

had never been formally demareated and which is now recognized by a major power, 12. Pakistan is further gratified by the agreement because it formalizes the Chinese stand on Kashmir, Through this agreement, China has rejected India's claim of sovereignty over the whole territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and recognizes the existence of a dispute between India and Pakistan which China wishes to be resolved peacefully through negotiations. China is thus the first socialist state -which has not accepted India1s claim. Moreover, Pakistan seeing little chance of improvenent in its relations with two of its other neighbours, India and Afghanistan, was keen to settle the border issues on its other frontiers. Accordingly, Pakistan made agreements with Iran and Burma and sought negotiations with China. In view of China's neutrality in the Indo-Pakistan dispute and in that between Pakistan and Afghanistan, it was not difficult for Pakistan and China to evolve a mutually acceptable basis for negotiations. Pakistan is also worried about the recent military build-up in India, with large-scale aid from western Powers. Pakistan fears that a great imbalance is taking place between the respective military strength of the two countries. In that respect, Pakistan is shewing impatience also with the United States. 13, Pakistan has maintained that it started its talks with China much earlier than the Sino-Indian border fighting in October 1962 and also before the present series of talks on the Kashmir question. Moreover, both Pakistan and China have repeatedly emphasized that the agreement is of a provisional nature and that Pakistan has not claimed sovereignty over the area contiguous to China's Sinkiang province which was under discussion in the agreement.

The agreement, therefore, has no relevance with the settlement of the Kashmir dispute and should not affect the course of those talks. The Government of •• 7 ••

India, however, has strongly resented the signing of the agreement. It has charged Pakistan of having "surrendered some 2,000 square miles of Kashmir territory" to China and of "having so timed the signing of the agreement as to prejudice the outcome of the Indo-Pakistan talks on Kashmir". It accused China of using the Kashmir dispute "to further its own expansionist policy". The United States has also expressed its fears about the "timing" of the signing of the agreement and has stated that it might adversely affect the talks between India and Pakistan on Kashmir, The talks, however, have not been called off and are to be held in Calcutta, India on 12 March 1963• There is no doubt that the Sino-Pakistan agreement would henceforth be an important feature in the future discussions on Kashmir* CR.13 (4-59) ROUTING SLIP

Comipeft.3 for the record should not be written on this slip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.108 should be used instead. TO: U Thant Secretary-General

APPROVAL YOUR INFORMATION MAY WE CONFER? AS REQUESTED

YOUR SIGNATURE FOR ACTION NOTE AND FILE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE

NOTE AND RETURN PREPARE DRAFT YOUR COMMENTS ATTACH RELATED PAPERS

The attached paper contains some useful points. Unfortunately, the lack of time - since you are leaving tomorrow - did not allow to dwell more on it.

DATE: FROM: 27/1/64 V.P. Suslo' 27 January 1964

NOTE ON THE QUESTION OF CHINESE REPRESENTATIOM IN THE UNITED NATIONS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AFRICA

"Ehe apparent success of Premier Chou En-lai's current tour of African

States and the recognition of the People's Republic of China by France have aroused discussion of the effect of these events on the Chinese representation question in the United Nations and on international affairs generally. This paper is designed to present certain preliminary observations on this question in relation to Africa. Premier Chou En-lai's African tour, by itself, did not have much effect on the question of representation. Four governments - Burundi,

Kenya, Tunisia and Zanzibar - have agreed to exchange diplomatic representatives with the People1 s Republic of China, but these governments had already supported representation of the People's Republic or were expected to do so.

(Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, -which are due to achieve independence in 1964, may also recognize the People's Republic of China.) Expectations as to a change in the balance of votes in the United Nations depend primarily on a larger swing in African votes, as a result of: (a) the recognition of the People's Republic of China by France; (b) the atmosphere created in Africa by Premier Chou's tour; and (c) the possibility that the countries on his tour might prevail upon other African States to vote for the People's Republic in order to promote African unity and African interests (colonial liberation and revision of the

Charter).

The decision of France to recognize the People's Republic of China is apparently due to a desire to strengthen the independent role of France in world affairs, to buttress French interests in Southeast Asia and to - 2 - promote France's export trade. It may be that the government of France would find little benefit in taking actions beyond exchange of diplomatic representatives, such as active support for an expansion of the relations of the People's Republic of China -with African States or its representation in the United Nations.

According to reports in the Western press, France intends to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China, without ending such relations with the Republic of China. The People's Republic of China has refrained from any comment on this matter. Its traditional policy has been to demand non-recognition of the Republic of China as a condition for the establishment of diplomatic relations. (In the case of the United

Kingdom, it accepted the retention of consular relations). The only excep-. tion was in Laos, where the problan was solved by the prompt withdrawal of the embassy of the Republic of China. It may be that a similar development will take place in the case of France, despite reported United States advice.

But that might still leave open the possibility of a French espousal of a

"two China" policy, denounced by the People's Republic of China but apparently supported by several "French African" States and Nigeria.

The consumation of diplomatic relations between France and the People's

Republic of China may be expected to have substantial repercussions outside

Africa. Possible effects in three directions would seem to deserve study:

(a) influence on the attitudes of other States towards recognition of the

People's Republic. ( The Japanese Foreign Office, for instance, announced on

19 January that it was closely watching the developments, though it had to take account of other factors in making its owi decision); (b) effect on the situation in Southeast Asia; and (c) reaction of the United States. -3 -

The following observations, however, are concerned solely with the influence on African States. The African States are now almost evenly divided. Of the 34 members of the African group (including Kenya and Zanzibar), 15 maintain diplomatic relations with the Republic of China and 14 with the People's Republic of China. Ethiopia recognizes the People's Republic, but has not exchanged diplomatic representatives. Ivory Coast, Niger, Nigeria and Sierra Leone apparently have relations with neither. In the United Nations since I960, both sides have gained in African votes as the African membership increased. But the gains of the Republic of China were achieved by active efforts to establish relations with members of the Union of African and Malagasy States. The gains of the People's Republic were due to the attitudes of African members admitted after I960. Though the votes are not necessarily comparable, it may be noted that at the fifteenth session in I960, only Liberia among African States voted for the United States proposal to exclude discussion of Chinese representation. It was opposed by 9 African States: the seven which then recognized the People's Republic of China were joined by Nigeria and Senegal. Fourteen others abstained and one was absent. In favour; Liberia (l vote) Against: Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, United Arab Republic (9 votes) Abstaining;: Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Libya, Madagascar, Niger, Somalia, Togo, Tunsia, Upper Volta (14 votes) Absent; Congo (Leopoldville) (l vote) - 4-

At the eighteenth session, the African votes on the Albanian-

Cambodian draft split as follows: In fa-your: Algpria, Burundi, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic (12 votes) Against: Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville)., Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, Upper Volt a (16 votes) Abstaining; Mauritania, Nigeria, Sierra Leone (3 votes)

Absent; Ethiopia (l vote)

Since then, two new members (Kenya and Zanzibar) have been admitted and both recognize the People's Republic of China.

As a switch of votes of as few as five of those voting against can change the balance at the next session, it is essential to study their attitudes. Most of these States emerged into independence from the French community. The Republic of China had an initial advantage in relations •with them, as she had an embassy in Paris and consulates in French African territories. However, these states were not bound to the Republic of China by any strong ties of economic or political relations. In fact, Senegal indicated a desire tb establish relations with the People's Republic of China. The latter, however, was reported to have insisted that relations with the Republic of China should first be broken. Several factors seem, to have led most of these states to establish relations with the Republic of China; (a) The general policy of the People's Republic of China which seemed to be critical of the role of "French African" States; (b) the pressure, after the formation of the Brazzaville group, - 5 - by the strongly anti-communist governments of Malagasy, Cameroun, etc., for a common' policy by all the members of the group; (c) the active diplomatic efforts by the Republic of China, including the provision of technical assistance; and (d) the desire to develop friendly relations with the

United States. These states may now find it difficult suddenly and individually to recognize the People's Republic of China after having made an initial decision to the contrary, despite the French move. A change of policy after a period of time and in concert among themselves may not, however, be excluded for various reasons. (a) The establishment of the Organization of African Unity is a

new factor, as the number of States recognizing the People's Republic of China is likely to increase. (b) The technical assistance from the Republic of China is not too large. (c) The apparent change in the attitude of the People's Republic of China towards diplomatic representation would permit a change

by governments which seem inclined towards a "two Chinas"

policy.

(d) Though the governments wish to maintain good relations with the United States, their economic, political and military relations are largely with France* A final and perhaps most important factor may be the role of China in relation to the colonial problem which now assumes increasing importance to African ^tates. The People's Republic of China has now succeeded in - 6- establishing relations roith every significant national movement - in Angola,

Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa - and has offered them substantial material aid. The Republic of China cannot compete in this field. Any aggravation of the colonial problem may lead to pressure on African States to establish contacts with the People1s Republic of

China.

A change of policy by "French African" States, on the colonial question rather than as a result of a change of French policy, may be more popular and perhaps even be regarded as opposite, (it may be recalled that

France may very well have recognized the People's Republic of China in 1950, but for the latter's recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Many of the present leaders of "French Africa", notably the President of the Ivory Coast, had then supported Vietnam's right to independence, and perhaps owe the peaceful transition to independence of their owi countries partly to the struggle of the Vietnamese). CR.13 (4-59) ROUTING ILI P

Comments for the record should not be written on this slip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.108 should be used instead. TO; U Thant, Secret ary-General

APPROVAL YOUR INFORMATION MAY WE CONFER? AS REQUESTED

YOUR SIGNATURE FOR ACTION NOTE AND FILE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE

NOTE AND RETURN PREPARE DRAFT YOUR COMMENTS ATTACH RELATED PAPERS

DATE: FROM: V.P. S 9

BOEB^OB

-£AIaS V3S3S ISO SO?M ASM

>» «./« 9 PBEECEH CHO?J EErZA£ S TOS3? %0 SOUM AS51

1<> Soon after their zstusa from a sei?@n«week visit to ten African states, &B& taking ooly a few days off to Pe&ing*, Premier Gfaou Ea-lsi sa& Marshal Chen Yi bsgan their too? of South Asia* Buying this tou^ hegiassing on 2& February and lasting uatil 29 Fefcjfuasyp they visited BussBSa Bakistea sad Cegrlon. Unlike their visit to Africa^ tbs South Asian eouatx-ies have bean visited a OTsaber of tines befor@ by ?f®aie? CSacas ®st£ otfea? high-saakiag Cisiaes© officials^ All three ceuatzles wes® asossag t&® vesy first to recognis© ara2 establish cliplsssatic missiosjs tjlth the Faople'e Republic of China aM hav@ coastaatl^ advocated, its right to 5?egreeent that couBta^r in t&e United JSatiosss. 2* In contrast to the visits in Africa^ they t?sxe sot looking for contacts or an o^poTtmii^r to ©equslat tb@ host countries %ltb tfeei? Nevertheless^ Kr. Ghou Si-lsi tooSc tha op|jortxmity to reiterate the Bd need of Af ro-Asiaa solidarity,, ths slssilaslty of the aattire of their struggle fo? irjfle|xEijfiences and the ai3f irations for tfe© fusturs Tdiicb cîna stated that it sh&7@£ tirith all othe? Afro-Asiaa states « Here egainj he stresses the dangers of aec-colonialisms ss& by plication ii^resssd upon his host count?i@s Mo oouats3r9s eissa^le of seLf-relieac©. She Ghioes® Issiisrs r©|»aatefi3y expressed their belief that the aswly iBtte^safieat coautries couM eoasolldate their esd aatôsmi ecoaca^r l)jr de^sMiug sgaialj OB ths @f fos?ts of thei? peoples esd thai? o>m azatsrial ^sources « At the SSKS t2aie th<^r their ^hes^nee to the five pxlnciplsis of co-osiGteaca asfl th@ ten pjfineiples. 3* S%ro subjects., therefoye^ B®smsd to be u^ssiaost in ths asicsi. of the Chinese Psssmier duriiig the em?s°eat tou?| the coa-?©aia§ of a second Eaafiuag Gonfersae© oi^ the resolving of the bosder di@gmt@ with SE&ia, Those tô to ha lnt©r«re3Bted ia as such ae the rols that CiaSna woulS wish to play ixt any future Af jp»-Asian ccafewmee ie boisaS to b© affestefi "by its selKtiosB «itfe other Asian States. k, IXaring his AfKlcaa tour Mr. C&ou, la-^lai must ha^@ es&sed & feelieg of Siesôi&tssst ov@? the clesdlock seaehed la the settlsasEBft of the Sin dilute j, asfi ia soa^ t^ss^®^ the %l@@e Eig&t hav@ âen laid at his door. Daring a stopover in Bajagoon., OB hie return Jous-noy fs«®a Africa^ Mr. Chou fe- asked BUSES to sousaS out Mr. Sshru on a -possible saeetiag with him sod also to geffsuade Xcdia cot to $ress its opposition to a seeosd Bandung Conferenceo Sibils General Be Wia8s sudden visit to Slew Delhi did not remit in any encouraging signs towards a s?s.gi»roeh©tteat<> there were mvsrthelass indications that Xcdia might be Hilling to consider seme a«w pKOgosals to end the iasgasee reached in the eettlesoe&t of its dispute ^rith CMma^ es was clear frcm & speech asde by Mr. Shastri in the IMiaa Parlisaaeat on 19 February and by the official sraleeae given in SSe*y Delhi to ths cosasuniquffl which expressed the hope that direct negotiations wouM between Sadia and China OB the basis of Colosnbo Pcwera9 profosals. 'rhes© efforts wars resumed by £&£• Ba&fiaxa&aS&e* Frisae Miaieter of C@ylon| 3h@ reporfesfily proposed that China shouM agree to th® pssssenee of Xsaian civilian posts in the SO kilmstre d&ailit&ri!&@& 5Eoa@ on th© Chinee© side ef their "actual line of coafcrol" in the westers sector (XsfiaJsh). fhese 'wsm press reports that China sight accent the Ceylsasse suggestion,? but the issued in Colombo did not indicate sc3r agr«@3ienê It only stated that China had expressed "readiness to continue to @@laiQs cosisultatioas witSi other of his Govem%nt is Pskisg. 5. Oa the st&êct of a secoaS ^Mtang Coaferaactgj-, Premier Chou Sn-lai secured full si^sKsrt frcsa Bafeis-tan while Busasa @&d Ceylea £shcrt?sd reluctance to be dmsm into the controversy of Beafiuag VB, Bslgâfie* l^hile BUSES, agrsed in principle on the &@$& of easasTdiag aM streQg&he&i&g the co&tscts of Afro-Aeian States^ it did net agree t?ith the Chiasse lseae?s to include ia the joint cosGsaaaiûd any reference to the convening of a sscssd Conference 5 CeyloB apparent3y feas sss objection to the second Conference as long as it is held after the Conference* of the nations for -HMch Ceylon ta a ec°3^92a8or tfith 2M.ia^ Bigoslovia United Araib B@pv3>li

8. On its 9ide? Pakl@t@4a was gratified that IB the joint GGs$EauE)l<£u

in the Seeuslty Cmmeil3 eseopt that Hr

towards the aasdiatozy efforts of Buasm end Ceylon e 11. Although Mr. Ghou Si-lai bad visited Fa&istsaa b©£os© in 195^ vfe gskistsa was already © sffisfb©? ®f the Western sponsored ailitasgr pacts^ Ms present visit led to seae United States pyotestatioa®,, Th® ISaited States had @frai2ar3y reacted when last year Pa&istas signed with tba Pe®gle°s

Be&ublic of Chins. (l) & trade agressseat la J&auary; fii) a bosde? ags?eeiBe1\& in Karehs and {i£i} a civil aviation agreement in August » Soon sites' the signing of the Aiyliae egr®eaeat9 Hr6 Gsorge Ball; United States Ursa@r-Seey«ta.£,,* of State5 paid & visit to Ifekistsn aasi9 aecosdiag to SCESS e^ecific eosEmitoent fKasi Pald-staa to atop its "dslft"

BEklatan9 oa the other heaSg jaaintained that it® various ®gs@Oite«ts <^iim were "updght intesrastioKSl deals" sM could not to on any aeeoust* The Utaited Ststsn cireles had thought that duriag the cvtrsent visit Chic® and Pakistan might sigs a treaty of f^ieEiSship^ imvigatioa asd coffimeree if &ot "a Eon-aggressioa pact". ?aki6teaff hareve?9 mMe no

IS. 2n srîte of the receat tread in its fo?eiga policy to establish sad develop nossaal and f£iex&ly relatieag with the SoGis.15.st Statea9 ggkis'csa felt that Ghl^, o-as not in a position to ES©t [email protected] 3 reqvdreaisats fo? loag-teaaa ®cosayeciat @£>«ut the coEfeisuefi stsBiasd relatioas betweâ their States* ££d Pi^QsMsufc ^yub felt sufficiently ©sccmmgsd to at&te at Press Conference that wif GU? gcod offices ar@ êqaired at asy tlsEs., should be only too gl®d5 because we Mil sesve the interest of Asian th€ iaterest of sroi?M geace5 eM it ^ril3. Mv® a ^saricg OB our security 5 well* . Bs&istaa -H©S^ h&«mv@r9 laalitely to s^k© auy sior© ia that rsspeet •uithowt a favoussfele resôas© frsss the United States » \

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: U Thant Secretary-General Date:. October_lQ65_

THROUGH: FILE NO.: .

N. A. Nesterenko FROM: Under-Secretary for Political and Security Council Affairs SUBJECT: Estimates of voting on the question of the representation of China in the United Nations.

I am sending hereby enclosed a note on the abovementioned subject, •which has been prepared in this Department. It should be noted, however, that the probable result of the voting on the question, •whether the change in the representation of China in the United Nations should be considered as an important question under Article 18 of the Charter,is more difficult to assess due to the fact that the vote on the preliminary question has been held in 1961 while up-to-date information frcm delegations appears to be not so readily available as on the substantive question since, among others, the African group has so far not been holding a meeting on the subject. k October 1965

THE jUSSTIOK OF THE OF CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

The number of States favouring the seating of the representatives of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations has been steadily increasing in the last few years. In the meantime, a number of political developments has taken place in the period "between 1963, "when the last vote on the question was taken in the General Assembly, and the present Assembly, which are bound to enhance the number of votes in favour of the restoration of the rights of the PEG in the United Nations. The most significant among them are:

(1) In October 1964 the PEC became the fifth member of the "nuclear club", thus reinforcing the argument that she should be brought into the United Nations to make any discussion and eventual agreement on disarmament really meaningful;

(2) Since the last vote in 1963, France has established diplomatic relations with the PRO and she should, therefore, be expected to vote for the seating of the representatives of the PRC. The statement of the French Foreign Minister before the present Assembly can be taken as a confirmation of this expectation.

(3) Both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom have made statements to the press to the effect that the United Kingdom was interested in assuring the proper representation of the PRC in the United Nations organs. The latest statement of Mr. Wilson at the recent Labour - 2 -

Party Conference in Blackpool, seems, however, to indicate less vigour in favouring the idea than the earlier statements would imply;

(Ij.) ihe number of African States that have recognized the PRC has grown to 18 and in the cases where previous relations existed with the Government of Nationalist China, such relations have teen severed upon establishing of diplomatic relations with the # PRO.

At the XVIth session of the General Assembly a resolution (1668-XVI) was adopted providing that "any proposal to change the representation of China" was "an important question" in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter. It may be assumed that at the present session, this "preliminary question" will again be raised in one form or another. A country by country estimate of the voting on the preliminary question at this session as compared to the vote taken at the XVXth session is to be found in Annex 2. In estimating the vote it has been borne in mind that, as previously, a number of delegations, while prepared to vote in favour of the restoration of the rights of the PRC would nevertheless vote in favour of considering the matter as an important question under Article 18. Similarly, some delegations who would abstain in the vote on the representation draft resolution would cast an affirmative vote on the question of the applicability of Article 18. Illustrative of this trend are the results of the voting in the XVIth session on the two resolutions dealing with the question. There were 36 votes in favour of seating the representatives of the PRC, 1*8 against and 20 abstentions

* See Annex 1 for Tabulation on the relationship of African States with China. -3 -

while the vote on the preliminary question was 6l in. favour of considering it an important question under Article 18 of the Charter, 5^ against and 5 abstentions. An estimate of the vote on the question of substance in the present session as compared to the vote at the XVIUth session is to be found in Annex 3- The estimates of the voting on the preliminary question and on the question of substance have been made on the basis of examination of the previous attitudes of Member States on the representation issue and in J&M-tjL some casesAon information obtained from delegations. ANNEX 1

DIPLOMATIC (As of 1 October 1965)

Diplomatic Relationship With Diplomatic Relationship With Cgugtrj Algeria Relations est» Jiily Eton©' Burundi Relations ®st« January 1964 Ion® Has not recognised Relations est» February I960

Central African Republic Relations ©st0 Octoter 1964 Relations est. June 1962 3 severed November 1964 Chad Has not recognised Relations est. January 1962 Relations est. February 1964 Rslatione est, -September 196Q| severed April 1964 Has not recogniaed Relations est. Deesasber 1961 Relations est, Kovembar 1964 Relations severed April 1965

.Ethiopia Recognised Janiaary 19^49 but no steps yet taker* to est. diplomatic relations Hone Gabon Has sot recognised Relations est. December I960 Has recognised Hone

Ghana Relations este July I960 1 Guinea Relations oate October 1959 Ivory Has .not rocognised Relations ast, July 1963 Kenya Relations ®st. January 1964 Liberia Has not recognised Relations est, August 1957

Libya Has not recognised Relations ©st0 Decerabep 1959 Malagasy .Republic Has not recognised Relations set. July I960 Malawi Has not recognised 1'one

Mall Relations 03t9 October I960 Mono Ifeuritsrsie Relations est, July 1965 Relations severed July 1965 Diplomatic Relationship With Diplomatic Relationship With 11 Country ThePfople s RepQ of (Mm nationalist China. If Any

Halations est. November 195® None ' . . Has not recognised Relations eat. July 1963 Has "two-China policy1' but no foraaL relations with either S@© column 2 Rwanda Has not reeogftiaed Relations est, July 1962 Has "twB-Caina policy" but no foraal Relations ©st. June 1960| severed rslations with either at present. Sierra L©on© Has not recognised Relations ©sto September 1?63 Somali Republic Relations eat. B©@@mb©r I960 South Afxdoa Has not recognised Relations est. prior to 1927 Sudan Relations established Relations severed Tanzania Relations est. December 1961 Hone Togo Has not recognised Relations estc April I960

Tunisia Relations este January 1964 None Relations ©sto October 1962 Ifon® United Arab Republi© Eelations est. 1956 None Upper Volta Has not rseognisod Relations est. December 1961 Zambia Has reeognised CS. 12 (10-64) GENERAL ASSEMBLY

ROL L C A L Session Plenary Meeting Date: Committee Time: Question at issue: Yes No Abstain Yes No Abstain AFGHANISTAN y y LAOS y y ALBANIA yy LEBANON yy ALGERIA y LIBERIA yy ARGENTINA LIB YA yy AUSTRALIA ^yy LUXEMBOURG yy AUSTRIA yy MADAGASCAR yy BELGIUM yy MALAWI y MALAYSIA / BOLIVIA yy MALI riAUMtt y1^ yy BRAZIL vy yy BULGARIA yy MALTA ^ BURMA yy MAURITANIA y y BURUNDI y MEXICO yy BYELORUSSIAN S.S.R. yy MONGOLIA y/ CAMBODIA vV MOROCCO yv CAMEROON yy NEPAL y>/ CANADA vy NETHERLANDS yy CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC y y NEW ZEALAND v/V CEYLON y/ NICARAGUA yy, CHAD yy NIGER yy CHILE *X NIGERIA v/y CHINA yy NORWAY yy COLOMBIA yy PAKISTAN y y CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) y y PANAMA y^ CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF yy PARAGUAY yy COSTA RICA vV PERU y^ CUBA yy PHILIPPINES y/ CYPRUS yv POLAND yy CZECHOSLOVAKIA yy PORTUGAL v/y DAHOMEY y y ROMANIA yy DENMARK yy RWANDA y DOMINICAN REPUBLIC yy SAUDI ARABIA /• ECUADOR yy, SENEGAL y y EL SALVADOR /y SIERRA LEONID y. y V ETHIOPIA /y SOMALIA *" " '""" y y FINLAND yy SOUTH AFRICA yy FRANCE y y SPAIN yy GABON Q^nQiA /Voi/ y SUDAN yy GHANA yy SWEDEN /y GREECE yy SYRIA yy GUATEMAL A yy THAILAND yy GUINEA yy TOGO y HAITI y/ TRINIDAD and TOBAGO y HONDURAS yy TUNISIA /y HUNGARY /y TURKEY yy ICELAND yy UGANDA y INDIA yy UKRAINIAN S.S.R. L/V y UNION of SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS /y IRAN yy UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC /•/ IRAQ yy UNITED KINGDOM yy IRELAND yy UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA y y ISRAEL yy UNITED STATES yy ITALY yy UPPER VOLTA yy, IVORY COAST yy URUGUAY yy, JAMAICA y VENEZUELA yy JAPAN x/y YE MEN yy JORDAN yy YUGOSLAVIA yy KENYA y ZAMBIA ^-^ ^^ KUWAIT s/ © Safc- Total: TOTAL : (j%) U> & R& p re a e/) Aa bio r>

CS. 12 (10-64) GENERAL ASS_EMBLY } 9^5- y ROLL CALL

SetRsinn Plenary Mpp-tiog Date: Committee . Tim*- Question at issue: Yes No Abstain Yes No Abstain AFGHANISTAN y y LAOS yy / j ALBANIA y y LEBANON yy ALGERIA y y LIBERIA yy ARGENTINA y y LIBYA yy AUSTRALIA yy LUXEMBOURG AUSTRIA yy MADAGASCAR yy BELGIUM y y MALAWI y BOLIVIA yy MALAYSIA vr. yy BRAZIL yy MALI yy BULGARIA yy MALTA y BURMA \f \s . MAURITANIA y y BURUNDI \/ \/ MEXICO yy BYELORUSSIAN S.S.R. y y MONGOLIA yy CAMBODIA y y MOROCCO yy, CAMEROON NEPAL yy CANADA yy NETHERLANDS yy CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC y NEW ZEALAND yy CEYLON yy NICARAGUA yy CHAD yy NIGER yy CHILE yy NIGERIA yy CHINA yy NORWAY yy COLOMBIA yy PAKISTAN yy CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) y y PANAMA yy CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF yy PARAGUAY yy COSTA RICA yy PERU yy CUBA yy PHILIPPINES yy CYPRUS y x/ POLAND yy CZECHOSLOVAKIA yy PORTUGAL yy DAHOMEY y y ROMANIA yy DENMARK yy RWANDA yy DOMINICAN REPUBLIC yy SAUDI ARABIA yy ECUADOR yy SENEGAL y y EL SALVADOR SIERRA LEONE \/ / yy o^»AAtTA tSAVS^ pOrv t3T y £JX y' y y ETHIOPIA v/y SOMALIA yy FINLAND yy SOUTH AFRICA yy FRANCE V y SPAIN yy GABON \v f yy SUDAN yy GHANA yy . * SWEDEN yy GREECE yy SYRIA yy GUATEMALA yy THAILAND yy GUINEA yy TOGO yy HAITI yy TRINIDAD and TOBAGO yy HONDURAS TUNISIA /y HUNGARY yy TURKEY yy ICELAND yy UGANDA yy INDIA yy UKRAINIAN S.S.R. yy i Mnn MF^UA t UNION of SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS \f yV Vy , IRAN yy UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC yy IRAQ yy UNITED KINGDOM yy IRELAND yy UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA yy ISRAEL yy UNITED STATES yy ITALY yy, UPPER VOLTA yy IVORY COAST yy URUGUAY yy JAMAICA y/V::r> y VE NEZUELA yy JAPAN y y YE MEN yy JORDAN yy YUGOSLAVIA yy KENYA y ZAMBIA >n?) KUWAIT yy 0D (£%) Sub- Total: TOTAL: (gj) (g) @ PolAtj.jjal.and Securit.Y Council Affairs Department CONFIDENTIAL 1 April 1966 CDHrraw

3,o Since fehe and of the £0th session of the Genial Assembly a nwibsr of » developsrsnta have occurred which say affect the attitude of governments toward the solution Of the China question*

L :> It, Political changes since ;thg_..Aaj J'..AS;SggJ 3.^ ffJXJch j&?-y igd-^enC-Q .._ths. chanceg of aeatizg the Represent aMA?^ 2« Shpu3/i the problem of seating the PHG be presented in the same vray as last year, naataly in the form of the two resolutions, one substantive and the other procedural - wJjich is highly unlikely - there is no reason to believe that there would bs at the present tiaio an increase in the number of votes in favour of seafcir^ the PRC0~' There are several reasons for this, among them of particular interest is the nature of the changes v?hich have occurred in the governments of a nuiKber of countries^ especially in Africa, (a) Dahomey aitl the Central African Aepublio broke diplomatic relations in January wa.th the PJtC0 Sahoaiej did not participate in the votirjg on both resolutions whereas tho Central African itepubiic voted in favour of the seating of ths PP,C on both resolutions,, (b) Ghana and Nigeria both had coups dT^tat» Ghana had diplomatic relations with the PRO and maintained bhsss diploicatic relations r after the coupa Nigeria did not and doos not hax c diplonsatic relations with both Chinas* (c) In the Congo ( Leopold ville) Colo Kobutu came to poi/or since the last vote on China « -The Congo did not participate in the ^ote on ths substsntiro resolution and Troted in favour of the tsvo-thirds majority on the procedural resolution* (d) .ftmong countries that hac! no changes of r€giaie in Africa, Burimdij Cameroon and Chad abstained on both resolutions, and Kuan da, Senegal and Tunisia abstained on the substaiibive one taut voted agaiast the procedural one0 Among these coantries there may be a slight shift against admission. (s) BasutoJand and Bechuanaland i-ri.11. be independent before the next General Assembly ancL, as recipients of considerable aid fi'oia the Republic of Uhina, might abstain on the ouestion of admitting Peking,

I/ Ambassador Goldberg at a news conf srence on 28 Farch stated that he believed that the PliC would get fewer votes now than at the last {£ ) British Guiana, which vail raise be independent by the nest has a conservative go^*crnmenii at the present time and its hopes foi* American aid v»«M not make it likely to vote for- the adralssion of Possible 3e A nuK&eir> oi* possible clanges in American. attitudes ara presently being Studied by the American Gtytfernajent, Several indications oi this wero given during the month of Karcho In a speech in Chicago Aesisfcarsfc Secretary of State for international Organisation Affairs, Joseph J, Sisco, stated that instead of reaffirming the rigid determination of the United States to bar the PRO from the United Nations, "we will continue our efforts to prevent the expulsion * i . 11 of the Hept&He of China 0 The new strategy wouM consist in concentrating teericaa policy on ways to preserve the rights of the Republic of China in the

U2J r&ths? than to keep the PfiC outft ITiis apja-oaeh was also eccpnsssed by Anbassador Goldberg who, 5jn a speseh in Berkeley California on 25 March., said that the real question tvas not "whether we should recognise Comnauilsb China oar support its admission to ths United Nations" but whether "the United » , States is prspas?ed to agree that the 22 million people of Tcdv?an are. to be handed over to Peking against their KQltt* A* Such declarations do open the possibility Soy the US to adopt the policy of "the two Chinas". It should bo noted,, however, that this might not be as radical a departure from previous policy as it 'would appaar: the US representative,, in his speech in the debate at tho General Assembly, was not one of those who contended that the prsssnt delegation of China represented all the Chinese people* 5» Secretary o£ State Dean iiusk oji several occasions*™* has also indicated that he was not rulLig out eomplstoly the possibility that the US slight shift its polity regarding ac&tdssion of, the P&C to the OK on condition that the raparesesfcation of the present regime would continue., HaV howQvers placed the emphasis on different aspects o.f the problem than ?&» GoiMbergs by stating srepeatedly Wiat any further steps toward improved relations between the US and tho PRC should eoise froa the PHC througt th® modification of its policies of militancy and self-issposed isolation » He was not optimistic about a changed PSC attitudes "those carrying official responsibility come up against the rather harsh facts that the Pe3d.ssg regime does not now im'3 a serious interest

2/ CBS interview HPaco the Nation", March '20s press coherence in Washington^ March 25« -3-

ia improved rolaticnR" a As to the proposal of ?:;f;e--?r:î^--n^ Hvr-phrey that ths PJRC be "contained bin not isolated" .5 Seru'etory Ru^k E?t,îed "hrl, !,'io i£ojnt:on was a s;elf---imponee ono and "tho efforts that hive je:.n :,v?/i;-'; to Ivc'ik Uirû^h i! this isolation havo not been avtd.lod o£ 4 &"< trie t/uortior <..-.? •:•. rjc-.-.t .r»x' Pi;kir,j at tha UJ! he thought that the irdtiati.vc; shotiid Ivav-j io cc. ;<. :n.a .:,!•. .-i Pi:C c..;-i that this was un3ake3y as ono of thotr p:'econdivions wa-j ihu «:<-;ulîor;

6n Senator Javits, in a speech on 20 March, stated "since 1949 United States policy toward Consminist China has boon static and largely negatives Wo ha-vo done and must continue to do ti/hat we nuistj that is contain Red Chins, rei3it3.rily.

But we should now begin as x«rell? in a measured and careful jnanncr,, the; process o£ trying to bring CoEin-maist. China into the eoiraniinity of nat-iono". This, he addedj shouild not rs&on tJiat the US vition: and c;ur,h participation woi^Ld ba facilitated if it wore "a raeniber of the coansunity of nations"e ?o In spits of the new wave of statoiaonfcs by. American poDiiiciansj officials and a part of the acadeaic oonnajnitgr/for a change in the 'US policy towei-ds tho PRC, ons has to keep in saind the Tact that a connlder'abls se0vent of the same public has not ye& been brought a-round to favour tl-sat jp-olic;/,-, According to some this ms.y in part bo due to the "China Lobby" and ita effectiveness c certain segraents of ths US population} especial^- legislators., Thus the 193 scholars - members of the Association for A'sian Studi.es - who signed a atate calling for a change in policy., represent a small minority of the 3^374 scholars belonging to that Association* Furthermore;, 300 meanbors or the Senate and House of Represent at ives front teth P&3rbie>? adapted a raaolutiou on 23 Jfes^ch in which they declared themselves "opposed to the adicisoion of Coaanunist China to the UK and tc the recognition of the Peking regime by the United atates and the establishment oi* soramercial relations bet we on ths United k States and ths PRO and to any policy which msy bo interpreted as condoning aggression direct co* indirect of Goaaaffliot; Uhi:-- against its noi^-boui-s-**. ^

This declaration v/as published in Kei-r York by the Contnittse oi One MS.llion Against t^i0 Admisoioii of Communisi China to th@ United fetiona and includes tho 3CX) parliamentarians» t.wo"Ghina question at the United Mat ions 0 During Mi*' debate on the seating of the People's Republic of China a of spaaksrs seemed to favour SOB:® forsi of representation far- tb?. p E«publie of China., should the repreaentativas of the PHG be s sated » The discussion ahowoi also that a number of countries who wers in favcuj- of scat-ing the PRO did not wto for it because of tha harsh language of the draft resolution. calling for the expulsion of Taiwan. It is therefore logical that those governments who wish to sea the representatives of tha FUG neatcd v.culd seek vays to proviso SOHKJ type of reprsseJitaiion for Taiwan,:, Speakers recalled the fact that tho Taiwan Government had effective control over a. territory containing 12 million people and could therefore not be considered a covoprjnent in G3tile6 Some stated that the Charter provided for expulsion only if a Hsyrbez1 did not fulfil its obligations and that thio vras defin3.te3y not ths case of the Taiwan Govorn- rasnt. Still others refori-ed to the fact that it was not. without precodcmt in tho United Nations b hat more than one seat was hold by representatives of the same peopld - one a Great Power seat and -the other an ordinary seat* As to the ways in which the representation of Taiwan would be assureds the important con- • sideration ia that it be brought about in accordance with the principles of the Charter* 9» ^fhe problem (as I see it) is not whether the Chinese People's Republic wanted to be a jjanber of the 053 or not, but rather that it should bo jaads clear to the Government of the PRO that the seat of China is available, should they desire to join« This., though, would nofe necessarily involve an ittvi.tat.ion but & notification*, IV. Attitude of the PHC to wards the

1G0 There is no reason to beliovs that the -official attitude of tho PHC towards the UN has changed since it was expressed by For sign Minister Chen Yi in his 29 September 1965 press conference « At that tims the Foreign 2-ii.n?,3ter stated that ths UN was "a tool of the United States while fcha US was tho overlojtrd of ths M(f« Ho added that there has been some chango recently, as the UN was not any more tho exclusive tool of the US as in the past, but had now become the tool of a few Big Powers, primriXy the US3 that used it as a bargaining place,, In answer to the question of a Japanese foreign correspondent on the question of rsstoz!ng to China its i-egltimats H.ghts in the UU^ the Foreign Minister stated the conditions which would have to be fulfilled before the PftC would consider to be s. part of tha UK? libei-ation of the OH from the control of the US and other F ,.g -5-

Powers; passage of a resolution expelling "the elements of bho Chiang Kai-shek - cliqual(s official admission and correction of all past mistakes* and in particular cancellation of the resolution condemning China and tha Democratic Peopled Republic of Korea as aggressors in Korea and condemning the US instead; a thorough reorganization and reform and a full roviev; of 'the Charter; and finally

expulsion of all 'Saperialist puppets0« Ho Since the end of the J&th session of the General Assembly increasing emphasis has boon put by the PEC on accusing the M of furthering the "collusion" . between the US ancl.tho USSRo ISo The 20th session. of the Assembly vas characterised by e,n editorial of the of 2? December 1965 as having achieved three objectives 5 it opposed the revolutionary movonents of the oppressed nations ard peoples 5 it •was "an anti-China conference which vdlfully interfered in the 'internal affairs of sovereign states'.' arid thirdl* y it provided a fonira for the pursuancs of the policy of "Afflerican-~Soviefi. cooperation for the domination of the -world" ••.•,' 0 The title of the editorial "TKe United Nations is an American-Soviet Political

Market Place" indicates whetre the eaiphasis of the assessment Iies0

13d At feha time of ltps Khrushchev, tha editorial states. Soviet-Amca-ieaa was attempted directly between the leaders of 'the tvro countries., but since his downfall it is the United Nations that is baing used as a» inotru™ ment fordaala0 "Todjvy, both the US impar-ialisto and the Khrushchev rs^rl sionists 8 are going all out for 'upholding' and 'strengthening the Unit ad Nations 0 But the joore evil it does,, the quicker it will go bankrupt,,, Such are the dialectics of history" o 14* The decisions of the AssemblLyy the editorial coranentss a.nd the behind-the-scenes bargaining havo led to the collusion of the United States arid the Soviet Union on the following questions: te) yjjgfcSSISS* ®v&n though this problem was outside the scops of the United Nations its rostrum was used to "peddle the US imperialist peace talks swindle" « Furthermore there was behind-the-scenes bargaining and secret talks between Mr. Groa^ko and Mr. Rnsk0 The speech of the Soviet delegate on the rostrum contained only a few remarks of censure of the US which were not taken seriously by either of theiaq Pprainican Uepubjlgi The Soviet Union endorsed "the United 'States rialisBi's arjred intervention" by first agreeing to put off the vote on the resolution calling for the withdrawal of US troops from tha Dominican Republic^and thus allowing, "the US aggressor to go on with his sanguisiary nassaers there of the patriotic so3.diers and peoplis-"^ and then joining the Uaited States in the vote to authorise the Secretary-General to send representatives to the Dominican Republic to conduct an investigation "which v»uld enable the US to take further steps to intervene in the internal affairs of the Dcaninican Republic through the instrumentality of the United Nations",, The Soviet Union also favoured a permanent cease-fire thare "with a -view to force its patriotic soldiers and people to lay down their anas"0 India^Patdstar^ conflict. ; The Soviet Union took a biased stand in favour of "India's aggression" against Pakistan by voting with the United States in favour of four resolutions which resulted in impeding any Pakistan counter-attack in self-defence against the invasion launched by Indian reactionaries*" On the Kashmir question, the Soviet Union also joined the US in ignoring the right of self -determination of the Kashmir people o (d) Southern Rhodesia; The Soviet Union .joined in a resolution which constituted an act of betrayal of the African people's revolutionary struggle, by asking Britain to put down the "anti-imperialist strijggls of the Zimbabwe people",, (e) Permanent^ UN geace f ore e ; The USSR worked actively to set up a permanent United Nations force which really amounts to a counter<-r

(f) Preventing nuclear proliferation and consolidating jnacleari mpnogoj^;: It was common knowledge that the two governments have for a long time carried out behind-the-scenes consultations over the prevention of nuclear proliferation and thus "deprived peace-loxdng nations of their right to possess the means of defence against OS nuclea? black-

"&ai3ing_an anti -China chorus" t Mien the US led the canpaign against China, going so far asr to interfere vdth China" s internal affairs by using its allied to oppose the restoration of the legitimate sights of China in the United Nations, the Soviet delegate made only a per- • functory speecho In addition he lost no opportunity to attack China by insinuation; thus he said that "certain persons" assumed a "nihilist attitude" toward the United Cations ard spread "pessimism" about dis» armmento He declared that the India-Pakistan conflict would only- work to the "advantage35- of a third party and warned "others not to interfere in the internal affairs of countries on ideological, or other grounds'3 „ 15 <. Official spokesmen of the PRO have repeatedly objected to any handling of

the Vietham question by the UH0 Foreign Minister Chen Yi9 in the press COB- ference of 29 September 1965s stated squarely that the UN had no right to inter- fare in the Vietnam question,, At the time the Security Council had taken up the Vietnam quesion on the request of the US on 1 and 2 February 1966, the objection of the PRO to this procedure was again strongly escpressedc A state~ juent of the Foreign Ministry of 2 February accuses the US of calling on its tool the UK to cover up the resumption of borabing of North Vietnam « "As is well knowns the UN has no right whatsoever to intervene in the Vietnam question and it is entirely illegal for the Security Council to discuss the. questicme«o Consideration of the US war acts in Vietnam falls within the competence of the 1954 Geneva Conference o.n Indo-Ghina and not of the UJJ Security Council 0 Any resolution by the UH Sectirity Council intervening in the Vi etnas question will be null and void0" This statement was repeated by editorials of the esazic date in the Fep.plels, and all Peking newspapers and by bx-oadoasts through the Jlew China News Agency „ Polit leal _and j3_ecuri t;g Council Affairs.Department COKFIDEKTI&L 1 April 1966 COT: raw

Since the end of the 20th session of tha Gonesnal Asseaabj^ a number of have occurred which asay affect the attitude of governzesnts toward the solution of the China, question. g Political changes sines the last Ass^ab]vy v4]jktfiJ^Y_l^l.a. "ce the chances of Besting the Representatj^^ of 2o Should the problem of seating the PRO be preserved in the same way as

3ast yearf rassaily in the fo;m of the two resolutions s one substantive and the other procedural - ^ieh is highly unlike3y «• there is no reason to believe that thsro -would ba at the present tiaio an increase in the number of votes If/ in favour of seating the PRC0- There are several reasons for this,, among them of particular interest is the nature of the changos which have occurred in the goveriuaer&s of a number of countries, especially in Africa,, (a) Dahom^jr a«i the Central Africsin Republic broke diploiratic relations jji January with the PltC0 Saliomqjr did not participate in the voti?>g on both resolutions whereas the Central African Republic rated in favour of the seating of the PHC on both resolutions,, (b) Ghana and Nigeria both had coups d'etat, Ghana had diplossatic relations with the PRC &nd 3raJ.ntained these diplomatic relations after the coup0 Nigei*ia did not and does not have diplomatic relations with both Chinas. (c) In the Congo ( Leopold viHo} Colo Mobutu came to power since the last vote on China 0 -The Congo did not participate in the vote on the substantive resolution and voted in favozir of the two-thirds majority on the procedural resolution* (d) Among countries that had no changes of regime in Africa, Burundi, Cameroon and Chad abstained on both resolutions;, and Ruanda5 Senegal and Tunisia abstained on tha substantive one but voted against the procedural one. JUaong these eoimtries there nay be a slight shift against admission 0 (e) Baautoland and Bechuanaland vri.ll be independent before ths nexfe General AssemWy and> as recipients of considerable aid from the Republic of Uhina, might abstain on the question of admitting Peking „

I/ Ambassador Goldbeig e,t a nsws conf ^-ence on 28 March stated that he believed that the PfiC would get fewer votes now than at the last

British Guiana, which vd.Il also be independent by the nseb has a, conservative go\*ern>Eer>l at the present tiros and its hopes for tasericaa aid wouM not -mkv it likely to vote for the admission Of

3» A auKbsr ol' possible clanges in American attitudes srs presently bc-ir-3 studied by the American Govemassnto Several indications of this were given during fcho month of Karcho In a spsech in Chicago A.ssieLar«t. Secretary of State for international Organisation Affeii*3j Joseph Jo S5.sco3 stated that instead of reaffirming the rigid determination of ths United States to bar the PRO from the United Nations, "ws will coatintie our efforts to prevent the e>"pu3.3ion of the Republic of China" 0 The new strategy would consist in concent rating Aaericaa policy on ways to preserve the rights of the Republic of China in the US rather than ix> keep the PflC outo This approach was also expressed by Anibassadop Goldberg Tiiho, in a speech ,1.n Berkeley, California OK 25 March, said that the real question was not ^i^hother we should recognise Coiuisunist China 03? support its admisaion to the United Nations" but vðar "the United * States is prepared to agree that the 22 million psople of Taiwan are to be handed over to Peking againat their will". 4., Such declarations do opsn the possibility for the US to adopt th© policy of "the two Chinas" « It should to noted, however, that this might not be as radical a departure from previous policy as it 'would appears the US representative, in his speech in the debate at the Gersral Assembly, was not one o£ those who contended that the present delegation of China represented all the Chinese people « 5o Secretary of State Dean itusk on several occasions-^ has also indicated that he was not ruling out completely the possibility that, the US might shaft 3.ts policy regarding admission of, the PEC to the IK! on condition that the representation of the present regime would continue 0 He',' however $ placed the eiaphasis on different aspects of the problem thsn Mr,, GoMberg, by stating rspeab«d3y that sny further stops toward improved relations between the US and the PSC ehoxslii coiae froa the PHC throu@i the moc&fication of its policies of sailitaaey and self«in$io3Qd isolatiosio He was not optisaistiG aboiAt, a changed FKC attitudes "those cej?rying official responsibility come up agaasist the rather harsh facts that the Peking regime does not now have a serious interest

2/ CBS inbesrvie&r "Face the Nation", Har-ch -20; press conference in Washington, March 25o in improved relations"<> As to the proposal of ?ico---President Humphrey that ths " PftC be "contained but not iso^&ted"j Secretary Rusk stated that the isolation was a self-iEzposed ono and "the efforts that have been r/;ade to break through this isolation have not been availed of"« On the question of a coat for Peking at the UU ho thought tint the initiative should have to cosie froza the PfiG and that this was unlikely as one of their preconditions was the expulsion o:? Taiwano The US however was committed not to "surrender Formosa"<, Furthermore.? both Taiwan and Peking wore opposed, to the "iv/o Chinas" and the question was therefore, in his opinion, a hypothetical one.

6» Senator Javits5 in a speech on 20 I-Sarchj stated "oinse 1949 United States policy toward Coramunisi China lias been static and Xargo.ly ncgativo, We have done and must continue to do what we oust, that is contain Rod China militarily,, But we should now begin as well, in a measured suid careful manner, the process of trying to bring Conummist China into the community of nation's"* This, he added, should not mean that the US vmi3d be "turning its back on the Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan which as a State and as a member of the United

Nations must be assured that its intogrity is boing fully respected"0 Ths Senator's main argument for such a policy was his idea that- a settlement in tfisfcnam could not be mado without thea PEC's participation^ sud such participation' » t! v«>ulc{ bs facilitated if it were "a meniber of the coaniunity of nations 0 7« In Gpits of the new nsv& of statemsrAs by. Amerlcsin politiciansj, officials and a part of the acadi-anic community .-for a change in the US policy towards tho PRO, one has to keep in nviKd the fact that a considerable segment of the saaie public has not yst been brought around to favour that policy* According to £5om© this ssay in part be dto to the "China Lobty" and its effsctiveness a.-nong certain sograents of the US population, especially legis.latersa Thus the 198 scholare - snerabers of the Association for A'sa.an Studios - who signed a statement calling for a change in policy, represenb a small minority of the 3S374 scholars belonging to that Association,, Purthenuore, 3CO uvranbers of the Senate and House of Representatives from both Partial adopted a resolution on 23 March in which they declared themselves "opposed to tho admission of Coazrnunist China to the UN and to the recognition of the Peking regime by the United States and the establishment of coizmercjlal relations between the United. i States and the PRO and to any policy which ias$y be interpreted as coMoning o, aggresaion direct or indirect of Communist China against its noigibours"***•

This declaration was published in New York by ths Couzmittee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to ths United Motions v=s,nd includes the 300 parliamentarianso III,, The two-China question at the^United ^ So During t.Vin debate on tha seating of the People's Republic of China a number of speakers soemcd to favour soms form of representation .for the present •

Bepublic of China,, should the representatives of the PHC be seated 0 The dis«= cussion showed also that a ntunber of countries who were in fa-vow of seating the PEC did not vote for it. because of the harab language o.f the draft resolution calling for the expulsion of Taiwan* It is therefore lexical that tho so governments who wish to s-ae tho representatives of tha PRO seated v.culd sook '.rays ivo ' f provide some type of representation for Taiwan,, Spojikero recalled *ha f--ct that tho Taiwan Government had effective control over a territory containing 12 million people and eould therefore not be considered a ^overrcient in exile „ Some stated that the Charter provided for excision only if a ferber did nob fulfil its obligations and that this was definitely not the ease of the Taiwan Govern- nento Still others referred to the fact that it was not without precedent in the United Nations t hat more than one' seat was hold by representatives of the same people » one a CSreat Power saat and -the other an ordinary seate As to the wayg in which the representation of Taitran vjottld be assvredj the important con- - sideration is that it be brought sbotat in accordance with the principles of th© Charter, 9* The problem (as i aes it) is not whether tho Chinas 3 PGople'3 Republic ivanted to ba a jjamber of the CM or not, but rather that j.t should bo aacle clear to the Go\'ernmsnt of the PRO that the seat of China is available, should they desire to join« Thisj, though, would not ne'cessari3,y involve an invitatica bnt. a

I?. Attitude of the_ Fgg_toward3n the_Uai.ted

3JDa Thers is no reason to believe that the -official attitude of the PKC towards the US! has changed since it was expressed by Foi-eign Minister Chen Yi in his 29 September 1965 press conference,, At that time the Foreign Minister stated that the UN was "a tool oi% the United States while the US was the overlo/rd of the UN", He added that there has been some change recent3y, as tho UP. W.T.S not any more the QKClusivo tool oi% tha IS as in the past, but had now become tha tool of a fevx Big Pov/erss prfurari^ the tfSs that used it as a bargaining placea In answer to the question of a Japanese foreign correspondent on the question of restoring to China its legitimate rights in the UK, the Foreign Minister stated the condi~ tions which would have to be fulfilled before the PRO would consider to be a part of tha Ms liberation of the UM from the control of the US and other Big Powers; passage of a resolution expelling "the elensents of the Chiang Kai-uhek clique"j official admission and correction of all past mis takes 5 and in particular cancellation of the resolution eonderanixig China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as aggressors in Korea and condemning the US instead \ a thorough rsorgsniaation and reform and a full revisw of the Charter; and finally s! eacpulsion of all toper 3.alist puppet30 Ho Since the end of the 20th session of the General Assembly increasing emphasis has been put by the PEG on accusing the UH of farthering the "collusion" . between the US and. tho USSR0 12 0 The 20th session of ths Assembly was characterised by an editorial of the 'People 'rs Daily of 27 December 1965 as having achieved three objectives j it opposed the revolutionary movements of the oppressed nations and peoples j it was "an anti-China conference wMch wilfully interfered in the internal • affairs of sovereign states',1 and thirdly it provided a forum for the pursuance -

of the policy of "American-Soviet cooperation for the domination of the world" 0 The title of the editorial "Tne United Nations is &n American-Soviet Political

Market Place" indicates where the onphasis of the assessment ii030 13» At the time of Mr. Khrushchev, the editorial states, Soviets-American it was attempted directly between the leaders of 'tho two countries., but since his downfall it is the United Nations that is being used as an instru- ment for deals o "Today, both the US imperialists and the Khrushchev revisionists aro going all out for "upholding* arsd 'strengthening' the United Nations. But the more evil it does, the quicker it will go bankrupt » Such ar® the dialectics of history", 14-. The decisions of the Assembly, -the editorial eoinnentsj and the bohdnd-bhe-scanes bargaining have led to the collusion of the United States and tho Soviet U-iion oa the following questions: ts) Vietngni Even though this problem was outside the scope of the United Nations its rostrum -was used to "psddle the US imperialist peace taUts swindle"* Furthermore there was oehind-the-scenes bargaining and secret talks between Mr* Gronyko and Mr. Rusko The speech of the Soviet delegate on the rostnua contained only a few resiarks of censure of the US which were not taken seriously by either of them, (b) Dominican. Itegyjbllc; The Soviet Union endorsed "the United 'States imperialism's arned intervention" by first agreeing to put off the vote on the resolution calling for the vd-thdrawal of US troops fro/n tho Dominican Republic^and thus allowing, "the US aggressor to go on with his sanguinary massacre there of the patriotic soldiers and people"., and then Joining the United States in the vots to authorise the Secretary-General to send representatives to the Dominican Republic to conduct an investigation "which vould enable the US to 'take further steps to intervene in the internal affairs of the Dominican iiepublic through the instrumentality of the United Nations",, The Soviet Union also favoured a permanent cease-fire there "with a view to force its patriotic soldiers- arid people to lay dovm their arms",,

(c) The Ijndi^?akigtg.njcpn.t'3aGti The Soviet Union took a biased stand in favour of "India's aggression" against Pakistan by voting with the United States in favour of four resolutions -which resulted in impeding anjr Pakistan count, er-attack in self -defence against, the invasion launched by Indian reactionaries „" On the Kashmir question, the Soviet Union also joined the US in ignoring the right of self -determination of the Kashmir people o (d) South ernfihodesiss ; The Soviet Union joined in s, resolution vihich consti~ tuted an act of betrayal of the African people* s revolutionary struggle, by aska.ng Britain to put down the Banti=i^iperaalist struggle of the Zimbabwe people" » (e) Permanent UK peace force: The USSR worked actively to set up a per- nanent United Cations force -which really amounts to a counter-revolutionary force for suppressing and interfering vdth the revolutionary movements of the peoples all over the wor3dc Doth the US and the USSR asked th© Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations to review this question Carefully and "finish its work as soon as possible",, nuclear pro liberation and coasolidatirg^igigl.ga.r ^ It was common know3.edge that the two governments have for a long tims carried out behind-the-scenes consultations over the prevention of nuclear proliferation and tints "deprived peace-loving nations of their sight to possess the means of defence against US nuclear black-

,v(s3 " -Raising an anti~China ohorus"; When the US led the campaign against Chic?,; soing so far- "as- to interfere with China's internal affairs by using its allied to oppose the restoration of the legitimate rights of China in the United Nations., the Soviet delegate nade only a per- functory spaecho In addition he lost no opportunitj to attack China by insinuation; thus he said that "certain persons" assumed a "nihilist attitude" toward the United Cations and spread "pesaizniffln" about dis~ arasanienta He declared that the India-Pakistan conflict would only work to th® "advantage" of a third }».rty and warned "others not to interfere in the internal affairs of countries on ideological or other grounds'^ 15 o Official spokesman of the PRC have repsated3y objected to any hardling of the Vietnam question by the USU Foreign Minister Chen Yi^, in the press conference of 29 September 1965 5 stated squarely that the U55 had no right to interfere in the Vietnam question,. At the time the Security Council had taken up the Vietnam quesion on the request of the US on 1 and 2 February 1966, the objection of the PEG to this procedure was again strongly expressed, A state~ msnt of the Foreign Ministry of 2 February accuses the US of calling on its tool the UK to cover up the resumption of bombing of North Vietnam o "As is well known,, the UN has no right whatsoever to intervene in the 1 Vietnam question and it is entirely illegal for the Security Council to discuss the question,,, 0 Consideration of the U3 war acts in Vietnam. falls within the competence of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China and not of the M Security Council,, Any resolution by the UN Security Council intervening in the Vietnam question will be null and void0" This statement was repeated by editorials of the sarso date in the .tgo^ and all Peking newspapers and by broadcasts through the JJow China Ksws CR.13 (4-59) ROUTI

Comments for the record should not be written on this slip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.108 should be used instead. TO: The Secretary-General

APPROVAL X YOUR INFORMATION MAY WE CONFER? AS REQUESTED

YOUR SIGNATURE FOR ACTION NOTE AND FILE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE

NOTE AND RETURN PREPARE DRAFT YOUR COMMENTS ATTACH RELATED PAPERS

DATE: FROM: M.A. Vellodi, 16 Aug. 1966 Deputy to the Under-Sec'y PSCA. CONFEDEWTIAIi 15 August 1966 CdeH:ms

NOTE ON THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHIMA JULY 1966 MOTE ON THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA JULY 1966

J. Comments of a General Hature 1. Political developments in the ERG during the month of July focused on the intensified "socialist" or "proletarian" "cultural revolution" characterized by the strengthening of the so-called "hard line" of the Mao Tse-tung revolutionary ideology. This "cultural revolution" resulted in the apparent ascendancy of Defence Minister Lin Piao and the replacement of a number of high ranking officials who vere denounced as "anti-Party" and "anti-socialist" by others from the group around the Defence Minister. Foreign observers wonder what relevance the internal changes will have on the foreign policy of the PRC and how far the PEG will move to implement the precepts contained in Lin Piao's article of September 1965 on the role of the peoples' wars in the revolutionary struggles around the world. - 2. There had been no manifestations of a change in the attitude of the PRC towards the United Nations, though a few critical statements were made about the Secretary-General. Nor was there any reaction to the unofficial consultations taking place among delegations on the possible ways of handling the item on the agenda of the forthcoming General Assembly dealing with the seating of the representatives of the PRC. 3. In matters of disarmament and nuclear co-operation, the PRC renewed its accusation of collusion between the Soviet Union and the United States. h» The Soviet Union was also accused of other forms of collusion, such as moving its troops away from Europe towards the Chinese border and having received advance notice of the American bombings. 5. Official speeches and statements showed strong reaction to the renewed American bombing of North Vietnam. In particular, it was emphasized that the bombings have definitely invalidated the Geneva Agreements, Renewed assurances of support were given to North Vietnam, though no concrete commitments for the present were made.

I/ Lin Piao's article entitled "Long Live the People's ¥ar", published in the People's Daily, Red Flag and the Liberation Army Daity, 3 September 1965. - 2 -

6. Chinese officials voicedsalso strong criticism of the mediation efforts undertaken by Prime Minister Gandhi and Prime Minister Wilson on the occasion of their trip to the Soviet Union and charged collusion "between India, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and the United States to "bring about "peace through bombings". Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Japan at the end of the month -was also reported to serve the same purpose, 7. The PRO continued to accuse the United States of escalating the war in Viet Nam vith the purpose of enlarging the conflict. 8. Relations with the Netherlands deteriorated due to events that resulted in the death of a member of a visiting Chinese technical mission. Relations with Indonesia continued to deteriorate and the last Indonesian Consulate in China was closed. The United Kingdom and India were severely criticised because of their efforts to bring peace in Vietnam. Contrary to a recent policy of encouraging foreigners to visit China, travel restrictions have now been increased. II. Implications of the Cultural Revolution 9. During his visit in Bucharest in June, Foreign Minister Chou En-lai made reference to the "cultural revolution" taking place in the PRC and explained its 2/ meaning in these terms: -' "At present, a great socialist cultural revolution is being unfolded in our country. This is not only a struggle which fosters what is proletarian and liquidates what is bourgeois, and which touches the people to their very souls, but also a crucial question concerning whether the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist economic basis in our country can be consolidated and can advance, and affecting the destiny and future of our party and state. "Through this great cultural revolution we want to demolish all the old ideology and culture and all the old customs and habits, which, fostered by the exploiting classes, have poisoned the minds of the people for thousands of years, and to create and foster among the broad masses of people a new ideology and culture and new customs and habits — those of the proletariat. "The spearhead of this great cultural revolution is directed chiefly against a small handful of anticommunist villains who have donned the cloak of communism and a small handful of antiparty, afltisocialist and counterrevolutionary bourgeois intellectuals." 10. According to some observers, the turn of events outside China has contributed to the debate and the crisis in the Chinese leadership: the realization that the

2/ Speech made at the banquet given on 17 June by the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist Party and of the Council of Ministers. Text from FBIS No. 118. - 3 - U.S. was determined to continue under existing conditions the war in Viet Nam, and developments in Africa and Indonesia have helped to give impetus to the "cultural revolution", 11. In the military field, the crisis occurred in the course of July and resulted in the replacement of the heads of all three branches of the military service and of a number of other leaders. In its broadest terms, the debate in the military field centred on the type and role of the armed forces. The present decision to have an army which relies predominantly on the human factor, a "People's Army", and on traditional weapons rather than on the latest techniques of missile and nuclear developments which would require technical assistance from and reliance on outside sources, has led to the necessity of re-defining the tasks of the army. Expressed <% in Chinese terms, the new role of the army is contained in the editorial of the Liberation Army Daily which quotes Mao Tse-tung and Defence Minister Lin Piao as stating that the army had three great tasks, "fighting, mass work and production". The editorial then defined the problem within the army as being a conflict between politics and professionalism. "Representatives of the bourgeoisie got hold of important posts in the army and ... overtly agreed but covertly opposed Lin Piao's direction on putting politics in the forefront". Because they advocated for the army a single task of training in peace time and fighting in war and did not "put politics in the forefront", they were to be considered as enemies of the regime. 12. In line with this thinking, a number of replacements were made in key posts: (a) Lo Jui-ching, Chief of the Army's General Staff, who had been absent at important functions in the last few months, has been replaced by Yang Ching-wu, a veteran of the Korean war, alternate member of the Central Committee and former Peking garrison commander. On several occasions last year, General Lo had advocated the unity of the Socialist Camp and the modernization of army equipment, including defence against nuclear weapons. He had accepted the statement of Mr. Mao, made in earlier times, that, under certain conditions, it was permissible for Socialist countries to enter into negotiations and reach agreements with imperialist countries. (b) Lu Ting-yi, Director of the CCP Central Committee's Propaganda Department, and Chou Yang, Deputy Director, have been dismissed and replaced respectively by Tao Chu and Chang Ping-hua. Mr. Lu, who had participated in the Long March, held the propaganda post since 195^ and became Minister of Culture in 1965. In this latter post he was replaced on Jl July by Hsiao Wang-tung. Both the replacements of Mr. Lu are reported to be close collaborators of Lin Piao. Tao Chu, who replaces Mr. Lu as Director of the Propaganda Department and as Politburo alternate, also holds the title of Deputy Premier. He had been Director of the Political Department of the Fourth Field Army and later of the Central South Military Area at a time when they were commanded by Lin Piao. He is a strong supporter of the "great leap forward", and last year called for an intensified programme of indoctrination in. the countryside as a prelude to a "second revolutionary soaring leap". He is an outspoken adovcate of the campaign to replace old plays and operas with works on "contemporary revolutionary themes". Hsiao Vang-tung, replacing Mr. Lu as Minister of Culture, is a former military commander who, until his present appointment, held important administrative posts in the army. Since 1965 he has been a member of the National Defence Council and one of eight Vice Ministers of Culture. (c) A number of intellectuals have been dismissed. Among them, Ho Lu-ting, the principal of the Shanghai Conservatorium, accused by his subordinate teachers and students to have berated the Communist Party for "turning people into machines" and "forcing composers to become song writing tools"; Tien ¥ei, Director of the Kwangtung Broadcasting Administration and head of the Canton radio, for "sabotaging the great proletarian cultural revolution" by delaying the announcement of the reorganization of the Peking Party Committee last month for two hours; Ko Lin, President of Canton's Sun Yat-sen Medical College, and his deputy, Liu Chih-ming, for opposing the transfer of students from the university to rural areas, and Li Ta, President of the ¥uhan University. 13. It became known in July that the "cultural revolution" is carried out by a specially set up group under the leadership of Chen Po-ta, who is 6l years old. He is an alternate member of the Politburo, editor of the Party's theoretical journal Red Flag and former Political Secretary of Mr. Mao. The PRC and the United Nations A. Attitudes of the PRC towards the United Nations 1^4-. No change of attitude occurred on the part of the PRC towards the United Nations in general and on the question of its interest in being seated* Twice in the course of the month NCNA criticized the Secretary-General in connexion with his role in a - 5 - possible Viet Nam settlement. On 15 July, NCNA reported that the Secretary-General would go to the Soviet Union after Mrs. Gandhi's and Mr. Wilson's visit. "Wilson and U Thant have always been loyal brokers for the U.S. peace talks fraud". After the Secretary-General's visit to Moscow, on the 1st August, NONA called the trip "another farce serving the U.S. scheme of forcing peace talks through "bombing, with Moscow at its centre, following the tour of the Soviet Union by India's Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson". 15. Objections were voiced by the PRC that, in spite of the Viet Nam war, the Soviet Union continued to participate in disarmament talks and the drafting of a treaty on Governments' Conduct in Outer Space. Under the heading of "Soviet leading clique again shows itself up as U.S. accomplice", the NCNA on 2 July reported a statement by the Soviet representative at the Geneva disarmament talks on 50 June that the bombing would not affect U.S.-Soviet negotiations for a disarmament agreement. On 6 July, NCNA interpreted President Johnson's press conference of the previous day in tte same way by stating that Presidnet Johnson "indicated positively that this would not affect closer U.S. collusion with the Soviet revisionist leading clique". "Asked whether the U.S. bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong would jeopardise the reaching of an agreement preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, Johnson replied explicitly, 'no, I don't think so. We are doing everything we can to reach an agreement on such a treaty. We are very anxious to do it1. Johnson's statement was very similar too with that made by A. Roshchin, the Soviet representative to the disarmament conference in Geneva. On 30th June, the day after the USA first bombed Hanoi and Haiphong, Roshchin made it clear in Geneva that the. criminal US action would not affect the possibility of the Soviet Union and the USA reaching an agreement on disarmament. He emphasised: 'If we did not consider there was such a possibility, we would not be here'. The echoing of Roshchin's words by Johnson fully exposed the criminal feature of sham support but real betrayal of the clique of Soviet revisionist leaders over the Viet Nam question." B. ' Attitudes within the United Nations 16. There are as yet no definite indications within the United Nations on the way in which the item of seating the representatives of the PRC will be handled at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. Consultations taking place among delegations indicate the possibility of a draft resolution sponsored by nine powers being presented in favour of seating the PRC. - 6 - 17. It is _not as yet known what the U.S. attitude will be at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. Even though there seems to be an increased flexibility in a number of statements made by politicians and editorials throughout the U.S., - the present official attitude, as reflected by the latest statement by the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, is unchanged. On 3 July, at the time of his trip to Taiwan, he informed the press that the Johnson Administration would oppose seating the PEG in the United Nations "for years to come". This was interpreted by American observers to reflect Mr. Rusk's belief that there was no apparent prospect of a change in the FRC's "militant policies" despite a series of overtures made by the U.S. Administration since last spring. At Taipei airport a day later, Mr. Rusk put the emphasis on a different point, "we oppose any proposals to deprive the Republic of China of its rightful place in the United Nations and to seating Chinese Communists in its place". IV. Relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a consequence of renewed American Bombings of Worth Vietnam 18. Chinese news agencies and radio broadcasts started denouncing U.S. air raids on North Vietnam immediately after the events. The Government's official statement, however, came only on 5 July. It made the following principal points: (i) The renewed bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong has escalated the war. ("It has now extended the flames of war to the capital of the DRV and has thus raised this war of aggression to a new and still graver stage."); (i±) The "bombings shew the weakness of the U.S. and represent "a desperate act of a cornered beast"; (iii) They are an attempt to "coerse the Vietnamese people into submission and force peace talks through bombing"; (iv) Governments supporting peace talks under present circumstances or "striking behind-the-scenes bargains with the USA" are selling out the Vietnamese people; (v) The bombings resulted in totally erasing the Geneva Agreements by "further" breaking the line of demarcation between South and North Vietnam; (vi) The Vietnamese people and countries supporting its war of resistance are now freed of all restrictions. ("It is not up to the USA to decide how the war should be fought next. Since the U.S. imperialists have come from the sky and the sea, why can't others fight back on the ground.");

3/ Senator Edward Kennedy on 20 July and Senator Robert Kennedy on 26 July. - 7 - (vii) The Chinese Government endorses the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DRV made on JO June, k/ China, who in the past, had consistently aided Viet Nam "politically, militarily and morally" feels at present freed from all restrictions in rendering any type of aid and "at any time while taking such actions as is deemed necessary"; (viii) The U.S. is warned that "once the war breaks out, it will have no boundaries ... and we will unswervingly support the fraternal Vietnamese people in fighting through to the end". 19. The ideas contained in this official statement were echoed throughout the month over the radio and in the press and by speakers at mass rallies in support of Viet Nam all over China. Two of these rallies were held in Peking on 10 and 22 July and were attended by Cabinet Members and senior party officials. The meeting of 22 July was attended by nearly a million people and was addressed by President Liu Shao-chi. He warned the USA not to misjudge its opponents; the Chinese people were ready for the greatest sacrifices. Since the USA had "torn the 195^ Geneva Agreements to shreds", China was no longer bound by these agreements and its aid to Viet Nam was not restricted in any way. U.S. aggression against Viet Nam was aggression against China, which was "the reliable rear area of the Vietnamese people". The Chinese people had made up their minds and made every preparation "to take such actions at any time and in any place as the Chinese and Vietnamese people deem necessary for dealing joint blows at the US aggressors". The speech of President Liu as well as an editorial of the People's Daily of 18 July contained a passage which may be interpreted as a formal offer by China of its territory as a rear area for Worth Vietnam. Noting that China's TOO million people "are behind the Vietnamese people", both the President and the editorial declared that "the vast expanse of China's territory is the reliable rear area of the Vietnamese people". - Support for the statement of President Liu was expressed in broadcasts throughout China and the points made in the speech were repeated by Foreign Minister Chen Yi on 12 July at a dinner of the North Korean Charge dfAffaires and on 14 July at the dinner of the French Ambassador. k-/ The statement called for all-out war and partial mobilization. 5/ British sources interpret this to mean that North Vietnamese pilots can use Chinese territory as a base area from which to attack American raiders and to allow ground units to establish a logistic base free from American air attacks, (Associated Press from London, 18 July). Agence France Press reporting from Peking interpreted the Chinese statements on Viet Nam to mean that even though no immediate change in China's policy on intervention will take place, it is nonetheless emphasized, more than on previous occasions, that China might intervene at any time without first being subjected to a direct American attack. - 8 -

20. Commentaries on the official statement of 3 July were made by Chinese and foreign sources. NONA on 10 July conveyed the impression that the statement did not change the nature of China's basic commitments. Stating that China had done everything possible to give "positive support", the article went on advising self- reliance and cited as examples Chinese Communists who had won their revolution by following Chairman Mao's precepts of self-reliance, and the Viet Cong guerillas vho are relying on their own strength. - "The people should and can only rely on themselves to make revolution and wage people's war in their own country, since these are their own affairs. No outside aid can replace their struggle. Whatever its amount, it is only auxiliary. "To make and win revolution, the people must unswervingly rely on themselves and be prepared to carry on the struggle by themselves should all material aid from outside be cut off. Only thus can they become invincible in any circumstances." V. PRC Attitude towards the U.S.S.R. 21. The attitude of the ERC to the Soviet Union has continued to be affected by both countries' relations with the Vietnam situation. The repeated official Chinese insistence on the invalidity of the Geneva Agreements give the impression: to some observers that by depriving the Soviet Union of its role of co-chairman, the PRC was manoeuvring to force her into a position of having to make a choice of either complete disengagement1 'from the Vietnamese question or alternatively, of a closer alliance with the FRC which, in turn, would increase the chances for a Soviet- American confrontation. 22. The Soviet Union was repeatedly accused of collusion with the U.S. or with the United Kingdom and India. Editorials and articles called the Soviet Union "a centre of Washington's intrigues". Citing the visits of Prime Minister Gandhi and Prime Minister Wilson, the People's Daily editorial of 18 July described the Soviet capital as a busy market place, and Soviet leadership as "the chief accomplice in the Johnson Administration's vicious manoeuvres to force peace through bombing" The visits were called "dirty political bargains aimed at selling out the Vietnamese people".

6/ This emphasis on self-reliance has also been interpreted by some to be in answer to the offer for volunteers for the DRV made by the Warsaw Pact countries at their Bucharest meeting in June. (For details see East-West Relations, July 1966.) - 9 -

23. Commenting on the joint U.S.S.R.-Indian communique ending the visit of Mr. Gandhi in Moscow, the WCNA on 19 July was critical of the fact that it did"not contain any condemnation of the U.S. aggression against Viet Warn and ignored the fact that the Geneva Agreements had "been scrapped a long time ago "by the U.S." "The Soviet Union and India were birds of the same feather" hoping to induce the Vietnamese people to abandon their revolution and capitulate to aggressors. 24. At the two mass meetings in support of Viet Nam, speeches by Cabinet members gave the official seal to the editorials that had accused the Soviet Union of collusion with the U.S. Tao Chu, the newly appointed propaganda chief, said in his speech; "All along, the Soviet leaders have been playing the role of leading accomplice in the U.S. imperialist expansion of the war of aggression against Vietnam and, in the case of the bombardments of Hanoi and Haiphong, they have made still greater efforts at co- ordination with the U.S. to force peace through bombing." He also accused the Soviet Union of working for a detente in Europe "in order to allow American imperialism to concentrate its forces against Vietnam", -7/ 25. Foreign Minister Chen Yi accused the Soviet Union of "making military deploy- ments along the Chinese border in co-ordination with U.S. imperialist encirclement of China". He also charged the Soviet Union with seeking a relaxation of tension and a reduction of armed forces in Europe so that the U.S. could "draw away forces to cope with the Vietnamese people". He accused the Soviet Union of having received ft/ advance warning of the bombing from the U.S. State Department, - Q/ VI, ERG Attitude towards the United States 2' 26. The ERC's position towards the United States did not change in the course of the month. There were no reactions to the "hard line" statements made by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk in Taipei, when he reassured Chiang Kai-shek of continued American support and of standing by the mutual defence treaty and other commitments towards the Republic of China,

7/ Soviet statements pertaining to "peace and security on the European Continent" made at the Bucharest meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries were also interpreted by Chinese leaders in the same sense. 8/ Xn its denial to Foreign Minister Chen Yi's accusations, the Tass Agency dispatch criticised both the U.S, and the ERG, accusing the former of creating this rumour with the special intent that it be picked up "by the people in Peking who are eager on anti-Soviet fabrication", and accused the latter of playing into the hands of U.S. propagandists, 9/ For the reactions of the PRC to the U.S. bombing of targets in North Vietnam, see Section IV. - 10 - 27. Nor -was there a favourable response to the overtures made by the U.S. at the beginning of July by relaxing travel restrictions to the PRC. The list of those who could get passports for travel to the ERG was enlarged to include "persons in cultural, athletic, commercial, educational, public affairs and other fields who demonstrate that the visit to the restricted country would be of benefit to the United States". The American Administration on 14 July suggested that it might "in certain circumstances" permit some trade with the PRC. These offers, like earlier ones, were rejected by the PRC. 28. The President of the United States indicated =-' the possibility of a somewhat more flexible attitude towards China in the long run. Looking towards a situation which would emerge in Asia after the end of the Viet Nam war, the President addressed himself directly to China and appealed for "peaceful co-operation between nations that now call themselves enemies". At the same time, as if to counter the repeated Chinese demands for U.S. withdrawal from Asia, he asserted that the U.S. was a. "Bacific power" whose obligations were to help build a "truly world civilization in the Pacific". The PRC to date has not commented on the offer of reconciliation and instead, it stated: "The US President's apparent saber-rattling statement is in fact an indirect revelation of the nature of the United States as a paper tiger in a world where the four seas are rising, clouds and waters raging, the five continents are rocking, wind and thunder roaring. Johnson made it clear that the losing war of aggression in Vietnam had become problem Number One tormenting the U.S. ruling circles." VH. Relations with other' Countries A. The Netherlands 29. There is in Western European governing circles a widespread belief that the Chinese Embassy in the Hague is the focal point of PRC activities in Western Europe. This belief was found to be reinforced by an unfortunate incident that occurred in the Hague when a member of a visiting Chinese technical mission was found dead. Official statements on the circumstances surrounding his death differ. The Dutch Government stated that the 42-year old engineer did not die of an accident, but was the victim of physical injuries inflicted and that he was abducted from the hospital by occupants of a car with diplomatic license plates. Upon asking the Chinese

10/ Speech of 12 July to the American Alumni Council meeting in White Sulphur Springs. - 11 - charge d'affaires for the man's return to the hospital, the Dutch Foreign Ministry was informed that he had died. The Chinese charge d'affaires, on the other hand, stated that the engineer had jumped from a window after U.S. agents induced him to defect to the West. Subsequently, the Dutch expelled the charge d'affaires but retained the members of the technical mission. 30. The Chinese lodged a protest with the Netherlands Government against the "outrageous and unjustifiable" declaration of the Chinese charge d'affaires as personna non grata. The Director of the West European Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated to the Dutch charge d'affaires in Peking that this was an "extremely grave incident manufactured by the Netherlands Government deliberately to undermine the relations between China and the Netherlands, in active pursuance of US imperialist anti-Chinese activities". He then informed the Dutch charge d'affaires that in retaliation he would be expelled, but added that he would be held as hostage until the safe departure from the Netherlands of the Chinese technical mission. The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs then protested against the Chinese version of the events, and against the treatment of its charge d'affaires. B. The United Kingdom 31. Strong attacks were made against Britain for her endeavours to bring about peace in Viet Nam. The People's Daily on 25 July made a personal attack on Mr. Wilson, stating that he was "driving Britain step by step into the whirlpool of the US imperialist war of aggression against Vietnam", and warned that this action "will hasten the collapse of British imperialism". Mr. Wilson was also accused of having "unscrupulously attacked" Mr. Chou En-lai in a speech on 7 July to the House of Commons, and of having "openly and vociferously" urged the British public on 13 July to demonstrate in front of the Chinese charge d'affaires' residence in London, — C» India 32. Mrs, Gandhi was attacked several times for her role in trying to bring about a settlement in Vietnam. "Carrying the seven-point proposals in her portfolio, Mrs, Indira Gandhi visited Cairo and conferred with President Nasser on 8 and 9 July. She went to Yugoslavia on the 10th for secret huddles with Tito, a hireling of US imperialism," 12/ ll/ This is an apparent reference to the ceremony at the University of Sussex where Mr. Wilson, who was receiving an honorary degree, told students who were demonstrating against US policy in Vietnam, that the demonstrators should make their protest outside the Chinese mission in London, 12/ NONA dispatch, 19 July 1966. - 12 - Chinese officials also reproached Mrs. Gandhi for her statement in Moscow deploring that "certain Asian powers" had forgotten the pledge they signed at Bandung, rejected peaceful co-existence and promoted tension by their dogmatic belief in the inevitability of var in the settlement of problems. D. Indonesia 33 • Relations between the two countries have steadily deteriorated since the events of last September-October, During July flights of the Indonesian airline between Djakarta and Canton were suspended, and the sole remaining Indonesian consular mission in China, that in Peking, closed. (The AHTARA Office in Peking had been closed earlier), 34, It was reported from Chinese sources that former Indonesian Ambassador to the PRC, Mr, Djawoto, and several other Indonesiansintend to constitute a Government in exile in Peking, and were given facilities for this purpose by the PRC Government, 35. The Chinese Foreign Ministry's Note of 29 June, followed by several similar Notes from the Chinese Embassy in Djakarta, protested against "the continuing persecution of Chinese nationals in Indonesia", and demanded that the Indonesian Government give immediately "an unequivocal and positive reply" on the despatch of ships proposed by China to repatriate from Indonesia Chinese nationals desirous of leaving. The Note also proposed that negotiations for concrete arrangements on the subject start in the second week of July between the two Governments. As far as can be ascertained, no answer was made by Indonesia during the month of July. ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION T0t AS The Secretary-General FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER , FOR INFORMATION X POUR LNFORMATION

Date: FROM: 16 Sept. 1966 DE: M.A. Vellodi, Deputy to the UMer-Sec*y, CR. 13 (11-64) PSCA. CONFIDENTIAL CDH:pnm 16 September 1966

NOTE ON THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA^. AUGUST 1966 NOTE OH THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA - AUGUST 1966

1. General Comments 1* On 29 August nine governments submitted a request for inclusion in the agenda of the forthcoming General Assembly the item "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations". In the past US officials have objected to PRC representation in the United Nations because of certain developments inside the PRC as veil as foreign policy pronouncements made by Chinese officials. It is in this sense that certain pertinent internal developments will be analysed* 2. An often-mentioned criterion for seating representatives of the PRC in past years* debate in the General Assembly was the attitude of the PRC towards the United Nations and its willingness to abide by its principles and accept the international obligations created by full participation* In this connection the PRC has stated on 29 August that It was not willing to sign any treaty on the denuclearization of Latin America as this treaty was tied up with the United Nations, an Organization that had "trampled under its feet" the legal rights of the PRC and with which therefore the PRC wishes to have no dealings. 5. The international relationship of the PRC during the month of August has deteriorated with a number of governments. Some observers believe that the eleventh plenary meeting of the Eighth Central Committee which was held from 1-2 August will go down in history as one at which the break with the Soviet Union became final. The text of the communique of the Central Committee Is especially virulent against the Soviet Union which is accused of having betrayed Marxist-Leninist communism, and of having joined the United States in a "new holy alliance against communism and China". With the USSR therefore, no united action is possible either in the establishment of a "broadest possible international front to combat the main enemy, United States imperialism", or in the Vietnamese question where the Soviet Union is manifesting towards the Vietnamese people's struggle a "two-faced policy of sham support but real betrayal". -a- k. The communique ef the Central Committee did not contain any new element on relations with the United States though it did explicitly call for the liberation of Taiwan. An editorial at the end of the month may be interpreted as welcoming the redeployment of American military strength in Asia and the Pacific as a result of the Vietnam involvement as this would allow the DRV and its allies to "nibble away" at American strength and cause American forces to be spread too thinly in other parts of the world. 5. Accusations of collusion between the US and the USSR were made repeatedly during the month. The sensitivity of the PRC on the question of collusion was illustrated by her violent reaction to an article in Prayda which it interpreted to be a Soviet accusation of collusion between the FRC and the US at the Warsaw talks on the subject of Vietnam. 6. It is reasonable to assume that one of the main aims of the EEC's foreign policy is to bring about a confrontation between the United States and the USSR. One of the danger points is the possibility of accidental bombing of Soviet shipping in Haiphong harbour. In the course of the month of August, the Soviet Union protested to the United States about an alleged incident, and the United States rejected the protest on the grounds that no merchant ship had been sighted within the target area during the air raid, 7. There are no indications of change in the PRC's attitude towards the conflict in Vietnam although the communique of the Central Committee hinted at the possibility of increased aid. At the end of the month it was reported from non-Chinese sources that an agreement to that effect had been signed by the two governments. Reactions of the PRC to the calling for an all-Asian peace conference proposed by the Foreign Minister of Thailand was negative. Marshal Chu Teh, at a banquet given in Peking on 12 August by the Speaker of the Pakistani National Assembly, denounced the proposal as part of an "American peace talks fraud". NONA reported also the negative reactions to the conference from the Vietnam Liberation Press Agency, Cambodia's President Prince Sihanouk and the North Korean News Agency. 8. While the Central Committee was calling for a "united anti-imperialist" front without the participation of the Soviet Union, there have been setbacks: the Communist Party of Japan has indicated that its relationship with the PRC was cooling, and the Democratic Republic of Korea declared that henceforth it would steer a neutral course between Peking and Moscow. -5-

9* Frictions with a number of other governments are reported. Relations with the Netherlands remained at a stalemate on the question of the death of the Chinese technician which is still unresolved. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Dutch Lover Chamber has proposed that in case the problem is not resolved soon, a foreign diplomat should be asked to mediate. The PRC protested to the United Kingdom about the presence of the American atomic submarine "Nook" in Hong Kong which it considered a "new provocation", cautioned Cambodia on a possible rapprochement with the United States, and accused Cuba of following the Soviet line of communism. A note of the Indian Government protested against alleged Chinese military intrusions in Western Ladakh, an area which, according to the note, was not claimed by the Chinese. The Minister of External Affairs of Australia stated that his country was willing to explore new ways of co-existing with the PRC, but found the condition made by the latter, namely that Taiwan be sacrificed, unacceptable. 10. In the case of the PRC more than for other countries, a study of domestic Chinese policy and practices is of considerable help In understanding her foreign policy and of what it can be expected to be In the future. The meeting of the Central Committee has taken domestic decisions and issued directives which contain implications for the international position and foreign relations of the PRC. The cultural revolution is to continue with its corollary the reorganization of the Army along the lines advocated by Defence Minister Lin Flao; the preponderant influence of Chairman Mao is confirmed and he is credited with a "series of brilliant policies of decisive fundamental importance over the last four years". The mass meeting of 18 August chaired by Chen Po-ta and attended by Chairman Mao was meant to underline the Implications of the cultural revolution contained In the communique of the Central Committee. It revealed the composition of the new hierarchy headed by Chairman Mao and his "close friend in combat" Lin Plao; it also brought to the attention of the outside world the existence of the Bed Guards, defined as a "revolutionary mass organization set up by middle school and college students in Peking". 11. One of the first acts of these Red Guards was the organization of a mass demonstration lasting nearly three days in front of the Soviet Bnbassy which led to a strong protest by the Soviet Union. Other reported excesses committee by them led to protests by the governments of France, the United Kingdom and the German Democratic Republic. 11. The PRC and the United Nations A. Question of credentials 12. Request for the inclusion of an item entitled "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations" was made by nine Governments in a letter dated 30 August (A/6391). The nine countries are Albania, Algeria, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Guinea, Mali, Romania, and Syria. Last year the letter was signed by ten Powers which included Burundi and Ghana but did not Include Romania.-' 13. The explanatory memorandum resembles in its broad lines closely that of last year. However, there are some differences: omitted are this year's references to (a) the recommendation of the Cairo Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-aligned Countries; (b) the fact that the refusal of "the restoration of China's legitimate rights is based entirely on political considerations contrary to the spirit which guided the creation of the Organization"; and (c) the importance of the PRC's participation in a conference on disarmament. Express reference is made in this year's explanatory memorandum to the United States in two places where formerly only the word "Powers" was mentioned. Thus, paragraph 6 states, "the United States of America which is violating the principles and objectives of the Charter by opposing the restoration to the People's Republic of China of its rights in the United Nations", and paragraph 8 states that "the unlawful authorities installed in the island of Taiwan, who brazenly claim to represent China, remained there only thanks to the armed forces of the United States". A new legal argument is included in this year's explanatory memorandum (paragraph 9), namely that the situation of the two-Chinas can create "the unhappy precedent" and "cannot but give rise to uncertainty regarding the future of the national and territorial unity of many Member States". B. Disarmament 14. At the end of the third session the Preparatory Committee for the denuclearization of latin America (COPREDAL) last May requested its negotiating

I/ A dispatch of Agence France Presse from Kinshasa dated 30 August reports a statement of the Foreign Minister of Burundi that at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly Burundi will support the "immediate entry of the PRC to the United Nations and the re-establishment of its legitimate rights" and indicates also that Burundi will resume - no date mentioned - diplomatic relations with the PRC. -5- commlttee to transmit a draft treaty to the nuclear powers, asking whether they would be ready to sign it. France and the United Kingdom have sent favourable answers and the United States and the USSR have not yet let their positions be known officially. As none of the governments represented on the negotiating committee (Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico) had diplomatic relations with the FRC, it is through the Mexican Ambassador in Cairo, Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto, that contact was made as he had previously been Ambassador in Warsaw and had established personal contact with the PRO representative there. 15. On 29 August, the Negotiating Committee reported that the PRC had refused to sign. In its reply the Government of the FRC contends that the eventual denuclearization of Latin America is "strongly linked to a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations" and that,the United Nations "having trampled under its feet all the legal rights of the PRC," Communist China did not wish to be associated with anything which had a connection with the activities of that Organization. The Chinese answer adds "it will serve no useful purpose to denuclearize zones neighbouring the United States if the United States itself continues to maintain nuclear arms on its own territory and in its Latin American bases". Nonetheless, the answer of the Chinese Government stated that it looks with "positive sympathy" to the efforts of Latin American countries to denuclearize their region and recalls Its own position with regards to nuclear arms, which it had made known for the first time after its first atomic explosion on 16 October 196U, namely that "China will never under any pretext be the first one to use nuclear arms" and that a world summit conference should be called to discuss "complete banning and total destruction of all atomic weapons". 16. Announcing the failure of its efforts with the ERC, the Negotiating Committee of COPREDAL expressed its regret to the members of the Commission as the negative answer of the PRC will make the conclusion of the treaty even more difficult as a number of Latin American countries considered the guarantee of all nuclear Powers, present and future ones, a necessity. III. Attitude towards the Soviet Union IT* The wording of the condemnation of Soviet revisionism in the communique is the same as that used in speeches and editorials in the course of the last year. There is, however, a substantial difference of language between the communique of say the 10th plenary meeting on 28 September 1962 and the present one. At that time the revisionists were considered dissidents or "Titoists" whereas at present they are viewed as headed by a "clique of the Soviet Communist Party". In 1962 the communique still spoke of developing friendly relations and mutual assistance and cooperation with the USSR in order to form the largest possible united front against "American imperialism". The present document attacks the Soviet leaders "whose line consists in safeguarding the imperialists and colonialists domination in the capitalist world and to restore capitalism in the Socialist world", and rejects definitively any possibility for united action in any field with "the revisionist clique", including the possibility of united action in Vietnam. —2.'1 "There is no middle road in the struggle between true Marxism-Leninism, that of China and modern revisionism", the communique stated. 18. Western sources report that during the month of August the two senior aides of President Ho Chi-Minh, Generals Qyap and Prime Minister Fham Van Dong, vent to Moscow to ask the Soviet Union to accelerate the sending of supplies in order to allow North Vietnam better to face "American escalation". At the same time, an important economic mission was sent to Peking though no mention at the time was made of it in the Peking press. Some observers interpreted the mission to Moscow as a recognition by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that in the present stage of operations the USSR does represent the main source of help and that this development, far from displeasing the United States, would on the contrary open the possibility of negotiations between the United States and the USSR on the question of Vietnam. 19. Chinese officials renewed repeatedly their charges of collusion between the Soviet Union and the United States. In addition they accused the USSR of charging collusion between the PRC and the United States. Pravda's article

2/ The French Communist newspaper L'Humanite in analysing the communique believes that this attitude of the Chinese leaders helped "American imperialism". It deplores the fact that the Soviet Union, who brings the most effective aid to North Vietnam, is the target of Peking's attacks. "Such an attitude can only help American imperialism in its aggression in South East Asia and in its endeavour to achieve world hegemony". -7- of 28 July entitled "The Sino-American Dialogue" was interpreted in China as hinting that at the Warsaw talks representatives ©f the FRC and the United States were striking some kind of a "political deal" on Vietnam. NCNA on 3 August stated, "Eravda hopes that it can thus extricate the Soviet leading clique from the quandary it is in after the exposure of its role as an energetic salesman for Washington's scheme to force peace talks on Vietnam through tombing. Furthermore, Rrayda hopes to absolve the clique of its crimes in this regard". The broadcast, as well as subsequent ones on the same subject, then reaffirmed China's support of the Vietnamese people's struggle against the United States aggression and labelled the Pravda article vilification. 20. On the occasion of changing the name of the street where the Soviet Bnbassy is located to "Anti-Revisionism Street", the Red Guard organized a mass meeting on 30 August in front of the Soviet Embassy which lasted nearly three days. More than a million persons were reported to have participated and were instructed to carry in a red cover the abbreviated works of Mao as well as a red flag. In the week preceding this mass demonstration members of the Soviet Embassy were harassed by smaller demonstrations and on 29 August the Soviet Government sent a note of protest to the Government ©f the ERG against the "acts of hooliganism which took place in front of the Soviet Embassy and which have seriously Inconvenienced the normal work of the Embassy and created a security risk for members of the Bnbassy". As a result of this protest the Red Guards were called to use moderation and the demonstration of the end of the month though inconveniencing Russian officials was relatively more restrained, ^'

j§/ According to a series of articles by Harrison Salisbury, in the New York Times, there is mounting evidence that the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of 1930 is for all practical purposes no longer in existence. He reports that at the present there is nothing but evidence of hostility along the Russian-Chinese and Mongolian-Chinese border manifesting itself in extraordinary military security measures and precautionary troop movements. He also reports that intelligence information reveals that Chinese military publications, secret or public, do not refer to the Soviet Union as an ally and stated that no aid can be expected from her. The indoctrination and command theory of the People's Liberation Army is now entirely based on the "go it alone principle". No mention of any of this is made by Soviet sources. -8-

IV. Attitude towards the Halted States 21. In the course of the last month the ERG has issued a number of warnings to the United States: the If-OJth warning about a purported intrusion of a US warship in Chinese territorial waters on 28 July; the W)8th warning on the •* subject of a US military plane that allegedly intruded Chinese air space on 2 August; and the 409th and 410th warnings against a US warship which allegedly entered Chinese territorial waters several times on 7 August and on Ik August. 22. The question that preoccupied observers increasingly is the degree of probability of the PRC entering the Vietnam war. The opinion is sometimes expressed in the United States that the ERC will not intervene unless directly LY attacked. Other observers -J believe that the ERC will enter the war if and when it feels the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will not be able to hold out any longer. Eroponents of this thesis consider the DRV to be the shield of China's safety and, consequently, any increased American action directed against North Vietnam would bring the entrance of China in to the war closer. The present internal developments In China, such as the cultural revolution, the reform of the Army and the purges in leadership in their opinion all point to the fact that China has decided to brace itself for this eventuality. Other observers feel differently. In answer, American officials are careful to point out that the likelihood of China's intervention exists only if Hanoi was completely destroyed and that consequently American policy is careful to limit its aerial attacks on North Vietnam to military objectives without aiming to overthrow the DRV Government. ^ Such is also the opinion expressed by a former Chinese Communist diplomat who was reported at the end of August to have sought asylum in the United Spates Embassy in Damascus. In an interview on his arrival in the United States he stated that the leadership of the ERC was "still very cautious about any confrontation with the United States over Vietnam".

k/ Le Monde, 4 and 5 August, in its articles entitled "Vers une Guerre Slno-Americaine? 1. Les avertissements de Pekin; .2. La Chine accepte 1'idee du combat". 5/ See statements of Walt Rostow, Assistant to the President of the United States on International Affairs. -9-

23- Attitudes of the PRC and of the United States towards each other became further hardened at the end of the month when, on the same date - JO August - both countries exposed their position. President Johnson struck a new note in a speech to the American Legion saying that the United States must assume that the PRC "means every militant vord it utters *.. until there is proof that it cannot and will not encourage a whole series of wars". The United States, he felt, could not gamble that the PRC's threats to ignite other wars of liberation were rhetorical. 2k. An editorial of the People?e Daily of 30 August called for anti-American uprisings throughout the world "so US imperialism can be nibbled up bit by bit •while the US was in Vietnam". The editorial reasoned that the United States had set the stage for its own destruction "by transferring the main weight of its military force to Asia ... the more forces the US imperialism throws into Asia, the more will be bogged down, and the deeper the grave it is digging for itself". The tying down of a large number of US troops by the Asian people creates a favourable condition for further growth of anti-US struggle of the people in other parts of the world. When all the people rise to attack it, "one hitting at its head, the other at its feet, US imperialism can be nibbled up bit by bit". After giving considerable details on the composition of the Armed Forces of the United States in Asia and the Pacific the editorial charged that Soviet leadership has "ganged up with Indian reactionaries and Japanese militarists and together they are working for the encirclement of China. In this way", the Soviet clique serves as accomplice number one of US imperialism in pursuing its counter-revolutionary line". 25. The PRC did not give any indication about its intentions to enter the conflict. A number of rallies were held to express continued solidarity with the DRV, and an increase in the amount of material aid from the PRC was reported by Hanoi. ^—5a>/ An editorial in the Army newspaper Liberation Army Daily of

5a/ On 30 August a communique of the DRV announced the signature of an agreement under the terms of which it would receive "non-refundable" economic and technical aid from the PRC. No details were given as to the goods involved. Observers believe that it is mostly rice and guns. An editorial in the Hanoi newspaper Nhan Dan after Expressing gratitude stated that "the agreement is an outstanding manifestation of the relations of profound friendship and fraternity and close militant solidarity between the peoples of Vietnam and of China, and of the great, sincere, disinterested and unswerving support and assistance given by the Communist Party, Government and people of China to the Vietnamese peoples' fight against the United States imperialist aggressors". -10-

25 August recalls the 20th anniversary of Chairman Mao's "paper tiger" thesis. The editorial is entitled "We are afraid ef nothing". It states that Chairman Mao's statement of 20 years ago that imperialism and reactionaries were paper tigers has "been completely borne out by the outcome of the Chinese civil war and by the result of the Korean war and the outlook in Vietnam. Should the United States dare to invade China, the editorial states, they would be routed by the Chinese people using the methods "of the people's war". "The Chinese people, armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought, are; .not afraid of war. Our answer to the US imperialist war threat is: (l) oppose it; (2) we have no fear, should you invade, we will resolutely strike back, engage you in people's war, and wipe you out completely". "US imperialism and its accomplices are in a habit of scaring people with atom bombs. Chairman Mao pointed out long ago that the atom bomb is also a paper tiger* We possess not only material atom bombs but also the moral atom bomb which [they] cannot possibly have. The moral atom bomb of the revolutionary people is hundreds of thousands times more powerful than the material atom bomb. We are out-and-out materialists. We firmly believe that the masses are the creators of history." -n-

V. Relations with other countries A. Japan 26. Relations "between the two countries, which had deteriorated in the last six months, reached a new low. The NCKA reports that the Japanese Government refused entry to the leader of the Chinese delegation to the Anti-Nuclear Bomb World Conference. The People's Daily in its report notes the timing of this decision: it had coincided with the Soviet Foreign Minister's visit to Japan and followed a visit by the US Secretary of State* The ban, the paper stated, was part of the Sato Government^ policy of "fraternizing with the USA", allying with the Soviet Union ..» and sabotaging the friendly relations between Chinese and Japanese peoples* 27. The Japanese Association to ban the A-Bomb and the H-Bomb issued a communique accusing China of breaking the unity of the International Communist movement and of trying to impose its will on other Parties. It was also reported that at the beginning of August the Japanese Communist party, in a confidential instruction, had indicated to its members that it could not approve the nuclear experiments of China and had ordered all portraits of Mao Tse-tung removed. The Japanese Communist Party daily newspaper Akahata stopped publishing schedules of Peking radio broadcasts in June, and reprints of articles from Communist Chinese organs also ceased to appear. The cooling between the two Parties is reported to have its origin in the trip undertaken by the Head of the Japanese Communist Party to China, Horth Vietnam and Worth Korea last February, in the course of which he tried to convince Chinese leaders to re-establish a common front against "the menace of American imperialism in Vietnam". Many Japanese are also reported to be shocked not only by the nuclear explosions, but by tha current purge of academic figures and others accused of ideological crimes. 28. Though Chinese communiques showed indignation at the refusal to issue a visa to Liu Ming-yi, the leader to the Anti-Bomb Conference, and at the other series of rebuffs, there seems to be a change of emphasis in China's policy towards Japan. According to some analysts, the PRC has decided to concentrate on the expansion of its trade with Japan, and on 12 August Foreign Minister Chen-yi told a visiting mission from the Japanese Socialist Party that his Government would endeavour to expand the scope of trade and personal visits between the two countries. -12-

B. The Democratic Republic of Korea 29. An editorial entitled "Let Us Defend our Independence" appeared on 12 August in Rodong Shinmoon, the Party*e official newspaper. It criticizes the Soviet Communist Party for lagging in support to the Vietnamese, "but criticizes even more strongly China's Party policy and its divisive effects upon the Communist world. The editorial declared that "... for the sake of the anti-Imperialist joint action and the United Front, common grounds should be sought first of all on this fundamental question (meaning unity of the Communist world) in face of OS imperialism, shelving all other questions for the time being. .*. One country of the Party cannot serve as a center of the world revolution or as the leading Party ... there can be no superior Party or inferior Party nor a Party that gives guidance and a Party that receives guidance ... revolution can neither be exported nor imported and outside influence plays only a secondary role". The editorial then congratulates the Japanese Party for having adopted an independent line of conduct. 30. Some analysts consider that the present North Korean position goes beyond the current attitude of most Bast European parties seeking a measure of independence.

C. Cuba 31. Relations with Cuba, which started deteriorating since the Tri-Continental Conference and the disagreement over rice shipments at the beginning of the year, have taken a turn for the worse. The Peking Review in the month of August reproduced an article by Robert Williams, an American Negro who formerly broadcast anti-US propaganda from Havana but who has recently transferred his headquarters to Peking. Mr. Williams, whose article has received wide distribution over China, accuses Cuba of having preserved the "white reactionary anti-Communist power structure", including racism. Editorials and reports by HCHA depict the Cuban delegates at the recently held latin American Student Congress in Havana as working hand in glove with the Soviet revisionists and as having made motions "arbitrarily to obstruct and interrupt the speech of the Chinese delegation"; they also accuse the President of Cuba, Mr. Dorticos, of having made a speech along Soviet lines favouring unity of "anti-imperialist forces". -13-

D. chile 32. On 18 August HCM reports information originating in Santiago which announces the formation of a "revolutionary communist party, at the same time anti-revisionist and anti-Castroist". The formation of this party seems to "be the outcome of a disintegration process vithin the Communist Party of Chile since 196^, and the publicity given to it in China raises the possibility that the PRO might consider this new party as a basis for operation in Latin America.

VI. Internal Developments having implications on Foreign Affairs 33. The August meeting of the Central Committee was the first one in four years, and its communique approved the principal decisions of the Politburo since the last meeting of the Central Committee in 1962. Most of these decisions, however, are reported to be the outcome of a secret meeting of the Central Committee held, last November. A. The Army 3U. The set of "extremely important decisions of building the Army" were contained in the speech of Mao Tse-tung and an editorial in the Liberation Army Daily on 1 August, Army Day. The purpose of the directives seems to be to achieve a greater integration between armed forces and civilians, "with both performing each other*s tasks", and to eliminate professionalism in the Army. "The mass movement to learn from the People's Liberation Army has reached its climax", and civilian life is to acquire the revolutionary spirit exemplified by the Army and its leader, Lin Piao, who has "most resolutely and thoroughly carried out Chairman Mao's ideas and the line concerning Army building". 35• Among the "series of brilliant policies of fundamental importance put forward by Comrade Jfeo Tse-tung" and approved by the Central Committee, is that of raising and training successors in the proletarian and revolutionary cause; on the strategic principle of preparedness against war; the call for the whole Party to grasp military affairs and for everybody to be solid soldiers; and, finally, "...on the call for the People's Liberation Army and all factories, villages, schools, commercial departments, service trades and Party and Government organizations to become great schools of revolution". The key to success of this great cultural revolution is "to have faith in the masses, rely on them, boldly arouse them and respect their initiative". It is therefore imperative to persevere in the line of "from the masses and to the masses". B. The Hierarchy 56. The communique established clearly the preponderant place of Chairman Mao and of his next in command, Lin Piao. It seems, however, that considerable discussion had taken place within the Central Committee on whether to give Mr. mo or the Central Committee first place. It seems that Peking papers were published nine hours late in order to give time for a compromise to be worked out, According to the communique, "Comrade Mao is the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era" and the call of Comrade Lin Piao on the People's Liberation Army "... to launch a mass movement in the army to study Comrade Mao's works has set a brilliant example for the whole Party and the whole nation". The most fundamental guarantee against revisionism and the restoration of capitalism and "for victory for our Socialist and Communist cause" is to study the thoughts of Mao. y\. At present, and as a result of the developments of the month of August, the hierarchy in the leadership, or membership in the Central Committee, seems to be the following: 1. Mao Tse-tung - Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party; 2. Lin Piao - Defence Minister; 5. Chou En-lai - Prime Minister; k. Tao Chu - propaganda Chief; 5. Chen Po-ta - Organizer of Cultural Revolution; 6. Ten Hsiao-ping - Party General Secretary; 7. Kang Sheng - Police Head of the Party Ideological School; 8. Liu Shao-chi - President of the Republic} 9. Chu Teh - Army Marshal; 10. Li Fu-chun - Economic planner; 11. Chen Yun - Economic planner. -'

6/ Though no official statement has been issued on the subject, the Standing Committee or Secretariat of the Politbureau seems to be made up by the seven first names on this list. The new additions are Tao Chu, Chen Po-ta and Bang Sheng, replacing Messrs. Liu Shao Chi, Chu Teh and Chen Yun. -15-

38. The Cultural Revolution Rally held in Peking on 18 August in the presence of Chairman Mao and all Members of the Central Committee was reported to have been attended "by one million people. The speeches at the rally, especially that of Chan Po-ta, who chaired the rally, made clear the purposes for creating the "Red Guards". As part of the cultural revolution and the directives for it established in the communique of the Central Committee of the Party, it was essential to harness the youth of the country in order to bring pressure on the rest of the population and ensure the survival of the present Chinese interpretation of Communism. "In order to build China into a great socialist country, to guarantee that our great fatherland will never change colour, and to support the revolutionary struggles waged by all the oppressed people and nations in the world against US Imperialism and its lackeys, you have to struggle against the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all exploiting classes and, answering the call of Chairman Mao, smash all kinds of monsters". 39. It seemed also important to avoid any softening of the revolutionary ardour of the generation who did not have to go through the hardships of the beginning of Communism in China, or in the words of a commentator to "bring about the conversion of a new generation to the Spartan ideas of Yenan". For this reason, it seems that most youths at the Peking rally were imported from remote parts of China. "Our great leader Chairman Mao always tells us all revolutionaries, including all revolutionary young people, must pass through storms and hardships. Revolutionaries cannot grow up in a hothouse, but should grow up in the big storms and waves. We must steel ourselves in the big revolutionary furnace. You have come to Peking, capital of proletarian revolution and source of the great proletarian cultural revolution. You have passed through many difficulties and hardships. You have no fear of big storms. Your action is very correct ... Your action and struggle have shown that you are hopeful. You can be really good students of Chairman Mao and successors to the cause of the proletarian revolution. Your experience in hardships this time has displayed your heroic spirit, but this is Just a preliminary test. You have to pass thousands upon thousands of tests, a long-term test. You must immerse yourselves into revolutionaries to struggle for the people, socialism and communism." ho. Editorials in NONA repeatedly harked back to the difficulties of suffering and frustrations faced by those who made the revolution: "With a »Red heart, a Red flag and a Red book1, the -16-

young revolutionary soldier dared to break through, and dared to open fire at the covert and overt bourgeois representatives. How they are advancing along the revolutionary path charted by Chairman Mao in the teeth of great storms in the class struggle." ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION The Secretary-General

FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDS NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION POUR INFORMATION

CR. 13 (11-64) DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AMD 18 January 1967 SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS CdeH:pmm Political Affairs Division

PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE QUESTION OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION (ITEM 90)

— 21ST SESSION PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE QUESTION OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION (ITEM 90) — 21ST SESSION

I. Factual Information 1. A request for the inclusion of the item entitled "Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations" was made "by a letter dated JO August 1966, accompanied by an explanatory memorandum (A/6J91). The letter was signed by representatives of Albania, Algeria, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Guinea, Mali, Romania and Syria (see Annex I). 2. The debate lasted ten days, from 18 through 28 November, and 69 delegations addressed themselves to the question. Of these, seven addressed themselves exclusively to explaining their vote (Bolivia, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Guyana, Israel and Malta). 3. The Assembly was faced by three draft resolutions (see Annex II): (a) Representation of China in the United Nations; draft resolution submitted by Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Gabon, Japan, Italy, Madagascar, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, Togo and the United States of America (A/L.1^ and Add. 1). dated Ik November 1966. (b) Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations; draft resolution submitted by Albania, Algeria, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Pakistan, Rumania and Syria (A/L.^96 and Add. 1), dated 16 November 1966. (c) Draft resolution submitted by Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Italy, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America (A/L.500 and Add. l) dated 21 November 1966. if. The voting took place on 29 November (A/PV.lifSl) in the order of the presentation of the resolutions. The draft resolution A/L.ij-94, also called the procedural resolution, was adopted by 66 votes in favour, 48 against and seven abstentions. It became resolution A/RES. 2159 (XXI) of 30 November 1966. Draft resolution L.V?6 calling for the immediate seating of representatives of the PRO "was rejected "by 57 against, h6 in favour and 17 abstentions. 5. A procedural debate preceded the voting on the third resolution. The representative of Syria proposed that the two-thirds majority vote accepted by the Assembly through the vote on draft resolution L.^-9^ should also apply to draft resolution L.500. After some debate in which the representatives of Italy, Congo (Brazzaville) and Pakistan participated, the President decided to put to a vote the Syrian proposal that draft resolution L.500 be considered an important question requiring two-thirds majority. The proposal was adopted by 51 votes to 37 with 30 abstentions, and voting on draft resolution L.500 proceeded. The resolution was lost by 3^ votes in favour, 62 against and 25 abstentions.

II. Analysis 6. The signatories of the request for inclusion were the same as last year, with the exception of Burundi and Ghana which did not sign this year, and Syria which became one of the signatories. The request for inclusion of the item was couched in similar terms this year to those of last year. There were, however, slight differences in the explanatory memorandum. Omitted in this year1s memorandum were references to the recommendation of the Cairo Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries; also omitted were references to the fact that refusal to seat representatives of the PRC was "based entirely on political considerations", and to the importance of the PRC's participation in a conference on disarmament. On the other hand, express reference was made this year to the United States, whereas previously the vvaguer term "Powers" was used. Thus it was stated in paragraph 6 that; "... the United States of America which is violating the principles and objectives of the Charter by opposing the restoration to the People's Republic of China of its rights in the United nations... " and again in paragraph 8 that "... the unlawful authorities installed in the island of Taiwan, who brazenly claim to represent China, remained there only thanks to the armed forces of the United States.

This year's memorandum also includes a new legal argument aimed at forestalling the possibility of any "two Chinas" solution by stating that such a solution can create an "unhappy precedent" and -3-

"... cannot but give rise to uncertainty regarding the future of the national and territorial unity of many Member States." 7. The texts of the two draft resolutions, i.e. the procedural and substantive ones, were also similar to those of last year. The language of the procedural draft was similar to last year's text, with the addition of a reference to the resolution itself ("which the General Assembly in its resolution 2025 (XX) of 17 November 1965 affirmed as remaining valid"). The draft resolution this year acquired additional sponsors, namely Belgium, Bolivia, Hew Zealand and Togo. Compared with last year (56-49 with 11 abstentions), ...the resolution passed with a net gain of 10 votes in favour, h less abstentions and one voice less against it. The ten additional votes in favour of the resolution were: Maldive Islands (last year abstained), Rwanda (last year against), Saudi Arabia (Last year abstained), Botswana (new country), Central African Republic (Last year against), Dahomey (last year did not participate in voting), Indonesia (last year absent), Jamaica (last year abstained), Lesotho and Guyana (new Members). Voting against the resolution this year for the first time: Burundi and Kuwait. Abstaining this year were the same countries as last year: (Austria, Cameroon, Chad, Cyprus, Iran, Portugal)and Sierra Leone. 8. The sponsors of the substantive draft resolution were the same as last year, with the addition of Mauritania, and with Ghana and Somalia missing. The text was also similar, with the exception that the reference to the Cairo Conference was omitted here also, and where last year the expulsion of the "Chiang-Kai Shek representatives" was called for in a separate paragraph, this year it was included in the one operative paragraph — presumably to de-emphasize the harshness of the language which delegates last year had singled out as a factor in not voting in favour of the draft Resolution. The comparison with last year's vote on the same draft resolution (4-7-^7 with 20 abstentions) shows a loss of one vote and an increase of 10 votes against, as well as a decrease by three in the number of abstentions. 9. The same countries voted for resolution L.^9^ as did last year, with the addition of Burundi (abstained last year), Indonesia (absent last year) and Senegal (abstained last year). On the other hand, four countries which last year had voted in favour of the draft resolution changed their vote this year: Central African Republic and Sierra Leone now voted against the draft resolution, and Morocco and Singapore abstained. The ten additional countries voting against the draft this year were: Central African Republic, Chile, Congo (Democratic Republic), Dahomey, Iceland, Lesotho, Libya, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia and Sierra Leone. One country (Canada), which last year voted against it, changed its vote to abstention:; There were three more abstentions this year, but the composition of the group had changed. Austria, Cameroon, Chad, Iran, Jamaica, ,'uwait, Lebanon, Maldive Islands, Netherlands, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago and Tunisia abstained both times. In addition, this year Botswana, Canada, Morocco and Singapore abstained. Last year's seven additional abstentions became the following votes this year: in favour - Burundi and Senegal; against - Iceland, Libya, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia and Chile.

III. Voting Patterns 10. This year, unlike last, speakers addressed themselves mostly to the draft resolutions directly rather than expanding on legal and political arguments in favour or against seating the representatives of the PRC.—' 11. As last year, generally speaking delegations who voted in favour of the procedural resolution voted against the substantive draft resolution, and vice-versa. The correlation with the third so-called Italian draft resolution is somewhat less clear, though a pattern exists: a great number of countries who voted in favour of the procedural resolution voted also in favour of the Italian'draft .±esolutibn.:\ None of the countries voting in favour of the immediate seating of the PRC voted for the Italian draft resolution. Three of them, however, abstained on it. Indonesia, Nigeria and the United Kingdom. 12. Voting in favour of the substantive or Albanian draft and against the procedural and Italian drafts were: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Nepal, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

I/ A number of speakers referred to the legal and political aspects of the Chinese question in their speeches during the General Debate. As the arguments for and against the procedural and substantive draft resolutions were similar to those of previous years, it was not thought necessary to repeat them again. As, however, the Assembly was faced by a third draft resolution, the Italian draft, the debate on it presents a new approach to the problem and will be discussed in another section. -5-

15. The countries which voted in favour of the procedural resolution and the Italian draft resolution, and against the substantive draft resolution were: Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Democratic Republic. of Congo, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Turkey, United States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela. 1^. A number of countries which voted in favour of the procedural resolution and against the Albanian substantive draft did however not vote in favour of the Italian draft resolution, which shows that a number of countries among those opposed to the seating of the PRC were also opposed to any softening of the attitude as represented by a study of the question. Abstaining were: Voting against were; Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Central African Republic, Dominican Republic, • China, El Salvador, Dahomey, Gabon, Gambia, Guyana, Ivory Coast, Haiti, Jordan,. Honduras, Madagascar, Lesotho, Niger, Malaysia, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia. Philippines, \ Rwanda, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Togo, Upper Volt a. 15. Six Member States abstained on all three draft resolutions: Austria, Cameroon, Chad, Cyprus, Iran and Portugal. 16. Though not numerically significant, important deviations to these patterns have occured, representing different shadings. Thus Canada, Jamaica, the Netherlands, and Trinidad and Tobago, all of them in favour of:the -6-

procedural draft and the, Italian draft resolution, did however abstain on the draft Albanian/resolution, showing a softening of their position and indicating a possible^trend for the future. Two countries - the United Kingdom and Indonesia - which felt that the PEG should be seated but that this was an important question under the terms of the Charter^ therefore voted in favour . of both the/^ubstantive and procedural draft resolutions and abstained on the Italian draft. Still other countries felt that the question of seating was an important one, but did not express an opinion on the substantive and Italian drafts. These were: Lebanon and the Maldive Islands which abstained, and Laos which either was absent or did not participate. Kuwait on the other hand did not think it was an important question, and voted against the procedural resolution, abstaining on the two other drafts; whereas Sierra Leone opposed the seating of the PEG and abstained on the two other draft resolutions. Singapore voted against the procedural resolution and the Italian proposal, but abstained on the Albanian draft resolution. Morocco and Tunisia both believed that a further study of the question might be beneficial, and voted in favour of the Italian draft, against the procedural draft, and abstained on the Albanian draft resolution.

IV. The "Italian" Draft Eesolution (A/L.500 and Add, l) (a) History 17. The reasons for tabling the draft resolution were presented by Mr. Picconi of Italy (A/PV.1^70). Hitherto the approach on the Chinese problem has been wrong, the argumentation ran, and the time has come to try a new approach "rationally and constructively". The debates on the question had been inconclusive in the last 16 years because on the one hand there is the irrefutable reality that Peking administers and governs the whole of mainland China and that its population of 700 million is not represented at the United Nations. This lack of representation in turn was due to the fact that the Members of the Assembly were divided in their assessment of the situation, and primarily on "the intentions of the Peking Government". "... Does the Peoplefs Eepublic of China really want to be represented in the United Nations? And assuming that the reply to this question is categorically •yes1, is the PEC prepared to comply..with the terms of the Charter?" -7—

On the other hand, a factor to be taken into consideration was what the position of the Government of the Republic of China "can and must be". There was no reliable data on the intentions/ of Peking, and therefore the first thing was to ascertain the "official intentions of Peking". In order to achieve this, it was proposed to establish an ad hoc committee which would have among its functions to find out what the "... feelings of Peking in regard to representation in the United Nations and compliance with the Charter were." The ad hoc committee should in addition assemble "... all the necessary official data and submit them as rapidly as possible in a report embodying proposals for an equitable and practical solution." This procedure was calculated to provide a suitable way out of the present impasse, and would be clearly justified under the Charter. 18. The effort of Italy and the other co-sponsors was not the first one during the 21st session of the Assembly. Since the/beginning of the Assembly private consultations had been taking place on the initiative of Canada with a view to establishing an ad hoc committee to look into the possibility of assuring some form of representation for the PEG and also to look into the question of whether a continued representation for the Republic of China could be worked out. It was reported that a number of governments favoured this idea and were ready to support a draft resolution to this effect, but that others such as the United States, were opposed to it on the grounds that it went too far by limiting the terms o f reference of the committee and thus tending to prejudge the outcome. The Italian Government in the meantime was also thinking of the establishment of a committee, but with more general terms of reference under which the committee would be free to examine the question of Chinese representation as a whole and leave the door open for any conclusion, including the possibility of no change in representation. Foreign Minister Fanfani met Foreign Secretary Martin in Rome when the latter was returning from the Soviet Union, and it is reported that they tried to agree on a formula. This did not prove possible, and the Canadian delegation therefore neither pressed its original proposal nor co-sponsored the Italian resolution. (b) The vote 19. The Italian draft resolution was defeated by a very large margin: 54 in favour, 62 against and 25 abstentions. The bulk of the vote against it came from governments who voted in favour of the immediate seating of the -8-

PRC. Their argument was typically expressed by Ambassador Seydoux of France when he recalled that "... a similar procedure was adopted in 1950-51; we know the results of that only too well. We believe that it is neither timely nor realistic, after sixteen years of debate, to propose the creation of a body whose purpose would be that 'of exploring and studying' this matter so as to suggest 'an equitable and practical solution'. (A/L.500). There is no solution other than to restore to China the place that belongs to it, and, in our opinion, it is discrimination to submit China to an examination procedure, which, in the last resort could only be envisaged for the admission of a new State. ..." 20. The bulk of the favourable vote came from governments who supported the procedural resolution and opposed the substantive one, though many of them, even in this group, opposed the Italian draft or at least abstained. In other words, the draft resolution last votes "on the right" from (i) neighbouring countries: Thailand, the Republic of China, Philippines and Australia voting against, and Malaysia abstaining; (ii) thirteen African countries, of whom 11 voted against: Botswana, Central African Republic, Dahomey, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Niger, Rwanda, South Africa, Togo, Upper Volta. Two abstained: Gabon and Lesotho; (iii) Eight Latin American States, of whom seven abstained: Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guyana, Haiti and Honduras. Paraguay voted against. 21. The United States let its attitude toward the Italian draft resolution be known early in the debate (A/PV.lUTl). Ambassador Goldberg made it clear that he would vote in favour of the draft resolution on the grounds that it "... does not in any way prejudice or undermine our commitments; nor indeed does it pre-judge the results of the study to be made." At the time it was thought by a number of countries that such eager endorsement of a proposal made by its Western European allies signified that the United States had instigated it, and a number of countries which might have voted for the original Canadian proposal now refrained from endorsing this one. 22. The Canadian representative in his speech made it clear that his delegation would have favoured a text with a different emphasis. -9-

"It is a matter of great regret to Canada that the proposal which has emerged as a result of our joint deliberations is not one which, in our view, goes far enough in charting the course which this Assembly should now take in the interest of the United Nations and -ftiat of the larger world community." Mr. Martin added that he did not consider the compromise proposal as a step forward from a similar proposal Canada had made in 1950- At the present time what was needed was "... a more specific mandate by which the proposed committee would be guided in exploring the elements of an equitable solution of this question. ..." What was wanted therefore was not a study and research, but "... a committee to act on behalf of this Assembly in mapping out a viable solution and paving the way for forward movement on this issue." 23. Mr. Martin then proceeded to refute a number of statements made in opposition to the seating of representatives of the PRC; though statements from Peking did raise doubts about the willingness to be seated, still countries friendly to the ERC have in successive years tabled proposals aimed at seating. One assumed that this was done with the consent of Peking. As to the willingness to adhere to the obligations of the Charter, this question in accordance with Article k was properly raised only in the case of a state applying for membership, whereas here the issue was one of representation of a state already a Member. Finally, Mr. Martin thought that any realistic appraisal by the committee should have included a reference to the Security Council as the issue of China in that organ could not be ignored. V. Trends and Conclusions 2k, This year's vote ran counter to the trend of past years toward seating the PRC. Whether the former trend will prevail depends on a number of factors including the attitudes of a number of countries who have hitherto followed the line of the United States but seem to indicate that in the future they might follow the Canadian pattern. 25. A polarization of attitudes has been noticeable in this year's vote as witnessed by the fate met by the Italian draft resolution and the hardening of the abstentions into either favourable or unfavourable votes. -10-

26. The defeat of draft resolution L.500 cannot be taken as an accurate indication of future trends. It vas a draft resolution insufficiently discussed and too narrowly sponsored by countries, none of vhom had relations •with thePRC. The increased number of votes against the Albanian resolution was due mostly to the image created by the PEC in the course of the last year: accusations of intervention in the internal affairs of African countries, the reported activities of the Red Guards, statements of extreme nature made by Chinese officials all contributed to lessen the willingness immediately to seat the PRC. 27. On the other hand, the Republic of China has manoeuvred with ability both inside the United Nations and outside it and has continued to give technical aid to developing countries. Finally, in the course of the year a number of political changes occurred in countries formerly championing the seating of the PRC. 28. Some votes hardened against the seating of the PRC: Rwanda, which last year voted against the procedural resolution and abstained on the substantive one, this year voted in favour of the procedural resolution, against the substantive one and against the Italian draft. Iceland, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chile and Libya, who abstained last year on the Albanian resolution, this year voted against it. Only Senegal, having abstained last year on the Albanian draft, this year voted in favour of it. 29- Attitudes of countries neighbouring the PRC were also significant. At one extreme was Australia which opposed even a study of the question; Japan and New Zealand, though they voted in favour of the procedural resolution and against the Albanian draft resolution, voted in favour of the Italian draft resolution. Singapore, though against the procedural resolution and the Italian draft, abstained on the Albanian draft resolution. India and Pakistan voted in favour of the Albanian draft resolution and against the other two drafts. 50. African attitudes by and large hardened against seating the PRC. Most significantly, Morocco changed its vote and joined Tunisia in abstaining on the substantive resolution and voting affirmatively on the Italian draft (though both voted against the procedural resolution). 31. With the exception of Cuba, Latin American countries were unanimous against seating at present the PRC, and voted in favour of the procedural resolution and against the substantive draft resolution. Chile, which last -11- year abstained on the substantive draft resolution, voted against it this year as, in its opinion, the Italian draft resolution was aimed at finding a solution to the question in the long run. Twelve other Latin American countries joined Chile in calling for the establishment of a committee. The eight Latin American countries who either abstained or voted against the Italian draft, did so because they did not consider it a question on which their relationships with the United States would force them to vote in a given direction. The position of the two Caribbean countries of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago was, so to speak, half way between that of the United States and the United Kingdom: they voted in favour of the procedural resolution and the establishment of the Committee but abstained on the Albanian draft. 32. The Arab vote was mixed. Iraq, Mauritania, Syria and the UAE voted for immediate admission. Syria was especially active in furthering this aim, Jordan on the other hand voted against both the Albanian draft resolution and against the establishment of the committee. Libya voted in favour of establishing the committee, Lebanon abstained both on admission and on the committee, but voted in favour of the procedural resolution, whereas Morocco and Tunisia voted against the procedural resolution, abstained on immediate seating, and favoured the Italian draft. 33. Western European attitudes are significant not because of their vote this year, but because of the possible developments in the future along the lines adopted by Canada which this year abstained on the Albanian draft. As last year, France voted for immediate seating, Britain in favour of both the procedural and substantive resolutions, and the Netherlands, though voting in favour of the Italian draft resolution, abstained on the Albanian one. Scandinavian countries, as in the past, voted for immediate admission and against the establishment of a committee, with the exception of Iceland which, though it abstained last year on the Albanian resolution, this year voted against it but for establishment of the committee. UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: 5 DATE: 9 February 196? A: The Secretary-General^^/ '^y£/

REFERENCE: THROUGH: S/C "DE:

FROM: DE: A.E. Nesterenko Under-Secretary, PSCA

SUBJECT: OBJET:

I am sending you, herewith, a short note on the present stage in the "cultural revolution" in the PEG, prepared by a Political Officer of the Political Division of PSCA. Due to reasons quite obvious to you, the note is far from being comprehensive but it might be of some interest as a summary of the numerous publications on this question. yJKXf»Jsxtr^ — to read these publications in full and be thoroughly acquainted with their contents would be a very difficult and exhausting work. DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AM) 7 February 196? SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS EhP:pmn Political Affairs Division

NOTE ON THE EBESEHT STAGE IN THE "CULTURAL

REVOLUTION" IN THE ERG 7 February 1967 PhPrpmm

Note on the Present Stage in the "Cultural Revolution" in the PRC

1. Developments in the PRC where the news media are generally in the hands of the pro-Maoist group are difficult to evaluate or even ascertain. Yet, a phase of the cultural revolution in which the pro-Maoist "Red Guards" attempted to wrest power from those in control of party and trade union offices and of the factories, without the intervention of the Army, has apparently not teen very successful and may have come to an end. —' 2. Reports from Japanese correspondents in Peking on 6 February that President Liu Shao-chi and Communist Party Secretary-General Teng Hsiao-ping had been dismissed were accompanied by an appraisal that "resistance to Chairman Mao's campaign to replace the appointees [of those two former leaders] in the Party and Government machinery throughout China was expected to continue unabated1' (A.P. dispatch from Tokyo, 6 February). 3. The "Cultural Revolution" was indeed an attempt by pro-Mao elements to seize power from established authorities. In the words of a Peking broadcast monitored in Hong Kong on 2k January, "the revolutionary people is decided to annihilate the old system of exploitation as well as the revisionist and bureaucratic institutions, to set up a new proletarian order" (Neue Zurcher

Zeitun^t 26 January). Following a phase of warnings,-' major efforts were made by the Maoists in January 1967, notably between the 15th and 23rd, as indicated in paragraphs 1O-1J below. 4. However, already by mid-January the objective of replacing all authorities by Maoist revolutionary rebels, was officially rejected by Premier Chou En-lai and Chen Po-ta. ^J The Maoist People's Daily quoted by Reuters wrote:

I/ Subsequent to the drafting of this Note the Central Committee and the State Council ordered the Red Guards to return to their homes (Peking correspondent of the MainichiShfaibun, Hew York Times. 8 February). 2/ On 27 January, for instance, a Declaration of the Central Committee warned opponents to submit to the directives of Mao or be destroyed. .3_/ In charge of the Cultural Revolution group of the Party's Central Committee. -2-

"It is a completely erroneous policy to oppose everybody as well as to want to exclude all others and overthrow everything." (Le Monde, k February) 5. In keeping with the new directive of not "overthrowing everything", the Maoists by the end of January agreed that the Army itself should conduct its own purge as demanded by Defense Minister Lin Piao, reportedly as a. condition for Army intervention against the anti-Maoists (Le Monde. 27 January). — 6. The Maoist take-over in the Heilunkiang province of Manchuria seemed to have taken place, on 31 January, in accordance with the new "supervision formula", 5/ The incumbent First Secretary of the Northeast Bureau,-^ Sung Jen-chiung, had been sent from Shenyang to Harbin to re-establish Maoist authority there. 7. On the other hand unreconciled anti-Maoist forces remained in control of the South-West Bureau,^ the Central Committee of which is headed by PRC Politburo member Li Ching-ehuan, with headquarters at Chengtu (Szechwan). Only in Kweichow province of the South-West Bureau did the cultural revolution forces, through the local military command, appear in control, at least in Kweiyang, the provincial capital (New York Times. 2 and 7 February). 8. There was doubt as to the situation in Sinklang (North-Vest Bureau). As admitted by pro-Maoist wallpapers, only one out of twenty-three regiments of reinforced regular units were in favour of the cultural revolution; and the pro-Maoists charged that they were victims of a massacre on 27-28 January at Shihotzu near the Soviet border. Yet, as reported on 2-5 February by Western press correspondents, Wang En-mao, a powerful regional official for 15 years and regarded as anti-Maoist, was arrested. According to the French Press Agency, information from Sinfciang was confused and contradictory (Le Monde, k February). 9. Another regional leader, regarded as anti-Maoist, was apparently still in office in Inner Mongolia, namely, First Secretary Ulanfu of the Mongolian Autonomous Region, also a Vice-Premier and Regional Military Commander. The Maoists complained that the Army had been used against them; and there were reports of "Mongolia for the Mongolians" slogans used by the anti-Maoists. y Rival anti-Maoist armies were reportedly established, i.e. Chinese Army of the Red Flag and General Staff of Chinese Workers, peasants and soldiers. 5/ As well as First Political Commissar of the armies in the Shenyang (Mukden) military region. 6/ Tibet Autonomous Region, Yunnan, Szechwan and Kweichow. -3-

10. Even in cases of initial successes by the Cultural Revolution, counter- offensives "by their opponents were acknowledged by Radio Peking. At Tsingtao in Shantung province a Maoist take-over took place on 22 January, according to Radio Peking (23 January), but on the following day, Radio Peking announced that the opponents of Mao in Tsingtao had dealt a counter-blow; the "reactionary authorities", having attacked, the Revolutionary Committee, were threatening "to cut the heads" of the supporters of Mao (Neue Zurcher Zeitung. 1 February). 11. Similarly, in Shansi, in spite of a Maoist success reported on 17 January, "counter-revolutionaries", according to Radio Peking, were mounting an offensive (Le Monde, k February). Further west in Shensi, following a Maoist victory reported on 18 January, their opponents were said to be preparing a rebellion (Le Monde, 27 January). 12. In Kwangsi (Central South Bureau) a Maoist take-over on 23 January (FBIS, 27 and JO January), was apparently unchallenged so far. 13. Three cities seemed to be solidly in the hands of the Maoists - Taiyuan (Shansi), Peking and Shanghai. The Maoists, having wrested control from the established party organizations,were reported to be planning new city administrations patterned after the 1871 Paris Communeso(Hew York Times. 7 February). Ik. Known developments to date indicate that Maoist successes have not been very extensive and that almost nowhere are they securely in control. New tactics, including arrangements with regional leaders and possible intervention of the Army, would have to be used, unless the enterprise was at least temporarily given up.