Mapping interests in conflict areas: Katanga Steven Spittaels Nick Meynen Summary “Mapping interests in conflict areas: Katanga” reports on the presence of (ex-) combatants in the Congolese province of Katanga. It focuses on two broad categories: the ‘Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo’ (FARDC) and the Mayi-Mayi militias. There is no significant presence of other armed groups in the region. After the surrender of the warlord Gédéon in May 2006, the large majority of the remaining Mayi-Mayi groups have demobilised and disarmed. They have chosen to reintegrate into civilian life but this has proven to be a difficult process. The FARDC are still represented all over the province although their numbers have been significantly reduced. It is an amalgam of the former government army (‘Forces Armées Congolaises’, FAC) and the different rebel armies that fought during the Congo wars. The positions of the (ex-) combatants in the region are shown on a first set of maps that accompanies the report. Their possible interests are indicated on a second one. The maps and the report focus on four regions where security problems are persisting into 2007. In the Northern part of Katanga the situation is particularly interesting in the territory of Nyunzu. Two Mayi-Mayi groups, who have not been disarmed yet, operate in the area. However, the biggest threat to the civilian population in the region are the FARDC, who took a specific interest in the Lunga gold mine at least until March 2007. In the Copperbelt there has never been a Mayi-Mayi presence, not even throughout the Congo wars. The FARDC on the other hand have always deployed several units in the area. There is no pressing reason for them to be there but the fact that they can pinch some of the money circulating in the mining business. The Centre is the part of the province that suffered the most from Mayi-Mayi rampages during the last years. Today many of the militias have been demobilised and disarmed but often their reintegration through the ‘Programme National de Désarmement, de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion’ (PNDDR) is not working. Partly because the execution of the PNDDR in Katanga is stalled, but also because they are no longer accepted in their villages of origin. Some of them are regrouping in the Upemba Park, where they can hide and where they know how to survive. An additional problem may arise in case the grieved Mayi-Mayi join forces with other fighters living in the park, who have never surrendered. The East of Katanga is relatively quiet. An interesting case, however, is the territory of Pweto. There is no significant Mayi-Mayi presence in this territory but it harbours one of the two remaining full FARDC brigades quartered in Katanga. The 62nd brigade has a bad reputation because of its harassment of civilians. It is implicated in the illegal exploitation of natural resources at the Cassiterite mine in Kapulo. The West of Katanga is not discussed. From a general perspective the security situation in the Katanga province has improved considerably during the last year. Very few active Mayi-Mayi groups remain, more and more FARDC soldiers are sent for ‘brassage’, the large majority of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) has returned home and the 2006 elections took place without any major incidents. Nevertheless, serious human rights violations by (ex-) combatants, especially FARDC soldiers, are still an everyday practice. There are still a lot of armed men in Katanga who are not always under control. 2 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION 4 PART 1: NECESSARY BACKGROUND 5 The Mayi-Mayi and the DDR process 5 The FARDC and the ‘brassage’ process 8 Presentation of the map collection 11 The basic map ‘Katanga’ 12 The dynamic maps 12 The static maps 13 The report map 15 PART 2: ANALYSIS 16 The North 16 Nyunzu 16 The Copperbelt 22 Shinkolobwe 23 Luisha 25 The Centre 26 Malemba Nkulu 26 The Upemba Park 30 Mitwaba 31 The East 34 Pweto 34 CONCLUSION 38 RECOMMENDATIONS 41 ANNEX: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 43 3 Introduction The following report is the first in a series of at least four inquiries into the motivations of combatants and their leaders. It applies a new methodological approach using cartography as an analytic tool. This text document constitutes only half of the report. At least as important as the written analysis is the cartographic material that comes with it on the IPIS website (www.ipisresearch.be). It is the first time IPIS uses the approach in a public document. Therefore we welcome any remarks or suggestions. “Mapping interests in conflict areas: Katanga” reports on the presence of (ex-) combatants in the Congolese province of Katanga, in other words, the armed men who participated in the consecutive Congo wars. It tries to answer the questions who they are, where they are quartered, why they are quartered there and what should be done to prevent them from causing security problems. The link between natural resources and armed conflict is high on the current research agenda and the search for profit is without any doubt an important motivation for several armed groups involved in conflicts around the world. However, a tendency has developed within the press to reduce all (Central African) conflicts into bitter fights driven by the desire for diamonds and gold. The “Mapping interests in conflict areas” reports compare the importance of four different motivations: power, greed, grievance and security/survival. For each of them we have located specific military targets on separate map layers. For example, on the map showing greed targets, we have included mining areas. In this report we will compare the maps indicating the possible interests of the warring parties with a second set of maps representing the deployment of all troops in the region. We will then use the combined maps to explain the presence of armed groups at certain locations. The maps are not the only source IPIS uses to explain the behaviour of (ex-) combatants. The general insights generated by the maps are complemented with knowledge gathered in the field –two researchers spent a total of 11 weeks in Katanga- and through classic desktop research. At times the information on our maps incited us to dig deeper into a specific situation. Sometimes it worked the other way around. Reliable (security) information on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is hard to find. Despite the official end of the war and transition period, the country is still in a state of serious disorganisation. IPIS welcomes any additional information on the security situation, which could be added to our maps at a later stage. The maps are not only intended to provide answers but also to raise important questions. We hope others will use them as a framework for further thinking and action. 4 Mayi-Mayi combatants of the Gédéon group, May 2006 Part 1: Necessary background This report will focus on two broad categories of (ex-) combatants in Katanga, the ‘Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo’ (FARDC) and the Mayi-Mayi militias. There is no significant presence of the ‘Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda’ (FDLR) or Interahamwe in Katanga and the former rebels of the ‘Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie’ (RCD) all have officially joined the FARDC. The Mayi-Mayi and the DDR process Until the summer of 2006 the Mayi-Mayi militias were considered to be the greatest security threat in Katanga. Without any clear command structure and purpose they had been terrorising the local population for years committing the most horrendous crimes. The most striking feature of these groups was the tendency, among some of them, to eat their victims1. In media reports the term Mayi-Mayi is used as a common denominator for the different popular militias that fought against the RCD invasion in Katanga. A 1 The use of anthropophagy has been well documented in: ASADHO, CDH & CVDHO, Nord-Katanga. Attaques délibérées contre la population civile, October 2003, 42 pp. 5 distinction has to be made between the ‘regulated’ and the ‘non-regulated’ movements. The ‘Forces d’Auto Protection’ (FAP) constituted the regulated popular defence system. They were called into existence by L.D. Kabila and received a (very) limited amount of weapons and training. They were mobilised immediately after the fall of Pweto in December 2000, when the RCD threatened to break through to Lubumbashi and Kamina2. It was a hasty operation with a complicated coordination structure3. The irregular popular defence groups have different names and historical backgrounds. The most important are the ‘Force d’Intervention Populaire’ (FIP), Simba and Mayi-Mayi movements. Some of them came into existence spontaneously4 (as a reaction to ‘Forces Armées Congolaises’ - FAC or RCD aggression), while many others are in fact derailed and transformed FAP groups. Although many differences exist between the various Mayi-Mayi militias, they have certain characteristics in common, most importantly the use of magic and war chanting5. The Mayi-Mayi of Katanga have gone through 3 phases. Initially they were involved, to a greater or lesser extent, in the resistance against the RCD. Afterwards, with the withdrawal of the Rwandese troops from the DRC territory in October 2002 and the start of the transitional government in June 2003, they were left to their own devices. During the transition they both protected (against the FAC) and terrorised the local population. With the start of the ‘Programme National de Désarmement, de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion’ (PNDDR) process, they have entered a third phase. Mayi-Mayi who have surrendered their weapons to the ‘Structure Militaire d’Intégration’ (SMI) of the FARDC have two options.