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THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
THE EFFECTS OF STRATEGIC BOMBING ON GERMAN MORALE
VOLUME II
Morale Division December 1946 THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
THE EFFECTS OF STRATEGIC BOMBING ON GERMAN MORALE
VOLUME II
Morale Division
Dates of Survey: March-July, 1945
December 1946 This report was written primarily for the use of the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensive nature. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be considered as limited to the specific material covered and as subject to further interpretation In the light of further studies conducted by the Survey.
ii FOREWORD
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey was established by the Secretary of War on 3 November 1944, pursuant to a directive from the late President Roosevelt. The officers of the Survey were: FRANKLIN D'OLIER, Chairman. HENRY C. ALEXANDER, Vice-Chair man.
GEORGE W. BALL, HARRY L. BOWMAN, JOHN K. GALBRAITH, RENBIB LIKERT, FRANK A. MCNAMEE, JR., PAUL H. NITZE, ' ROBERT P. RUSSELL, FRED SEARLES, JR., THEODORE P. WRIGHT, Directors.
CHARLES C. CABOT, Secretary. . The Table of Organization provided for 300 civilians, 350 officers and 500 en• listed men. The Survey operated from headquarters in London and established forward headquarters and regional headquarters in Germany immediately fol• lowing the advance of the Allied armies. It made a close examination and inspection, of several hundred German plants, cities and areas, amassed volumes of statistical and documentary material, in• cluding top German government documents; and conducted interviews and inter• rogations of thousands of Germans, including virtually all of the surviving political and military leaders. Germany was scoured for its war records which were found sometimes, but rarely in places where they ought to have been; sometimes in safe-deposit vaults, often in private houses, in barns' in caves, on one occasion in a hen house, and on two occasions in coffins. Targets in Russian-held terri• tory were not available to the Survey. Some two hundred detailed reports were made. During the course of its work, the Survey rendered interim reports and submitted studies and suggestions in connection with the air operations against Japan. While the European War was going on, it was. necessary, in many cases, to follow closely behind the front; otherwise, vital records might have been irretriev• ably lost. Survey personnel suffered several casualties, including four killed.
The Survey studied the effects of the air attack on Japan and further reports have been submitted to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.
in VOLUME II
Supplementary Studies of the Morale Effect oj Strategic Bombing
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page List of Tablec - — Ti List of Charts __ vii Chapter 1. Analysis of Background Material on Cities 1 Chapter 2. Analysis of Captured German Mail 7 Chapter 3. Foreign Worker Studies 15 Chapter 4. The Relation of Bombing to Suicide — 29 Chaptei 5. The Effects of Allied Air Attack on the Morale of German Land Armies 37 Appendix A. Validity and "Reliability of Mail Studies - 43 Appendix B. The Composition of Bombing Strata. 46 Appendix C. Questionnaire for Foreign Workers 47 Appendix D. Pilot Study on French Kscapee3 . . — 52 LIST OF TABLES
Chapter 1 Number . Page 1. Relationship Between Tonnage and Behavioral Morale 2 2. Relationship Between Behavioral Morale and Percentage People Bombed Out 2 3. Utility Services and Willingness to Surrender 3 4. Correlations Between Willingness to Surrender and Disruption of Utilities 3 5. Population, Bomb Tonnage, and Unbombed Cities—by Region 4 0. Average Ranks of Cities in Behavior and Attitude Factors —' .4 7. Population and Bomb Tonnage in Bombed Cities—by Region 5 8. Average Ranks in Behavior and Attitude Factors in Bombed Cities—by Regions 5
Chapter 2
9. Geographical Distribution of the Sample 8 10. Distribution of Letters—by Date, and Sex of Writer. _ 8 11. Bomb Weights for Regions and Strata 8 12. Effects of Bombing.. 10 13. The Relation of Proximity to Low Morale and Anxiety 10 14. Anxiety and Health as Related to Low Morale 10 15. The Relation of Closeness of Exposure to Bombing and Low Morale , 11 10. Interrelations of Various Morale Factors . - 13
Chapter 3
17. Nationality and Regional Background of Foreign Workers— 15 18. Educational Levels 16 19. Education by Age - - — 19 20. Percent of Foreign Workers Subjected to Various Degrees of Bombing 16 21. Percentage of Evaluative Judgments by Foreign Workeis •_ • 17 22. Relation of Initial Fear to Habituation (All Groups) - 18 23. Relation of Personal Involvement to Habituation (All Groups) 18 24. Relation of Raid Expectation to Initial Fright and Habituation (All Groups) 19 25. Raid Expectations as Related to Education and Black Listening -- 19 26. Male-Female Differences Among Russian DPs 19 27. Frequency of Raids as Related to Habituation (All Groups) 19 28. Fear Responses of the National Groups 20 29. Primary Reaction to Raids 20 30. Per Cent Reporting Resistance Behavior 20 31. Effects of Raids on Resistance Movements 20 32. Escape and Transfer Attempts, as Related to Radio Listening and Resistance (All Groups) 21 33. Age and Habituation as Related to Transfer and Escape (All Groups) 21 34. Reasons for Drop in Industrial Production as a Result of Bombing 21 35. Per Cent of French Respondents Indicating Topics of Conversation by Germans in Shelters... . ---- 22 36. Effects of Air Raids on German Attitudes Toward Nazi Party 23 37. Reasons Given for Continued German Participation in War Effort - 23 38. Indices of Air Raid Intensity Related to Reports of German Resistance 23 39. Groups Involved in Air R&id Panics—according to Foreign Worker Reports 24 40. Groups Responsible for Pillaging, as Repoited by DPs 24 41. Types of Bombs Reported as Most Dreaded - 25 42. Estimates of Shelter, Relief and ARP Adequacy 25 43. Educational Level as Related to Observation of Black Marketing 27
Chapter 4
44. Large German Port Cities with High Suicide Rates Heavily Bombed in 1942 Compared with Similar Cities Lightly Bombed in 1042 33
vi LIST OF TABLES
Chapter 4—Continud Number •Pwe 45. Large German Cities with Low Suicide Rates Heavily Bombed in 1942 Compared with Similar Cities Lightly Bombed in 1942 34 46. Large German Cities not Heavily Bombed in 1943 Compared with Similar Cities Lightly Bombed in 1943 34 47. Large German Cities not Heavily Bombed before 1944—Heavily Bombed in 1944 Compared with Similar Cities Lightly Bombed in 1944..- 35
Appendix A
A. Reliability of Codes Used in Mail Study I --- -- 44 B. Reliability of Codes Used in Mail Study II ._ _ - 45
Appendix B
C. The Composition of the Bombing Strata Used in Mail Study II *_ _ 46
Appeadix D
D. Classification of Respondents in French Escapee Study 61
LIST OF CHARTS Chart Page 1. Changes in Morale with Closeness of Exposure to Bombing Facing page 12 U. Variations in Suicide Rates and Bombing Conditions in German Cities 28
vii I
VOLUME II
CHAPTER I
ANALYSIS OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON CITIES
The foregoing volume has provided extensive standard list of topics without any formalization evidence on the morale effects of bombing, evidence of interview procedure. In this manner a back• wliich has come from interviews with German ground story for each of the cities' was obtained civilians and from documentary sources. which, togebher with some material'from the sample • Every effort has been made to test the conclu• of civilians, permits an analysis of morale and be• sions of these studies by independent sources of havior in relation to bombing and certain other city information. The present chapter supplements characteristics. The cities are also grouped by re• these findings by analyzing material obtained from gion and analyzed. interrogations of local leaders and from community In the first four chapters of Volume I all the indi• records in 33 of the cities which were included in viduals in the sample were thrown together for the cross-sectional sample.. Medical authorities, analysis. In those chapters groups of individuals police officials, religious leaders, educational per• with certain characteristics were studied. • In the sonnel, and ARP functionaries were questioned present chapter'the information relates to each city and in some cases requested to prepare memoranda taken as a unit and groups of cities with certain on their activities. The questioning followed a characteristics are analyzed.
SUMMARY 1. The heavier the total tonnage of bombs drop• a. The Rhine-Ruhr-Westphalia Region, hetero• ped on a town and the larger the town, the greater geneous in population and strongly industrialized, the incidence of subversive activity and disruptive was the region with the poorest war morale. It was behavior. How much of this relationship is due most amenable to accepting unconditional surren• to city size and how much to severity of bombing der, and its civilians showed the most reluctance is difficult to determine. to participate in the voluntary activities available • 2. The percentage of population .bombed out of to the people of Germany through the war years. their homes is also correlated with disruptive and The picture for this region seems to be that of a subversive 'behavior for the cities studied. submissive but unwilling and uncooperative part• 3. More of the jwoplc in cities which had under• ner in the Nazi adventure. gone bombing were willing to surrender uncondi• b. The North-Central Region, with its seaport tionally than in unbombed towns. cities and its formerly large Communist Party 4. The more actively religious cities had a lower membership, presents a much more "active" pic• war morale and were more willing to accept uncon• ture, both from the pro- and the anti-Nazi point of ditional surrender than the communities less active view. It had the best morale of the three regions, from the religious point of view. showed a relatively large incidence of voluntary 5. There is a large and significant correlation participation in war activities, and had the smallest between willingness to accept surrender and the number of people who were ready to accept uncon• state of public utilities of a city after bombing. ditional surrender. On the other hand, disruptive Transportation seems to have been the critical and subversive behavior was also found in this re• public utility for the morale of the civilian popula• gion, particularly in the cities of Bremen, Hanover, tion. Its disruption lowered morale more than and Hamburg. interference with the functioning of other utilities. c. The Southern Region, which is not very highly 6. When cities are grouped into three regions, industrialized, occupies a position mid-way between the following regional' differences appear: the other two regions. It is less submissive than the Rhineland but not as actively anti-Nazi as the . 1 Tuebingon waa the only sample city for which DO Background Report wa3 made, duo to the disappearance of key local Informal) 13. industrialized seaports of the North.
696414—47—2 1 d. The data would support the hypothesis that Table 1 shows that there is no relation at all be• in a deteriorating war situation, disruptive and tween bomb load and amount of voluntary partici• subversive behavior arc more directly functions of pation. This may be due to the fact that many so- sociological factors found in a large city, while called voluntary activities were really not volun• morale, " willingness to surrender, and voluntary tary but coercive in some respects, so that people participation arc more closely related to personal engaged in war activities regardless of their willing• factors, such as bombing experience, individual ness to do so. In this case, even if bombing made notions of fatalism, etc. them reluctant to cooperate, it did not stop the "voluntary" activities. EFFECTS OF BOMBING ON MORALE The amount of bombing is moderately related to subversive activity and to disruptive activity (cor• The background reports on the cities contained relations of 0.59 and 0.44). There is some ques• accounts of subversive behavior, such as under• tion, however, whether this means that air raids ground activity and sabotage; disruptive behavior, were responsible for these manifestations of lowered including hoarding and black market activity, riots morale. The heavier bomb loads were dropped in and demonstrations, looting, and crime and delin• the large cities which, before bombing, were on the quency; and voluntary participation in the war effort, whole more anti-Nazi in their attitudes. Hence such as ARP activity, winter help campaigns, Red some of this behavior could be the result of city Cross work, and social welfare activities. Two size as well as bomb weight. The material of attitude measures, taken from Interview Schedule Chapter 4, Part I, Volume I, has shown, however, B, were also used in this analysis. One was "Will• that both Nazis and anti-Nazis were affected by ingness to Accept Unconditional Surrender" and bombing. the other was the "Morale Index" (See Chapter 3, The results reported in Chapter 3, Part I, Volume Part I, Volume I). I, have established tho relationship between bomb Each city was rated on the basis of evidence that tonnage and willingness to surrender. It was point• it had much or little of the activity in question. ed out there, however, that morale did not fall off The city was ranked "one" winch had the greatest in proportion to the tonnage of bombs dropped and amount of behavior undesirable from the Nazi point that very heavy raids yielded diminishing returns. of view, i.e., the most disruptive behavior, the most This same effect is reflected in a moderately low subversive behavior, the least voluntary participa• coefficient of correlation between tonnage and the tion, the most willingness to surrender, or the low• percentage of people willing to surrender. This est morale. The cities were also ranked on the correlation, when computed, is 0.37. basis of the amount of bombing suffered and on If the amount of bombing is measured, not by other characteristics studied. The most bombed tonnage but by the percentage of people bombed city was given a rank of "one." Comparisons of out of their homes, the same-results are obtained, ranks which cities hold on these measures show as indicated in Table 2. whether heavy bombing is associated with unde• sirable behavior and light bombing or no raids with more satisfactory behavior. These relationships' TABLK 2.—Relationship between behavioral morale and percent• age of people bombed out are expressed numerically by correlation coefficients2 Rank correlation* with in the accompanying tables. pro portion bombed out Disruptive behavior 0.56 Subversive activity 1 .44 TABLE 1.—Relationship Between Tonnage and Behavioral Morale Rank correlation ' wUK bomb load RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY AND MORALE Subversive activity 0.59 The ranking of cities on religious activity was Disruptive behavior .44 Voluntary participation .01 made on the basis of three criteria. (1) Did the city have active religious leadership, as indicated 1 If the correspondence between bombing conditions and subversive activ• ity had been such that tho city receiving most, bombs showed the most suv- by the utterances of the leaders, by their refusal vorslon, tho city with second heaviest bomb load, the second most subver• sion, etc., down to the lowest city In bomb load, which was also lowest in to close churches, etc.? (2) Was there an increase amount of subversion, the correlation would be perfect, and would be ox- pressed by the numerical cocfllclcnt of 1.00. in religious activity in the city during the war and On the othor hand, where there Is no rotation at all between two measures throughout the bombings? Increased church at• applied to tho same group of cities, the correlation is said to be zero. If. for example, some olilos receiving lame bomb loads showed much disruption tendance and prayer meetings indicated that the and others little, and somo cities receiving light bomb loads showed much subversion nod others Httlo, the correlation would be close to zero. civilians of the city supported or sympathized with
2 the religious-leadership of the city. (3) Was the The extent t)f disruption of each one of the utility city heavily Catholic in its religious identification? services was correlated with willingness to accept It was assumed that the Catholic Church with its unconditional surrender. The results are shown in heavy stake in opposing the encroachment of the Table 4. German state was centrally and powerfully organ• ized to fight the Nazis. TABLE 4.—Correlations between willingness to surrender and Heading the list of most active cities were Muen• disrujHion of utilities ster, Munich, and Bonn, with Karlsruhe and Lue• Transportation— 0.81 beck at the bottom. Religious activity correlates Electricity .43 0.583 with the Morale Index, as noted above, and Gas .32 Water .' .30 0.65 with willingness to accept unconditional sur• render. The first important observation is that all the correlations are consistent with the idea that dis• DISRUPTION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES AND ruption "of utilities increases willingness to accept WILLINGNESS TO SURRENDER unconditional surrender. An analysis of the relationship between disruption The higher degree of relationship between trans• of public utilities and willingness to accept uncon• portation and morale is probably due to the fact ditional .surrender reveals a reliable and striking that transportation is more vital to everyday urban correlation. living than any other single utility.. When trans• The background reports provided adequate ma• portation breaks down, people find difficulty in get• terial on interference with gas, electric, water, and ting to work, in shopping for food, in reaching the transportation service in 18 cities. From the In• drug store for medicine, etc. H electric service is terview Schedule B were also available the answers knocked out, people can fall back upon substitutes to the question, "What did you think of uncondi• for light and power. Water mains for a whole city tional'surrender at 'that time?" ("At that time" were generally not destroyed, and relief was"usually referred to the point at which the respondent had forthcoming in German towns through hydrants come to feel that he could no longer go on with the and water wagons. war). This made possible a ranking of 18 bombed This conclusion that disruption of utilities is im• cities on attitudes toward unconditional surrender. portant to morale is in agreement with the findings The rankings of these cities are given in Table 3. of .the mail study reported in Chapter 2, Vol. II, as well as with Chapter 3, Part.I, Vol. I. TABLE 3.—Utility services and willingness to surrender REGIONAL ANALYSIS Surren• Trans• Utili• City der portation Gas Electric Water ties ranking ranking ranking ranking ranking ranking In order to determine whether there were any re- ' gional differences in the behavior of our sample Cologne 1 2 2 5 2 1 cities, the 33 German cities for which background Essen 2 6 5 2 3 2 data were available were divided into three major Bonn . 3 1 3 18 16 8 Muenster.- 4 8 4 6 1 3 cultural-geographical regions. These regions and Nuremberg 5 4 12 4 5 4 the cities which were included in each arc presented M.-Gladback -.. ' 6.5 3 11 13 18 12.5 below: Munich 6.5 7 10 12 15 10.5. Region' CUle TJlm_.._ __. 8 9 17 1 12 9 Rhineland, Ruhr, West• 10 11 8 10 6 • 6 phalia Bonn, Bottrop, Dortmund, Essen, Wetalar. _. 11 12 16 9 7 10.5 Kettwig, Cologne, Luderischeid, 9 Frankfort. 13 9 16 8 14 Muenchen-Gladbach, Muenster, 12 5 14 3 4 5 Wetzlar, Wuppertal, Witten. 13.5 14 7 15 9 12.5 Neumeunster 13.5 18 13 7 14 17 South Germany * Erlangen, Frankfort, Freiburg, Luebeck 15 16 18 17 17 18 KarlBruhe, Kempten, Munich, Witten 16 10 15 11 11 15.5 Nuremberg, Speyer, Stuttgart, 17 15 1 8 13 7 Ulm. Karlsruhe IS . 17 6 14 10 15.5 North-Central Germany .Bissendorf, Bremen, Detmold, Eck- 1 Tho correlation indicates that the greater the religions activity In a city, ernfoerde, Hamburg, Hanover, the greater the tendency toward low moralo from the point of view of the Kassel, Luebeck, Muenden, Neu- German lovernment. See footnote. Page S, for Interpretation of the mean• ing of correlation. menster, Rietze.
3 Comparability of Regions with Resptfct to Popula• respect, to the behavioral and attitudinal measures tion and Bomb-Load appear in Table 6. In order to discover whether differences which 4 might be found among the three regions were due TABLE 6.'—Average ranking in behavior and attitude factors to regional factors (i.e., geographical or cultural) Volun• Surren• Disrup• Subver• der and not to such factors as differential population, Region tive sive tary Morale behavior bohavlor partici• index willing• size, or severity of bombing, it is necessary that the pation ness three regions be equal with respect to the latter two Rhine, Ruhr, variables. Table 5 presents the average population Westphalia 17.4 18.0 13.1 13.5 11.5 and average bomb load per city, together with the South. Germany .-. 15.1 14.3 1 16.6 13.7 16.4 number of bombed and unbombed cities for each of North Central the three regions. Germany 18.4 17.0 21.6 23.5 20.5
* Based upon rank orders, from I to 33, of the cities included in this study. The city showing most disruption, most subversion, least vuluntary partici• TABLK 5.—Population, bomb tonnage, and unbombed cities by pation, lowest Morale Index (See Chapter 3, Vol. I) and most willingness to region surrender, was in eaoh case ranked first, tho city showing next most subver• sion second, eta.
• Average Average Number Number Region city popu• city bomb- lation tonaage 'cities citie3 From the table it appears that: (add 000) (add 000) unbombed bombed (1) North-Central Germany, on almost every Rhine, Ruhr, West- measure was the "best" region from the Nazi point 249 13.0 2 10 of view. It ranked first in four.of the five measures South Germany 296 12.S 1 - 9 used, and was second in the fifth measure-. In other North Central Ger- 283 10.4 5 6 words, the North-Central Region showed the least disruptive behavior, the most voluntary participa• tion, the best morale and had the smallest number Fom the above table it appears that there is little of people who were willing to accept unconditional variation among the three regions in either average surrender. city population or average city bomb load. The (2) While the data are fairly clear as to which greatest difference for population is found between region was the best-behaved Nazi region, they are the Rhine region and South Germany where the somewhat ambiguous as to which region was the average city difference is 47,000. The greatest dif• worst-behaved Nazi region. Thus in three meas• ference in bomb load is found between Central ures out of five (Willingness to Surrender, Morale Germany and the Rhine where the difference is Index, and Voluntary Participation) the Rhine- land-Ruhr-Westphalia region is the worst region, 2,600 tons; It should also be pointed out that no one of the three regions is first in both population and in the remaining two measures (Subversive and bomb load. Insofar as there are any differ• Behavior and Disruptive Behavior) South Germany ences, South Germany has the larger population seems to be the worst. The difference between but the Rhineland received more bombing. these two regions with respect to the Morale Index While the three regions are faily well equated is negligible and probably not significant. There with respect to the averages of the two variables of are, it seems, qualitative differences in these two bombing experience and size of city, they are not sets of measurements. Thus the Rhine-Ruhr- well equated with respect to the distribution of Westphalia region is the worst with respect to the those variables among the cities in the region. This more passive morale factors, such as willingness to suggests that any conclusions made on the basis of accept surrender, and refraining from participating comparisons among the three regions may need to in community and Party activities. On the other be qualified. It will be demonstrated below, how• hand, the Southern region is worst with respect to ever, by an analysis of bombed cities only, that the more active resistance factors, such as disrup• there are regional differences independent of these tive behavior and subversive behavior. And both factors of city size and bombing experience. are low in morale.
Behavior and Attitudinal Differences Among the Analysis for Bombed Cities Only • Three Regions In the following analysis only the bombed cities The average rankings for the three regions with in each region are examined. If we discard the
4 umhombed cities, , the three regions now comprise .From the above table it appears that: the following cities: (1) North-Central Germany, just as in the pre• Region Cities vious analysis, remains the region with the highest Rhineland Region Cologne, Bonn, Bottrop, Dortmund, morale, the most voluntary participation, and the Essen, Muenster, Wotzlar, Wit• smallest number of people willing to accept uncon• ten, Wuppertal, Muenchen-Glad- ditional surrender. By omitting the unbombed bach. South Germany Frankfort, Freiburg, Karlsruhe, cities, this region does not improve its position with Kempten, Munich, Nuremberg, respect to these three variables. However, with Spcyer, Stuttgart, Ulm. respect to the other two variables its position is North-Central Germany .Bremen, Hamburg, Hanover, Kas• changed. It now ranks as the region with the most sel, Luebeck, NeuinueriBter. disruptive behavior and with the most subversive If we now examine the two factors, size of city behavior. and bomb load, we discover that'the three regions (2) The possibility is suggested that since the are still much the same with respect to the latter North-Central region now consists of proportion• but that the North-Central Region has the largest ately more large cities than either of the other two cities. Where the Rhineland sample now has an regions, and since its bomb-load is only slightly average of 293,000 population size, South Germany larger than "that of either of the other two regions, has 361,000 and North Central Germany has what we have here is an effect of city size upon city 510,000. Those inequalities, however, may serve behavior with bombing experience held constant. a useful function inasmuch as they can permit us If this suggestion is valid, it appears that city size to determine the differential effects of city size and is correlated positively with voluntary participa• bomb load on our behavior factors. Table 7 sum• tion, individual morale, or the willingness of the marizes the above data. individual to accept unconditional surrender. In
TABLE 7.—Population and bomb tonnage in bombed etiiea by other words, the first two factors are more sensitive region to urban factors, while the latter are more sensitive toother factors. Average Average Rogfon population bomb load (3) The Rhine-Ruhr-Westphalia region presents (add 000) (add 000) the same picture in this analysis which it did in the previous analysis. In the present analysis, as in 293 15.6 361 14.4 the previous one, the Rhine-Ruhr-Westphalia re• North-Central Germanv 510 19.1 gion is the worst behaved region according to Nazi standards, in willingness to surrender, morale in• In Table 8 are presented the average rankings for dex, and • voluntary participation. South Ger• the five behavioral and attitudinal factors. many, however, seems to change significantly.
TABLE S.—Average rankings in beliamor and attitude factors for Where formerly it had been the worst behaved bombed cities only area in disruptive behavior and subversive behav• ior, it now occupies the middle position between Volun• Surren• Dlsrui^ Subver• tary Morale der North-Central Germany and the Rhine-Ruhr- Region live sive partici• Index willing• behavior behavior pation ness Westphalia regions in every respect.
Rhine, Ruhr, Westphalia 14.8 14.6 8.7 10.4 8.4 South Germany 13.2 12.4 13.3 13.1 13.9 North-Central Germany 9.8 9.1 19.7 17.3 16.4
5 CHAPTER 2
ANALYSIS OF CAPTURED GERMAN MAIL1
SUMMARY . Competent linguists then proceeded to select all Two separate studies of captured German civilian letters that made any reference to bombing. This mail show: procedure netted a total sample of 802 cases, or six 1. Morale is lowered as bombing exposure in• percent of the total number of letters read. creases. In Study I, regions in which s greater The portion of each letter dealing with bombing bomb weight had been dropped, definitely exhibited was translated and then coded for the presence of lower morale on a variety of measures than regions certain measures of exposure to bombing and for winch suffered light raids. In Study II, measures evidence of certain aspects of morale. The results of the degree of closeness of personal exposure cor• were then tabulated to determine .the relation be• relate highly with loss of morale. tween the frequency of certain morale attitudes' 2. Bombing below a certain level of severity, or and exposure to bombing. closeness of individual exposure, did not produce Study I dealt only with bombed people since the severe decrements in morale. On the other hand, letters were selected on this basis. Every writer increases in bombing above a certain intensity level mentioned bombing, which not only meant that he produced only slight additional decline in morale, was in a region of bombing but that the effect and 3. Disruption of community life, damage to prop• impact of the bombs was close enough for the per• erty, and other personal consequences are powerful son to write of his exposure'. factors in lowering morale. Such effects should be Many writers who did not mention bombing in aimed for in precision bombing if morale is to be their letters might also have been exposed to raids. impaired. In Study I, 86 percent of the letters, from regions 4. Morale attitudes are generalized to some ex• where 1,000 tons or more bombs had been dropped, tent. The effects of bombing on the individual can did not make any reference to bombing. There• be manifold. fore, a new procedure was used in Study II. The 5. Day raiding had a greater effect on morale influence of bombing was determined by comparing "attitudes than-night raiding, but night raiding pro• the morale of writers in cities which were known duced much more severe emotional reactions. to have had different raid experiences. The readers 6. It is suggested that a given weight of bombs, were instructed, in Study II, to select from a ran• dropped in a series of raids, has no more effect on dom sample of captured mail all letters that made any morale than the same weight dropped at one time reference to the xoriter's morale, good or bad. Some of these letters mentioned bombing, some did not. METHODS AND PROCEDURES In this fashion 1,100 letters were selected from a Captured letters written by German civilians random sample of 10,506 captured letters or 10 during the war have been analyzed quantitatively percent of the total. The determination of whether to determine the effects of bombing upon the will the writer had been exposed was made by reference and capacity of the German civilian population to to the raid history of.the place from which he came. resist. The bomb history of the regions is a less sensitive Two complementary studies were made; each on measure of the writer's exposure to bombing than part of this material. Study I analyzed 802 letters, the individual report. Not all people living in selected because the writers had been bombed. bombed areas were personally exposed or close to In Study II, 1,100 letters of both bombed and un• bombs. Consequently, Study II provides for all bombed writers were analyzed. cases an objective but gross measure of. bombing In Study I, 14,017 letters were selected at ran• exposure. Study I provides an individually accu• dom from all uncensored captured mail available. rate measure of bombing exposure, and in addition Letters written by front-line soldiers and those objective tonnage estimates are available. originating in non-German cities were excluded. Two principal measures of morale were used. The first was based chiefly on comments about dis• ' These two studies were made between November IBM and March 1046. See Appendix A for discussion of validity and reliability al this study. couragement, misery, and suffering on the part of
7 the writer or on the part of the community. The in the second study, which came chiefly from the second measure was based on indications of anxiety later months of 1944 with a few from early 1945. over future raids. No analysis has been made of the relation between The procedure, apart from the selection of let• morale change and the date of bombing. Table 10 ters, was similar in Studies I and II. In Study II presents the distribution of dates for the letters in the portion of each letter dealing with morale was the two samples. translated, as well as any portions dealing with bombing. The translation was then coded for cer• TABLE 10.—Distribution of letters by dale and sex of writer tain measures of exposure to bombing, such as dam• Percent of sample age suffered, and loss of life, and for certain atti• tudes that evidenced in connection with raids, Study I Study n .such as anxiety over the recurrence of raids, evi• dence of lowered or improved morale, etc. The January-April.. »3 I sex of the writer, the date on which the letter May " _ 2 1 June 3 1 was written, physical nearness of the writer to July... 18 2 the bombing, and the time period elapsed from August 25 14 the time of bombing to the date of the letter were September 25 24 also coded. The bomb tonnage dropped on the 14 19 section of the country in which the writer lived November 9 30 December 0 1 was also recorded. 1945 January..^ 0 7 The Sample 100 100 All results are based on these two samples of 802 and 1,100 letters, respectively. Although no claim Sex is made that this adequately represents the entire 15 10 German population, the fact that the letters origi• Females-, • 82 90 Indeterminate.. _ 3 nated in a great number of different localities sug• gests some representativeness. 100 100 Number of Cases Table 9 shows the percentage of the sample 802 . 1,100 • Letters dated January through Anrll wore too few to permit analysis for originating in each of certain regions of Germany. separate months. Tho letters from,these months are therefore combined.
TABLE 9.—(VeoprapAioa/ distribution of the sample There is a wide rauge of bomb tonnages in the • cities and regions from which the letters come, Percent of BO in pie though various bomb loads are not represented in Study I Study n correct proportion. Bomb weights for regions used in Study I and strata for use in Study II are pre• 1. Saar-Mosclle . _ ^ ... - 13 19 sented in Table 11. 2. CoIogne-Dusseldorf-rtuhr __. 19 16 3. Hannover-Bremen-Hamburg 12 10 TABLE 11.—Bomb weights for regions and strata 4. Berlin-Northern Germany 10 9 5. Central Gennany 9 11 Bomb Bomb weights In weights lo 6. 4 6 tons for the tons for the 7. Frankfurt Area 18 11 Reg Ion regions used Stratum* stmts used In in 8. Southern Germany 1 9 10 Study I Study II 9. Austria 4 4 1. Saar-Moselle 29,014 1 72,000 10. East Prussia and Danzig n 2 2. Cologne-DuBseldorf- 11. Czecho-SIovakia n • 2 Western Poland 1 Ruhr 230,670 2 18,800 1.2- 3. Hannover-Bremen- 100 100 122,260 3 7,000 4. Bert in-Northern Ger• 802 1,100 many 86,461 4 2,000 * D flea use of tho small number of letters reported from these regions, they 5. Central Gennany 5S,740 5 300 were excluded from subsequent nnalysls. 0. Silesia ... 607 6. 0 7. 79,450 7 0 The two' samples of letters varied with respect 8. Southern Germany 81,120 to the time of writing. Those in Study 1 were D. Austria.. 423 written somewhat earlier in 1944 than were those * Tho cities composing these strata are presented In Appondlx B.
8 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS OF STUDY I moderate amount of association between the fac• Morale Effects of Light and Heavy Bombing tors involved. Six percent of the 802 letter writers reported The first problem is to determine whether writers that the writer's own health or the health of rela• show differences in morale and related phenomena, tives and friends had been affected. A good ex• such as health and anxiety, in areas of Germany ample of this comes from a woman in Pelch who which have been subjected to different amounts of writes: bombing. If it can be shown that low morale, "I am a nervous wreck from all the excitement. It was poor health, and anxiety are more frequent in heav• terrible again today; the enemy planes do not stop coming. ily bombed areas than in lightly bombed areas, it We had luck but 1 am completely exhausted (Fcrtig)." would tend to indicate that the bombings affected The correlation between total bomb weight and morale. percentage of writers evidencing disturbances in In the sample of 802 letters, 14 percent show health is 0.40. When bomb weights during July- lowered morale. A typical example of lowered November 1944 are correlated with health disturb• morale is given by a woman writer from Binger- ances, the coefficient is 0.27. bruck, who says: In the sample of 802 letters, 17 percent showed "We have alerts day and night and planes and the fighters some type of focalized anxiety. Examples of are coining always. It really is a misery on tins earth. If anxiety are: thiB war docs not come to an end either our nerves will be "I only hope that you keep your house, so we at least mined or else we all shall be dead. It's becoming nearly im• have a place to slay." possible to work or to even prepare lunch at noon time. On "We have put everything in the cellar." Sundays we can't go to visit the cemetery. We Bcarcely re• "We sent the children away." ceive any milk deliveries at all. If we go to town for milk there is a constant alert on. People here are about to lose There is no correlation between bomb weights courage. In Mainz and Bonn they possess less courage dropped in regions in Germany and the occurrence yet. There they are in the process of moving and going of focalized anxiety in these regions. away," Conclusions from these correlations suggest that Four percent show sustained morale. For ex• civilian morale and related phenomena are affected ample, a woman from Stolberg writes: •by bombing to a moderate extent. "All you hear all day long are the sirens, the anti-aircraft guns, the sound of the motors, and the dropping of bombs; Morale and Exposure to Bombing Effects despite, all that, they won't get us down. It's out of the A more precise determinant of morale than the question." mere weight of bombs dropped in a region is the Four percent show habituation to bombing. A extent to which the individual has experienced letter from Aachen reports: some effect of the bombing as reported in the letter. "They are here all day but we don't even care about them Five measures of exposure to bombing effects were any more. The popidationhas a lot of courage and I am sur• used: prised at it as 1 have, never known anybody who would have gone through as much." 1. Damage to personal property or the property Finally, 78 percent make no reference to their of friends and relations. For instance, the follow• morale. ing statements were indicative of damage: The relationship between the weight of bombs "I was bombed out." dropped in different regions of Germany during "Mrs. K's store was destroyed." the entire war and the percentage of writers showing 2. Damage to community property. Examples: lowered morale is expressed by a coefficient of rank "The lvoddive .(a department store in Berlin) and the 5 Gloria (a cinema) were destroyed." correlation of 0.48. "They bombed the hell out of us. There is nothing left to When weight of bombs dropped in each region destroy here." from July to November 1944 is correlated with per• 3. Disruption of community life, including trans• centage showing low morale (92 percent), the cor• port, communications, utilities, occupation, etc. relation is 0.58. These correlations indicate a Examples: "I*couldn't visit you because the roads were bombed." 1 U the correspondence between bombing and morale had been such that the region receiving the most bombs showed the lowest morale, the region "We no longer receive any milk or paper deliveries." with the second heaviest bomb load, the second lowest morale, utc, down to tho least bombed city which wae the highest in morale, the correlation "We had no water for a week." would bo iKirfcot and would bu 1.00.- "We still cannot go to work in the factory." On the other hand, where there Is no relation at all between the two meas• ure* tho correlation ig iero, Then, some regions receiving heavy bombing 4. Loss of relatives, and friends. Examples: would show high morale and some low and some regions receiving light bomb• ing would show high and some low morale. "Mr. X was killed."
9 69MH—17—3 "Aunt Annie was among 61 people killed." affects morale. It is possible that a large scale 5. Health of writer affected. Examples: study would show this more clearly. There is a "My nerves give out when I think of it." suggestion that those with their own towns hit "1 can't work all next day" (after a raid). show lower morale. "My hand is shaking as I write this." Continuous bombing of people seems to add Uttle The percentage of the sample of 802 letters which to the morale changes produced by recent or past evidenced some effect of bombing is shown in raids. This may be due to habituation to contin• Table 12. ued bombing, since eight percent of those continu• TABLE 12.—Effects of the bombing ously raided show habituation in their morale, \ Percentage of Sample (80f letters) whereas only one percent of those raided in the past Damage to person at pro petty or proper• show habituation. It is also possible that such ty of friends and relatives 14 effects are obscured by the method used in the Damage to community property 38 Disruption of community life 14 study. Loss of life .. 15 Morale as a Generalized Attitude Health affected..... 6 No report of any effect J 45 Those writers reporting some type of anxiety show more evidence of low morale than writers with Total....' 132* DO reference to anxiety. Those writers evidencing * Since some individuals evidenced more than one effeot In their letters, disturbances in health show a greater increase of the percentages add up to more than 100 percent. low morale than those writers with no disturbances Those individuals who report none of the direct in health. This suggests that there is a common effects of bombing, despite the mention of bomb• general factor in all these measures. ing, show higher morale than those reporting some of the specified effects. This assumes that no re• TABLE 14.—Anxiety and health as related to low morale port of effects means that no effect was experienced. Percent of groups Eighteen percent of those experiencing some effect Type of anxiety showing low morale of bombing show lowered morale; whereas 12 per• General tension phis some focalized anxiety. 35 cent of those reporting no effect show lowered mo• Focalized anxiety 24 rale. Twenty percent of those experiencing some General tension 19 effect show focalized anxiety (i.e., anxiety over perr No report of anxiety 8 sonal well-being, family, property, etc.) whereas Disturbed health 38 12 18 percent of those reporting no effect show much No disturbance anxiety. The differences between the percentages report• Loss of Morale in Men and Women ing and not reporting effects of bombing are suffi• Sixteen percent of the women show lowered mo• ciently large to be statistically significant. Stand• rale as compared with eight percent of -the men. ard statistical procedures were employed in testing Nine percent of the .women show anxiety over their the significance of these differences. personal well-being as compared with two percent Morale and Proximity to Bombing of the men. It is not likely that these differences are due to factors that have not been examined. The findings of this study show no clear indica• The samples of men and women show the same tion that proximity to bombing in time and space geographical coverage by regions. It might be assumed that'the findings could be due to the great• TABLE 13.—The relation of proximity (in time and space) to Low Morale and Anricty er tendency of women to be more vocal than men, and their tendency to report such things more. Percent of Percent of However, when we compare groups of men "and Proximity group show-ins group showing low morale focalized anxiety women, all of whom report in their letters the state of their morale, the same finding occurs, i.e., wc Own town hit— 17 25 Nearby towns hit — 5 21 now have men and women who are all articulate Distant places hit 10 18 or vocal about themselves and the morale differ• Air alarms, no bombs 16 • 21 ence persists.
Continuous raids 19 24 It is reported in Chapter 4, Part I, Volume I, Recent exposure 14 IS that women's morale showed no consistent differ• Exposure in the past 12 24 ences from that of men in the material from the
10 civilian interviews. They showed about the same of trends of the differences in the comparisons tends loss as men and under heavy bombing slightly more to confirm their significance. This trend can be women than men were unwilling to surrender. tested statistically. Of 23 comparisons, 16 are in The markedly lower morale of women in the Mail the expected direction, namely, a higher incidence Study is probably due to the fact that the morale of low morale in the greatly exposed or personally measure is in this case based chiefly on emotional exposed group. The likelihood that this number, components; that, in other words, women's emo• 16 out of 23 comparisons, would occur in this direc• tional reactions were more affected than those of tion by chance is only six chances in 100, which men, but not their attitudes toward surrender. indicates a considerable degree of dependability.
THE ANALYSIS OF RESULTS OF STUDY II TABLE 15.—The relation of closeness of ex-posure to bombing and low morale The Morale Effects of Light and Heavy Bombing Pesai- Bad The approach used in Study II was intended to mLim Deal re emo• Per• Measures of closeness of exposure about for tional sonal determine whether writers in areas of Germany outcome pence react tone health of war to raids affected that had been subjected to different weights of bombing showed differences in morale. The pro• Percent Percent Percent Percent cedure is the same as in Study I. If it can be Close to bombs dropped , 68 80 86 98 Remote from bombs 64 76 79 67 shown that low morale is more evidenced in letters from heavily bombed areas than in letters from In a strafing or indiscriminate lightly bombed areas, it would tend to indicate raid '63 •67 82. 74 again that bombings affect morale. In a strategic bombing-. ... _ 33 *70 78 63 . For this purpose the letters were grouped into Personal property damaged 64 84 *80 *70 more precise strata than the regions used in Study General property damage 52 77 "85 *S9 I. Seven geographical strata were defined, vary^ ing from zero bombing to very heavy bombing. Personal routine disrupted by The'findings indicated, in contrast with Study I, 69 *74 89 90 no correlation between bomb weight for these strata General utility disruption... _. 60 *80 89 88 and the frequency of expressions of low morale in Severely involved in disruption. *73 85 98 89 the letters, as evidenced on the following four meas• Not involved in disruption 33 56 '56 67 ures: (1) belief in a bad outcome of the war, (2) desire for peace, (3) writer's health affected, and Friends or relatives injured or (4) the bad emotional impact of bombing. killed 100 *73 *66 General injuries or deaths . 60 *82 !70 This suggests three possible explanations: (a) Bombing does not affect morale. . This is a con• < Indicates statistically significant difference. 1 Indicates a difference opposite In dlreotion to that expected, according to tradiction of the findings of Study I. (b) The se• •hypothesis. lection of letters here was different. Or (c) many writers did not mention bombing, either because The fact that low morale is clearly related to the they personally were not exposed or because they severity or closeness of bombing exposure can be were not sensitive to the raids! demonstrated in another way. This suggested the use of a more precise measure An index of closeness of personal exposure of tho of personal exposure. From the reports of bomb• writer was derived from the combination of the ing exposure in the letters, the writers were grouped above single aspects of degree of exposure. Indi• as to the degree of personal exposure, and' these viduals were most exposed who (1) were close to groups were compared on the four morale measures bombs dropped, (2) we're subjected to an indis• listed above. The-consistent-finding_is that the criminate raid, (3) suffered personal damage, (.4) greater the personal exposure to bombing, as re• had personal routine disturbed, and (5) were per• ported in the letters, the higher the incidence of sonally involved in the disruption. An individual low morale. Table 15 shows this clearly. was given a score of zero if he reported on none of The greatest proportion of these comparisons of these factors of exposure and one point for each personal exposure are in the expected direction: factor of exposure reported. Thus the scores of increased closeness of exposure is associated with the writers ranged from zero to five, depending on lowered morale. Although not all the single com• how many of these measures of exposure to bomb• parisons are statistically significant, the consistency ing the writer reported.
11 CHART I CHARGES IH MORALE WITH CLOSENESS OF EXPOSURE TO BOMBING
INDEX OF CLOSENESS OF EXPOSURE INDEX OF CLOSENESS OF EXPOSURE
0 12 3 0 12 3 100%-
50
25
PER CENT SHOWING PER CENT SHOWING DESIRE FOR PEACE PESSIMISM ABOUT OUTCOME
INDEX OF CLOSENESS OF EXPOSURE INDEX OF CLOSENESS OF EXPOSURE
0 1 2"3 100%
75 *•*•*•*'•* '•*I-j*j'^'X-j
50
HUll'llllttll •Vr*f*ri'f'V'i>T'*T'VfX^'T /•.V-" t P P - - -1 -* f t
25
P£R CENT WtTH PER CENT SHOWING HEALTH AFFECTED BAD EMOTIONAL REACTIONS
CHART-I 12 When individuals having different scores on this In Chapter 4, Part I, Volume I it is indicated index are compared on morale, the findings are that degree of fear is not related to willingness to again consistent. On three of the four'measures surrender. It appears that this typo of attitude (the measure of health affected is least reliable; see acts differently from certain others in its relation to Appendix A), morale declines with increasing close• fear. This is a distinct limitation on the generality ness of exposure to bombing. of morale measures. Above a certain level of closeness of exposure, Day Bombing as Compared with Night Bombing the decrement in morale seems to taper off as indi• cated in Chart I. The exact meaning of this is not A comparison was made of the morale of writers clear. Possibly, with a certain amount of involve• who reported day raids versus those who reported ment, the individual ceases to be further affected. night raids. The findings are only suggestive, but Perhaps, things being so bad already, he simply no they indicate that the emotional reactions to night longer cares and becomes apathetic; possibly the raids are worse. index is not sufficiently sensitive. In any case, One hundred percent who reported night raids these findings are consistent with those of the cross- gave evidence of bad. emotional reactions, whereas sectional interview study. (See Chapter 3, Part I, 83 percent of those reported days raids were classi• Volume I.) fied as having bad emotional reactions. In short', morale is affected by bombing, but is The effect of day raids on morale attitudes, how• seriously affected only as bombing produces serious ever, appears to be greater. Seventy-seven per• personal exposure and personal disturbance. The cent of the writers reporting day raids had a bad mere fact of being in the general region of bombing outlook on the outcome of the war, whereas 55 has not the same serious effect as personal exposure.. percent reporting night raids had an equally bad This is also demonstrated in the personal interviews outlook. with civilians (Chapter 3, Part I, Volume I). It Another comparison shows the same difference. is made clear there, however, that the morale of Eighty-two percent of the writers reporting day persons in bombed areas, who suffer no direct con• raids showed a desire for peace, whereas only 45 sequences of the bombing, is also depressed, though percent commenting on night raids mentioned this less seriously so. desire. People subjected to day raids also gave more frequent evidence' of effects on personal The Generality of Morale health, with 75 percent of them saying their health In Study I morale was shown to be a generalized, was affected. On the other hand, 35 percent of the attitude. Morale effects can be observed in many writers reporting night raids said their health was aspects of the individual's behavior and attitudes. affected. Parallel results were obtained in Study I. In Study II, similar evidence for generality of These results must be interpreted with caution. morale is found. The four morale measures were Correlated with day and night raiding are certain intercorrelated, and the finding is that those indi• other features of bombing, such as the degree of viduals who show low morale along one of the di• damage and the extent to which the bombing was mensions studied, show low morale in the other indiscriminate rather than mainly strategic.Whether dimensions. The data are summarized in Table 16. the differences found are due to the intrinsic effect TABLE 16.—Interrelations of various morale factors oi daylight as compared with nighttime, or to the complex of bombing factors associated with day Of Those WiUt: Percent desired peace Bad emotional reaction to raids 85 and night raids, cannot be established from these Good emotional reactions to raids 62 data. It is suggested that the usual report of individ• Bad outlook on outcome of war 93 Good outlook on outcome oi wnr 33 uals as to the greater effect of night raids in lower• Percent thawed bad ing morale is not in conflict with these findings. Of Those With: of mar Such individual reports may refer mainly to the bad Bad emotional reaction to raids 79 emotional reactions to night raidB (which is borne Good emotional reaetion to raids 5 out in the present study), and in considering this Health affected 72 problem individuals may not be thinking in terms Health not affected--. 53 of such morale attitudes as belief in the outcome Percent showed bad
m, TT7-.I emotional reaction* of the war or desire for peace. This is consistent Of Those With : to raids Health affected _ 94 with the findings reported in Chapter 3, Part I, Health not affected--, 66 of Volume I.
13 CHAPTER 3
FOREIGN WORKER STUDIES
INTRODUCTION: man official statistics. Concerning such activities OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDffiS as looting and black marketing, where the study of German sources had provided a picture of the me• The Nazi war program brought into Germany chanics of these operations and the manner in eight million foreign workers—witnesses to the which they were controlled by the Nazi authorities, conduct of the German people during the course of the DP questionnaires have provided an. over-all the war. These witnesses were of many European statistical estimate of their prevalence that confirms nationalities. In varying degree they shared the the best available German evidence. lot of the German' civilian population. They (4) It has suggested various cause-and-effect shared much of its experience of Allied bombing, relationships characterizing civilian reaction to since they worked in every German city and in in• bombing, and provided hypotheses concerning the numerable German war factories. But while they factors influencing psychological reactions to raids. themselves experienced bombing, they were also All the major conclusions of the Morale Division able to observe the German reaction with the vary• cross-sectional study have been substantiated by ing degrees of objectivity with which their alien the DP data, and there are no significant discrepan• status endowed them. cies in German and DP reactions to bombing not During May and June 1945, more than two thou• clearly explainable by overt differences in national sand French, Italian, and Russian displaced per^- background or the slave-labor circumstances in sons in Germany were given a questionnaire to which the DPs experienced bombing. answer anonymouslyThis study served four objectives: TABLE 17.—Nalionaliiy anil regional background of DP re• (1) It has provided the basis for analysis of many spondents aspects of reactions of displaced persons as such. Total Inasmuch as these persons comprised a sizable part Group Vlicb of origin Percentage number of the population of Germany during the last three years of the war, their reactions constitute an im• Italian North Italy.. •43 Central Italy 34 portant element of the over-all morale reaction to South Italy- 23 the Allied bombing of Germany. Furthermore, • information has been acquired on several specific 100 436 subjects of interest, otherwise totally unclarified: 23 the receptivity of the DPs2 to Allied leaflet and French North East France. Paris Region 21 radio propaganda; the variation among DP reac• South West 18 tions according to nationality. North West 16 (2) Information has l>een obtained which serves South East 16 as a check on the findings in the main cross-sectional Belgium.- 6 Colonial France study of German civilians. On many .specific ques• tions of German reaction to bombing, the DP re• 100 801 ports corroborate the German civilian interview data. • Such is the case, for example, with data on Russian... Ukraine 43 the reaction to day and night raids, the German Great Russia.-.- 28 White Russia 9 system, evacuation problems, war weariness, black• Southern Russian Tartars. listing, etc. Siberia and Tartars (3) The DP questionnaires have provided data Miscellaneous (Georgia, which are totally unavailable or incomplete in Ger- Turkomen, Armenia, Daigstan, etc.) ' See Appendix O for & copy of the Questionnaire. See Appendix D for report of Pilot Study on French Escapees. 100 2,235 'Throughout this chapter the abbreviation " DPs" Is used to refer to dis• placed persons.
15 METHODS OF OBTAINING DATA The percentage of males in the three sample groups The information upon which this report is based were: French, 97; Italians, 92; and Russians, 69. was collected during the months of May and June, In-some of the analyses, especially with respect to 1945. The DPs involved were located in camps* fear reactions to bombing, the Russian males and throughout the American, British and French zones the Russian females will be treated separately. of occupation. Paper and pencil questionnaires But throughout the analyses made here, this differ• were handled by interviewers fluent in the language ence among the groups should be kept in mind. of the specific group of DPs with whom they were Bombing Experience in contact. The nationality and regional back• grounds of the DPs in the sample are shown in The German cities in which the DPs worked have Table 17. been divided into four major categories, on the Age, Education, Marital Status basis of total bomb tonnage received. Table 20 indicates the percentage of respondents The three groups were fairly similar in age. The who reported having worked in one or another of median ages were French 29 years, Italian, 28, and these categories for the major part of their stay in Russians, 24. Germany. The three groups were somewhat similar in edu• cational level, insofar as any comparison can be TABLK 20.—Percent of DP groups subjected to various degrees made among the three different educational sys• of bombing tems. Only two degrees of education were dis• A vera* e bomb tonnage In thousands criminated; the percentages of each group falling French Italian Russian into these two educational levels are: Percent Percent Percent 31 , 87 72 59 TABLE IS.—Educational levels 10 6 10 10 4 17 6 22 French Italian Russian 0.4 . 10 12 9
Peroent Percent Percent » 100 100 100 Primary* education only • 69 60 60 31 40 40 The distribution of the three groups of- respon• 100 100 100 dents was generally similar, with a few more Ital• Educational level and age were negatively cor• ians than French or Russians reporting that they related to some degree; fewer of the younger groups came from the most heavily bombed areas. This had only primary education. The percentage of checks to some degree with the answers to the ques• those having primary training only were as follows: tion: "How many raids did you experience?" The Italians reported a median number of 45, the French TABIJJ 19.—Primary education by age * Percent came next with 28, and the Russians reported 18. DPs 30 yeans or younger 61 It is doubtful, however, that the figures given by DPs 31 years or older 71 the Italians can be accepted at face value. The An interesting difference appears when a similar data for this doubt will be presented in several analysis is made for the three groups separately: places throughout this report. 45 percent of the younger and only 29' percent of The respondents were also asked to report on any the older Russians had gone beyond primary school. personal injury they may have suffered from the air The difference of 16 percent is statistically signifi• raids: nine percent of the French, 10 percent of the cant. For the French, the difference between the Italians, and 16 percent of the Russians reported two corresponding age groups is 7 percent and for that they, themselves had been harmed in a raid. the Italians, 5 percent. - It may well be that, although the Russians re• The three groups were also fairly similar with ported having experienced the least number of raids, respect to marital status. The respective propor• they suffered the most injury. This could be ac• tions of those unmarried were: 58 percent of the counted for by the fact that the Russians were least , French, 62 percent of the Italians, and 57 percent favored in the provision of shelters for the DPs, of the Russians. while the French were most favored. • Thus, in Sex answering the question whether they were allowed In one important variable, sex, there was a differ• access to the shelters on the same terms with the ence between the Russian and the other two groups. Germans, 95 percent of the Russians, 94 percent
16 of the Italians and 62 percent of the French report• statement. The statements are, for the most part, ed that they were not permitted auch access. given in a negative form, i.e., reflecting unfavor• Seventy-four percent of French, 74 percent of Ital• ably on the Germans. ians, and 72 percent of Russian's report lodgings or In 12 of the above 13 statements more Russians personal possessions destroyed by raids. Seventy- passed negative judgments on the Germans than did three percent of French, 72 percent of Italians, and either the French or the Italians. While a few of 74 percent of Russians report friends hurt or killed. the differences are small, the consistency of the The fact that the Italians reported no greater dam• differences suggests a definite bias on the part of the age or casualty figures than either the Russians Russians. ThiB consistent bias leads to many ap• or the French, suggests that their estimate of hav• parently inconsistent judgments. Thus, more Rus• ing been through almost twice as many raids as the sians reported observing anti-Nazi resistance among other groups is probably a bit inflated. the Germans (probably because "anti-government resistance" is something no good citizen should be VALIDITY OF ANSWERS involved in), and at the same time more Russians than Italians or French reported that as bombing Systematic Bias of the Russians went on the Germans became more dependent on Throughout the questionnaire there were a num• the Nazis (probably because "being a Nazi" was ber of opportunities for the respondents to pass also bad). judgment on the German people, their morale, The fact that more Russians than French or Ital• their character, their organizational efficiency, brav• ians reported that evacuations were voluntary ery, etc. A comparison of the three groups with might be explained by the Russian notion that respect to such judgments might give some insight evacuation was a "cowardly" escape reaction, and into any systematic bias any one of the three groups therefore to be ascribed to the Germans, who might have. Should such a tendency be estab• evacuated voluntarily without being forced to do so. lished, it. might be useful in interpreting the data When the respondents were given, an opportunity secured from the biased group. to attribute the determined German resistance until The following' table lists all the "evaluative" the very end of the war to the German "character," statements possible in the questionnaire, and the the Russians declined to do so to a greater extent percentage of each group which subscribed to the than either of the two other groups. There is only one statement (regarding pillaging) where the Rus• TABLE 21.—Percentage of evaluative judgments by DP groups sians did better by the Germans than did the other two groups. Here it would be interesting to specu• TUm Number Russian Italian French late on a possible difference in the point of view of
Percent Percent Percent the three groups. The Russians, for instance, re• 17 Production was diminished be• ported that pillaging was restricted to the foreigners cause ofabsenteeiam 60 31 40 (41 percent so reported), whereas only 24 percent of 17 Production was diminished be• both the French and Italians held to that opinion. cause of low morale • 64 47 52 There is some reason to believe that the Russians 18 AA defense measures were bad 73 58" 58 21 Germans alone guilty of panic- 82 70 72 themselves engaged in more pillaging than either of 22 Germans alone guilty of pillag• the other groups, and the Russians may very well ing.. .- 37 62 48 have regarded such pillaging as "righteous retribu• 24 Evacuations not voluntary 70 83 83 tion" and a virtue, and therefore not to be ascribed 24 Evacuations badly organized. _ 79 86 72 to the Germans. 24 FJvacuees did not get along well with hosts 91 66 78 No systematic bias is observable among the other 25 As bombing progressed, Ger• two groups; i:e., the differences between the French mans became more depen• and Italians are not consistently in one direction. dent on NSDAP 24 17 4 Thus, out of the 13 statements, in five the Italians 28 German character responsible for resistance 20 52 26 passed a harsher judgment on the Germans than 31 German civilians engaged in did the French, agreed with the French in two, and 57 16 35 are easier on the Germans in six. 27 Before the invasion Germans 84 75 71 Differences in Accuracy of Reports 26 Germans sometimes lost all.de- Some of the respondents were in a better .position sire to continue with war 82 70 76 to report on certain specific questions than others.
SB 9411—17—i 17 This fact must be remembered throughput this former "caused" the latter is not clear from the analysis, and on a priori grounds more weight given data. to some respondents than to others. Thus, for ex• TABLE 22.—Relation of initial fear to habituation (all groups) ample, it is reasonable to expect that the French would be in a better position to report on the radio- Fright at first raid Habituated Continued fear listening habits of the Germans, or the personal Percent Percent reaction of the Germans to the evacuation of mem• None at all 90 10 bers of their families, etc., than would either the A little 71 29 Italians or the Russians, because the French were Much 52 48 more accepted by the Germans as fellow-creatures than were either the Russians or the Italians. About 70 percent of the total DP group reported Similarly, the, French probably were in a better habituation to air raids. Greater habituation has position to report on.the distribution of Allied leaf• been found among DPs than among German civil• lets addressed to foreign workers, because they ians. The explanation of the difference derives could more easily distinguish between a leaflet from the following factors: written in French and in German than could the (1) There were more women among the German civilian Rus.sia.ns, to-whom both types of leaflets would ap• population than among the DPs. Since women habituated pear pretty much the same, a Latin-script tongue. less readily than men, the German civilians might be expected Again, the more educated and literate person was to become habituated in lesser degree than the DPs. probably in a better position to report on such sub• (2) The Germans were more exposed to "personal involve• ment" in the raids than were the DPs since they had more jects as the operations of the "black market" than relatives and 'more valuable possessions to be lost through the less educated worker. bombing, Throughout the analysis an attempt will be made (3) Bombing increasingly betokened liberation to the DPs to call attention to this differential validity. and defeat to the Germans. REACTION OF DPS TO BOMBING Personal Involvement in Raids. The most useful question in determining the For the DPs personal involvement seems to have over-all reaction of DPs to bombing was, "With been strictly limited to injury to oneself. Destruc• the continuation of the air raids, were you more tion of possessions or injury and death of friends and more frightened, or did you become habitu• do not seem to have been factors of importance in ated?" determining "personal involvement" for the DPs. Most of the DPs did become habituated to the Of the DPs not injured, 72 percent reported air raids according to their own reports. There habituation in contrast to 56 percent of those in• is a significant difference between the Italian and jured. Other indices of "personal involvement" Franco-Russian group (65 percent of the Italians do not seem to be correlated with habituation. reported that they became habituated, while 72 TABLE 23.—Relation of personal involvement lo habUuation percent of the French and 72 percent of the Russians (All groups) Reporting habituation. so reported.' (For further discussions of this dif• {Percent) ference, see "Note on the Difference in Fear Reac• Injured in raid and possessions lost... 56 tion between the Italian and Franco-Russian Not injured in raid and possessions lost 72 groups.") In any case, over half of each group injured in raids and friends hurt or killed 56 reported habituation. Not injured in-raide and friends hurt or In determining the factors which were associated . killed f • - 72 with or responsible for habituation, it appears that Mental Preparation for First Raid the following were the most important (listed in Those who expected the first raid tended to react order of importance). with less fright than did those who were surprised. Fright Reaction to First Raid They also tended to become more habituated to The importance of the reaction to the first raid in continued bombing. determining whether the individual would habituate Whether mental preparation was an independent or not seems to be primary. Those who showed factor contributing to eventual habituation is not the most fear at the first raid, showed the least clear, since mental preparation not only correlates habituation. Whether "fright reactions to first with habituation, but it also correlates with fright raid" and "continued fear" were both reflections at the first raid. Mental preparation might be of some generalized fear pattern, or whether the considered as one factor which determines the fear is reaction'to the first raid, which in turn determines sex difference in itself was an important factor in habituation. the habituation frequency.
TABLE 24.—Relation of raid expectation- to initial frigid and TABLE 26.—Male-Female differences among Russian DPs lidbiiuation {All groups) Reaction to raids Women Men Expected Surprised Fright at first raid Percent Percent Percent Percent No fright at first raid ... 22 38 Not at all. 31 15 A little fright at first raid . 22 27 A little - - 42 32 Much fright at first raid. 56 35 27 53 100 100 100 100 Habituated to later raids 68 82 Became habituated .. 78 59 Did not habituate.. 32 18 22 41 100 100 100 100 Variety of Bombing Experience There is some indication that mental preparation The only information available on variety of is itself in turn determined by the educational level bombing experience was whether or not the respon• of the subject, and by'his information. Thus, dents had been strafed. More strictly speaking, those respondents with better education tended to therefore, tin's factor should be called "strafing ex• be mentally prepared for the raids to a greater ex• perience." Specifically, a smaller percentage of tent than those who were less educated, and thosf- the DPs who had experienced strafing became who listened to the Allied radio tended to be men• habituated than of those who had not: 68 percent tally prepared to a greater extent than those who of those subjected to some strafing report habitua• did not listen. tion, as compared with 75 percent of those not ex• periencing strafing. TABLE 25.—Raid expectation as related to education and black Age listening (Alt groups) Age seems to have been correlated to a very minor Expected degree with habituation. Thus men of 30 years first raid Surprised and younger tended to report more habituation Percent Percent than men of 31 years and older (73 percent ot the 63 69 former and 67 percent of the latter). Beyond primary 37 31 On the negative side it appears that neither fre• quency ol raids nor adequacy of shelters was cor• 100 100 related with habituation. Listened to Allied radio... 43 35 Did not listen.. 57 65 TABLE 27.—Frequency of raids as related to habituation, (All groups) Atcragc frequency Reporting habituation 100 100 of raldt (Percent) 5 66 Black listening is not correlated with education, 29 73 73 73 so that both those factors may be considered as relatively independent. Thus 39 percent of those There is a possibility, of course, that frequency with primary education only and 40 percent of may have an effect on habituation up to a certain those with more than primary education listened to point, after which a plateau is reached where raids allied radio. have no discernible effect. However, even if this The only group which had sufficient women to explanation is taken as the interpretation of the permit any statistical analysis on the basis of sex above figures, the data show that the effect of fre• was the Russian group. quency is small. In other words, fewer women than men tended Adequacy of anti-aircraft is not related to habitu• to become habituated. This was partially a result ation; 35 percent of both the habituated and the of the women's greater tendency to react with fear non-habituated report "good" anti-aircraft protec• to the first raid, but the data clearly indicate that tion.
19 ITALIAN FEAR REACTION CONTRASTED behavior correlates fairly well with the "political WITH THOSE OF OTHER GROUPS consciousness" of the three groups, but it would To the question, "Did the first raid frighten you seem that the Russian figure is a bit high. The a little, much or not at all?", the three groups only resistance behavior measures available to this answered as shown in Table 28. study were (a) attempts to escape, (b) attempts to get transferred out of industrial zones (although TABLE 28.—Fear responses of Die National groups there is some reason to doubt that this is a measure [In Percentace] of resistance behavior, as will be seen from further Russian analysis), and (c) unauthorized absences. The Italian French Russian (male) correlations among the three groups for the above Not at all frightened.. 15 22 33 38 "resistance indices" appear in Table 30. Frightened a little 40 50 25 27 Frightened much-- .. 45 28 42 35 TABLE 30.—Percent re]x>rting resistance behavior [in Percentage.' 100 100 mo 100 Roportlng Reporting Median number escape attempts trans/or at tempts unauthorized Continued to fear raids 35 28 28 18 day a Became habituated to raids 65 72 - 72 82 Russians 44 52 26.1 French 35 39 o.o 100 100 100 • 100 Italians 37 53 8.5 The data tell ah interesting story regarding the Because the Russian sample included women and, effect of air raids on resistance. Even-the Russians, as has been shown, women showed a greater fear who seem to have been the most enthusiastic about reaction to the first raid than did men, both the the Allied air raids and about resistance movements, over-all and the male responses are given for the did not all believe that air raids produced more Russians. resistance movements. This is shown in Table 31. On the question, "With the continuance of the On the whole, however, the DPs were of the opinion - raids, did you become more frightened or did you that the air raids increased resistance movements become used to them?",, again the Italians showed among the foreign workers. greater fear patterns, than did either the French or Russians. TABLE 31.—Effects of raids on resistance movement* On the question, "During the raids did you think tin Percentage.!
that the raids would speed up your liberation, or Frenoh Italian Russian were you uneasy because your life was in danger?" the Italians showed the most contradictory reac• Believing raids decreased resist• tion, as shown in Table 29. ance 24 5 12 Believing raids had no effect 22 19 6 TABLE 29.'—Primary reaction to raids Believing raids increased resist- [In Percentage' 54 76 82
Italians French Russians 100 100 100
Saw liberation-—value of raids 77 90 91 As might be expected, the younger men "saw" Uneasy about own danger 2 2 3 more resistance than did the older men. Of the Thought of both things 21 8 /6 men 30 and younger, 70 percent reported seeing 100 100 100 resistance, and of the men 31 and older, 60 percent reported seeing resistance. RESISTANCE BEHAVIOR Allied Propaganda Observation of Resistance Among the French 71 percent, among the Italians The three groups differed widely on the question 34 percent, and of the Russians 15 percent said that whether foreign workerB engaged in any resistance they listened to Allied radio programs. While the behavior; 86 percent of the Russians, 56 percent of absolute values of these percentage's may be in• the Frenchmen and 34 percent of the Italians said flated, the rank order among the three groups is that they had observed resistance activity among what might be expected, inasmuch as most of the the foreign workers. Participation in resistance programs were designed for the French and Italians
20 rather than for the Russians, and since the French TABLE 33.—Age and habituation as related to transfer and probably had easier access to radios than did the escape (All groups) Russians. (In Peroentaflo] The Allied radio was apparently a more effective Reporting escape Tranifor medium in reaching the French than were literature attempts attempts and leaflets. Only 38 percent of the French report• ed seeing any leaflets addressed to the foreign work• Men 30 and younger _. . 41 50 Men 31 and older „ 31 47 er, compared to 71 percent listening to Allied radio. For the Italian and Russian worker, however, it Habituated group 36 43 seems that the leaflets were very much more effec• Non-habituated group. 43 55 tive: 75 percent of the Italians and 69 percent of the Russians 'reported seeing leaflets addressed to As might have been expected, the younger men the foreign workers. There does not seem to be a attempted to escape from Germany more frequently ready reason why the Italians and the Russians than the older. The difference, however, is much should have seen more Allied leaflets' than the smaller for attempts to transfer to a non-industrial , Frenchmen. One explanation is plausible, how• zone. The suggestion is made that "escape at• ever. It may very well be that the Italian and Rus• tempts" might be considered as more genuine re- sian could not cUscriminate between a leaflet writ• sitance behavior than "attempts to get transferred ten in French and a leaflet written in German. to non-industrial zones." As will be shown, the As to actually seeing either a German or foreign- latter form of behavior was more a reaction to worker leaflet, the' percentage differences become downright fear than to the desire to resist. much smaller: 87 "percent of the French, 99 percent The non-habituated group made more escape of the Italians and 93 percent of the Russians re• attempts than did the habituated group; But the ported having seen one or more Allied leaflets. difference in "escape attempts" (seven percent) between these two groups was substantially less Escape and Transfer Attempts than the difference in "transfer" attempts (12 per• cent). There are some interesting relationships between the percentage of DPs who were exposed to Allied PRODUCTION, ABSENTEEISM, AND RELATED propaganda and their resistance behavior, as shown FACTORS in Table 32. Altogether, 79 percent of the French, 81 percent . of the Italians and 82 percent of the Russians re• TABLE 32.—Escape and transfer attempts, as related to radio ported that the place where they worked was dam• listening and resistance (Alt groups) aged by bombing: This pays a rather high, tribute [In Percentage] to the accuracy and effectiveness of the Allied air raids. No reliable information was obtained from Reporting escape Transfer this source on the duration of shut-downs on ac• attempts attempts count of bombing. Neither listened to radio nor saw re• Among those reporting air raid damage to their sistance activity., 33 37 plants, 40 percent reported that in consequence Radio alone 31 38 of such damage their place of work, was partially Saw resistance activity.. 39 51 Both. . 47 53 shut down, and 60 percent reported complete shut-down. All three groups were of the almost
Seeing resistance activity was more effective in TABLE 34.—Reasons for drop in industrial production as a inducing escape behavior than listening to the Allied result of bombing radio. There is, of course, the more likely alter• [In Percentage) native explanation that both seeing resistance activ• ReaaoDS stated French Italian Russian ity and escape attempts were reflections of some• thing more basic, such as personal contact with Lack of raw materials — 78 92 70 anti-German leaders or groups. Lowered morale 62 47 64 Absenteeism 40 31 60 Table 33 shows that age and habituation to air Lack of sleep of workers . 38 33 54 raids are related to escape attempts and transfer to Other reasons.. 27 12 26 non-industrial zone attempts. (Multiple reasons allowed: percentages add to more than 100.)
21 unanimous opinion that air raids did interfere with MORALE AND BEHAVIOR OF GERMAN production, even when plants were not in fact hit; CIVILIANS 90 percent of the French, 98 percent of the Italians, About 11 questions permitted the respondents and 96 percent of the Russians were in accord in to give their judgments about the morale and "will this opinion. When asked for the reasons for this to resist" of the German civilian population. An drop in production, the three groups again agreed analysis of these data indicates that, in the opinion fairly well. of the DPs, Allied air attacks lowered the morale The French and Russians ranked their reasons in of the German, decreased his will to resist, induced the same order; the Italians showed one inversion. absenteeism from work, encouraged criticism of the There seems to have been no doubt in the minds Nazi Party, and even resulted in resistance behav• of the DPs that the lack of raw materials was the ior on the part of the German civilian. After draw• most important single factor. It is significant that ing this dark picture of German morale, the DPs a relatively high percentage of DPs mentioned ab• agreed that the- major reason for the German senteeism as a factor. There is no way of knowing people's continued support of the war was Nazi -whether the DPs referred to "their own absenteeism police control. or to that of the Germans. It is probable that they were thinking of both. The high frequency in Lowered Morale "lack of sleep" should also be noted. As was indicated in the section on "Production All three groups reported that some of their and Absenteeism," all three groups of DPs listed normal working time was taken up with clearance lowered morale as second only to lack of raw ma• work after a raid. Sixty-one percent of the French, terials among the reasons for decreased production 86 percent of the Italians and 87 percent of the Rus• on the German home front: 52 percent of the sians reported to that effect. There was a remark• French, 47 percent of the Italians and 64 percent able agreement on the total number of days spent of the Russians mentioned low morale. at such clearance work. The median number of A question was designed to elicit a report on days spent in this work were: 18.9 days by the what the Germans talked about in the shelters French, 18.3 by Italians, 17.5 by Russians. This while a raid was in progress and it was hoped that agreement on the number of days spent and the this might be of value in helping to determine the disagreement on whether or not they spent any effect of bombing on morale. Unfortunately, how• time at all, is Easily understood if it is assumed, ever, since only about 38 percent of the French, first, that the less skilled workers were assigned the and even fewer of the Italians and Russians (6 and cleaning-up jobs, and secondly that the Russians 7 percent), were permitted to use German civilian and Italians were, on the whole, less skilled than shelters, few respondents could answer this ques• the French. Considering the samples" for each tion. Only the French data can provide sufficient group as representative, it can then be concluded cases for this analysis. Their replies are listed in that the French DPs spent a median of about 11 Table 35. days in clearance work (18.9 x 61 percent); the Italian DPs about 15 days, and the Russians also about 15 days. TABLE 35.—-Percent of French respondents indicating topics of conversation by Germans in shelters The data concerning authorized and unauthor• Ptreent ized absences on account of raids appear at 'first Desire for peace.. 69 glance to lack any validity whatsoever. The Gossip about losses 31 Criticism of Party ..^ 28 Russians, who presumably had no opportunity to Desire for reprisal 23 engage in any unauthorized behavior, and the Criticism of defense measures 18 Italians, who were also strictly controlled, reported (Percentages total more than 100 percent, since multiple answers were a median of 8.5 days during 1944, while the French,' permitted.) who were in the best position to get away with time off, reported a median of zero days (60 percent of It will be seen from this table that the only topic the French reported no unauthorized days off.) mentioned by more than half the group was desire Much the same story holds for the authorized for peace. Desire for reprisals received less than days off due to bombing. • The Russians reported 25 percent of the votes, and ranks second from last a median of 3.9 days off during 1944, the Italians, in the group. War weariness was the most obvious a median of 5.6 days off, and the French, again, characteristic of German shelter conversation. zero days-off. Most of the DPs, for example, asserted that .even
22 before the Normandy invasion the Germans with that the Nazi police and control system had been whom they were friendly said that, as a result of too much for the Germans. The reasons, listed in bombing, the Germans felt that they could not answering the question appear in Table 37. continue with the war. Seventy-one percent of .the French, 75 percent of the Italians, and 85 per• TABLE 37. Reasons given for continued German -participation cent of the Russians so reported. in war effort Correlated with this war weariness was the feel• [In Percentage] ing of the Germans that the war was lost. The Fronch Italian Ruse tan DPs stated that the Germans confided this anxiety- to them. Seventy-one percent of the French, 75 Police control 79 87 81 Nazi education / 37 41 46 percent of the Italians and 84 percent of the Rus• Fear of Allied victory 33 40 26 sians so reported. German character 26 52 20 Another indication of the war weariness of the Other 4 3 0 Germans as a consequence of bombings is the an• (Percentages total more than 100 percent, slnoc multiple answers were swers of the DPs to the question,"Did the bombings permitted.) have an effect on the attitude of the Germans to• Both the Russians and the French chose the Nazi wards the Nazi Party?" Table 36 presents the Party (either its open police control methods or its data. propaganda) as the main explanation of the Ger• man's persistent support of the war. Only 20-26 TABLE 36.—Effects of air raids on German attitudes toward Nazi Party percent specified the German character. The Ital7 ians give much more weight to character. But in [In Percentage] any event it is clear that the DPs believed that French Italian Russian Nazi police controls kept the Germans in line. This clearly checks with the dominant reason stated Blame Party for starting by most interrogated German civilians for then- the war ... 63 37 56 Blame Party for inade• continued participation. quate protection 22 27 20 Despite the fact that the DPs listed the police Attitude did notchange.. 17 23 16 controls as the most effective reason for,the con• Becanie more dependent tinued docility of the German people,, they also on Party 4 17 24 Other reactions 7 11 3 reported that the Germans did engage in resistance movements against the government. (Percentages total to more than-100 percent; multiple aDswere permitted.) Either the Russians let their enthusiasm for re• All DPs agreed that the most noticeable German sistance movements run away with thsm or else attitude-reaction to bombing was castigation of the this is another case where the Russians have an Party for starting the war. Less than 20 percent opportunity to ascribe "misbehavior" to the Ger• of all the respondents reported that bombing did mans. Over half of the Russians (57 percent) re• not change the attitude of the Germans toward the ported that they saw resistance activity among Party. Further, it is clear that the change which the Germans; 35 percent of the French and 16 per• did take place was in the direction of criticism of cent of the Italians reported similarly. While the the Nazis. Only 4 percent of the French, 17 per• Russian report may seem a bit inflated, it is safe to cent of the Italians and 24 percent of the Russians conclude that-the notion that no German resistance reported that bombing knit the Party and the took place is incorrect. people closer together. No breakdown could be There seems to be'a correlation between intensity found which showed any differences among the re• of raids and resistance. There are two indirect spondents, except for the nationality group differ• indices of intensity of raids: (1) injury to the re- ence. Those with primary school education, those with moro education, those under 30, those over 30, TABLE 3S.—Indices of air raid intensity related to reports of German resistance) those with little bombing experience, those with Reporting German resistance much bombing experience, those who believed the (Percentage) shelters good, those who believed them bad—all 3 days off granted 36 give the same results for the above attitude changes. 18 days off granted 43 Above 42 days off granted 45 In describing the reasons for the German's con• tinued participation in the war effort, the most Respondent injured in raids 51 popular explanation among all the DPs was simply Respondent not injured in raids 41
23 spondents, and (2) number of authorized days off French data can be used here, since the French granted, to the respondent because of bombing. are the only group providing a sufficient number Assuming these as valid indices of intensity of raids, of cases in the "saw no panic" category to permit a the figures emerge as shown in Table 38. breakdown). Those experiencing many raids do There is one caution, however. The above two not report panics more frequently than do those_ indices may not mean that the more severe raids experiencing few raids. induced more resistance on the part of the German There is some indication that the reports on civilian, but rather that the injured DP did more panics were not altogether determined by wishful wishful thinking about. German resistance. The thinking on the part of the DPs. Those' DPs present data do not permit a choice to be made be• who had been, the most frightened did not tend to tween these two possibilities. report having seen more panics, or more dead and Another measure of the morale and disaffection injured. Thus, of the French who became habitu• of the German civilian on the behavior level is ated to the raids, 67 percent reported having seen black-listening to Allied radio, prior to the invasion. panics, and of the French not habituated, 68 per• .The DPs were asked to estimate the number of cent so reported. Germans who had been engaged in black-listening. Pillaging, on the other hand, was not as common The median estimate given by the French was 33 as panic behavior. Both, the Italians and the percent, by the Italians 22 percent, and by the French agreed on this. Only 26 percent of the Russians 23 percent. Because the French were French and 27 percent of the Italians reported hav• .probably in a better position to observe the listen• ing witnessed pillaging. Only among the Russians ing habits of the Germans, the French figure may did more than 50 percent report this type of be• be accepted as closer to the truth than either the havior. The majority of the DPs of all groups did Russian or Italian. As might be expected, these not ascribe pillaging to German civilians. figures are lower than those obtained from the TABLE 40.—Groups res-ponsibls for pillaging as reported by DPs interviews with German civilians, 50 percent of [Lh Percentage] whom reported that they had listened to Allied broadcasts (see Chapter 4, Part II, Volume II). French Italian Russian Another measure of the morale of the German Pillaging was restricted people is civilian panic and pillaging during or after to the Germans.. 48 62 37 bombing. According to the DPs, panics were com• Pillaging was restricted mon; 68 percent of the French, 82 percent of the to the foreign workers - _ 24 26 41 Italian and 95 percent of the Russians reported Pillaging was partici• having witnessed panics during air raids, and stated pated in byboth groups 28 12 22 that for the most part they were of German rather 100 100 100 than foreign-worker origin. The Russians were the only group which ascribed TABLE 39.—Groups involved in air raid panics, according to the first rank in pillaging to the foreign worker. DP reports (See "Validity of Answers," above.) [In Percentage] Just as in the case of panics, so in pillaging, fre• French Italian Russian quency of raids does not seem to have been an im• portant factor; 35 percent of the most frequently Panic was among Ger- 72' 70 82 raided respondents, 39 percent of the less frequently, Panic among foreigners.. 6 .8 6 and 38 percent of the least frequently reported pil• Panic among both 22 22 12 laging. TYPES OF AIR RAIDS 100 100 100 Regular and Irregular These panics were apparently serious; 81 percent There was some disagreement among the three of the French witnesses, 82 percent of the Italian, groups as to whether regular or irregular tempo of and 92 percent of the Russian reported panic- air raids caused the greater fear. The French were deaths; 89 percent, 88 percent and 92 percent re• evenly divided in this opinion, 50 percent answering ported panic-injuries. "regular" and 50 percent "irregular." The Italians The incidence of the panics does not seem to have leaned toward greater fear of the irregular tempo been related to the frequency of raids (only the (55 percent as against 45 percent). The Russians
24 on the other hand overwhelmingly specified the Those who were strafed, however, split on the irregular as more fearful (71 percent to 29 percent). question whether strafing was worse than bombing, Thus, in all three groups the unexpected irregular with a slight tendency 'to indicate greater fear of raids were considered more fear-evoking than the bombing; 40 percent of the French, 52 percent of expected, regular raids. The difference between the Italians and 44 percent of the Russians specified the French and Russian opinion may be due to the strafing as worse. (For a further discussion of fact that the French had better access to adequate strafing, see "Reaction of DPs to Bombing," shelters and, therefore, were in a better position to above.) get out of danger no matter when it occurred, Alerts without Raids whereas the Russians generally had only limited All three groups agreed that air raid alertB in access to shelters and were doubly exposed to un• themselves' had a morale effect upon the people. expected raids. The agreement is striking: French, 89 percent; Night versus Day Raids Italian, 86 percent; Russian, 89 percent. There is All three groups agreed that night raids were some indication that this' question was answered worse than day raids; 77 percent of the French, "projectively." That is, while the question in• 87 percent of the Russians and 97 percent of the quired as to the effect on "people," the respondents Italians subscribed to this opinion. The fact that tended to reply in terms of the effect on themselves. all three groups considered night raids the worse Thus, more of those who did not become habituated is not due to the differences in intensity of day and tended to report that alerts were effective than did night raids, but is attributable to the day-night those who became habituated (67 percent of the factor itself. (See discussion of day and night former group and 60 percent of the latter). raids, Chapter 3, Part I,Volume land in Chapter 2, Accepting this as a "projective" answer, it must this volume.) be concluded that alerts alone generally had a mo• Type of Bomb rale effect, which was greatest, however, on those There was general agreement as .to which types who were not yet habituated to raids. of bombs had the greatest, morale effect. The three groups ranked them as shown in Table 41. ADEQUACY OF AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS Alerts TABLE 41.—Types of bortibs reported as most dreaded [i indicates most dreaded. It least dreaded] The three groups agreed that the alert system
Fran oh Italian Russian was good; even the Russians almost gave the Ger• mans a majority vote on that—the nearest the Air mines 1 1 2 Russians ever came to doing so; 64 percent of the Large bombs 3 2 1 French, 71 percent of the Italians and 50 percent Phosphorous._. _ 2 3 3 of the Russians praised the alert system. How• Delayed action. 4 4 4 Incendiary. • 5 5 5 ever, all three groups believed that the rest of the ARP system was "poor and inadequate," as shown It is interesting to note that "incendiary" bombs 'in Table 42. were mentioned last by all three groups. The in• cendiary bomb destroyed property, and thus did TABLE 42. Estimates of shelter, relief and ARP adequacy . not much worry the DPs. [In Percentage] Strafing French Italian Russian It was reported by 48 percent of the French, 46 percent of the Italians and 79 percent of the Rus• Shelters poor.! 62 65 76 Relief poor 56 72 83 sians that they had experienced strafing. The rea• 1 AltP poor.. ".. 76 66' 83 son for the discrepancy between the Frauco-Italian group and the Russians is not readily apparent, Shelters for the DPS unless it is assumed that the Russians, as the least favored nation in respect to shelter access, were The DPs were not permitted access to the shelters still in the streets when the strafing aircraft ar• in the same way as the'Germans. Even the French rived. However, from the absolute percentages were discriminated against,, although not to the noted above, it is apparent that all three groups same extent as the Italians and Russians. It was irregularly experienced strafing. reported by 62 percent of the French, 94 percent
25 89M14—*7—6 of the Italians and 95 percent of the Russians that sians reported that those who remained at home they were not permitted to enter the shelters on the were happy in the knowledge that their families- same terms with the Germans. were safe. The rest reported either that the effect was mixed (French, 8 percent; Italian 18 percent; EVACUATION Russian 7 percent), or that there was no observable The first of the questions dealing with evacuation effect1 (French, 29 percent, Italian, 18 percent, attempted to filter out those respondents who had Russian, none). not observed any evacuation; 718 French (89 per• The French were in the best position of the three cent of total), 397 Italians (91 percent), and 907 DP groups to observe and pass judgment on the Russians (90 percent) answered this question. Of personal reactions of the German civilians. The these, 88 percent, 94 percent, and 94 percent, re• French figures on this question are therefore prob• spectively, stated that they had observed evacua• ably more reliable than either of the other two- tion. These high percentages corroborate the groups. broad scale of evacuations in Germany. All three groups agreed that the evacuees did The French and Italians agreed that most of the not get along well with their hosts; 78 percent of the evacuation was "forced." Thus 24 percent of the French, 66 percent of the Italians and 91 percent French and 26 percent of the Italians said that all of the Russians subscribed to that statement. the evacuations with which they were familiar were of this character, while 59 percent of the French BLACK MARKET ACTIVITIES and 57 percent of the Italians reported that they had witnessed both voluntary and forced evacua• Majorities of all three groups agreed that the air tion. Only 17 percent of the French and 17 per• raids increased black-market activity in Germany cent of the Italians reported that all the evacuations in the following percentages: French 60 percent;. were "voluntary." The Russians, on the other Italians 89 percent; and Russians 63 percent. hand, told a different story. Only 22 percent Only among the Russians was there a sizable stated that all of the evacuations were forced, 48 group which believed that the raids decreased percent reported both types, and 30 percent report• black-market activity. The percentages 'were:. ed only voluntary evacuations. This last percent• French 5; Italians zero; and Russians, 30. age is significantly different from the corresponding Only among the French was there a sizable group' percentages for the other two DP groups. How• which believed that the air raids had no effect on ever, as is indicated elsewhere, there is reason to the black-market; 35 percent of the French so re• believe that the Russians in reporting on the Ger• ported, as compared with 11 percent of the Italians- man people tended to be far more critical than and 7 percent of the Russians. either the French or Italians. The hypothesis When all national groups are combined, the re• is suggested there that the Russians regarded volun• sults show that 68 percent believed raids increased, tary evacuation as cowardly, and were therefore black markets; 14 percent believed they decreased more prone to report voluntary evacuations than these dealings, and 18 percent said there was no- either of the other two groups. It is therefore safe effect. . to assume that the French and Italian figures are The question of whether the black-market activ• more accurate than the Russian figures, on this ity was increased or decreased was not a simple point. question capable of being answered by any and. All three groups agreed that evacuations were every DP. In the first place, the DP must have badly organized; 72 percent of the French, 79 per• been in a position to observe the black-market, and cent of the Italians and 86 percent of the Russians of the three groups there is a priori reason to be• expressed this opinion. lieve that the French group was the most favored, In indicating how the Germans reacted to the in this respect. In the second place, it is assumed evacuation of members of their families, 35 percent that the more educated and sophisticated reporter of the French, and 30 percent of the Italians re• was in a better position to make a valid judgment, ported that those who stayed at home were adverse• than the relatively uneducated. As a check on. ly affected, while 80 percent of the Russians so these assumptions a.breakdown was made in terms- stated. Again the Russians had an opportunity to of education, with the results as shown in Table 43. say that the Germans did not react "properly." Apparently, education does seem to have made On the other hand, 28 percent of the French, 15 some difference in these judgments, thoughjthe percent of the Italians and 13 percent of the Rus• differences are not great. TABLE 43.—Educational level as related to observation of black all when broken down- according to education. marketing The suggested explanation is that neither the [In Percentage] Italians nor the Russians were in any position to Primary Beyond make observations on the activities of the black schooling only primary market in Germany. Only the French were in any Increased black market. 70 65 position to do so. Since valid observation of black Decreased. — 15 14 market activities is correlated with education, 15 21 differences between the more and less educated re• spondents might be expected among those who did 100 100 have an opportunity to observe the black market, An examination of the effect of education in each iind no differences might be expected among those of the national groups was made. The interesting who did not have such an opportunity. From all observation seems to be that the French results these considerations it is suggested that the reports are sensitive to an educational breakdown, while of the "educated" French respondents are probably the Russians and Italian results do not change at the most valid.
27 CHART II
VARIATIONS IN SUICIDE RATES AND BOMBING CONDITIONS IN GERMAN CITIES
PORT CITIES WITH HIGH SUICIDE RATES
PER 100,000 PER YEAR HEAVILY BOMBED IN I94B (OVER 1000 TONS)
90
15
SO V LIGHTLY BOMBED IH 1942 C UNDER BO TONS)
IB
1998 llll 940 1*41 94C 1948 1144
LARGE CITIES WITH LOW SUICIDE RATES
PER 100,000 I 1 PER YEAR HEAVILY BOMBED IH 1942 (OVER 1000 TONS
LIOHTLY BOMBED IH 1942 (UNDER BO TONS)
1938 I 1939 1 1940 1 1941 '1948 11943 11944
LARGE CITIES NOT BOMBED BEFORE 1943
PER 100,000 PER YEAR
36-
30-
LIOHTLYIBOMBED IN 1943 (UNDER 80 TONS) «B-
20- HEAVILY BOMBED IN 1941 (OVER 1000 TONS) II
94 942 1 1943
LARGE CITIES NOT BOMBED BEFORE 1944
PER 100,000 PER YEAH
40" •
38 N.
LIOHTLY B IMBED IN 1 44 (UKDE R BO T0K3) 30- \
10- \
20- HEAv ILY BOMBE 1 IN 1944 (OVER 1000 TONS)
1 938 19 39 1 1940 ' 1941 1942 l 1943 CHART - 2 28 CHAPTER 4
THE RELATION OF BOMBING TO SUICIDES
LOW WARTIME SUICIDE RATES they have been fought in the past. Only this type' might indicate high group morale. In this type of In the past the suicide rate of nations has invari• 1 suicide, which has become rarer in modern times, ably decreased during war time. If the morale of the individual is so submerged in the group that his a nation is high, there is generally "no time during 1 interest in his possessions and even in his own life war to indulge in personal or imaginary worries/ * are secondary. This leads to placing a low' evalua• and persons who in peace time might commit sui• tion on life which may be coupled to a social man• cide "come out of their shells" and become part of date to suicide. Suicide altruiste is common in the thrilling enterprise of inflicting defeat upon the armies and highly regimented societies. The enemy or defending the homeland. In the first Japanese commits hara-kiri when his honor is im• World War the suicide rates of neutral European pugned and in this action, perhaps to a lesser extent nations as well as warring nations decreased. This than in the Indian custom of suttee, there is a direct fact, along with the observed decrease in suicide, mandate to suicide. The Nazis in Germany also in times of revolution, indicates the importance of tried to establish this type of reaction to defeat inter-group conflict in drawiug the individual's as a manifestation of high morale. Group values attention away from his own personal problems. were to be placed above the individual's own life.* As indicated later in this report, instability and Most suicides commited in Germany cannot be change in peace time create a situation leading to classified as altruiste. The wave which swept over high suicide rates, but when countries are involved Germany after the Potsdam agreement was an• in war or revolution the influence of "having a nounced would almost all have been classified by cause," "taking sides" as a part of a group enter• Durkheim as suicide anomique.* Suicide anomique prise and the consequent development of high occurs when there are sudden changes in group morale, or forming an esprit de corps offsets the values and in the equilibrium of social life which individualizing aspects of such chaotic times. This disrupts social bonds. The increase in suicides will be important in explaining the influence of which characterizes both depressions and periods bombing German cities. If the bombing could de• of prosperity is due in large measure to suicide stroy this tendency of- the group to take the indi• anomique. When Dublin and Bunzel6 in their vidual away from his own small realm of worries, monograph explain why people take their own lives and counteract the lift he gets from being an en• by saying', "What tries men's souls is the prospect thusiastic member of the group enterprise of war, of being deprived of the accustomed comforts, the suicide rate should increase and morale should friends and surroundings and of accepting in their decrease. place conditions that are decidedly inferior/' they EXPECTED EFFECTS OF WAR ON CERTAIN are describing the basic elements in suicide anom• TYPES OF SUICIDE ique. Egoistic suicide, Durkheim's third type, like Of the three types of suicide which Durkheim3 suicide anomique, is a form which might be in• described in his classical study only one, suicide creased by defeat at war, or helplessness brought aliruiste, might be expected to increase in wars as about by bombing. Egoistic suicide is high where
' Germany's 1918 ralo of 15.3 suicides per 100,000 Inhabitant* was tholowost group bonds are .weak or where the individual is rate evor recorded tor the country. Data for the United States show that rates decreased in both the Oivll and World Ware. In 1940 the rate per "on his own." Protestants commit suicide more 100,000 for the nation was 14.3 alter which It dropped to 10.2 In 11M3. The 1916 rate Ln the United States was 16.2 after which it dropped ll.fi In 1019. frequently than Catholics in all countries because, It did not rise again until 1021. Data for other countries indicate that wars era associated with decreasing suicide raid. on the positive side, Catholicism relieves the indi• ' Dublin, Louis I, and Buniel, Bessie, To Be or Not to Be—A Studs of Sui• vidual from certain strains by offering him a means cide, New York; Harrison Smith and Robert Haas, 1933, p. 110. • Durkhalm, Emile, La Suicide, Paris; F. Alcan, 1887, New Edition 1903. of appeal to authority and of resignation to his lot » Time Magazine, Vol. LVT, August 20, 1945, p. 42. and, on the negative side, by not "forcing him to be ' Dublin, Louis L. and Buntel, B. op. cfl. p. 101. * This la an expression of Rousseau used by Parsons in explaining Durk- free" and brave* in the face of adversity as does boim's types of suicide. Parson?, Talcott, The SfruduM of Social Action, New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1937, p. 332. the Protestant'faith. Moreover, advanced educa-
29 8984 14:—47—0 tion may have the influence of "freeing" one from plain the high rates of suicides among business and authoritarian beliefs and educated persons are more professional men. The rationalistic orientation of apt to try to control their destinities and less apt these groups in our society (and tins holds for Eng• to resign themselves to the imaginary powers of a lish and German society) do not permit one to supreme being or to group influences. Thus the blame fate or chance for one's success or failure. suicide rates of educated persons, who according to Individual responsibility-is a basic orientation which Durkheim often commit egoistic suicide, are higher makes it difficult for individuals to resign them• than those of uneducated persons. selves to adversities. In general, this is confirmed The larger the family, the less the chance the by the position of Miner as described in his state• parents will commit suicide, and married persons ment that the professionals and those of indepen• are much less apt to commit suicide than single dent means, being "two groups most affected by persons. Persons without family ties are apt to the individualistic and rationalistic movement, have commit egoistic suicide. Thus the breaking of high suicide rates, while farmers and other outdoor family ties by tho evacuation of children and seg• manual laborers, groups generally conservative in ments of families from bombed cities might be ex• their habits of thought, show low rates. It is, pected to result in either suicide of the egoistic or therefore, quite probable that decrease in group anomique types. In general, low morale should be spirit is a factor in the increase in suicide rates-."7 associated with these two types of suicide. When an acute depression or sudden period of prosperity descends upon the cultures of countries HIGH SUICIDE RATE OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES so basically similar as those of the United States, Germany, and England, many suicides may be ex• After studying the data on economic and social pected in addition to the two other types men• •status in relation to suicide rates the author came tioned.8 to the conclusion that suicide in the middle classes .may typically combine the three forms of Durk• HIGH SUICIDE RATES IN GERMANY AND heim. Why do the professional and business class• JAPAN es have such high rates in normal times? The professions impose terrific pressure on the indi• Germany9 and Japan have very high suicide vidual to improve his competency and to "get up" rates. In Gennany the number of suicides for the in the world in accordance with high standards set 'country per 100,000 inhabitants in 1930 was 27.8 by the profession. Of the free professions only the as compared with 15.6 for the United States. clergy have low rates. The professional man like Among the Japanese it was 19.3 for 1921-1925. the business man is driven to "get up" or admit he Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Switzerland, all heav• is a failure, in which case he might commit a sort of ily populated with Germans,.have high rates. The altruistic suicide without, the usual ceremony. Irish Free State and Spain have low rates, only 2.8 The drive and the social bond-tearing mobility of per 100,000 in 1930 for the former and 3.5 for the present day society become so great that interest in latter. Protestant Ireland has the slighly higher any but the closest relatives may be lost. This pre• figure of 4.9. vents the formation of bonds which Durkheim • Particularly significant for our study is Miner's would call "preventers" of egoistic suicide. If the observation that,,vin the center of Europe from the professional or business man works in a bureaucracy Northeast of France to the eastern borders of Ger• where, although his heart and soul are in his work, many a suicidigehous area exists where suicide his family and neighborhood ties are inconsequen• reaches the maximum of its intensity and around tial' to that post, a non-familistic adjustment de• which it takes a decreasing ratio to the limits of the velops and egoistic suicide may be high. Thus northern and southern states."10 egoistic suicide is increased by the fact that modern
govcrmnental, business, and industrial organiza• 1 Miner, John Rice, "Suicide and Its Relation to Climateand Other Fac• tor!," The American Journal of Hugicnc, Monographic Series No. 2, 1922, tions stress individual performance and compe• P. 11. » For suicides from 1910-1931 for 10 large cities in the United States, Dublin tence; family connections are subordinated in the and Bunzel, op, cil, found that tho business Index and the suicide rates wore related aa expressed by tho correlation coefficients 0.47 and O.M. The better resulting high mobility as individuals attempt to the economic conditions the lowor tho rates. Tho lower figures are based upon units of deviation. The higher (Iguro Is based upon IUMURI data. find their places in the occupational and professional It must be emphasized that Durkheim found that suicide is no function of [loverly because the1 poorest people often have the lowest-rates and suicides structure. Increase In periods of great prosperity. Moreover, in Western culture there is a charac• 1 In tho United Slsuos tho German born imputation has the highest rate and in 1910 tho State of Pennsylvania ro] lotted tho amazing rale of 80 suicides teristic value orientation which may partially ex• per 100,000 for German bom males. Dublin and Bunzel, op. cit. » Minor, John Rice, op..eft.; p. 10.
30 Regional Differences in German Suicides Tio/i grata to the Nazis were often eliminated and There are great variations even in Germany, reported as suicides. with Saxony and Prussia having the highest suicide rates. Heavy industrial and Catholic areas have low ANALYSIS OF THE RELATION BETWEEN rates. Port cities' and others, where business, BOMBING EXPERIENCE SUICIDE RATES clerical, and professional people have importance Since the population data of the. cities studied and mobility* is high, show high rates. In 1939 do not indicate the influence of bombing in terms among the original German cities having over of evacuation and mortality on the age and sex 100,000 inhabitants, Berlin reported a suicide rate structure of the 50 German cities of over 100,000 of 42.1 per 100,000 and Hamburg a rate of 41.6; population in 1938, the following procedures were the city having the lowest rates was Bochum with used. Since the rates for bombed and unbombed 10.5. Since rates of large cities are remarkably cities were relatively the same, a sort of negative constant through the years, the great variation to be hypothesis was drawn. It was assumed' that if noted in Chart II must be reckoned with in any bombing was not associated with increased rates, interpretation of the influence of bombing on these when the known facts about the population would rates. lead the investigator to the conclusion that it German Statistics on Wartime Suicides should increase, bombing -per se did not increase The number of suicides and total population for the suicide rate. It is dubious that the data at the cities of Germany of 100,000 or more are re• hand are sufficient to prove that bombing depressed ported weekly in the Reichsgesundkeitsblalt, by the the suicide rates. National Health Agency. Rates are available for In so far as possible, cities with similar suicide all weeks up to the last part of 1944.11 These fig• rates and very different bombing experiences were ures include only the German civil population who compared. Since the cities had been sampled in live in and have established their residences in the the cross-section Interview Study of Morale on the cities reporting. Foreign workers are not included. basis of food ration cards/ the age-sex composition Any study of the effects of bombing on suicide as of May 1945 could be estimated. These data, rates in Germany is fraught with grave difficulties. taken together with detailed studies carried on The rates are calculated on population data about during June and July in the various cities, proved which too little is known. Thus although males that bombing and evacuation increased the pro• and aged persons are much more prone to commit portion of adults and males-. Since older people suicide, we do not have exact figures which can be and males are more likely to commit suicide than used to standardize suicide data with regard to sex younger people and females, we should assume and age. Once the groups in the armed forces are that if after a city is bombed the crude suicide eliminated, it is assumed that evacuation to avoid rates remain the same, the standardized rate would" bombing removed more women and children than be lower. There" seems no reason for assuming other groups. If this assumption is correct, evacu• that the proportion of Jews and Catholics would ation should increase the suicide rates. On the be changed on account of bombing, and wc have other hand, evacuation of the aged, particularly the no knowledge of factors wliich would make for fewer aged men, should have decreased the rates. An• persons who would be potential suicides remaining other difficulty with the data is the fact that after in the bombed cities. Of course, there is the pos• November 1942 12 Jewish suicides are omitted from sibility (in fine with the above reasoning concern• the weekly reports. It is known that even before ing the value orientation of groups prone to commit the Nazi persecutions the Jews of recent years had suicide) that those who were more individualistic, relatively high rates.13 What the shivffling of vari• secularized, or rationalistic might take matters in ous religious groups did to the rates is unknown. their own hands and leave the bombed cities. Also it. is claimed that persons who were persona However, movement was not free and we have no proof that this happened to a great extent. 11 Rates for 1844 have been estimated as follows: The published figures were available up lo November. November and December rates were cal• In Tables 44 and 45 and Chart II the suicide culated on che basis of the experience for 1942 and 1&43. The proportion of all suicides committed in 1942 and 1943 which were committed in November rates of cities which received heavy bombings and and December of these years was used as a basis for projecting the rates of had similar suicide rates in 1938 and 1939 are com• " Information from Dr. H. Ralfa, Hoadof tho Statistical Office of npnovor. pared with those that received light or no bombings " The earlier rates of Jews as Indicated by Durkheim were lower than Protestants and Catholics, but in tator years, even before the Nasla coma to in 1942. By modern standards no German cities power, the Jewish rate had exceeded the other two groups In many parts of Germany. were heavily bombed in 1941. The cities classified
31 as low, suicide rate cities are those with less than 20 and July in 1945 convinced most investigators of suicides per 100,000 population per year for 1938 the survey that, the bombing of the German cities and 1939. Those classified as high suicide rate had a tremendous influence in decreasing the aver• cities are those with more than 25 suicides per age German's morale in the sense of decreasing his 100,000 per year for 1938 and 1939. Heavily desire to continue the war, the question must be bombed cities are those which received more than posed: Why did not the bombings increase Ger• 1,000 tons of bombs in a given year. Lightly many's suicides? Aside from the possibility that bombed cities are those, wliich received less than 50 many persons who were potential suicides went to tons of bombs in a given year. When Tables 44 rural villages where they may later have committed and 45 and Chart II are taken together, there seems suicide, there arc no doubt a good many reasons to be no definite proof that bombing increases the for this. It is now obvious that the German defeat, suicide rate immediately. Among heavily bombed in which bombing played an important role, is di• port cities there is a slight rise in 1942, but the rectly related to a great increase in the present lightly" bombed cities with high suicide rates also suicide rate. To many with whom the author registered a Blight rise in 1942. Population fell talked there appeared no other adjustment avail• rapidly after the 1942 bombings of Hamburg, Bre• able.1* This appraisal of the situation is only a men, and Kiel. The increase in the number of recent one because no one knew whether the terms suicides in 1942 in these cities is greater than for as related to individual interests would be better or any of the other groups. worse. However, it must be recognized that, ter• Since most of Germany's heavy industrial areas rible as the bombings were, they created a certain had lower suicide rates than other areas because of amount of community spirit in addition to increas• the presence of both unskilled workers and Cath• ing the desire to give up. While bombing made olics, most of the areas.wliich were heavily bombed people willing to sacrifice certain loyalties to the in 1942 and 1943, with the exception of the port national group, or at least, its temporary leader• cities, analyzed in Table 44, have low rates. There ship, the reverse could and did often happen "under was, therefore, no homogenous group of unbombed fire" in the narrower and more concrete groups in and bombed cities for the year 1943. These low neighborhoods and communities. However, it suicide rate cities were included in Table 45 and must not be overlooked that once the intensity of Figure II as unbombed cities of low rates in 1942. bombing went beyond certain bearable limits, the When the high rate cities which were not bombed individual tended to be thrown back upon himself in 1943 or previously are compared with these low and his problems, once naked survival became the rate cities which were heavily bombed in 1943, only issue. bombing does not seem to decrease the spread be• Another element to be considered is the excite• tween the rates in the two groups as it would if it ment and frequently the fear involved in the bomb• "were increasing the rates of the bombed cities. ings. There is reason to believe that the act of According to reasoning explained above, it may be suicide, especially Durkheim's egoistic suicide in• concluded that 1943 bombing did not increase the volves considerable contemplative action. During rates in 1943. the years of bonibing there was a tenseness and a Those cities unbombed or lightly bombed at the frequency of emotional excitement which were notin beginning of 1944 all had relatively high suicide harmony with brooding. Many made their stays rates in 1938 and 1939. When those which were in the bunkers social occasions, and after each heavily bombed in 1944 were compared with those bombing each person whose propeity was untouch- which were lightly bombed during the same year, »"Dr. Halbert L. Dunn, Ohlef of the Division of Vital Statistics, Bureau there is no great spread in the rates for the previous, of the Census, U. S. Department of Commerce, after studying the figures and tables presented In this report remarked that gulolde was only one of years (Figure II and Table 47). The rates of both the maay solutions which individuals may resort to whan confronted with what seems to tbem an impossible situation. He maintained that solutions the heavily and lightly bombed cities increase of mental conflict were comparable to the adjustments persons make In case of bombing or defeat. The confllcits in the later case would be based upon the slightly. If the National Health Agency, which discrepancy between what one was accustomed to and feels tha"t one must have for a decent eiistenceand what oneaotually has. His logic Is as follows: furnished the suicide and population statistics,' "If we era extroverts by nature, we might be able W force suoh conflicting thoughts Into separate compartments of our mind, lock them In securely, had not been bombed out the cumulative effect of and tben, forgetting the prisoners In the dungeon cells, live plaoialy in the luxury of a forced peace. Or, li we are of thoso who can confess their sins and the bombings could have been studied in 1945 data. feel salvation's peace descend upon us, we might be able to pass the problems to tbe sturdy shoulders of another—or to the listening ear of a benevolent God, and thus avoid tbe conflict. If neither of these two pathways of escape ' SUMMARY is open, we must face cur problem honestly and squarely with an unbiased mind. Adjustment! No other way Is open. Thatis, except neurosis, which Is nature's solution." Prom " Human Relations as a Public Health Prob• Since the cross-section study and close personal lem." Paper delivered before Western Branch, American Public Health contact with the German population in May, June, Association at Denver, June 24, two.
32 cd had the opportunity and felt the obligation to falling into the proletarian class. To a realistic help others. Those who were bombed out had German who tries to envision his future welfare many fellow commiserators. within the peace terms and administrative system With the end of the war the futility of life on any brought by defeat, there is ample ground for dis• level has struck many. This is particularly true couragement. The fear of Russia among the ^ of the returning soldier who is now possibly the middle classes and the widespread belief that she highest potential suicide. Many returned to de• will not allow a non-Russianized Germany to rise, stroyed homes and dead families. Uncertainly pre• is depressing. The peace terms' proved one com• vailed. No one knew how far the feared Russians mon post-war rumor to be false; namely, that the would come, and rumors were rampant about star• United States and England would fight Russia. vation and freezing in the coming winter. The With administrative mechanisms separating Ger• excitement of war was gone. Every man had to many into zones which are in some Tespects to be try to work out his existence, and as a result of the self-contained and most, of which do not produce war and the bombings, the great middle class, enough food, few can see anything but economic among whom the suicide rate is high at all times, chaos. have lost almost everything except their dread of
TABLE 44.—Large German port cities xcith high suicide rates1 heavily bombed1 in 194t compared with similar cities lightly1 bombed m 194S (See Chart II). HEAVILY BOMBED
Suicide rates per 100,000 Bomb loads (TJ. S. torn) City 1938 im 1640 1941 i Hamburg 40.6 41.6 28.4 25.5 31.5 30.4 35.7 2,278 •11,215 14,052'' 13,558 Bremen.. 24.2 25.8 25.6 18.0 22.4 19.4 34.6 5,013 6,852 7,209 7,105 Kiel 37.8 27.0 26.5 28.5 24.7 22.1 28.1 1,033 3,288 11,989 9,934 Total • 37.7 37.4 27.7 24.5 29.0 27.3 34.2 8,324 21,356 33,250 30,597 LIGHTLY BOMBED Koenigsburg . _ 30.1 20.6 15.4 16.2 17.7 16.5 19.1 1,047 Stettin ^ 20.9 18.2 16.3 12.2 14.6 10.1 S.14 950 4,965 Total _ 26.0 19.6 15.9 14.2 16.1 13.3 14.3 950 6,015 1 Average annua) number of suieidwfor 1B3R and 1939 per 100,000 were over 36. 5 Received over 1,000 tons of bombs Including bigh explosive and incendiary. 1 Received none or less than SO tons of bombs. Loads for cities receiving less than 50 tons were arbitrarily counted as tero. 33 TABLE 46.—Large German cities with low suicide rates1 heavily bombed1 in 194& compared with, similar cities lightly* bombed in 194» (See Chart II)) HEAVILY BOMBED Suicide rates w 100,000 Bomb loads nj. 8. tons) Olty 1638 1039 1940 1041 1942 1943 1944 1942 1943 1944 1945 Cologne 17.2 21.5 14.0 17.6 15.3 10.8 19.1 2,847 8,654 25,968 7,514 Essen 17.6 18.1 13.0 13.1 7.94 7.96 17.0 5,027 • 9,072 19,095 7,681 Dufaburg 18.3 19.3 14.0 14.6 8.35 1J.4 15.4 2,250 8,716 22,082 Duesseldorf 19.7 18.0 14.9 16.5 13.5 12.5 13.1 2,221 7,885 9,366 961 Total 18.1 19.4 13.9 15.4 11.6 10.5 16.2 12,345 34,327 76,511 16,156 LIGHTLY BOMBED Wuppertal 21.4 ' 17.0 17.5 20.7 15.5 9.47 19.5 4,0S0 855 2,058 Gelsenkirchen 12.4 9.61 9.94 8.83 11.0 9.71 11.5 3,850 14,261 6,844 Bochum 15.0 10.6 13.6 • 10.7 9.42 10.2 16.0 2,754 5,938 Hagen. 11.1 15.5 16.3 14.7 14.7 16.6 22.3 1,288 2,106 1,573 Solingcn __ 19.7 19.6 19.7 12.0 11.8 15.3 15.2 1,460 2,265- 176 Muelheim 14.8 11.7 18.0 16.2 8.21 18.2 9.62 1,840 Muenchen-G lad bach _ 17.2 14.1 7.87 6.3 15.2 9.83 7.77 2,635 4,212 800 Total 16.6 13.7 14.4 13.3 12.3 11.9 13.3 17,907 29,687 11,451 i Average annual number of suicides for 1938 and IB30 per 100,000 were undor 20 1 Received-over 1,000 tons of bombs Including high explosive and incendiary. » Received none or less than SO tons of bombs. Loads for cltlos receiving less than 50 tons were arbitrarily counted asiero TABLE 46.—Large German cities1 not heavily bombed before 194$ which were heavily12 bombed in 194S compared wtih similar cUies tighlly* bombed in 194S (See Chart II) HEAVILY BOMBED Suicide rates per 100,000 Bomb loads (tj. 8. tons) City ' 1038 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1942 1843 1044 1945 Wuppertal 21.4 17.0 17.5 20.7 15.5 9.47 19.5 4,080 855 2;058 Gelsenkirchen 12.4 9.61 9.94 8.83 11.0 9.71 11.5 ,3,850 14,261 6,844 Bochum 15.0 10.5 13.6 10.7 9.42 10.2 •16.0 ' 2,754 5,988 Hagen 11.1 15.5 16.3 14.7 14.7 16.6 22.3 1,288 "2,106 1,573 Soliagen 19.7 19.6 19.7 12.0 11.8 15.3 ' 15.2 1,460 2,265 176 Muelheiin.. 14.8 11.7 18.0 16.2 8.21 18.2 9.62 1,840 17.2 Muenchen-Glfldbach. 14.1 7.87 6.3 15.2 9.83 7.77 2,635 4,212 800 Total 16.6 13.7 14.4 13.3 12.3 11.9 13.3 17,907 29.687 11,451 LIGHTLY BOMBED 27.9 12.5 17.0 15.3 18.8 1,415 Bielefeld 27.8 29 9 25.0 30.2 16.9 15.3 29.9 2,175 2,281 Wuerzburg 25.2 27 5 15.6 16.0 24.5 19.2 18.6 1,340 Wiesbaden 33.3 28 1 16.4 15.6 39.2 ' 29.8 20.4 870 2,532 Braunschweig 37.9 32 5 26.1 21.0 20.6 21.6 19.0 16,134 1,585 Karlsruhe - 23.2 26 9 17.0 32.6 17.2 22.2 15.9 5,455 4,472 Dresden _ 42.5 32 8 14.5 16.4 11.8 7.42 12.1 124 6,342 Chemnitz 48.6 43 8 33.8 34.5 36.2 42.1 32.3 176 5,732 Plauen 46.7 57 7 40.5 37.7 45.7 32.7 41.3 100 2,922 Koenigsberg 30.1 20 6 15.4 16.2 17.7 16.5 19.1 1,047 Dessau. 39.3 30 6 31.4 22.8 23.5 24.2 25.0 927 1,212 Halle 36.4 33 0 19.2 23.1 35.8 26.5 28.6 247 2,057 Magdeburg 32.3 32 6 26.3 25.8 24.1 22.8 33.2 6,182 7,116 26 3 16.7 16.0 20.5 16.2 14.2 55 Totals 36.8 1' 2 2 3 22.0 22.1 23.1 21.1 22.4 34,907 37,591 ""•^7 K.I.™ u».u i-uii^! iu iDMouu • D • 34 TABLE 47.—Large German cities1 not heavily bombed before 1944—heavily bombed1 in 1944 compared with similar cities lightly bombed1 in 1944 (See Chart 11) HEAVILV BOMBED Suicide rates per 100,000 Bomb loads (U. S. tons) Oity 1938 1939 iWC mi JW2 ms ' JW4 IfH2 1043 IW-f 27.9 12.5 17.0 15.3 18.8 1,415 Iiielofeldl 27.8 29.9 25.0 30.2 16,9 15.3 29.9 2,175 .2,281 Wiesbaden 33.3 28.1 16.4 15.6 39.2 29.8 20.4 870 2,532 Karlsruhe 23.2 26.9 17.0 32.6 17.2 22.2 15.9 5,455 4,472 Koenigsberg 30.1 20.6 15.4 16.2 17.7 16.5 19.1 1,047 39.3 30.6 31.4 22.8 23.5 24.2 25.0 927 1,212 Magdeburg 32.3 32.6 26 3 25.8 24.1 22.8 33.2 6,182 7,116 Totals — 30.7 " 27.4 21.5 20.7 22.1 20.4 22.S 18,071 17,013 LIGHTLY BOMBED Wuerzburg 25.2 27.5 15.6 16.0 24.5 19.2 IS.6 1,340 Dresden 42.5 32.8 14.5 16.4 1.1.8 7.42 12.1 124 6,342 48.6 43.S 33.8 34.5 36.2 42.1 32.3 176 6,732 46.8 57.7 40.5 37.7 45.7 32.7 41 .3 100 2,922 Halle 36.4 33.0 19.2 23.1 35.8 26.5 2S.6 247 2,057 Potsdam 26.3 16.7 16.0 20.5 16.2 14.2 55 Totals 42.1 36.3 22.0 23.7 24.4 21.7 22.5 702 18,393 1 Average annual suicides for 1938 Bnd 1939 per 100,000 were over 25. 1 Recelvod over 1,000 tons of bombs Including high explosive and incendiary. 1 Received none or lose than 50 tons of bombs. Loads for cities receiving less than w tons were arbitrarily counted as 0. 35 CHAPTER 5 THE EFFECTS OF ALLIED AIR ATTACK ON THE MORALE OF THE GERMAN LAND ARMIES1 INTRODUCTION armies is a moot and largely technical question. It has seemed desirable to append to the civilian •There is no general agreement among German army morale study a memorandum summarizing the chiefs on this subject. Field Marshal Keitel, when effects of air attack upon the morale of the German asked which Allied weapon he would consider the land armies. The original intention was to present most effective in impairing the morale of troops, a definitive statement of the effect of air attack stated that, "Without any doubt it was the superior upon the morale of German troops. . This state• air force . . . from the very beginning of its supe• ment was to have been based upon a systematic riority until the time when it could not be stopped examination of all pertinent research studies in the at all . . Similarly, Major General von Gers- files of the Allied intelligence agencies. Examina• dorff (Chief of Staff, 7th Army, late July 1944) tion of the intelligence files showed,however, that was of the opinion that in the case of close-support no systematic scientific research had been done. air-operations, "The main result of the large-scale The intelligence files contain substantial numbers bomber formations at the time of the Normandy of interviews with prisoners of war, but unfortu• campaign was the tremendous effect on German nately these interviews are essentially of an anec• troop morale. Actual loss of life, and material was dotal rather than scientific character. No quanti• not as significant."- tative analysis of this material is possible, because Field Marshal von Rundstedt, on the other hand, its character does not permit analysis. The interro• in fisting nine effects of 'air activity, relegated the gations did not represent a properly selected sample morale effect of air attack to ninth place. He was of a clearly defined population. Moreover, the of the opinion that the morale effect was of rela• same interviewing techniques and questions were tively little importance. not used for all persons. Uniform procedures in Nonetheless, it is abundantly clear that the interviewing are necessary for any systematic and Allied air attack contributed greatly to the lower• accurate analysis. Consequent]}', all that can be ing of the morale of the German land armies. Air done at this time is to present a summary of all the attack in its many varieties presented the most sig• various kinds of morale effects that air attack pro• nificant military morale problem—the distinguish• duced upon the German army, as reported by Allied ing military morale problem—of the Second World intelligence. No final appraisal of these effects will - War. Troop .demoralization has been an ever- be attempted. They are of great variety, and will present and important phenomenon of all warfare. be presented topically. Pertinent supplementary It was one of the military achievements of Allied references to the problem have also been drawn air attack in the course of the Second World War from top-level U. S. Strategic Bombing'Survey that it not only intensified the primary, previously interviews. standard causes of troop demoralization, i.e., the The problem of the morale of the German Air horror of battle, the superiority of the enemy, and Force in relation to Allied air attacks is qualified the weakening of the home front, but that it pre• by so many factors absent from the situation of the cipitated an entirely new series of potentially German land armies, and is in so many respects demoralizing elements—-isolation of the battlefield unique, that it cannot be contained within the and instability of supply, subjection of the home framework of this report. front to continuous attack, etc. It affected the fife of the German soldier in the areas of staff work, SUMMARY intelligence (revealing his position through aerial The ranking of Allied air attacks among the fac• reconnaissance), training, and supply. In all of tors that affected the morale of the German land these it was a demoralizing or potentially demoral• 1 Othor aspects of the effects of bombing on German Armies are considered izing force. Only in limited instances does it ap• in the report of the Division of Military Analysis of the United States Stra• tegic Bombing Survey. pear to have strengthened enemy troop morale. 37 In the following analysis the military and morale dently the fighter-bomber, both because of its fre• results of air attack are inevitably and inseparably quency over the battlefield and its terrifying sound intermingled. These varied details of air attack effects, was, of all aircraft, the most effective in are presented solely with reference to their morale destroying morale. Certain stretches of road, connotations. The illustrations are selected to which had become known as "highways of'death," show the great' variety of effects that are reported were henceforth carefully avoided by personnel and to have occurred. vehicles in daytime. The prevailing mood of insecurity, enhanced, of EFFECTS OF BOMBING ON THE BATTLEFIELD course, by the mounting supply and replacement difficulties which the Nazis' military leadership Fear and Insecurity experienced in the final stages, is reflected in an Foremost among the morale effects produced by order issued by Field Marshal Model in the early air attacks on the battlefield is the element of fear winter of 1945: and insecurity which has been w'dcly observed in "The experiences of the last few days show that the enemy this war. does not employ his fighter-bombers from 1700—1900 hours. Colonel General Jodl reported that, "The troops If "we use the time from 1700-1900 hours to our greatest ad• from the foreward lines to the rear echelons always vantage, we should be able to solve our supply problem . . ." 'griped' about enemy air attacks . . . the question A prisoner of war reports that even after dark always arose, 'Where is our air force?"' Under the our aircraft continued as a disturbing factor: circumstances it became necessary for Nazi political "Night reconnaissance was unpleasant for the troops . . . commissars (Fuchrungs-Omziere) attached to the they felt that they had been seen . . . Positions were often front-line troops to attempt explanations for the changed after night reconnaissance." absence of the German Air Force; they simply pro• Both the use of smoke shells to pinpoint Nazi posi• ceeded to guarantee the arrival of new and better tions for subsequent investigation and attack, and weapons in the near future. Prisoners of war as• the unexpected attack by fighter-bombers were in• serted that they usually slept through such "orien• tensely feared, the latter because it afforded less tation" sessions. time to take cover. According to Lieutenant Gen• Lieutenant General Baycrlein, Commanding eral Bayerlcin the P-38, on the other hand, was General of a crack Panzer division, similarly especially unpleasant for the troops "because of its brought out that the presence of fighter-bombers in almost noiseless approach.-" the air had in all cases a demoralizing effect on New methods of air warfare were even more apt ground troops and gave them a feeling of inferiority. to disrupt morale. The appearance of the rocket The normal and predictable battle fear of un• shell is a case in point. Que interrogation, in which seasoned troops was heightened by the possibility about a hundred prisoners of war were questioned and actuality of air attack. Thus it is reported about rocket attacks, revealed that, that experienced German tank crews "had great "Except for a few anti-aircraft gunners, all who had been difficulty in preventing now men from bailing out attacked by rockets expressed dread of this weapon . . . Tt when our aircraft attacked. Large numbers of un• is an unknown quantity, except to anti-aircraft gunners. Exaggerated tales of its terrors have circulated among Ger• damaged tanks have often been found abandoned man troops ..." at points where air attacks had taken place.". What was true of rockets applied doubly to air• The visual impression itself was of no small im• borne landings. After the airborne landings of 24 portance as an clement of demoralization. Special March 1945, during the crossing of the Rhine, admiration is expressed, in the diary of a prisoner prisoners of war reported that "amazement and of war, for the perfect flying order of the fighter- fear" were'experienced at the sight of the landing bombers. The very sight of Allied aircraft forma• actions: tions became symbolic of our superiority. One "While many expressed dislike and fear of our fighter- intelligence report of interrogations records "the bombers, they did not seem especially impressed by them on impression of overwhel mi ng strength given to the day in question ... In many previous battles the very troops who were not under direct attack but saw presence of a flight of Typhoons in the neighborhood had'a the huge procession of attacking aircraft overhead." considerable effect upon the enemy, but there are several reasons for thinking that on this occasion it was not very Inevitably, the constant circling of aircraft over great . . . The sight of descending gliders loaded with air• the battlefield engendered a feeling of apprehension borne tmojKj would probably exercise the minds of gunners in the German troops who could never be sure far more than the threat of rocket attack, great though their whether they were the next target or not. Evi• fear of such attack is known to be . . 38 It is quite clear that in this situation the most tional. The men insisted on taking cover, often novel battle experience, the glider landings, out• directly disobeying their non-commissioned officers. weighed earlier ones to which the troops had become Similar examples could be multiplied. When at least partially inured. German soldiers had begun to complain that they The combination and coordination of older battle would soon be told "to fight fighter-bombers with devices and the new airborne weapons should be pocket knives," it is small wonder that orders to regarded as another characteristic element in this attack aircraft with manifestly inferior weapons arsenal of demoralization. Thus it is repeatedly and from exposed positions were increasingly dis• reported that the already overwhelming intensity regarded. That this type of demoralization had of Allied artillery fire was greatly strengthened in begun to spread also among the officers is suggested effect by simultaneous or coordinated air-artillery - by the statement of a captured officer that "staff bombardments. On the occasion of the infantry personnel in motor trucks avoided fighter planes in assault on Boulogne, on 17 September 1944, which cowardly fashion." , was preceded by a heavy air bombardment, prisoners The discipline of transport personnel itself was of war reported that the large quantity of suppos• generally affected. Air attack upset drivers and' ing artillery fire, timed to follow immediately the caused further confusion miles from the scene of bombing attack, prevented their quick recovery bombing. Drivers of only slightly damaged ve• from tho effects of the bombing. In another case, hicles became panicky and disregarded traffic rules; where artillery and air force had been so coordi• traffic jams would set off bitter arguments all along nated that artillery fire did not cease during the air the route. Such breakdowns might occur the more attack," . . . many prisoners of war literally did easily in view of the1 relative inferiority of normal not know what hit them." Confusion and bewil• German as compared with American traffic disci• derment heightened the general sense of insecurity pline . engendered by any intensive use of firepower. In this situation, as has been revealed in prisoner interrogations, Allied propaganda found fruitful Effects on Staff Morale and Troop Discipline soil. Airborne leaflets were widely read among In the aftermath of intensive Allied air attacks, German troops. '.They had a twofold effect on sol- the normal channels of command frequently dis• dier morale. They undermined confidence in com• integrated or were thrown into confusion. Natur• mand by offering the men an alternative and often ally the efficiency of communications was progres• conflicting source of news and information. Ulti• sively impaired. Attacks on staff command posts mately, they stimulated desertion, the complete and the death of commanding officers often made a breakdown of military discipline. deep impression on the troops. Consequently, as prisoner interrogations have shown, the trips of ISOLATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD BY AIR commanding officers were often postponed or aban• POWER doned. It is clear that the disruption of transportation Under such circumstances conflicts of judgment and communication to the battle zone by air power were no longer sufficiently ironed out within the had a special bearing on the development of anxiety staff echelons. Higher headquarters ordered day and insecurity among the troops. movements during the battle of Normandy, against Movement of supply, for instance, over exposed the wish of Panzer Lt. General Bayerlchi. On an• routes had by necessity become restricted to night other occasion, a day march was ordered by one hours. They ultimately caused such haste and headquarters and forbidden by directive from congestion that day movement had again to be re• another. Or, again, orders were issued, "presum• sumed, with psychological results which are not ably by Goering," -that all Allied aircraft be en• hard to reconstruct. gaged with small arms. This order was generally Night-time movement of supply had made for disobeyed unless the aircraft was reported at suffi• insecurity in supply, and this burden resulted in cient altitude by anti-aircraft artillery. In early loss of sleep to all concerned. Flares dropped at January 1945, a paratroop unit received orders to night by intruder aircraft further slowed move• employ small arms against all low-flying planes. ment, and broke the sleep of those not engaged in Machine guns were to be placed on a wall, a tree supply work. In the latter stages the issue of branch, or even another man's shoulder. Although supply by day was forbidden in all military units. courts-martial were threatened in cases of non• This ruling, which was ruthlessly enforced, of compliance, actual defense of this type was excep• course, ran violently counter to prejudice and cus- 39 torn and thus constituted an additional irritant at Target Intelligence, G-2 Air, 11 March 1945V a time when morale was adversely affected by many That the destruction of motorized equipment and other factors. fuel shortages increased the use of horse-drawn The delay of reinforcements, caused by the prob• vehicles in the German army', should also be noted. lem of rolling stock, roads and motor vehicles, pos-- Numerous reports, which could well be substan• sibly coupled with direct attack from'the air, pro• tiated by earlier American experience, have stressed duced a most important strain-. There was a dual its extreme vulnerability to air attack, with the morale effect on the troops themselves, attacked or resultant discouragement of the personnel. immobilized by the threat of air attack, and upon An interesting example of • a temporary but those awaiting their arrival. Many examples tactically most significant isolation of the battlefield could be cited of such delay. The 410th (Poles) * by aerial bombing occurred in the course of an Artillery Corps, for example, wliich was found in Eighth Air Force operation against Metz on 9 No• Czechoslovakia and Bavaria late in 1944, suffered vember 1944, which was undertaken in support of considerable losses through fighter-bomber action ground troops. A report indicates that the target when it was en route to commitment in the vicinity fortifications were not physically much affected. of Muenchen-Gladbach. This was late in Decem• Yet: ber. Only one battalion could be restored from ,r Very sporadic fire was received from target forts and (it the remnants of the units; the others moved to a was believed) that bombing was very effective in neutralizing temporary base to be re-formed and were not ready the personnel of the fortress, mainly because of the demorali• for commitment until about 20 February 1945. zation. The confusion of the ranks of the enemy is indicated Similarly, after an air raid on Siegburg, a troop by the statement of prisoners that the air bombardment and artillery preparation created great confusion among the enemy transport to the front was cancelled. For two days at firat, aad quick exploitation prevented him from reorganis• the unit was employed in rescue and repair work, ing . . . The morale of our own troops was increased in the being drafted into an improvised rescue formation same way that the morale of enemy troops was reduced; aerial of 2,000 soldiers and civilians. The fact that the bombardment is an excellent morale stimulant for the eide supported." maximum effectiveness of our air power coincided with the period of the Nazis' progressive military In this case, then, the fortifications which were decline was bound in all such cases to place an espe• to support the enemy units were temporarily, but cially severe additional strain on troop morale. decisively, isolated from the enemy on the battle• The same was true of the delay, diminution, and field due to the morale effects of bombing. destruction of supply to front-Hne troops. Avail• A somewhat parallel development occurred, also able intelligence reports provide us with innumer• in the course of Eighth Air Force operations, near able examples of the interruption or destruction of St. Lo on 25 July 1944. While the bombing in badly-needed, badly-wanted supplies. It is clearly this case was believed to have caused only slight established from the bulk of prisoner interrogations, enemy casualties, that the short and long-term expectations of sup• "The main effect of our air Ijombing was the demoralization ply of every type, including food, were frustrated of enemy troops due to shock, confusion resulting from smoke on every front on which Allied air attack was oper• and dust, and disruption because of uncertainty of enemy ative against transportation dumps, .and depots troojw as.to conditions existing behind their lines after bomb• ing." behind the German lines. General Manteuffel, for instance, attributed the EFFECTS OF THE BOMBING OF THE HOME . failure of the Ardennes offensive to the disruption FRONT of rear echelon supplies and the subsequent lack of fuel. It is clear that such stoppages were especially There, is sufficient evidence to suggest that the significant for motorized troops; the extent of con• air raids on the home front had an appreciable im• sequent demoralization can only be gcessed from pact upon troop morale. Field Marshal von Rund- General Thomale's report that the maneuverability stedt's staff might contend that the heavy attacks of larger units in the West was ultimately reduced on German cities were, from a military, point of to practically zero. view, the least harmful weapon-in the Allied arse• What the difficulties were is apparent when we nal. There was far less doubt with regard to the learn that after an ammunition dump had been de• morale consequences. Rundstedt's Chief of Staff, stroyed by air attack, an order restricting fire General Wcstphal, was sure that the demoralizing (Schussverbot) had to be issued to troops after they effect on troops in the occupied countries and in had received firing schedules. (12th Army Group, the field was severe. In an interview with General 40 Goldbeck, a ranking officer in the German Medical use for us to destroy the Russians here, while the English de• Corps, it was specifically stated on this point: stroy o\ir homes . . ." (from the records of the Security Service regional headquarters in Dortmund. "Soldiers and officers worried so much about the safety of .Confronted' with such experiences, the German their families that by the fall of 1943 the German Government discontinued publication of the. individual towns which had soldier coulckhave two distinctly opposed reactions: been struck by bombs." (1) the feeling that, with hit home and possessions and possibly Ms family utterly lost, he had no longer News from Home any cause to fight, or (2)-the feeling that, since all On 27 December 1944 a broadcast by the official was lost and there was nothing to return to, he news service for German troops was. intercepted should fight the hated enemy to the death, in re• which emphasized merely the physical obstacles in venge or despair. the way of satisfactory soldier mail distribution: The restrictive counter-measures on the part of "Communications between homeland and the front are the authorities which have been cited in Chapter 7, sometimes very difficult, and after an air attack on his home Part II, Volume I suggest that the possibilities of town the soldier sometimes has to wait for weeks before he demoralization weighed more heavily in the think• learns that his family is safe." ing of the German authorities, although unques• Significantly, however, at the same time, a measure tionably instances of revived and invigorated battle had been taken which was hardly designed to facili• morale did occur. tate such' communications; instructions had been issued that telegraph offices were only to accept Furloughs in the Zone of the Interior telegrams informing members of the armed forces What inroads mail and personal reports from of home bomb damage if they had been passed by home had made into soldier morale were further Party authorities. This is direct testimony of the deepened by personal experience on the spot. As concern of the Nazi home authorities with the effect strategic bombing of the German homeland in-' of aerial warfare on troop morale. Like some creased in scope and intensity, German soldiers 'other Party control measures it doubtless further found it more and more difficult to repair home• enhanced anxiety and the predisposition to credit wards for a much needed rest from the frontline and circulate rumors. existence. The following account of a prisoner of . We have concrete evidence of the character of war is richly suggestive: this German civilian-to-soldier mail. A total of ". . . IleftDuerenbytrain2r)ecember.l944 . . .difficult 6 percent of 15,000 of such captured letters analyzed journey, experienced air attacks . . . found out that my by the Morale Division contained references to the' mother and sister left Saarbruecken three days before, after bombing of German cities. Of a smaller regional having lived in a cellar for some time after their'house had sample, 16 percent of the civilian-to-soldier letters been bombed . . ., My dear wife had taken refuge with her from the more heavily bombed interior areas (e.g. brother in Neustadt ... I went by bicycle to Niedermodan (near Darmstadt) to see my sister and niad out where ray dear Berlin-Northern Germany) referred to the effects mother was . . . No one in Saarbruecken, neither city nor of strategic bombing. From them the German Party officials, had been able to tell me ... I had to go to soldiers learned details of the sufferings on the Ger• Darmstadt to apply to the local commander for extension of man home front. A predominant percentage of ray furlough . . . was granted two additional days . . . was about to leave Darmstadt when the air raid alarfn sounded these letters, moreover, conveyed an impression of . . . the raid lasted 45 minutes . . . When it was over, the lowered civilian morale. The hideous panorama city was a sea of flames'and smoke . . of the German cities falling into ruin under con• tinued bombing was presented to the soldiers in the- CONCLUSION most lurid or poignant terms.1 Furthermore, soldiers returning from home leave While our materials do not yield sufficient quan• or otherwise arriving from the interior brought to titative data for the formulation of final conclusions- the front lines vivid tales of the condition of their on the effects of air attack upon troop morale, they homeland. A letter from a German soldier to his have provided a general fisting of the principal types mother, written in mid-1942, clearly illustrates this of military-morale disruption caused by Allied air source of demoralization: attack. ,a. Air attack on the battlefield itself was found "... I have talked with comrades who returned from leave in Cologne. They told me that one-third of the city is a pile to be a chronic cause of fear; discouragement and of ruins, that there is much anguish and misery . . . it is no confusion, and a potentially serious disrupter of discipline. It is apparent that the terrifying sound ' The Captured Mall Study in Chapter 2 of < this volume contains Illustra• tive citations on this point. and sight of aircraft, as well as the.frequency of its 41 appearance, were significant factors in their im- case of an enemy who was defending himself ulti• pressiveness. mately with rapidly dwindling means. b. Air power when employed against lines of c. The repercussions of the heavy aerial bom• communication and transportation plays a vital bardment of the homeland, relayed through mail, role not only in producing the more obvious mili• furlough reports and personal experiences, were a tary isolation of the battlefield, but intensifies feel• significant contributory factor m further lessening ings of anxiety and frustration, especially in the troop moiale. •a APPENDIX A VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF MAIL STUDIES THE VALIDITY OF THE REPORTS OF BOMB• Cottelatim ING IN LETTERS Correlation between the bomb weights dropped in areas of Germany, during July-November 1944 It may be thought that writers would tend to and the proportion of letters that mention bombing .68 fabricate or suppress certain information because Increased bomb weight is associated with increased report of censorship or other reasons. There is no evi• of damage dence of any kind of formal censorship in any one Correlation between the total bomb weights dropped of the thousands of letters that have been used. in areas of Germany and the proportion of letters that mention damage .55 No letter bore a censorship mark nor were there Correlation between the bomb weight dropped in any deletions by a censor. A great many letters areas of Germany during" July-November and the were still unopened at the time this Division re• proportion of letters that mention damage .43 ceived them and many of them bore ho postmark. Increased bomb weight is associated with increased Refer• However, some form of self-censorship may be ence to a writer's own town being hit assumed to have existed. For instance, a mother Correlation between the total bomb weight dropped writing to her son at the front may have tended to in areas of Germany and the proportion of letters minimize damage caused by bombing at home, or that mention the writer's own town was hit 71 she may have suppressed her anxiety over future Correlation between the bomb weight dropped In raids in order not to upset the recipient of the letter. areas of Germany during July-November 1944 and the proportion of letters that mention the It is also probable that 'some writers withheld in• writer's own town hit .50 formation because of fear of possible reprisal, or through a genuine desire not to spread news of Increase in bomb weight is associated with increased loss of life raids, since such news would impair the morale of Correlation between the total weight of bombs drop• others. ped in areas of Germany and the proportion of On the other hand, there were those people who letters that mention loss of life - _ 2fi tended to over-dramatize and over-emphasize bomb• Correlation between the bomb weight dropped in ing and its effects. It is plausible that some, in areas of Germany during July-November and tho proportion of letters that mention loss of life .54 order to identify themselves more fully with the war effort, tended to exaggerate their sufferings in order to convince others that they, like the soldier, The correlations reported above for Study I are were making sacrifices for the war. sufficiently high to indicate that increased bomb However, despite all these possibilities, the re• weights dropped in areas are related to increased sults establish the fact that the letters used were mention of the varied effects of raids. In other not affected by self-censorship or exaggertion in any words, writers tend to-report experiences that cor• significant way. What is actually measured is the respond to the amount of bombing the town actu• relative situation in each region. ally experienced. Total bomb weights dropped in each area1 of Parallel measures of the validity of the bombing Germany were compiled from the beginning of the reports in letters can be demonstrated for Study II. war to 31 November 1944. Since the letters in the The correlation between percentage of letters in sample covered only the period from July to No• the sample reporting bombing and the bomb weight vember 1944, separate compilation .was made for dropped by bombing strata is not possible, since these months. These bomb weights were then the letters were not selected in terms of references correlated against various factors as shown below: to bombing. Thus no measure of the number of times bombing was mentioned is available for each Increase in bomb weight is associated wiUt increased refer• stratum. But, if wre use as a basis for correlations ences to bombing Correlation Correlation between total bomb weights dropped in with bomb weight the nature of reports about bomb• areas of Germany, and proportion of letters that ing, calculating the percentage of given types of mention bombing .62 reports in terms of the total of those letters refer• ' SeoTablaC.AppendliB. ring to bombing, it is possible to demonstrate the 43 validity of the reports. As bomb weight increases with Study I, an independent coder coded a sample in a given bombing stratum, more writers from of the work of the other three coders. The average that stratum mention being greatly affected. (See amount of agreement of this individual coder with Appendix B for description of bombing strata.) the oth'er three coders is also presented. In general, for practically all measures, the results show that the letter contents were coded with suffi• Increased bomb weight is associated with increased refer- erence to being close to bombs dropped cient reliability to justify analysis. Correlation The reliability- of the coding was determined by Correlation between the total bomb weights dropped the use of Arringtons' formula. When two inde• in bombing strata of Germany and the proportion of letters mentioning being close to bombs dropped .89 pendent coders record two different codes for a given letter this constitutes two disagreements. Increased bomb weight is associated with increased re• Agreements arc therefore weighted double to equate port of personal damage suffered Correlation between the total bomb weights dropped the two. • Agreements and disagreements between in bombing strata of Germany and the proportion coders were computed for each category in the of letters mentioning persona! damage .89 table and the coefficient of agreement is determined Increased bomb weight is associated wiUi increased report by the use of the formula: of personal routine being affected 2 X (Agreements) Correlation between the total bomb weights dropped in bombing strata of Gennany and the proportion (.Disagreements) -J- 2 X (Agreements) of letters mentioning personal routine being affect• ed ^ .32 Perfect reliability is indicated by a coefficient of 1.00, and a completely random relation by a coeffi• Again, in Study II, the findings are that those cient of 0.00. writers who report being exposed to bombing tend to give the relative truth of their raid experiences. TABLE A.—Reliability of codes used in Study I Writers relation to bonMng ^SK' THE RELIABILITY OF THE CODING Own town hit _ .78 Nearby towns hit -- -71 By reliability is meant the consistency with which Distant places' only... .68 the letter material is coded into given categories. Air alarms and planes overhead .79 Thus, two independent workers (or coders) agree• Effect of bombing ing on the classification of letter contents would Damage to property*.. .92 suggest that the technique of measurement used Disruption of community life .70 in this study was reliable. Similarly, the' same Loss of life—relatives and friends -Sft individual rccoding letters after a lapse of time in Loss of life—others 94 the same fashion as initially would demonstrate the Health affected—writer and relatives or close reliability of the coding. In these analyses, high friends reliability indicates that confidence may be placed Anxiety over future raids in both the method of coding and the ability of the Focalized anxiety .64 coders to interpret letters in a uniform manner. Genera] tension _ .69 The reliability of the quantitative coding was Morale determined for the two studies. In Study I two Lowered—personal and community 67 coders categorized all the letters independently. Improved—personal and community — .69^ The high level of agreement obtained by this proce• Habituated—personal and community - .59- dure (as indicated by the per cent of agreements Solution wished for out of the total) indicates that letters can be suc• Peace in general... .74- cessfully coded and that the reliability of the pro• Victory' for Germany .67 cedure of coding is, in general, satisfactory. A No way out—ho)>cless situation - .44 description of the technique used and results ob• Reference to enemy air force tained is presented below. Objective mention. .91 • In Study II, two measures of reliability were Abusive mention,. .97 used: (1) Each of four coders rc-coded a sample of Times between raid and letter his own material after a lapse of one month. The Itcccnt •86j average amount of agreement for the four coders Remote - -77 on repeat trials is presented below. (2) Parallel Continuous -81 44 TABLE B.—Average reliability of Uie codes vstd in Study II Coefficient of agreement Coefficient of Ap-cemcnt Measure Measure Self- Independent Setf- Independent coding' coders codlng oodora General classification oi the letter ... .87 .72 Physical effect of raid (disruption) — . .70 .74 Physical closeness to bombs dropped. .64 .62 Involvement in disruption .79 .85 Type and frequency of attack (day Loss of life .81 .94 vs. night) .79 .74 .75 .84 Type of attack (general area or pre-. .73 .75 .85 .91 Attitude toward outcome of war .81 .79 Physical effect of raid (damage) .78 .88 Desire for peace - .79 .78 1 The same coder re-coded a sample of his interviews alter an Interval of one month. The agreement between his two eeta of codes was computed as if the two seta were made by two Independent oodera. ' 45 APPENDIX B THE COMPOSITION OF THE BOMBING STRATA USED IN STUDY II TABLE C Bomb" Bomb Bomb 1 8tratum tonnage1 Stratum 3 tonnage Stratum 5 tonnage' (add1000) (add 000) (add 000) Berlin. 72 Wilhelmshaven Brandenburg.,. Saarbruecken.- Wanne-EickeL. Dortmund Wiesbaden Gelsenkirchen.. Pforzheim Bomb tonnage Stettin Wittenberg.— Stratum I (add 000) Aachen FuMa., Bremen 19 Leipzig. Stargard Frankfort-on-Main 22 Osnabrueck Heilsberg Essen 20 Coblenz Recklinghausen Hamburg 21 Bochum Innsbruck Stuttgart 21 Karleruehe Saarlautern Munich 19 Magdeburg Halle Cologne 18 Merseburg Duelmeh Mannheim-LudiAigehafen... 20 Vienna Wetzlar Duisburg 13 Chemnitz Dusseldorf 13 Mean 7.0 Zwickau Braunschweig 14 Unna Kiel 14 Euskirchen Friedberg . Mean 18.8 Bomb tonnaat Dresden Stratum 4 (add 000) Gera Wesermuende Bad Homburg. Hagen Worms Solingen _•—. Aschaffehburg.. Trier Siegen "Ulm Speyer Kaiserslauten Linz Mean Krefeld 3 Mainz 4 Dueren 1.1 Stratum S Darmstadt 2- All Western unbombed cities Wuppertal 4 Neuss 3 Leverkusen 2 Stratum 7 Mean 2.0 All Eastern unbombed cities 1 Total toonaije In thousands of tons dropped up to the oltles where the letters were written. 46 APPENDIX C QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FOREIGN WORKERS Questionnaire for French Workers (Italian) (Russian) Age Married or . Sex Single Home in France (Russia) City department (Italy) to answer the following questions please mark an X in the proper sqttare 1. What schooling have you had primary ( ) secondary ( ) 2. In what way did you work in Germany? Drafted laborer ( ) Substitute for prisoner ( ' ) Transformed prisoner ( ) Volunteer ( ) Political deportee ( ) War Prisoner ( ) 3. In what cities did you work?- from . to - oily date date from . . to . city date date from . to oily date date 4. How many raids did you experience in Germany? Please give us the dates of the heaviest bombardments. city ' date city date city date 5. Were you ever wounded during a raid? . Yes ( ) No ( ) Were your lodgings damaged? Yes ( ) .No ( ) Were your possessions lost? Yes ( ) No { ) Were any of your.friends wounded? Yes ( ) No ( • ) Were any of them killed? Yes ( ) No ( ) 6. Did the first raid surprise you? Yes ( ) No ( ) or Did you expect to be bombarded? Yes ( ) No'( ) 47 7. Did the first raid frighten you a little ( ) or a great deal C ) or not at all ( ) 8. As the raids continued, were you more and more frightened C ) or did you become used to them? C ) 9. During the raids, were you glad to see the Germans getting it C ) or sorry to see German civilians in danger C ) 10. During the raids, did you think of the fact that they might hasten your liberation ( ' ) or did you resent that your own life was endangered ( ) 11. What was, in your opinion, the object of the allied raids? To destroy German industry To kill German civilians To demoralize the German people -To destroy German culture Revenge for the bombings of London Punishment for having started the war 12. Did you think that the bombings were more severe than military necessity, dictated? Yes No 13. What kind of raid upset people the most? (a) raid day'after day or unexpected raids (6) raids by night or • raids by day 14. What kind of bombs was the most feared? Phosphorus Incendiary Liquid air Delayed action Blockbusters 15. Were you ever machine-gunned by the allied planes' Yes " . ( No ( If yes, did it frighten you more than the bombings? Yes ( No ( 16. Did alerts, even without bombing, also upset people Yes ( No ( 48 17. Was the plant where you worked ever damaged by bombs? . Yes . ( ) No ( ) If yes, please give the following information: (a) . plant city Give the number Put T for totally closed, of days closed P for partially closed b. - repeat of above c. repeat of above 17b. Even if your plant was not hit, did the big raids lower the production? Yes ( - ) No ( ) For how many days, on an average was the production affected? days By what percentage of the production? percent 17c. If the production was lowered, what were the roason for the lowering? Absences of personnel ( ) Cutoff of raw materials ( ) Slowdown because of lack of sleep ( ) Slowdown because of lowered morale { ) Other reasons (. ) 17d. Did you ever spend working hours cleaning up after a raid? Yes f ) No ( ) If so, how many days? days 17e. During the year 1944, how many days did you -miss from work solely because of the raids? days How many of these days absence were authorized? days How many were unauthorized? — days 18. What did you think of the German anti-raid defense measures? Alarm system ( ) good ( ) bad Shelters ( ) good ( ) bad Rescue system ( ) good ( ) bad Anti-aircraft ( ) good ( ) bad 19. Could you go into the shelters just as the Germans could? Yes ( 0 No ( ) 20. What did people talk about in the shelters? Wish for reprisals ( ) Criticism of defense measures ( ) Criticism of Nazi Party ( ) Rumors about losses ( ) Wish for peace ( ) Other subjects 21. Did you ever witness a panic during a raid? Yes ( ) No ( ) Were there any killed? Yes ( ) No ( ) Were there any wounded? Yes ( ) No ( ) Did the panic start among the Germans ( ) or Among the foreigners? ( ) 49 22. Before the invasion of Germany by the Allies, did you witness any looting during a raid? Yes ( ) No ( Were the looters Germans ( ) or were they foreigners £ 23. Was the black market affected by the raids? Increased ( Diminished . ( Unchanged ( 24. Did you witness the evacuation of German civilians? Yes ( ) No ( Were these evacuations voluntary (, ) or forced ( ) or both ( Where these evacuations well organized ( ) or badly organized ( Did the evacuation of their families affect the Germans who remained? They were glad to know them in safety ( ) Disturbed to be separated from them ( ) Not affected ' ( ) If you .were in a region where evacuees were received, how did they get along with their hosts? Well ( ) Badly ( ) 25. Did the bombings have any effect on the attitude of the German people toward the Nazi Party? They blamed it for having begun the war ( )• They blamed it for hot having protected the cities ( ) They became still more dependent on the party ( ) Their attitude remains unchanged ( ) 26. Before the invasion of Germany by the Allies, did any of the Germans that you knew come to the point, as a result of the bombings, to think that they could not continue the war? Yes ( ) No ( ) Please give a brief explanation 27. Before the invasion of Germany by the Allies, did any of the Germans confide in you that they feared that Germany was going to lose the war? Yes ( ) No ( ) * 28. Why have the Germans continued their efforts to the very end, in spite of the raids? Character of the German people ( Their education by the Nazi Party ( Governmental controls (police, S. S., etc.) ( Fear of what an Allied victory would bring them ( Other reasons ( 29. Have you ever read any leaflets dropped by airplane? Yes ( ) No ( ) Where they written especially for foreigners ( ) Were they destined for Germans ( ) 50 30. Did you listen to Allied radio? Yes ( ) No ( ) What period did you start to listen? Was there a program that you preferred? Before the invasion, what percentage of Germans do you think listened to the foreign radio? 31. Did you observe resistance movements among the Germans? Yes ( ) No ( ) Among foreigners? Yes ( ) No ( ) Were resistance activities affected by the raids? Increased ( ) Decreased ( ) • Unchanged ( ) 32. Following raids did you ever try to escape from Germany? Yes ( ) No ( ) Did-you try to move to a non-industrial zone? Yes ( ) No ( ) i 51 APPENDIX D PILOT STUDY ON FRENCH ESCAPEES1 A preliminary pilot survey was conducted in overlaid upon those with which they returned from Paris to ascertain what French workers, who had Germany. returned from Gennany, thought about the effect (3) The language barrier in many cases rendered of Allied strategic bombing on German civilian inexact their understanding of German propaganda morale. techniques and popular expressions of opinion. A classification of 37 respondents according to The opinions and reporting of facts by the 37 their occupation and geographical location while respondents appear, in any case, to have been suffi• in Germany will be found in Table D attached to ciently consistent to warrant some observations on this report. the effect of Allied, bombing on German civilian There are several advantages and several draw• morale. These tentative generalizations may sug• backs in the interrogation of such French sources gest some hitherto not fully considered aspects of of information on German civilian morale. It is .the German civilian morale problem. At best they found that: provide an indication of preliminary conclusions (1) With few exceptions the French interviewed which were substantiated for the most part by the were cooperative and informative to the extent of more complete studies of German sources. their ability. The interviews have also thrown some light on (2) As imported French*labor played an increas• various aspects of Nazi post-raid propaganda and ingly important role in German industry, French morale-maintaining techniques, the activities of the workmen increasingly shared the standard experi• German ARP, labour control in German factories ences of the German civilian factory worker. following Allied bombings, and post-raid evacua• (3) Some of the drafted French laborers inter• tion conditions. viewed, being in fact FFI agents, were during their The French respondents agreed without excep• servitude in Germany primarily interested in the tion that Allied strategic bombing had a demoraliz• problem of undermining the morale of German ing and disruptive effect upon German civilian life. workers, and were therefore unusually sensitive to Without exception they attested to the hardship its fluctuations under the impact of Allied bombing. and suffering which it imposed. They described (4) Other French workers having voluntarily • widespread destruction of industrial and residen• enrolled for employment in Germany, frequently tial areas, widespread post-raid evacuations through had an opportunity of associating on intimate out Germany, and an over-all dislocation of civil• terms with the civilian population. ian living conditions. In short, they substantiated (5) French workers often became the repository the generally preconceived notions of the havoc of confidential grumblings which German workers that Allied strategic bombing caused in Germany. were afraid to entrust to each other (a French They attested to the following results: worker who repeated such confidences could with- ' (1) Allied bombing caused a deterioration of the out difficulty be denounced as an agent provoca• German civilian's enthusiasm for tho war effort. teur) . * (2) It created dissatisfaction with the Nazi gov• On the other hand, it was found that: ernment, and a minor degree of actual disaffection. (1) The returned French, in some cases physi• (3) It contributed to the growing feeling among • cally depleted by their experiences, tended to inter• German civilians that the war was lost. pret the reactions of the German civilian popula• (4) It rendered ineffective certain aspects of Ger• tion in the light of their own personal sufferings. man home-consumption propaganda, especially fac• (2) The accinacy of their description of Geiman tual news reporting. reactions has variously been affected by the lapse (5) At times it caused dislocation of civilian life of time and by subsequent impressions and ideas beyond the control of the German ARP. 1 This study was made in November and December, 1944. It Is or import• (6) It badly frightened the German civilian ance to notice tho extent to which it auticipated the findings of the later studies of the effects of bombing. population; phosphorus bombs had a notably de- 52 moralizing effect; in frequently bombed metropoli• men, women, or children of both sexes. While the tan areas the civilian population lived in fearful precise percentage of foreign labor in German fac• anticipation of renewed raids. tories was not ascertained, there are indications (7) It adversely affected the capacity for work that in all but the most secret plants it frequently of the German civilian, owing to nervousness and exceeded 50 percent (many respondents reported fatigue. It was the cause of some absenteeism in working in large factories employing 80 percent for• German industry. eign slave-labor). The study of the effect of Allied (8) The post-raid evacuations were on an increas• bombing on the morale of factory workers in Ger• ing scale a source of permanent discomfort and many must therefore Bcriously take into account lowered morale among German civilians. the fact, that these factory workers by no means After affirming all of the above results of Allied constituted a normal indigenous civilian group. bombing, the majority of the respondents made In view of the fact that the survey was limited to the following major qualifications, in which lie the 37 respondents, and that among these respondents burden of this report: some, although highly informative in answering - (1) Rigid and terrorizing police control of the certain queries contained in the lengthy verbal laboring population provides the basic explanation questionnaire, were unable to answer others (for of the maintenance of the Geiman civilian war example, had observed the effects of one intense effort through 1943 and 1944 regardless of the deter• raid, but had seen nothing of evacuation condi• rents imposed by bombing. It prevented what tions), the answers to each question are not pre• might have become post-raid absenteeism on so sented below with an eye to statistical exactitude large a scale as to endanger German industrial pro• but rather with the intention of indicating the pre• duction.. The actions of German civilians in the dominating opinions, the variety of responses, and wake of Allied raids were not dictated primarily by such isolated details as may be of interest in the a rise or fall in morale, but by fear of police reprisal. further study of the German civilian morale. The fear of punishment by the controlling author• ities (absentees were treated on the same basis as ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR EFFORT military deserters)' was greater than the fear of suffering continued Allied bombing. Without ul• Do you think that Allied bombing has had an effect on tra-rigid police control the German civilian war the German civilian's attitude towards ihe war effort? • effort would have foundered, regardless of the sustaining effect of skillful propaganda techniques The majority opinion specified in answering this (instilling fear and hatred of the enemy, confidence question that Allied bombing had a more pro• 58 in revenge through the agency of secret weapons, nounced effect upon older civilians, especially and persistent hope for eventual victorjr), of gener• those old enough to have experienced the last war, ally efficient ARP emergency operation, and of the than upon the-younger and Nazified section of the large scale distribution of supplementary rations. population, whose attitude was largely unaffected. (2) As a demoralizing factor Allied strategic This was explained by the respondents on the bombing appears to rank second to the dismal spec• grounds that, more important even than the exten• tacle of retreats and losses on the Russian front sive suffering it has imposed, the ever-increasing since Stalingrad. Nazi propaganda made the Ger• scale of Allied air attacks indicated to the older man population acutely aware of the necessity of Germans the distinct possibility of losing the war; winning the war, and desperately afraid of a Rus• two respondents reported that as early as 1942 sian victory (as a reminder the German civilians (Dortmund, Hanover) Allied raids into Germany constantly saw in their midst, enslaved and brutal• portended to middle-aged civilians the eventual ized Russian workers). The fear, then, of eventual course "of military events (apres tout, les vieux— Russian reprisal was also greater than the fear of ils connaissont un peu la vie"). continued bombing. In answering this general question, however, the (3) The ever-iucreasing introduction on a gigan• respondents almost without exception volunteered tic scale of imported foreign labor into German fac• and emphasized the opinion that it was not the tories for the purpose of releasing every able-bodied "attitude" towards the war effort that really count• German male for military service rendered the work• ed in Germany, but the simple fact that the terror ing population in German industry atypical of the reign of the Nazi police prevented the manifestation normal civilian laboring class. Those Germans 1 The survey of German civilians did not connrra the greater effect of bomb^ who remained in German industry were either older ing on old people. See Chapter A, Part 1, Volume 1. 53 and fruition of widespread demoralization and kept A respondent who had experienced the three the civilian population relentlessly at work. large-scale Munich day raids of 12, 13, and 16 A respondent who had arrived in Gruenberg July 1944, reported that on the third day there ap• (Silesia) from Berlin in August 1944, remarked peared on the ruins pictures of Hitler, captioned, that in this unbombed area the morale was far "This is Your Achievement"; but he felt that this higher than in Berlin, that the Heil Hitler salute' attitude represented at the time only a minority, was still much in vogue, and that there was still an the masses being primarily enraged with the Allies almost unaffected confidence in German victory. for the destruction of the city. There was mention in three interviews of a per• A singular but probably not significant form of manent "five for the moment" attitude among those post-raid anti-Nazi feeling was mentioned in three civilians who had lost their homes once, or more interviews. It not infrequently happened that than once. It was frequently remarked, moreover, industrial targets escaped damage and working- that in the despairing moments which followed im• class residential areas were badly hit. This gave mediately after a heavy raid many Geiman civilians rise to limited talk among workers (specified in the evinced a desperate desire for the prompt termina• interviews as communist-inspired) of an interna• tion of the war at any cost. The majority of the tional capitalist collusion (including Nazi indus• respondents stressed, on the other hand, that after trialists) designed to spare certain factory installa• the passage of a few days a reasonable stability of tions at the expense of the working class. conduct was re-established, although shock and What measures were taken by the Nazi Government fatigue left some vestiges of apathy in frequently to maintain civilian moralet bombed areas. Regardless of its ultimate dependence on police ATTITUDE TOWARD NAZIS AND NAZI force for control ot the civilian war effort, the Nazi MEASURES government took very definite measures.-for the maintenance of civilian morale in the wake of Al• Did AUied air raids affect the. attitude of German lied bombings. About half of the respondents civilians towards the Nasi Party? stressed Nazi propaganda techniques as the most Here, again, a distinction was made by the re^ effective; the other half stressed the large-scale spondents between the attitude of the older and issue of supplementary rations. younger civilians. Allied bombings did not shake Several postpaid propaganda techniques were the younger civilians' faith and confidence in the mentioned. The arrival of high-powered Nazi Nazi Party. This was emphasized by respondents speakers shortly after a raid, coinciding with the returning from Friedrichshafcn and Nuremberg as distribution of special rations, apparently gave to late as the last week of November 1944. the population the feeling that it was being looked The majority of the French, however, testified after in its distress. Several respondents empha• to having personally received the disgruntled confi• sized the success under these circumstances of inspi• dences of Germans by whose side they worked, or rational addresses by important Party orators. with whom they were intimate. (It is of course In the event of the destruction of the local press in possible that many Germans, foreseeing eventual a city, arrangements were made for the printing German defeat, were anxious through such inti• and despatch of special newspaper editions from macies to establish themselves as anti-Nazis in the neighbouring cities, with such announcements as eyes of foreign laborers.) The respondents stressed were of particular interest to the bombed city— that when individually isolated, the Germans ex• e.g., the forthcoming distribution of special rations, pressed considerable dissatisfaction with the hard• praise of the heroism of its inhabitants. ships and sufferings of civilian fife under current For a long time substantial supplementary ra• conditions, and that they were critical of the Nazi tions were,issued after every important raid; a de• Party, even of Hitler; but that in the presence of pletion of stocks decreased the quantity, quality, even one other German such dissatisfaction was and frequency of these rations (in Berlin, for ex• never expressed because of the all-pervading fear ample, after March 1944). These rations vari• of betrayal. One respondent remarked that the ously included meat, bread ("whiter than that very fact that Germans were afraid to express their wliich we now receive in France," one respondent true opinions, criticisms, and fears freely among woefully remarked), schnapps, ,wine, and tobacco. each other in itself imposed a restriction on the The distribution was made to all civilians in a spread of panic among large masses. bombed locality, including foreign workers. After 54 the heavy November-December 1943 night raidB (6) Hate propaganda against the "terrorists"; on Berlin, and after the 4 December 1943 raid on respondents were generally agreed that this type of Leipzig, these supplementary rations were very propaganda, having acquired much fertile subject satisfactorily supplemented by the special Christ• matter since increase in the scope and intensity of mas distribution. While the efficacy of such rations raids, achieved considerable success. in maintaining the morale of civilians whose homes (c) Stress on the terrors of the Bolshevik peril were destroyed may be questioned, some respon• should Germany lose the war. dents believed that it was precisely under such con• (d) Claims of counter-blows in the war, for ex• ditions that these rations achieved their maximum ample, the sinking of an Allied convoy- This type effect; the German civilian's state of mind was of propaganda was considered especially effective, often reduced following severe bombing to that of a inasmuch as German civilians viewed their suffer• front-line soldier, and in these very circumstances ings in extremely close connection with the course he was particularly responsive to the issue of ra• of the war and were reconciled to them only in the tions. Two respondents mentioned the pertinent, hope of eventual victory; after an Allied raid any if somewhat bitter, remark current in Berlin in news that portended victory was effective propa• early 1944; "Let us have another good raid soon; ganda. it will at least bring us some special rations." ( What was the Nazi propaganda line to counter AUied It is difficult to deduce from the respondents' raids? answers to this question just how much of an effort About half of the respondents believed that was made by the Nazi government to prevent the Goebbels was increasingly regarded as a liar, and spread of rumors from a bombed city. There is that the factual (news) aspect of home-consumption evidence that an attempt was made at times to im• propaganda was largely discounted by the German pede contact between post-raid evacuees > and the civilians. The lack of confidence in domestic news inhabitants of other cities. and the desire for more accurate information con• A large number of evacuees from Berlin passed cerning the course of military events was witnessed through Leipzig in November 1943, and during by the frantic efforts of many civilians to get hold passage were mostly confined in the railway station, of leaflets dropped during Allied bombings; a very and were hidden from the view of the Leipzig popu• striking story of the. risks incurred to obtain these lation by fencing specially erected for the purpose. leaflets was told by a respondent who witnessed the In Chemnitz (1944) evacuees were confined, vir• ,19 July 1944 day raid on Augsburg. tually imprisoned, in the environs of the city, and -On the other hand, three-quarters of the respon• were allowed no contact with the Chemnitzers. dents emphasized that the emotional type of post- During a night bombing of Kassel the inhabi• raid propaganda—that founded upon the motifs of tants of Waltershausen (55 miles away) were forced revenge, of fear, and of promise of eventual victory to enter the air raid shelters and were thus pre• regardless of obstacles—still had a profound effect vented from watching the spectacle of the raid. upon the German civilian population. They men• A respondent (Augsburg) reported that in the tioned the following propaganda lines in relation to immediate aftermath of a raid no one in the bombed Allied bombing: city was allowed to visit neighbouring cities without (a) The promise of secret weapons; this technique a special permit; if rumours concerning the results had an important morale-sustaining effect long be• of the raid spread in a city visited by those holding fore the appearance of the V-l rocket; a respondent such special permits, investigation was conducted who had been in Berlin during the first days of the and punitive action taken. V-lvreported that Berliners joyfully regarded it as For 48 hours after a severe raid no one was al• the long-awaited guarantor of victory (and as a lowed to enter a bombed city. promise- of the 'dimunition of Allied raids). The On the other hand, it is clear that news of raids respondents stressed the fact that the German nonetheless spread very rapidly throughout the people clutched at any promise whatever. country. The progress of the flight of AlUed 55 bombers was at all times announced over the radio. fear primarily in connection with raids tokening Immediately after a raid inhabitants of 'a bombed total annihilation. city were allowed to send through the mails a ten- How did the ARP operate? word red-bordered postcard (Lebenszoichon) to their friends and relatives elsewhere in the country. In combating the results of all but the heaviest- When factory workers were evacuated for employ• scale raids the German ARP operated, in the unani• ment in other cities, they inevitably came into con• mous opinion of respondents with great over-all tact with the workers in their new location; some efficiency. If a German worker's home was de• evacuees carried with them and exhibited clandes• stroyed by a raid during his working hours, on ar• tine photos of the bomb damage in the cities from riving in Iiis section of the city, he found ARP per• which they came. News of the raids was constant• sonnel prepared to direct him immediately to new ly being spread, with great exaggeration, by chains lodgings. In some cities the ARP provided civil• of FFI agents in German factories and cities. ians with anticipatory notification of emergency It was significantly stressed by many of the re• billets in the event of the destruction of their homes. spondents that the news of bombings of cities other The respondents laid great stress upon the fact than their own did not profoundly disturb German that the ARP.undertook the clearance of air raid civilians. This appears to have been true not only debris as soon as possible after a laid. For this of raids on distant cities, but even of raids on re• purpose it employed large Todt organization gangs, mote areas of the cities in which they themselves largely composed of enslaved Polish and Russian lived; during the initial bombing of Berlin, owing laborers (men and women). The ARP habitually to the very great size of the city, Berliners were not requisitioned for clearance work any civilian who much affected or worried by what occurred in dis• was idling in the streets after a raid; civilians were tricts other than their own. There is as well some sometimes requisitioned in the streets although evidence that inhabitants of one area were mali• they were on their way to or from work, and were ciously satisfied when certain other cities were subsequently given certificates to justify their ab• bombed. One respondent reported that there was sence; in the event of the complete destruction of a considerable gratification among the long-bombed factory, all its employees were often immediately workers of the Ruhr when Berlin was at last heavily turned over to the ARP for the emergency. Since attacked. Another related that there had appeared as early as the spring of 1943 the Berlin ARP "re• in the Berlin press criticism of the conduct of the quested" French volunteers for ARP duties in the Hamburg civilians during the raids of July 1943, factories in which they were employed; these French attributing to them partial responsibility for the workers performed such duties under the leadership failure to prevent the spread of fire throughout the of German foremen, and were peremptorily shot if city; during the heavy attacks on Berlin, Novem• disobedient to orders. ber-December 1943, there was considerable forth• The operation of communal kitchens and emer• right satisfaction in Hamburg. (A parallel may be gency canteens was apparently extremely efficient. noticed in the rejoicing of the Neapolitan popula• The food provided by these kitchens was described tion when the previously immune and disliked Ro• as very satisfactory; they operated without red tape; mans were finally bombed in 1943). they were equipped to function on a large scale— More significant is the following remark by one communal kitchens operated in Hamburg for almost German-speaking correspondent. To engender an• a month after the bombings of July i943. ticipatory fear elsewhere, a raid or series of raids According to several respondents, there were on a given city must be of annihilating intensity, grumblings against certain ARP procedures. De• so that the inhabitants of other cities know when bris-clearance in badly devastated areas was fre• their turn comes, the game is up. When raids quently restricted to opening streets for traffic, cause only partial destruction, civilians elsewhere without the disinterment of bodies from destroyed tend to feel that they will in their turn survive. buildings; this, on occasion, necessitated the aban• Only after the second consecutive day raid on donment of living victims in the ruins, to the dis• Munich in July 1943 did the population in panic pleasure of the civilian population. Inasmuch,as begin to express the realization that they them-, the German ARP was a Nazi organization, it at• selves were suffering the fate of Hamburg. One tempted upon occasion to save Nazi-owned prop• respondent also mentioned the not infrequent use erty, while neglecting that of non-Nazi Germans. among German civilians of the phrase, "to be Cov- A respondent reported that in the chaos which fol• entryized," indicating the existence of anticipatory lowed the heavy bombing of Hamburg in July 1943,. the ARP distinctly failed to fulfill its duties; its per• many no appreciable degree of pillage in the wake sonnel concentrated primarily on saving their own of Allied raids. The immediate and irrevocable lives and property. death sentence was applied to the theft of any item, It was emphasized by several respondents, how• however insignificant. ever, that the occasional collapse of the ARP in a During and after a mid SS troops patrolled the very heavily bombed city did not by any means streets in vehicles and on foot. They were thus in indicate the disintegration of all controls. In such a position to disperse any unauthorized gatherings events the ARP (including communal kitchens) and as the population emerged from the shelters. police of adjacent cities were immediately rushed Civilians were in most cities required to enter to the affected area (e.g. from Bremen and Berlin air raid shelters during an attack. This was in. to Hamburg, from Augsburg and Nuremberg to itself an opening wedge for police control of any Munich), formed a cordon around it, and proceeded suspected rebellious demonstration; a respondent to re-establish order within. In this manner it was related that in Pforzheim (August 1944), expecting possible to retain the immediate chaotic effects of a some such difficulty, the police sounded the air heavy raid within a veiy limited area surrounding raid siren; the civilian population entered the shel• a stricken city. ters; on emerging they found SS machine-guns mounted in the streets. Did the people have confidence in the air-raid shelters? There were, however, reasons of a more basic The majority of the respondents agreed that the nature that made the hours immediately after average underground air raid shelter "was not an bombing unfavorable for rebellious activity. Re• efficacious or confidence-sustaining protection spondents stressed, in the first place, the obstacles against heavy caliber bombs. Respondents refer• to conspiracy among German civilians. The SS red, however, to the existence of and increasing con• and Gestapo infiltrated stool pigeons into German struction of very large shelters of the Blockhaus factories on a very large scale—a Gennan worker type, accommodating five to' six thousand people. never knew whether the worker on the next bench These shelters, described as partly above ground, was a police agent or not. Two respondents used were topped by six to 10 feet of reinforced cement; the same phrase to describe this state of affairs: within them the deafening noise of bombing and "For every man working there are two men stand• anti-aircraft fire was considerably muted; they were ing behind him to see that he does work." It was equipped with emergency air-provision systems; mentioned by two respondents recently returned they contained special rooms reserved, for example, (from Friedrichshafen, November, 1944, from Ber• for pregnant women (a respondent mentioned that lin, October 1944) that although many SS men such special rooms were purchasable by wealthy were sent to the fronts, they were effectively re• Party members). These shelters were equipped placed by young fanatics of 15 and 16 years of age with multi-decker cots; civilians in frequently whose conlrol of the civilian population was as ruth• bombed cities slept confidently in them every night, less as that of their predecessors. There were also Bringing with them such of their possessions as in the factoiies large numbeis of German, workers they could carry in two valises. who had been released from concentration camps A respondent who had escaped from Germany in for the purpose of employment in German industry; November 1944, mentioned that in Munich many these men lived in constant fear of committing any small workshops wore located underground; and fault which might return them to such camps. that civilians felt more secure from bombing while The German civilian population was, in the opinion at work underground than while living in their free of most of the respondents, too browbeaten and hours above the ground in jerry-built barracks. afraid of reprisal to revolt under 'any but the most favorable circumstances. Did you observe any signs of lawlessness after Allied The immediate aftermath of a raid did not, ac• raids? Any looting? Do you think that the hours cording to the respondents, provide such favorable immediately after an air raid are a favorable time for circumstances. First of all, the local police were rebellion? generally in dominating control of the streets dur• Respondents stated that during the initial period ing and after a raid; in the event of a raid so devas• of Allied air attacks lawlessness and looting on the tating that they lost this control, they were prompt• part of German civilians (or foreign workers) was ly reinforced by police units from adjacent cities. so promptly. and unequivocably dealt with by Secondly, immediately after bombing, civilians immediate death sentence that there was in Ger• were primarily occupied with saving their lives and, 57 if possible, with the very important problem of sav• Two respondents reported that in the Ruhr and ing their property (which was generally irreplace• Rhineland areas which were occupied by the Allies able) . That there were lynchings of Allied fliers after the last war, the effectiveness of the "terror• shortly after raids does not contradict these conclu• ist" propaganda line was somewhat diminished by sions. It was far easier to lynch'a handful of Allied the recollection of the older inhabitants that the •fliers than to rebel against an all-powerful govern• British and Americans were not the "gangsters" ment. that the Nazi propagandist claimed them to be. One respondent gave what'he believed to be the It was also mentioned that the hatred propaganda recipe for successful rebellion in a German city was somewhat less effective among the non-Nazis •after Allied bombing. First, carefully prearranged than among the Nazis, and likewise less effective planning with the organized French underground among the older civilians than among the young. (several respondents mentioned that many German But the majority opinion agreed that Allied bomb-; civilians looked to this quarter for leadership in ing has definitely provbked a feeling of hatred revolt against the government); 'then, unremitting among the German civilian population as a whole. aerial attack for-at least 36 consecutive hours; fin• There was, on the other hand, no evidence in the ally, coordinated aid from Allied parachutists drop• respondents' replies that the hatred caused by Al• ped during the raid. In the opinion of this imagi• lied bombings had at any 'time in itself a stimu• native and intelligent respondent, such a procedure lating effect on the German civilian population, might have succeeded in initiating a successful local such as would increase the detennination to con• revolt. tinue the war; the intense and cumulative suffering ATTITUDE TOWARD ALLIES entailed principally demoralized the people without in itself exciting their will to fight; none of the re• What did German civilians say about the Allies after spondents who had been in Germany in 1942 felt the raids? • that even the early lighter raids had had a morale- The employment of area bombing, and the in• boosting effect-. evitable inaccuracies of "precision" bombing by large formations of aircraft, provided fertile soil KINDS OF RAIDS for the "terrorist" and "air gangster" propaganda How do you think the German civilians feel about day line. It was the belief of the majority of the re• raids as opposed to night raids? spondents that the German civilian population was far more embittered against the Allies for the de• Almost without exception the respondents speci• struction of German cities than against the Nazi fied that the night raids were the more feared; this government which was unable to prevent such a appears to have been due principally to the greater state of affairs. One respondent remarked that panic and chaos that ensued at night, regardless of among the more informed Gennan civilians there the frequent illumination of a bombed city by large was some recognition of Allied raids as reprisals for fires. the German bombing of English cities (the use of One respondent remarked that the day raids were the phrase "to be Koventrisiert" indicates an un• more demoralizing because of the' fact that they derstanding of the nature of the Luftwaffe bomb• vividly symbolized the enemy's strength and ability ing), but that among the working people as a whole to rule the sky over the heart of Germany in full the Allied "terror attacks" provoked a profound daylight. hatred. This hatred was" augmented, as another Did German civilians consider any particular type respondent remarked, by the feeling of powerless bomb most dangerous? rage against an enemy who ruled the Gennan sky in full daylight, and was capitalized upon by re• The respondents, with five exceptions, were of venge and secret-weapon propaganda. the opinion that phosphorus and light incendiary Respondents who had been (individually) in bombs were the source of greater demoralization. Ludwigshafcn (1943), Munich (1944) and Nurem• They referred specifically to the resultant wide• berg (1944) reported that in the days following spread, and frequently uncontrollable property Allied raids foreign workers were reviled and occa• damage, rather than to the fear of personal injury. sionally attacked by Gennan civilians; they were The demoralizing spectacle (sometimes lasting, scapegoats for the feeling of hatred against the several days after a heavy raid) of innumerable enemy ("you too are responsible," was the attitude and often inextinguishable fires destroying irre• of civilians). placeable property was stressed in the majority of 58 the interviews. Although heavy demolition bombs respondent (Berlin) reported that after the partial killed a far greater number of civilians, and both destruction of. a small-plant in which he was em• at the time of impact and during the collapse of ployed, Gennan and foreign workers, men and building-walls caused more intense fear, the fact women, continued at their benches under an almost that their action was immediate appears to explain open sky in midwinter, in bad weather, while the why their over-all demoralizing effect was not re• repair work was in progress. Respondents stressed garded as equally great. Two respondents sug• that repair work on partially damaged factory in• gested that this may also have resulted from the stallations was undertaken immediately;' when no fact that a civilian under frequent bombing often attempt was made to repair or rebuild because of resigns himself to the possibilities of being killed in total destruction, the workers were immediately the course of the next-raid, but in the event of his assigned to work elsewhere; no worker in Germany, survival is dismayed to see everything he possesses native or foreign, was at any time allowed to be in the world irretrievably destroyed by fire. idle. One respondent remarked that the German Four respondents believed that the shock and worker was caught up in an irresistible machine, terror caused by the impact of demolition bombs which set his pace. Another commented on the was the greater demoralizer; one respondent speci• satiating repetition of the word "Arbeit" (work) in fied whistle-bombs. German factories; "Arbeit," he remarked, has long been the god of the German" worker, for whom POST-RAID LABOR CONDITIONS liberty is something laughable and intense disci• pline is an ideal; on such fertile ground Goebbels If the raids caused Apathy among German -workers, has long found a natural reception for the preach• how long after a raid did,they remain apathetic? ment of work for the-Fatherland, and it has ren• None of the respondents testified to having at dered intelligible his propaganda pleas, after the any time observed post-raid illegal absenteeism on worst raids, for even more and more work to achieve any noticeable scale. It- was predominantly em• final victory. Behind him stands, the police. phasized in the interviews that regardless of how If during the six a.m.—six p.m. factory shift, German workers felt after a raid, they were obliged (shifts were variously reported as from 10 to 12 to continue unremittingly at their jobs, at the risk hours),, a raid occurred which did not touch the of severe punishment should they absent them• factory but hit the workers' residential area, work• selves. There appear to have been two exceptions ers were nonetheless required to stick at the^r to this rule. If a worker's home was damaged or benches until six p.m.; only then were they able to destroyed, he was variously granted from one to investigate the condition of their homes. During seven days for the purpose of making necessary re• the hours' between the raid and the time they were pairs or salvaging his property and reestablishing released, they were in a hyper excited condition, himself elsewhere in the city. There were also in• and the quantity of the work accomplished was stances (Hamburg, 28 July 1943, Munich 16 July perceptibly affected. On the other hand, by the 1944) where the over-all destruction caused, by time they arrived home they were somewhat calmed bombing brought all productive labor to a halt for by the passage of several hours, and were better a time. In Hamburg this appears to have been the prepared to contemplate the results of the raid. case for over two weeks (with the exception of one In the immediate aftermath of a raid, a worker unaffected section of the city). After, the 16 July was allowed to claim two days uncertified absence 1944 raid on Munich all productive factory work on the basis of injuries received; on,the third day was abandoned for four days; on the fifth day large he was required to request official medical author• billboards announced that on the fifth day absence ization for absence. Medical officers were reported from work would constitute unauthorized absen- by the respondents to be exceedingly strict; it was .teeism. believed that they issued medical excuses on the After a raid of non-saturation intensity, factory basis of an allowance indicated to them by the local labor was maintained uninterruptedly at the high• labor authorities; the medical authorities were pos• est level possible, regardless of difficulty and incon• sibly even more rigorous with German workers than venience. Impaired rail transportation for com• with foreigners. muting workers was immediately supplemented by In the event of an unauthorized absence, the fac• the use of vehicles (everything in the countryside tory director (Nazi) immediately informed the po• was at the disposal of the authorities). Every lice, and within a few hours a search for the absen• effort was made to keep up "work as usual." A tee was initiated. For a first offense, a German 59 worker received a heavy fine (200-300 marks), modations, which were then still available. These which he could generally ill afford; a second offense evacuees were described as feeling somewhat supe- . brought commitment to a concentration camp. rior to those whose cities and homes had not been Absenteeism was also curtailed by the fact that bombed; they had first priority on the purchase of factory directors were not obliged to re-employ any supplies and clothing; they were generally billeted absentees; they received from the foreign labor sup• in reasonable comfort in private homes. As the ply replacements for such German workers as ab• number of evacuees increased greatly, the quantity sented themselves. By the same token, the arrival of billets available to them correspondingly de• of drafted foreign labor in Germany for a long time creased, with corresponding dissatisfaction. Evac• released large numbers of Gennan factory workers uees were still frequently assigned to private homes, for the Russian front, and made certain the dis• but it became necessary to requisition movie houses patch of anyone noticeably dissatisfied or inefficient. and government buildings for donnitory purposes Many respondents reported that as the tempo in various evacuation areas (Walterhausen, Sant- of Allied raids penetrating deep into Gennany in• hofen, Singen). The German evacuee, especially creased, much working time was lost by the con• the factory employee, was being increasingly re• stant entiy of factory personnel into air raid shel• duced to the status" of a foreign worker, and was ters. To counter this, in some factories, the alarm often billeted in large jerry-built barrack camps was given only when enemy aircraft were almost near factories. He slept on cots, and generally overhead (Mannheim, 1944; Berlin 1944; Munich led a comfortless fife (Gruenberg, August 1944). 1944); instances were cited in which bombs were being released before workers were permitted to What was the effect on German civilians of being leave their benches .(Berlin 1944); it was related separated from their families by evacuation? that in Hamburg (1944) factory doors were locked Respondents distinctly minimized the effect of to prevent workers from leaving before the desig• the disruption of the Gennan family under Allied nated moment. . bombing. This they explained principally on the The respondents concurred that after heavy grounds that the German family had already been bombings the bearing of German civilians was fre• profoundly disrupted by the influence of the Nazi quently marked by a seriously apathetic attitude government. Children had frequently been absent (aplati). Three respondents described this state from their homes since an early age. They were of mind as dominated by a laisser-aller spirit. The inculcated with greater loyalty to the Nazi Party duration, of this apathy after .a heavy raid was than to their families; the entire family structure generally designated as from "three to four days" frequently disintegrated through fear of betrayal. to "a week or so." During this period the civilians Every member of the German family, whether were subject to extreme .nervousness; they were apt civilian or military, was a "soldier"—the dispersal to show panic when air raid alarms were sounded. and sufferings of a family were viewed in this light. It was stressed in several interviews, that this Mourning dress was not worn in Gennany; German apathetic condition is a compound of the shock women were described as wearing for a few days a caused by the raids and by the very important fac• minute mourning ribbon. Respondents referred tor of cumulative fatigue. The constant fatigue in a tone, almost of disbelief, to the rapidity with engendered by continual air alerts, added to the which the dead were forgotten in large cities after long working hours of the Gennan factory em• heavy Allied1 raids; they did hot believe that such a ployee, resulted in some areas in what two respon• state of mind could be induced in Latin countries. dents described as a state of permanent partial It was also pointed out that a worker employed apathy. on a 10 or 12 hour day, eating his meals in factory canteens, had far less need of family life than under EVACUEES normal conditions; and that evacuated workers, What was life like for German evacuees who had lost being far from their homes and indifferent to the their homes and possessions t life of the cities in which they were working, were not hostile to the prospect even of working over• Respondents who had been in a position to ob• time, for which they received extra and welcome serve the living conditions of German evacMees in pay.3 1943 testified that, although they were unquestion• ably depressed by their experiences, life was ren• * The Impression o( indifference to family ties given here Is not borne out by the reports of civilian distress at separation of families by evacuation of dered tolerable for them by the satisfactory accom• children, reported in Chapter S, Part II. Volume I.. 60 EFFECTS OF BOMBING ON CLASSES 30-35 years 10 35-40 years 2 Were the upper classes more or less affected by the 40-45 years 5 raids than were the lower classes? 45-50 years 1 Over 50 years 2 It was clearly brought out in several of the inter• views that the upper middle class did not suffer Experienced Allied strategic bombing in or near the following citieB: social or economic disintegration as a result of Augsburg _ 1 bombings; wealthier families had the recourse of a Berlin. _ 14 country home in the event of the destruction of Dortmund 1 urban residences (the wealthier families of Munich, Friedrichflhafen 1 for example, withdrew to their homes in the Tyrol). Hamburg .. 2 Hanover 3 Furthermore, possessing Party, connections, they Leipzig .1 were frequently able to recoup their air raid losses Ludwigshafen _ 2 more fully and rapidly than the less privileged.., Mannheim 1 A respondent who had experienced the 27 July Munich 3 1943 raid on Hamburg reported that for approxi• Nuremberg 1 1 Oberhausen (Essen) 1 mately two weeks after the raids all unbombed Pforzheim ^ 1 property, all unbombed private homes, were indis• Witten (Dortmund) _' . \ criminately shared by the homeless; that there was Witnessed post-raid evacuations (but not Allied bomb• during this period a genuine spirit of Kamerad- ings) in or near the following locales: schaft; and that all classes lived on the same plane Cnemnita 1 in their common suffering. It is indicated, how• Krems (Austria) 1 ever, that before long, class differences were re• Santhofen 1 asserted, and that the wealthier bourgeoisie rapidly Singen . 1 Waltershausen \ reestablished their position. The fate of the lower middle class, of the small • How employed: local merchant was difficult. For him lost prop• Agricultural machinery factory.- 1 Aircraft factory 2 erty was irreplaceable; when his shop was destroy• Bicycle factory 1 ed, he was without appeal and was mobilized into Chemical factory.. " 1 a labor pool without delay. Frequently he was Cinema-operator for French workers 1 evacuated for factory work in some other city. Civil engineer. 1 His position became increasingly untenable, since Garage employee 1 Gasworks ; 1 owing to the vast extent of destruction the place• Hairdresser 1 ment and collection of bomb-damage claims became Jockey . - 1 more and more difficult. Munitions factory 1 Precision-tool factory 1 TABLE D.—Classification of respondents in French escapee study Radio factory ' V Iteicbsbahn employee 1 Foreign worker classification: Rubber factory 1 Military prisoners escaped after impressment into Submarine-parts factory 1 civilian labor.— ^— 9 Synthetic-food plant 1 Escaped drafted laborers (including 4 FFl agents) 17 Tank-parts factory 1 Drafted laborers returned to France on German- Telephone factory' 1 granted leave : 10 Warehouse employee 1 Drafted laborers invalided, home because of indus• Unascertained H trial accident — 1 German-speaking: Age: Fluent (including 1 Alsatian, 1 Luxemberger) 6- 20-25 years..- — 10 Elementary . 8 25-30 years 7 Not at all - 24 61 UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY LIST OF REPORTS The following is a bibliography of reports resulting from 23 Alumintumwerke GmbH, Plant No. 2, Bitterfeld, the Survey's studies of the European and Pacific wars. Cer• Germany tain of these reports may IH: purchased from the Superintend• 24 Gebrneder Giulini G m h H, Ludwigshafen, Germany ent of Documents at the Government Printing Office, Wash• 25 Luftschiffbau Zeppelin GmbH, Friedrichshafen on ington,.D. C. Permission to examine the remaining reports Bodcnsee, Germany may be had by writing to the Headquarters of the Survey at 20 . Wieland Werke A G, Ulm, Germany Gravelly Point, Washington 25, D. C. 27 Rudolph Rautenbach Leichmetallgiessereien, Solingen, Germany European War 23 Lippewerke Vercinigte Aluiniuiumwerke A G, Lunen, ' Germany OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN 29 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Heddernheim, Ger• 1 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Sum• many 30 Duerener Metallwerke A G, Duren Wittenau-Berlin & mary Report (European War) 2 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Over• Waren', Germany all Report (European War) AREA STUDIES DIVISION 3 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy 31 Area Studies Division Report 32 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on AIRCRAFT DIVISION Hamburg (By Division and Branch) 33 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Wuppertal 4 Aircraft Division Industry Report 34 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on 5 Inspection Visits to Various Targets (Special Report) Dusseldorf Airframes Branch 35 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Solingen 6 Junkers Aircraft and Aero Engine Works, Dessau, 36 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Germany Remscheid 7 Erla Maechinenwerke GmbH, Heiterblick, Germany 37 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on 8 A T G Mascliinenbau, GmbH, Leipzig (Mockau), Darmstadt Germany 38 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on' 0 Gothaer Waggonfabrik, A G, Gotha, Germany Lubeck 10 Focke Wulf Aircraft Plant, Bremen, Germany 39 A Brief Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Berlin, Over-all Report Augsburg, Bochum, Leipzig, Hagen, Dortmund, 11 Messerechmitt A G, Part A Obcrhausen, Schweinfurt, and Bremen Augsburg, Germany Part B Appendices I, II, III CIVILIAN DEFENSE DIVISION 12 Dornier Works, Friedrichshafen & Munich, Germany 40 Civilian Defense Division—Final Report 13 Gerhard Fieseler Werke GmbH, Kassel, Germany 41 Cologne Field Report t 14 Wiener Neustaedter Flugacugwerke, Wiener Neustadt, 42 Bonn Field Report Austria 43 Hanover Field Report Aero Engines Branch 44 Hamburg Field Rcport^-Vol 1, Text; Vol II, Exhibit* 15 Bussing NAG Flugmotorenwerke GmbH, Brunswick, 45 Bad Oldesloe Field Report Germany 46 Augsburg Field Report 16 Mittel-DeutBche Motorenwerke GmbH, Taucha, 47 Reception Areas in Bavaria, Germany Germany EQUIPMENT DIVISION 17 Bavarian Motor Works Inc, Eisenach & Durrerhof, Germany Electrical Branch 18 Bayerische Motorenwerke A G (BMW), Munich, Ger• 48 German Electrical Equipment Industry Report many 49 Brown Bovcri et Cie, Mannheim Kafertal, Germany 19 Henschel Flugmotorenwerke, Kassel, Germany Optical and Precision Instrument Branch Light Meial Branch 50 Optical and Precision Instrument.Industry Report 20 Light Metals Industry f Part 1, Aluminum Abrasives Branch of Germany \ Part II, Magnesium 21 Voroinigte Deutsche Metallwciko, Hildeslieim, Germany 51 The German Abrasive Industry 22 Metallgussgesollschaft GmbH, Leipzig, Germany 52 Mayer and Schmidt, Offenbach on Main, Germany 62 Anti-Friction Branch Submarine Branch 63 The German Anti-Friction Bearings Industry 92 German Submarine Industry Report 93 Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg A G, Augsburg, Machine Tools Branch Germany 54 Machine Tools & Machinery as Capital Equipment 94 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany 55 Machine Tool Industry in Germany 95 Deutsehewerke A G, Kiel, Germany 56 Herman Kolb Co, Cologne, Germany 96 Deutsche Schiff und Maschinenbau, Bremen, Germany 57 Collet.and Engelhard, Offenbach, Germany 97 Friedrich Krupp Germaniawerft, Kiel, Germany 58 Naxos Union, Frankfort on Main, Germany 98 Howaldtswerke A G, Hamburg, Germany 99 Submarine Assembly Shelter, Farge, Gennany MILITARY ANALYSIS .DIVISION 100 Bremer Vulkan, Vegeeack, Germany 59 The Defeat of the German Air Force Ordnance Branch 60 V-Weapons (Crossbow) Campaign 61 Air Force Rate of Operation 101 Ordnance Industry Report 62 Weather Factors in Combat Bombardment Operations ' 102 Friedrich Krupp Grusonwerke A G Magdeburg, Ger• in the European Theatre many 63 Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heavy and Medium Bomb• 103 Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G, Bo• ers in the ETO chum, Germany 64 Description of RAF Bombing 104 Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, Germany 64a The Impact of the Allied Air Effort on German Logistics 105 Rheinmetali-Borsig, Dusseldorf, Germany 106 Hermann Goering Werke, Braunschweig, Hallendorf, MORALE DIVISON Germany 107 Haunoverisehe Maschinenbau, Hanover, Germany 64b The Effects of .Strategic Bombing on German Morale 108 Gusstahlfabrik Friedrich Krupp, Essen, Germany (Vol I and Vol II) Medical Branch OIL DIVISION 65 The Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care In 109 Oil Division, Final Report Germany 110 Oil Division, Final Report, Appendix 111 Powder, Explosives, Special Rockets and Jet Propel- MUNITIONS DIVISION lants, War Gases, and Smoke Acid (Ministerial Re• port #1) Heavy Industry Branch 112 Underground and Dispersal Plants in Greater Germany 66 The Coking Industry Report on Germany 113 The German Oil Industry, Ministerial Report Team 78 67 Coking Plant Report No. 1, Sections A, B, C, & D 114 Ministerial Report on Chemicals 68 Gutehoffnungshuette, Oberhausen, Germany Oil Branch 69 Friedrich-Alfrcd Huette, Rheinhausen, Germany 70 Neunkirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neunkirchen, Germany 115 Ammoniakwerke Merseburg GmbH, Leuna, Ger• 71 Reichswerke Hermann Goering A G, Hallendorf, Ger• many—2 Appendices many 116 Braunkohle Beiiziu A G, Zeitst and Bohlen, Germany 72 August Thyssen Huette A G, Hamborn, Germany Wintershall A G, Luetzkendorf, Germany 73 Friedrich Krupp A G, Borbeck Plant, Essen, Germany 117 Ludwigshafen-Oppau WorkB of I. G Farbenindustrie 74 Dortmund Hoerder Huettenverein, A G, Dortmund, A G, Ludwigshafen, Germany Germany 118 Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Germany, 75 Hocsch A G, Dortmund, Germany Vol I, Vol H 76 BocViumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G, Bo• 119 Rhenania -Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Harburg Re• chum, Germany finery, Hamburg, Germany 120 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Grasbrook Motor Vehicles and Tanks Branch Refinery, Hamburg, Germany 77 German Motor Vehicles Industry Report 121 -Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Wilhelmsburg 78 Tank Industry Report Refinery, Hamburg, Germany 79 Daimler Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany 122 Gewerkschaft Victor, Castro p-Rauxel, Germany, Vol 80 Renault Motor Vehicles Plant/Billancourt, Paris I & Vol H 81 Adam Opel, Russelsheim, Germany 123 Europaeische Tanklager und Transport A G, Hamburg, 82 Daimler Benz-Gaggenau Works, Gaggenau, Germany Germany 83 Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg, Nurnberg, Ger• 124 Ebano Asphalt Werke A G, Harburg Refinery, Ham• burg, Germany many # 84 Auto Union A G, Chemnitz and Zwickau, Germany 125 Meerbeck Rheinpreussen Synthetic Oil Plant—Vol I 85 Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, Germany & Vol II Rubber Branch 86 Maybach Motor Works, Friedrichshafen, Germany 87 Voigtlander, Maschinenfabrik A G, Plauen, Germany 126 Deutsche Dunlop Gummi Co., Hanau on Main, Ger• 88 Volkswagenwerkc, Fallersleben, Germany many 89 Bussing NAG, Brunswick, Germany 127 Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany 90 Muehlenbau Industrie A G (Miag) Brunswick, Germany 128 Huels Synthetic Rubber Plant 91 Friedrich Krupp Grusonwerke, Magdeburg, Germany 129 Ministerial Report on German Rubber Industry 63 Propellants Branch 177 Adam Opel A G, Russelsheim, Germany 178 Daimler-Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany 130 Elektrochemischewerke, Munich, Germany 179 Valentin Submarine Assembly, Farge, Germany 131 Schoenebcck Explosive Plant, Lignose Spreugstoff 180 Volkswaggomverke, Fallersleben, Germany Werke G m b'H, Bad Salzemen, Germany 181 Railway Viaduct at Bielefeld, Germany 132 Plants of Dynamit A Gf Vormal, Alfred Nobel & Go, 182 Ship Yards Howaldtswerke., Hamburg, Germany Troisdorf, Clansthal, Drunimcl and Dunebcrg, Ger• many 183 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany 184 Daimler-Benz A G, Mannheim, Germany 133 Deutsche Bprengchemie GmbH, Kraiburg, Germany. 185 Synthetic Oil* Plant, Meerbeck-Hamburg, Germany OVER-ALL ECONOMIC EFFECTS DIVISION 186 Gewerkschaft Victor, Castro p-Rauxel, Germany 187 Klockner Humboldt Deutz, Ulm, Germany 134 Over-all Economic Effects Division Report 188 Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Germany Gross National Product | Special papers 189 Neukirchen EisenwerkcA G, Neukirchen, Germany Kriegseilberichte I whieh togetlier 190 Railway Viaduct at Altenbecken, Germany . Herman Goering Works J comprise the 191 Railway Viaduct at Arnsburg, Germany Food and Agriculture j above report 192 Deurag-Nerag Refineries, Misburg, Germany 134a Industrial Sales Output and Productivity 193 Fire Raids on German Cities PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION 194 I G Farbenindustrie, Ludwigshafen, Germany, Vol I AVolH 134b Physical Damage Division Report (ETO) 195 Roundhouse in Marshalling Yard, Ulm, Germany 135 VUlacoublay Airdrome, Paris, France 196 I G Farbendustrie, Leverkusen, Germany 136 Railroad Repair Yards, Malines, Belgium 197 Chgmische-Werke, Huels, Germauy 137 Railroad Repair Yards, Lkmvain, Belgium 198 Gremberg Marshalling Yard, Gremberg, Germany 138 Railroad Repair YardB, Hasselt, Belgium 199 Locomotive Shops and Bridges at Hamm, Germany 139 Railroad Repair Yards, Namur, Belgium 140 Submarine Pens, Brest, France TRANSPORTATION DIVISION 141 Powder Plant, Angoulcmc, France 142 Powder Plant, Bergerae, France 200 The Effect* of Strategic Bombing on German Trans• 143 Coking Plants, Muntigny & Liege. Belgium portation 144 Fort St. Blaise Verdun Group, Metz, France 201 Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass 145 Gnome et Rhone, Limoges, Fiance 202 Effects of Bombing on Railroad Installations in Regens- 146 Michelin Tire Factory, Clermont-Ferrand, France burg, Nurnberg and Munich Divisions 147 Gnome et Rhone Aero'Engine Factory, Lo Mans, France 203 German Locomotive Industry During the War 148 Kugelfiacher Bearing Ball Plant, Ebelsbaehj Germany 204 German Military Railroad Traffic 149 Louis Breguet Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France UTILITIES DIVISION .150 S. N. C. A. S. E: Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France 151 A. I. A. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France 205 German Electric Utilities Industry Report 152 V Weapons in London 206 1 to 10 in Vol I 'TJtilities Division Plant Reports" ' 153 City Area of Krefeld 207 11 to 20 in Vol II "Utilities Division Plant Reports" 154 Public Air Raid Shelters in Germany 208 21 Rheinische-Wcstfalische Elektrizitaetswerk A G 165 Goldenberg Thermal Electric Power Station, Knapsack, Germany Pacific War 156 Brauweiler Transformer & Switching Station, Brau- weiler, Germany OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN 157 Storage Depot, Nahbollenbach, Germany 1 Summary Report (Pacific. War) 158 Railway and Road Bridge* Bad Munste"r, Germany 2 Japan's Struggle to End the War 159 Railway Bridge, Eller, Germany 3 The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Naga• 160 " Gustloff-Werke Weimar, Weimar, Germany saki 161 Henschel! & Sohn GmbH, Kassel, Germany CIVILIAN STUDIES 162 Area Survey at Pirmasens, Germany 163 Hanomag, Hanover, Germany Civilian Defense Division 164 MAN Werke Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany 4 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied 165 Friedrich Krupp A G, Essen, Germany Subjects, Tokyo,"Japan 166 Erla Maschinenwerke, G m b H, Hciterblick, Germany 5 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied 167 A T G Maschinenbau GmbH, Mockau, Germany Subjects, Nagasaki, Japan 168 Erla Maschinenwerke G m b H, Mockau, Germany 6 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied 169 Bflyeriscbe Motorenwerke, Durrerhol*, Germsny t Subjects, l\yoto, Japan 170 Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke G m b H, Taucha, Ger• •7 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied many Subjects, Kobe, Japan 171 Submarine Pens Dcutsche-Werft, Hamburg, Germany 8 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied 172 Multi-Storied Structures, Hamburg, Germany Subjects, Osaka, Japan 173 Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany 9 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied 174 Kassel Marshalling Vards, Kassel, Germany Subjects, Hiroshima, Japan—No. 1 175 Ammouiawerke, Merscburg-Leuna, Germany 10 Summary Report Covering Air Raid Protection and 176 Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim, Kafertal, Germany Allied Subjects in Japan 64 11 Final "Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied 28 Ishikawajima Aircraft Industries Company, Ltd. Subjects in Japan Corporation Report No. XIII (Ishikawajima Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha) Medical Division (Engines) 12 The Effects of Bombing on Health and Medical Services 29 Nippon Airplane Company in Japan Corporation Report No. XIV 13 The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Health and Medical (Nippon Hikoki KK) Services in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Airframes) 30 Kyushu Airplane Company Morale Division Corporation Report No. XV 14 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale (Kyushu Hikoki IOC) (Airframes) ECONOMIC STUDIES 31 Shoda Engineering Company Aircraft Division Corporation Report No. XVI (Shoda Seisakujo) 15 The Japanese Aircraft Industry (Components) 16 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. 32 Mitaka Aircraft Industries Corporation Report No. I Corporation Report No. XVII (Mitsubishi Jukogyo KK) (Mitaka Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha) (Airframes & Engines) (Components) 17 Nakajima Aircraft Company, Ltd. 33 Nissan Automobile Company Corporation Report No. II Corporation Report Aro. XVIII (Nakajima Hikoki IOC) (Nissan Jidosha IOC) (Airframes & Engines) (Engines) 18 Kawanishi Aircraft Company 34 Army Air Arsenal & Navy Air Depots Corporation Report No, III Corporation Report No. XIX (Kawanishi Kokuki ICabushiki Kaisha) (Airframes and Engines) (Airframes) 35 Japan Aircraft Underground 19 Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company, Inc. Report No. XX Corporation Report No. IV Basic Materials Division (Kawasaki Kokuki Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha) (Airframes & Engines) 36 Coal and Metals in Japan's War Economy 20 Aichi Aircraft Company Capital Goods, Equipment and Construction Division Corporation Report No. V (Aichi Kokuki KK) 37 The Japanese Construction Industry (Airframes & Engines) 38 Japanese Electrical Equipment 21 Sumitomo Metal Industries, Propeller Division 39 The Japanese Machine Building Industry Corporation Report No. VI Electric Power Division (Sumitomo Kinzoku Kogyo KK, Puropera Seizosho) 40 The Electric Power Industry of Japan (Propellers) 41 The Electric Power Industry of Japan (Plant Reports) 22 Hitachi Aircraft Company Corporation Refxrrt No. VII Manpower, Food and Civilian Supplies Division (Hitachi Kokuki IOC) • 42 The Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Utiliza• (Airframes & Engines) tion of Manpower 23 Japan International Air Industries, Ltd. Corporation RejKrt No. VI f I Military Supplies Division (Nippon Kokusai Koku Kogyo IOC) 43 Japanese War Production Industries (Airframes) 44 Japanese Naval Ordnance 24 Japan Musical Instrument Manufacturing Company 45 Japanese Army Ordnance Corporation Report No. IX 46 Japanese Naval Shipbuilding (Nippon Gakki Seizo KK) 47 Japanese Motor Vehicle Industry (Propellers) 48 Japanese Merchant Shipbuilding 25 Tachikawa Aircraft Company Oil and Chemical Division Corporation Report No. X 49 Chemicals in Japan's War • (Tachikawa Hikoki IOC) 50 Chemicals in Japan's War—Appendix (Airframes) 51 Oil in Japan's War 26 Fuji Airplane Company 52 Oil in Japan's War—Appendix Corporation Rejxirt No. XI Over-all Economic Effects Division (Fuji Hikoki KK) (Airframes) 53 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Econ• 27 Showa Airplane Company omy (Including Appendix A: U. S. Economic Intelli• Corporation Report No. XII gence on Japan—Analysis and Comparison; Appendix (Showa Hikoki Kogyo KK) B: Gross National Product on Japan and Its Compo• (Airframes) nents; Appendix C:1 Statistical Sources) 65 Transportation Division 84 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure E) , Muroran Area 54 The War Against Japanese Transportation, 1941-1945 85 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure Urban Areas Division F) ,ShimiauArea 86 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclo• 55 Effects of Air Attack on Japanese Urban Economy sures G and H), Shionomi-Saki and Nojima-Saki Areas (Summary Report) 87 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure 56 Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo-Kawa• I), Comments and Data on Effectiveness of Ammu• saki-Yokohama nition 57 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagoya •88 Report of Ships. Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure 58 Effects of Air Attack on OBaka-Kobe-Kyoto J), Comments and Data on Accuracy of Firing 59 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagasaki 89 Reports of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure 60 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Hiroshima K), Effects of Surface Bombardments on Japanese War Potential MILITARY STUDIES Military Analysis Division Physical Damage Division 61 Air Forces Allied with the United States in the War 90 Effect of the incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan (a Against Japan Report on Eight Cities) 62 Japanese Air Power 91 The Effects of the Ten Thousand Pound Bomb on 63 Japanese Air Weapons and Tactics Japanese Targets (a Report on Nine Incidents) 64 The Effects of Air Action on Japanese Cround Army 92 Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan Logistics 93 Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan 65 Employment of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific 94 Effects of the Four Thousand Pound Bomb on Japanese Command Targets (a Report on Five Incidents) 66 The Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bombard• 95 Effects of Two Thousand, One Thousand, and Five ment in the War Against Japan (Twentieth Air Force) Hundred Pound Bombs on Japanese Targets (a Re• 67 Air Operations in China, Burma, India—World War II port on Eight Incidents) 68 The Air Transport Command in the War Against Japan 96 A Report on Physical Damage in Japan (Summary 69 The Thirteenth Air Force in the War Against Japan Report) G-2 Division 70 The Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the War Against Japan 97 Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence 71 The Fifth Air Force in the War Against Japan 98 Evaluation of Photographic Ingelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part I, Comprehensive Report Naval Analysis Division 99 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese 72 The Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Vols I and H) Homeland, Part U, Airfields 73 Campaigns of the Pacific War 100 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese 74 The Reduction of Wake Island Homeland, Part HI, Computed Bomb Plotting 75 The Allied Campaign Against Rabaul 101 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese 76 The American Campaign Against Wotje, Maloelap, Homeland, Part IV, Urban Area Analysis MiUe, and Jaluit (Vols I, II and HI) 102 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese 77 The Reduction of Truk Homeland, Part V, Camouflage 78 The Offensive Mine Laying Campaign Against Japan 103 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese 79 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party—Fore• Homeland, Part VI, Shipping word, Introduction, Conclusions, and General Sum• 104 Evaluation of Photographic intelligence in the Japanese mary Homeland, Part VTI, Electronics 80 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure 105 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese A) , Kamaishi Area Homeland, Part VHI, Beach Intelligence 81 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure 106 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese B) , Hamamatsu Area Homeland, Part LX, Artillery 82 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure 107 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese C) , Hitachi Area Homeland, Part X, Roads and Railroads 83 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure 108 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese D) , Hakodate Area Homeland, Part XI, Industrial Analysis tir U. 5. agvtrnmint Printing ORloai 1947—896414 66