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Case-Studies-Collated-NOV-2019-1 Case Studies - Collated - NOV 2019.docx Table of Contents Methodology Notes ..................................................................................................... 4 Angola ........................................................................................................................ 5 Argentina ................................................................................................................... 7 Australia ..................................................................................................................... 8 Austria...................................................................................................................... 11 Azerbaijan ................................................................................................................ 14 Bahrain .................................................................................................................... 16 Bosnia ...................................................................................................................... 19 Brazil ........................................................................................................................ 20 China ........................................................................................................................ 22 Colombia .................................................................................................................. 25 Croatia ...................................................................................................................... 27 Cuba ......................................................................................................................... 27 Czech Republic ......................................................................................................... 29 Ecuador .................................................................................................................... 30 Egypt ........................................................................................................................ 30 Ethiopia .................................................................................................................... 33 Georgia ..................................................................................................................... 35 Germany ................................................................................................................... 36 Greece ...................................................................................................................... 43 Hungary ................................................................................................................... 45 India ......................................................................................................................... 49 Iran .......................................................................................................................... 53 Israel ........................................................................................................................ 59 Italy .......................................................................................................................... 61 Kenya ....................................................................................................................... 63 Macedonia ................................................................................................................ 66 Malaysia ................................................................................................................... 68 Mexico ...................................................................................................................... 71 Moldova .................................................................................................................... 73 The Netherlands ....................................................................................................... 74 Nigeria ..................................................................................................................... 77 Pakistan ................................................................................................................... 80 Qatar ........................................................................................................................ 83 Russia ....................................................................................................................... 85 Saudi Arabia ............................................................................................................. 89 Serbia ....................................................................................................................... 91 South Africa .............................................................................................................. 92 South Korea .............................................................................................................. 95 Spain ........................................................................................................................ 96 Sudan ..................................................................................................................... 102 Sweden ................................................................................................................... 103 Syria ....................................................................................................................... 106 Thailand ................................................................................................................. 110 Turkey .................................................................................................................... 111 Ukraine .................................................................................................................. 116 United Arab Emirates ............................................................................................. 117 United Kingdom ..................................................................................................... 119 United States .......................................................................................................... 123 Venezuela ............................................................................................................... 126 Vietnam .................................................................................................................. 128 Zimbabwe ............................................................................................................... 129 Page | 2 Table of Figures Figure 1: Instagram content by the IRA to elicit engagement and accumulate followers ... 10 Figure 2: SMS sent as part of the United Australia Party’s campaign .................................. 10 Figure 3: SMS sent as part of the United Australia Party’s campaign ................................... 11 Figure 4: ................................................................................................................................. 13 Figure 5: ................................................................................................................................... 14 Figure 6: Automated Sectarianism ......................................................................................... 19 Figure 7: Number of followers of the three main channels owned by Russia ..................... 39 Figure 8: Example post on Redfish, owned by Russia (post fails to mention the intense resistance to the police the suspect exhibited before the video starts) ................................ 39 Figure 9: Example post of In the NOW, owned by Russia .................................................... 41 Figure 10: AfD’s ‘fake-account-fail’ (comment by Andre Wolf reads: The Dilemma of forgetting to change to your Fake-Account on Facebook before you praise yourself. A small social media lecture.) .............................................................................................................. 42 Figure 11: Fake news mentions per platform ......................................................................... 45 Figure 12: Soroush app’s emojis ............................................................................................. 58 Figure 13: Liberty Front Press news website ......................................................................... 58 Figure 14: Liberty Front Press associated Twitter accounts ................................................. 59 Figure 15: Facebook engagement rates by politician ............................................................. 63 Figure 16: “selfbot” network tweeting the same message at the same time ........................ 63 Figure 17: Twitter users trolling Ndolo for speaking out against protests asking Kibwana to step down ............................................................................................................................ 66 Figure 18: Bart Onnes is on the list of the PVV to run in the March State elections (English: What do you mean refugees? They’re rapists and people that spread hate. Get them out.) .................................................................................................................................................. 76 Figure 19: Geert Wilders calling the Prophet Mohammed a “paedophile, mass murderer, terrorist and madman” ..........................................................................................................
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