POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA Annual Report 2020

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABOUT CPR ...... 2 THE TEAM ...... 3 ABOUT THE PARTNERSHIP ...... 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... 5 LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES ...... 7 CHAPTER 1: MUSLIM REPRESENTATION AT THE GRASSROOTS ...... 10 INTRODUCTION ...... 10 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF MUSLIMS ...... 11 MUSLIMS IN UTTAR PRADESH ...... 12 LOCAL BODIES IN INDIA ...... 13 LOCAL BODIES IN UTTAR PRADESH ...... 16 METHOD NOTE ...... 17 ANALYSIS ...... 18 CONCLUSION ...... 24 CHAPTER 2: THE INDIA MANIFESTO PROJECT...... 28 INTRODUCTION ...... 28 WHY STUDY MANIFESTOS? ...... 29 METHOD NOTE ...... 30 ANALYSIS ...... 34 CONCLUSION ...... 48 CHAPTER 3: STUDENT POLITICS IN INDIA ...... 52 INTRODUCTION ...... 52 CONCEPTUALIZING STUDENT POLITICS...... 53 METHOD NOTE ...... 55 ANALYSIS ...... 56 REPRESENTATION AND PATTERNS OF GROUP DOMINANCE ...... 57 PARTY POLITICS AND UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES ...... 61 PARTICIPATION IN STUDENT POLITICS ON CAMPUSES ...... 64 CONCLUSION ...... 69 CHAPTER 4: DECLINE OF THE CONGRESS ...... 74 INTRODUCTION ...... 74 WHEN DO PARTIES WANE? SITUATING CONGRESS DECLINE IN COMPARATIVE THEORY ..... 75 METHOD NOTE ...... 78 ANALYSIS ...... 79 CONCLUSION ...... 86

APPENDIX … ...... 89 ANNUAL REPORT 2020

About CPR

The Centre for Policy Research (CPR) has The vibrant community at CPR regularly been one of India’s leading public policy collaborates with the central and state think tanks since 1973. The Centre is a non- governments, civil society organizations and profit, non-partisan independent institution other think-tanks on research projects. This dedicated to ethical and high-quality makes the Centre especially visible in the scholarship on all aspects and processes that public sphere, where it is known to lead shape life in India. conversations from the front.

CPR fosters a community of distinguished The Political Economy team is a new academics and practitioners committed to its addition at the Centre. The team aims to values of robust public discussion. Through examine questions of political economy in a different verticals of research, the Centre rapidly changing India. This report provides a snap-shot of their work in the previous engages in questions of economic policy, year. The team members regularly write state capacity and governance, law and state commentaries in leading media outlets, a regulation and domestic and international comprehensive summary of which is politics. These verticals, while separate in available on the CPR website. their functioning, often have overlapping research interests, which promotes Centre- wide dialogue and collective intervention in India's policy domain.

CENTRE FOR POLICY RESEARCH ANNUAL REPORT 2020 THE TEAM

PROJECT COORDINATOR Rahul Verma, Fellow

RESEARCH ASSOCIATES Asim Ali Ankita Barthwal Jatin Rajani Talha Rashid

RESEARCH ASSISTANTS Abdul Najah Ilika Trivedi

RESEARCH INTERNS Durgesh Dixit Pragyna Divakar Rakesh Kumar Gautam Satyam Shukla

COMMUNICATION & DESIGN SUPPORT Dhruv Bhasin Sristi Bhatt Praveen D'Souza

ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT Puneet Aggarwal ANNUAL REPORT 2020

CPR-RLS PARTNERSHIP 2020

Our project is supported by the Rosa- As we expand our research agenda to study Luxemburg-Stiftung (RLS)*, a German political democratic politics, RLS' commitment to the foundation that is part of the grassroots values of freedom and fairness adds to the movement of democratic socialism. Bearing the quality and non-partisanship of our work. name of Rosa Luxemburg (1871-1919), the foundation serves as a forum for debate and Our expanding network of researchers, critical thinking about political alternatives, as academics and journalists create opportunities well as a research centre for progressive social for both organisations for greater public development. outreach. Such outreach enables us to inform and participate in discussion on issues that Our partnership with the RLS, South Asia has matter. We present our research output for the been a rewarding experience. 2020 has been year 2020 in the hope that it adds value to this unanimously challenging: the research and discussion, and to our on-going partnership. academic community has found its projects stalled and carefully laid timelines go awry. In *DISCLAIMER: Sponsored by the RLS with funds of the the midst of this, our partnership with the RLS Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development of the Federal Republic of Germany. This has only expanded and improved. What started publication or parts of it can be used by others for free as as a pilot project in 2019 has matured this year long as they provide a proper reference to the original to become a comprehensive research output publication. The content of the publication is the sole shedding light onto crucial, yet understudied, responsibility of the partner and does not necessarily reflect a position of RLS. aspects of India’s democratic system.

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Executive Summary The CPR-RLS Annual Report brings together a presentation of our expansive research agenda undertaken in the year 2020. We began this agenda to stir greater conversations around understudied facets of India’s polity. In this pursuit, our research presents and proposes new questions regarding substantive representation, activism and issues in Indian politics. It also finds new lens to address old concerns of how parties flounder and decay. While each report chapter is independent and comprehensive, they string together with our broader interest of understanding changing dynamics of democratic processes in the country. As with the many academic events held in partnership with RLS during the year, this compendium opens up the space for future research and moves the conversation forward.

Muslim Represetation at the Grassroots sheds light on a largely neglected question- the representation of Muslims in the local level structures of power. Indian democracy has constantly rejuvenated itself by providing ever greater representation to its marginalized sections. Yet, in recent times a clear trend has been observed in the declining Muslim representation in the national and state level. Our report finds an interesting paradox: while the Muslim representation is declining at higher levels, it has remained stable at the local level, largely proportionate to the population. The report is based on a rich trove of data taken from elections held in 60000+ local bodies of Uttar Pradesh in the last 25 years. If the representation of Muslims at the local levels is indeed adequate, what are the reasons behind their persistent economic vulnerability? How is the quality of the Muslim representatives related to their socio-economic indicators? These are some of the thorny questions that this report disentangles and seeks to answer.

Our second report is the ambitious India Manifestos Project, the first of its kind research that codes and studies the election manifestoes of major Indian political parties since independence. As the report showcases, the data gathered by the project and the analysis done is a significant contribution to the systematic study of political parties in India. The election manifestoes of political parties are not just a window to the ideology of the party, they also illuminate the nature of party competition in India, and reflect how political parties view their constituents. The analysis of manifestoes across time enables the researchers to trace the changing ideology of specific political parties, as well as to mark the waxing and waning importance of certain ideas across time in our polity. PAGE 6 ANNUAL REPORT 2020

We code 49 manifestos of major national parties: the Bhartiya Janata Party, the Indian National Congress, the Communist Party of India and Communist Party of India (Marxist). Thus, we are presented with an unprecedented window to study the self-image, purpose and the ideas of the three major political and ideological streams in independent India- the Right, Centre and Left. Textual content analysis is the major method employed, with the manifestoes coded and interpreted through an elaborate code list prepared beforehand, and the text broken down into sentences, which are then slotted into predefined domains such as economy, freedom, security, development and federalism. Apart from the research questions addressed in the report, this project potentially lends itself to a large gamut of future research questions, many of which are surveyed in the report itself.

Our third report attempts to understand student politics by undertaking a comprehensive study of student union elections. The history of independent India is replete with student movements that have shaped the intellectual and political discourse of India, and provided the foundation for transformative political events. Yet, systematic studies of student politics remain rare, resulting in a dearth of understanding of even the contemporary student activism and unrest that has provoked widespread public discussion. In Student Politics in India we create a unique data set of union elections held across 100 different universities in the country and supplement it by survey of student leaders and ordinary students of various state and national universities. Together, these shine a piercing light on how students relate to politics in their immediate spaces. The report highlights some fascinating continuities and points of disjunction between student politics and wider electoral politics, which provides a lens for not just understanding the youth of the country, but also the processes of Indian democracy.

The final section of this report is on the Congress party, and presents the story of its waning fortunes. This story is told through the election turnout data over the last four decades, and provides a unique and original lens to understand the decline of India’s oldest political party. The decline of the Congress has been researched before from the perspective of weak leadership, organizational atrophy and ideological confusion but here we fuse all these perspectives and constructs a single and comprehensive lens of voter mobilization. PAGE 7 ANNUAL REPORT 2020

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1.1:Multi-tiered structure of local governance ...... 14 Figure 1.2: Local Bodies in Uttar Pradesh ...... 17 Figure 1.3: Snapshot of State Election Commission Website of Uttar Pradesh ...... 18 Figure 1.4: Muslim Representation in Block and Gram Panchayats in UP ...... 19 Figure 1.5: Muslim Representation in Nagar Palika Parishads and Nagar Panchayats in UP ...... 19 Figure 1.6: Muslim Representation in Assembly and General Elections ...... 20 Figure 1.7: Geographical spread of Muslim representation in Rural Local Bodies ...... 20 Figure 1.8: Geographical spread of Muslim representation in Urban Local Bodies ...... 21 Figure 1.9: Relation between population and level of local electoral representation ...... 21 Figure 1.10: Education levels of Muslim and non-Muslim Sarpanch between 2010-2015 ...... 22 Figure 1.11: Muslim leaders and electoral quotas in rural bodies ...... 23 Figure 1.12: Muslim leaders and electoral quotas in urban bodies ...... 23 Figure 2.1: An illustration of coding process of the manifesto text ...... 33 Figure 2.2: Approximate number of words in manifestos since 1951 ...... 34 Figure 2.3: Trends of major domain categories since 1951 ...... 35 Figure 2.4: Domain-wise comparison between all 3 parties ...... 36 Figure 2.5: Sub-categories under Economy for the Left ...... 37 Figure 2.6: Sub-categories under Economy for the BJP ...... 38 Figure 2.7:Sub-categories under Economy for the Congress ...... 38

Figure 2.8: Sub-categories under External Relations+ Security for the Left ...... 39 Figure 2.9: Sub-categories under External Relations+ Security for the Congress ...... 40 Figure 2.10: Sub-categories under External Relations+ Security for the BJP ...... 41 Figure 2.11: Sub-categories under Freedom + Social Fabric for the Left ...... 42 Figure 2.12: Sub-categories under Freedom + Social Fabric for the Congress ...... 42 Figure 2.13: Sub-categories under Freedom + Social Fabric for the BJP ...... 43 Figure 2.14: Social Group across years and parties ...... 45 Figure 2.15: Development and Quality of Life Social Group across years and parties ...... 46 Figure 2.16: Political System and Governance across years and parties ...... 47 Figure 2.17: Federalism across years and parties ...... 48 Figure 3.1: Total Number of candidates for various posts of SU elections, 1988-2019 ...... 57 Figure 3.2: Mean Number of candidates participating in the Student Union Presidential elections...... 57 Figure 3.3: Caste-wise segmentation of contesting students in DUSU elections (2013-2019) ...... 58 Figure 3.4: Dominance of Jat and Gujjar community across all posts in DUSU elections (2013-2019) ...... 58 Figure 3.5: Percentage of female MPs and MLAs in Delhi legislative assembly (2015-2019) ...... 59 Figure 3.6: Political futures of DUSU Presidents between 1960-2019 ...... 61

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Figure 3.7: : President student-wing association in DUSU elections 1960-2019 ...... 62 Figure 3.8: Political futures of JNUSU Presidents between 2000-2019 ...... 62 Figure 3.9: UP MLAs with student politics background between 1985-2017 ...... 63 Figure 3.10: Spread of survey responses ...... 65 Figure 3.11: Average interest in politics on a scale of 1-7 ...... 66 Figure 3.12: Student participation in SU elections ...... 67 Figure 3.13: Reasons for approaching the SU ...... 67 Figure 3.14: Interest in contesting elections in the future ...... 68 Figure 4.1: Comparison of Support of BJP and Congress ...... 79 Figure 4.2: Total Electors and Congress Voters Over Years ...... 83 Figure 4.3: Support for Congress and Proportion of Hindus ...... 83 Figure 4.4: Support for Congress and Proportion of SC ...... 84 Figure 4.5: Vote share of Congress across different quartiles ...... 85

Table 2.1: Sub-domains and codes under 'Federalism' ...... 31 Table 2.2: An illustration of recording process of the manifesto text ...... 33 Table 4.1:Mobilization of BJP and Congress over the years ...... 80 Table 4.2: OLS Regressions- Congress Vote Share in Lok Sabha Constituencies ...... 81 Table 4.3: Congress Performance Over the Years...... 82

M U S L I M R E PRE SE NTATIO N A T TH E G R ASSRO O TS

PRESENCE IN RURAL AND URBAN LOCAL BODIES IN UTTAR PRADESH PAGE 10 ANNUAL REPORT 2020

Muslim Representation at the Grassroots

Introduction

lectoral representation of Indian Muslims is one of the most contested political questions in post- E colonial India. The Sachar Committee Report of 2006 represents an important milestone on the subject. The report shed light on the community’s economic and social backwardness, and while it did not delve deep into its causes, it is still one of the most far-reaching and controversial government document on the subject. Since then, many scholars have argued that there is a clear link between this socio-economic backwardness and political backwardness (Ahmed, 2008; Alam & Kumar, 2019). The historical underrepresentation of Muslims in the Indian Parliament and in state assemblies gives further fillip to this argument. As already low levels of representation have plummeted further in the last decade, the issue is in the limelight once again.

Questions of minority representations are inextricably linked with issues of substantive democracy. Increasingly diversifying electorates in advanced industrial nations have brought even greater attention to the subject. In essence, most debates address the need for representation in the legislature and alternative platforms for fostering representation (Urbanity & Warren, 2008), while also discussing some of its limitations (Jensenius, 2017). In India, scholars scrutinise Muslim representation by assessing this at higher legislature levels, such as in the Parliament and state assemblies. Lower level institutions such as Urban and Rural Local Bodies are consistently overlooked in most studies.

The representation of Muslims in local bodies is as important because local bodies have been constituted to make democracy more inclusive and participatory. Citizens are closer to their local body representatives than any other legislator, and this creates more robust possibilities for inclusivity. Additionally, the objectives of local bodies include planning and implementation of economic development and social justice. This makes them a cornerstone of a majority of the government’s services and last-mile welfare delivery in India.

Assessing Muslim representation at the local level helps us answer two questions: first, do we find historical underrepresentation, observed in higher legislatures, at the local levels too? If that stands false, even with fair representation, what is hindering representatives from ensuring progress among Muslims? Second, it allows us to investigate whether this recent decline of Muslim representation at the upper levels is connected to any phenomenon at the lower level.

We choose to study the state of Uttar Pradesh to investigate these questions for a few reasons. The state has the highest number of Muslim citizens in the country. It also has the most number of socio- economically weaker Muslims. Apart from that, it is India’s political heartland and it is one of the very few states that provides Muslim voters with multiple choices for their electoral preference for parties. Finally, the state has a humongous number of local bodies, thus allowing us to have a robust sample of data.

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Using our rich data from elections held in over 60000 local bodies of Uttar Pradesh in the last 25 years, we find that Muslims are descriptively well-represented in the local bodies, contrary to what we observe in the upper levels of legislature in India. We also find that this representation has been stable since 1995 and it does not have any relation to the recent decline in the Muslim representation at the upper levels. Since we observe descriptive representation in most of the local bodies, we believe that it is the lack of education of the representatives that is leading to this perpetual backwardness of Muslims in India.

The rest of the report is organised as follows: first, we outline the political representation of Muslims in India. The next section describes the local body structure and its responsibilities. This is followed by an overview of the local bodies and the Muslim representation in the state of Uttar Pradesh (henceforth UP). After presenting the methodology and the data used along with the limitation of this study, we conclude the paper with a discussion on our findings and possible areas of further research.

Political Representation of Muslims

Muslims are historically underrepresented in India’s political realm. In the 17th Lok Sabha, Muslims account for 5% of the elected representatives although they constitute 14% of the country’s population (2011 Census). This number has remained low since Independence indicating their historical underrepresentation. 25 Muslim representatives were elected to the Lok Sabha after the 2019 elections, only three more than in the previous election (Farooqui, 2020). In the Rajya Sabha – the lower house of the Parliament, Muslims have been represented on an average of 12% since Independence. But, in 2019, it fell to 7%. Additionally, there is no Muslim minister in the Cabinet except for the minority welfare ministry. State assemblies are also no different. In 2014, only 14% of the Members of Legislative Assemblies were Muslims. Between the 2014 and 2019 election it was further reduced to 7% (Verniers, 2019).

It has long been noted that Muslims are one of the most economically weaker communities in India. As their marginalisation and the decline in representation is intertwined, this decline is concerning. In a representative democracy like India, it is ideal to have fair representation for the whole electorate, and at the same time it is difficult to ensure that in a multi-ethnic set up. In her seminal work, Hanna Pitkin argues that in-group members are better equipped to convey the constituents’ preferences and therefore representation from their own kind would lead to better legislature (Pitkin, 1967). Similarly, Bhogale has shown that substantive representation does derive from descriptive representation, by analysing questions asked in the Parliamentary debates (Bhogale, 2018). Both these works show the significance of fair representation.

There are numerous causes for such low representation. Some scholars find that the spatial distribution of Muslim population in the country is a factor which doesn’t allow the community to emerge as a formidable voting bloc (Ahmed, 2008). 46% of Indian Muslims live in Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, and Bihar. Other states with a considerable Muslim population are Assam, Telangana, and Kerala. Muslims are the most urbanised community in India, with 40% of the population living in urban areas (Farooqui, 2020). Urbanisation of the community is a disadvantage with respect to representation as the majority of parliamentary constituencies are rural. Muslims are a minority in 97% of parliamentary constituencies; a sizable number of Muslims live in urban and semi-urban constituencies but there are only seven

PAGE 12 ANNUAL REPORT 2020 parliamentary seats in this cluster. While reservations exist for other dispersed minority groups such as Scheduled Castes, no such quota has been introduced for Muslims.

The features of the first-past-the-post system have also been detrimental for political representation of Muslims. Being minorities almost everywhere, they are dependent on other social and religious groups for their representation. Muslims are not able to form a unified platform that represents their interests due to their small numbers at the constituency level. Further, the FPTP system incentivises parties to appeal to majority groups and discourages them from nominating Muslims candidates due to a fear of backlash. Consequently, Muslim-led parties have had limited success, and that too only in areas with a high concentration of Muslims (Farooqui, 2020).

Historically, the Congress party has enjoyed patronage from Indian Muslims and the community has found greater political opportunities under the Congress rule. There have been only two parliamentary elections – 1980 and 1984 – in which the community’s representation in the Parliament was nearly proportionate to their population share and it is no coincidence that these years coincide with the electoral dominance of Congress. However, with the party’s decline and the rise of the Hindu right, their preferences have become increasingly defined by political context and spatial concentration (Farooqui, 2020).

The decline in the support for Congress has seen a consequent rise in patronage for non-BJP parties, according to a Lokniti-CSDS survey. This trend of strategic non-NDA support has been prominent since the 2009 General Elections. An analysis of the 2014 General Elections by Raphael Susewind and Raheel Dhattiwala finds that Muslims vote en bloc for parties at a more local level than was previously thought. Muslims also expect protection from the state as they are a minority and they vote out ruling parties that have failed to do so (Susewind & Dhattiwala, 2014). Unlike in most other states, Muslims in UP have viable parties such as the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party to serve as alternatives.

Muslims in Uttar Pradesh

Uttar Pradesh has long been at the centre of Indian politics, and remains a deciding factor in many elections. The state accounts for 80 of the 543 Lok Sabha seats and is home to 230 million people, resulting in its huge electoral influence. Muslims make up 18.5% of the population in Uttar Pradesh, the sixth-largest Muslim population in the country by proportion (Census of India, 2011). The population is widely spatially distributed, ranging from 2.97% in the district of Lalitpur to 49.14% in Rampur. Two other districts, Moradabad and Bijnor, have a Muslim population of more than 40%, which is classified by the census as “very high”. Seven districts have a high population, i.e., between 30% and 40%. The overall spatial distribution indicates that the Muslim population is concentrated along the northern boundary of the state. Concentration of Muslims in these areas is a significant factor for their socio-economic development as well as their political participation (Siddiqui et al., 2011). The literacy rate among Muslims is 58.76%, which lags behind the state average of 67.68%. Literacy among men is 66.42%, while only 50.59% women are literate, the lowest literacy rate among all religious groups. The sex ratio is on the higher end at 973 per 1000 males.

The political landscape in Uttar Pradesh is caste-dominated and this is exhibited by the Muslim community too, which shows considerable diversity along caste lines. However, the community is

PAGE 13 ANNUAL REPORT 2020 perceived as homogenous, and the caste hierarchy among Muslims is not widely recognised. Political movements in the state have been dominated by communal mobilisation since colonial times. Muslims were first mobilised when the Muslim League was formed as a response to the fear of marginalisation and underrepresentation. However, the League mostly comprised of Muslim elites of UP. After the Partition, the marginalisation of Muslims increased as many of the elites migrated to Pakistan and those who remained behind had not been engaged in politics before Independence (Brass, 2005). The political preferences of Muslims were shaped by elitism until 1970. The formation of Bangladesh in 1971 was a turning point – it led to a demand for greater political participation and representation for Indian Muslims. This resulted in Muslim support for Congress in Uttar Pradesh as they were attracted to the party’s principle of secularism (Larsson, 2016).

In recent times, Uttar Pradesh has witnessed increased polarisation between the Hindu and Muslim communities. At the backdrop of this divide is the demolition of the Babri Masjid, which has sparked a decades-long conflict between the communities. The 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots, said to be the worst communal violence in UP in recent history, left over 60 Muslims dead and more than 40,000 Muslims displaced. Even small-scale everyday incidents that might not be spurred on by religious differences tend to take on a communal colour in the state, according to recent work on new-age communal violence by Sudha Pai and Sajjan Kumar (Pai & Kumar, 2018). It has left Hindus and Muslims of UP in a constant state of antagonism. This has only accelerated since the appointment of Yogi Adityanath as the Chief Minister. One of the priorities of his government has been the protection of cows, a holy animal for followers of Hinduism. To this end, slaughterhouses and butcher shops have been raided, which was seen as an attack on the lifestyles and livelihoods of Muslims. In the year that Yogi Adityanath rose to power in UP and the BJP government came into power at the centre, cow-related violence in UP increased by 69% (Saldanha, 2018).

In November of 2020, the UP government passed the Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, unofficially known as the ‘love jihad law’. While interfaith marriages are rare to begin with, marriages between Muslim men and Hindu women are seen with particular suspicion. The law provides for a jail term of up to 10 years. Within one month of its passage, over 35 arrests have been made, and several have turned out to be falsely registered as cases of forcible conversion (PTI, 2020).

Uttar Pradesh’s complex political landscape with fractionalisation, both along the lines of caste and religion, as well as its considerable electoral influence has made it an important case study for both psephologists and political parties. However, much of the attention paid to it has been at the state and national level. There has been little work done to understand how politics works at the grassroots level. Do the trends persist across all levels of government? Do panchayats offer a more equitable power distribution among the various politically salient groups? For these reasons, we chose to study local government in Uttar Pradesh with a special focus on Muslim representation.

Local bodies in India

History India has had a long dialogue with local self-government, even before the country gained independence in 1947. The first strong exhortation came in the 1920s from M.K. Gandhi who believed that rural economies

PAGE 14 ANNUAL REPORT 2020 could only flourish through the devolution of political power to local governments. However, it was dismissed by the British government and remained unaddressed until the Congress Ministry was formed in 1935. Leading up to the country’s independence, the Congress made a sustained effort to promote the formation of panchayats. This manifested as Article 40 of the Constitution which states, “The State shall take steps to organise village panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government”. The Balwant Rai Mehta committee proposed a three-tier structure of local self-government that was incorporated into the Planning Commission’s recommendations but it did not gain traction in the years following Independence.

The wave of decentralisation gained momentum after Rajiv Gandhi came to power as Prime Minister in 1985. The government initiated the institutionalisation of panchayati raj as a distinct tier of the Indian federation. While the motion did not initially pass through the Parliament, it gained assent in 1992 as the 73rd Amendment Act. The panchayati raj became an officially recognised level of government whose members would be democratically elected, with reservations for women, OBCs and SC/STs. To ensure free and fair elections, a State Election Commission was formed for each state, with a governor-appointed State Election Commissioner. The Amendment also endowed panchayati raj institutions with independent taxation powers and enabled them to receive central funds from the State Financial Commission (Ananth, 2014). In the same year, the 74th Amendment was introduced to address some of the issues with urban local bodies (ULBs), namely – i. Failure to hold regular elections, ii. Prolonged supersessions, and iii. Inadequate delegation of powers and functions (Chaubey, n.d.). The Amendment sought to rectify these weaknesses of ULBs by strictly defining functions and taxation powers, ensuring that elections are conducted freely and regularly, and providing adequate representation for women, scheduled castes, and scheduled tribes. The amendment has loosened the grip of state governments on local self-governments and allowed them to exercise power freely.

Structure of Local Government in India Figure 1.1:Multi-tiered structure of local governance

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This structure is followed uniformly across the country, except for scheduled and tribal areas which are exempt from enacting the Panchayati Raj Act. The Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act, 1996 provides for the expansion of panchayats into these areas across ten Indian states (“Local government in India,” 2020). Both panchayats and municipalities essentially enjoy similar functions and powers, as delineated in Article 243 of the Constitution.

Reservation of Seats The Constitution provides for the reservation of seats in both panchayats and municipalities. Seats are reserved for persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in every panchayat/municipality in proportion to their population in that district. These seats may be allotted to different constituencies on a rotational basis. Additionally, one-third of all seats and one-third of all ‘Pradhan’ (Chairperson) positions are reserved for women in the panchayats. Similarly, one-third of all seats and Chairperson positions are reserved for women in the municipalities. All these seats must be filled by direct election of candidates.

The Impact The 73rd and 74th Amendments have been pivotal for the decentralisation of power and the efficient delivery of public goods. They aim to bring decision-making as close to the people affected by these decisions as possible. However, in a country like India that is fractured along lines of class and caste, it is important that decentralisation does not lead to the neglect of the marginalised sections of society. Reservations were introduced for this purpose. Reservations for SCs and STs at the centre mirror that at the state level; however, the reservation of one-third of panchayat seats for women is unique to local bodies. Some states such as Bihar, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh have increased this to 50% reservation of seats. There has been a move to introduce a constitutionally mandated reservation of 50% for women in local bodies across all states. The Bill was first tabled by the UPA government in 2009 and was supported by the consequent government as well. The Bill lapsed in 2014 and has not been reintroduced in Parliament (National Bureau, 2016).

Any discussion of reservations is fraught with tension. Nevertheless, they provide a way for candidates from marginalised communities to participate in politics. An analysis of reservation in state legislatures by Rohini Pande finds that reservations have increased the targeted redistribution of goods among those groups that receive it, i.e., Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (2003). She concludes that reservations can improve a marginalised community’s influence on policy (Pande, 2003). A similar study was conducted by Raghabendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo among panchayats in West Bengal and Rajasthan. Along with reservations for SC/STs, they were also able to include women’s reservation in their analysis. They found that women invest more in goods that are more relevant to women, such as drinking water and roads. SC and non-SC Pradhans do not differ in the kinds of goods they invest in but they do differ in where they invest — SC Pradhans were more likely than non-SC Pradhans to invest in hamlets that had a high SC population (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2003). These results indicate that local leaders have significant influence in the distribution of public goods and are especially beneficial for their own communities. Both these studies suggest that representation of marginalised communities in local self- government is a way to improve the well-being of their own communities. Additionally, given the difficulty

PAGE 16 ANNUAL REPORT 2020 of targeting public goods to specific groups, representation of marginalised communities ensures better delivery of goods to the general polity (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2003).

These studies give us an understanding of why local bodies are important for the representation of marginalised communities and how leaders can influence policy to improve the conditions of their communities. Using this framework, this report examines the representation of Muslims in local bodies in Uttar Pradesh.

Local bodies in Uttar Pradesh

History of rural local bodies

The United Provinces Panchayati Raj Act of 1947 first established panchayats in the state. 35,000 panchayats were instituted, which more than doubled to 72,409 after the second general elections in 1955. The latter phase also saw the extensive participation of panchayats in the Green Revolution that swept the country and, chiefly, the northern states (Prasad, n.d.). Between the years of 1961 and 1972, one of the main focuses of local government was to make villages self-sufficient. Towards this end, committees to oversee agricultural production and welfare were set up. The three-tier panchayati raj system consisting of the district panchayat, panchayat samiti, and zilla parishad was also adopted in this period.

In the next phase, 30% reservation for women was initiated. In 1989, the Jawaharlal Employment Yojana was introduced for unemployed and under-employed citizens in rural areas, marking the first instance of a targeted scheme entrusted to the panchayat for execution (Prasad, n.d.). The 73rd Constitutional Amendment was passed in 1994. Consequently, Uttar Pradesh amended its Panchayat Laws to accommodate the new guidelines including powers, functions, term limits, and reservation quotas.

There are over 10 lakh villages in Uttar Pradesh, according to the 2011 census. Of the total population of 20 crore, 13 crore people live in these villages. This implies that rural local bodies are extremely integral to the development of the state and the delivery of services. Participation in panchayats indicates that there is a considerable level of grassroots democracy in Uttar Pradesh.

History of Urban Local Bodies

Municipalities have existed in India at least from the time of the Mauryan kings, if not longer. They were formalised under British rule when the East India Company found itself with the responsibility of managing large tracts of land and providing them with water, sanitation, and roads (“History of Urban Local Bodies”, n.d.). Madras and Bengal were the first states to establish municipal institutions via the Act of 1842. In Uttar Pradesh, a municipal act exclusively for Lucknow was passed in 1856, followed by the North-West Provinces and Oudh in 1873. Reforms for municipal administrations were introduced over the next decade. Several acts were passed in the subsequent years which led to the establishment of zilla parishads and development authorities.

After the 74th Constitutional Amendment was passed, the Uttar Pradesh Local Self-Government Laws (Amendment) Act, 1994 was enacted. This Act clearly defined the three categories of urban local

PAGE 17 ANNUAL REPORT 2020 bodies that would constitute each municipality — Nagar Nigam (Municipal Corporation), Nagar Palika Parishad (Municipal Board), and Nagar Panchayat (Town Panchayat). The Act also defined the reservation quota for women and backward castes, and the powers and duties of the municipalities. Uttar Pradesh currently has 12 Municipal Corporations (Nagar Nigams), 191 Municipal Boards (Nagar Palika Parishads) and 421 Town Panchayats (Nagar Panchayats).

Figure 1.2: Local Bodies in Uttar Pradesh

Method Note

The first step to analyse the involvement and the particularities of Muslims in grassroots politics was to acquire information regarding winners of past local body elections in Uttar Pradesh. Unfortunately, there were no available data sets of local body elections in India. Data was collected from past elections to build an analysable dataset. This was a mammoth task, given that there are more than 60,000 local bodies in UP.

This data was available on the UP State Election Commission website. We had to scrape the data for different local bodies and years from varied webpages. The snapshot of the webpage that contains information on 2015 winners for rural local body elections is shown below. We automated this process with the help of our data scientist and collected winners' information and auxiliary data from 1995 for all local bodies except Gram Panchayats. For Gram Panchayats, we have only been able to collect data from 2005, given the lack of data availability in the public domain. The main variables in the available data were the candidate's name, age, education, gender, and reservation of the seats. There was no information about the party of the candidates since the local body elections in UP were not contested with party labels. This resulted in a massive data set with more than two lakh data points.

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Figure 1.3: Snapshot of State Election Commission Website of Uttar Pradesh

However, this was not enough for analysis. We were still missing a crucial part of the data - the religion of the candidate. As obvious as it seems, it is impossible to study Muslim politics at the grassroots level without having information about the winners’ religious identity. We coded them manually using surnames as guides. This took massive effort and much longer time because of the data set's size. It has to be noted that no other research has collected data or analysed Muslim representation at a micro level like this. Hence, this analysis relies on a unique and novel data set and adds tremendous value for future researchers.

A major limitation of our work is that we were unable to find Muslim population at the panchayat level. This is important because of the fact that it is supposed to serve as a control for the models we were wishing to test our hypothesis with. However, we would continue advancing our research in this area as soon as we succeed in calculating or finding the Muslim population at Gram Panchayat levels. We would discuss the possible hypothesis in the last section. Additionally, we would be not focusing on the Zilla Parishad and the Nagar Nigam considering that they are limited in number, to avoid skewed results.

Analysis

Representation

In this section, we look at the representation of Muslims in urban and rural local bodies. We find that there is a stable trend of representation of Muslims at the lower and the intermediate levels. We also observe that in rural local bodies, Muslim representation declines as the local body reaches the apex body and the opposite is observed in the urban local body.

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Figure 1.4: Muslim Representation in Block and Gram Panchayats in UP

We can see from the graph that, on an average, 10% of the gram panchayat heads and 5% of the block heads are Muslims. These representation levels have been consistent in the last few elections, with a slight increasing trend. Although the average Muslim representation at the Zilla Panchayat is 5% like the Block Panchayat, the trajectory is inconsistent. This is partly due to the minimal number of seats available at the apex body.

Figure 1.5: Muslim Representation in Nagar Palika Parishads and Nagar Panchayats in UP

In the urban local bodies, around 32% and 21% of the heads are Muslims in the Nagar Palika Parishads (NPP) and Nagar Panchayats (NP) respectively. However, in the Nagar Nigams it is relatively low, averaging around 10%. It began at 22% representation in 1995, then it plateaued around 9% during the forthcoming years. In the other two bodies, we can observe a slight rise in the representation in the last election compared to the 2012 election.

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Figure 1.6: Muslim Representation in Assembly and General Elections

Looking at the Muslim representation at higher legislative levels enables us to have a comparative perspective. The average Muslim representation in the assembly and the parliamentary election is 11%. Even though there has been variation in the representation of Muslim MLAs and MPs throughout the last 70 years, we observe a decline in the last few years.

We then mapped all the results to detect the possible spatial patterns. We observe that there is a significant spatial variation in the levels of Muslim representation. In all levels of local bodies, we observe a concentration of Muslim representation in north-eastern UP. There are local bodies, both urban and rural, with no Muslim representation. Apart from this, we observe high stability in the representation levels of Muslims across the years. This is evident in the both urban and rural local bodies as we can see in the following maps.

Figure 1.7: Geographical spread of Muslim representation in Rural Local Bodies

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Figure 1.7: Geographical spread of Muslim representation in Urban Local Bodies

Now that we observe a significant difference in the Muslim representation levels with regard to the local body type and location, it is natural to ask why this is the case. We had many hypotheses. These included Muslim migration, population, difference in the residential pattern in the urban areas and so on. We started testing them one by one. We started off with the most obvious hypothesis - population. It turns out that it is the one that drives this variation in the representation levels spatially and structurally. In the scatterplot below we see that Muslim representation in the both urban and rural areas are highly correlated with the population levels.

Figure 1.8: Relation between population and level of local electoral representation

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Education Figure 1.9: Education levels of Muslim and non-Muslim Sarpanch between 2010-2015

Data suggests that Muslim Sarpanches are less educated than the non-Muslim Sarpanches. 64% of the Muslims Sarpanches do not have a high school degree as compared to 45% of their non-Muslim counterparts. The education level of Sarpanches is low overall because there is no mandated education qualification required to contest elections. This, coupled with the general lack of education amongst the Muslims in UP, is one of the main driving factors behind the low literacy level. We could not perform a comparative analysis for urban local bodies due to the lack of data.

Reservation

In Uttar Pradesh, reservations in the local bodies are available for OBCs, SC/STs and women. The women’s category is further divided into OBC Women and SC/ST women.

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Figure 1.10: Muslim leaders and electoral quotas in rural bodies

In the GPs, reserved seats are almost equally distributed among Muslim and non-Muslim officeholders. But in BP and ZP, we see a different picture. Only 37% of Muslim officeholders enter through the reserved seats whereas it is 46% for non-Muslim officeholders. This 37% comprises Muslims who belong to the OBCs, and Muslim women who enter through the women’s quota. Non-Muslim candidates can be elected through the general quota, women’s quota, SC, ST, and OBC quota which gives them a higher chance at representation. We also found that an overwhelming majority of the women winners come from the general category from both Muslim and non-Muslim communities. This reiterates the role of women’s reservation in ensuring their political representation and participation. Muslims and non-Muslims have a similar chance of entry through reservation and this is true across all levels of urban local bodies.

Figure 0.11: Muslim leaders and electoral quotas in urban bodies

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Conclusion

In our report, we find that Muslims are proportionally represented in all the local body levels. This is contradictory to the decline of the Muslim representation that we have observed in the state and national legislatures. Descriptive representation is important as the elected representatives can better understand the constituents’ preferences and needs, thus improving the efficiency of service delivery. This also helps to change the perceptions about leaders from minority communities, as evidenced by Chauchard (2017) in his study of minority leaders. Additionally, Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2003 have shown that representatives from minority groups tend to provide public goods that are relevant for their groups. Similarly, Bhalotra finds that increasing Muslim representation in Gram Panchayats improves health and educational outcomes (Bhalotra, 2014).

Even though all the communities are adversely impacted by the lack of education, we find that the ramifications of this could be greater for the Muslim community due to their already low literacy levels. There could be many factors, including cultural, that could explain the literacy rate, but the fact that it adversely impacts representation enhances challenges for democratic participation.

Furthermore, the difference in education levels of the Sarpanch can have an adverse impact on service delivery. In a Harvard Kennedy School study (McManus, 2014), researchers found that Gram Panchayats with uneducated Sarpanches receive fewer benefits and experience more delays in large development programmes like MGNREGS. They also found that development outcomes like literacy rate grow slowly in GPs with an uneducated Sarpanch. This is a point of concern that could lead to the further marginalisation of Muslims especially since we find that most Muslim Sarpanches are elected in areas with a high Muslim population. By this measure, introducing a minimum education qualification or literacy level for contesting local body elections might have positive spill over effects for the community. However, we must acknowledge that it could lead to elite dominance in local government.

Further Research This report is limited to a preliminary analysis of Muslims politics at the grassroots level. We intend to advance this research along the following lines: first, addressing this question of why we don’t see a sound representation of Muslims in the higher levels of legislature. Secondly, once we succeed in calculating the Muslim population at the Gram Panchayat level we would be equipped to test hypotheses that need high statistical robustness. This includes the impact of Muslim representation on developmental outcomes, and the representation of Muslims in the other levels of legislature.

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References Ahmed, H. (2008). Debating Muslim Political Representation. Seminar, (586). Alam, T., & Kumar, S. (2019). Social and Economic Status of Backward Muslims in Uttar Pradesh: Need for an Inclusive Policy? Social Change, 49(1), 78-96. doi:10.1177/0049085718821517 Pitkin, H. F. (1967). The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Bhogale, S. (2018), Querying the Indian Parliament. What can the Question Hour tell about Muslim Representation in India? TCPD Working Paper, 2018-1. Ananth, P. (2014). Panchayati Raj in India, Journal of Education and Social Policy, 1(1), 1-9. Bhalotra, Sonia. (2014, May). Health and the Political Agency of Women, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6(2), 164-197. doi: www.jstor.org/stable/43189382. Brass, Paul R. (2005). Language, Religion and Politics in North India, Cambridge University Press. Chattopadhyay, R., & Duflo, E. (2003, November). The Impact of Reservation in the Panchayati Raj: Evidence from a Nationwide Randomized Experiment, Framed Field Experiments, 1-22. Chaubey, P.K. (n.d). Urban Local Bodies in India: Quest for making them self-reliant. Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1-45. Chauchard, Simon (2017). Why representation matters? Cambridge University Press. Farooqui, Adnan. (2020). Political Representation of a Minority: Muslim Representation in Contemporary India, India Review, 153-175. doi: 10.1080/14736489.2020.1744996 History of Urban Local Bodies. (n.d.). Regional Center for Urban and Environmental Studies, 4- 22. Jensenius, Francesca (2017). Social Justice through Inclusion. Oxford University Press. Larsson, Frederik. (2016). The Muslim Elite’s Perceptions of Representation in Village Panchayats (councils) Towards Local Urban Authorities, Department of Government, Uppsala University. Local Government in India. (2020, January 28), India Development Review. Local Bodies. (n.d.), Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation. McManus, J.. (2014). Educational qualifications of village leaders in north India: implications for public service delivery. John F. Kennedy School of Government. National Bureau. (2016, February 4). 50% Quota for Women in Panchayats Planned. The Hindu. Pande, Rohini. (2003, September). Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India, The American Economic Review, 94(4), 1132-1151. doi: www.jstor.org/stable/3132282 Prasad, Radheshyam. (n.d.). The Success Story of Panchayati Raj System in Uttar Pradesh, 1-8. PTI. (2020, December 26). About 35 Arrests, Dozen FIRs as UP ‘Love Jihad’ Law Completes One Month. The Indian Express. Religion, Census of India, 2001. (2001). Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, India.

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Saldanha, Alison. (2018, December 4). Uttar Pradesh Emerges As Deadliest State For Cow- Related Violence. The Quint. Siddiqui, F. A., Hussain, N., & Hannan, A. (2011). Literacy and work participation among Muslims in Uttar Pradesh. Journal of Geography and Regional Planning, 4(6), 305-325. Susewind, R., & Dhattiwala, R. (2014). Spatial variation in the ‘Muslim Vote’ in Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh, 2014. Economic and Political Weekly, 49(39), 99-110. Nadia Urbinati and Mark E. Warren. (2008). The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory. Annual Review of Political Science, 11:1, 387-412. Verniers, G. (2019, June 02). Verdict 2019 in charts and maps: Nearly half of India's Muslim MPs come from only two states. Retrieved January 04, 2021, from https://scroll.in/article/925440/verdict-2019-in-charts-and-maps-nearly-half-of-indias- muslim-mps-come-from-only-two-states

T H E I N D IA M ANIFE STO PRO J E C T

COMPARING ELECTION MANIFESTOS FROM 1951-2019 PAGE 28 ANNUAL REPORT 2020

The India Manifesto Project

Introduction

n times of quick and dramatic worldwide changes, with shifting technologies and ideological turns, I political parties are also continuously transforming. With the reversal of fortunes of our most significant national parties, the need to study party ideology, their relative positions and their partisan appeal to the electorate have become essential and urgent. The India Manifesto Project aims to do the same by using manifestos of dominant political parties as the primary instrument of research. The goal is to understand how election manifestos of parties have transformed since Independence and what that tells us about the nature of politics and how it is impacted by events in the public domain.

When researching a political party through manifestos, there are various avenues of study which open up. First is the study of the party itself: which issues have changed in priority and which have remained consistently important. Second, inter party comparison according to election years can give a good description of how national parties differ from (or resemble) each other. Do parties take vastly different positions on issues or do they remain committed to only emphasizing some specific ‘owned’ issues?1 In short, through their manifestos, do parties converse with another or do they self-advertise? Third, the question of the ideology of Indian political parties has been hard to place, especially on the traditional left- right political spectrum. A wholesome study of manifestos can shine better light on this dilemma.

Under the India Manifesto Project, we have undertaken extensive collection, coding and analysis of 49 party manifestos related to Lok Sabha elections in the country. We focus on the chief national parties of the day, the Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP), the Indian National Congress (INC/Congress) and the major left parties, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the Communist Party of India (together-the Left). We use content analysis techniques, similar to those developed under the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), to come up with a data set that quantifies the space accorded to different issues and the positions they take on them. We find substantial movement of parties on different issue positions, signaling the dynamic nature of competition and party responsiveness. Our analysis also suggests the transformational impact certain events can have on the trajectory of national politics. We find that parties often speak directly against their chief competitor in manifestos, while at the same time emphasizing on issues that are specific and salient to them. There is thus an observed trade-off between the two and parties use different strategies to communicate their issue superiority to the reader. Based on these preliminary observations, we find manifestos to be dynamic instruments which simultaneously signal party intentions and political trends; they can be as futuristic as they are retrospective and this provides us an important glimpse into the role and relation of parties to democratic politics.

1 There are two competing theories of party competition: one focuses on relational proximity of parties to suggest that in an election, parties take different positions on a given set of issues which are determined by the context. The salience theory suggests that competing parties only talk about issues that they “own” or issues that they have an advantage in (Budge & Farlie, 1983).

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Why study manifestos?

Political parties perform three important functions in a democracy: they provide a platform for likeminded individuals to come together and fight elections; in opposition, they provide necessary curbs to the winner’s unbridled power; and as chief arbiters of ideas, they influence the ideological make-up of politics. Some scholars insist on the fundamental importance of parties for democracy, insisting that ‘modern democracies are unthinkable except in terms of political parties’ (Schattschneider, 1942). Today, when partisanship has expanded beyond politics to affect all aspects of social life, the role of parties gains greater salience, further highlighting the need to study them with renewed lens.

The cluttered and noisy political landscape in India has garnered much attention, as has the fact that there are 2598 registered parties in the country. It is surprising then, that parties remain an understudied aspect of democratic politics in the country, often only remembered in relation to electoral wins or losses. We know little about internal party functioning of even the 8 major national parties and even less effort has been made to understand their ideological leanings through party literature. There have been some attempts to address the question of internal party working and organization2, but largely the focus of academic analysis has remained on the interaction of parties with voters (or ethnic groups).

Manifestos present us with an effective method of studying political parties. They clarify party ideology and party position on issues of national significance, while also giving us a glimpse of relevant contemporary events and issues. As they are not legally enforceable, manifestos afford a degree on freedom to parties to present true ideological leanings, unencumbered by concerns of feasibility or plausibility. At the same time, as means of direct communication with the electorate, they allow parties to address issues which they think would be most well received. The tussle between what the party seeks and the public desires is captured succinctly through these documents; studying manifestos is an exercise that will have to take into account both to be able to make meaningful analysis of political parties.

In India, it is customary for major political parties to release their manifestos in the public domain before elections. While most parties typically tend to constitute separate committees for such a process and there has been increasing media attention to what parties write in their manifestos, the dominant belief is that party manifestos do not matter at all. Given that few voters ever read them, such a disparaging view is understandable. However, as some scholars have argued, manifestos have many diverse uses. They can provide crucial clarity regarding party positions and help candidates in conveying the same to the electorate. They can also act as campaigning guides and allow candidates to streamline their efforts to match with that of the broader party line (Eder, Jenny, & Müller, 2017). These documents also signal shifts in party positions and allow for greater partisan sorting among supporters (Adams J. E.-T., 2014). On occasions,

2 Chhibber et al in a study of state assemblies between 1967 to 2004 study the level of party organization and link it to the level of electoral volatility in the state (Chhibber, Jensenius, & Suryanarayan, 2014). Another close inspection of party ecosystem is provided by Angela Burger, whose book examines the Jan Sangh, the Praja Socialist Party and the Socialist Party in Uttar Pradesh in the late 1960s (Burger, 1969). More recently Anjali Bohlken has used a game- theoretical approach to link level of control on party-affiliated local activists to decentralization of state power (Bohlken, 2010).

PAGE 30 ANNUAL REPORT 2020 they can also further accountability on political parties by providing the public with enough information to compare performance with promises (Ashworth, 2000).

Researchers have also used manifestos to understand campaign strategies, especially regarding which issues to emphasis and which to blur (Rovny, 2012). In the increasingly competitive election climate in India, where professionalized campaign management has become the norm, these nuanced strategies deserve greater inspection. Other scholars have also used official party platforms for analyzing the degree of policy adjustments induced by mimicking the opposition (Adams J. &.-T., 2009). Using data from the CMP, they find that parties tend to shift their policies in the same direction as their opposition in the previous year, and that the policy adjustments were more apparent for ideologically similar parties. While government responsiveness to public opinion is fundamental to democratic functioning (Lijphart, 1984), the same has not been studied in-depth in India. This is because of the abiding conception of the country’s politics being clientelist and non-programmatic/ non-ideological. The study of manifestos allows one to estimate party responsiveness to programmatic and ideological preferences, thus creating a new framework with which to assess politics.

In summary, studying party manifestos clarifies essential questions with regard to the nature of parliamentary competition in the country: how are parties matched with issues on a range of pan-national topics and the extent to which their positions differ from one another? What are the chief ideological poles that emerge from the contest between parties and how has this ideological spectrum in turn impacted party competition? What is the relation between promises and policy decisions and what factors are important in understanding elite responsiveness to mass preferences?

With the India Manifesto Project, we have undertaken the task of studying the major national political parties of India in detail and use the manifesto as an instrument to understand each party and the contemporary polemics that influence. Conceived along the lines of the CMP, which has been providing data of various party manifestos to the academic community since 1979, our project seeks to undertake content analysis of all major party manifestos released since the first election of independent India in 1951.

Method Note

Manifestos have undergone substantial change in form and content over the years, but some key features can still be gleaned. They often contain a general list of policy positions of the concerned party, though a detailed plan of action can be missing. The focus remains on taking a persuasive tone to sway the voters towards the self and away from one’s opposition. Since manifestos are non-binding, our focus in the current study does not refer to policy implementation. There is known to be dissonance between what is emphasized in manifestos, what is prioritized before elections during campaigning and what is actually delivered after coming to power post elections. Our priority, however, is to understand the stance of parties, their ideology, their opposition or support for current policies and the direction of promises for the future of the country. An analysis of manifestos can describe changing national sentiments and the response of political parties towards them. They can also be informative by analyzing what is missing from them.

To code, manifestos of the Bhartiya Janata Party and its predecessor Jan Sangh, Indian National Congress, Communist Party of India and Communist Party of India (Marxist) were selected. In addition to

PAGE 31 ANNUAL REPORT 2020 being the three most stable and enduring national parties, they are known to represent three different ideological leanings of what is popularly referred to as the Right, Centre and Left positions on the spectrum respectively. A comparison between these would therefore clarify the chief poles in the country’s politics. In order to collect the official party manifestos since Independence, online and offline archives of the concerned political parties were accessed from various university and institutional libraries and online sources. All manifestos related to these main parties released since the first election of 1951 were eligible for this study. In total, 49 manifestos are available so far and efforts are being made to access the rest. These 49 manifestos have been read and coded. They include all manifestos of BJP (and its predecessor) and manifestos of all four political parties for the four most recent national elections.

To ensure coding reliability, all the manifestos are being read and coded by the same individual which marks stability. Independent coders will go through the data and data with a high degree of agreement between them will be used, which will ensure reproducibility.

Textual content analysis is the major method which will be employed. All the manifestos are read thoroughly by independent coders and the text is broken down into sentences and quasi sentences according to the predefined domains and categories, all of which have different codes attached to each individual category. Specific guidelines have been provided in the standard code book to guide the independent coders, which answers any questions about which statements and which issues need to go under which category. To accommodate distinctions that became apparent during the coding processes, further nuance was added by the introduction of specific sub-categories. The final list stood at 9 domains with a total of 58 sub- categories. The finalized domain names are as follows -

1. External Relations 2. Freedom and Democracy 3. Federalism 4. Political System and Governance 5. Economy 6. Development and Quality of Life 7. Social Fabric/National Unity/Diversity/Culture 8. Security 9. Social Groups We use the domain ‘Federalism’ to illustrate how these categories function. This domain includes the following sub-domains

Table 2.1: Sub-domains and codes under ‘Federalism’ CATEGORY CODE

Decentralization - Centre-State Relations 301

Decentralization - Rural Local Government 302

Jammu & Kashmir 303 Interstate Relations 304

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While the Comparative Manifesto Project has a publicly available codebook for use, it was noted that the domains and categories used in it were more suited to the context of advanced industrial democracies. Therefore, a dedicated Indian code book was created to fit the Indian context better. The above given example of Federalism emphasizes this point since there is a unique category of Jammu & Kashmir was added. Issues and questions related to this subject are always mentioned specifically in manifestos, making it a separately identified category of its own, which was required to be shown in the coding process as well.

Along with coding, we use the word count of each sub-domain to quantify the space dedicated to each topic. In using word count as the parameter of analysis, there is the possibility that certain issues or topics are written in manifestos with more verbosity as compared to others. For instance, if there are 100 words written about the generic importance of Issue A and only 10 words for a decisive statement on Issue B, using word count might show that the party prioritizes Issue A over Issue B, which may or may not be factually correct. Therefore, during coding, it is being assumed that the entire manifesto of a party has been written by one person or a team of persons representing the political party and their stance on issues is deliberate and meaningful.

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Figure 2.1: An illustration of coding process of the manifesto text

Table 2.2: An illustration of recording process of the manifesto text Page Word Domain Category Code Notes No. Count Democracy: Electoral 131 Freedom and Democracy 202 84 Positive Reforms Development and Quality Regional 131 611 25 Northeast of Life Development Political System and 131 Judiciary 405 31 NJAC Governance Development and Quality Welfare State 131 606 50 Aadhar, NRC of Life Expansion

The purpose of the Notes column is to note down the specifics of the statement or issue being considered, in a manner that is replicable and succinct. Point No. 27 from the above example comes under the category of Regional Development in the domain of Development and Quality of Life. But since it specifically talks about Northeastern part of India, marking it as Northeast in the Notes column also opens the possibility of issue or intra category-based research in the future. In general, the coding process followed the motto of ‘specific over generic’, paying close attention to matching specific issues with their specialized sub-domains.

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Some categories in the codebook are inherently positional. For example - ‘Employment: Positive’. This clarifies the party’s stance: bent positively towards increasing employment. But it is possible that their methods of reaching the same goal may be different or contrasting. Here, neutral categories come into play. For example - the category of ‘Free Market Economy’. Any criticism or praise of this topic will both be marked under this category. A party holding the stance against privatization and another holding a completely opposite stance will both be placed here. The Notes section is used to keep track of the varying positions of parties, to capture nuances in party positions that might not be fully captured under the sub- domains. Such meticulous data entry also gives us the flexibility to expand the sub-domain categories if the analyses necessitates it.

Analysis

The output presented here focusses on understanding intra-party variations in topics emphasized, the relative space accorded to each and the temporal changes therein. For analysis of inter party comparison, the research will be focused on the 6 years for which manifestos of all major political parties are available currently. While each domain measures a unique issue, for ease of analyses and presentation, we have combined similar or inter-connected themes with each other to come up with a list of 5 domains, shown below-

1. Economy 2. Freedom and Democracy + Social Fabric and Culture 3. Security + External Relations 4. Development + Social Groups 5. Federalism + Political System and Governance

Detailed analysis of the first three merged domains has been discussed below, both for intra and inter party comparison. Rest of the domains have been analysed at the end for a comprehensive understanding of the sub categories and the generic developments in these sectors.

Total number of words Figure 2.2: Approximate number of words in manifestos since 1951

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This graph shows the total number of words in the manifestos over the years. While there is no continuous trend, the overall increase since 1951 has been manifold. Left manifestos (that of the CPI and the CPI(M) used to be extremely long in the 1950s and 1960s, hitting the 10,000-15,000-word mark at times. They have reduced in length till 2009 but the length has picked up again in the past two national elections, mainly because of the longer manifestos of CPI(M). BJP manifestos were concise till the 1970s, the length peaked in 1980s and 1990s with 25,000 words at a point and even though they have reduced in length since, they have remained consistently detailed. Length of Congress manifestos has constantly increased since the past 4 national elections, substantially exceeding the other two parties in the last Lok Sabha election.

Thematic Trends Figure 2.3: Trends of major domain categories since 1951

In terms of comparing the level of importance of all domains for all the political parties, Development (including the smaller domain of ‘Social Groups’) holds the lion’s share of the word count with approximately 40% of all words in manifestos in recent years dedicated to this domain by all political parties. This is followed by Economy with generally 25-30% words dedicated to this topic and its sub categories.

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Figure 2.4: Domain-wise comparison between all 3 parties

Political Systems and Governance (plus Federalism) hold around 20% of the word share; here the sub-categories include generic criticism of other parties and emphasis on competence or praise of the party under consideration. Security, External Relations and Social Fabric (plus Democracy) get the least number of words overall. This general trend seems to hold for all parties and there isn’t any discernible pattern apart over the decades.

Domain – Economy

Economy is the second largest domain in terms of overall word share. When talking about Economy, political parties usually discuss overall economic policy that should be followed in the country. The focus can be on a Free Market Economy with liberalization, privatization, disinvestment, ease of doing business and incentives for easier trade. Some parties also prioritize Pro State Intervention with policies like self-reliance, boosting domestic production in Indian industry, adopting an attitude of protectionism especially towards small industries and local artisans and improving the conditions of public sector enterprises. The agricultural sector and farmers are a major focus in this domain, with detailed descriptions of the policies and schemes to improve the agricultural sector. This can include irrigation, infrastructure, crop insurance, technology and education, crop insurance, incentives to farmers like loan waivers and agricultural modernization. Labour Rights are another important category with topics like working conditions, changing demands and Labour laws, facilities for workers especially for women and children and changing industrial conditions. Economic Goals include reforms related to the financial sector, banking sector, foreign trade, taxation, fiscal deficit, etc. Sustainability/Climate Change/Environment includes conversations about greenhouse gas emissions, adoption of methods of growth which align with environmental protection and better techniques of sustainable development. Finally, the category of Land includes topics like land reforms, tenancy reforms and land ownership for more equitable distribution of land resources.

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Figure 2.5: Sub-categories under Economy for the Left

Left has consistently taken a Pro state-intervention stance when it comes to the Economy. The proportion of words has certainly reduced by half since 1991 but they are still much higher than BJP or INC. Congress has a visible free market tilt in recent years with almost no mention of Pro State Intervention for 3 consecutive years. Pro state intervention does come back with a 10% word share in 2019. BJP also mentions Free Market Economy substantially; the presence of Pro State Intervention is regularly mentioned in the specific context of Make in India and for the welfare of small and medium enterprises.

Agriculture and Farmers are of equal and high importance to all the parties with almost 20% of the Economy words being dedicated to this category. Interestingly, BJP has dedicated almost 50% of its words in Economy to this category in 2019, which is 4 times more than that of 2014. This suggests a relation between issue-emphasis in manifestos and legislative performance in power. What is said in the manifesto can therefore be a blue-print of policy-decisions for the coming years.

Labour Rights are a constant priority for the Left every year, while they are usually a token mention for BJP and INC. Left parties also talk about Land consistently, usually with respect to land and tenancy reforms. It is worth noting that these issues, especially that of Labour Rights, have not undergone substantial change in their relative emphasis over the 16 election cycles for which the manifestos have been analysed.

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Figure 2.6: Sub-categories under Economy for the BJP

Economic Goals are prioritized by BJP significantly. This can include reform of the financial sector, banking sector, foreign trade, taxation, fiscal deficit, etc. Congress also talks about economic goals but not as much as former while Left parties barely mention this category though the election of 2019 was a notable exception.

Finally, Sustainability/Climate Change is a recent addition for all political parties especially since the last 3 national elections. The category is still very miniscule but must be mentioned, due to its relevance to the current conversation.

Figure 2.7:Sub-categories under Economy for the Congress

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Domain - External Relations + Security

External Relations primarily deals with four categories. First, Foreign Special Relationships which includes any favourable or negative mention of relations with other countries. All country specific topics are included in this category. All political parties consistently mention issues related to Pakistan, China, USA and other neighbouring countries of South Asia. Second, External Influence includes any talk about a state or international organization exerting political, military or financial influence on another state, issues of sovereignty, neo-colonialism and decolonization. Pro US tilt in foreign policy and independence in policy decisions is discussed here. Third, Military includes mentions of increasing or decreasing military expenditure or manpower, welfare of serving and retired soldiers like the issue of pension, modernization, weapons and armaments as well as statements about nuclear weapons and treaties. The fourth category of World Peace and Internationalism includes goals of peace and any conversation about prevention of war. Questions of international and regional cooperation, mainly relating to regional grouping like SAARC, BRICS, ASEAN and United Nations and its sub organizations are included here. Reform of the UN, statements about Indian diaspora and other international issues of importance are discussed here.

Figure 2.8: Sub-categories under External Relations+ Security for the Left

For Left Parties, maximum words are dedicated to External Influence and Foreign Special Relationships. There is direct criticism of India’s pro USA tilt in foreign policy, neo imperialism and its negative impact on domestic affairs; they particularly emphasize building better relations with China and Russia over the US and Israel.

For Congress, all categories are well distributed. External Influence is barely mentioned in most years but there is a significant jump in 2019 with approximately 9% words being dedicated to this category. Congress mentions non alignment, independent foreign policy and including experts and scholars in foreign policy decisions and Indian Foreign Service.

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Figure 2.9: Sub-categories under External Relations+ Security for the Congress

For BJP, Military and Internationalism are a greater priority, with 15-20% words dedicated to these categories each year. There is basic talk about relations with other countries but no mention of External Influence in recent years, showing their opinion of a pragmatic foreign policy.

Security domain includes the category of Law and Order which focuses on police, and domestic criminal activity and how it can be tackled in a better manner through reform and procedural improvement. Any opinion about methods of justice and specific crimes or criminal issues like drugs are discussed here. The category of Terrorism is explanation enough. Parties usually discuss prevention of attacks, better security and justice for victims and punishment for terrorists. Internal Security includes statements related to tackling Left Wing Extremism or Naxalism and Insurgency in India especially in North East. Earlier manifestos include references to Punjab’s insurgency problem. Issues of illegal immigration from neighbouring nations and armed struggle and instability in specific regions of India is mentioned here. The category of National Security Goals is related to any generic mention of improving border security, methods of improving security architecture and institutional effectiveness at the national level.

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Figure 2.10: Sub-categories under External Relations+ Security for the BJP

When it comes to Security, Law and Order is mentioned every year by BJP consistently, but not much by Congress and Left. National Security Goals are noticeably absent from INC and Left, though this category appears in 2019 for these parties, again signaling the impact of contemporary context on official party platforms. For BJP, National Security Goals are a usual presence, even if it is a small mention. Internal Security is consistently mentioned by all parties. There is no consistent trend for the category of Terrorism but it is mentioned in 2009 by all parties, possibly due to the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. It is again mentioned in 2019 when elections were held in close succession of the Pulwama attack in Kashmir.

Domain - Freedom and Democracy + Social Fabric and Culture

In the domain of Freedom and Democracy, the category of Freedom and Human Rights includes statements related to individual freedoms. Criticism of Emergency era restrictions, right to freedom of expression, civil and political rights, issues of preventive detention laws like AFSPA, UAPA, POTA, freedom of press, right to equality and freedom of religion are some of the most commonly discussed topics in this category. The second category of Democracy includes topics related to praise of Indian democracy or criticism of the same. Democratic institutions, their independent decision making and electoral procedures and reforms like simultaneous elections, anti-defection laws, free and fair elections, issues related to Election Commission of India are also included here.

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Figure 2.11: Sub-categories under Freedom + Social Fabric for the Left

For the domain of Freedom and Democracy, Freedom and Human Rights dominated the Left and BJP manifestos during the emergency era, as criticism of Congress and Indira Gandhi was openly rampant. BJP has not dedicated many words to this category in recent years but Left and Congress have criticized BJP in 2014 and 2019 in this respect. For Democracy, BJP brings up electoral reforms but it is not a major focus for this party. The Left and Congress have focused on institutional integrity and undemocratic methods of governance under BJP rule.

Figure 2.12: Sub-categories under Freedom + Social Fabric for the Congress

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The domain of Social Fabric/National Unity/Diversity/Culture has various categories of which Secularism/Communal Harmony usually has a significant word share. Maintaining harmonious relations between different religious communities of India, ensuring that the right to freedom of religion is guaranteed and any criticism or favour of the type of secularism practiced in India comes under this category. Rights of Muslims and the issue of Hindu-Muslim amity are mentioned regularly. Statements related to India’s freedom struggle and independence movement and encouragement towards national pride and patriotism come under National Way of Life/Nationalism/Patriotism. The category of Hindutva/Hinduism/Hindu Culture is also important. Statements related to BJP’s ideology of cultural nationalism, and core issues like the Ram Mandir at Ayodhya, protection of cows, conservation of river Ganga and statements related to ancient Hindu achievements are included here. Direct criticism of Hindutva by other parties is also relevant in this context. India’s diversity is regularly mentioned by all parties and the ability to remain united irrespective of linguistic, religious, tribal, and other differences is included under Cultural Diversity and Unity. Statements related to caste equality and the policy of reservation come under the category of Social Justice. Any discussion about media, cinema, arts, sports and heritage sites is also included in this domain under the category of Other Issues.

Under the domain of Social Fabric and Culture, Secularism/Communal Harmony is the most dominant category under Congress and Left manifestos especially under BJP rule. Nationalism/Patriotism was emphasized by BJP immediately post-Independence and again in 2009 and 2014 but was conspicuously absent in the period in between. Similar trend is observable for the category of Hindutva/Hindu Culture for the BJP. This was a category of focus for many years post-Independence, disappeared from manifestos for a while and saw a kind of resurgence since 2009.

Figure 2.13: Sub-categories under Freedom + Social Fabric for the BJP

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Cultural Diversity and Unity is mentioned by all parties nearly every year. The category of Other Issues includes aspects related to Art, Culture, Sports, Media, Cinema and Heritage Sites. This category holds a major chunk of the word share in recent years for both BJP and Congress.

Miscellaneous domains

The rest of the domains do not present us with substantial temporal trends, across parties or within. One reason for this is the generic nature of topics under consideration, which often get merely a token mention in the template followed by all parties. However, we have presented a broad analysis of each of the remaining domains in this section.

In the domain of Social Groups, it is evident that all possible groups of people who are considered disadvantaged or who need special welfare schemes are grouped and talked about. Each of these groups have thus been coded separately. The category of SC/ST/OBC usually deals with statements about upliftment of these communities and reservations. Women includes issues of gender discrimination, reservation in electoral bodies, laws for protection of women, schemes and policies for their benefit, entrepreneurship, health and education facilities. Youth category includes references to reduce unemployment, increase participation of youth in democracy by skill building, education, vocational training and sports. Children category includes topics for child welfare, reducing child Labour, their health and education, protection from abuse and exploitation and other related issues. The category of Religious Minorities predominantly talks about Muslims and their rights, improving the socioeconomic situation of their community and religious issues of importance which need to be addressed separately for all other minority religions. Any other minority groups which aren’t classified on the basis of religion like linguistic minorities are discussed under the category of Underprivileged Minority Groups. The category of Persons with Disabilities includes references to better infrastructure for differently abled individuals, reservation, education and other policies for their benefit. LGBT/Transgenders category usually includes the issue of upliftment of Transgender community with occasional references to decriminalization of same sex relationships.

Equal importance is given by all parties to SC/ST, Women and Children. One can pick up almost any manifesto at random and there will certainly be one or two pages dedicated to these categories. Another thing to observe is that the category of LGBT/Transgenders has recently come up in manifestos since 2014, especially as a social group which need special attention and welfare support. The number of words dedicated to this category is very little but it is a new social group that is getting the attention of all parties and this is important to note.

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Figure 2.14: Social Group across years and parties

The topic of Development and Quality of Life, is the biggest domain being studied with the maximum number of sub categories (i.e. 12) which range from topics like Education and Health to dynamic topics like Information Technology, Communication, Infrastructure and Science and Technology. All welfare schemes, governmental policies, proposed bills and measures for reform are included according to category. Generic mentions of development are captured under the Development category but apart from that, categories like Health, Education, Rural Development, Urban Development, Food and PDS are also included. Physical Infrastructure includes any reference to building roads, transport, energy, ports and industrial networks. Science and Technology includes statements related to the same like better technical education, research and development, and higher technological aspirations. Specific statements regarding internet connectivity and modern methods of communication are captured under IT, Telecom and Communication category. Finally, the category of Welfare State Expansion deals with public service, need to increase social security and welfare schemes for the benefit of the public.

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Figure 2.15: Development and Quality of Life Social Group across years and parties

The domain of Political System and Governance includes five dominant categories. Statements related to administrative reforms like streamlining of bureaucracy, lateral entry to civil service, improvements in political systems and governance methods, budgetary adjustments, all come under Governmental and Administrative Efficiency. The category of Political Corruption includes mentions of public sector scams, and any mention of reducing widespread corruption by political parties. Political Authority: Party Competence and Personal Competence deal with statements related to the ability of a party or party leaders to govern the country and the incompetence of other parties and party leaders in the same. Any general self-appreciation and criticism of other parties and their leaders are included in this category. Finally, the fifth category of Judiciary tackles statements related to judicial reform. Issues of high number of pending cases, extended time spent on trials, lack of accountability and transparency in judicial appointments are usually included here.

In the domain of Political System and Governance, most of the words are dedicated to the category of Party Competence, for all parties. This is mainly because general self-praise or general criticism of other political parties and appeals for votes, come under this category. This is followed by Corruption and some mention of Judicial Reforms, usually mentioned regarding judicial appointments, accountability and judicial delays and solutions for the same.

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Figure 2.16: Political System and Governance across years and parties

Finally, the domain of Federalism is divided into four categories. Of these, Centre-State Relations and Local Self Government are the two most important categories. The former includes references to financial distribution of resources, discussions of tax distribution, subjects handled by centre and state respectively, centre-state disputes, methods to ensure independence of state governments, the position of Governor and misuse of provisions like President’s Rule. The latter includes statements related to strengthening of urban and rural local bodies, regular elections, better financial allocations and involvement of women and youth in local bodies. Any statement related to Jammu & Kashmir is categorized under the category of the same name. It includes references to continuation or abrogation of Article 370, autonomy to Ladakh and Jammu, internal security issues, state level politics, elections and any other immediate matter of concern. Statements related to cooperation between states, resolving disputes between two or more states and building platforms like Inter State Councils for better multilateral interactions between states are included in the fourth category of Interstate Relations.

Maximum words have clearly been about Centre-State Relations followed by Jammu & Kashmir (which is a separate category altogether so that such persistent issues of India can be analysed later separately and data is easier to obtain) and Rural Local Government.

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Figure 2.17: Federalism across years and parties

Conclusion

While the data collected and presented above is a unique endeavour in the study of Indian politics, it is not without its limitations. Some of these limitations are temporary and will be resolved as further analysis takes place, while others are more endemic to the methodology adopted.

First is the inter-play between positional sub-domains and generic ones. Parties do not always have well-defined positions on issues, which makes their positional classification problematic. In our current schema, we have used a hybrid technique of positional plus thematic issues, but as the analysis moves deeper into the question of temporal shifts and comparison on a specific scale, the former allows for greater flexibility. We are therefore identifying and expanding such sub-domains, while ensuring their relevance and comparability across parties. Second, there are some overlapping categories which make domain analysis tricky. Specifically, any mention of Pakistan is currently placed under the category of External Relations but the language used by parties also make it a candidate for Security or Military, which are separate categories across other interrelated domains. Third, inter-coder reliability is an important feature of such coding-based data sets. It ensures uniformity and comparability for other users, while also quantifying the level of error in coding. We aim to conduct inter-coder reliability tests with trained coders in the coming year.

In spite of these limitations, an in-depth study of Indian political parties can be very illuminating for the field of political science in general, and the use of manifestos as the tool of study can actually help

PAGE 49 ANNUAL REPORT 2020 both parties and voters build a better conversation with each other. Analysis of manifestos can show us what is missing from them, how they need to be reformed, what the voters need to see to take better decisions, should the voters read manifestos or not, whether manifestos are a mere tradition with no functional meaning or do they shape a party’s direction and motivation to act? Such deep questions need an exhaustive analysis and that is the aim of this study.

Apart from the direct aims of the project which have been stated in the report and shown in the analysis, other future prospects can also be considered at a later stage. This can include research on some selected issues of importance and how they have been handled in the past by political parties in terms of their stance and tone of action. Further, important state level political parties can also be studied in a similar manner to study how they’ve held on to positions of dominance at the state level despite strong competition from national level competitors. Since we are coding manifestos of both Communist Party of India and Communist Party of India (Marxist) for the Left, there can be research done within the Indian Left parties, to study what is different and what is similar in terms of positions taken and how this ideology impacts their statements. Research can also be undertaken to analyse whether there is a difference in the way political parties write and release manifestos when they are in opposition and when they are in power. Do parties in opposition have more critical manifestos? Are their statements more detail oriented? Do they give practical solutions and answer the ‘how’ more than ruling parties? Is there a distinct type of method of manifesto being followed by specific parties? Such questions can be answered through the data being collected here.

Further, other projects being handled by our team like the study of the decline of the Congress Party will also be meaningfully supplemented by this project. Coding and analysis of Congress manifestos especially in comparison to BJP in recent years can shine some light on the changing circumstances of Congress Party.

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References

Adams, J. &.-T. (2009). Policy Adjustment by Parties in Response to Rival Parties' Policy Shifts: Spatial Theory and the Dynamics of Party Competition in Twenty-Five Post-War Democracies. . British Journal of Political Science,.

Adams, J. E.-T. (2014). Do Voters Respond to Party Manifestos or to a Wider Information Environment? An Analysis of Mass-Elite Linkages on European Integration. American Journal of Political Science.

Ashworth, R. E. (2000). Party manifestos and local accountability: A content analysis of local election pledges in Wales, Local Government Studies. Local Government Studies.

Bohlken, A. T. (2010). The Paradox of Decentralization: Internal Party Organization and the Political Logic of Decentralization in India. Retrieved from ProQuest: https://search.proquest.com/openview/87eac67fbc5f15baaf5fae721793b57e/1?pq- origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y

Burger, A. S. (1969). Opposition in a dominant-party system : a study of the Jan Sangh, the Praja Socialist Party, and the Socialist Party in Uttar Pradesh, India. ANU Press.

Chhibber, P., Jensenius, F. R., & Suryanarayan, P. (2014). Party organization and party proliferation in India. Party Politics.

Eder, N., Jenny, M., & Müller, W. C. (2017). Manifesto functions: How party candidates view and use their party's central policy document. Electoral Studies.

Lijphart, A. (1984). Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Rovny, J. (2012). Who emphasizes and who blurs? Party strategies in multidimensional competition. European Union Politics.

Schattschneider, E. E. (1942). Party government. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc.

S T U D EN T PO LITICS IN IND IA

STUDYING CAMPUS REPRESENTATION IN GOVERNMENT UNIVERSITIES PAGE 52 ANNUAL REPORT 2020

Student Politics in India

Introduction

olitics in university spaces has the potential to shape the subjectivities of generations of students. P Spilling over from campus spaces, student politics can collectively influence social and political events in their own unique way (Martelli & Garlayte, 2019). With a plethora of student-led protests witnessed in the country in recent times, campus activism has become a topic of vigorous debate and discussion. However, student elections and campus activism have received scant scholarly attention in the country’s contemporary social sciences.

In this report, we seek to address this lacuna by analyzing union elections held in government- funded universities across the country.

Our analysis follows three thematic divisions: participation, competitiveness, and representation. We analyse campus politics through each of these. These themes hold consequence for politics beyond that of campus spaces. Participation and representation are important parameters for judging the strength of a democratic polity. As India’s larger political system undergoes substantive and unprecedented change (Chhibber and Verma, 2019), a large part of this transformation relates to these two indicators. Opening up of the electoral space along with greater participation of vulnerable groups such as women and traditionally backward communities has been at the forefront of leading this change. For politics on campuses too, these questions are of relevance. Similarly, the question of competitiveness also deserves greater attention in the context of student politics.

There are degrees of continuity and intriguing divergences between campus politics and state or national politics. Understanding the former, however, is important not just because of these linkages; university campuses also have the potential to indirectly impact the larger democratic discourse. Indian campuses have long produced charismatic and erudite young leaders who have an outsized impact on their contemporary socio-political environment. Scholars trace the emergence of a youth political class with the birth of the modern educational institutions as (Rudolph, Rudolph, and Ahmed, 1971). The beginning of the student movements in India is often traced to the Student's Scientific and Historical Society founded by Dadabhai Naoroji in 1848. With a history dating back to more than 170 years, organized student movements continue to play a crucial role in shaping the nation's political consciousness.

Some of our tallest post-Independence leaders find their beginnings on campuses. From Samajwadi Party supremo Mulayam Singh Yadav to Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) stalwart and former Union Finance Minister Arun Jaitley, CPI (M) General Secretary Sitaram Yechury and RJD President Lalu Prasad Yadav, all started their political career as student leaders.

We find campus politics to be riddled with interesting dichotomies: a large part of the student population supports the presence of politics on campuses but few avail the assistance of student unions (SU). Male and female students are equally likely to be interested in politics and appraisal criteria for male and female candidates also remains similar. Yet, there is a glaring absence of female representation on most campus unions. Student unions, on the whole, remain largely unrepresentative and often become fiefdoms

PAGE 53 ANNUAL REPORT 2020 of particular communities and political groups, as our analysis of SU election data suggests. We also find elections to be increasingly competitive, though this does not translate into greater representation. Some of the challenges of high expenditure and existing political networks does not allow for politics in campus to become truly egalitarian.

This report can be broken down into the three parts. First, we explore the breadth of literature relating to the conceptualization and functioning of student politics. In the second section of the report, we discuss the various methodologies adopted to undertake this research. In the final part, we present our findings, based on analysis of the data collected through RTIs and an original online survey.

Conceptualizing student politics

The idea of the university as a political space became dominant in the 1960s and 1970s in the political sciences especially when students took to the streets in the US and Western Europe in “new left” and “anti-war” protests (Bottomore, 1970) and in democratic movements in Africa and Asia (Altbach, 1984). In recent years, campus activism has frequently been in the national headlines in India and remains a heavily debated issue. One side regards it as the emergence of youth political consciousness while the other side holds that the growing student unrest and dissent in the country is the handiwork of a few political parties fomenting unrest. These views are often also divided across strict partisan lines which colours campus politics in the hues of national political parties.

Campus politics as community activity

There is, however, a need to understand students as an independent community. Martelli and Garlayte conceptualize the student community on campus as a generational community. This includes large groups of non-students, teachers, alumni, peers, relatives contributing to educational life, friendships and more formal organizational linkages, as well as neighbourhood ecologies, infrastructure businesses, coaching agencies, vocational training centres or placement structures tied to the educational field, NGOs, and political organisations, cadres, and leaders supporting student politics (Martelli & Garlayte, 2019).

Thinking of the campus as a natural community means that definitions are set by its proximity to the socio-political space structured around class, caste, gender, religion, economic aspirations, social upbringing, and muscle politics (Jeffrey and Young, 2013; Ruud, 2014; Kuttig, 2019). We can use this typology to classify various Indian universities; premier universities like Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS), Banaras Hindu University (BHU) are tilted towards a clear ideological leaning to their campuses and can be called political communities. Natural communities can be seen more in prominent campuses like Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) where there is less activism and more association with respect to the space. The emergence of the youth as a new political class can also be attributed to the rewards of industrial economies for a literate, knowledgeable and skilled workforce. It is an aspiration for a democratic citizen to be informed and responsible (Rudolph, Rudolph & Ahmed, 1971).

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Campus politics as career ladder

Another aspect of student politics relates to its role as a ladder for a political career. One can look at student political actors as rational individuals who aspire to invest time and resources in a lucrative political career (Anderson, 2016). These political actors become the leadership that propels protests by the larger student body; thus political considerations of the day will always loom large in any significant protest activity. In the introduction, we highlighted how student politics has always acted as a breeding ground for future politicians. In spaces where direct electoral competition does not take place, agitation and patronage become important avenues to win the favour of political parties (Martelli & Garlayte, 2019). The importance of these strategies can be exemplified in the case of Aligarh Muslim University (AMU). The Aligarh campaign allowed certain student leaders active in the protest movement to acquire significant political capital outside university circles. Their status as AMU student leaders made them enviable allies for the Muslim religious and political organizations (Gautier, 2019). Individuals studying in regional universities located in small towns often participate to get political mileage through networking and brokering, even if their participation in those activities has nothing to do with social change or service (Banerjee, 2008).

If student politics is the first step towards becoming a career politican, mobilizing support would be at the heart of this endeavour. In a compact space with limited resources, how do student leaders mobilise supporters? This is often done through the use of quid pro quo material exchanges, assisting with administrative requirements, or simply through ideological appeals. In Bangladesh, Andersen (2016) finds that students looking for political careers and relations are important mediators in allocating hostel seats to students. The appeals made by leaders aren’t always materialistic, ideological appeals are also made, with references to the discourse of nationalism or secularism. For instance, Ahmad (2010) indicates that the campus-based radical student organisation Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) emerged in India’s Aligarh Muslim University because it did not have to abide by the democratic beliefs of Muslim constituencies outside campus.

In India, the major student political activity is centered around the institutes which are funded by public money. This structure complicates the relationship of student politics with the state administration (Martelli & Garlayte, 2019). The notion that student politics is disruptive and students should focus on their studies, instead of engaging in politics, stems from both the publicly funded nature of institutes, and from the methods used by students to voice their opinions. Such an altercation is not uncommon. Students are regularly labelled as deviant by the members of the dominant culture (Becker, 1963). This was especially visible during the anti-war student movement in the United States in the 1960s and continues to resonate in present-day India where groups of protesting students have been perniciously labelled ‘anti-national’ or ‘tukde tukde gang’ by partisan actors. Self-perception of students, as we find in the following sections, is vastly different. In our analysis too, however, partisan affiliations play an important role in shaping the nature of student politics in the country.

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Method Note

We began our data collection by filing Right to Information Applications with university administrations in 100 campuses spread across the country (template for RTI application attached in the Appendix). With these RTI applications, which are one of our dimensions for looking at data, we primarily aim to seek information about the candidates, total votes they got, age and gender of the candidates contesting university elections, their political affiliations and total electors. Out of the total 100 RTI applications, a majority of universities did not submit the information sought, replying by stating that ‘they don't maintain data for more than one year’, while only 12 universities provided information of a few years. We have taken only the information that we received from these universities into consideration, and ignored those responses which provided data just for a year.

The major hurdle while collecting data for university elections in India is that there is no set of rules about formalising or maintaining the university elections statistics. The non-formalisation of data in educational institutes limited our scope of trying more methods. In addition to filing of RTI applications mentioned above, others data collection methods include primary research from web archives and student wings’ offices, as well as unstructured interviews with student leaders.

We also document caste membership of elected leaders in student elections using their surnames as markers of community identity. Similar attempts to identify the caste by names was done by Anderson & Pant in 1963. There are a few issues in identifying caste by common surnames, such as the surname ‘Singh’, which is used commonly by people belonging to general, backward castes and scheduled castes in north India. However, it is easy to identify Gujjars, Jat, Muslims, Punjabi Khatri, SCs, Yadavs, Brahmins, Kurmis, etc. by their surnames (Anderson & Pant, 1963).

Using web archival research, we tried to trace current involvement of previous student leaders in the political sphere. As often claimed, student politics provides a breeding ground for future politics. We wanted to check this hypothesis, which required a rigorous amount of data collection. We collected information about presidents of some universities. We traced their political involvement post their election to student council/union. With the help of the Association for Democratic Reforms’ web archives, election certificates and news archives, we managed to collect primary data regarding this. We also adopted a reverse pyramid approach to trace MLAs who started their political career as student leaders. This is based on the short introduction that all elected MLAs submit to the legislative assembly. This short description of all MLAs of Uttar Pradesh can be easily accessed from the UP legislative assembly website. We used this approach for the UP Legislative Assembly from the year 1985 to 2017, covering around 9 elections. UP, which has seen a long history of prominent student and youth leaders, can become an important microcosm for the study of patters in student politics.

To get a clear and better understanding of party politics inside these campuses, we conducted unstructured interviews with those students who are associated or have been associated with student wings for the past few years. This was done to get a glimpse into their mobilisation strategy, their day-to-day campaigns and see how these wings build their cadre and units.

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This aspect of student life was also supplemented using original data collected through an online survey, conducted between October and November 2020 (questionnaire in Appendix). Through the online survey, we focus on the perception and thoughts of the students about students’ elections and campus democracy. The survey majorly covers questions around election expenditures, degree of violence in polls, voter bribing, campaign methods, and respondents’ interest in students’ politics and related activities. It also has questions about respondents’ personal background, caste and annual family income, among others. To reach out to respondents, we used social media websites such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp.

Analysis

The universities in India, based on their funding, are currently divided into four broader categories: central universities, state universities, deemed universities and privately-owned universities. In this report, we tried to analyse many components of student union elections over 100 universities on different variables - age, vote, women participation, caste, margin of victories, their involvement in mainstream politics - based on the information received through RTI applications.

In India, top posts of university unions or councils are either elected directly, and/or selected by indirect elections or appointed by the administration. Our data from several universities suggests that most state and central funded universities hold elections to elect members of councils or unions - directly or indirectly. Student elections in universities did not have a set of rules until 2005, when the Supreme Court intervention brought out new guidelines, widely known as Lyngdoh Committee Guidelines.

Our analysis in this report is based on three basic questions: participation, competitiveness, and representation. We study the latter two themes using RTI application and web archival data while using survey responses to study the question of participation and interest in campus politics.

How Competitive are Student Union Elections?

We observe a steady increase in the number of candidates fighting SU elections over the years. The mean number of candidates fighting elections varies largely across campuses. While the number of candidates has gone up, this does not necessarily mean that the competition has become tougher. We find that there has also been a steady increase in the difference between votes received by the winning candidate and the runner up, indicating that voting preferences remain largely skewed in favour of the former and competitiveness remains low. The increasing number of candidates could also indicate the presence of dummy candidates that are fielded by main unions to cut opponent vote share.

In student union elections, the most sought after post is that of president followed by the secretary. Winning margins of the candidates are consistent across posts. In our analysis, we also found that the main fight remains between two candidates. This is especially seen in electing presidents, where the largest share of votes accrues to only the top two candidates while the rest of the candidates get marginal share.

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Figure 3.1: Total Number of candidates for various posts of SU elections, 1988-2019

Figure 3.2: Mean Number of candidates participating in the Student Union Presidential elections

Although the Lyngdoh Committee strictly prohibits parties and organisations from fighting Student Union elections, in practice, the winning candidates are usually backed by political parties (further explained in survey analysis). Therefore, a student election is also fought along student wings/organisational lines of state and national parties. Typically, the political space on campuses is quite crowded: there are more than 20 wings active on JNU campus, and more than 5 in the DU and TISS campuses. In spite of being a politically charged space, it is interesting to note that in our analysis of responses received from survey: 80 % of respondents said that they aren’t members of any student wing or organization. Yet these groups dominate when it comes to mobilising support for their candidate or for protests.

Representation and patterns of group dominance

We find that elections in the educational campuses across the country are often dominated by groups, sometimes by caste groups and other times by regional groupings, just like mainstream politics. We start our analysis with Delhi University, one of the premier universities in India with over 4,00,000 enrolments. Politics on campus is intrinsically enmeshed with that of the national capital and the chief contest is often between student wings of the BJP-RSS (the Akhil Bhartiya Vidyarthi Parishad, henceforth ABVP), the INC

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(National Students Union of India or NSUI) and the Left Parties (All India Student Association/Federation- AISA/F and others). Jats and Gujjars from the most dominant communities in Delhi University Student Union (DUSU) elections :from 2013-14 to 2019-20, DUSU has seen only Jat and Gujjar presidents. The percentage vote share of Jat and Gujjar candidates also remains relatively high compared to the members of the other caste groups. Dominance of these two castes is not just limited to the presidential post but can also be seen across the other three posts of DUSU. This trend of dominance is visible across universities: in our analysis of state universities of Punjab (Panjab University and Guru Nanak Dev University) and Rajasthan University, Jats are the most dominant group on campuses when it comes to holding positions.

Figure 3.3: Caste-wise segmentation of contesting students in DUSU elections (2013-2019)

Figure 3.4: Dominance of Jat and Gujjar community across all posts in DUSU elections (2013-2019)

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Male dominance in student politics

The state of women in Indian politics shows us that they are severely underrepresented in all the political positions. Since 1990, the female voting percentage has increased but it has still not translated to larger representation in the political sphere (Figueras, 2011). In our analysis of data received from various universities, we tried to capture the female representation and compare it with the various election trends seen in the legislative assembly elections and parliamentary elections. It is also useful to ask if the university serves as a space of political incubation for females. Do these trends show any promise of larger female representation in the political sphere of India?

Figure 3.5: Percentage of female MPs and MLAs in Delhi legislative assembly (2015-2019)

In DUSU election data from 2013 to 2019, data shows women candidates were able to secure any posts only 7 times, and they did not hold presidential posts anytime between 2013 and 2019. If we see the percentage of female member of sitting MPs in the current and previous Lok Sabha, the percentage of female candidates winning is 14 % in 2019 and 11 % in 2014. Even if we look at the assembly elections of the NCT of Delhi, where the university is located, the percentage of female MLAs was just 11% in 2020 and 8% in 2015. If we take data received from other universities in India into consideration, the picture of female representation is not very different from the DUSU elections. Data received from other universities through RTIs also shows us a similar trend, because a female president was elected in the direct elections only 9 times out of 84 times. The trend improves across other posts but it still remains significantly lower than male candidates.

If we look at the participation rate of women in the DUSU presidential elections and other universities, including other posts we see relatively low participation. The major challenges to the women joining politics are basically categorised into three dimensions. These are: perception of women’s capacities to join politics, the consequences of political engagement for the family’s reputation, and consequences of

PAGE 60 ANNUAL REPORT 2020 women’s political participation for their domestic responsibilities (Haug et al., 2020). All these together are responsible for stifling female participation in politics, and the same might be true even on campuses.

Party-led dominance

A frank and open discussion was needed to understand the control of major student campuses by prominent parties. Groups such as ABVP and NSUI have near complete dominance in most universities, and even the left groups such as AISA have a robust presence in many colleges. Most of the political discussion in such spaces gets mediated only through the forum of these party-affiliated student wings, which often divides the student body along partisan lines. Organic associations endemic to campus life do not, in such situations, find adequate opportunity. The question of representation thus has to include an inspection of diverse student wings on campus. For this, we used unstructured interviews with student leaders involved in campus politics. We share those insights in the current section.

ADG, who hails from Satna, a small city in Madhya Pradesh, gives account of how his organization, wing X, maintains a strong base in DU. “Elections in universities are often held in between 4-6 weeks of new sessions; personal bonds and interactions with the freshers in these starting 4-6 weeks is crucial because a major chunk of voters came from freshers.” “Wing X ensures that their message reaches from top to bottom, we make sure 2-3 students per department of college keep on interacting with new students - just like panna pramukhs - to make personal bonds and that lately convert into votes.” “Yeh sab hi karte hain”, (Every wing and candidate does this no matter what), he adds. Not all strategies rely on ideology however, as ADG also stresses on the role of winnability, recalling an incident from his days in DU. “A ‘purvanchal3’ candidate bargained very hard to get a ticket from us in 2015, but couldn’t get a chance; the same candidate then contested next year from wing Y for president’s post,”

A wing Y member who graduated last year from a north campus college in Delhi University (DU), VY, had a different view point when it comes to dominance of wing X in the campus for years. “A major chunk of the students enrolled in DU comes from adjacent states like Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan and North Eastern states - and all these states have become a stronghold of their party lately”, he opines. There thus appears to be a linkage between state or national elections and fortunes inside university boundaries. Such a relation precludes new and diverse voices from coming up, in the same way that competitiveness of national/state elections creates bottlenecks for outsider politicians.

The case of JNU, however, illustrates that alternate voices can thrive even without electoral patronage. SB, a PhD scholar and JNU veteran, finds the reason for continued Left-dominance in JNU, a stark contrast to the party’s electoral reality outside campus spaces, in the close relationship of student bodies and the faculty. Such a relationship not only safeguards most students against administrative excesses, but also grants a degree of legitimacy to student activities. The faculty-led role however also

3 Purvanchal is an important geographic subregion of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar that is within the larger Bhojpuri region. It comprises the eastern end of Uttar Pradesh and western part of Bihar.

PAGE 61 ANNUAL REPORT 2020 comes with its own limitations, the chief of which is that it hinders the independent nature of student politics, thereby similarly inhibiting organic associations as in the case of wing X or wing Y.

Party politics and university campuses

Delhi University Students’ Union (DUSU) has a history of producing leaders for the national capital and the country. University elections, that some may claim to be a reason for campus distress, often provide an incubation space for nascent politics. Universities like Delhi University, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Lucknow University, Allahabad University, and Osmania University have given many politicians to elections at the state and national levels.

A quick look at how DUSU presidents, that were elected between 1960-2019, managed to make their space in the political sphere will give a clear picture. Out of the total 61 presidents that were elected between 1960 to 2019, 3 managed to contest national polls and occupied cabinet positions in Central government, while 13 of the DUSU presidents are contesting or at some point of time contested state level elections in Delhi or in nearby states. 3 of them were actively involved in local level elections and some of them were elected as the heads of the urban local bodies. 11 former DUSU presidents are actively involved in politics and hold influential positions in their respective political parties. One out of all was an activist while 3 ex-DUSU presidents run businesses or are employed in different professions. The status of the other 25 is unknown.

Figure 3.6: Political futures of DUSU Presidents between 1960-2019

Polls at Delhi University are often a bipolar contest between the student wing of two national parties Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Indian National Congress (INC). Hence, most of the former DUSU presidents who joined politics in the later stage of their life are either from the BJP or the Congress. A quick look at the association of these former DUSU presidents will confirm this. In the DUSU elections from 1960-2019, the BJP’s student wing ABVP bagged the President post 26 times, that amounts to 46%, while the President was elected from the NSUI 19 times.

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Figure 3.7 : President student-wing association in DUSU elections 1960-2019

We see a similar trend when it comes to the political involvement of the JNU Students’ Union president in the last 20 years. Our data from 2000 to 2018 suggests that 50% JNUSU presidents continue to be in direct or indirect politics, while 29% choose academics as their future path post their election to the SU top post. It should be noted that that university did not go to polls in 2008 and 2006.

Figure 3.8: Political futures of JNUSU Presidents between 2000-2019

Educational institutions like Allahabad University, Lucknow University, and Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) among others, which are located in the densely populated state of Uttar Pradesh, are also credited with providing a platform for future politicians. But, lack of consolidated data on these lines from UP’s universities makes it difficult to confirm this trend. However, the state that sends 403 representatives to its legislative assembly has many names of leaders that started their political careers as student leaders.

Looking at the data of assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh from the year 1985 to 2017, which was the latest poll in the state, will give some interesting insights. In the last 9 state elections, on an average, 12 MLAs elected to the state assembly had student politics as their background. According to the available data, in the year 1985, 9 MLAs who had student politics as their background were elected in the state.

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Subsequently, 12 such MLAs were elected in 1989. Amid the mandir-masjid politics in the state, this trend saw a significant rise in the 1991 elections with 21 MLAs being elected to the lower house of the state with a student politics background.

In the subsequent years: 9, 13, 6 and 9 such MLAs were elected in the election years 1993, 1996, 2002 and 2007 respectively. With the return of the Samajwadi Party in 2012, the trend again saw a sudden increase in the representation of MLAs who started their political career as student leaders. 22 such MLAs were elected in the Sixteenth Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh in 2012. The BJP stormed to power in the state with a huge mandate in 2017 and the representation of MLAs who kicked off their career as student leaders witnessed a sharp dip as compared to the last election. In the last polls of the state, 11 MLAs with such a background, were elected to the Vidhan Sabha.

Over the period of 32 years spread over the last 9 elections, that is, 1985 to 2017, a total of 112 such MLAs who entered politics through university elections were elected to the Legislative Assembly. Out of this, 37% of such MLAs were elected on a BJP ticket, while 26% were fielded by the Samajwadi Party. 18% of such MLAs got elected while contesting on the ticket of the Congress. These figures quite strikingly reflect the political dominance in the state, thus clarifying the close link between campus contests and the states’ larger politics.

Interestingly, Mayawati’s Bahujan Samajwadi Party could only send one such MLA to the legislative assembly. The Lucknow headquartered party, the BSP, is among the very few national level parties without its frontal organization. The BSP has no youth wing or student wing, which is one of the important reasons for low representation of such MLAs from the party founded by Kanshi Ram.

Figure 3.9: UP MLAs with student politics background between 1985-2017

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Participation in student politics on campuses

In the previous sections, we talked about election data, party politics and future involvement of student leaders, which is one way of looking at student politics. In this section, we study these themes through the responses of students received in our online survey. The survey majorly covers questions around participation and interest of students in campus politics, their opinion on SU elections and their assessment of work done by SUs on their campuses.

The survey was carried out in the same 100 universities where we filed RTIs. The sample consisted of 547 students who are currently enrolled in these universities. Out of this sample, 364 respondents were from the universities where polls were held at least once in the last three years. We’ll call them Respondent Set 1.183 respondents were from the universities that had not held elections in the last three academic sessions, which we refer to as Respondent Set 2. The survey link was active between October and December 2020 and it was shared on various social media platforms and directly communicated to university administrations.

The sample received comprise of 58% male and 42% female respondents, with more than half of them belonging to the age bracket of 22-28 years. The religion-wise segregation of data is as follows–66% of the respondents are Hindu, 14% follow Islam, and 9% respondents submitted ‘No religion’. The sample consists of 44% respondents enrolled in Master’s programmes, 41% in Bachelor’s programmes, and 9% and 12% belonging to MPhil and PhD programmes respectively (details in Appendix).

Out of the total 547, over 100 respondents were from the national capital, New Delhi, while responses from states like Uttar Pradesh, Assam and Telangana range between 50-100. Punjab, Goa, and north eastern states do not find any representation in our survey. Our online survey covered over 300 districts of India. University wise classification reveals that over 20% respondents were from the University of Delhi, 8% and 6% respondents were from University of Hyderabad and Assam University respectively.

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4-6% respondents were from Universities like Gauhati, Banaras Hindu University, JNU and Jamia Millia Islamia.

Figure 3.10: Spread of survey responses

While student politics is a crowded field with many political parties participating indirectly on campus activities, the same interest is not mirrored by the general student body. On the question of interest in campus politics, less than 1 in 4 respondents said that they have ‘very high interest’ in campus politics while nearly 10% responded with ‘No interest’. Calculating the mean interest across gender, we found that interest of male students was nearly similar to that of their female counterparts. This goes against the popular perception of women being less interested in politics. This also adds a curious dichotomy to the analysis: while interests of both genders are similarly situated, the level of female representation in elected SU posts is abysmally low as explained in the previous sections. Interest, therefore, does not necessarily translate into greater political participation, an insight which has analytical consequences for the study of politics beyond campus spaces as well.

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Figure 3.11: Average interest in politics on a scale of 1-7

We posed a set of questions to our respondents about their participation in university polls, its related activities and other aspects of politics.

On the question of general voting, 53% said they voted in last Lok Sabha polls, while 27% said ‘No’. Almost 18% of the respondents said they were not eligible to vote for last Lok Sabha polls. Similar responses were reported for voting in state elections. When it comes to local elections, including urban local bodies or panchayat elections, we see a dip in terms of voting, with only 37% saying that they voted in the last local elections.

Given the compact and integrated nature of campus life, elections, especially those held in bigger university campuses like DU and JNU, can become large festive affairs that touch all students. It is, therefore, not a surprise to find high levels of participation in SU election-related activities among the respondents. On the question of their participation in university elections, 69% respondents said they have attended a rally or gathering, while 55% said they have posted or shared a post on social media supporting a candidate. Overall, 34% and 22% respondents said they have made posters/banners for candidates and contributed funds or resources respectively.

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Figure 3.12: Student participation in SU elections

Interestingly, on the question of how often university administration takes action against the students involved in politics, the data suggests that such action is more common in spaces where regular SU elections are not held. Out of the total respondents, who said their university did not hold polls in the last 3 years, 29% said their university administration often takes action against the politically active students while out of the respondents who said their university holds polls, only 17% submitted that the university administration did this.

Figure 3.13: Reasons for approaching the SU

There is a lot of discussion in recent times about the involvement of national parties via their student wings’ involvement in the student polls. Our survey respondents appear strongly critical of this trend, with a large majority of respondents (75%) saying that students inside the campus should float their own wings for campus issues which should be free from national and state level political parties. 17% respondents were of the opinion that all the political parties should be allowed for student polls directly or indirectly. It should be noted that out of the 547 respondents, a major portion— almost 80% — do not belong to any student wing in their campus, while 4%, 3% and 2% belong to the ABVP, Students’ Federation of India

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(SFI) and AISA respectively. 7% respondents belong to students' wings like ASA (Ambedkar Student Association).

Amid the current slew of chaos and violence witnessed on campuses, renewed debate around the role of campus politics has resurfaced. We asked our respondents about their view on the importance of politics on campuses and found that 84% believed student politics to be an essential part of campus life as it helps in raising issues and concerns of students. Only a small percentage, 8%, said that it is an unnecessary disruption in student life. However, this positive assessment of the necessity of student politics is not related to its ability to redress grievances. When asked about their contact with SUs regarding campus-related grievances, only 1 in 5 respondents stated that they approached their unions with administrative issues, while 39% of the respondents said that they have never approached student unions with their problems. 18% and 17% said they have been in touch with union representatives for hostel or mess issues and academic issues respectively.

In our analysis of responses from universities where SU elections did not take place in the last three years (Respondent Set 2), we find that the demand for student union elections across these campuses is split in half: around 38% reported ongoing demand for notified elections while 37% of respondents said that there is no such demand. Even though there were no recognized union elections, this did not curtail political movement on campuses. Around these campuses, we find that more than half of the respondents saw protests or rallies in a span of one year. This trend is in line with media reports of the last year which saw heightened student activity on campuses.

Since campuses are breeding grounds for future politicians, it is expected that we find a high percentage of people with political aspirations. Around half of the total respondents showed interest in fighting elections, and this was highest for university-level elections in comparison to local or state/national elections. There are, however, some interesting trends in relation to income: we observed that students from lowest income groups (less than Rs. 10,000 per month) are more inclined towards contesting elections in the future than those with higher income. This could suggest that politics is as much a career option aimed at upward mobility as other professions, but, given the increasing competition in the latter, those from vulnerable income groups could find it more worthwhile to take a chance with fighting elections. Figure 3.14: Interest in contesting elections in the future

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Aspirations, however, do not often match with the reality of fighting elections. Even at the university level, gathering resources for SU elections is no child’s play. Given that all major political parties try to stake their claims in university spaces that they can control, this is not surprising. The perception of our respondents also aligns with this. On the question of perceived expenditure by presidential candidates in SU elections, we find that a quarter of the respondents believe that the average spending ranged from Rs. 1 to 50 lakhs. These expenses could accrue due to the high cost of campaigning, especially in bigger universities. Inducements made through freebies are common: around 30% of the respondents said that they have been offered free meals or chocolates against their votes, while 13% stated that they have been given movie or amusement park tickets in exchange. 11% of the respondents had been offered alcohol ahead of poll day. These campaign tactics add to the high cost of fighting elections which limits participation only to those with higher means and/or with established political networks. Thus, the near-complete pre- eminence in elections of a few dominant communities reported in the previous sections of this chapter can be explained by these bottlenecks to widespread participation.

Conclusion

In our report, we attempted to put forward an analysis of student politics in India. Due to the broad scope of the subject of study and the limitations imposed by the ongoing COVID19 pandemic, it was difficult to study the subject in its entirety. We thus focused our study around student union elections across university campuses. While student unions do not neatly approximate student politics, our analysis still covers an important component of the latter. Our attempt was to examine questions of representation, participation, and competitiveness of these elections.

More than 8 in 10 respondents find student politics to be an essential part of student life. It helps them to raise issues and concerns related to their campus life and of national significance. In a broad sense, student politics acts as a breeding or training ground for the student, which we believe is not just limited to joining politics but also pertains to being politically involved in the democratic process. Our current research provides a unique empirically driven examination of the youth and its politics but several more questions emerge from this. Most significant among these is the question pertaining to how young and aspirational leaders create networks of association to carve out political careers for themselves in a crowded space. As the country enters a new political phase and seeks new political faces, this questions gains utmost importance. A further analysis of modes of entry into active politics is therefore necessary.

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References

Andersen, M. K. (2016). Time-use, activism and the making of the future. South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 39(2), 415–429. Anderson and Pant (1970). Students' Politics at Allahabad University. Economic and Political Weekly, 910-916. Becker, H. S. (2018). Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (Free Press trade paperback edition). Free Press, Simon & Schuster, Inc. Banerjee, Mukulika. (2008). Democracy, Sacred and Everyday: An Ethnographic Case from India. in Democracy: Anthropological Approaches , edited by J. Paley. Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 63–96. Clots-Figueras, I. (2011). Women in Politics. Journal of Public Economics, 95(7–8). ‘Delhi University Students’ Union’ , World Heritage Encyclopaedia: Article ID: WHEBN0012818829 Financial Express Online. (2017, 13 September). DU Election Result 2017: Who is Rocky Tuseed? Meet NSUI Candidate Who Won President Post. https://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/dusu-elections-results-2017-who-is-rocky-tuseed- congress-backed-nsui-candidate-who-won-president-post/853145/ Hazary, S. (1988). Protest Politics of Student Youth in India. The Indian Journal of Political Science, 49(1), 105-120. Iftikhar, Fariha. (2020). Delhi Assembly Election 2020: Six Former Delhi University Presidents in the Fray. Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/six-former-du-presidents-throw-hat-in-poll-ring/story- V6Vyjz14IErDkNWuqn6E0K.html Martelli, Jean-Thomas and Garalyté Kristina. (dir.) (2019). Student Politics in South Asia. South Asia Multidisciplinary AcademicJournal, Jeffrey, C. (2010). Timepass: Youth, Class, and the Politics of Waiting in India. Stanford University Press. Jeffrey, C., & Young, S. (2012). Waiting for Change: Youth, Caste and Politics in India. Economy and Society, 41(4), 638–661. Kumar, Sanjay (ed.). 2019. Youth in India: Aspirations, Attitudes, Anxieties. Abingdon, Oxon, New York: Routledge. Kuttig, J. (2019). Urban Political Machines and Student Politics in “Middle” Bangladesh: Violent Party Labour in Rajshahi City. Critical Asian Studies, 51(3), 403–418. Laurence Gautier, Crisis of the “Nehruvian Consensus” or Pluralization of Indian Politics? Aligarh Muslim University and the Demand for Minority Status , South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal [Online] Martelli, Parker. (2018). Diversity, Democracy and Dissent: A Study on Student Politics in JNU. Economic & Political Weekly,53 (11), 18 Mittal, Pallavi. (2001). Political Wannabes. The Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Political-Wannabes/articleshow/62124390.cms Nair, Aditya. (2017). Kabhi Gujjar, Kabhi Jat: Here's How Delhi University 'Caste' Its Vote. News18. https://www.news18.com/news/politics/kabhi-gujjar-kabhi-jat-how-delhi-university-caste-its-vote- 1526577.html One India. (2006). Not Many UP Student Union Leaders Enter 'Real Politics. One India. https://www.oneindia.com/2006/12/20/not-many-up-student-union-leaders-enter-real-politics- 1166623024.html Rahman, Nazia Alvi. (2013).Young Not Afraid to Take on Heavies in Winter Fight. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Young-not-afraid-to-take-on-heavies-in-winter- fight/articleshow/25230674.cms Rampal, Nikhil. (2018). Here’s What the Last 11 DUSU Presidents are Doing Now. The Print https://theprint.in/politics/dusus-last-11-presidents-where-are-they-now/113924/

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Rudolph, L., Rudolph, S., & Karuna Ahmed. (1971). Student Politics and National Politics in India. Economic and Political Weekly, 6(30/32), 1655-1668. Report of the Committee, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Department of Secondary and Higher Education, Govt. of India, New Delhi, May 23,2006 Sinha, Namya. (2011). Where are the Women in DUSU? Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/education/where-are-the-women-dusu/story- 09TEOAWl5kyWk9tvUpkXDO.html Singh, Aditi. (2019). Former LUSU leaders: Student Polls Best Teacher of Democracy. Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/lucknow/former-lusu-leaders-student-polls-best-teacher-of- democracy/articleshow/72737590.cms Wilkinson. (2019). Student Politics in British India and Beyond: The Rise and Fragmentation of the All India Student Federation (AISF), 1936–1950. South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal

D ECL I N E O F TH E CO NG RE SS

WANING FORTUNES OF INDIA'S GRAND OLD PARTY PAGE 74 ANNUAL REPORT 2020

Decline of the Congress

Introduction

In the 2019 elections, the Congress party received its lowest ever vote-share of 19.5%, down from 48.12% in 1984. This vote-share has been undergoing a secular decline since the 1989 elections, except for a bump in the 2009 elections. The decline of the Congress party, particularly over the last three decades, has become a subject of considerable scholarly attention. Of the recent studies, the decline of the party has been attributed to the inability to accommodate rising social groups (Jaffrelot, 2003; Chandra, 2000) or the loss of capacity to dispense patronage, organizational weakness and better opposition co-ordination (Ziegfeld, 2014). Farooqui and Sridharan (2016) argued that the decline of an umbrella party was almost inevitable in a heterogenous democracy with progressively sharpening political cleavages along linguistic, caste and communal lines. Palshikar (2015) has blamed the “complete abdication of politics” for the Congress decline, which he argues, has its roots in the 1970s and 80s.

In another work, Palshikar identifies three particular features of the current Congress crisis, which distinguishes the state of the party from a mere cycle of electoral defeats (Palshikar, 2019). First, the Congress is unable to define what has gone wrong with it and put together a response. Second, unlike in 1989 or 1996-98, the Congress is in an existential crisis. It is for the first time that the party “has fallen below 20% vote share and 10% seat share and lost state after state”. Thus, it is doubtful that Congress is even the main ‘‘national’’ opposition. Third, the existential crisis of the Congress is even more serious because it occurs at a time when another party is emerging to be the hegemon of India’s society and polity.

In this report, we chart the decline of the Congress through the story of electoral turnout. Although this story incorporates many of the elements above, these elements are refractive through the broader lenses of party mobilization. Over the last many decades, the deepening of democracy has changed the face of the Indian electorate. We propose that one of the main reasons for the decline of the Congress has been the failure of its mobilizational mechanism to keep pace with a changing electorate. As we will show, the Indian electorate has tripled in size over the last four decades. Yet the absolute number of Congress voters have remained at roughly the same level from 1984.

The new electorate that has been added in this period has partly come from new voters and partly from the previously unmobilized lower orders of the society, what Yogendra Yadav had termed the “second wave of democratization” (Yadav, 2000). The 1990s saw a jump in electoral turnout, mostly resulting from the higher turnout among the more marginalized sections of society- rural, poor, Dalits and tribals. (Kumar & Palshikar, 2004) The overall turnout in assembly and national elections touched 70 per cent in 2004 from 60 per cent a decade earlier (Shastry, Suri and Yadav 2009). Why was the Congress party not able to integrate these voters using its electoral machine? The answer to this question can help illuminate the ways in which dominant parties can decline in the face of a changing electorate.

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The failure to mobilize the newer segments of the electorate, we find, is down to three factors: organizational atrophy, ideological disarray and leadership crisis. In the first section, we will lay out the theoretical argument, and explain how each factor contributes to the overall failure of mobilization. This shall be followed by the second section which is about the data and methodology of our empirical research. The third section will deal with our empirical finings based on the constituency level data which is classified as per the socio-economic level by using the 2011 and 2001 censuses.

When do parties wane? Situating Congress decline in comparative theory

In advanced industrial societies, major party decline has been correlated to a failure of linkage between the parties and the political process (Lawson and Merkl, 1988). Parties have been replaced by other representative vehicles such as interest groups and social movements, as polities have become more diversified and mature leading to the proliferation of single-issue groups. However, the electoral system in many of these countries, in terms of party competition, has remained the same. In India, the mobilizations of newer segments of the population has also transformed the party system, leading to an increasing array of parties based on caste or regional identity. These parties have grown at the expense of the previously dominant Congress party.

In the first democratic upsurge around 1967, new segments of OBCs and linguistic groups began to be electorally mobilized under the banner of regional parties, which rapidly dismantled the Congress system of dominance. The second democratic upsurge, from roughly 1989, which mobilized previously untapped sections of Dalits, Tribals and the poor has further marginalized the Congress party, as these newly mobilized groups have found their electoral home away from the party.

The defining story of electoral mobilization in Indian politics can be very broadly termed as the shift from “vertical mobilization” to “horizontal mobilization”. Vertical mobilisation refers to political linkages that draw on and reinforce social and economic dominance. Horizontal mobilisation takes place when people situated at the same social and economic level get together to use their combined political strength to improve their situation. There is another type of mobilization defined by the Rudolphs termed differential mobilisation which refers to coalitions that cut across social strata (Rudolph & Rudolph, 1967). The electoral machine of the Congress has still not fully adapted to this shift, now has it evolved its structures to mobilize newly politicized groups.

The traditional method of mobilisation of the Congress has been vertical mobilisation- patron client relationship between so called dominant castes and other castes (Rudolph & Rudolph, 1967). This enabled the Congress to dominate by forging coalitions between dominant castes and lower castes. This dominant caste, which formed the core of the Congress organisation at the local level acted as the intermediary between the party and the local population. The Congress also mobilised the electorate using local factions (Brass, 1965). These local level brokers, and their networks, played a bridging role between the party and society (Bailey, 1970). Thus, the Congress organisation was an effective political machine integrating people into the Congress system. This organisation had highly autonomous state units and the dispensing of patronage occurred at the state and local levels. The mechanism of mobilisation was primarily patronage: the exchange of access to public resources and jobs in exchange for electoral support (Brass, 1965).

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As early as the 70s, this pattern of vertical mobilisation was already becoming less potent owing to the fraying of the social order on which it depended. The post-colonial democratisation was steadily levelling social hierarchies, and thus the basis of vertical mobilisation. The delegitimization of caste hierarchies, changes in land ownership and the resultant shift in authority at the local level had set the stage for the political rise of lower castes (Robinson, 1988). Breman (1996) gauged from his fieldwork in Gujarat the shift from vertical to horizontal mobilisation driven by the loss of social legitimacy of inequality as a concept. Similarly, Mendelsohn (1993) spoke of the delegitimization of the ‘moral economy of the old order’ as the ideas and the practices of representative democracy seeped onto the ground.

In the 1960s and 70s, political leaders such as Lohia recognised the potential of horizontal mobilization of lower castes on issues of social justice and caste-based discrimination (Sheth, 1996). This first led to the exodus of OBCs from the Congress party, and subsequently the Dalits and tribals who also found more incentives to back their own party rather than depending on the patronage network of the Congress.

We now turn to the three broad factors for the decline in mobilization capacity of the party over the past four decades in detail: organisational atrophy, leadership crisis and ideological array.

One of the main avenues of party mobilization is through organisation. The deinstitutionalisation and de-federalisation of the party has prevented the party from mobilising new groups. A number of eminent scholars such as Paul Brass and Atul Kohli have written on the deinstitutionalisation of the Congress from the time of the authoritarian populism of Indira Gandhi, when party organisation began to be centred around the personality of the central leadership. The party structure at the local and the state level, which was previously the site of mobilisation, has severely declined for the last four decades. The state units of the party, which catered to local interests, have also undergone loss of autonomy and weakness, which has led to the decline of the mobilisation capacity of the party. The withering away of this organisational structure has hobbled Congress’ ability to integrate newly politicized groups from marginalised sections into its fold.

Another way that the Congress mobilized new groups, through competitive factions, has also been largely closed as factions now compete more for the favour of the high command rather than on building political coalitions. In its phase of dominance, factions in the state units of the Congress party used to integrate new groups into their fold in order to outmanoeuvre other factions (Brass 1965). With the centralisation of the party, and the pre-eminence of loyalty over the dynamic of competition, this integrative function of faction has also declined.

The second avenue of mobilization is through leadership. The crisis of leadership as it relates to mobilisation potential is threefold: overcentralisation of leadership structure, inability to produce mass leaders and a dearth of lower caste leaders. The crisis of leadership of the party, like much else, stems from the deinstitutionalisation and de-federalisation of the Congress party, which began during the tenure of Indira Gandhi. The leadership culture of the party has revolved around loyalty to the “high command” at the centre. This high command culture has not only weakened state units but also created a system of incentives where no genuinely popular leader with state wide appeal can emerge.

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This answers the question of why hardly any mass leaders has been produced by the Congress party in the last three decades. Since the time of Indira Gandhi, personal loyalty to the high command has trumped popular connect as a precondition for advancement in the Congress. The state leaders who do possess a mass base sometimes find greater incentive in breaking away from the party and forming their own party, like Mamata Banerjee, Sharad Pawar or Jaganmohan Reddy.

Similarly, the Congress leadership continues to be overrepresented by upper castes. Horizontal mobilisation rests on the ability of parties to groom leaders who can mobilize their particular groups based on a credible articulation of their interests. The dearth of lower castes in leadership positions at all levels- national, state and local- hampers the Congress in its efforts to mobilize people of those caste (Zernini, 2007). Even after the Mandal movement, the profile of the party has not undergone any significant change, which is explained by Kanchan Chandra (2000) through the concept of representational blockage. In the district of Hoshiarpur, Chandra shows how an upwardly mobile section of Dalits moved towards the BSP, which, unlike the Congress, gave them tickets and important positions in the local party structure. The Congress, despite being the traditional home of the Dalits of Hoshiarpur, didn’t accommodate them either in the government or the party machinery,

The ticket distribution in the Congress party is skewed towards the upper castes in states because of their dominance in the executive positions of the state PCCs. For example, since 1998, the Congress has had 12 twelve state Presidents, out of which six have been upper castes, one aristocratic Muslim (Salman Khurshid), four OBCs (Sreeprakash Jaiswal, Balram Singh Yadav, Raj Babbar and Ajay Kumar Lallu) and one Schedule Caste (Mahavir Prasad). Likewise, the Congress CWC has always been highly overrepresented by upper castes (Jayal, 2013). The domination of the rich and stranglehold of Delhi based professionals on party positions further undermines the potential for horizontal mobilization.

The third avenue of mobilization is ideology. The Congress’ ambiguous middle-of-the-road ideology has left it exposed to ideological attacks from both the Right and the Left, which have both shaved away some of its political support. The lower castes and the poor have particularly mobilized around regional parties who have espoused a more radical discourse of social justice and egalitarianism rather than the moderate Congress. Palshikar (2019) has written that “the party has reached here (the point of existential crisis) through the route of ideological bankruptcy.”

The reason Congress had managed the support of a cross-section of castes and communities in the first four decades after independence was that it was identified with the mainstream of Indian nationalism, particularly because it carried the legacy of the freedom struggle. But starting from the late 1980s, the shape and character of the Indian nation itself was being molded by powerful forces that are sometimes characterised by scholars as Mandal, Masjid and Market. The Hindu Right Wing’s idea of a majoritarian India was not just gaining ground among the upper castes, but also among a section of the OBCs. In time, a section of Dalits would also be mobilised along this ethnic majoritarian axis, such as the Valmikis. Meanwhile, a large mass of backward castes and Dalits started getting mobilised on the question of equality and justice within the maturing nation state. The middle classes, expanding after the free market turn, started favouring a more assertive nationalism that the BJP

PAGE 78 ANNUAL REPORT 2020 propounded, over the old moderate nationalism of the Congress. Thus, the ‘ideological mainstream’- on which the Congress anchored itself- was shifting below its feet. Unable to adapt its ideology adequately to these powerful winds of change, the Congress ideology energised an ever-narrower group of people, and certainly not the marginalised groups that were starting to mobilise during this period.

Method Note

In this report, we ascertain the degree of support for the Congress party, not based on the level of the individual voter, but at the constituency level. We use a dataset created by Jensenius (2016), which provides census level estimates at the parliamentary constituency level. However, since the Indian electoral result is available at the constituency level, linking census data to constituency level data is a difficult process. Administratively, India is divided into states, districts, villages, and blocks, which fit nicely into each other. The census collects large amounts of data at all of these levels. But electorally, India is divided into 4000 state assemblies that fit into districts but cross block boundaries and several of these Assembly Constituencies (ACs) are then aggregated into 543 Parliamentary Constituencies (PCs) which cross district boundaries.

There have been several attempts to estimate these census level indicators to constituency level. Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) created PC level estimates of Indian Census variables by roughly matching districts to parliamentary constituencies. Since we will be using data from 1991- 2019, and in 2008 there was a new delimitation, so, pre-delimitation data would be used from 1991- 2004 and post-delimitation data from 2009-2019. In a recent work, Bhavnani and Jensenius (2015) created area-weighted estimates of India’s pre-delimitation ACs from block-level census data.

The process of carrying out the mapping used in this data is as follows: area-weighted estimates of census variables at the Parliamentary Constituency level were created by overlaying GIS maps of India’s almost 6,000 administrative blocks (usually called Tehsils, Mandals, or Police Circles) and maps of India’s PCs from before and after the 2008 delimitation. This made it possible to identify what proportion of the area of each block overlapped with which concerned PC. These proportions were then used to create area-weighted PC-level estimates of the variables in the Indian Census from 2001 onwards. This resulting dataset has PC-level estimates of the variables from the 2001 census and 2011 census respectively; it contains data on literacy, gender, religion, poverty and occupation and assets owned by individuals (such as TV, car etc.) and access to a variety of household items [available for only the 2011 census]. The census from 2001 has data of the 15 largest states containing 493 parliamentary constituencies, whereas data from the 2011 census pertains to all the 543 constituencies.

Electoral data from 1977-2019 is taken from Trivedi Centre For Political Data (TCPD Data) (Jensenius and Verniers, 2017). Since census happens once in every ten years, election years 1996- 2004 have been benchmarked to the 2001 census, and election years 2009-19 have been benchmarked to the 2011 census.

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Analysis

Analysing Turnout

The turnout levels in India have been varying from 55-70 per cent since independence. In 2019, India’s national-level elections witnessed a record level turnout of approximately 70 per cent. In Figure 4.1, we compare the relationship between the turnout and support for the BJP and INC over the years. The BJP’s analysis is done from 1991 onwards, because that was the first time when it got more than 20 percent of the vote share. There is a stark contrast between both the parties, because for the BJP, its performance improves when turnout is higher whereas for the INC, there is a negative correlation between turnout and its support.

The negative co-relation between turnout and Congress vote supports our main argument that the decline of the Congress is driven by a failure to mobilize people in its favour. As studies have shown (Yadav et al, 2009) this turnout has partly swelled by the entering of voters from marginalised backgrounds- lower castes, poor and rural voters. The consistent nature of the negative correlation since 1977- around the point when the lower orders of the society started to vote in higher proportions- bolsters our argument.

Figure 4.1: Comparison of Support of BJP and Congress

In Table 4.1, we have calculated the mobilisations of both parties, the BJP and INC over the years. Mobilisation is a mathematical connotation given by Chhibber & Nooruddin (2000) to track the performance of the parties. It is given as

Mobilizationi,j=VoteSharei,j x Turnoutj

(For party i in district j)

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Multiplying the votes a party receives in the particular district by the turnout tells us how much of the electorate the party was able to mobilise into voting. They have defined it at the district level but here we use it at the constituency level. We have divided the Congress into five phases based on the leadership.

Table 4.1:Mobilization of BJP and Congress over the years

Mobilisation for the Congress has shown a downward trend after Indira Gandhi. Although the decline was only one percentage point till Rajiv Gandhi, but after that, there was a decline of 5 percentage points when the party was headed by a non-Gandhi leader. The situation improved after Sonia Gandhi took charge, but her inability to improve the party structure at the grass root level during that period, worsened things for Rahul Gandhi. He also ran the party similarly, and the mobilisation declined by approximately 4 percentage points. In comparison, the BJP, showed an upward tick from the very beginning, although they faced a similar slump during the Sonia Gandhi phase. They improved and came back stronger in the 2014- 2019 period with the increase of almost 12 percentage points.

In Table 4.2, we ran Ordinary Least Square (OLS) models on Congress vote share on different socio-economic variables from census data to study the significance as well as the impact on the vote share. We have considered the time period from 1996-2019, and divided this period into two-time frames. For the pre-delimitation (1996-2004) period, we have used variables from the 2001 census and for post-delimitation (2009-2019), variables from the 2011 census have been used.

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Table 4.2: OLS Regressions- Congress Vote Share in Lok Sabha Constituencies

We ran models including the fixed effects of state as well as year on both terms. Turnout Percentage is a significant variable in both the periods. In the pre-delimitation period, turnout had a positive effect on Congress vote share (0.127) in model 1, but in the post-delimitation period, it turned out to be negative(- 0.305) in model 2 which means that with 1 per cent increase in turnout, congress vote share declined by 0.3 per cent. So, in constituencies where the turnout increased, congress vote share suffered in the post delimitation period, including all models which had fixed effects.

Overview of Congress Performance over the years

After the death of Indira Gandhi, the congress only managed to win 200+ seats twice in 1991 & 2009 and the possibility of achieving this in the near future appears to be bleak. It appears that the vote share of the Congress is keen on touching new lows, and with the increasing turnout, it appears to be diminishing. In 2014 and 2019, the Congress vote share went below the 20 per cent mark and approximately two out of

PAGE 82 ANNUAL REPORT 2020 every five candidates lost their deposits in both of these elections. In more than one-third of the seats in 2019, it did not even get 15-16% of the votes, which is an indication of the defunct organisation (Aiyar, Verma & Hasan 2019).

Table 4.3: Congress Performance Over the Years

In Figure 4.2, the relationship between total electors and voters of the Congress has been shown. Total electors increased from 300 million to 900 million in approximately 42 years from 1977-2019. As shown that voters of the INC crossed the 100 million mark in 1984. But from 1984 onwards, voters of the INC were in the range of 100-120 million, and they never crossed more than that, which indicates the lack of ability of the party to attract new voters.

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Figure 4.2: Total Electors and Congress Voters Over Years

Analysis of the INC Vote Share based on Caste Variables:

In Figure 4.3, we show the support-base of the Congress and the proportion of Hindus living in a constituency. From 2009-2019, negative correlation was found between the Congress support-base and proportion of Hindus in a constituency. In 2009, the relationship was not significantly negative (b=-0.097). This was an indication of impending doom for Congress support among Hindus. In the same election year, the relationship between BJP support amongst Hindus was around (b=0.17), which too is not very strong. The reason for this could be that Hindu support was divided along the lines of caste and the benefit of that went to regional players (Heath 2020).

Figure 4.3: Support for Congress and Proportion of Hindus

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In 2014, the relationship between the Congress vote and Hindu support turned out to be more negative (b=-0.138) and in the same year, the BJP’s relationship improved to (b=0.36) which implies that the BJP strongly mobilised voters in constituencies having a dominant Hindu population. This can again be linked to an effective campaign and strong leadership, and these factors were missing in the former, which led to constituencies having higher Hindu population desert it. Since the turnout was high, people not coming in enough numbers can’t be the reason for the Congress’s declining support. In 2019, the situation improved for the party and the relationship was less negative(b=-0.113) but for BJP, the relationship became significantly positive and they consolidated their vote share in predominant Hindu constituencies (Heath (2020).

A similar analysis is done as shown in Figure 4.4, to study how the Congress support varied among the marginal sections of society i.e Scheduled Caste population (SC). In 2009, although the relationship was negative (b=-0.195) for the same election year, the BJP’s relationship with the SC population was highly negative (b=-0.70) and this can be attributed to regional and caste parties mobilising them.

Figure 4.4: Support for Congress and Proportion of SC

Over the years, this relationship turned out to be more negative for Congress, but the BJP’s relationship improved vis-a-vis the SC vote. As per (Yadav 2003,6), new Congress voters belonged to the marginalised section of society in terms of caste, but as we can see here, this section has also deserted the party in the post-delimitation period because people of this caste can identify themselves more with regional parties. The BJP also played a detrimental role as they were able to extend the positive effect they had with Hindus to the SC population (Palshikar 2014,59).

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Analysis of the Congress vote share based on economic variables:

In this report we earlier pointed out that the vote share of Congress from the weakest section of society, which was the party’s most loyal section, had shifted to BJP. We now try to quantify this shift. The inspiration to create this variable comes from an article in Mint(2019) where the authors have shown support of BJP among various wealth quartiles.

We created a wealth score formula which is given as:-

WealthScorei=0.11 x tap water i,h + 0.11 x electricity i,h +0.11 x lpg i,h +0.11 x firewood i,h +0.11 x toilet i,h +0.11 x mobile i,h +0.11 x scooter i,h +0.11 x car i,h +0.11 x TV i,h

(For Constituency i,percentage of households h having access to each of the given things)

Wealth score is based on the variety of indicators which are given as number of households having access to treated tap water, electricity, cooking fuel, LPG, TVs, mobiles and automobile vehicles, where equal weightage is given to each variable. Constituencies were divided into four quartiles based on this wealth score. In Figure 7, it shows the Congress vote share in different quartiles from 2009-2019.Here the first quartile indicates the poor section and the fourth quartile is the richest section of the society.

Figure 4.5: Vote share of Congress across different quartiles

Here, we see a substantial difference between the vote share of the first and fourth quartile in the period from 2009-2019 except 2014. There is a difference of approximately 15 percentage points in both the election years 2009 and 2019, between these quartiles. This shows that the Congress vote share has

PAGE 86 ANNUAL REPORT 2020 concentrated to the most well-off sections of the society and the poor have started to desert the party, which could be due to different direct-to-consumer schemes introduced by the BJP government such as the distribution of LPG cylinders at subsidized rates, construction of toilets and houses. The BJP’s vote share has consistently improved over the years in each quartile.

Conclusion

Since all of this analysis is done at constituency level, we cannot say anything about individual voting behaviour. We have used linear regression models in our study to ascertain each variable’s impact on Congress vote share. This model has an underlying assumption that the dependent variable (Congress Vote share in our case ) has a linear relationship with all the independent variables (all the indicators in our case) which sometimes may not hold true. We did check the variables for multi-collinearity and did not find any such relation.

We also have used the census data which was mapped at constituency level using area weighted estimates technique, which is also a concern because there is assumption of uniform distribution of population of every religion or other indicators which might not be the case everywhere. Also, we have merged census data with election years which are quite ahead in time for eg: census 2011 was merged with 2019 national level elections. It could be the case that population or indicators might have varied significantly over the years.

Our analysis seeks to add to the debate on the Congress party by providing a broad lens- the failure to mobilise- that integrates the often-cited elements behind the decline of the party: shrinking support base, organisational atrophy, ideological confusion and its leadership crisis. The declining support base is the outcome of the failure to mobilise, we find, and the latter three elements are the causes of this failure to mobilise, and hence the story of the diminution of India’s oldest political party can be coherently told through this primary framework of party mobilisation.

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References

Aiyar Yamini, Verma Rahul, Hasan Zoya (2019) The future of Congress Party. Seminar. Bailey, F. G. (1970). Politics and social change: Orissa in 1959. Univ of California Press. Banerjee, Abhijit and Somanathan, Rohini(2007) The political economy of public goods: Some evidence from India. Bhavnani, Rikhil R., and Francesca Refsum Jensenius (2015). “Socioeconomic Profile of India’s Old Electoral Constituencies, 1971-2001.” In Mohd. Sanjeer Alam and K.C Sivaramakrishnan (eds.) Fixing Electoral Boundaries in India: Laws, Processes, Outcomes and Implication for Political Representation. Delhi: Oxford University Press Brass, P. R. (1965). Factional politics in an Indian state: The Congress party in Uttar Pradesh. Univ of California Press. Breman, J. (1996). Footloose labour: working in India's informal economy (Vol. 2). Cambridge University Press. Chandra, K. (2000). The transformation of ethnic politics in India: The decline of Congress and the rise of the Bahujan Samaj Party in Hoshiarpur. Journal of Asian Studies, 26- 61. Chhibber, Pradeep, and Irfan Nooruddin. 2000. “Party Competition and Fragmentation in Indian National Elections: 1957-1998.” In Indian Politics and the 1998 Elections: Regionalism, Hindutva, and State Politics, eds. Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace. New Delhi, London: Sage Publications, pp. 36-54 (Chapter 2) Farooqui, A., & Sridharan, E. (2016). Can umbrella parties survive? The decline of the Indian National Congress. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 54(3), 331-361. Francesca Refsum Jensenius (2016). “A sign of backwardness? Where dynastic leaders are elected in India.” In Kanchan Chandra (ed.) Democratic Dynasties: State, Party and Political Families in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Hasan, Zoya (2014): Article in The Hindu “Congress and its moment of Truth”. Heath, Oliver (2020): Communal realignment and support for the BJP, 2009–2019 Hindustan Times (2020): “A look at how Congress faced similar leadership crisis in 1998-1999” on 24th August 2020 https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/how-congress-faced- leadership-crisis-in-1998-99/story-h2Lf0X6az80xQGPgvBe1BN.html Jaffrelot, C. (2003). India's silent revolution: the rise of the lower castes in North India. Orient Blackswan. Jayal, N. G. (2013). Citizenship and its discontents: An Indian history. Harvard University Press. Jensenius, Francesca, and Gilles Verniers. 2017. “Indian National Election and Candidates Database 1962–Today.” Trivedi Centre for Political Data. Lawson, K., & Merkl, P. (1988). Alternative organizations: Environmental, supplementary, communitarian and antiauthoritarian. K Lawson, P and Merkl (eds), When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations.

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Mendelsohn, O. (1993). The transformation of authority in rural India. Modern Asian Studies, 27(4), 805-842. Mint(2019) “Ten Charts that explain the 2019 LokSabha Verdict” on 24th May 2019 https://www.livemint.com/elections/lok-sabha-elections/ten-charts-that-explain-the-2019- lok-sabha-verdict-1558636775444.html Palshikar, Suhas(2014): “The Defeat of the Congress”. Economic and Political Weekly. Palshikar, S. (2015). Surviving sans Politics: Congress in the Times of the Post-Congress Era. Economic and Political Weekly. Palshikar, Suhas (2019): The Curious Case of the Congress Party, Economic and Political Weekly., Vol. 55, Issue No. 38 Patnaik, Ila(2019): Article in The Print “Modi’s anti-poverty schemes work. That’s why BJP swept the Lok Sabha elections” on 26th July 2019 https://theprint.in/ilanomics/modis- anti-poverty-schemes-work-thats-why-bjp-swept-the-lok-sabha-elections/268121/ Robinson, M. S. (1988). Local politics: the law of the fishes. Development through political change in Medak District, Andhra Pradesh Rudolph, L. I., & Rudolph, S. H. (1967). The modernity of tradition: Political development in India. University of Chicago Press. Shastri, S., Suri, K. C., & Yadav, Y. (Eds.). (2009). Electoral politics in Indian states: Lok Sabha elections in 2004 and beyond. Oxford University Press. Sheth, D. L. (1996). Ram Manohar Lohia on Caste, Class and Gender in Indian Politics'. Lokayan Bulletin, 13(2), 1-15. Yadav, Y. (2000). Understanding the second democratic upsurge: Trends of Bahujan participation in electoral politics in the 1990s. Transforming India: Social and political dynamics of democracy, 145. Yadav, Yogendra(2003): “The New Congress Voter”. Seminar Ziegfeld, A. (2014). Inheriting Victory: Congress Dominance and Decline in India.

Appendix A Coding scheme of the India Manifesto Project

S.NO. Domain Domain_name Category_code Category_name Description Code 1. 1 External Relations 101 Foreign Special Relationships Favourable/Negative mentions of particular countries with which the manifesto country has a special relationship; the need for co-operation with and/or aid to such countries. Mentions of Indo-Pak relationship; the need for co-operation with and/or aid to such countries; Dialogue or Pak diplomacy. any mention of aggressive action against Pakistan; blaming Pakistan for terror, ceasefire violations etc. 2. 1 External Relations 102 External Influence: Negative references to imperial behaviour and/or negative references to one state exerting strong/undue influence (political, military or commercial) over other states. May also include: • Negative references to controlling other countries as if they were part of an empire; • Favourable references to greater self-government and independence for colonies; • Favourable mentions of de-colonisation.

In notes column, record names of countries (If Mentioned) Negative references and statements against international financial organisations or states using monetary means to assert strong influence over the manifesto or other states. May include: • Statements against the World Bank, IMF etc.; • Statements against foreign debt circumscribing state actions. 3. 1 External Relations 103 Military The importance of expanding military and defence capabilities of the country. • The need to maintain or increase military expenditure; • The need to secure adequate manpower in the military; • The need to modernise armed forces and improve military strength; • The need for rearmament and self-defence; Negative references to the military or use of military power to solve conflicts. References to the ‘evils of war’. May include references to: • Decreasing military expenditures; • Disarmament; Any favourable mention of India’s right to hold nuclear weapons; mention of discriminatory nature of the NPT regime. In case of Nuclear weapons, mention nuclear weapons in notes column 4. 1 External Relations 104 World Peace and Any declaration of belief in peace and peaceful means of international conflicts Internationalism -- absent reference to the military. May include: • Peace as a general goal;

• Urging countries to use dialogue/negotiations for solving disputes • Ending wars in order to establish peace.

In notes column, record names of countries (If Mentioned)

Need for international co-operation, includes any kind of multilateral cooperation or intergovernmental organiztions. May include references to the: 5. • Need for world planning of resources; • Support for global governance; Support for UN or other international organisations Negative references to international co-operation, functioning of inter- governmental organizations, UN reforms, and unfair measures against India by IGOs etc Diaspora 5. 2 Freedom and Democracy 201 Freedom and Human Rights Favourable mentions of importance of individual freedom. May include mentions of:

• Freedom of expression • Freedom from state coercion in the political and economic spheres; • Freedom from bureaucratic control; • The idea of individualism. Favourable mentions of importance of human and civil rights. Press Rights 6. 2 Freedom and Democracy 202 Democracy: Positive Favourable mentions of democracy as the ideal form of government. General support and appreciation of Indian democracy. May also include: • Democracy as method or goal in national, international or other organisations (e.g. labour unions, political parties etc.); • The need for the involvement of all citizens in political decision- making; • Support for parts of democratic regimes (rule of law, division of powers, independence of courts etc.). (Only include if broad objectives are mentioned; specific statements to be coded independently) Greater democratisation, participator decision making, direct democracy etc; Electoral Reforms 7. 3 Federalism 301 Decentralisation – Centre State Support for federalism or decentralisation of political and/or economic power Relations from the centre to the states. May include: • Any positive mention of improving centre-state relations • More autonomy for any sub-national level in policy making • Greater fiscal devolution to the states. In notes column, record names of states if mentioned specifically. Any mention of disputes or conflict between the centre and at least one state. 8. 3 Federalism 302 Decentralisation – Rural Local Support for decentralisation of power to rural local government. May include: government

• Greater power/autonomy for Panchayats etc. • More fiscal autonomy and funds for Panchayats. Positive mention of the role of Panchayats. 9. 3 Federalism 303 Jammu and Kashmir Mention in brackets if specific reference to Article 370, plebiscite 10. 3 Federalism 304 Interstate Relations Instances of inter-state cooperation, mechanisms for dispute resolution etc. Specific mention about an ongoing dispute between two or more states. Mention names of states in notes. 11. 4 Political System and Governance: 401 Governmental and Need for efficiency and economy in government and administration and/or the Administrative Efficiency: general appeal to make the process of government and administration cheaper and more efficient. May include: • Restructuring the civil service; • Cutting down on the civil service; • Improving bureaucratic procedures. • Administrative Reforms 12.Note: Specific policy positions overrule this category! If there is no specific policy position, however, this category applies. 12. 4 Political System and Governance: 402 Political Corruption Need to eliminate political corruption and associated abuses of political and/or bureaucratic power. Specific mentions of scams. Promises for reducing corruption 13. 4 Political System and Governance: 403 Political Authority: Party References to the manifesto party’s competence to govern the country. Any Competence generic self-appreciation of the party. References to the any opponent’s lack of competence to govern and run the country. Any generic criticism of opponents. In notes column, record name of the other party if mentioned specifically. 14. 4 Political System and Governance: 404 Political Authority: Personal References to the party leadership’s competence to govern the country. Any Competence generic self-appreciation of the party leadership. References to the opponent party leadership’s lack of competence to govern the country. Any generic criticism of leaders from other parties In notes column, record name of the other party and leader if mentioned specifically. 4 Political System and Governance: 405 Judiciary 15. 5 Economy 501 Free Market Economy Favourable mentions of the free market and free market capitalism as an economic model. May include favourable references to: • Reducing state control over business and promoting private ownership. • Private property rights; • Personal enterprise and initiative; • Need for unhampered individual enterprises. • Economic Reforms/Liberalisation. Favourable mentions of supply side oriented economic policies (assistance to businesses rather than consumers). May include: • Financial and other incentives such as subsidies, tax breaks etc.; • Wage and tax policies to induce enterprise;

• Encouragement to start enterprises. • Easy of doing business/Promotion of entrepreneurship Negative mention of extending or maintaining the protection of internal markets. Positive mention of MNCs and measures for increasing foreign investment. Measures may include: • Removal/reduction of Tariffs, Quota restrictions, Export subsidies etc. • Allowing entry of MNCs, SEZs etc. • Allowing FDI 16. 5 Economy 502 Pro-state intervention in Support for policies designed to create a fair and open economic market. May economy include: • Increasing economic competition by preventing monopolies and other actions disrupting the functioning of the market; • Positive mention of Licensing and Permits system • Social market economy. Favourable mentions of long-standing economic planning by the government. Generic mention of five year plans. Favourable mentions of extending or maintaining the protection of internal markets. Negative mention of MNCs and foreign investment. Measures may include: • Tariffs; • Quota restrictions; • Export subsidies. • Promotion of Swadeshi through restrictions on imports Nationalisation: Favourable mentions of government ownership of industries and enterprises (banks, factories etc.), either partial or complete; calls for keeping nationalised industries in state hand or nationalising currently private industries. 17. 5 Economy 503 Economic Goals Broad and general economic goals that are not mentioned in relation to any other category. General economic statements that fail to include any specific goal.

Note: Specific policy positions overrule this category! If there is no specific policy position, however, this category applies. 18. 5 Economy 504 Economic Growth: Positive: Any mention related to economic growth. Eg:

• Need for the government to take measures to aid economic growth.

• Performance on economic growth rate. 19. 5 Economy 505 Price Rise/Inflation 20. 5 Economy 506 Sustainability/Climate Call for sustainable economic development. Opposition to growth that causes Change/Environment environmental or societal harm. 21. 5 Economy 507 Employment: Positive Specific reference on the issue of unemployment or increasing availability of jobs etc.

22. 5 Economy 508 Labour Rights Favourable references to all labour groups, the working class, and unemployed workers in general. Support for trade unions and calls for the good treatment of all employees, including: • More jobs; • Good working conditions; • Fair wages; • Pension provisions etc. Negative references to labour groups and trade unions. May focus specifically on the danger of unions ‘abusing power’. Any step which reduces the power of unions. 23. 5 Economy 509 Agriculture and Farmers: Specific policies in favour of agriculture and farmers. Includes all types of Positive agriculture and farming practises. Only statements that have agriculture as the key goal should be included in this category. 5 Economy 510 Land 24. 6 Development and Quality of life 601 Development Generic mention of development as an objective. No specific sector specific development goals. 25. 6 Development and Quality of life 602 Environmental Protection General policies in favour of protecting the environment, fighting climate change, and other “green” policies. For instance: • General preservation of natural resources; • Protection of forests; May include a great variance of policies that have the unified goal of environmental protection 26. 6 Development and Quality of life 603 Food and PDS 27. 6 Development and Quality of life 604 Education 28. 6 Development and Quality of life 605 Health 29. 6 Development and Quality of life 606 Welfare State Expansion: Favourable mentions of need to introduce, maintain or expand any public social service, social security scheme. Any sector not mentioned separately may be included here. Limiting state expenditures on social services or social security. Favourable mentions of the social subsidiary principle (i.e. private care before state care); Mention name of scheme in notes 6 Development and Quality of life 607 Rural Development Cooperatives 6 Development and Quality of life 608 Urban Development 31. 6 Development and Quality of life 609 Physical Infrastructure: This includes any mention focused on improving the physical infrastructure in Positive the country – roads, bridges, large public work projects etc. Any mention about increase in spending on infrastructure. Railways, Electricity. 32. 6 Development and Quality of life 610 Information Technology, • Support for public spending on technological infrastructure (e.g.: Telecom and Communication: broadband internet). • Mobile and telecom network • Spread of internet and telecom facilities 33. 6 Development and Quality of life 611 Regional Development: Generic/specific mention about expanding developmental work in a particular sub-national region or state. 6 Development and Quality of life 612 Science and Technology

34. 7 Social Fabric/National 701 Caste Equality and Reservation Unity/Diversity/Culture Social Justice 35. 7 Social Fabric/National 702 Secularism/Communal Positive reference to existing model of secularism; need to strengthen current Unity/Diversity/Culture Harmony laws for preventing communal violence etc. Negative references to the existing model of secularism; any mention about favouritism towards specific religious groups. 36. 7 Social Fabric/National 703 National Way of Favourable mentions of the national history, independence movement and Unity/Diversity/Culture Life/Nationalism/Patriotism general appeals. May include: • Support for established national ideas; • Appeals to patriotism; • Appeals to nationalism; Freedom Fighters and their dreams for the nation 37. 7 Social Fabric/National 704 Traditional Morality: Positive Favourable mentions of traditional values and morals. Maintenance and Unity/Diversity/Culture stability of the traditional family as a value; 38. 7 Social Fabric/National 705 Hindutva/Hinduism/Hindu (Mention in notes if any specific promise is made – eg. Ram Mandir.) Unity/Diversity/Culture Culture: 39 7 Social Fabric/National 706 Civic Mindedness General appeals for national solidarity and the need for society to see itself as Unity/Diversity/Culture united. Calls for solidarity with and help for fellow people, familiar and unfamiliar. May include: • Favourable mention of the civil society and volunteering; • Decrying anti-social attitudes in times of crisis; • Appeal for public spiritedness; • Support for the public interest. Appeals to grassroots movements of social change; banding all sections of society together to overcome common adversity and hardship; appeals to the people as a united actor. 40. 7 Social Fabric/National 707 Cultural Diversity and Unity: Favourable mentions of cultural diversity and cultural plurality within domestic Unity/Diversity/Culture Positive societies. May include the preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages within the country including special educational provisions. 7 Social Fabric/National 708 Other issues related to social Arts, films, sports Unity/Diversity/Culture fabric/national unity/diversity 41. 8 Security 801 Law and Order General: Favourable mentions of strict law enforcement, and tougher actions against Positive domestic crime (excluding terrorism). May include: • Increasing support and resources for the police; • Tougher attitudes in courts; • Importance of internal security. Favourable mentions of less law enforcement or rejection of plans for stronger law enforcement. Only refers to the enforcement of the status quo of the manifesto country’s law code. May include: • Less resources for police; • Reducing penalties; • Calls for abolishing the death penalty;

• Decriminalisation of drugs, prostitution etc. 42. 8 Security 802 Terrorism 43. 8 Security 803 Internal Security NE insurgency, Naxalism etc. 8 Security 804 National Security Goals 44. 9 Social Groups (Specific policy 901 Middle Class and Professional General favourable references to the middle class. Specifically, statements may positions overrule this domain! If Groups include references to: there is no specific policy position, • Professional groups, (e.g.: doctors or lawyers); however, these categories apply.) • White collar groups, (e.g.: bankers or office employees), • Service sector groups (e.g.: IT industry employees); • Old and/or new middle class. 45. 9 Social Groups 902 Underprivileged Minority Very general favourable references to underprivileged minorities who are Groups defined neither in economic nor in demographic terms (e.g. the persons with disabilities). Only includes favourable statements that cannot be classified in other categories 46. 9 Social Groups 903 Women Any women centric programme, proposal or mention which cannot be included in other categories. 47. 9 Social Groups 904 Youth Any youth specific programme, proposal or mention which cannot be included in other categories. 48. 9 Social Groups 905 Children Any Children specific programme, proposal or mention which cannot be included in other categories. 49. 9 Social Groups 906 SCs, STs and OBCs Calls for the protection of SCs, STs and OBCs. r strengthening their rights, may include: • Special budgetary allocations and government schemes (except reservation). • Special schemes 50. 9 Social Groups 907 Religious Minorities Calls for the protection of religious minotiries, strengthening their rights, may include: • Special budgetary allocations and government schemes (except reservation). • Introduction of special provisions in the democratic or bureaucratic process;

• Special schemes 9 Social Groups 908 Persons With Disabilities 9 Social Groups 909 LGBT/Transgender

Appendix B

List of Universities contacted through RTI Applications

Sno University State Recognition Status 1 Nalanda University Bihar Central No Elections Held Jammu and 2 Central University of Jammu Central No Elections Held Kashmir Dr. Harsingh Gour 3 Madhya Pradesh Central No Elections Held Vishwavidyalaya 4 Central University of Rajasthan Rajasthan Central No Elections Held 5 Central University of Tamil Nadu Tamil Nadu Central No Elections Held Pandit RaviShankar Shukla 6 Chhattisgarh State Called for inspection University 7 University of Delhi New Delhi Central Data Not Available 8 Central University of Jharkhand Jharkhand Central Data Not Available 9 University of Kerela Kerala State Data Not Available 10 Jai Narayan Vyas University Rajasthan State Data Not Available 11 Gujarat University Gujarat State Declined 12 Central University of Haryana Haryana Central Declined English and Foreign Languages 13 Telangana State Declined University Mahatma Gandhi Kashi 14 Uttar Pradesh State Declined Vidyapeeth 15 Guru Ghasidas Vishwavidyalaya Chhattisgarh Central Information Received 16 Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi Central Information Received

17 Kolhan University Jharkhand State Information Received 18 Tata Institute of Social Sciences Maharashtra Deemed Information Received 19 Panjab University Punjab State Information Received 20 Guru Nanak Dev University Punjab State Information Received 21 Rajasthan University Rajasthan State Information Received 22 Kota University Rajasthan State Information Received 23 University of Hyderabad Telangana Central Information Received Maulana Azad National Urdu 24 Telangana Central Information Received University 25 Doon University Uttarakhand State Information Received 26 Chaudhary Devi Lal University Haryana State Information Received Info received for one year/ Irrelevant 27 University of Calicut Kerala State Data Info received for one year/ Irrelevant 28 Gujarat Central University Gujarat Central Data Info received for one year/ Irrelevant 29 Central University of Karnataka Karnataka Central Data Info received for one year/ Irrelevant 30 Central University of Punjab Punjab Central Data Info received for one year/ Irrelevant 31 Jadavpur University West Bengal State Data 32 Gauhati University Assam State No Response 33 Assam University Assam Central No Response 34 Patna University Bihar State No Response 35 Central University of South Bihar Bihar Central No Response 36 Magadh University Bihar State No Response 37 Ranchi University Jharkhand State No Response

38 Vinoba Bhave University Jharkhand State No Response Kavayitri Bahinabai Chaudhari 39 Maharashtra State No Response North Maharashtra University 40 Tripura University Nagaland Central No Response 41 Utkal University Odisha State No Response 42 Central University of Odisha Orissa Central No Response 43 Pondicherry University Pondicherry Central No Response 44 Mohanlal Sukhadia University Rajasthan State No Response 45 Sikkim University Sikkim Central No Response 46 Osmania University Telangana State No Response 47 Deen Dayal Upadhyay Gorakhpur Uttar Pradesh State No Response 48 Banaras Hindu University Uttar Pradesh Central No Response Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar 49 Uttar Pradesh State No Response University 50 Rabindra Bharati University West Bengal State No Response 51 Maharishi Dayanand University Haryana State No Response Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar 52 Bihar State No Response Bihar University 53 Shivaji University Maharashtra State No Response 54 Mangalore University Karnataka State No Response Central University of Himachal 55 Himachal Pradesh Central Processing Pradesh 56 Jamia Millia Islamia New Delhi Central Processing 57 University of Allahabad Uttar Pradesh Central Processing 58 Aligarh Muslim University Uttar Pradesh Central Processing

59 Kumaun University Uttarakhand State Processing 60 University of Calcutta West Bengal State Processing Maharishi Dayanand Saraswati 61 Rajasthan State Processing University 62 Dravidian University, Kuppam Andhra Pradesh State Processing Jawaharlal Nehru Technological 63 Andhra Pradesh State Processing University 64 Sri Venkateswara University Andhra Pradesh State Processing 65 Andhra University Andhra Pradesh State Processing Central University of Andhra 66 Andhra Pradesh Central Processing Pradesh 67 Munger University BIHAR State Processing 68 Purnea University, BIHAR State Processing Chhattisgarh Swami Vivekanand 69 Chhattisgarh State Processing Technical University Hemchandracharya North Gujarat 70 Gujarat State Processing University 71 Chaudhary Bansi Lal University Haryana State Processing 72 Kurukshetra University, Haryana State Processing 73 Cochin University Kerala State Processing 74 Kannaur University Kerala State Processing Atal Bihari Vajpai Hindi 75 Madhya Pradesh State Processing Vishwavidyalaya 76 Chhindwara University, Madhya Pradesh State Processing Dr. B.R. Ambedkar University of 77 Madhya Pradesh State Processing Social Sciences,

Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar 78 Maharashtra State Processing Marathwada University 79 Savitribai Phule Pune University Maharashtra State Processing The Rashtrasant Tukadoji 80 Maharashtra State Processing Maharaj Nagpur University 81 Anna University Tamil Nadu State Processing 82 Madras University Tamil Nadu State Processing 83 Bundelkhand University Uttar Pradesh State Processing Chatrapati Sahuji Maharaj Kanpur 84 Uttar Pradesh State Processing University 85 M.J.P.Rohilkhand University Uttar Pradesh State Processing 86 Dibrugarh University ASSAM State Processing Central University of Kashmir, Jammu and 87 Central Processing Transit Campus Kashmir Sant Gadge Baba Amravati 88 Maharashtra State Processing University Maharaja Surajmal Brij 89 Rajasthan State Processing University 90 Telangana University Telangana State Processing Maharaja Sayajirao University of 91 Gujarat State Processing Baroda Arunachal 92 Rajiv Gandhi University Central Raised query, replied but no response Pradesh Veer Narmad South Gujarat 93 Gujarat State Raised query, replied but no response University Jammu and 94 Central University of Jammu Central Raised query, replied but no response Kashmir

95 Barkatullah University Madhya Pradesh State Raised query, replied but no response 96 Jiwaji (Gwalior) University Madhya Pradesh State Raised query, replied but no response 97 University of Mumbai Maharashtra State Raised query, replied but no response 98 University of Lucknow Uttar Pradesh State Raised query, replied but no response Chaudhary Charan Singh 99 Uttar Pradesh State Raised query, replied but no response University Veer Bahadur Singh Purvanchal 100 Uttar Pradesh State Raised query, replied but no response University

Note: Delhi University responded to our RTI request stating that data is not available however the data is collected through Web archives.

Sample RTI Application

To Public Information Officer Tata Institute of Social Sciences, V.N. Purav Marg, Deonar, Mumbai - 400 088 Date: January 24, 2020

Sub: Request to furnish information under section 6(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 on the following questions.

Sir, You are requested to furnish following information:

1) Name of all the candidates contested University level election from 1980 (or whenever the first election took place) till 2019 (or till last election). 2)Number of votes received by each candidate in the University level election from 1980 (or whenever the first election took place) till 2019 (or till last election). 3)Age or date of Birth and Course of all the candidates contested University level election from 1980 (or whenever first election took place) till 2019 (or till last election). 4) Year-wise voter turnout in University level elections from 1980 (or whenever the first election took place) till 2019 (or till last election). 5) Male voter turnout and female voter turnout in University level election from 1980 (or whenever the first election took place) till 2019 (or till last election). 6) Political affiliation of all the candidates contested University level election before the implementation of Lyngdoh Committee guidelines.

If the information is not available in your office, kindly forward to the concerned public authority as per section 6(3) of the RTI Act,2005.

I am a citizen of India and the address is given below. Requisite RTI application fee for Rs.10/- is being remitted vide Indian Postal Order No...... …………………………………….dated...... ………….is enclosed).

Yours sincerely,

Talha Rashid For Centre for Policy Research (CPR)

Postal Address: Centre for Policy Research, Dharam Marg, Near NDMC Hospital, Block C, Diplomatic Enclave, Malcha, New Delhi: 110021

List of questions that were part of our unstructured interviews for Party Politics Inside Campuses: 1.Name? 2.University/College Name? 3. Can you elaborate about the election process of the university polls within your university campus? 4. Are you aware of the all different Student Union Wings/ Organisations functional in your campus? 5. If yes, can you please tell us how many are present in the campus and name them. 6. Can you elaborate about everyday functioning of such an organisation/wing inside your university campus? 7. If there are multiple Wings within campus, can you please tell us which SU organization or wing has dominance and why? Q8. Our data shows us that the major fight for usually important posts like president, general secretary is mainly between two candidates across campuses. These candidates are usually from prominent wings. Why do you think these students' wings are dominating the campus?

Basic demographic profile of the respondents

Student Union Elections Survey 2020

Thank you for taking time out for this survey exercise. All the questions asked in this questionnaire are related to the University Student Union - a single body that is elected across colleges - such as Delhi University Students' Union, Jawaharlal Nehru University Students' Union, etc

The following questionnaire is part of our study of Student Politics in India. The aim of the study is to examine the nature of campus politics in the country, and understand people’s perception of the same. Responses to this questionnaire will be kept strictly confidential and findings will only be used for research purposes. This survey is being undertaken by researchers associated with the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi. Centre for Policy Research is an independent research institute not linked with political party. The survey would take about 10-12 minutes. Please take some time out to fill the survey and help in the study. If you have any questions/concerns regarding this survey, please feel free to reach us at < [email protected]>.

Do you agree to take part in the survey?

Yes

No

Student Union Elections Survey 2020

* Name

* Gender

Male

Female

Other

* Age

* Home district

* Email Address * Mobile number

* State/UT in which university is located

Student Union Elections Survey 2020

* Name of university

Student Union Elections Survey 2020

* Did any student union election take place in your university in the last 3 years?

Yes

No

Student Union Elections Survey 2020

* Course currently enrolled in

Bachelor's

Master's

MPhil

PhD

* Stream (such as Engineering, Medical, Commerce, Arts, Science etc) * Year of study

First Year

Second Year

Third Year

Fourth Year

Fifth Year

* Where do you reside while attending college?

University/College Hostel

Living with family/relative

Living in Private PG/Flat

* How much interest do you have in politics in general? Answer on a scale of 1-7, with 1 being no interest at all and 7 being highly interested.

1 7

* Did you vote in the following elections the last time they were held in your hometown

Yes No Was not eligible

Local Elections - Municipal or Panchayat

State Elections

Lok Sabha Elections

* Given an opportunity, are you interested in contesting the following elections?

Yes No

University Elections

Local Elections (Municipal/Panchayat)

State level/Lok Sabha elections

* How active is the student politics in your university/college? Indicate on a scale on 1-7 with 1 being not active while 7 being very active

1 7 * How much interest do you have in campus politics? Please Indicate on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being no interest and 7 being very high Interest

1 7

* Did you take part in the following activities during the last student union elections on your campus?

Yes No No Response

Posted/Shared a post on Social Media supporting a candidate

Attended a group discussion/gathering/rally

Made posters, Banners, Charts for a candidate

Contributed funds/resources such as bike/car

During campaigns, there are many tactics that candidates use to win over voters. Have you or your friends ever received any of the following inducements?

Movie Tickets/Amusement Park Tickets

Free food/chocolates

Alcohol

Not Applicable

Other (please specify)

* How often does your university administration take action against students who take part in student politics?

Often

Sometimes

Rarely

Never

No opinion

* Some people are opposed to holding student union elections on campuses while some people support this exercise. What about you? How would you rate your support for elections in your campus on a scale of 1-7, with 1 being no support at all and 7 being fully support?

1 7 * On an average, how much money does a prominent candidate for a president post spend on their campaign for your student union elections?

Less than 1 Lakh More than 50 Lakh

Between 1 to 10 Lakh No Opinion

Between 10 to 50 Lakh

* While judging male candidates, what quality is most important to you? Rank 1 for the most important and rank 6 for the least important trait.

´

Candidate's caste

´

Candidate's party

´

Issues raised by Candidate

´

Departmental or college linkages

´

Candidate's personality

´

Candidate's physical appearance * While judging female candidates, what quality is most important to you? Rank 1 for the most important and rank 6 for the least important trait.

´

Candidate's caste

´

Candidate's party

´

Issues raised by Candidate

´

Departmental or college linkages

´

Candidate's personality

´

Candidate's physical appearance

* Have you ever heard about Lyngdoh Committee recommendations?

Yes

No

* What was the last issue for which you sought help from the student union in your University in the last one year?

Hostel/Mess related issue

Administrative Issue

Academic Issue

Bullying by other students

Have not sought any help in the last one year

Other (please specify) * How effective is the student organisation in your university in raising issues of students like you? Indicate on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being not effective and 7 being most effective.

1 7

* Following are the two different kind of opinions people have about student politics, which statement do you agree with more?

Statement 1- student politics is an unnecessary disruption and distracts students from studies.

Statement 2 – student politics is an essential part of student life because it helps in raising issues/concerns

No opinion

* Which of the following two statements comes closest to your opinion on this issue?

All major political parties should be allowed to take part in University elections directly or indirectly.

Students should form their own student wings which should be free from national or state political parties

No opinion

Which student organisation are you a member of? Write '0' if not a member of any organisation.

* What is the monthly household income of your family?

Less than 10,000 More than 1 Lakh

10,001 to 50,000 No response

50,001 to 1 Lakh

* Which of the following items do you own?

Laptop

Smartphone

Cycle

Two-wheeler such as bike/scooter

Car How often do you use the following internet services?

Never/Dont have an

Many times a day Once-twice a day Sometimes Rarely account

Facebook

Twitter

Instagram

Internet news portals

* Religion

Hindu

Muslim

Christian

Sikh

Buddhist

Jain

No Religion

Other (please specify)

* Caste

General

Other Backward Caste

SC

ST

Other (please specify) For those respondents who said that the university elections did not take place in last few years, few additional questions were added while questions related to university polls and related activities were hidden. Following were the additional questions: Appendix C- Decline of the Congress

Figure 1: Turnout and Congress Vote Share in Contested Seats(1977-2019)

Figure 2: Congress Vote Share between 1977-2019

Figure 3: Congress Vote Share between 1977-2019

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