Identification of a Chemical Fingerprint Linking the Undeclared 2017 Release of 106Ru to Advanced Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing
Identification of a chemical fingerprint linking the undeclared 2017 release of 106Ru to advanced nuclear fuel reprocessing Michael W. Cookea,1, Adrian Bottia, Dorian Zokb, Georg Steinhauserb, and Kurt R. Ungara aRadiation Protection Bureau, Health Canada, Ottawa, ON K1A 1C1, Canada; and bInstitute of Radioecology and Radiation Protection, Leibniz Universität Hannover, 30419 Hannover, Germany Edited by Kristin Bowman-James, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, and accepted by Editorial Board Member Marcetta Y. Darensbourg May 1, 2020 (received for review February 7, 2020) The undeclared release and subsequent detection of ruthenium- constitutes the identification of unique signatures. From a radiologi- 106 (106Ru) across Europe from late September to early October of cal perspective, there is none. Samples have been shown to be radi- 2017 prompted an international effort to ascertain the circum- opure and to carry the stable ruthenium isotopic signature of civilian stances of the event. While dispersion modeling, corroborated spent nuclear fuel (10), while stable elemental analysis by scanning by ground deposition measurements, has narrowed possible loca- electron microscopy and neutron activation has revealed no detect- tions of origin, there has been a lack of direct empirical evidence to able anomalies compared to aerosol filter media sampled prior to the address the nature of the release. This is due to the absence of advent of the 106Ru contaminant (1, 11). We are, then, left with the radiological and chemical signatures in the sample matrices, con- definition of a limiting case for a nuclear forensic investigation. sidering that such signatures encode the history and circumstances Fortunately, we are concerned with an element that has sig- of the radioactive contaminant.
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