MASTER'S THESIS M-787

FREDLAND, Richard Alan. UNIPARTY STATES IN AFRICA.

The American University, M. A ., 1965 Political Science, international law and relations

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan UNIPARTY STATES IN AFRICA

by

Richard Alan Fredland

Submitted to the

Faculty of"the School of International Service

of The American University

In Partial Fulfillment of

The Requirements for the Degree

• -

MASTER OF ARTS

Signatures Committee:

Chairman:,

Date:

Dean of th

Date AMERICAN UNIVERSITY l i b r a r y

M A Y 121965

*ASHING1DN.D.C. TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION...... 1

The Study* ...... 1

Definitions...... V

II. UNIPARTY BACKGROUND ...... 9

Tribalism...... 9

Ethnocentricity-Xenophobia...... 11

Unity Gained from Fighting for Independence. . . . 15

Expediency ...... 2Ü

Rejection of Western Ideas 24

Efficiency ...... 2a

Conclusion...... 34

III. UNIPARTY FUNCTIONING...... 37

Parties Are Coalitions ...... 39

Uniparty Is Uniperson...... 49

Man-to-Man Opposition...... 5fa

Party Is Government Is Party...... bU

Vested Interests ...... b4

Competition through Intra-party Elections...... 8 7

IV. CONCLUSIONS...... 7U

BIBLIOGRAPHY. . Vfa

APPENDIX...... tJ3 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

For many years in this country, and especially in this century, the epitome of the "democratic" state in the repub­ lican tradition has been the two-party— or less desirably, the multi-party state, e.g., France. This country has long enjoyed a stable two-party operation, and this has grown to be the standard by which many observers have tested the rest of the world. Among other reasons for this view has been the

West's witnessing of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy or the currently-totalitariaii regimes of the communist countries of

Eastern Europe and behind the Bamboo Curtain, regimes whose totalitarianism has been epitomized by intolerance of political opposition. As some elements of our society have become increasingly aware of the dangers of communism— fancied or genuine— they have moved toward associating all things unde­ sirable with the "international communist conspiracy." This pro and con possibility has come to be their testing ground for the degree of communism a given state manifests: To what degree does the government in power tolerate political oppo­

sition? In a less rigid sense, and decreasing since the demise of John Foster Dulles, this attitude has been the measuring

stick against which this country has stood regimes, especially new states, across the world. 2

But, the flood of new states which burst upon the world scene out of the crumbling European colonial empires in the late portion of the last decade found the United States without an adequate contemporary yardstick to apply to the governmental systems of the pocket-sized states which resulted from this process. (Pocket republics are not new, of course: San Marino, the Vatican City, Lichtenstein, and Andorra have existed for years and even centuries, but they were considered— and more importantly— acted as political curiosities. Sovereignty has never been their sole shibboleth.) Consequently, the United

States has struggled to frustration as it tried, often vainly, sometimes valiantly, to grind the lenses of its political spectacles to focus on these states, particularly on the reputedly one-party, democratic states.

Another factor contributing to our political myopia has been the fact that Negro-controlled states were previously political curiosities in themselves: Haiti, Ethiopia, and

Liberia have not really qualified as substantial political

institutions. Now a new situation has dawned when one realizes

that the largest voting bloc in the United Nations is the

African group. Furthermore, we of the political West are not

accustomed to such blustery independence movements such as

those which we have witnessed recently. The United States'

prototype revolution has become so cloaked in myth and rever­

ence that it no longer applies to current independence movements. 3

Rather, the traditional struggle for independence which here­ tofore has required volumes of passionate lore has been so compressed into the:report of a British commission or a French referendum.

Long and loud have government officials proclaimed that many new areas are not ready for independence— and certainly such entities as Gibraltar or the Cook Islands can never be taken seriously in their independence bids, even though a dis­ traught "colonial power" will be inclined to put to rest their f. clamorings by granting a constitution and the other trappings 1 of independence while continuing to subsidize their existence.

On the other hand, however, when states which were similarly unready for independence achieved this hallowed con­ dition following the Peace of Versailles, and then reverted to totalitarian governments, albeit by force and/or subversion, we heard moaning and wailing even more loudly about the demise of freedom. The time has arrived when twentieth century

Americans must take a hard look at the empirical facts regarding the new breed of single-party states. Ue must determine whether

Professor Paul Linebarger of the School of Advanced International Service of Johns Hopkins University maintains that the proper stance for the established countries of the world to take toward this proliferation of new states is to permit— even encourage— this process till the emerging peoples have reached satiety. Then is the time to establish and encourage regional economic communities since economics are the only force appli­ cable to a fair number of people over a large area of the world or a continent. 4 we are simply able to brashly decree as John Foster Dulles did, that those who are hot with us must be considered to be against us, or we can merely "assure the survival and success of liberty" as the late President John Kennedy declared,!

Unly through a two-faceted examination of both the background of the uniparty state and also the contemporary functioning • of such" a type of government can one hope to understand the uniparty state in an emerging nation. Other­ wise, strict semantics will relegate such a system to the heap of unacceptables immediately. An example of this rigid­ ity is Time magazine's quotation regarding Algeria's uniparty state:

The pro-government newspaper Alger Republican tried to reply to "those who regret that our country is not the scene of electoral battles as are practiced elsewhere" by lamely explaining that a "multiplicity of parties and programs is not necessarily synonomoua with real democracy."2

Only a cursory knowledge of things political.and things

African demonstrates that single-party states cannot be dis­ missed out of hand, just qa "unworkable" communist theories can­ not be ignored when half the world is subjected to their doc­ trines. It is through the examination of these states that this paper will compare uniparty states of Africa with func­ tional democracy on both functional and theoretical levels.

IJohn F. Kennedy, "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1961.

^ Time. October 2, 1964. 5

Similarly', we cannot place the uniparty state arbitrarily at the midpoint of the political spectrum between the conven­ tional Western two-party system'and totalitarianism. And

Maurice Duverger cautions us against relegating uniparty states to the "bad" end of the spectrum with this comment:

' .A good deal of confusion has been introduced into'the question by the widespread idea that Communism and Fascism constitute the only two possible types of singi^e party; . such an idea doea not correspond with reality. Despite the aforementioned lack of standards for judging states such as those which will be examined in this paper, the ground rules must be established. Throughput the study, the purpose of government shall be considered that which is articu­ lated in the following statement: Politics is the exercise of * power to maintain order under a conception of right grounded either in law or tradition. To this should be appended Joseph

Schumpeter's definition of democracy:

The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by iMans of a competitive struggle for the people's vote.

Government as conceived in the traditional West func­

tions on all levels and is manifested in social, political,

economic, and administrative areas of activity. Tribal govern­ ment in a pre-literate society is not so pervasive in its

^Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (London: Meuhuen & Company, Ltd., 1954), p. 275. 2 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism. and Democracy (New York; Harper and Brothers, 1942), p. 269. 5 society, nor is there present the concept of progress in the abstract sense so constantly sounded in international relations.

Were one to examine the effectiveness or suitability of a government, different standards would certainly need to be applied to an industrialized state of some historic standing and an emerging state which has barely the resources to set it­ self up in the business of domestic politics, much less the highly competitive field of international relations.

To even up a set of standards for such a judgement in so fluid and dynamic a situation is presumptions, but for a measure of understanding of the thoughts which follow, this is desirable, Certain factors immediately corns to mind: 1) Is the governmental structure stable enough to permit conduct of both international and internal affairs? 2) Are all significant areas of the country at least cognizant of the sovereignty of the central government? 3) Is there a two-way flow of dialogue and information between the central social and governmental power structure and the lower levels of government? 4) Is it reason­ able to. expect members of opposition groups to remain in the country to pursue their chosen courses? 5) And, probably the most significant measure of any state's viability and potency, can the government pass from control by one individual or political group to another without an internal cataclysm?

Now to expect any African state to receive A-plus on all, or even any, of these criteria is not reasonable. Sut at the 7 same time it is necessary to elevate some ideal toward which they themselves would«also aspire if only granted reprieves from the exigencies of everyday operation to pursue them.

By the same token, certain guides to the study of the background of uniparty states is desirable. These are less tenu­ ous to propound, by the very nature of history. The background of the uniparty state system in Africa shall be. examined through a study of six factors which determine the political functioning of these states: 1) tribal communalism, 2) xenophobia and ethno- cantricity, 3) a camaraderie gained through the fight, figurative or literal, which preceded independence, 4) the extraordinary, lack of skilled civil servants, 5) a general disdain for Western ideas, especially in these days of a diffusing East-West ideo­ logical, and 6) the overahelming desire and necessity for unobstructed development.

Prior to proceeding to an examination of the uniparty state, certain definitions must be established.

Definitions

Uniparty: one-party, single-party; the term is utilized in an effort to develop a logical, concise term for a political institution heretofore referred to only with hyphenated titles; the term is, of course, interchangable with one-party or single- party.

Democracy: The idea and practice of democracy rarely meet at the same point, and the conception of this political a condition varies widely itself. For the purposes of this paper it shall be taken to imply a system of government in which the constituents of that government are regularly consulted through ^ an open vote for their expression of confidence or disapproval, regardless of the economic system or form of government in the state. CHAPTER II

UNIPARTY BACKGROUND

Any of a number of qualities in the character of a primitive society "gone modern" can be elicited to substantiate the contention that uniparty government is virtually a natural for emerging states in Africa. The most interesting and per­ tinent shall be treated here..

Tribalism

It is from the tribal background of the African states that one sees the most easily connected explanation for the current emerging pattern of uniparty states. No one is able to tell us exactly— and it really does not matter here— how many tribes constitute the patchwork of Africa's vast cultures; suffice it to say they are legion. Each has its rigid tribal organization— growing often more unyielding with the influx of alien, Western notions of how to run a society. African social development has been traditionally intertwined with tribal political decisions. It would be out of order here to go beyond pointing out the problems of reorienting a social tradition; a refresher course is simulated by examining the difficulties being encountered by civil rights workers as they confront the legalized traditions of this country's South.

Acknowledgedly an overstatement, comment in the Ghanaian 10

Convention Peoples' Party organ, Party, indicates an aspect of this feeling. It is, of course, impossible to know what por­ tion of this statement is based upon sociology and what portion finds its being in political expediency. The writer maintains that, "a multi-party system is entirely alien to the traditional concept of government in African Scoiety. Moreover, a one- party system provides the best answer for the problem of govern­ ment in Africa."^

Tribes have unitary, autocratic government through the chief. Open negotiations producing open decisions openly arrived at and compromise characterize the governing procedures.

Tribal councils gather periodically to discuss the matters that pertain to the governance of the tribe. Even so momentoud a decision as selection of a successor chieftain for those tribes which do have hereditary traditions provided for is accom­ plished by such a confabulation.

A Ghanian, K. A. Busia, studied the governing procedures of the Ashanti and explains that their chieftainship is based on lineage with each lineage group considered a separate political unit when choice of a chief occurred. To expand the base of support for this system, the Ashanti also had formal- ' ized practices which ensured that the popular will was given due consideration. In an ultimate struggle for exercise of

^Comment in the Party ^Ghana/ April 16-30, 1962. 11 power, the "people" reserved the constitutional right to destool a chief.!

It is not unheard of for the colonial authorities to utilize this pre-established governmental system through which to exercise political control. The British are especially noted for this type rule in their former colonies. Its results are varied, not the least of which is arousing resentment among the non-participating leaders who are predisposed to criticize both their opposition and the alien rulers also. Fortunately for the future of democracy in many of these areas, the British have imposed and fostered a respect for democratic institu­ tions without intense attention to the specific mode of govern­ ment which is established to achieve this end.

To us of the Western democratic tradition, accustomed to ordering our lives by pervasive laws, it is difficult to perceive the functioning of so tenuous an arrangement as that evoked by a uniparty arrangement. Also, unaccustomed to the adulation attached to leaders in these primitive societies, we expect "loyal opposition" and the other accoutrements of our refined, venerable system.

Ethnocentricity-Xenophobia

Ethnocentricity is a factor giving natural impetus to uniparty government, just as xenophobia operates to discourage

!k. a. Busia, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), pT 21. 12 active opposition. The security and solidarity of unopposed government guarantees more satisfaction than politically com­ petitive arrangements when the basic social agency is a tribe whose institutions are already threatened by incursions of

Ui'stern political, religious, economic, and social organiza­ tions and institutions.

Study of virtually all early elections in an emerging state suDstantiates this conclusion. T. E . Smith, in his less- than-Hxciting survey. Elections in Developing Countries, deduces that the ethnic majority usually came out on top. when that was not the evident case, the victorious party appeared to be that one which could capitalize to the greatest extent on association with the then-current drive for independence.^

The writer of a memorandum for the House of Representa­ tives' Foreign Affairs Committee concluded similarly:

Political parties in the Congo have been built on one or more of three bases: A. Personal following of a particular leader; d. Coalition of évolués, each with a^personal fol- .iDwing.; C. Tribal affinity most freouently.

Ihe three bases discussed above are not, of course, mutually exclusive, and, more often than not, at least two of these factors are found to be present in any given situation.

One cannot automatically expect the evolution of a

1 T. £. Smith, Elections in Developing Countries (New York: St. Martins Press, l9bUj, p. 259. 2 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on For­ eign Affairs, "Staff Memorandum on the Republic of the Congo," bfath Congress, 2nd Session, August 24, l9bU (Washington: Govern­ ment Printing Office, l9bU), p. 41. 13 totally representative political arrangement simply through the

introduction of Western ideas. Other more potent forces function.

Lewis Caser, in a sociological treatise examining conflict in primitive societies observes:

Rigid systems, such as contemporary totalitarian socie­ ties, may have success, as has been suggested previously, in partly canalizing hostile feelings through safety-valve in­ stitutions such as institutionalized anti-Semitism or xeno­ phobia. However, their lack of mechanisms for readjustment to changed conditions permits the accumulation of occasions for conflict and hence of hostilities wl^ich may eventually directly threaten consensual agreement.

As in mathematics, if four plus three equals seven, then three plus four also equals seven; so, empirically, it appears valid that the reverse of the sociologist's conclusion can be maintained: A society with a general cause for xenophobia, for

example, can provide a framework for a rigid social system. Con­

temporary society in such a locale as the state of Mississippi

today produces a not-wholly analagous axampls. As the more

traditional 'Mississippians see that their system is threatened,

and with it their way of life and livlihood, they form radical— or dare we say extreme— groups resorting to actions which would

otherwise be considered unacceptable, or at least undesirable.

The concept of xenophobia regarding ideas is dealt with

in a later portion of this paper.

In the study of the Ashanti mentioned above, Busia ex­

plains that these proud people now entertain a tradition of having

.1 Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Illinois: The free Press of Glencoe, l9bb), p. 154. 14 united in a fight for their independence against the Denkuira to whom they were tributary. In a society where history has been relatively uncomplicated, allegiance to a single thread of that history has much deeper meaning than in a Western society where forces and counter-forces beyond number have been operating.

Implicit in this discussion is the innate xenophobia so often noticed among primitives, despite the grsgariousness of the human genus. This fondness for one's own kind leads to unspecified reluctance to offer support for a program or candi-' data not of one's own tribe or region.

The contrary, or positive, aspect of this phenomenon cannot be ignored. Hodgkin, in African Political Parties. suggests strongly that some national parties have derived much of their strength from the way in which they have been able to capture basic Islamic tenets and appeal to supra-national

Muslim solidarity rather than the elusive Pan-Africanism so 1 often preferred by soma African leaders.

Since, through natural functions, a given area— not, however, the same area delineated by international boundaries— is endowed with preponderant tribal or ethnic groupings, there is generally the resultant condition of a dominant tribe or group. The ruling Watusi in Rwanda, the Flemish in Belgium,

^Thomas Hodgkin, African Political Parties (Harmonsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1961), p. 67. 15 the Lunde in the Congo, or the white in Mississippi are the first of repetitive examples of dominant groups which amount to dominant ethnic parties which do not tolerate serious oppo­ sition beyond permitting minority groups s o M measure of self- governance, frequently conceived in such a way as to amount to . political murder or suicide. Evidence indicates that this is the case of the recently-instituted Bantustens in the Republic of South Africa.

Only in the most unenlightened do we sea such crude efforts to perpetrate political genocide, and only in the most enlightened and unaasimilable societies does the majority permit full exercise of rights to the minority. The tenuous political arrangements in most African countries would strongly suggest little interest in these rights during the early stages of political development. Unity Gained from Fighting for Independence

Coser says that "a group defines itself by struggling with other groups."^ This is not dependent on stages of devel­ opment or education.

Without approaching the philosophical implications of the problem, it can be said that all men in today's world have come to yearn— or have been led to believe that they yearn— for what they conceive as freedom to express their individual uniqueness to the limits of their abilities. This has, in the

^Coser, 00. cit.. p. 87. IB normal course of human development, evolved Its epitome: political independence— not self-governmsnt, not dependence,

not gradual political evolution, nor is the measure of viabil­

ity to be applied before an area demands an end to its ties with the administering colonial power. Since this is an a posteriori observation, there is little left to observe except

that this process has occurred many times over in the former colonial areas of the world in recent years.

The degree of the intensity of the feeling that has developed in most of these areas cannot be too great since thbre has not been a wearisome struggle, save in a few arees, e. g., Algeria. Consequently, this unity born of a freedom fight cannot be counted upon to serve too gallantly during periods of dilemma and uncertainty which are sure to beset the emerging state.

Zolberg gives hearty assent to this proposition in his recent study of the Ivory Coast when he contends: "Most importantly, the experience of past conflict has led many

Ivoiriens to seek unity at any price.However, as the reali­ zation sets in that there is no longer a fight to be waged against an alien power, the feeling of need for a united front relaxes. It is at this stage that the efforts of insidious

"black brothers" go to work to wheedle acquiescenss of the

^Aristide Zolberg, One-Party Government in tns Ivory Coast (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 7. 1? government of such a state into one or another scheme of

political intrigue. . '

This process of "independence, at any price" has been manifested on various levels over past centuries of foreign

administration in alien lands. One of the more notable expres­

sions of a high degree of this feeling was the American

Revolution close to two centuries ago. At the other end of

the independence spectrum was Britain's reluctant relinquish­

ing of India short of overt revolution at the opening of the post-Ulorld War II era of emerging nations.

As the populations of these erees mobilize their resour­

ces to plod or dash toward the cauldron of political indepen­

dence at the end of the colonial rainbow, there has been a

certain concentric attraction among those opposing the outgoing

colonial regime. This has tended to produce a cohesiveness— or something which might properly be termed an "anti-nesa"—

which has proven itself to be a fertile bed in which unipar-

tisanship can be implanted.

John George, in Africa Report, puts the Tanganyika

Africa National Union's corner on the political market in this

light:

TAIMU has come to hold this pervasive influence over all aspects of Tanganyikan life because the party ascended to power under a yielding British policy during a period when the heterogeneous nationalist elements of labor, peasant farmer or herdsman, and the fragmented ethnic and tribal communities were still unnaturally united by IB 1 the cry of uhuru.

It ia important to note that even under the "yielding"

British policies in Tanganyika— or in any other British colohy, for the mostpart— there was sufficient provocation for this degree of unity; the test of turmoil did not have to reach the proportions that prompted the Boston Tea Party of this country's heralded past or the denounced Algerian Revolution more re­ cently. Political parties are not founded on intransigent principles, nor need there be eternal ideals to coalesce a body politic.

The general and widespread attitude of unity "left over" from the achievement of independence presents problems, of course, to the newly-responsible government as it attempts to assume the actual role of operating the governmental machinery.

During the period of agitation over independence, these recently-invested leaders of a nation actually filled the role of the opposition, loyal or otherwise. Theirs was not the desire to perpetuate the government as it was then constituted; nor was it politically advantageous for them to go out of their way to heap praise on the colonial administration. The perennial and generally accurate charge that can always be legitimately levelled at opposition parties— that they would act differently if given the opportunity to function in response

^John 8. George, "How Stable Is Tanganyika?" Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 3, March, 1963, p. 3. 19

to the problems which they so liberally and scathingly criti-

. cize— comes to be a brute challenge for a new government's con­

trolling party. Very shortly after achieving independence, the

three former British East African territories were compelled to

swallow their nationalistic pride and summoned the British to

return to assist in suppressing a mutiny in their armed forces. 1 Their "loyal" opposition had gotten out of hand.

Though we are existing too early in history to draw con­

clusions on this phenomenon, it is necessary to mention the

logical possibilities of the uniparty state, burdened as de­

scribed above, seeing its political leaders fracturing into

bickering and dissenting factions that will return the nascent

country to a condition more totalitarian and apprehensive than

that against which they professed to be leading a fight prior

to independence and, of course, freedom.

Since we are searching so vast a fabric, woven from yet un­

tested yarn, it is possibly fatuous to draw out a single thread

to be scrutinized. But the apparent merits of the case warrant

its inclusion. In an early (1957) article on the Convention

People's Party in Ghana, the London Times remarked that the party

was "heavily influenced by the Indian example and also by 2 American Political forces."

1 In Guinea, Toure's Rassemblement Démocratique Africain was an active political force long before independence and conse­ quently could be expected to assume a leading role after indepen­ dence. News analysis in the London Times. December 18, 1957. 2U

Possibly, on the edge of some future political chasm they can be conceived as looking to the American constitutional reform of 1763 when the original pattern— the only one acceptable at its inception— was found to be lacking in strength, and was remodeled. Such a thoroughgoing transformation is certainly going to become desirable at various times in the futures of various African states, whether they be uniparty today or not.

The basic pattern upon which they have begun building their modern state is going to demand hard looks and fearless action if what are already tenuous governments are to entertain any aspirations of continuing long into the future.

Expediency

"It is not surprising, then, that Africans create ideological justifications for the structures they find neces- sary to resolve their primary problems." Thus concludes the newly-recognized African scholar, Immanuel Wallerstein.

Every child can recall playing sandlot baseball with three-man teams because that called every available man into action. This was simply adapting a program to the exigencies of the situation. Similarly, it is observed by many students of the contemporary political scene that United States political reaction to the Soviet Union should take cognizance of this equally-applicable universal political reality; we

^Immanuel hlallerstein, Africa; The Politics of Independence (New York: Random- House, 1961), p. 154. 21 must not be diverted by Marxian— or Stalinist, or Khrushchavian, or Kosygin-Brasnnevian— predi-ctions or statements of intent.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as with any and. all other national states, parties, organizations, or systems, must be judged by its actions, not its words; and it, nor any othea state, cannot act for an extended period in a manner contrary to the general condition it finds itself in vis^-vis its neighbors or other states. Furthermore, this condition or system of actions and responses occurs often as a result of situations totally beyond the control of the acting state.

This comparison can be extended to any new state which wishes to maximize its productivity of precious talents by limiting the number of the educated elite which will be per­ mitted to become political deletanti, in effect, by function­ ing as the opposition. In a lecture describing the operation of the then-Neo-Oestour Party in Tunisia, Deputy Director M .

Haidar of the Socialist-Destour Party, pointed out that it is nothing more than practical use of all-too-rare talents that governmental and party hierarchies be paralleled insofar as possible 30 that government officials can easily function in dual roles and so that no talent will be lost in the operation of a political party that has virtually no being outside the

government itself.

. In most countries, then, it becomes desirable to dis- 22 courage the wasting of precious talent. Newspapers in this country some two years ago carried a reporter's observation of one African country which was overwhelmed upon receiving a

Peace Corps contingent of twelve or so members. This platoon actually doubled the number of college graduates then in the country! Educated talent is unbelievably precious in most emerging areas. When there is but one hypothetical transpor­ tation specialist, it is hardly suitable for the national interest that he be a mambtar of a shadow cabinet criticizing the efforts of an amature doing "his" job.

If there is to be progress, there must be unity of pur­ pose; the fact that the opposition would probably be dedicated to the same goals in general is not sufficient— too many leaders feel that there is not time, nor do they possess suf­ ficient political prestige, for them to quibble over what amounts to minutiae. This, of course, gives the government a proclivity for hyper-responsibility and hypersensitivity, and places heavy demands upon the bureaucrats to avoid errors of judgement. Little recourse remains to the discontented than to overthrow the government, and in effect, destroy the state, a situation which all-too-frequently materializes.

In a study unencumbered by the complexities of helter- skelter independence movements, having been conducted in 1946 and 1947, Elton Mayo's Political Problems of Industrial

Civilization admonishes emerging governments to capture the 23 spontaneous cooperation of the population and not to attempt to mobilize a reserve of power for an emergency. It is in the day-

to-day operation of a society, with a constant push toward pro­ gress, that a country can hope to build up a political loyalty

and awareness.1 Change can be Introduced by relating all actions

to all others unified actions for a common goal. The state cannot select random areas of action if these areas have no

relevancy for those of the population who are going to have to

labor and sacrifice for the achievement of the designated ends.

Mayo quotes Aristotle on sociology: "The primitive

social organization comes into being for the sake of life, but

continues to promote a life directed towards better living." It

is at the point of transformation from pursuing life to seeking

a better condition, that we see most of the developing states

now. They have risen above a primitive desire for the satis­

faction of animal wants, and now possess the capacity for

greater satisfaction.

But the simple fact that broader interests are evident

does not automatically imbue the society with an interest in,

or a capacity for, the abstract. Though there has long bean

evidence of the abstract in the religions and superstitions of

the African tribes, we do not have the link to move into the

realm of the Idealistic political campaign. It still gets us

Elton Mayo, Political Problems of Industrial Civilization (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), passim. 24 back to the type of concern displayed by the Masai during an early Kenyan election: Their primary response went to the politician which offered more cattle and better conditions for the present herds. We cannot, therefore, seriously assume that parties represent a genuine ideological consensus. (It is, of course, only in the most general way that Western parties achieve this condition.) The party, rather, can be made to serve as such a school through which politicians implant their conceptions of the common good in the populace.

The party expressions, consequently, are little more than a reflection of the political notions of no more than an educated handful at the top of the prestige ladder.

Rejection of Western Ideas

With few modern, and virtually no historical exceptions, the idea of the multi-party government has been of Western

European association. The United Kingdom has been the classic manifestation of "loyal Opposition" and a fiercely loyal devotion to two-party government. Even in those states which support a wide range of parties for every political credo, there is the resultant coalition government which often works itself out to be a contest between the "ins" and the "outs."

Any suggestion that a two-party system should be adopted in an African state sooner or later gets around to being the butt of a charge of Western imperialism or neo-colonialism.

The chips of nationalism or chauvinism the typical emerging • 25

state carries on its shoulder suggest that no modifications of

traditional systems can be instituted that do not enhance the material lot of the population; hence, there is reluctance to

accept Western political philosophy. Nationalist leaders have

rather effectively pierced the notion so widely held, especially

in the West, that Western governmental traditions are, ipso

facto> best for all political entities. Many African leaders have perceived an opportunity to create a virtually new approach

to, enlightened, liberal government. Despite the 'immense de­ mands upon their fairness and statesmanship that would be

necessitated oy adhering to democracy in a unitary government,

there is the growing appeal— reinforced with the writing of

each new page of contemporary history— of African socialism

or Wegrituds, or whatever name it traffics under at a given

place at a given time. For instance, the Africans have

striven to prove to the world that Négritude can develop to a

degree sufficient to repudiate traditional Western types of

government. The Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations, or

recent conferences of non-aligned nations, would be additional

manifestations of this sentiment.

Taken too far tnis argument breaks into semantic quib­

bling. Tnis IS captured in the contention of Dr. Abdul Said,

of The American University, that modernization, per se. is concom­

itant with and inseparable from Westernization. It is surely

beyond thought of dispute tnat most, and certainly all impor- 2b tant, inventions and discoveries advancing the industrial society are tributes to Western pioneering and exploration in this field. Sp, try as they must, the underdeveloped— or emerging— land must accept much of what the West has to offer; all Western notions cannot be scorned en toto.

Even in paying respect to Western ideas from which they can draw benefit, there is resentfulness bn the part of many

Africans. Pere Antoine Mabone, writing in Presence Africaine, says:

There is no doubt that today's world is in the image of Europe. For Europe, I imply also the Americas, Canada, and Australia. The European way of life, then, is for the rest of the world. But a person does not want to idolize this image; this leads the world to really want a complete image of humanity based on the different forms of culture and thought, understanding the diverse ethnic groups which form the human family.

During the earlier stages of the emergence of new states, it is evident that efforts were being made on the parts of many leaders to at least present the appearance of emulating

Western conceptions and ideals. This is not even any longer the case. It is now desirable to proclaim new African polit­

ical theories, no matter what degree of similarity they bear 2 to established Western ideas.

Pare Antoine Mabone, "Philosophie Africaine," Presence Africaine, No. 3Q, February-Msrch, I960, p. 40. Translated from the French by the writer.

In a study of those states which exist in the grey area between empirical democracy and full-blooded totalitarianism, John Oakes observes, "The states of Asia and Africa are highly 27

We are witnessing in many developing areas, then, a stalwart effort to blend the best of two worlds: They want to combine the traditionalism which has led them from wherever they have come to where they are today with modern political ideas which are primarily Western and under which they can hope to proceed further into the world of their political aspira­ tions.

This discussion is closed on a poetic note: Leopold

Senghor of Senegal penned these lines while a student in Paris.

"Wash me clean, from all contagions of civilized man." In his

"Prayer for Peace" he writes;

Lord God, forgive white Europe. It is true Lord, that for four enlightened centuries, she has scattered the baying and slaver of her mastiffs over my lands And the Christians, forsaking Thy light and the gentleness of Thy heart Have lit their campfires with my parchments, tortured my disciples, deported my Docters and masters of science.1

individualistic, and while the course of their early development under independence may be patterned after European forms, their growth to maturity will be molded by their own local conditions." John B. Oakes, The Edge of Freedom (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. xli.

^Leopold Ssdar Senghor, Selected Poems, translated by John Reed and Clive Wake. (New York: Athenum, 1964). Senghor published a statement on African socialism in 1964. In this he said: "The proletariat of the nineteenth century was es­ tranged from humanity; the colonized people of the twentieth century, the colored peoples, are estranged even more seriously. To economic alienations, others are added: political, social, and cultural. The result is physical and moral suffering, poverty, and uneasy conditions, the latter stemming from a feeling of frustration. In both instances, revolt and struggle 28

Efficiency

Zolberg quotes an Ivoirien: "Should we allow, because of our immoderate love of freedom or of democracy, an irrespon­ sible minority to endanger the regime which we have freely chosen? Do not count on me to make such an error.

This examination of uniparty background and motivations cannot remain in the clouds of abstraction and ideology. There is always the mundanely practical explanation for the uniparty government: It is afficient. This justification was perhaps hinted at above whan the proposal was suggested that any given national state, "cannot act for an extended period in a manner contrary to the general condition it finds itself in vis-a-vis 2 its neighbors or other states." A state must remain flexible, and the more mature it becomes politically, the more flexible will it wish to be.

If Hitler can ever be relished for any contribution to history, it would probably be the devastating efficiency with # which he pursued his perverted policies in Germany during the decade of his tenure. Such a cataclysmic twist to a nation's policies could not be wrought in a parliamentary-type govern-

servB to 'abolish present conditions' and 'transform the world' by reestablishing the natural equilibrium. Where coloured peoples are concerned, it is accurate to speak of a 'revolt against the West.' p. lU.

^Zolberg, op. cit.. p. 253.

^Above, p. 21. 29 ' ' . ment in so brief a period without rorces being applied which

would, in their course, destroy the very institution, out it

does illustrate movement.

Philip II, of Spain (1527-1598; raigned 1556-1598), is

a more remote instance of efficiency through totalitarianism.

His rule, however, illustrates both sides of the argument for

his stubbornness produced unreasonable hardships. Castillo, in

his Historia da Esoa#a. suggests that had Philip wished to

achieve one particular victory, it was necessary that he employ

discretion and heed, "the voice of reason and justice, but as 1 this was not done, the war was prolonged extraordinarily."

This is not to say that the same intent is necessarily

present in contemporary Africa or even Eastern Europe or Asia,

but the same type efficiency is certainly possible and even

generally desirable, the procedures employed being a function

of the temperament and charisma of the leaders. This is ac­

complished by simply rediverting resources— generally human—

otherwise destined for the opposition, into efforts toward

national goals of development.

A modest United States recognition of this condition was

acknowledged by the Under Secretary of State for Africa, G. Men-

nen Williams, in testimony before the House Committee on Foreign

Relations Subcommittee on Africa. He said, in early 1963, that

D. Rafael del Castillo, Historia de Espaça (Barcelona: Imprenta Y Libreria Religiosa Y Cientifica, IbVb), Capitula CLXUIII Translated from the Spanish by the writer. . . 3Ü though the one-party state was not desirable, the idea of a functioning two-party system was probably too sophisticated 1 for most Africans during their transitional period. Governor

Williams predicted, further, that it was likely for the mono­ lithic parties to splinter resulting in the practical effect of a multi-party state. He also noted that the lack of leadership presently made such a course both undesirable and unlikely in moat African states.

Zolberg again quotes a member of the Ivory Coast i\.ational

Assembly;

These immense tasks..legitimize a power that is author­ itarian and strong. Because of this need for strong power the political system unu^x uiiiich the Ivory Coast was nur­ tured— the parliamentary regime of the Fourth Republic,— stood as a negative model to be avoided as any price.

A native recently related the story of a problem con­ fronting the Syrian government which illustrates an opportunity tor this somewhat ruthless effort toward efficiency under a uniparty system to become useful. There were said to be only two trained agronomists in Syria— one native and one American.

The American, red, white, and true blua to the manner charac­ teristic of public servants abroad (and doubtless under orders from the State Department or the Agency for International

^United States Congress, House of Representatives, Com­ mittee on Foreign Affairs, "Africa Briefing," Hearing before Subcommittee on Africa, BBth Congress, 2nd Session, February 27, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 8. 2 Zolberg, op. cit., p. 255. 31

Development), has accepted an assignment in an agricultural area far from a metropolitan center. The Syrian, on the other hand, having spent years abroad acquiring his priceless training— and, not incidentally— status, refuses to consider any position out­ side the center of government! It is not necessarily obvious that the native could do more amongst his people in tne hinter­ lands than in the capital city, but the implied attitude is what is so important for a developing country to counter, especially among those who have some measure of technical skills which can readily be utilized. *

Not unlike tnis problem is the one facing the South

Carolina state university system. Under the aegis of the

University of South Carolina in Columbia, there nave opened six or eight two-year centers around the state. In order to staff

these outiand centers, it had bscoma standard procedure for

incoming professors to be offered a contract consigning them to one of the centers for two years or so before moving to the main

campus at Columbia. A simplified theorem is not difficult to

arrive at: The more educated and trained one becomes, the more

complex a society he will want to live and work in, especially

if he has risen from the masses to a position among the rarified

elite.

Since the central government in an emerging state will

control most of the development projects through funds made

available by foreign aid grants, development loans. United

Nations technical assistance, and similar programs, the uniparty 32 can readily lay down terms under whicn technicians can ds re- tain.ed. And, as we have witnessed in many of the more developed lands, even private capital ventures can be brought to heel through the government's administration of tax laws, investment restrictions, nationalization, profit limitations, and mineral right retentions.

It is at least fairly widely agreed that certain re­ strictions of freedom are necessary, and even desirable, for sure-footed development. The cause of personal freedom shall be dependent, then, upon an inordinate amount of restraint on the part of the administering authorities. Unfortunately, the guarantees of freedom can frequently slip away so quietly that they are gone before their aosence is noteo, and it this fear that raises its head as high as any other when considered as a possible result of a uniparty government.

Just as a reading of the Constitution of tne Soviet union can lead one euphoristically to deduce tnat all is sweetness and light there, so a reading of any other documents or plans of government tells much less than the actions which emanate there­ from. In addition to moving toward desired goals, the operation of a state must indicate respect for the presence of honest dissenters and some opportunities for the legitimate expression of dissent. It must be observed in the new state that the conceptions and plans of this central government do not become the ultimate right with all other rights and liberties subverted. 33

But, the necessity for speed' does produce dilemmas.

The uniparty in an emerging state can attempt to justify its extraordinary political measures only if it can produce— and further, if these efforts at production end in results which can be perceived by the layman. This government must provide the means for obtaining human necessities and then hope to dis­ tribute its ideology along with its' goods. i\io state can even hope to wait for the consolidation of its national revolution as mentioned in the footnote below; the society of a modern state is the national revolution brought to fruition, and without this assumption no national government can hope to enjoy internal complacency.

There is another sub-factor in a discussion of efficiency in an emerging state: The individuals who lead the party and government in a uniparty, more often than not, have been collab­ orating from years before, whether it was in Paris or London in a university or jail or as an active leadership in the native political party on the local scene. From a long list one could select Bourguiba in Tunisia who participated in the founding of the Destour Party of Tunisia or Tours who virtually personifies

George Shepard, writing in Africa Today, puts this pro­ cess in interesting terms: "(Mkrumah has continued to follow the advice of nis old mentor, George Padmore..., and has pursued the social revolution without waiting to consolidate the na­ tional revolution. Pressing the pace of change in this relent­ less was inevitably arouses great opposition." George Shepard, "Four Views of Ghana," Africa Today, Vol. IX, f\io. lU (December, 19b2), p. 4. 34 the Parti Démocratique oe Guinea. Along with these headline- gatherers, there are the usual subalterns who collect in the rays of any star. Those who survive the tribulations generally visited upon "revolutionary" leaders become stalwarts who form the vanguard of both the new government and party.

When this condition is analyzed for obtaining maximum efficiency, no alternative to a uniparty stats commands the justification that the state itself does.

Efficiency is, then, both desirable, and almost unavoid­ able in a typical emerging state.

Conclusions

Dust as ail symptoms of a given disease do not always make themselves manifest in every instance of that oisease, so all of these factors do not operate with equal rorcs in every state experiencing uniparty government. Certainly, if a Oominant con­ sideration were to be selected, the factor of expedience would come to the fore.

As willing as African leaders appear to oe to flaunt traditions for the sake of expediency, it is evident that the latter, i. s. expediency, takes precedence in tnis considera­ tion. L. Gray Cowan's examination of Guinea in Carter's African

One-Party States mentions specifically that the Parti,

Démocratique de Guindé" is seeking to discourage tribalism. Doth for the benefit of tne perspective of the present regime, and also because.the former French regime had operated their control 35 through utilization of tribal loyalties, but disregarding the advantages which could accrue to the people in emulating some traditional practices.^ Furthermore, any African who "conspired" with the former colonial power is currently highly suspect and not in a position to be awarded a position of high trust de­ spite his qualifications or training.

Possibly the weakest of the contributing causes is the unity sometimes gained through a revolution or rebellion, kla are presently witnessing extreme dissection among rhe anti-

Portugese leaders in Angola and Mozambique.- Both Holden

Roberto and Eduardo «-ondlàne, leaders of the clandestine rev­ olutions in these areas, respectively, are the constant targets of disparaging remarks by rivals who purport to be joined in the same cause.

The uniparty state as observed in Africa is derivative from a host of background factors. First, the basic organiza­ tion of Africa is, and has been, the tribe. Any study of society traces elemental organization back to the family group, and

Africa is no different.

Second, just as throughout history people have feared the unknown, so the African tends to reject those ideas, methods, and systems, and their progenitors, which are alien to them.

Third, the Africans in a given area have been driven to-

1 Gwendolen M. Carter, African One-Party States (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, l9bZ), p. 19U. ■ . 3B gether by the vague, but real, bond of orotherhood that comes from battling a common foe, real or imagined.

Fourth, when there is only one set of individuals capable of functioning, it is reasonable to expect that the government, personified in the dominant faction if there be factions, would seek the services of all who are capaoie or rilling necessary roles.

Fifth, aside from the fear that is almost natural in any society regarding the strange or unknown, there is also a con­ trived opposition to things Western, including Western govern­ mental systems.

And, sixth, once the leaders assume power, however tenu­ ously they hold it, tney must produce, and that demands a degree of efficiency which must be attained at any cost short of undoing the system.

It is now necessary to examine the functioning of the uniparty states presently constituted in order to determine their actual category in the po-litical spectrum. CHAPTER III

UIMIPARTY FUNCTIONING

By attempting to examine the degree of representation and the functions of uniparty states, we presume a range of possibilities including totalitarian and reasonably represen­ tative, for two. Furthermore, we presuppose that this subject sheds relevant light on an examination of uniparty states.

Both of these presuppositions shall be assumed safe and shall not be put to the test here.

liie can only examine these states on the basis on their past performancB--BxtremBly brief as the annals of history go.

We cannot put great stock in things said, nor in -documents written. Words fill mouths, but actions constitute the pages of history. Our value judgements, then, must be predicated only on the direction a state appears to be moving, unencum­ bered by preconceptions, insofar as possible.

These preconceptions of institutions whose functioning is considered not nearly so important as that they possess a proper-sounding title can frequently blind the vision of an ordinarily objective individual.

An example of this at work was provided by three jun­ keting lawmakers, Senators Nauberger, Hart, and Gore, when they visited sixteen African capitals in twenty-three days 3d on what was termed a "Study Mission to Africa" in tne fall of

1961. Their report was rife with Cold War overtones: "What many Africans have known of European colonialism they have not liked; but not having experienced-a Soviet type colonialism, we doubt that they perceive its dangers."^

Another example of Cold War-oriented observation # Gwendolen Carter's Independence for Africa, published in 1961 after her series of trips across the continent. Though her work is of high quality, many other newly-arrived writers must be given credit for scholarship in this field. Unfortunately, the recent deluge of tomes in this field has obfuscated efforts to obtain an objective analysis of Africa or its modus operandi■

The total effect is to further complicate the study of an area that already thwarts efforts at objective analysis.

The function of parties must be considered from two

approaches. Thera is the day-to-day— or on a more reasonable scale, month-to-month--operation of the party frequently man­

ifested in formal or temporal coalitions. Then there is also

United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "Study Mission to Africa," Report of Senators Albert Gore, Philip A. Hart, and Maurine Neuberger, b/th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 19bZ), p. 1. The questions which arise after such an exposition are legion: How do jjB perceive the dangers of communism not having lived under it? Who likes colonialism? What does this observation really tell us about Africa--or any other emerging area today? Certainly no other historical movement has been so thoroughly chronicled; consequently, choice of material is difficult. - 39 the cumulative effects of party operation such as the vested interests which develop.

Also, we must remember that though background factors have a certain universalism that precludes any one factor being considered exclusively in connection with one state; but fac­ tors differ widely in their applicability to any particular state and at any particular time.

Parties are Coalitions

The General Secretary of the Partie Démocratique de la

Cote d'Ivoire is quoted by Zolberg as suggesting that the single party in thqt country adequately represents its popula­ tion:

This is truly a democratic procedure. After all, we took a great deal of care to give some representation to every group in the community /each group was asked to submit a list of nominees for office to the part^^/. What more can anybody ask for? By representing every group, we gave every voter someone of his own kind to vote for and to be represented by.

The area of discussion from which one is most likely to slip from an objective examination of uniparty states into a justification of this practice as actually a two-party or multi-party state in disguise is upon us. The primary func­ tional premise is defined by nebulous parameters: The uniparty state's government has, within itself, an effective coalition of its interests, political activists, nationalists, and every and all other factions present in the emerging country

^Zolberg, op. cit.. p. 255. 4Ü that could have— or would like to think they have~a bearing on the operation of the government as a political institution.

We in this country, accustomed to two major parties (at least till the 1964 Presidential electioni) see much the same process at work. However onerous the reputation was for it to live down, for instance, the Republican Party has not in recent years harbored just one sector of our economy among its members, or even its leaders. It, like the Democratic Party, has a cross-section of society with at least a fair number of mem- bers from the working class, a handful of Catholics and Jews and Negroes and others generally associated with the Democrats.

A comparative situation is ekfemplified by the Convention People's

Party in Ghana which will be discussed later. But the Party has had to go a step further and attempt to include all members of a given,political interest group if the party is to effec­ tively stave off the opposition, which in itself is a point to be doubted.

An incident of this coalescing was reported from Ghana in 1961. The country's labor unions were compelled by the government to reorganize into sixteen groups, and no other labor organizations were permitted to form. These sixteen groups were brought under the wing of the Convention People's

Party and kept in line through the use of party discipline.

The Osagyafo Doctor Nkrumah was quoted in the April, 1962, issue of The Partv. the Convention People's Party of­ ficial newspaper, to the effect that, "we cannot talk loudly 41 of building a ona-party state and yet drive away persons who 1 would want to join our Party and help realise that objective-"

There are, of course, both voluntary and compulsory facets to this philosophy. The closer the population feels itself associ­ ated with the party, the less effort that will be necessary to propagandize non-members. Also, the more pervasive the influ­ ence of the party, the greater its tolerated range of action.

De Toqueville paid homage to the heterogeniety of

American parties of the 184Q's in his excellent study of our system.

In the absence of great parties the United States swarms with lesser controversies, and public opinion is divided into a thousand minute shades of difference upon questions of detail. The pains that are taken to create parties erg inconceivable, and at the present day it is no easy task.

Homogeneous parties ultimately spread their base so widely that they become, in effect, all-encompassing and exclude only those persons or groups who specifically choose to alienate themselves from the mainstream of national and party thinking.

The socialist parties of Scandinavia do not limit their base- even though there is no pretense of a uniparty system in any of the countries. The fact is, however, that opposition has been generally overwhelmed because these parties have served

News item in the Partv. March-April, 1962, published by the Convention People's Party Bureau of Information and Publicity. 2 Alexis de Toqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Vintage Books, 1959), Vol. I, p. 165. 42 well the interests of the people.

The compensatory arrangements built into the Tanganyika

African National Union are described by John George in Africa

Report. The party's national executive body is designed to in­ corporate members from all the important power factions existing in Tanganyika thus enabling the party to "absorb and digest" any new, unexpected opposition before it hae time to gether momentum and produce other-party opposition.^ This practice is the obverse of the coin which has as its reverse a crush- the-opposition miasma which is so frequently associated with uniparty states. This appears to reflect an effective desire to mobilize all sectors of the society behind the party for the very practical reason of wishing to continue in power with a minimum of effort and also for the salutary reason of bringing about the desired and promised progress with a modicum of energy expended at dilatory squabbling.

Moot discussion is possible in differences between a party attempting to include virtually all sectors of the society such as wives' groups, children's groups, trade unions, and others, compared to the party approach encompassing the entire social spectrum with outspread wings. There is a more apt

analogy possible with industrial craft unions as constituted in

this country. Ghana is working on the industrial union prin­

ciple attempting to include all facets of the society, while

^George, op. cit.. p. 4. 43 possibly Egypt and the faltering, incipient United Arab Republic represent the union making an effort to form a coalition gov-

B.nrment from several factions. France with its perennial coali­ tion governments during the Fourth Republic provides a compar­ ison in a relatively mature nation.

Carter puts it succinctly:

It is sometimes said facetiously that "the opposition is either in jail or in the government." Increasingly the latter is the case. Most of the dominant African parties have demonstrated a remarkable capacity.for absorption of former rival or antagonistic groups....

Zolberg concluded similarly regarding the Partie Démocra­ tique de la Cote d'Ivoire. It has been the policy of the party to bargain with potential opposition leaders rather than to confront them in uncontrolled conflict politically or other­ wise. Doubtless, in large measure, due to this approach, the party is regarded as having a good measure of support through- 2 out the country.

Zolberg also describes another device employed in the

Ivory Coast to assure a measure of electoral participation in the selection of the popular representatives. Since there is no election, per se. competition must take place on the nomi­ nating level. Each local party organization is informed of its number of representatives and is requested to submit a list of acceptable candidates in order of preference. During

^Carter, op. cit.. p. 9. 2 Zolberg, op. cit.. p. 113. 44 the 1959 elections, it is said that between eight hundred and one thousand names were submitted for one hundred legislative seats. Since the potential number of candidates of any polit­ ical persuasion throughout the entire country cannot exceed this number by far, the Bureau Politique need no.t trouble it­ self to accomodate outsiders. Of course, the results of the

Bureau's selection process may not reflect to any great degree the actual feelings of outiand constituents, but a sufficient satisfaction must be achieved to maintain tacit compliance and participation in the system.

A close look at the Convention People's Party, possibly the most mature of such coalition parties in sub-Sahara Africa, serves to illustrate the specific functioning of such a party.

The components of the C.P.P. include the Trades Union Congress,

United Farmers' Council, National Cooperative Council, and the

National Council of Ghanaian Women. A party membership card is valid for participation in all wings of the party; thus, a farmer is technically a member of the Women's Council if he chooses to consider himself such. A curious melange of polit­ ical and governmental functions is observed in the Farmers'

Council which is given sole responsibility for procuring cocoa for the government Marketing Board. The significance of just this one power for the party in a one-crop economy assures virtually complete control of the nation's economy. With economic and agricultural diversity, the party will have to 45 step more adroitly to maintain a similar degree of control. The degree of their inability to keep step with diversification of the economy will reflect to some extent the degree to which political freedom evolves— either planned or otherwise. Of course, it must be borne in mind that this one facet of govern­ ment control is shored up by a boat of parallel- organs of party-govemment power.

Deputy Director Haidar, of the bocial Destour Party, men­ tioned above, spoke of the efforts of Tunisia's single party to encompass additional elements of the society; this flexi­ bility was termed essential if the party were to gain a consen­ sus of the, pppular will. He said that the party politburaau was enlarged to about fifty members from about twenty-five because even though the party was well-entrenched, it realized the need for a change so members of the opposition were invited into the meeting to plan revisions in party policy. This same realistic flexibility is not, and will not be, present in all uniparty states, but it must be characterized as a positive quality in the functioning of any uniparty state.

Leopold Senghor, in his exposition on African socialism, offered the unified party as a substitute for a single party,

per SB. Through the broad-based party all elements of a com* munity can be mobilized in support of the "national ideal.

^Lfopold Séüar Senghor, Oji African Socialism (New York: Frederick A. Praager, 19b4), p. tib. 46

Rousseau, in The Social Contract, admonishes today's rulers in all lands: "However strong a man, he is never strong enough to remain master always, unless he transform his Might into Right, and Dbedience into Duty."^ W@ fail to grasp the full import of these political machinations if we do not con­ sider the theoretical backgrounds of the uniparty government in an emerging state. There is no reason to dismiss the urge for legitimacy in every leader who rules, whether he lead a party in office by the barest of margins or with a totally sub­ dued opposition. However, regrettably few politicians are also philosophers, and among the emerging nations of Africa, possibly

Leopold Senghor stands alone in that category. His eloquent dedication to the cause of his people is expressed in "For Koras 2 and Balafong" excerpted from "Chants d'Ombre" written in 1945.

...To have to choose! deliciously torn between these two friendly hands...

But if I must choose at the hour of testing

I have chosen the verset of streams and of winds and of forests

The assonance of plains and rivers, chosen the rhythm of blood in my naked body

Chosen the tremulsion of balafonqs. the harmony of

^J. 3. Rousseau, John Locke, and David Hume, The Social Contract (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 172. 2 Senghor, Poems, op. cit.. no pagination. The Kora is a musical instrument similar to the harp and the balafong, to the xylophone. 4/

strings and brass that seem to clash, chosen the

Suing swing yes chosen the suing

And the far-off muted trumpet, like the plaint of a nebulous star adrift* across the night

Like the summons to Judgement, the burst of the trumpet over the snowy graveyards of Europe.

I have chosen my toiling black people, my peasant people, the peasant race through all the world.

Senghor also speaks out of both sides of his political mouth in justifying his position in his book. He first admon­ ishes toleration of the opposition:

It is at this point that the question of the opposition should be raised. The opposition, necessary at first glance, must pursue the same goal as the majority party. This is to prevent social groups from hardening into antagonistic classes. Its role is precisely to be the conscience of governments and majority parties. Since the political and trade-union leaders are intellectuals, the temptation of the majority party is to favor the intellectuals against the peasants, shepards, and artisans. On the other hand, the opposition is tempted to place itself, under the pretext of ideology, at the service of the foreigner.

But, in virtually the next breath, Senghor explains why we cannot really tolerate a nagging opposition:

The justice of our position and the effectiveness of our program have enabled us to win eighty per cent of the votes in the elections of February and March, 1959. Since then, we have been able to attract a part of the opposition; all of the opposition in Sudan.... The Senegalese apposition shows the cloven hoof— in other words, its selfish pre-oc­ cupations— when it specifies as a condition for party unification "the sharing of responsibilities"— meaning ministerial portfolios; this is the opposite of democracy and socialism. The people are not deceived when they term g these maneuvers "You-get-out-so-I-can-get-ln-Independence."

1 2 Senghor, Socialism, p. 87. Ibid. p. 89. 4b Here, as is so sadly often the case, idealism finds it­ self lost in the pragmatic practice of daily politics. Yes, we must unoerstand and tolerate the opposition, but we must not satisfy ourselves till uie have a one hundred per cent majority in the election. Implied in this approach to the opposition seems to be justified totalitarianism; the specific conditions discussed above are not known, but shared ministerial responsi­ bilities seems a reasonable price to pay for a unified govern­ ment— at least in most-countries where a parliamentary majority is necessary to form a government. Here appears a haughtiness born of disdain for the opposition; a condition in which the duly chosen single party disdains its conditions of election @nd embarks on a program of self-satisfaction and acclaim.

bJe have seen in this country, especially in the 193Q's and 1940's, a restrained uniparty functioning. Statistics demonstrate that during those years a greater percentage of eligible voters participated in primaries than in general elections since the Democratic nomination was "tantamount to election" in many areas of this country. This, however, was not predicated upon an articulated public philosophy of uni- partisanship, but rather a reflection of the populace's pref­ erence for what they envisioned as the stance of a particular political party.

The examination of this section seems to fortify the notion that a coalesced party is subject to the whimsies at­ tributable to any government— it is possible to go up or down. 49 right or left. And that appears to be exactly the case.

Unipartv Is Uniperson

"As soon as a certain number of living beings are .. gathered together, whether they be animals or men, they place themselves under the authority of a chief.

It is generally a corollary of the uniparty state that a compelling personality gets it off the ground. Germany had

Hitler; Egypt has Nasser; Tunisia bas Bourguiba; the Congo had

Lumumba; the Soviet Union had only two leaders over a period of thirty-five years ending in 1953 with the death of Stalin; this country was placed at the disposal of George Washington in its nascent years; Kenya is basically Kenyatta; Zambia is Banda.

The following attracted to these personalities can be directed and redirected almost capriciously even to a state of national

■i hypnosis as seen most classically in the German Reich of the

1930's. Gwendolen Carter concludes that a dominant political 2 personality is evident in virtually all emerging nations.

Undoubtedly the individual who has parlayed his person­ ality cult for the greatest personal advantage is The Oaagyefo

Doctor Nkrumah. "After the constitution, the country needs a true leader; and the people wanted a dynamic, a resolute, sin­ cere and honest leadership and it became the good fortune" to

^Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd (New York: The Uiking Press, 1960), p. 117. 2 Carter, One-Party States, op. cit.. p. 6. 50 find Doctor Nkrumah.^

Today Nkrumah is more idolized than other leaders of emerging states. Similar dependence on a single leader--uith little reference to party or political philosophy— occurs else­ where. For instance, TOGO 1962. a handbook accompanying the independence of that country, discusses the Togo Unity Party and includes the now-anachronistic proclamation that the "Life 2 President of the Party is Mr. Sylvanus Olympio. There had been opposition, we are told, but it was dissolved since they engaged in subversive activities.

We can examine the historical aspect of personal leader­ ship by study of Tunisia. The Neo-Destour Party leadership, at the time of that country's independence, went to the strongest persons, the dominant individual at that time being Habib

Bourguiba. As parties in most African states go, including antedating the independence of the country, the Neo-Destour

Party has a long history— since 1934. In the party's early years. Bourguiba served as Secretary General and led it from that position. Later he moved his control to the presidency

1 Party, op. cit.. p. 3. Comment immediately preceding the passage quoted above is of interest here: "The consistent rejection of all other groups by the people after several gen­ eral elections was not only an indication of the popular will that the Convention People's Party led by our redoubtable lea­ der Osagyefo Doctor Kwame Nkrumah is the only Party to whom they could entrust the destiny of their country, but also led to a gradual destruction of anything that was decent, honest, and fair in those who made it their aim to break this party."

^TDGD 1962, Published by the Information Service of Togo, 1962. bl with him. Of course, modifications have been effected in the party at all stages and on all levels as the party adroitly adapted to changing situations, always insuring the safety of

Bourguiba's position. The intrinsic strength of the party once Bourguiba leaves the scene can only be measured at this time hypothetically, and it is a function of many factors not easily quantified. ..

The editors of New Leader, in February, 1963, evaluated the party of the late Sylvanus Olympio, le Comité de I'Unite

Togolaise. They found it wanting, especially in its capacity for fulfilling the long-term needs of the Togolese.

. Olympio's party was a highly personalized one. Leader­ ship now seems to have fallen to some of the younger men, but it is doubtful that they will long survive in office. The party's platform has never, really been anything more than Olympic's own convictions. '

Olympio was not primarily interested in producing a party

in the conventional political sense— possibly not unlike former

President Eisenhower in this country— but he was more interested in getting on with the business of being president without

expending effort drumming up support or enthusiasm. It is also

true that he did not occupy his position for a sufficiently long

period of time to find the opportunity to implant his personal

workaday philosophy into an ongoing organization.

The former French colonies provided unique opportuni­

ties for politicians to polish the seeds for a personality

^New Leader. Vol. XLVI, No. 3 (February 4, 1963), p. 8. 52

cuit in the position of deoutsau The depute' was always in

public view as tns intercessionary for the citizens or the

colony with the metropolitan power. As Zolbarg terms this rise:

"He might begin as primus inter pares in a territorial party,

but he was in a position to transform the party into a personal machine."

There is no possible list of prerequisites for leadership of a personality cult. Each compelling leader across time has

had experience and qualities which were his alone. In some

cases a jail sentence, symbolizing succesful agitation against

the former colonial regime, is valued; education may merit con­

sideration, especially when those possessing it are as rare as

is usually the case in most African countries; naving risen

through the ranks of the party can oe a key to success, and can often offset some tarnish on the personality per se. The myriad bits of activity and personality which combine to give

one individual a hold on the destiny of a country constitutes

an enigma of a high order.

A pair of personalities present themselves for specific

consideration as prototypes; Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerers.

The Osagyefo first.

One of Nkrumah's prize characteristics is the lack of an

obvious successor or competitor, and this image is widest-spread

among the masses, evidently. The concern with the here and now

^Zolbarg-, op. cit.. p. 94. -53 adds an unreal dimension to the attraction that passionate people entertain in their disregard for a successor. Examina­ tion of the Ghanian constitution (and also the Togolaise and

Guinean) offers no provision for selecting a successor to the president of any one of those countries. Perhaps, sufficient unto the day is there evil thereof; tomorrow will provide for itself.

The devotion affixed to Nkrumah is indicated in the fol­ lowing passage quoted by Arthur Lewis in The Reporter;

In his article, dermis L . Done of Sierra Leone devel­ oped the theory that only a chosen few (among them Karl Marx, Lenin, Mao, and Gandhi) has ever "caught glimpses of the Christ or the true idea of God, good. When our history is recorded the man Kwame Nkrumah will be written of as the liberator, the Messiah, the Christ of our day.... Yasl IndeedIi Kwame Nkrumah is our Messiah and he is im­ mortal . "

Fortunately, this awesome and awed adulation is atypical in underdeveloped countries, but it is indicative of the direc­ tion in which uncontrolled loyalty-become-passion can be pushed or pulled and the degree of worship of leaders that can be tolerated.

It is not the writer's intention to imply that all of this is sympathetic admiration or crowd psychology. To the contrary. Nkrumah has vaulted Ghana, through fortunate cir­ cumstances, granted, into an international role far beyond her

^W. Arthur Lewis, "The Growing Pains of African Democracy," The Reporter. Uol. XXV, No. 8, p. 31. 54 indicated standing's worth. In the first place, Ghana had the good fortune to be the first of the African states to gain in­ dependence in the recent burst of freedom. It was blessed with the soundness that came from years of British administration.

The desire for supranational leadership provided an opportun­ ity— however ephemeral— for Nkrumah to play international pol­ itics. George Shepard, in Africa Today, maintains that

Nkrumah's position rests upon the valid progress made in the area of social action, the country's nonalignment and active leadership in African independence, thus giving Ghanaians a feeling of importance.^

Adheman Byl, writing in a companion piece to the above- quoted piece,, waves a caution flag on Nkrumah's euphoria.

Ghana cannot provide the Osagyefo with opportunities or re­ sources to fully challenge his personality. Something must give, Byl contends. "More and more it becomes clear that if

Nkrumah must choose between slower progress with more freedom, 2 or quicker progress with less freedom, he chooses the latter."

Julius Nyerere, being much newer on the international political scene, and operating in a less opportune environment, has been less carefully or adequately scrutinized. And probably he has been less regarded because no one has yet seen fit to

^Shepard, op. cit., p. 5.

^Adhemar Byl, "Four Views of Ghana," Africa Today. Vol IX, No. 10 (December, 1962), p. 9. 55 deify him. It appears that he is beginning, at least, with a temperate line. He has been quoted in moderate statements; but we must return to our original caution: actions say much, words say little.

A New York Times article by Elspeth Huxley gives fur­ ther insight into iMyerere's approach to uniparty government.

"Two principles determine whether a country is democratic: respects for rights of individual citizens and the government can be changed without assasination.

Here we see, if nothing more, that the new master of the uniparty state in Tanganyika resigned his premiership to take on party responsibilities fulltime— a tribute to the dedication to the cause for which the party is fighting.

With all of this, there is still hope for the van­ quished opposition, or for party dissidents, or even for two- party purists. The 1960 elections in the United States illus­ trate the point. Running on the coattails of one of the most popular Presidents in our history, Richard Nixon lost. Granted, he had peculiar political handicaps, but it is still amply evident that President Eisenhower could not transfer his per­ sonal charisma (even if he had sincerely wished to, which is sometimes doubtful) to"Tricky Dick." This phenomenon, then, is a personal activity, and not a national one which can be

^Elspeth Huxley, "Tanganyika," New York Times Magazine. January 21, 1962, p. 10. 5b counted upon to repeat Itself oftener than rarely.

The phenomenon of such charismatic leadership tends to frustrate the development of sorely-needed additional leaders to enable the developing country to manufacture the talent necessary for its continuing development— both economic and political. iMo matter how talented nor how wide and dedicated a following the leader of a one-man state has, it is abundantly evident that he needs diverse and talented followers if the country is to achieve the progress on as many fronts as is so regularly promised and demanded.

Man-to-man Opposition

To immediately deduce that a uniparty state is the equiv­ alent of the Soviet totalitarian system is jumping to an un­ founded conclusion. Since, in the realm of the political, there are not too many new things under the sun, especially in evolving governmental systems, any system devised for an

African country must borrow from existing systems. In any pro­ cess of determining governmental body members there must be a selection process. Names could', certainly, be decreed from the top. But most African politicians are too wary of their hold on the population to attempt that, or possibly are too respectful of a degree of representative government.

Banaequently, uniparty opposition in some cases takes place less formally than in the usual two-party or multi-party states. As a preface, we should remember that the primary concern of the political community in an emerging state is 57 with tangibles, and no candidate can be*expected to base a campaign on political philosophy or other abstractions fre­ quently Subjected to the politicians mellifulous tongue and expedient reasoning in this country.

This level of competition is at the very base of the political pyramid— man-to-man. With or without the sanction or direction of a national party, candidate A matdhes political acumen— or charisma— with candidate B, generally on matters that would be of virtually no import in this or another mature country.

Since, as has been pointed out, there is a paucity of potential political talent in any given emerging country, the party is often compelled to accept any candidates it can get its proverbial hands on. Mackenzie and Robinson, in Five

Elections in Africa, report that Sierra Leone’s People's Party even selected their candidates, in the election observed, from among those already announced for a given seat!

In the Ivory Coast there is an informal system of selecting cnadidates for the National Assembly, as described above. Zolberg allows that though this is not the usually- conceived form of democracy, and though there is no institu­ tionalized political competition, it does enable a limited degree of representation. However, along with this process has come a

^Mackenzie and Robinson, Five Elections in Africa (Oxford: Clarenden Press, I960), p. 187J bd perceptible curtailment of political and civil liberties more severe than that experienced under French domination.^

Politicians who might be members of the opposition are frequently driven to join the majority when it becomes evident that they "can't lick 'em." The results of the 1964 elections in this country with the South being the base of Republican power is indicative of a philosophy that has long been har­ bored within the Democratic Party, but not till recently could emerge as opposition and still remain respectable.

Carter and Brown have concluded that party labels are more a convenience than badges of conviction. The party is a vehicle to power and prominence; membership is as ephemeral as in this country and expedience dictates the label. They cite a local election in an unidentified country in which the candidates appeared to be about evenly divided between the two contending parties. The results came in showing a decisive victory for one party. By the time the elected body met, those of the opposition who had won were either staunch independents 2 or strong supporters of the winning party I

Zolberg cites an election observed in the Ivory Coast.

Caucusing among the party officials continued right up to the

^Zolberg, op. cit.. p. 355. 2 Gwendolen M. Carter and William 0. Brown (eds.), Transition in Africa; Studies in Political Adaptation (Boston; Boston University Press, 1958), pp. 54-55. by filing deadline. No candidates had announced their Candida-, cies for fear of precluding themselves from consideration for

Parti Démocratique de la Cote d'Ivoire nomination which assured

1 '— their election. Here we see the process in its narrowest operation. Still a certain amount of attention to genuine representation must be assumed since the party doss have con­ cern for its political future.

Furthermore, once the assembly is elected, any sem­ blance of opposition usually ceases. Again in the Ivory Coast, during the 1959-1960 legislative session never were more than 2 three votes' cast in opposition to the government's program.

To conclude this discussion with a sobering thought from

Joseph Schumpeter, we are reminded that there is no such thing as a "uniquely detarmined common good."^ This is not resultant from the fact that some participants in government are neces­ sarily aligned against the common good, but from the univer­ sally evident fact that there is sincere difference of opinion as to what the common good actually is.

1 ‘ Zolberg, oo. cit.. p. 265. 2 Ibid, p. 280. The Assmebly is reported to have held thirty-nine meetings during this period. All but five of the eighty-three items that came up for a vote were Introduced by the government. Of these, sixty-four were recorded as passing unanimously without abstentions. 3 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism. Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942), p. 251. 60

Party la Government Is Party...

Karl Marx tells ua that as long as there are classes 1 there will be parties. Emerging states have basically one class. We may then assume, at least theoretically, that until substantial middle and upper classes emerge, there will be nothing more than a single dominant party. Whether we wish to cast our lot in agreement with communist theoreticians or not, we must concede that there is certain merit in tnis argument.

A final evaluation must, however, await the final pages of this paper.

A Guinean government publication, "Giant Stride Forward," presents a straightforward, graphic representation of party- government interrelationships with all power emanating from the National Political Bureau of the Parti Démocratique de

Guinea.^ The base of the government rests on village committees of the PDG and rises through regional branches to the National

Bureau. On the reverse flow, political power is channelled to the National Assembly and to the national government and thence downward to subordinate political organs with village govern­ ments at the bottom. This again is a theoretical diagram and interpretation of a process colored by the personalities which are involved in its functioning. When there is a green light.

^T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx. Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy (New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company^ 1964), p. 249. 2 See Appendix A. bl ws have no constant assurance that the power will riow in the assigned direction of the specified distance.

The March, 19b3, Africa Report carried an interesting representation of the Tanganyika African National Union party 1 structure in a schema entitled, "Tne TANU Party Pyramid."

Though not so lucid as the Guinean scheme in Appendix A, it amply demonstrates the dependence the government has upon the party. From the topmost level, the party has emoraceo the gov­ ernment and provides its leading personnel and actionaries, or vice versa, since it is not unknown for a party to recruit an individual who proves nimseif to be an astute..ano successful politician. '

Apter and Lysta'dt, in their contrioution to Carter and

Brown's African survey cite an opposition charge against

Nkrumah: The Convention reople's Party and tne legislature make no effort to differentiate between themselves, to which the government replies that the opposition is without faith in the 2 Ghanaian constitution! The Ghanaian constitution, has, of course, institutionalized the uniparty stats so long as

Nkrumah remains the focus of both party and government. Dis­ counting the opposition statement as being that expected from any political "out" group, it can only be said that his is

^Sbb Appendix 0.

2 Carter and brown, op. cit.. p. 29. 62 normal operating procedure for such a state, and more fundamen­ tal criticisms must be levelled if the skin of the CPP is to be pierced. Likewise, the proforma response by the CPP is vapid.

Since the Ghanaian constitution is as much a creature of the party as is the state government, there is little recourse in citing it as an ultimate authority.

Indian political scientists, observing the uniparty system developing in Tanganyika since 1961, regarded Nyerere as having a government based upon loyalty to the country on the part of its citizens. Nyerere is quoted: "Ule are democratic and we are going to be even more democratic."^ Tanganyika the citizens are treated in the most expansive of terms; party membership is not considered a condition of citizenship so much as a benefit resulting from citizenship--the extra something which makes the Tanganyikan citizen proud to be what he is.

The Marxian doctrines of the oppressed— in this case not exactly workers in the capitalist sense-— rising. against the proletariat appeals to the semi-literates in emerging countries. They frequently view themselves as an oppressed class which is just rising from the chains of colonialism to exert their forces in the world. They cannot afford the ran­ cor of intra-class fighting nor can they afford to allow the impression abroad that they are less than absolutely unified.

^S.N. Varna and others, Tanganyika (New Delhi: Africa Publications, 1961), p. 102. 63 Zolberg suggests that there is an African justification for a uniparty system from Marx's premise that parties reflect classes; therefore, if there are to be no class distinctions, there can be no party distinction.^ The reverse of this is also argued:

Since there is no desire on the part of the new African social­ ists to produce class distinctions, there should be permitted no more than one party. This would prevent the conceivable evolution of a class struggle, at least among those lines which political parties seem to crystallize around: economic and ethnic matters.

The condition of the party and government consisting of interchanging individuals is, actually, a function of the paucity of educated, trained, or even capable leadership in a given state. There are, undoubtedly, some highly articulate voices speaking out in opposition to some governments such as

M.A. Busia of Ghana who has been quoted in this paper. But, for the most part, the parallel structure of the party to the government is flaccid when removed from the government upon which it depends so heavily, though which it claims to operate.

There is place in these emerging states for the vigorous party activity which we have recently witnessed in this country or in the United Kingdom or in Italy. The pre-literate populations, the rational impossibility of dispute over many of the issues.

^Zolberg, op. cit., p.264, 64

the inability of such neophyte states to articulate fine dis­

tinctions in policy, and the forces for unity which were earlier

described in this paper all support and foment the intermingling

of party and state structures.

Vested Interests

As with any human establishment, uniparty states develop

vested interests. Whether it be inertia or whatever, people once in do not want out, despite the universal phenomenon of

those out wanting in, however desperately at times. So, gov­

ernment becomes a vested interest.

Beginning with an aberrant form of uniparty state, we

see the very vested and entrenched— if simply laws enacted

determine entrenchedneas— government of the Republic of South

Africa. Here, and similarly In Malawi or Sothern Rhodesia or

Birmingham, Alabama, or Mississippi, an increasingly desperate

few have been witnessed taking all manner of measures to as­

sure themselves of continuance in power which translates into

continuance of domination over the out-groups— in these four

cases, the Negro. Sociology would suggest that retention of

power is especially desirable since the out-group is usually

a racial or ethnic minority which would likely, upon assumption

of power, relegate the former wielders of power to proper

minority status. There is, to be sure, more at work here

than just vested interest inertia at work, but it is an in­

tense example at the same time of the measures which a govern- 65 ment can invoke while remaining in power through it all.

Lewis Coser, in his commentary on social conflict, men­ tions the spiral effect this type social experience has upon a society in warning that such a society claiming total involve­ ment cannot tolerate conflict; such a society constantly fears a break through the apparent surface of unanimity and calm.^

Traditional rule in many primitive societies, especial­ ly in Africa, have centered around a sacrosanct hereditary ch 1 e:ftain who could be removed in the event of death or heinous malfeasance only. The chief has not, however, been omnipotent, and a certain degree of political acumen has been necessary for him to function effectively. No chief would be expected willingly to relinquish a position of power virtually unassailable and one through which contact with the twentieth century and with outside powers has been channelled in many

instances. An African observer comments that there is an

"aura of sacredness" surrounding the chief, even though there

ire constitutional limitation on the exercise of his full re- 2 sponsibilitias. In a study relating the role of traditional chiefs to modern government, N. U. Akpan concluded:

From all appearances, it would be not wrong to assume that, in those areas or territories where there were strong

^Coaer. Ob. cit.. p. 79. 2 Busia, 00. cit.. p. 196. bb

centralized idigenous chiefs, commanding wide respect and authority, their positon in modern local government sys­ tems is fairly assured providing they are themselves ad­ justing properly and wisely to the new conditions. Even with their changed positions, they can still find plenty of scope to.exert useful influence for good in their localities.

With the announced intention of "defending democracy in

Tanganyika," that state's government passed a preventive de­ tention act in 1962 which would certainly serve to perpetuate the power of those already exercising it. Circumstances under which the bill was run through the Tanganyikan legislature were judged by observers on the scene to have been less than representative of the full interests of the body. President

Nyerere affixed an "urgent" label to the legislation and had it rushed through the entire legislative procedure in less than a month. The judges who are empowered to try anyone in­ dicted under this act are appointed directly by the President, whose term is dependent upon the parliament, control of which

Nyerere wields rather adroitly, apparently.

In Ghana, Nkrumah utilized a less subtle approach in dispensing with the opposition in his domain. He accused the

United Party leadership of counter-revolutionary activity.

Consequently, the Osagyefo was able to announce in his speech of October 2, 1962, that the United Party was defunct and that

N.Ü. Akpan, "Have Traditional Authorities a Place in Modern Local Government Systems?" Journal of African Administration. Uol. UII, No. 3 (July, 19557, p. 111. b7

Ghana was officially a uniparty state. Opposition continues, however, hampered, from neighboring Togo and to a lesser degree from within the ranks of the Convention People's Party.

Competition through Intra-oartv Elections

Possibly the most challenging argument to those who would condemn the uniparty state out of hand as being undemo­ cratic^ is the inevitable competition through what amounts to party primaries held with varying regularity and varying universality in uniparty states. Certainly, at best, this is stultified opposition as we can see by comparing the virtual complete domination of thé Democratic Party in this country's

South for the century which ended in the past decade. Even staunch Republicans would register for the Democratic pri­ mary recognizing that this was the only genuine medium of representation available to them on the local level.

A case in pdint was reported in the December, 1962,

Africa Today. The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) was to encourage more than one party member to stand for a given seat in elections in order to "avoid the more destructive 2 effects of a single-party state." TANU was further reported to have officially reopened its ranks to any expelled Africans and to members of all other races who were interested.

^Undemocratic meaning unrepresentative.

^News item in Africa Today. Uol. IX, No. 10 (December, 1962), p. 16. 66 Obviously, an intra-party "primary" is not the equiva­ lent of national party opposition on a continuing basis in a democratic state, but with the semblance of competition fos­ tered, the voter is guaranteed a periodic opportunity to ex­ press some degree of political choice. Schumpeter permits this travesty on textbook democracy in suggesting that historically we have seen instances where the will and the good of the peo­ ple was served as well or better by governments which could not correctly be described as democratic according to standard 1 definitions.

A certain advantage present in intra-party competition is the Élimination of a possible problem experienced in pre- literate society's elections. Symbols used by various parties in given elections may result in an unfavorable reaction to the party simply because the symbol has an unfavorable connota­ tion. For instance, during the May, 1957, elections in Sierra

Leone, reported in Five Elections in Africa, the hammock of one party was interpreted to represent laziness and the cook­ ing pot of another party was assumed to promise food to all of 1 its followers. This is certainly a major problem, but the very fact that it has been observed indicates that it has had its effect on at least one election. It is just the sum of a num-

1 • Schumpeter, op. cit.. pp. 269-270. 2 Mackenzie and Robinson, op. cit.. p. 174. 69 ber of such problems that can undo the bast efforts of sophis­ ticated leadership to promote an international and internal

workable system of government.

Functional democracy is achieved so long as a vote is

permitted, again according to Schumpeter.

We have seen that the democratic method does not neces­ sarily guarantee a greater amount of individual freedom than another political method would permit in similar cir­ cumstances.

In a democracy, as I have said, the primary function of the electorate's vote is to produce government. This may mean the election of a complete set of individual officers. This practice however is in the main a feature of local government.... Considering national government only, we may say that producing government practically amounts to deciding who the leading man shall be.''

There is only one democracy in which the elector's vote does this directly, viz., the United States.*

We can safely conclude nothing more than that primaries

are genuine elections if the powers that be wish them to be so,

and not if they wish them that. Choice between and among con­

tending political leaders is made no matter the labels of the

system under which they operate. The ultimate question is,

rather, how free men are to seek the elective officers and

how free eligible voters are to register their genuine choice.

^Schumpeter, op. cit.. pp. 271, 273. CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

No matter what one's point of view is regarding a developing nation, of all developing nations collectively, it is evident that there is going to be a multifaceted str uiggle against one-crop agriculture, lack of essentials for indus­ trialization and modernization, pan— African movements, leader­ ship struggles, tribal or ethnic solidarity, and reactionaries, or any of a wide selection of problems that a given government chooses to single out for action or vinification at a given moment.

With this situation, there is not a sound reason for suggesting that an opposition party should be tolerated simply for the sake of paying lip service to the idea and ideal of democracy. This business of running a government has all the usual shades of grey between the white of democracy— as many in this country would elect to call it— and the black of totalitarianism, as we sporadically name it, de­ pending on whether it is in ally Spain or anathema Peoples'

China.

It appears that virtually every uniparty state leader has his own rationale for his state and its arrangement since much of the Western world forces these leaders to the defen­

sive for having an unacceptable political system. In this

paper we have attempted to examine the background of these 71

"unacceptable" states and also to scrutinize their functioning toward providing means of analysis and evaluation.

For those who would defend the measures taken by a uni­ party state, there are, it seems, then, reasonable criteria which could be examined to determine the acceptable qualities possessed by any given state in given situations. Questions could be asked such as: Are steps being taken to educate the populace in preparation for enlightened democratic government?

Are there laws on the books which would protect an opposition functioning within reasonable bounds? Is the legal system so arranged that it encourages the development of competing par­ ties or factions, or are the provisions such that organized opposition tends to fragment into nothingness? Is due process guaranteed in theory and in practice? Are political crimes arbitrarily attributed to those who fail to "play the game" as prescribed by those in power? Is there evidence that steps are being taken to ensure adequate representation by all major sectors of the population? And most importantly, in what direction does the government appear to be moving?

We in this country are accustomed to a system of laws under which the constitutional provision, "The Congress shall have power to regulate commerce...among the several states...."^ means that Ollie's Restaurant in Birmingham which uses, for instance, spices processed in Baltimore, must serve all Ameri-

^United States Constitution, Article 1, Section b. 72

cans whose right are guaranteed under the Constitution simply 1 because he is considered as dealing in .interstate commerce.

This allows us to witness how far laws can go to achieve a given

intent and interpretation of the Constitution— pursuing the

spirit of the original law. Lie are habituated to a system where great caution is taken to insure the preservation of something of which we have become intensely proud. Ule are not easily

reconciled to a government which would capriciously violate its most fundamental doctrine in the name of no-mattsr-what. The porvision in the Constitution of the Soviet Union, "Voting at 2 elections of deputies is secret," can only be received with

the additional knowledge that there is only one candidate, and

one does not need "secrecy" unless the, purpose is to strike the

only name listed. Actions by person or state dominia

or writings. Any given declaration, then, by a state with such

known contradictions must be received with restraint in cre­

dulity.

Any system of law can remain in force only through one

of two procedures: force or acquiesence; acquiesence implies

either a general acknowledgement of the system as based on jus­

tice and right or a system obligated to no more than an apathetic

constituency. Professor William Y. Elliott terms it thus: "Law

^The constitutionality of this measure has been tested in the Supreme Court and has been found valid.

^Article 140. 73 V, must claim legitimacy.” He notes further that in the French, droit interprets both as right and law, and the German recht does the same. In the political system of the West, much time and effort is given to maintaining and preserving the legitimacy of .our system. As the politically intolerant regimes, of. some uniparty states operate, we see them resort to force to retain the power which permits them to perpetuate their regimes, and through this to acnieve goals which may not oiffer greatly from those who have been so rashly dealt with.

Hans Morgenthau has reduced the attributes of national power

■ 2 to eight traits or quantities. Each country, no matter how meagre or plenteous its endowment in a given one of these , areas

(or any other scheme one may choose to measure this by) may be, is a function of a combination of these factors, just as a child is the result of the unique pairing in the joining of its X and

Y chromosomes. We must recognize first in our thinking about uniparty, emerging states, that just as no one set of responses will satisfy the precise needs of more than one child, so no one precise political doctrine can provide the means for solution to the problems of any given state.

^Professor William V. Elliott, remarks made during the course of class discussion at The American University, ly62. y Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19b%), pp.du-lüü. The elements are: geogra­ phy, natural •resources, industrial capacity, military prepared­ ness, population, national character, national morale, and the quality of diplomacy. V4

John Oakes, in The Edge of Freedom, admonishes political thinkers in this country thusly:

The evolution of the communist world in Eastern Europe is far from complete; the revolution in Africa has hardly begun. - To become effective in these areas, American.policy can follow no such stereotype of political action as it did in Asia after the Second World War, when the new countries were more often judged by the militancy of their anti­ communism alone than by. their efforts to fulfill the wants of their people. The Spark, the Convention People's Party newspaper in

Ghana, in an article entitled, "One-Party System of Government," responded to those who would suggest that uniparty states add one or more parties to their political life in order to achieve fairer representation. "I should be pleased to hear that the

Conservative Party have asked some of its.members to join the ranks of the Labour Party as to make an effective opposition in 2 Parliament and in the country."

Is this not what is being expected of the uniparty state, in a way, when outsiders, i. e. Lüesterners, demand that it change its system of government in order to achieve a theoreti­ cal alignment with Western preconceptions of government and political philosophy? The uniparty governments have been estab­ lished, at least in many instances, as the most effective means of responding to the will of the people. Just as perversions of

Oakes, op. cit.p. 119. The book contained a mis­ placed line of type; the quotation may be inaccurate but it is not outside the intended implication of the passage, according to the context.

^Kofi Baako, "One-Party System of Government," The Spark. March 15, 1963, p. 3. . .75 democracy ara evident and tolerable in this country, or any other, so totalitarianism appears in the uniparty African states. Are not the Africans to be permitted to be subject to the whims and wiles of human nature as have been the sophisticates of the West? BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. BOOKS

Bennett, George, and Carl G, Roaberg. The Kenyatta Election: Kenya 19bU-bl. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.

Bottomore, I . 8. Karl Marx. Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964.

Busia, K. A. The Challenge of Africa. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 19b2.

Carter, Gwendolen M. African One-Party States. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962.

Independence for Africa. New York : Frederick A. Praeger, 19bU,

.and William 0. Brown (eds.). Transition in Africa: Studies in Political Adaptation. Boston: Boston University Press, l9bb.

Chand, Bool. One Party State. Lohore, India: Minerva Book Shop, 1941.

Coser, Lewis A. The Functions of Social Conflict. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1966. del Castillo, 0. Rafael. Historia de tspafia. Barcelona: Imprenta Y Libreria Religiose Y Cientifica, 1876. de Toqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. New York: Vintage Books, 1969, Vol. 1.

Duverger, Maurice. Political Parties. London: Mauhuen & Company, Ltd., 1964.

Epstein, A. L. Politics in an Urban African Community. Manches­ ter: Manchester University Press, 1966.

Gluckman, Max. Custom and Conflict in Africa. New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 19b4.

Hodgkin, Thomas. African Political Parties. Harmonsworth, Middles**: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1961.

L b Bon, Gustave. The Crowd. New York: The Viking Press, 1960.

Mackenzie and Robinson. Five Elections in Africa. Oxford: 78

Clarenden Press, I960.

Mayo, Elton. Political Problems of Industrial Civilization. Cambridge; Harvard University Printing Office, 1947.

Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations. New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1962.

Oakes, John 8. The Edge of Freedom. New York: Harper & Bros., 1960.

Padelford, Norman J., and Rupert Emerson (eds.). Africa and World Order. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.

Padmore, George. Africa; Britain's Third Empire. London: Dennis Dobson, Ltd., 1949.

How Russia Transformed Her Colonial Empire. Londpn: Dennis Dobson, Ltd., 1946.

The Gold Coast Revolution. London: Dennis Dobson, Ltd., 1963.

. Pan-Africanism or Communism? London: Dennis Dobson, Ltd., 195b.

Raven, Faith, The Constitution and Race Relations in Central Africa. London: The African Bureau, 1958.

Rousseau, J. J., John Locke, and David Hume. The Social Contract. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962.

RouHek, Joseph S. Contemporary Pnlitical Ideologies. New York: Philosophical Library, — — .

Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism. Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper & Bros., 1942.

Senghor, Leopold Sedar. Selected Poems, trans. by John Reed and Clive Bake. New York; Athenum, 1964.

______. On African Socialism. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964.

Smith, T. E. Elections in Developing Countries. New York: St. Martins Press, 196Ü. 79

Varna, S.N., aJ^. Tanganyika. New Delhi; Africa Publications, 1961.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. Africa: The Politics of Independence. New York: Random House, 1961.

Zolberg, Aristide. One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964.

a. PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, LEARNED SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

Busia, K. A. The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti. Published for the International African Institute. London: Oxford University Press, 1951.

Commonwealth Survey. Vol. B, Nos. 23, 24 (June 11, 1962, and November 20, 1962).

Constitution. Republic of Ghana.

Constitution. Republic of Guinea.

Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Constitution of the Tunisian Republic.

Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Constitution of the United States.

"Giant Stride Forward." Information Service of the Embassy of Guinea to the United States.

"Tanganyika: Report of the Committee on Constitutional Devel­ opment, 1961." Dar Es Salaam: Government Printer, 1962.

"Tanganyika: The Making of a Nation," Central Office of Infor­ mation Reference Pamphlet. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961.

TOGO 1962. Published by the Information Service of Togo, 1962.

United States Articles of Confederation.

United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on tiü

Foreign Affairs. "Africa Briefing." Hearing before Subcommittee on Africa, BBth Congress, 1st Session, February 27, 19b3. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963.

United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. "Study Mission to Africa." Report of Senators Albert Gore, Philip A. Hart, and Maurine Neuberger, 87th Congress, 1st Session, January 14, 1952. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962.

■, ______, Government Operations Committee, "Is U. S. Money Aiding Another Communist State?" Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and üther Internal Security Laws, Testimony of K. A. Busia, B7th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington: Government Printing Office, 19b3.

"Yugoslav Communism, A Critical Study." b7th Congress, 1st Session. Washington: Government Printing Office, 19bl.

United States Declaration of independence.

Wilson, Goorrey. The Constitution of f\lponde. Wo. 3, The Rhodes-Livingstons Papers. Livingstone, Nortnern Rhodesia: The Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1939.

C. PERIODICALS

Akpan, iM. U. "Have Traditional Authorities A Place in Modern Local Government Systems?" Journal of African Administration. Vol. VII, l\lD. 3 (July, 1955).

Allott, Dr. A. N. "The Unity of African Law," Journal of African Administration. Vol. XI, No. 2 (April, 1959).

"Four Views of Ghana," Africa Today. Vol. IX, No. lU (December, 19b2)..

George, John B. "How Stable Is Tangantika?" Africa Report. Vol. 6, No. 3 (March, 1963), pp. 3-12.

Huxley, Elspeth. "Tanganyika," The New York Times Magazine. January 21, 1962. tJl

Malta, Madiera. "La Parti Unique en Afrique," Presence Africaine. No. 30 (February-March, I960).

Lewis, W. Arthur. "The Growing Pains of African Democracy," The Reporter. Vol. XXV, No. B, p. 31.

Littell, Blaine. "Big Brother in Ghana," The Reporter. Vol. XXV, No. 6, p. 37.

Mabona, Pare Antoine. "Philosophie Africaine," Prfeence Africaine. No. 30 (February-March, 1960).

New Leader. Vol. XLVI; No. 3, February 4, 1963, p. 6.

"News in Brief," Africa Report. Vol. 8, No. 2 (February, 1963), p. 19.

Rennie, Sir Gilbert. "Prospecta of Division," African Affairs Journal of the Royal African Society. Vol. 59, No. 238, 1961.

Ritner, Susan, and Peter Ritner. "Africanism's Constitutional Malarkey," New Leader. Vol. XLVI, No. 12 (June 10, 1963).

Time. October 2, 1964.

D. ESSAYS

"Address to the Alumni Society of the College of Charleston," March 30, 1652. Charleston, South Carolina: Steam Power Press of Walker and James, 1852.

E. NEWSPAPERS

Baako, Mofi. "One-Party System of Government," The Spark. March 15, 1963, p. 3,

London Daily Telegraph. September 14, 1962. Ü2

London Times. December 18, 1957, October IB, 1961, October 25, 1962.

The Party. March-April, 1962. Accra, Ghana: Convention Peoples' Party Bureau of Information and Publicity. APPENDIX 84

APPENDIX A

The TANU Party Pyramid ^

President (with a small group of intimates, which presently includes the Secretary General and the Vice President)

The "Little Baraza". An un­ official larger group which in­ cludes the intimates above plus the party members who hold Ministerial appointments in the government (about 12 members).■

The Central Committaa. Approximately 2Ü members appointed by the President from per­ sons resident near the capital;of special im­ portance in emergencies.

The NPtioral B

The Annual Delegates Conference. Approximately BLmmm- bers, including representatives from all of t ha re ^ n a and Areas, plus a few "observers", assembled in Dar es Salaam.

Regional Activities. Including the Annual Reglmal Conference and the activities of the Regional Committee.

Areas Activities. Including the Area Conference (in some areas)and "Village," "Settlement," and "Bush activities, which mach down to the peasants and herdsmen(45Q,DUO dues-paying members claimedin late 1962).

^Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 3 (March, 1963), p. 5. 85

APPENDIX B

STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT""

DEMOCRATIC PARTY LEGISLATIVE \ EXECUTIVE OF GUINEA (PDG) BRANCH 1 BRANCH 1 Party Elections Elected by 1 Appointed By by Members Universal Suffrage | President

1

NATIONAL POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY National NATIONAL OF GUINEA ASSEMBLY GOVERNMENT 7F

REGIONAL BRANCHES GENERAL COUNCILS ADMINISTRATIVE OF THE PDG REGIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICTS

VILLAGE COMMITTEES * VILLAGE COUNCILS VILLAGE °F THE PDG GOVERNMENTS

"Government Of The People, By The People, And For The People."

"Giant Stride Forward," published by the Infromation Service of the Embassy of Guinea to the United States, p. 13.