Franchising Global Governance: Making Sense of the Johannesburg Type II Partnerships
Liliana B. Andonova and Marc A. Levy
Introduction • Participation in the WSSD partnerships is uneven and As preparations for the World Summit on Sustainable mirrors rather than challenges prevailing patterns. Dis- Development (WSSD) were underway early in 2002, its parities in power and priorities that have dominated architects launched an effort to promote the creation of intergovernmental discourse over the past decade are multi-stakeholder partnerships that would implement spe- quite visible in these partnerships. cific goals associated with sustainable development. The • The question of how best to follow up on partnerships focus on these partnerships grew in part out of despair that deserves much more critical thought than was possi- conventional intergovernmental diplomacy was unlikely ble leading up to Johannesburg. Effective follow-up to bear fruit in Johannesburg and that some alternative will be constrained by divergent preferences among outcome was necessary to provide the summit with a posi- major stakeholders. tive result. But it also grew out of a deeper strategic un- derstanding, shared not only by key summit organizers but The Partnership Movement also by a broader network of actors involved in implement- ing sustainable development goals. This strategic under- Academic interest in transnational networks and their in- standing of the importance of partnerships was based on fluence in international affairs and environmental policy a set of realizations that had emerged over recent years. is not new. Networks of transnational actors such as mul- In this article we offer an initial critical assessment of tinational corporations, advocacy organizations, epistemic communities, and bureaucrats are identified as important the partnership strategy, based largely on an examination 1 of the partnerships that emerged from the WSSD. The agents of interdependence and globalization. More re- analysis starts with an overview of theoretical conjectures cently, networks came to be understood not simply as a on the role of partnerships in global governance. It then form of transnational interest organization, but also as a proceeds to evaluate empirically the patterns of WSSD new form of governance. The multi-stakeholder partner- partnership structure and country participation and the ships advanced at the WSSD exemplify a broader phenom- implications for effective governance. Our primary con- enon of transnational governance networks captured also clusions can be summarized as follows: by such rubrics as ‘global public policy networks’, ‘transnational issue networks’, or ‘transnational codes of • The rationale for partnerships, in particular their com- conduct’ that bring together public, private, and societal actors in an effort to agree on and institutionalize a set of parative advantage, is underspecified, and the strat- 2 egy is unlikely to be effective over time unless a more ideas, practices, and norms. coherent understanding is developed. Despite the increasing volume of case studies that examine • The benefits of using the WSSD as a device to pro- transnational partnerships, however, the rationale and com- mote partnerships was very poorly articulated, and parative advantage of such governance networks in relation opportunities for more effective leadership were lost. to other institutions remain underspecified. Most accounts • On balance the partnerships that emerged at the explain multi-stakeholder networks in functionalist terms, WSSD are supply driven rather than demand driven— motivated by demand for more effective governance in the they reflect ongoing implementation efforts more than context of globalization and the failure of states and interna- tional organizations to address an increasing number of com- new ideas for bridging core implementation gaps. The 3 promise of relying on partnerships to support a tran- plex issues and transnational spillover effects. Partnerships sition to ‘outcome-based’ decision making will fall flat thus emerge to fill a range of governance functions. They unless a mechanism can be found to steer the partner- enable information diffusion and social learning. They can ship activity in a more demand-driven direction. serve as effective implementation mechanisms by involving
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Art_01_Andonova.p65 19 17.07.2003, 23:07 directly affected actors. They facilitate the provision of stakeholder partnerships involve a diverse set of political global public goods via standard setting, norm creation, actors, it remains unclear whether they are always more and even market creation. And finally, networks are said representative of all sectors in society than traditional to address the ‘participation gap’ in global governance by forms of representation such as parties, interests groups, providing direct access for stakeholders to decision-mak- parliaments, and local and national governments. To de- ing. Case studies of multi-stakeholder networks illustrate termine the effectiveness of networks in responding to the these governance functions in a range of areas from pro- participation gap, therefore, it is necessary to determine viding micro-credit for development to management of whether they broaden participation to traditionally dams, to the implementation of the portfolio of the Glo- marginalized groups or whether they perpetuate existing bal Environmental Facility.4 patterns of power and influence. Functionalist accounts of partnerships do not specify, In sum, if the leading functionalist assumption is that however, why or under what conditions partnerships are partnerships emerge in response to demands for more ef- likely to respond to global governance gaps more effec- fective governance where other institutions have failed, we tively than other institutional forms such as states and should expect to see empirical patterns in their structure intergovernmental regimes. In fact, some of the very func- that reflect their comparative advantage: an emphasis on tions attributed to partnerships—supply of information, narrowly defined and implementable issues, a higher con- transparency, and reducing the transaction cost of stand- centration in deadlocked areas of co-operation, higher ard setting and market creation—are also identified as participation by traditionally marginalized actors, and an functions of intergovernmental regimes.5 Under what ability to draw knowledge from across levels of govern- conditions would networks succeed where other institu- ance. Evidence along these lines would support the thesis tions have failed? that networks are demand-driven, emerging out of shared One area where networked structures may have a clear concern for improved governance, and would reveal valu- advantage over hierarchical organizations is in the diffu- able information about their likely effectiveness. sion of knowledge and learning, particularly when such A second aspect of the emergence and role of multi- diffusion needs to tap into multiple levels of expertise.6 The stakeholder networks that is not well specified in the cur- voluntary and often informal character of networks im- rent literature is the question of the political incentives to plies that incentives for strategic manipulations of infor- supply such networks. What interests are likely to initiate, mation may be smaller than in the context of international participate in, and dominate such networks? bargaining, and there may be greater opportunities to Paradoxically, the very international organizations that parcel out knowledge about complex global systems as it are under attack for failing to respond effectively to glo- relates to particular groups and localities. Thus, the greater balization pressures may be most strongly motivated to the complexity and contestation of information and the reinvent their missions and support partnerships. The tra- greater the need to tap into local or specialized knowledge, ditional channels of governance are becoming increasingly the larger will be the comparative advantage of frustrating for international secretariats because of the transnational networks over hierarchical institutions. growing unwillingness of donor countries to provide finan- It is less clear, however, what might be the comparative cial support, a history of failures in implementing assist- advantage of partnerships in international standard set- ance through central government institutions, pressures by ting and implementation. So far, governments and inter- transnational actors for direct inclusion, and legitimacy governmental institutions have maintained a clear advan- assaults by the anti-globalization movement. Thus, con- tage in setting and implementing binding rules. Partner- trary to the conventional functionalist wisdom of partner- ships seem to find a ‘niche’ in setting non-binding norms ships as a radically new form of governance, there is rea- and unlocking market mechanisms within governance son to expect many of them to appear as a reinvention of areas deadlocked by competing state interests. By segmen- existing institutions. tation of the regulatory political economy, involving only Transnational advocacy organizations are also likely to a subset of actors, and by allowing for flexible adjustment jump eagerly on the partnership bandwagon. The mismatch of norms, partnerships permit more heterogeneous signals between the growing transnational resources of such organi- to actors and decrease the cost of collective action. Part- zations and the limited opportunities for direct policy in- nerships geared towards implementation are more likely volvement at the intergovernmental level provide a strong to have a comparative advantage not just in any govern- incentive to push for alternative venues such as multi- ance context, but where they compensate for weak insti- stakeholder networks, where multinational advocacy groups tutions or institutional deficits across levels of governance. have a real opportunity not only to participate in, but also Finally, partnerships are applauded for closing the ‘par- to set, the governance agenda. While advocacy organizations ticipation gap’ in global politics. While by definition multi- have demonstrated their strong comparative advantage in
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Art_01_Andonova.p65 20 17.07.2003, 23:07 effecting sustainable development through partnership-like ern governments, NGOs, and local communities. They are transnational networks,7 their position on WSSD type II likely to reflect the priorities of traditionally powerful en- outcomes has not been unidirectional. On one hand, NGOs tities. Moreover, if international agencies see partnerships have cautioned against using the concept of type II outcomes as an opportunity to improve their implementation record to deflect attention from progress on type I intergovernmen- and strengthen their legitimacy, they will seek to maximize tal agreements (particularly in the case of the USA). NGOs the likelihood for success by targeting partnerships in coun- also warned against the ‘recycling’ of existing aid pro- tries with relatively high institutional capacity rather than grammes under the partnership category and avoiding new weaker states, which may have the greatest functional need commitments, against lack of accountability and linkage to for innovative governance solutions. Industry participa- specific sustainable development goals and agreements, and tion is likely to be limited to large transnational compa- against the ‘privatization’ of sustainable development gov- nies, leaders in voluntary practices, and firms active in is- ernance by giving a free hand to business through partner- sue areas where the opportunity for public subsidization ship-like structures.8 Nevertheless, large transnational is greatest. NGOs have not in any way boycotted or even shied away The demand and supply rationales for partnerships can from participation and leadership in type II outcomes, be- thus have very different implications for the structure, cause on balance taking a proactive position gives them a geographic distribution, levels of participation, and issue clear comparative advantage in the transnational govern- orientation of partnerships. They furthermore imply a need ance process, enhances their resources, and provides a for systematic empirical research to determine what incen- greater ability to influence the agenda and structure of part- tives dominate the current partnership movement and nership institutions. what existing patterns imply for the effectiveness and fu- National governments, in turn, will have fewer incentives ture development of the partnership movement. These to support transnational partnerships if they are perceived questions seem particularly important in the context of the as infringing on the authority of the state. At the same time, WSSD partnerships, which were promoted heavily as ini- however, certain government units, such as aid and devel- tiatives that would help fill the functional gap between ris- opment agencies in industrialized countries, may have ing demands for meaningful progress on sustainable de- special interests to support partnerships as a way to in- velopment and declining confidence in intergovernmental crease their resources, to diversify their portfolios, to in- mechanisms. crease control over the implementation of aid programmes, and to channel some of the benefits back to industry or societal groups in donor countries. Partnerships, it has Partnerships in the WSSD Context been argued, can also be used by industrialized states stra- The idea that the WSSD should contribute to the devel- tegically to deflect pressure for increased assistance. opment of additional partnerships, and help improve the Finally, for industrial actors the incentives to lead or even effectiveness of existing ones, was advanced on the basis join partnerships are likely to be limited to transnational of two core rationales. One of these rationales could be companies which are under greatest scrutiny by advocacy called strategic. The WSSD Bureau, and the Secretary- and consumer organizations, and those that operate in General himself, consistently articulated a strategic vision developing areas where domestic governance failures in- in which the WSSD would contribute to partnership de- crease the risk of investment. Moreover, leaders in corpo- velopment in order to advance more effective results-ori- rate responsibility practices are likely to have special in- ented implementation of the summit’s agenda. Partner- centives in diffusing their standards to level the playing field ships would help fill critical implementation gaps that had and reap the benefits of improved reputation. Industry emerged in the Earth Summit follow-up. This strategic participation can also be motivated by the opportunity for rationale was not strongly contested. Such ideas had in- public subsidization of innovative products or services creasingly been in the air, and groups such as the which would otherwise be uncompetitive in the short run, Stakeholder Forum for our Common Future had been such as renewable energy technology or the development shaping a coherent agenda linking partnerships to sustain- and distribution of AIDS vaccines in poor regions of the able development action. There was a solid consensus world. across a range of observers and participants that, for the The anticipation of supply-side incentives to set up multi- WSSD to succeed, it would need to find a way to harness stakeholder networks implies some hypotheses about the the potential of multi-stakeholder partnerships on behalf pattern of partnerships likely to emerge. Partnerships are of the summit’s goals. more likely to be led and dominated by traditionally pow- There was also a second rationale that could be called erful actors such as intergovernmental agencies, donor tactical. As it became increasingly clear in early 2002 that governments, and transnational NGOs, rather than South- the WSSD was unlikely to break any major new ground
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Art_01_Andonova.p65 21 17.07.2003, 23:07 on the intergovernmental front, the Bureau advanced pro- The guidelines were also unclear about the procedural posals to elevate the partnership idea within the WSSD basis for declaring an activity a type II partnership. The process to ever greater levels. At the second preparatory most explicit guidance came in the form of a three-page committee, held between 28 January and 8 February 2002, note from the WSSD co-chairs, circulated at the third governments endorsed a proposal to make the creation of preparatory committee meeting, which was vague on all partnerships a major outcome of the summit, and these the important questions.10 Ongoing activities (as opposed quickly acquired the label ‘type II partnerships’. The to new activities) could be considered to constitute a WSSD WSSD Bureau actively encouraged creation of type II partnership if there was ‘a clearly demonstrated added partnerships, and significant space was made on the agenda value to these initiatives in the context of the Summit’; for discussing them at the third and fourth preparatory partnerships needed to be internationally relevant and they committee meetings. Many participants endorsed this idea, needed to have arrangements to monitor implementation. though there was scepticism about the tactical manoeu- Yet how added value was to be demonstrated, how rel- vre of treating partnerships and intergovernmental diplo- evance was to be determined, and how monitoring mecha- macy as close to functional equivalents. But in the end nisms were to be judged were never spelled out. nobody wanted the WSSD to fail, and although there were The question of what would happen with the partner- early voices of concern about how meaningful the type II ships after the WSSD received almost no explicit attention partnerships would be, nobody had any reason to oppose during the preparatory process. Instead the subject was them. postponed for the summit itself, where it also received al- More critical debate about the type II partnerships might most no attention. The Stakeholder Forum for our Com- have been helpful, though, because in retrospect it is now mon Future, which had pioneered a number of well-re- clear that the strategic rationale for partnerships that had garded multi-stakeholder dialogues and was a leading been crafted over the past several years and the tactical advocate of partnerships, criticized the process as overly manoeuvres that were put in place in the months leading vague and issued a number of specific recommendations up to the WSSD, had relatively little to do with each other. that were all ignored.11 The lack of clarity on post-sum- Two prominent lost opportunities had to do with what mit partnership mechanisms contributed to a sense that kinds of partnerships the WSSD encouraged and with how the partnership process may not be heading anywhere at follow-up would be pursued. all. Some high-profile initiatives that seemed to reflect the The primary guidance as to what type of partnerships spirit of the partnership idea bypassed the process in Jo- the WSSD would promote came in the form of a series of hannesburg out of a sense that it was irrelevant. The brief communications from the Bureau, none of which Megadiversity Initiative, which is a voluntary mechanism provided specific substantive guidelines. Instead of link- on the part of the 15 most biodiverse countries, is one such ing the partnerships firmly to the Millennium Development example. Goals (MDGs), articulated in the September 2000 Millen- At the eleventh meeting of the Commission on Sustain- nium Declaration, these documents referred more consist- able Development (CSD-11), between 28 April and 9 May ently to Agenda 21, a far broader and more unwieldy 2003, the subject of how to follow up on the WSSD part- framework for action. The MDGs were meant to serve as nership process occupied a prominent role on the agenda a more effective alternative to Agenda 21, whose track and received significant attention. However, there were record over the previous decade had been lacklustre. very few advocates for greater clarity or more precise Whereas Agenda 21 was an expansive catch-all document mechanisms, and in the end the CSD endorsed what full of procedural and symbolic recommendations, the amounted to a continuation of the status quo. Reporting MDGs constituted a more focused set of eight goals ar- on the part of partnerships was to be encouraged but vol- ticulated in terms of 18 quantitative targets. In many ways untary.12 the creation of the MDGs reflected a recognition that Given the disconnection between the WSSD strategic Agenda 21 had failed to serve as a useful guide to action objective of result-oriented implementation through part- on the part of the international community. Although the nerships and the loose guidelines set for partnership ini- partnership guidance documents did refer to the MDGs, tiatives and follow-up, it becomes important to examine they did so side by side with Agenda 21, which was de facto the patterns of partnerships and partnership participation licence for the proposed partnerships to focus on virtually that actually emerged and how likely they are to break new anything they wanted to.9 ground in implementing sustainable development objec- tives.
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Art_01_Andonova.p65 22 17.07.2003, 23:07 Nature of the Johannesburg Type II Partnerships International organizations lead close to one-third of the One virtue of the WSSD process is that it identifies a large partnerships, an observation consistent with the hypoth- number of discrete transnational partnerships that can be esis that secretariats of international institutions will be studied using the kinds of quantitative techniques not among the most eager suppliers of partnership in an ef- normally practical in the transnational network and part- fort to reinvent their mission and legitimacy. A closer look nership literature. Using documents available at the WSSD at the 55 NGO-led initiatives also reveals that most of the website, we constructed a simple relational database in leading NGOs are large transnational organizations such order to characterize broad patterns of partnership struc- as the IUCN – The World Conservation Union and the ture and national participation in the WSSD partnerships. Nature Conservancy, and considerably fewer are led by We downloaded each of the summary documents that were national and local groups. The most proactive actors available as of 12 February 2003, and were able to proc- within governments tend to be development ministries and ess information systematically on 231 partnerships. The aid agencies in OECD countries. The WSSD partnership database includes information on whether national gov- movement appears to be led and dominated largely by ernments, NGOs, industry, or international organizations transnational policy entrepreneurs from international sec- were involved and which category of stakeholder was the retariats, OECD governments, and transnational NGOs, lead partner. We added research institutes and local gov- reflecting rather than challenging existing realities of power ernments to the lead partner category because a number and influence. of partnerships were led by such entities. Subject catego- While partnerships are expected to have a comparative ries were assigned to the partnerships by relying on the 28 advantage in broadening the centres of influence and em- classifications used on the WSSD partnership website, as powering weaker or non-traditional stakeholders in the available on 28 March 2003. We harmonized country international arena, the empirical record shows that the names and then merged country data from sources such partnership enthusiasm and leadership of such groups as the World Development Indicators13 and the Environ- remain limited. Only a small share of partnerships is led mental Sustainability Index.14 By relating information on by lower- and middle-income governments (6.1 per cent), partnerships, subject categories, and national partners, the by industry (3.0 per cent), or by local governments (2.6 per database permits systematic exploration across these three cent). levels of analysis.15 That partnerships registered at the WSSD emerge as When looking at partnerships as the unit of analysis, we predominantly supply-driven is not very surprising. As observe a pattern that appears largely supply-driven (by already discussed, there have been great pressures and what powerful actors have to offer) rather than demand- organizational incentives for actors such as donor govern- driven (by what is needed to fill key implementation gaps). ments and international organizations to reinvent their role The supply-driven nature of most WSSD partnerships is in sustainable development, particularly under the critical evidenced most directly by the characteristics of lead ac- light of the Johannesburg summit. Moreover, tradition- tors. As Figure 1 shows, the larger share of initiatives (a ally powerful actors are precisely those who have the re- total of 75 per cent) is led by international organizations, sources to support sustainable development partnerships, by OECD and other upper income governments, and by and without their substantive financial involvement the non-governmental organizations. practical results of such initiatives are likely to be insig- nificant. The critical question, however, is whether the Numbers of partnerships preponderance of such actors is indeed accompanied by 35 % significant new commitments of assistance, something that 30 % 29% so far is extremely difficult to judge from the sparse infor- mation available on the partnerships. 25 % 24% 22% The leadership and dominance of traditionally power- 20 % ful actors in the sample we considered may also reflect the
15 % early stage in which the partnership movement finds itself, particularly within the context of the WSSD. The harried 10% 7,4% endorsement and development of type II initiatives as of- 6,5% 6,1% 5 % ficial outcomes of the Johannesburg summit, coupled with 3,0% 2,6% relatively broadly specified guidelines, most likely limited 0 % IOs NGOs Developed No lead Research Developing Industry Local gov. involvement to those most capable of putting together a proposal within a relatively short period of time. It is worth Figure 1: pointing out that a number of the partnerships in the Lead partners in WSSD type II outcome partnership
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Art_01_Andonova.p65 23 17.07.2003, 23:07 WSSD sample indicated an intention to involve certain Another important question is whether partnerships may categories of actors such as ‘local NGOs’, ‘local govern- fail to achieve some of the functional roles and effects ments’, and ‘developing countries’, but had not yet identi- commonly attributed to them, due to the predominance fied specific partners, although the coding reflected only of supply-side incentives. partners and objectives identified with some specificity. One of the widely touted advantages of partnership net- Further comparisons between the structural characteris- works over intergovernmental mechanisms of interna- tics of the WSSD partnerships and the level of participa- tional governance is the ability of networks to stimulate tion, leadership, and issue orientation of longer-standing consensus building and agreement through flexible and partnership-type initiatives and networks developed out- direct involvement of a diverse set of actors located at dif- side of or in parallel to the Johannesburg type II outcomes ferent levels of governance. Hence, the emphasis at the would be useful in illuminating broader patterns that have WSSD was that partnerships are ‘multi-stakeholder’ ini- emerged. As WSSD partnerships evolve they still may tiatives. A careful review of the universe of WSSD part- provide new channels to involve non-traditional nerships, however, reveals that only a small portion of the stakeholders and demands more effectively. Whether this registered partnerships involve all significant stakeholders. will be the case, however, depends in large part on the se- Only 14 of the 231 (6 per cent) partnerships examined in riousness of the follow-up process, and requires system- this study consist of all of the major categories—rich and atic data collection for its detection. poor countries, international organizations, NGOs, and
Table 1. WSSD type II partnerships involving all major stakeholders (developing and developed countries, NGOs, industry, and international organizations)
Partnership Lead partner Number of Number of wealthy countries developing countries
Bicycle Refurbishing Initiative Velo Mondial / Afribike 4 1 Nederland
Cleaner Fuels and Vehicles Partnership UNEP 5 4
Energy and Environment Partnership Finland 1 7 with Central America
Forest Management and Conservation in South Africa 6 6 the Congo Basin
Global Alliance for Building Sustainability RICS Foundation 2 1
Global Health & Development Chart Karolinska Institutet (a medical 1 4 university), Stockholm, Sweden
Global Master Plan for Cycling Velo Mondial 3 2
Global Partnership for Capacity Building to UNITAR 7 6 Implement the Globally Harmonized System for Chemical Classification and Labelling (GHS)
Global Partnership on Clean Fuels and Vehicles USA 2 2
Good Governance in Sustainable Development Indonesia 7 1
International Coral Reef Action Network (ICRAN)/ International Coral Reef Action 2 1 International Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI) Network (ICRAN)
Mandatory Disclosure of Automotive Emissions Indonesia 2 8
Partnership Initiative: Energy for Poverty Eradication European Commission 15 11 and Sustainable Development
The Andean BIOTRADE Programme UNCTAD 1 5
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Art_01_Andonova.p65 24 17.07.2003, 23:07 industry (see list in Table 1).16 If we examine the partner- of partnership initiatives that cannot be fulfilled as effec- ships that cross a more modest threshold—they simply tively by hierarchical intergovernmental structures. Even include both rich and poor countries—we find that only if this is the case, however, the fact that this rationale has 82 partnerships (36 per cent) meet this criterion. not been made explicitly, that the desired connections be- Table 1 presents the list of WWSD partnerships that in- tween this capacity-building role and the results-oriented volve all major stakeholder groups. These initiatives are agenda of WEHAB (water, energy, health, agriculture, and predominantly led by developed countries and interna- biodiversity) and the Millennium Declaration have not tional institutions—only one is led by industry and two by been articulated, and that within the context of capacity upper-middle income countries (South Africa and Indo- building no effort to encourage clear, measurable targets nesia). However, these partnerships have succeed in involv- has been undertaken, all highlight the lack of fit between ing an equal or greater number of developing states—the the partnership process and the overall movement towards total count of developing states participating in the 15 ini- more results-oriented collective management. tiatives is 59, while the total count of developed states It is of course possible to identify examples of WSSD participating is 58. By engaging well-identified industry partnerships that have managed to translate global sus- groups, non-governmental organizations, and government tainable development goals into very clearly identified bodies, the 14 truly multi-stakeholder partnerships have national and local objectives. Box 1 showcases three such succeeded in targeting fairly well-specified sustainable initiatives: the Access Initiative’s Partnership for Princi- development objectives. Three of these partnerships, for ple 10, which promotes specific commitments related to example, aim at improved monitoring and reduction of the implementation of the access to information principle automotive emissions and another two address local air of the Rio Declaration; the UN Institute for Training and quality and transportation via the promotion of bicycles Research (UNITAR)’s Partnership for Capacity Building in developing regions. These are cases where partnerships to Implement the Globally Harmonized System for Chemi- have indeed demonstrated a comparative advantage in cal Classification and Labelling, and the UN Conference engaging interests across levels of governance and stimu- on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)’s Andean lating transnational co-operation on a problem of critical Biotrade Programme, which promotes the principles of local importance, but for which no global governance biodiversity conservation and sustainable development framework exists. through the development of markets for biodiversity and A more comprehensive review of the target issue area services. These partnerships unite diverse stakeholders, set of all partnerships reveals, however, that less than half of specific measurable targets, and spell out clear monitor- them (120 out of 231) are designed to address a substan- ing mechanisms. However, they are the exception rather tive environmental management problem such as food than the rule. security, biodiversity, climate change, desertification, dis- aster preparedness, energy, forests, fresh water, minerals and mining, coastal management, and mountain develop- ment. A substantial part of the partnerships (102 out of Box 1. Examples of type II partnerships containing 231) seek to develop broadly defined ‘means of implemen- ingredients for success tation’ such as capacity building, education, science, and The Andean Biotrade Programme is an initiative led information for decision making, as well as the develop- by three international institutions, the Andean Com- ment of financial and trade mechanisms for sustainable munity, the Andean Development Corporations, and development. These numbers imply that partnership net- the United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel- works remain predominantly venues conducive to infor- opment. It links in a regional network the govern- mation and knowledge sharing, but the majority of WSSD ments of the five Andean countries, donor states and partnerships fail to provide concrete responses to expec- organizations, exporters’ organizations, research in- tations for more targeted and outcome-oriented manage- stitutions, and local communities to promote sustain- ment of environmental resources. This is not to say that able management of biodiversity through the devel- capacity-enhancing functions are less important for sus- opment of markets for biodiversity products and tainable development than targeting specific sustainable services. The initiative exemplifies the role of part- development outcomes. In fact, it may be that meaningful nerships in stimulating local and regional action in capacity building and information diffusion that empow- an area of governance among a set of interested ac- ers non-state actors and sub-national governance institu- tors that have been deadlocked at the intergovern- tions, and creates local capability to achieve global objec- mental level by competing interests and power in- tives, is precisely one of the strong comparative advantages equalities. The programme targets a range of specific
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Art_01_Andonova.p65 25 17.07.2003, 23:07 objectives from the implementation of a Regional problems. As Table 2 demonstrates, however, we do not Biodiversity Strategy of the Andean Community, to find a consistent and strong negative correlation between support of national biotrade programmes, techno- ESI scores and levels of participation in partnerships by logical development for conservation and use of subject areas. By contrast the ESI measure of ‘Social and biodiversity, and providing financing for bio-busi- institutional capacity’ had a strong positive correlation ness. across most subject areas. And when partial correlations The Partnership for Principle 10 of the Access Ini- are calculated, controlling for social and institutional ca- tiative seeks to promote the practical implementation pacity, only one correlation remains significant in the en- of the principle of access to information, participa- tire table—a negative correlation ‘Reducing air pollution’ tion, and justice in environmental governance. While and energy partnerships. This suggests that countries par- this principle was adopted by the Rio declaration of ticipate when they can, not when they need to (with en- the 1992 Earth Summit, there is no global treaty to ergy partnerships being the exception). advance its implementation. The only intergovern- In sum, a systematic examination of the type II partner- mental framework that exists on the issue is the 1997 ships initiated as one of the major outcomes of the WSSD Århus Convention, adopted by the Conference of reveals that they are predominantly driven by strong sup- European Ministers and influenced greatly by a pan- ply-side incentives on the part of traditionally powerful European network of societal organizations, inter- transnational entrepreneurs rather than by demand for national agencies, and government bureaucracies. specific sustainable development improvements. While the The Partnership for Principle 10 aims to extend the leadership by the rich and the powerful may be understand- practical implementation of norms on access to in- able if we take into account the need to secure resources formation and justice in Europe and beyond by en- for the realization of these initiatives, it indicates that part- gaging interested governments, non-governmental nerships so far have failed to present a significant challenge groups, and donor organizations and by setting spe- to traditional patterns of influence, a conclusion also sup- cific objectives for capacity building, diffusion of in- ported if we examine countries as a unit and analyse their formation, and institutional and legislative changes. patterns of partnership participation. The Global Partnership for Capacity Building to Im- plement the Globally Harmonized System for Chemi- cal Classification and Labelling is led by UNITAR Patterns of National Participation in collaboration with other international organiza- National patterns are worth exploring because there is a tions. It is tied to a very well defined international wealth of information already available about countries framework for managing dangerous chemicals—the (as compared to the paucity of information about NGOs, Globally Harmonized System for Chemical Classi- for example), because the UN system is organized around fication and Labelling (GHS) of the UN Economic the nation-state, and because we can readily compare na- and Social Council Subcommittee of Experts. Initi- tional patterns in these partnerships with what we know ated shortly before the official endorsement of the about other patterns of national participation in other GHS, the partnership harnesses the resources of do- venues. We recognize that the partnerships span multiple nors, UN organizations, and industry and advocacy stakeholders and that there are therefore other types of organizations to strengthen the capacity for GHS im- patterns worth exploring, and we hope that future work plementation in developing and transitional coun- will permit such investigations. tries. The average country participated in 4.4 partnerships; France had the highest number with 33, and 168 countries In search of further evidence of the extent to which part- participated in at least one partnership. Thirty-seven coun- nerships are driven by demand for more effective and tries did not participate at all. Far fewer countries were targeted environmental management, we also exam- designated lead partners: of these Italy, Japan, and France ined the correlations between countries’ levels of par- were the most active, accounting for half the 64 country- ticipation in type II partnerships by subject area and led partnerships. countries’ environmental performance scores assigned The list of most active countries is relatively heteroge- by the Yale/Columbia Environment Sustainability Index neous, and is representative of the world at large in terms (ESI).17 If the process is primarily demand driven, we of per-capita income. However, there are some persistent would expect poor ESI scores in the system and stress ar- patterns that emerge through multiple regression eas to be correlated with high levels of participation in the analysis. Countries that participate in more partnerships partnership subjects that deal with specific sustainability tend to give or receive large amounts of foreign aid (ODA),
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Art_01_Andonova.p65 26 17.07.2003, 23:07 Table 2. Correlations between countries’ partnership participation by issue area and countries’ ESI environmental performance scores
Health Agriculture; Biodiver- Climate Deserti- Early Energy Forests Fresh- Minerals Moun- Oceans; and Food sity change; fication warning water and tains Coastal sustainable security; Air disaster mining areas; development Rural pollution preparedness Fisheries Air quality + ++ Water quantity +- Water quality + + + + + ++ + - Biodiversity — - — Land — - Reducing air — - - — — pollution Reducing water stress Reducing — - ecosystem stress Reducing waste - — - - + and consumption pressure Reducing + ++ + ++ population growth Providing + ++ + ++ + - + for human sustenance Protecting ++ + ++ human health Social and ++ ++ + ++ + ++ ++ ++ ++ institutional capacity
+ = significant positive correlation at .05 level or better - = significant negative correlation at .05 level or better ++ = significant positive correlation at .01 level or better — = significant negative correlation at .01 level or better
Table 3. National participation in WSSD partnerships: most active countries Table 4. Results of multiple regression analysis Country Number of Independent Standardized T Significance partnerhips variable coefficient
France 33 Foreign aid .386 5.86 .000 South Africa 30 (receipts and donations) USA 29 Japan 26 Host of Prepcom IV .316 6.21 .000 Indonesia 25 or WSSD Italy 22 Number of NGOs that .237 3.49 .001 Philippines 20 are members of IUCN Thailand 20 Australia 18 Large population .189 3.33 .001 China 18 (>23 million) United Kingdom |7 Canada 14 Number of national .128 2.42 .017 Tanzania 13 environmental plans Vietnam 13 Dependent variable = Number of partnerships Germany 12 Adjusted r-square = 0.682 Kenya 12 N = 193 Malaysia 12 Sources: World Development Indicators (aid, population); Morocco 12 Environmental Sustainability Index (IUCN members, national environ- Netherlands 11 mental plans). Brazil 10
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Art_01_Andonova.p65 27 17.07.2003, 23:07 have large numbers of NGOs, have large populations, and regression analysis as well as by two variables that are di- have more extensive national environmental planning in- rectly correlated with population (foreign aid totals and frastructures (Table 4). Indonesia and South Africa both number of NGOs), the partnership process has not ignored participated in a disproportionate number of partnerships, the smallest countries. A number of partnerships deliber- which probably reflects the heightened attention that the ately targeted problems of small island states, for exam- process received as a result of the host role played by those ple. An examination of the 36 countries that did not join countries. any type II partnership suggests that being very small does These results indicate that much of the national par- put a country at risk of exclusion, but not overwhelmingly ticipation in the WSSD partnerships is reflective of ex- so. The group includes a handful of very small countries isting patterns of international engagement (as meas- such as Comoros and Cape Verde, but there are also a ured through foreign aid flows) and through existing number of politically marginalized states, such as North levels of domestic mobilization and capacity (as meas- Korea and Libya, and some countries experiencing domes- ured through national environmental plans and tic instability such as Somalia and Lebanon, which limits NGOs). Countries with larger populations are prob- their ability to participate in transnational networking. ably both more able to participate and more sought Even among these risk factors there are exceptions that after by other partners. On balance this picture sug- prove the flexibility of the partnership process. Taiwan gests a pattern consistent with a supply-driven rather managed to find a partnership it could join in spite of the than a demand-driven process of partnership forma- usual obstacles it faces in the international system. Sierra tion. If partnerships are meant to fill implementation Leone was able to participate in spite of a civil war. And gaps, then one would want to see them emerge among the very smallest countries, with populations under countries that are marginalized from the current in- 500,000, participated in an average of 1.75 partnerships ternational system. Yet we observe the opposite, sug- each. gesting that the countries that most embraced the part- However, the presence of the smallest countries in the nership movement were not the ones that needed it the WSSD partnerships is attributable almost entirely to the most, but rather the ones that had already acquired activities of the international organizations, and therefore an advanced capacity for international engagement. there is reason to be concerned about the ability of the Haiti and Somalia, for example, are not participating partnership movement at large to engage these countries. in any of the 231 partnerships, whereas Thailand and The countries with fewer than 500,000 people (36 coun- the Philippines are in 20 each. tries in our database) were left out of every single indus- Although smaller countries join fewer partnerships, as try-led and research institute-led partnership. The partner- evidenced by the presence of the population variable in the ships they joined were overwhelmingly led by international
Table 5. Partnership participation by income group and lead partner type
Lead partner type Income group International Industry National Local NGOs Research No lead organizations governments governments institutes designated
Low income 44.1% 1.1% 41.4% 1.9% 5.8% 2.3% 2.3% (n = 56)
Lower middle income 45.9% 0.4% 33.8% 9.5% 2.5% 2.9% 4.8% (n = 47)
Upper middle income 48.7% 1.2% 25.7% 1.0% 17.4% 4.4% 1.6% (n = 23)
High income OECD 44.4% 4.2% 26.4% 1.2% 13.8% 7.0% 2.2% (n = 22)
Other high income 38.1% 1.6% 44.4% 14.3% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% (n = 7)
All groups 45.1% 1.35% 34.8% 4.5% 7.5% 3.3% 2.8% (n = 155) Note: Columns do not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding.
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Art_01_Andonova.p65 28 17.07.2003, 23:07 organizations, with a much smaller number led by govern- absence of effective leadership, the process is heading for ments and an even smaller number led by NGOs. There- a future that will replicate as opposed to changing the fore, below the surface appearance of broad engagement world order in which they operate. But the exceptions are in these new governance mechanisms lies a reflection of just as interesting as the overall tendencies, and they pro- existing patterns in which the weakest countries rely on the vide a foundation for progress. The fact that two Arab most traditional international organizations to give them countries (the United Arab Emirates and Egypt) are a voice. among the 18 nations that are leading partnerships, when Across income groups as well, countries show different the Arab countries have not historically been active lead- preferences for partnerships led by different types of ers in sustainable development diplomacy,19 shows that the stakeholders. The largest difference is a mirror-image pref- partnership process is capable of eliciting and encourag- erence on the part of the richest and poorest, for partner- ing new patterns of engagement. ships led by NGOs and governments, respectively. Table 5 summarizes the differences. If one thinks of partnerships as forming a portfolio, the OECD countries allocated 13.8 Conclusions per cent of their portfolio to partnerships led by NGOs, The partnership process launched in Johannesburg has a whereas the low-income countries allocated only 5.8 per mixed heritage. In one sense it was guided by a thoughtful cent of their total to that group. The low-income countries theory of results-oriented global public policy that articu- allocated a comparatively far larger percentage of their lated a clear role for transnational partnerships, but in participation effort to government-led initiatives (41.4 per another sense it was driven by tactical manoeuvring and a cent), whereas OECD countries allocated only 26.4 per desperate search for procedural results. Among the result- cent to this group. The OECD countries also reveal a com- ing partnerships are some efforts that reflect genuine hard paratively higher preference for partnerships led by indus- work aimed at filling critical implementation gaps, but also try and research institutes. None of this should be surpris- initiatives that appear to be nothing more than opportun- ing. It shows that countries prefer to participate in venues istic window dressing (including the 14 partnerships that where they exercise more control.18 Within the intergov- were not able to designate any partners!). Progress will ernmental system, the poorest countries have an institu- therefore be difficult. If the opportunistic tendencies are tionalized voice that is absent in the transnational networks not subjected to disciplining leadership, transparency, and of industry, NGOs, and research institutes. Likewise the oversight, the seeds of innovation currently present will be wealthy countries, because they are in the minority among choked out and the process will become a mockery. governments but dominate transnational networks, find Except on the purely tactical notion that partnerships such venues more amenable to their interests. should be promoted, leadership was markedly absent in Another way in which national patterns of participation the preparations for Johannesburg. Realistically there in the partnerships mirror existing dominant patterns can probably wasn’t time to exercise substantive leadership be seen by examining the types of partnerships in which effectively without alienating critical constituents and jeop- countries choose to participate. The theory behind the ardizing the summit’s procedural goals. Because of the partnerships is that they encourage problem-focused, re- scepticism shown concerning the partnerships, it may have sults-oriented modes of action that bypass the entrenched been necessary to keep the substance vague in order to ideological divisions still found in many global organiza- retain everyone on board. But that need has now passed, tions. The WSSD partnerships, however, reflect rather and critical choices need to be made that will influence the than counter existing ideological divides and differences future of the partnership process. Among the key ques- of opinion about what matters most. The OECD coun- tions that can be settled only with vibrant leadership are tries, for example, gravitate most to those partnerships the following. dealing with science, information, and energy, whereas the What forms of partnership composition are most cen- poorest countries gravitate more to partnerships dealing tral to filling the key implementation gaps? In the current with trade and technology transfer. While there are useful mix a large number (65) have no national government exceptions, the rich countries reveal a preference for part- participation at all, in spite of the rhetoric about the cen- nerships that reinforce areas in which they are dominant, tral role of governments. Is it best to encourage or discour- and the poor countries reveal a preference for partnerships age these kinds of partnerships? Should they be included aimed at altering the rules of the game in which they are in the WSSD follow-up process or allowed to go their least powerful. own separate ways? Only a very small number bring to- Taken altogether, these broad patterns of national par- gether all the key stakeholders—is that appropriate or ticipation in the WSSD partnerships suggest that, in the would more be better? Research institutes, based in uni-
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Art_01_Andonova.p65 29 17.07.2003, 23:07 versities and think-tanks, emerged as a vibrant source of tal and multi-stakeholder types of outcomes. action on the partnership front, though they were not ex- Reaching consensus on these choices will be difficult be- plicitly targeted for engagement. Should the partnership cause of divergent preferences. The UN bureaucracy prob- process encourage more involvement on the part of such ably has little to gain from staking out a forward posi- actors?20 tion on the partnership issue and may, by and large, be What should these partnerships do? In the lead up to content to let the process fade into obscurity, having Johannesburg only the most vague guidance was given. already delivered its function of providing a procedural Saying that they should help implement Agenda 21 is so outcome of note at Johannesburg. Wealthy govern- broad that it is practically equivalent to saying that it ments, although they proved quite willing to enter the doesn’t matter what they do. One of the clearest lessons partnership process in the lead-up to Johannesburg, from the past decade is that Agenda 21, in its entirety, have little incentive to subject their partnerships to over- covers too much terrain to be susceptible to international sight, transparency, and accountability at the interna- oversight, planning, and prioritization, and that the ini- tional level. Poor governments are concerned that tial efforts to do so were resounding failures.21 The Johan- deeper institutionalization will be translated into forms nesburg partnerships may be doomed to the same fate, but of conditionality.24 NGOs are enthusiastic supporters they will become more focused only with sharp guidance of deeper institutionalization because they think it will and leadership. tie the hands of national governments, but they have a lim- How should the partnership process be institutionalized ited ability to influence the deliberations over how to insti- internationally? Currently there is nothing more than a thin tutionalize the partnership process.25 One tangible sign of shell of organizational infrastructure. There are no mecha- how inhospitable the constellation of interests may be can nisms to track progress towards implementing partnership be observed by looking at the large number of industry-led goals, no procedures to track patterns of membership and initiatives that opted not to associate with the formal WSSD participation, no process to relate partnership activity to process at all. Under the auspices of the Business Action for consensus goals such as the Plan of Implementation and the Sustainable Development, 95 partnership initiatives were Millennium Development Goals.22 If this situation persists, announced in the lead up to the WSSD.26 But almost none the partnerships will collectively have little chance of suc- of these partnerships chose to register with the WSSD part- ceeding. nership process, instead creating a parallel registry that will These questions pertain not only to the case of the WSSD pose barriers to monitoring and priority setting across part- type II outcomes but also more broadly to the future role nerships. of all partnership-like institutions within the UN system of One possible future of the partnership process, therefore, governance. As already implied, high-profile multi- is that it will quickly revert to where it was before Johan- stakeholder initiatives supported by UN organizations, such nesburg. New innovative partnerships will continue to as Kofi Annan’s Global Compact or the implementation of emerge in response to particular, fortuitous marriages of the GEF mandate through partnership projects, are already supply and demand; norms and lessons about how to easily identified by both scholars and practitioners as new manage such partnerships will diffuse as experience ac- forms of international governance that have emerged to fill crues; but there will be little overarching co-ordination some of the functional gaps and failures of the UN system.23 across these mechanisms. They will resemble what Oran The transnational partnership movement, however, has Young in a different context called ‘spontaneous re- emerged and remains in parallel to intergovernmental struc- gimes’.27 tures, and so far neither the literature nor policy makers have The other possible future is that the Johannesburg part- tackled the more challenging questions of the comparative nerships will form the nucleus of a co-ordinated approach advantages of each type of institution, their interaction, and to transnational governance, with institutionalization their combined effectiveness. This examination of WSSD evolving in response to periodic windows of opportunity partnerships suggests that transnational partnerships and and effective leadership. The report prepared by the Sec- networks endorsed by the UN system are likely to benefit retary-General as input to the eleventh meeting of the from a greater level of institutionalization, a better defini- Commission on Sustainable Development is an instructive tion of their objectives, and an ability to establish bridges example. Although it says very little explicitly about part- with specific targets and agreements set by intergovernmen- nerships, it recommends a matrix approach to follow-up tal bodies. It also shows, however, that it is as yet unclear centred around geographic regions and topical themes in whether there is sufficient interest by governments—the which partnerships could potentially play a useful role. actors that still, for the most part, dominate international This approach was broadly endorsed at CSD-11.28 governance systems—to bind more closely intergovernmen- Whether partnerships are able to play such a role in prac-
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Art_01_Andonova.p65 30 17.07.2003, 23:07 tice will depend on the development of a demand for in- (“type 2 outcomes”) to be Elaborated by Interested Parties in the stitutionalization that is greater than what can currently Context of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD)’, explanatory note by the Vice-Chairs Jan Kara be observed. and Diane Quarless, 7 June 2002, available at
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