UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF

ANNIE LAURIE GAYLOR; ; IAN GAYLOR, Personal Rep- resentative of the estate of ANNE NICOL GAYLOR; AND FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JACOB LEW, Secretary of the United States Department of Treasury; JOHN KOSKINEN, Commissioner of the In- ternal Revenue Service; and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Case No. 16-CV-215 Defendants, and

EDWARD PEECHER, CHICAGO EMBASSY CHURCH, PATRICK MALONE, HOLY CROSS ANGLICAN CHURCH, AND THE DIOCESE OF CHICAGO AND MID-AMERICA OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OUTSIDE OF RUSSIA,

Intervenor-Defendants.

INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS’ REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCUTION ...... 1

ARGUMENT ...... 1

I. Plaintiffs’ eleventh-hour attempt to manufacture standing changes nothing ...... 1

II. The parsonage allowance is fully consistent with the Establishment Clause...... 3

A. The parsonage allowance is consistent with the historical understanding of the Establishment Clause ...... 3

B. The parsonage allowance is consistent with the controlling opinion in Texas Monthly ...... 8

C. The parsonage allowance is consistent with the Texas Monthly plurality ...... 10

1. The parsonage allowance applies the convenience of the employer doctrine to ministers ...... 11

2. The parsonage allowance reduces entanglement ...... 19

3. The parsonage allowance avoids discrimination among religions ...... 23

CONCLUSION ...... 25

ii INTRODUCTION

The key question in this case is whether § 107(2) must be viewed in isolation or in context. Plaintiffs want the Court to view it in isolation, arguing that because § 107(2) applies only to churches and ministers, it is a “discriminatory preference for religion.”

Pls.’ Br. 2. But “context is all important” under the Establishment Clause. Cty. of

Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 640

(1989) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).

Viewed in context, § 107(2) is not only permissible under the Establishment

Clause, but desirable. It is fully consistent with the historical meaning of the Estab- lishment Clause, which strongly supports tax exemptions for ministers’ housing. It is fully consistent with the “convenience of the employer doctrine,” which allows tens of thousands of secular employees to exclude cash housing allowances from their in- come. Br. 29. And it is fully consistent with Supreme Court precedent, which requires the government to avoid entanglement in religious questions and avoid discrimina- tion among religions. Plaintiffs’ attempt to upset almost a century of settled tax policy should be rejected.

ARGUMENT

I. Plaintiffs’ eleventh-hour attempt to manufacture standing changes nothing.

Plaintiffs lack standing because they have failed to demonstrate that they will suffer any continuing harm that would be remedied by an injunction. Their complaint requests only prospective relief: a declaration that § 107(2) is invalid and an injunc- tion striking it down. Compl. at 13, ¶¶ A-D. To obtain such relief, Plaintiffs must

1 show “continuing, present adverse effects” that an injunction would remedy. O’Shea

v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974).

But Plaintiffs have failed to do so. They do not dispute that Anne Nicol Gaylor’s

estate lacks standing. Because Ms. Gaylor has passed away, there is no “likelihood

that [she] will again be wronged in a similar way,” Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 461

U.S. 95, 111 (1983), and she cannot benefit from the changes in the tax law that her

estate seeks. Accordingly, an injunction cannot redress her alleged injuries. See, e.g.,

Platcher v. Health Prof’ls, Ltd., No. 04-1442