DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT
IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS Palestine: the two-state solution under threat
Author: Kirsten JONGBERG
ABSTRACT
Fatah recently re-elected Mahmoud Abbas as its leader, despite strong criticisms from within his party and the wider Palestinian population. Palestinian politics remain divided, both between Fatah and Hamas, but also within the Fatah party itself. Nevertheless, Fatah and Hamas recently announced the creation of a new national unity government, which could pave the way for long-overdue presidential and legislative elections (possibly in 2017). However, the animosity between the two parties is seen as having undermined the capacity of Palestinian politics to move forward as well as the moral legitimacy of its institutions. Since the April 2014 failure of the latest peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians the idea of a two-state solution appears an increasingly distant possibility. The election of US President Trump, who has spoken in defence of Israel and has appointed several pro-settlement staff in key positions, puts into question the international consensus that had emerged on Israeli settlements since the passing of UN Resolution 2334. While the international community considers Israel’s 1967 annexation illegal, Israel continues to expand settlements, demolish houses and evict residents in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. These actions have increased in magnitude since the US elections. The EU has repeatedly condemned the construction of new settlements, which jeopardises the two-state solution as well as the possibility that Jerusalem could serve as the future capital of two states.
FOR EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT INTERNAL USE ONLY
DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2017_6 EN January 2017 - DV\1116488EN - PE598.342 © European Union, 2017 Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
This paper was requested by the European Parliament's Delegation for Relations with Palestine. The English-language manuscript was completed on 3 February 2017. It will be translated into EL, ES and FR. Author: Kirsten JONGBERG, with contributions from Benjamin REY and Camille LONS (intern) Feedback of all kind is welcome. Please write to the author: [email protected]. This paper will be published on the intranet site of the European Parliament's policy departments. The content of this document is the sole responsibility of the author and any opinions expressed therein do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. It is addressed to the Members and staff of the EP for their parliamentary work. Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a copy. Palestine: the two-state solution under threat
Table of contents
1 Domestic politics 4 1.1 Palestinian parties 4 1.2 A government of national unity 5 1.3 Palestine, statehood and the ICC 7
2 Middle East Peace Process 8 2.1 An uncertain future for the Peace Process 8 2.2 The EU and EP positions on the Middle East Peace Process 10
3 EU cooperation and aid to Palestinians 11 3.1 EU-Palestine relations 11 3.2 EU aid to Palestine 12
4 Disputed territory 14 4.1 Israel, Palestine and the 1967 borders 14 4.2 Residency, access and movement 15 4.3 Settlement expansions, house demolitions and evictions 16 4.4 Settlements, demolitions and the EU 19 4.4.1 The demolition of EU-funded structures 19 4.4.2 EU policy on Israeli settlements 19 4.4.3 Labelling of settlement products 20
5 The situation in Gaza 21 5.1 Life under blockade 21 5.2 The 2014 war and the reconstruction of Gaza 22 5.3 Intra-Palestinian reconciliation and negotiating with Hamas 23 5.4 The EU and EP positions on Gaza 23
6 Human rights 24 6.1 Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank 24 6.2 The detention of children 24
7 European Parliament policy options 27
8 Map: Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories 28
3 Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
1 Domestic politics
1.1 Palestinian parties Palestinian politics are dominated by two main parties: Fatah, a secular leftist party founded in the late 1950s by Yasser Arafat and led today by Mahmoud Abbas, and Hamas, an Islamic resistance movement that emerged in 1988 from the Islamic Muslim Brotherhood movement in opposition to the Oslo Accords. Fatah was the strongest and best organised
of the Palestinian factions until the al-Aqsa intifada, and its control over the
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) has made it the main
representative of Palestinian interests to the international community. However, since Hamas’ victory at the 2006 parliamentary elections and its Although Fatah and Hamas unilateral decision to form a ruling ‘government’ in Gaza, the party has dominate the political challenged Fatah’s grip on power and its right to represent all Palestinians. scene in Palestine, other Although Fatah and Hamas dominate the Palestinian political scene, jointly parties do exist and are taking 93 % of the seats at the 2006 parliamentary elections, other parties trying to break through. do exist. In August 2016, five left-wing factions announced a unified list for
the coming local elections, aiming at presenting a valid alternative to the main two parties. This list, called the Democratic Alliance, includes the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Palestinian Democratic Union (FIDA), the Palestinian’s People Party (PPP) and the Palestinian National Initiative (PNI). These parties promotes a renewal of the political class, improved inclusion of women and youth and fight against corruption1.
Fatah held its long-awaited general congress (its seventh) from 2 Fatah’s recent general 29 November to 4 December 2016 . Fatah’s last general congress was in congress was the first to be 2009 and the party had been unable to hold a new congress due to severe held since 2009. internal tensions, including the open campaign against President Abbas launched by Mohammed Dahlan, the former Fatah strongman in Gaza, from his exile in Abu Dhabi. Dahlan and his supporters were excluded from the most recent conference3. Abbas’s show of force during the congress secured him the re-election as leader of the party and undermined any Mahmoud Abbas secured future challenges by Dahlan. Abbas loyalists now hold 19 of the 21 seats in re-election as the leader of the Fatah Central Committee, the top decision-making body of the party4. the party and his supporters won 19 of the 21 seats The very popular figure Marwan Barghouti, jailed in Israel, received the in the Fatah Central most votes and Fatah leaders are currently discussing whether he could be Committee. given the position of Vice President. Jibril Rajoub, who came second in the votes, could be chosen in place of Barghouti and would then be Fatah’s
1 Al Monitor: Hamas, Fatah no longer the only candidates in Palestinian elections, 5 August 2016. 2 Al Monitor: Hamas delegates find welcome at Fatah conference, but not trust, 7 December 2016. 3 Al Jazeera: Fatah: From liberation movement to West Bank government, 6 December 2016. 4 Reuters: Palestinian President Abbas gets boost in Fatah congress vote, 4 December 2016.
4 Palestine: the two-state solution under threat
candidate in any future Palestinian presidential election5. The head of the Palestinian intelligence service, Majif Faraj, and the Secretary General of the PLO, Saeb Erekat, are also influential figures who appear as potential successors of Mahmoud Abbas6. The delegates of the Seventh Fatah Congress, who represent the next generation of Palestinian leaders, were younger (relatively speaking) and more representative of the occupied territories than the current leadership7.
1.2 A government of national unity The Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007 created not only a territorial divide but also an institutional deadlock:
• The last presidential elections were held in 2005 and the last parliamentary elections were held in 2006. New elections were scheduled for 2009, but were disrupted due to the Fatah-Hamas conflict. No agreement has yet been reached on holding new The Hamas takeover of elections. Local elections, initially scheduled for late 2016 have also Gaza in 2007 created an been postponed. institutional deadlock. • President Mahmoud Abbas, elected in 2005, has largely overstayed his initial four-year term after agreeing in 2009 to continue in his role until the next election.
• The Palestinian Legislative Council, dominated by Hamas after its
2006 victory, ceased to function.
In April 2014, Fatah, Hamas and other Palestinian factions agreed to form a A Palestinian government government of 'national consensus' committed to the principles set out by of 'national consensus' was President Abbas in May 2011 (i.e. a two-state solution based on the established in 2014. Its goal 1967 borders, recognition of Israel’s legitimate right to exist, nonviolence was to reunite the West and respect for previous agreements). The government had two key aims: Bank and Gaza and (1) putting an end to seven years of political division between the Fatah- organise presidential and controlled West Bank and the Hamas-controlled Gaza, and (2) organising legislative elections. presidential and legislative elections.
However, renewed tensions between Fatah and Hamas in the aftermath of The 2014 war in Gaza and the 2014 war in Gaza prevented the Palestinian Authority (PA)'s return to renewed tensions between Gaza and the government of 'national consensus' collapsed in June 20158. Hamas and Fatah resulted in the collapse of the One of the main issues of tension between the Fatah-led PA and Hamas is government of ‘national the payment of Hamas-hired civil servants in Gaza, which the PA refuses to consensus’ in June 2015. pay as long as it does not regain control of Gaza institutions. Recently, new tensions arose over the organisation of local municipal elections, that have
5 Al Monitor: Will jailed Fatah leader become its new VP?, 15 December 2016. 6 Al Monitor: How Abbas could end up with three successors, 7 November 2016. 7 Al Monitor: Fatah congress to usher in new generation of Palestinian leaders, 24 November 2016. 8 Al Jazeera: Palestinian political crisis deepens with collapse of unity government, 19 June 2015.
5 Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
been successively postponed by the Palestinian Authority9. Set to be held early 2017, they are still a subject of tensions between the two parties10.
Despite tensions, Fatah and Nevertheless, the two parties met in Qatar in October 2016 to discuss plans Hamas recently announced to bring the two parties together in a new national unity government and 11 the creation of a new prepare for elections . An agreement was reach on 17 January 2017 national unity government. following further negotiations in Moscow and the parties have announced that they intend to form a new National Council and to hold elections for the Palestinian National Council. The participants hope such a step could help resolve the tensions within the Palestinian political establishment, but also resolve the conflict with Israel, depriving it of the argument of the absence of Palestinian representation. However, cracks have already started to form after the PA announced that municipal elections in the West Bank and Gaza will be held on 13 May 2017. Hamas opposed this announcement, saying it only served Fatah12. Although the negotiations were more inclusive than the ones held six years ago (involving a dozen of Palestinian groups, including Fatah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad13), many of the minority parties in Palestine feel that the constant confrontation between Fatah and Hamas prevents the renewal of the Palestinian political system14. The animosity between the two main parties has only served to undermine the capacity of Palestinian politics to move forward as well as the moral legitimacy of its institutions15.
Table 1: PLO PA Main features of PLO and PA Date of creation 1964 1993 Specificity Recognised as ‘the only Proto-Palestinian state legitimate representative established as a result of the of the Palestinian people’ Oslo Accords. (Arab Summit, 1974). Head Chairman: Mahmoud Abbas. President: Mahmoud Abbas. Elected by the PNC. Elected by Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Legislative Palestinian National Council Palestinian Legislative Council (PNC) = represents (PLC) = represents Palestinians Palestinians from the Diaspora from the Occupied Territories. as well as in the Occupied Dominated by Hamas in Gaza. Territories. Dominated by Ceased to function as the Fatah. legislature of the PA following the 2006 elections and the West Bank-Gaza split.
9 Middle East Eye: Palestinian elections postponed for up to four months, 4 October 2016. 10 Al Monitor: Does Abbas really want to hold local council elections?, 17 January 2017. 11 The New York Times: Rival Palestinian Leaders Agree to Agree, but Not on the Details, 27 October 2016. 12 Al Arabiya: Palestinians sets delayed local elections for May 13, 31 January 2017. 13 Palestine News Network: Palestinian factions announce deal to form National Unity Gov’t after talks in Moscow, 18 January 2017 14 Al Monitor: How Palestinian left hopes to renew political system, 26 January 2017. 15 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: PALESTINE IN FLUX From Search For State to Search For Tactics, January 2016.
6 Palestine: the two-state solution under threat
1.3 Palestine, statehood and the ICC Palestine was granted 'non state observer' status by the UN General Palestine was granted 'non Assembly in November 2012, triggering debates in EU Member States on state observer' status by the the recognition of Palestinian statehood, and also in the European UN General Assembly in Parliament, which voted in favour of an ‘in principle’ recognition of November 2012. Palestinian statehood in December 201416.
Palestine signed the Rome Palestine has signed more than 30 international conventions and treaties, Statute in December 2014 including the Rome Statute in December 2014, leading to its accession to and acceded to the the International Criminal Court in April 2015. International Criminal Court in April 2015. The European Parliament welcomed Palestine's ratification of the Rome Statute in its Resolution of 12 March 2015 on the Annual Report from the High Representative and also in its Resolution of 12 March 2015 on the EU’s priorities for the UN Human Rights Council.
The US was opposed to Palestine’s accession to the ICC is seen as a way for Palestine to circumvent Palestine’s accession to the the US veto it encounters when appealing to the UN Security Council. The ICC. US, which is the second biggest donor to the Palestinian Authority after the EU, was firmly opposed to Palestine’s accession to the ICC and threatened to cut off financial support if Palestine were to press claims against Israel at the ICC.
Following its accession, Palestine asked the ICC to accept a case looking at Palestine has asked the ICC any crimes committed from 13 June 2014 in any of the Palestinian to investigate any crimes Occupied Territories (East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza). This would committed from 13 June cover the period of the 2014 Gaza war. In January 2015, ICC chief 2014 in any of the prosecutor Fatou Bensouda opened a preliminary examination to Palestinian Occupied determine whether the court would pursue a formal investigation17. It is Territories. worth noting that Palestine would also be subject to any investigation launched. Israel opposes any ICC investigation.
The ICC visited Israel and the Palestinian territories in October 2016, but stressed that this was not linked to the ongoing probe into alleged war crimes during the 2014 war and the visit did not include any evidence- gathering18.
The Palestinians are also pushing for an investigation into Israel’s Palestine has submitted settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, especially in light of three further files to the ICC, UN Security Council Resolution 2334, which reaffirmed that the settlements covering settlements, the were illegal under international law. It has submitted three files for issue of Jerusalem and consideration by the ICC, covering settlements, the issue of Jerusalem and Palestinian prisoners in Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. The Palestinian Authority has urged the Israeli jails. ICC to speed up its ruling on these three files in light of Israel’s continued
plans to expand settlements and the ‘Legalisation Bill’ being discussed by
16 The European Parliament also supported Palestine’s bid to become a UN non-member observer as outlined in its resolution of 22 November 2012 on the situation in Gaza. 17 BBC: Will ICC membership help or hinder the Palestinians' cause?, 1 April 2015. 18 Al Jazeera: ICC delegation to visit Israel, Palestinian territories, 5 October 2016.
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the Israeli Knesset, which would retroactively legalise 4 000 settler homes built on Palestinian land19.
The ICC is continuing its The ICC released its annual report on 10 November 2016, including its probe into possible war preliminary findings of its probe into alleged crimes committed in Palestine. crimes in order to The prove appear to cover all the files submitted to the ICC by Palestine. determine whether to The report concluded that the ICC was ‘continuing to engage in a thorough proceed with an factual and legal assessment of the information available, in order to establish investigation. whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation’.
2 Middle East Peace Process
2.1 An uncertain future for the Peace Process After the failure of John Kerry's attempt in 2014 and ahead of the US presidential election, the EU and European permanent members of the UNSC have felt the need to fill the political vacuum.
In June 2016 France hosted On 3 June 2016, France hosted the Paris conference on Israeli-Palestinian a conference to try to revive peace, but neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians were invited to attend20. the flagging Middle East Federica Mogherini reiterated the EU's two priorities on the Middle East Peace Process – Israel and Peace Process (MEPP): revitalising the Middle East Quartet and engaging Palestine were not invited. with regional players, including Saudi Arabia (as the initiator of the Arab Peace Initiative), Jordan, Egypt and the Arab League21.
A report published by the In July 2016 the Quartet published a new report focusing on major threats Quartet in July with to achieving a negotiated peace and offering recommendations to advance recommendations to the two-state solution. It received mixed reviews with many feeling that it advance the two-state offered nothing new. At the Quartet meeting in September, the Egyptian solution was met with and French Ministers of Foreign Affairs provided an update on their efforts criticism. to support the MEPP. All representatives reiterated the need to continue
close cooperation and the coordination of all work undertaken to achieve
peace and a two-state solution.
A second French A new conference was hosted by France in Paris on 15 January 2017, conference was held in gathering diplomats from 70 countries. In the end, after the Israeli Prime January 2017 - again Minister called the conference ‘rigged’ and refused to participate, France without participation from opted not to invite either side22. The final declaration expressed alarmed at the Israelis and the the violence and settlement activity imperilling the two-state solution, and Palestinians. urged Israelis and Palestinians to return to negotiations. It welcomed
19 Middle East Monitor: PA requests ICC speed up investigation into Israeli settlements, 31 January 2017. 20 For further information, please read the dedicated European Parliament’s Policy Department for External Relations ‘At a Glance’ note ‘The French initiative for Middle East peace’, Benjamin REY, 23 June 2016. 21 The European Council conclusions of 20 July 2015 on the MEPP endorsed the idea of setting up an International support group to launch a renewed multilateral approach to the peace process. First steps in that direction were taken with the convening of 'enlarged' Quartet meetings including regional stakeholders. 22 Al Monitor: What's in store at Paris peace conference?, 3 January 2017.
8 Palestine: the two-state solution under threat
UN Security Council Resolution 2334 and insisted on the importance of the Arab Peace Initiative, which has regained visibility as geopolitics have de facto brought Israel and Sunni Arab states closer.
Although President Obama Critics argued that the closing communiqué was simply a rehash what has had allowed UNSC come before, with nothing new to offer. It was widely seen as a message Resolution 2334 on Israeli intended for the new US administration23. One month before President settlements to pass without Trump’s inauguration, the US took a historical step by not vetoing a US veto, President Trump UN Security Council Resolution 2334 that denounced Israeli settlements. appears to be taking things Israel strongly criticised the resolution24. President Trump’s policy on Israel in a different direction. and Palestine appears to show a marked departure from the approach
espoused by President Obama.
Following through on statements made before his inauguration, President President Trump has Trump has already initiated discussions to move the US embassy in Israel announced his intention to from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem25, a move which would endanger a two-state move the US Embassy in solution with Jerusalem as a capital of both states. President Trump’s choice Israel to Jerusalem, which of David Friedman, who has suggested Israel should annex the West Bank would put the two-state and has openly supported settlement expansions, as ambassador to Israel, solution at risk. He has 26 nominated a US has been welcomed by the Israeli far right . President Trump has also Ambassador to Israel and a nominated his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, as his new Middle East peace- Middle East peace-broker broker, despite the fact that the Kushner family runs a foundation that has who support settlements. strongly supported West Bank settlements27. Finally, President Trump has frozen a USD 221 million aid package to the Palestinian Authority that President Obama had approved right before leaving office. The aid package was intended to provide humanitarian aid and to support good governance28. President Trump’s position on settlements remains unclear, although Israel appears to believe he is pro-settlements. In the most recent statement from the White House, it would appear President Trump has warned Israel that the settlements ‘may not be helpful’ in achieving peace, whilst at the same time insisting that his Administration has no official position on settlements29. Although it is too early to categorically determine whether the new US administration has moved away from supporting the two-state solution, it seems likely that US and EU policies towards the Middle East Conflict are beginning to diverge. This will mean that the EU will need to play a more active leadership role in the region, in order to keep hopes of a two-state solution alive.
23 The Economist: An Israel-Palestine peace conference—without Israel or Palestine, 17 January 2017. 24 Times of Israel: Choosing not to veto, Obama lets anti-settlement resolution pass at UN Security Council, 23 December 2016. 25 The Independent: Donald Trump in ‘beginning stages’ of discussing plan to relocate US Israeli embassy to Jerusalem, White House confirms, 22 January 2017. 26 The New York Times: Trump Chooses Hard-Liner as Ambassador to Israel, 15 December 2016. 27 The Washington Post: Jared Kushner’s family foundation donated to West Bank settlements, 5 December 2016. 28 The Independent: Donald Trump 'freezes Barack Obama's last minute $221m aid package to Palestinian Authority', 26 January 2017. 29 The Washington Post: Trump warns Israel that new settlements ‘may not help’ achieve Middle East peace, 2 February 2017.
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Israeli and Palestinian positions on the Peace Process
The Israeli government The Israeli government argues that it does not need an international argues that it does not need framework for negotiations and claims that it is ready to talk to Palestinians an international framework without preconditions, but it blames the Palestinians for being neither for negotiations. willing nor able to negotiate. It regularly accuses the Palestinian Authority of seeking to 'de-legitimise' Israel on the international arena, including by Israel opposes the promoting the BDS campaign ('boycott, divestment, sanctions'). It also Palestinian campaign for vigorously opposes the Palestinians' international campaign for recognition recognition of statehood. of statehood and accession to multilateral organisations, arguing that it
constitutes a unilateral step bypassing bilateral negotiations. The Palestinians refuse to According to Palestinians, negotiating while the Israeli government negotiate while Israel continues to expand illegal settlements in the West Bank does not make continues to expand illegal sense. President Abbas described these policies as a violation of the Oslo settlements in the West Accords and warned that Palestinians may no longer consider themselves Bank. bound by these agreements, should these policies continue30.
2.2 The EU and EP positions on the Middle East Peace Process The EU position
The EU supports a two-state solution with an independent, democratic,
The EU is a strong supporter viable and contiguous Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace and of a two-state solution to security with Israel. An EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace the Israeli-Palestinian Process, Fernando Gentilini, was appointed in April 2015. The EU is a conflict. member of the Middle East Quartet (with the UN, the US and Russia), which launched the 'Roadmap for Peace' in 2002. The EU is often said to be 'a payer, not a player' in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The EU is Israel's first trading partner and it has been the The EU is said to be 'a payer, largest donor to Palestinian state building following the Oslo accords (see not a player' in the Israeli- Section 3). On the political front, however, most major initiatives have come Palestinian peace process. from the United States. The EU has lent its support to the various efforts towards peace negotiations by the United States, regional actors such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia (the Arab Peace Initiative), and, more recently, the French. The Council has outlined The Council has adopted six sets of conclusions on the Middle East Peace what should be the Process since 201431. Although discussions on the Middle East Peace parameters of a negotiated Process are regularly on the agenda of the Foreign Affairs Council, there solution. appear to be no plans for any new Conclusions as there has been no
changes in position since UN Security Council Resolution 2334. A few Both Israel and Palestine have been offered 'special Conclusions worth highlighting include the Conclusions of July 2014, which privileged partnerships' outlined the EU’s proposed parameters for the re-launch of peace with the EU if a peace negotiations and the Conclusions of December 2013, which outlined agreement is reached. proposals for Special Privileged Partnerships for both parties if they manage to negotiate a peace agreement.
30 Times of Israel: Full text of Abbas’s 2015 address to the UN General Assembly, 30 September 2015. 31 Council conclusions on the Middle East Peace process: 20 June 2016, 18 January 2016, 20 July 2015, 17 November 2014, 22 July 2014, 12 May 2014.
10 Palestine: the two-state solution under threat
The EP position
The European Parliament has consistently expressed support for a The European Parliament has consistently called on two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as the European Union and its capital of both states and with a secure State of Israel and an independent, Member States to play a democratic, contiguous and viable Palestinian State living side by side in more active political role in peace and security. While supporting the parameters of a negotiated Israeli-Palestinian peace solution as outlined by the Council, it has repeatedly urged the EU and its talks. Member States to play a more active political role.
The European Parliament reiterated this position in its resolution on the
EU’s role in the Middle East Peace Process of 10 September 2015. The In its last resolution on the Middle East Peace Process resolution stresses that preserving the viability of the two-state solution in September 2015, the EP should be an 'immediate priority', and underlines that the structured called for a report on the dialogue with Israel on the situation in the West Bank should cover the destruction of, and issue of settlements. The EP supports the establishment of an international damaged caused to, support group as part of a renewed multilateral approach, underlining the EU-funded structures and importance of the conflict's regional context. The EP welcomes the EU's projects in the occupied commitment to ensuring that all agreements with Israel do not apply to Palestinian Territory. occupied territories 'in the spirit of differentiation between Israel and its activities in the occupied Palestinian territory'. Other recent resolutions support this position, including the recommendation to the Council of 7 July 2016 on the 71st session of the United Nations General Assembly and the resolution of 9 July 2015 on the security challenges in the Middle East and North Africa and prospects for political stability.
3 EU cooperation and aid to Palestinians
3.1 EU-Palestine relations EU-Palestine relations are based on the 1997 Interim Association The EU and the PLO signed Agreement on trade and cooperation between the EU and the Palestinian an Interim Association Liberation Organisation (PLO) on behalf of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Agreement on trade and covering duty-free access to EU markets for Palestinian industrial goods, cooperation in 1997. and a phase-out of tariffs on EU exports to Palestine over five years. The difficult nature of relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority makes it hard for Palestine to achieve greater economic integration with their neighbours or the EU. A first ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’ (ENP) Action Plan, setting up the agenda for economic and political cooperation, was approved in 2005, before a second one in 2013. Under the Action Plan, the EU supports the Palestinian Authority in building up the institutions of a future democratic, independent and viable Palestinian State living side by side with Israel and its neighbours.
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3.2 EU aid to Palestine The EU is the biggest donor of financial assistance to the Palestinians, The EU is the biggest donor including aid to the Palestinian Authority and to Palestine refugees through of financial assistance to the UNRWA32. It also channels support through the European Commission’s Palestinians. DG ECHO, the European Commission’s humanitarian aid department, and
the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In
July 2014, the EU adopted a Roadmap for the EU's Better Engagement with
33 Palestinian Civil Society . In line with the Palestinian National Development Plan 2014-2016 targeted Financial assistance in the priority sectors of EU cooperation have been: period 2014-2016 has focused on institution (i) support to governance at local and national levels; building, economic (ii) support to private sector and economic development; development, and water and land development. (iii) support to water and land development.
In 2016, EU funding through the European Neighbourhood Instrument
In 2016, the EU funding (ENI) amounted EUR 291.1 million: through the European • The bulk of it (EUR 170.5 million) was channelled through the Neighbourhood Instrument PEGASE Direct Financial Support. (ENI) amounted EUR 291.1 million – • EUR 82 million have been allocated to UNRWA in support of allocated to PEGASE, Palestinian refugees. The funding is used to cover UNRWA's crucial UNWRA, governance core programmes in the areas of health, education, social services – support, economic including salaries for teachers, doctors and social workers active in development and support refugee camps – and infrastructure/camp improvements. to East Jerusalem. • The remaining amount of EUR 38.6 million has been allocated to support to governance (EUR 8.1 million); support for economic enablers (EUR 20 million); and support to East Jerusalem (EUR 10.5 million).
Palestine also benefits from Palestine is also eligible for funding under several of the EU’s thematic funding under several of programmes34: the EU’s thematic • The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR programmes. – EUR 1.5 million annually); • The EU Peacebuilding Initiative (formerly EU Partnership for Peace Programme – EUR 5 million). Its overall objective is to facilitate the peace process by supporting a solid foundation at civil society level for a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East35; • The Non-state Actors and Local Authorities thematic programme; • The Food Security programme;
32 Fact sheet: EC support to UNRWA. 33 EEAS: West Bank and Gaza Strip, UNRWA and the EU, 16 May 2016. 34 EEAS: Projects in East Jerusalem, Area C, Gaza and UNRWA, 16 May 2016. 35 European Commission DG NEAR: Palestine.
12 Palestine: the two-state solution under threat
• The East Jerusalem Programme (EUR 10 million) – covers areas from education to health to private sector development. The programme also supports local organisations working with Palestinian communities in Jerusalem; • The Area C Programme. In the last three years, the EU committed around EUR 20 million to support the Palestinian socio-economic development in Area C. While around EUR 23 million were provided for humanitarian assistance through the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (ECHO); • The Culture Programme.
PEGASE36
The EU has contributed Through PEGASE Direct Financial Support (DFS), the EU has contributed EUR 1.9 billion to the substantially to the recurrent expenditure of the Palestinian Authority (PA) Palestinian Authority (PA) national budget (around EUR 1.9 billion since 2008). Three categories of national budget since 2008 public expenditure are supported through the PEGASE DFS mechanism through PEGASE. with a total budget of EUR 170.5 million in 2016: • Supporting Palestinian administration and services (EUR 115 million) – PEGASE DFS ‘Civil Servants and Pensioners’ (CSP) programme; • Supporting the Palestinian social protection system (EUR 40 million) – PEGASE DFS ‘Vulnerable Palestinian Families’ (VPF) programme; • Support to East Jerusalem Hospitals (indicative allocation: EUR 13 million) – PEGASE DFS ‘East Jerusalem hospitals’ (EJH) programme. The final EUR 2.5 million covers audit, verification, monitoring and visibility of PEGASE DFS programmes. Around 40 % of the PEGASE funding is allocated to the Gaza Strip. Coupled to PEGASE DFS, the EU has been supporting the PA to implement certain policy reforms aiming at enhancing its fiscal sustainability and improving the accountability, integrity, and transparency of its public finance system (public finance management, revenue mobilisation and fiscal reforms such as reduction of the net lending, health medical referrals), supporting its civil service reform, as well as improving service delivery (social protection). In December 2013, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) published a report on PEGASE DFS where it recognised that the European External Action Service and the Commission had succeeded in implementing direct financial support to the PA in difficult circumstances.
36 See Commission Implementing Decision of 29 February 2016 on the Annual Action Programme 2016 part 1 in favour of Palestine to be financed from the general budget of the European Union.
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Within the context of the new National Policy Agenda (NPA) 2017-2022, Going forward, the European development partners (the EU, its Member States, and Norway European Joint Strategy and Switzerland as like-minded countries) have come together to develop 2017-2020 aims to improve the first-ever European Joint Strategy 2017-2020, which is aimed at aligning the effectiveness of and synchronising with the NPA in order to improve the effectiveness of European programming for European programming for Palestine. They have agreed to focus their Palestine by focusing on five core Pillars. development financing and technical support on five core Pillars in the coming four years: (i) Governance Reform, Fiscal Consolidation and Policy (Macroeconomic and Public Finance Management, Public Administration and Local Governance); (ii) Rule of Law, Justice, Citizen Safety and Human Rights (Justice, Safety and Human Rights legislation); (iii) Sustainable Service Delivery (Education, Health and Social Protection); (iv) Access to Self-Sufficient Water and Energy Services (Infrastructure focus); and (v) Sustainable Economic Development (Agriculture and Private Sector). This new European Joint Strategy 2017-2020 will be replacing the Single Support Framework that ends in December 2016 and will be used as a strategic reference document by all European development partners.
4 Disputed territory
4.1 Israel, Palestine and the 1967 borders The State of Israel was created in 1948 following the 1947 UN Partition Plan The ‘Green Line’ was drawn that put an end to the British mandate in Palestine. The plan, that divided up on the basis of the the land between a Jewish State and an Arab State while keeping Jerusalem borders agreed during the under international administration, triggered the first Arab-Israeli war in 1949 armistice following 1948-1949. The hostilities resulted in the displacement of around 750 000 the first Arab-Israeli war. Palestinians. After the first Arab-Israeli war, new borders were drawn up based on the 1949 armistice line, more commonly known as the ‘Green
Line’.
On 5 June 1967, the Six Day War broke out. By the time a cease-fire was Following the Six Day War negotiated, Israel had managed to take the Egyptian Sinai, the Gaza Strip, in 1967, the UN Security the West Bank including East Jerusalem and parts of the Syrian Golan Council passed Resolution Heights. The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242 242, which is the legal basis following this ceasefire. The resolution outlined the conditions for a for the ‘1967 line’ in peaceful settlement in the Middle East, which crucially included the subsequent UN Resolutions. withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the territories captured during the Six Day War. The other conditions included the political independence and territorial inviolability of every State in the region. The resolution also called
for ‘achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem’. UN Security
Council Resolution 242 is the legal basis for the references to the ‘1967
14 Palestine: the two-state solution under threat
borders’ found in later UN Security Council resolutions and in European Council Conclusions and European Parliament Resolutions.
Israel unilaterally annexed East Jerusalem37 in 1967, following the Six Day Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967 is not War. This annexation has never been recognised by the international 38 recognised by the community and contravenes international law . The international international community and community considers East Jerusalem an integral part of the occupied violates international law. Palestinian territory, where the Fourth Geneva Convention and its provisions on the obligations of occupying powers therefore apply. Israel's The EU will not recognise decision to make Jerusalem its 'complete and united' capital, enshrined in any change to the pre-1967 the 1980 Basic Law, is not recognised internationally either. borders other than those The EU's position is based on international law: it has consistently made agreed by the parties. It clear that it will not recognise changes to the pre-1967 borders other than supports a negotiated those agreed by the parties. The EU advocates the 'fulfilment of aspirations solution to the status of of both parties for Jerusalem' and a negotiated solution to the status of Jerusalem as the future 39 capital of two states. Jerusalem as the future capital of both states . In 2002 Israel started working on a separation barrier around the West Bank. 85 % of the Israeli To date, around 65 % of the planned 710 km of barrier have been separation barrier around completed, with at least 85 % of it being built inside the West Bank the West Bank fails to (1967 borders). The barrier effectively cuts off East Jerusalem from the West respect the 1967 borders. Bank40. The EU considers the The EU considers the separation barrier – where built on occupied land – separation barrier – where illegal under international law. EU Member States voted in favour of the UN built on occupied land – General Assembly's 2004 resolution endorsing the International Court of illegal. Justice's advisory opinion, which concluded that 'the construction of the wall and its associated regime create a ‘fait accompli’ on the ground that could well become permanent'.
4.2 Residency, access and movement Although Palestinians living in East Jerusalem were offered citizenship Of the Palestinians living in following the annexation of the city in 1967, few Palestinians chose what East Jerusalem, only 5 % was perceived to be a tacit acceptance of Israel’s claim to Jerusalem (only have Israeli citizenship. The around 5 % of the Palestinians living in East Jerusalem currently have Israeli rest has 'permanent citizenship41), opting instead for a status of 'permanent residents'. resident' status. Permanent residents in East Jerusalem are issued with blue ID cards, which means they can live and work anywhere in Israel; they are subject to Israel's tax system and are entitled to social benefits. However, they do not have an Permanent residency can Israeli passport (they are not citizens) and they cannot vote in national be revoked and comes with Israeli elections. While they can vote in Jerusalem municipal elections, many constraints. Family Palestinians choose not to as a form of boycott. 'Permanent' residency can reunification often proves
37 'East Jerusalem' refers to the part of the city located at the East of the 1949 demarcation lines ('green line'). 38 See UN Security Council Resolutions 252, 267, 471, 476 and 478. 39 See Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process of 22 July 2014. 40 UN OCHA: West Bank Barrier. 41 The Jerusalem Post: East Jerusalem’s identity crisis, 10 April 2012.
15 Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
difficult, and resident status be revoked by Israeli authorities. At least 14 000 Palestinians have had their is not automatically Jerusalem residency revoked by the Israeli authorities since 196742. transmitted to children. Authorities rarely grant re-unification requests when a Jerusalemite marries a non-Jerusalemite Palestinian, often forcing the couple to move outside of
Jerusalem. Even if they are granted a re-unification request, there is no
automatic right of residence for their children. As a result there are an
estimated 10 000 unregistered Palestinian children living in East 43 Jerusalem . Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza receive green ID cards and they Palestinians from the West need special permits to enter, work or live in Israel, including East Jerusalem Bank and Gaza who are not (and can only do so through a limited number of checkpoints in the permanent residents need 44 to obtain a permit from separation barrier) . These access permits are subject to numerous Israeli authorities to access conditions and restrictions, although they are often eased around the East Jerusalem. Muslim holidays. Many Palestinians find themselves cut off from their places of work or from their families because they cannot obtain the necessary permits to travel. Access in and out of the Gaza Strip is also severely restricted45.
4.3 Settlement expansions, house demolitions and evictions More than 850 000 people live in the municipality of Jerusalem46. Among them, around 300 000 Palestinians currently reside in East Jerusalem The construction of Israeli alongside some 200 000 Israeli settlers47. The construction of Israeli settlements in the West settlements has intensified in the past years in spite of broad international Bank, including East criticism. Settlement expansion plans have particularly increased since the Jerusalem, has intensified in election of US President Donald Trump, who is seen by Israel as being recent years and more so since the election of US pro-settlements (see Section 2.1). Some Israeli hard-liners have even President Donald Trump. proposed a bill that states that Israel should push ahead with a full-scale annexation of Ma’ale Adumim, a city on the outskirts of East Jerusalem48. Israel has not annexed any land since 1967. The Israeli Prime Minister recently announced 100 new building units in Ma’ale Adumim, after an eight-year surcease49.
A particularly contentious project is the E-1 settlement plan, which would connect Ma'ale Adumim to Jerusalem and reduce the narrow corridor that
42 UN OCHA: East Jerusalem: Key Humanitarian Concerns, August 2014 43 UNCTAD: The Palestinian economy in East Jerusalem: Enduring annexation, isolation and disintegration, 2013. 44 UN OCHA: The Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank Barrier on Palestinian Communities: East Jerusalem, April 2007. 45 Human Rights Watch: Israel: End Restrictions on Palestinian Residency, 5 February 2012. 46 Israel Central Bureau of Statistics: Population by Group, Religion, Age, Sex and Type of Locality, 2015. 47 As of 2013 there were more than 540 000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank representing around 4 % of the electorate. See Times of Israel: A look at Israeli settlers, by the numbers, 18 August 2013. 48 Middle East Monitor: Israeli bill to annex Ma’ale Adumim settlement includes ‘E1’ area, 17 January 2017. 49 The New York Times: Israel’s Hard-Liners Want to ‘Go Big’: Annex a Settlement, 30 January 2017.
16 Palestine: the two-state solution under threat
links the north and the south of the West Bank. As noted in the European Council Conclusions of 10 December 2012, this would seriously undermine the viability of the two-state solution.
The Knesset is currently The Israeli Knesset is debating a bill which would retroactively legalise debating a ‘Legalisation Bill’ around 4 000 homes built in outposts on private Palestinian land without that would retroactively the approval of the Israeli government. The so-called ‘Legalisation Bill’ legalise houses built on passed its first reading in the Knesset in early December50 and it passed a private Palestinian land final committee vote on 30 January 201751. According to a Knesset press without government release, the Knesset plenum started the final debate on the bill on Tuesday approval. 31 January and the bill is scheduled to face its final vote on Monday 6
February.
The proposed law is highly controversial and has been denounced by the international community. The EEAS released a statement reiterating that the bill, if passed, would be a violation of Israeli and international law and a threat to the two-state solution. The day before the first Knesset vote in
December, then-US Secretary of State John Kerry called on Israel to stop the
construction of settlements in the West Bank and the UN high
Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein warned the bill 52 would violate international law . Many new settlements are Since the beginning of 2017, Israel has announced plans for several new planned, including in the settlements. These include plans for over 5 500 homes in the West Bank – West Bank, which hasn’t the first government-approved settlements in the West Bank since the happened since the 1990s. 1990s – as well as 560 new homes in East Jerusalem53. A spokesperson for the French Foreign Ministry condemned the announcements, saying that Israel had announced twice as many new settlement homes in a week as it did in the whole of 201654. Settlements violate international law, in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention, which outlaws the transfer of a country's population into occupied territory.
50 The Guardian: Israel votes to authorise illegal settler homes in Palestine, 5 December 2016. 51 Middle East Monitor: Israeli committee approves outpost ‘Legalisation bill’, 31 January 2017. 52 The Independent: UN criticises Israel settlement law that would legalise 4,000 West Bank homes, 8 December 2016. 53 Reuters: Israel to build first new West Bank settlement since 1990s, 1 February 2017. 54 The Jerusalem Post: Netanyahu announces plans for first new West Bank settlement in 25 years, 2 February 2017.
17 Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
Illustration 1: Map of Jerusalem and its surroundings
Source: BBC News, 22 October 2015
35 % of East Jerusalem has been appropriated for Israeli settlements and While 35 % of East more than half of the municipality area is unavailable for development55. Jerusalem is appropriated For Palestinians, construction is possible in the remaining 13 %, but for Israeli settlements, planning rules make permits hard to obtain. More than one third of planning rules expose many Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem do not have Israeli building permits, Palestinian homes to the thus exposing them to demolition56. risk of demolition. According to UN OCHA, 2016 saw the highest number of demolitions in any 2016 saw the highest entire year since it started its records. It reported that Israeli authorities had number of demolitions of demolished or seized 1 089 Palestinian-owned buildings in the West Bank Palestinian structures since and East Jerusalem, causing 1 593 people to be displaced. UN OCHA started its records in 2009. Another issue facing Palestinians in East Jerusalem is disputed ownership, often resulting in forced evictions. According to UN OCHA, at least At least 180 Palestinian 180 Palestinian households in East Jerusalem are threatened with eviction. households in East This represents 818 people, including 372 children. ‘Most of these cases were Jerusalem are threatened initiated by Israeli settler organizations on the basis of ownership claims, as with eviction as a result of well as claims that the residents are no longer ‘protected tenants’. Settler court cases initiated by organisations have increased efforts in recent years to purchase or settler organisations. otherwise acquire land in the ‘Holy Basin’ in of the Old City of East Jerusalem. This has had severe consequences for Palestinians living in the area, including restrictions on access to public space and general restrictions on their freedom of movement – in addition to the forced evictions.
55 Michael Dumper, 'Jerusalem,' in David Newman, Joel Peters, (eds.) Routledge Handbook on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Routledge 2013, p. 127. 56 The Association for Civil Rights in Israel: Planning and Building Rights.
18 Palestine: the two-state solution under threat
4.4 Settlements, demolitions and the EU
4.4.1 The demolition of EU-funded structures
The Israeli policy of denying construction permits in the Occupied Territories and subsequently demolishing any structures without a permit, also affects humanitarian and other structures funded by international donors including the EU. According to UN OCHA, over a third of all demolitions in September and October 2016 concerned structures that had
been supplied as humanitarian assistance, funded by international donors
or by the State of Palestine’.
In its most recent resolution on the EU’s role in the Middle East Peace Process of 10 September 2015, the European Parliament called on the EEAS The European Parliament is and the Commission 'to report back to Parliament on the destruction of, and concerned about the damage caused to, EU-funded structures and projects in the occupied continued demolition of Palestinian Territory'. EU-funded projects in the Occupied Territories. MEP Jean Arthuis (ALDE, France), Chair of the EP Committee on Budgets, travelled to Israel, the West Bank and Gaza in July. He raised the issue of the demolition of EU-funded structures during a meeting with Major General Mordechai, Coordinator of the Israeli Government’s Activities in the (Palestinian) Territories (COGAT). The Major General hinted during the discussion of a possible policy change with regards to urban planning in Area C. He implied that the Civil Administration had previously been ordered not to issue any new permits within Area C and that this may change under the direction of the new Defence Minister, Avigdor Lieberman. Reports have surfaced that the Israeli Security Cabinet in September 2016 secretly approved a number of zoning plans and construction permits for Palestinians in Area C. The plan of which permits to approve was put forward by COGAT Major General Mordechai and is thought to be part of Avigdor Lieberman’s ‘carrot and stick’ approach to the Palestinians (Lieberman has previously offered build an airport in Gaza in exchange for Hamas laying down arms). This approach is vehemently opposed by pro-settler factions, who do not want to cede an inch to the Palestinians. This would explain why the decision on the permits was kept secret57.
4.4.2 EU policy on Israeli settlements
The EU has repeatedly Repeated Council conclusions (May 2014, July 2014, November 2014, July warned that illegal 2015, January 2016) have warned that land expropriations and the settlements threaten the continued expansion of settlements directly threatened the two-state viability of the two-state solution as well as the possibility of Jerusalem serving as a future capital of solution and the possibility both states. The EU has urged Israel to put an end to its settlement policy, that Jerusalem serves as the to settler violence, to the worsening of living conditions for Palestinians in future capital of both states. Area C, to demolitions – including of EU funded projects –, evictions and
57 Al Monitor: How Netanyahu is keeping secret his move to help Palestinians, 31 October 2016.
19 Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
forced transfers, and to increasing tensions and challenges to the status quo on the Temple Mount / Haram al-Sharif. The EEAS has released numerous statements condemning Israel’s settlement expansion policy. In the latest statement, the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini stressed that the EU is ‘strongly opposed to this policy and deeply regrets that Israel is proceeding with this, despite the continuous serious international concern and objections, which have been constantly raised at all levels’. She also stated that ‘continued settlement expansion, illegal under international law as reaffirmed by UN Security Council Resolution 2334, goes directly against long-standing EU policy and the recommendations of the Quartet Report. A negotiated two-state solution is the only way to fulfil the legitimate aspirations of both parties and to achieve enduring peace’.
4.4.3 Labelling of settlement products
In response to a continuous In the past few years, the EU has undertaken to clarify the 'territorial scope' expansion of settlements of the EU-Israel partnership in order to ensure that EU legislation and and to legal considerations, bilateral agreements with Israel are not applied beyond the 1967 lines. the EU has sought to clarify the 'territorial scope' of the An 'interpretative notice' on the indication of origin of settlement products EU-Israel partnership. was published by the Commission on 11 November 2015. The notice, which does not create any new rule, aims to clarify existing EU legislation on An EU 'interpretative notice' origin information of products from Israeli-occupied territories, and to on the labelling of ensure the respect of Union positions and commitments in conformity with settlement products was international law on the non-recognition by the Union of Israel’s published on 11 November sovereignty over the territories occupied since June 1967. The EP 2015. encouraged the publication of such guidelines in its Resolution of 10 September 2015.
This policy stems from an EU legal obligation to ensure that bilateral The EU has taken steps to agreements with Israel do not apply in occupied territories, where Israeli ensure that EU legislation sovereignty is not recognised. Differentiation already applies to commercial and bilateral agreements goods from the occupied territories which, in accordance with the EU Court with Israel do not apply of Justice's 2010 'Brita ruling', cannot benefit from preferential trade beyond the 1967 lines. treatment. In addition, in July 2013, a new set of guidelines on EU funding established the ineligibility of Israeli entities and their activities in the
territories occupied by Israel since June 1967 for grants, prizes and financial
instruments funded by the EU.
Disagreements over the interpretive notice and the guidelines on EU Israel condemned the funding, and the consequences of Israel's settlement policy have caused interpretative notice and friction between Israel and the EU. Israel summoned the EU’s Ambassador summoned the EU to Israel Lars Faaborg-Andersen to explain the decision by the European Ambassador to Israel. Commission on labelling58. A number of Israeli politicians have accused the EU of supporting calls for a boycott of the country and a direct consequence was the postponement of the negotiation of a new and upgraded Joint Action Plan.
58 The Jerusalem Post: Israel: EU decision to label settlement products may harm ties with Brussels, 11 November 2015.
20 Palestine: the two-state solution under threat
5 The situation in Gaza
5.1 Life under blockade The Gaza Strip faces specific challenges. Geographically separated from the West Bank, the enclave of 1.9 million inhabitants has been under an Israeli The 1.9 million inhabitants and Egyptian blockade since 2007, following Hamas’ takeover of Gaza59. of Gaza have been living Israel considers that the blockade is necessary to protect itself against under a blockade since rocket attacks. While Israel requires special permits to let Gazans circulate in 2007 following the Hamas the West Bank, Egypt closed its only border-crossing with Gaza – the Rafah takeover of Gaza. crossing – in October 2014. In August 2013, the UN Secretary general declared that the blockade contravenes international humanitarian law. For Gaza, freedom of movement and trade are extremely limited. About a The economic and third of applications for exit permits for medical treatments outside Gaza in humanitarian situation in 2016 were rejected or delayed. Israeli authorities prevent the entry of all Gaza is extremely challenging as a result of goods that are considered as having a ‘dual’ military-civilian use – these the blockade. ‘dual-use’ goods include many of the materials needed for reconstruction. 60 61 Gaza suffers from a chronic deficit of electricity and drinking water . In January 2016, thousands of people protested against the electricity crisis62. Fishermen are allowed to access less than a third of the fishing areas allocated to the Palestinians under the Oslo Accords63. Constant restrictions make the humanitarian and economic situation in Gaza extremely difficult.
Nevertheless, there have been some recent improvements. In 2016, the There have been some Israel eased restrictions on the export of goods to markets into the West recent improvements, Bank – it allowed a significant increase in agricultural exports from Gaza, including the easing of with revenues increasing almost 80 % compared to 201564. Moreover, Israeli Israeli restrictions on the Defence Minister Avigdor Liberman is reportedly considering allowing export of goods to the West Gazans to once again work in Israel, particularly in the agricultural industry Bank. 65 – a move motivated by the need for cheap labour in Southern Israel . In December 2016, the UN launched the 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan The UN has launched its (HRP), which seeks to raise USD 547 million in donor funding to support the 2017 Humanitarian humanitarian needs of 1.7 million Palestinians. 68 % of these funds are for Response Plan seeking to project in the Gaza Strip, which shows the dire humanitarian situation in raise USD 547 million, 68 % 66 of which will go to Gaza. the enclave .
59 UN OCHA: The Gaza Strip: The Humanitarian Impact of the Blockade, 14 November 2016. 60 Al Monitor: Will Gaza's electricity crisis escalate Hamas-Israel tension?, 18 January 2017. 61 The World Bank: Water Situation Alarming in Gaza, 22 November 2016. 62 Newsweek: 10,000 Gazans Defy Hamas In Rare Protest Against Electricity Shortages, 13 January 2017. 63 UN OCHA: The Gaza Strip: The Humanitarian Impact of the Blockade, 14 November 2016. 64 UN OCHA: Significant increase in agricultural exports/transfers from Gaza during 2016, 11 January 2017. 65 Al Monitor: How did Gaza’s economic elite become day laborers in Israel?, 6 January 2017. 66 UN OCHA: 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview and Response Plan Dashboard, 19 December 2016.
21 Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
Illustration 2: Map of the Gaza Strip
Source: The Economist, 21 July 2014
5.2 The 2014 war and the reconstruction of Gaza The situation in Gaza was made worse by the July-August 2014 war. The war had a high human cost – over 2 100 Palestinians and 71 Israelis were killed67 – and exacerbated an already acute humanitarian crisis. Over 9 000 homes in Gaza were destroyed and much of the major infrastructure was destroyed or damaged, while nearly 500 000 people were displaced at the
peak of the conflict. Around 75 000 of these remain displaced two and a The 2014 war in Gaza half years later68. Gaza's economy, already hit hard by years of land, sea and exacerbated an already acute humanitarian crisis. air blockade, was further damaged by the war. In total 1.3 million out of Gaza's population of 1.8 million (who live in an area of 360 km²) are currently in need of humanitarian support. Over 70 % of the population receives international aid, most of it in the form of food assistance. According to the World Bank, unemployment in Gaza is the highest in the world at 42 % and youth unemployment has reached 60 %69.
The cost of rebuilding Gaza following the 2014 war was estimated at Pledges made at the USD 7.8 billion70. While USD 5.4 billion were pledged at the October 2014 October 2014 donors' 71 conference have been slow international donors conference , the money has been 'slow to manifest' to manifest. according to UNRWA, the UN agency for Palestinian refugees. The EU pledged more than EUR 450 million.
67 The Washington Post: The U.N. says 7 in 10 Palestinians killed in Gaza were civilians. Israel disagrees., 29 August 2014. 68 UNWRA: Gaza Emergency. 69 UN OCHA: The Gaza Strip: The Humanitarian Impact of the Blockade, 14 November 2016. 70 The Telegraph: Gaza rebuilding 'will cost $7.8 billion', 4 September 2014. 71 The New York Times: Conference Pledges $5.4 Billion to Rebuild Gaza Strip, 12 October 2014.
22 Palestine: the two-state solution under threat
Restrictions on the The reconstruction of Gaza after the 2014 war has stalled, partly because of importing of construction a slowdown in the distribution of aid money pledged by donor countries materials have contributed during the October 2014 Cairo Conference. Moreover, restrictions at border to slowing the pace of crossings make the importing of construction materials (classified by Israel reconstruction. as ‘dual-use’ goods) into Gaza very difficult.
5.3 Intra-Palestinian reconciliation and negotiating with Hamas The situation in Gaza is further complicated by the political rivalries that divide Palestinian politics between Hamas and Fatah. As mentioned in Section 1, one of the concrete outcomes of the fallout between Hamas and Fatah has been the non-payment of salaries of Hamas-hired civil servants in
Gaza. The Palestinian Authority (run by Fatah) refuses to pay the salaries as
long as it does not have control over Gaza institutions. Civil servants are A reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas could paid a small ‘advance payment’ on their salary and often go months unfreeze the salaries of without full pay. International donors have stepping in from time to time to thousands of civil servants assist. In July 2016 for example, Qatar agreed to pay the salaries of 50,000 in Gaza, which would be a civil servants in Gaza72. great benefit for the local The recent announcement of a new national unity government (see economy. Section 1) could be a boon for the beleaguered Palestinian economy. If government salaries are paid, it will provide a much-needed cash injection. A unity government could also offer advantages in terms of international support.
Countries that have been reluctant to negotiate with Hamas, may be more
willing to deal with a unity government. The EU will in principle be open to Countries that have been reluctant to negotiate with dealing with a unity government that includes Hamas, as long as three Hamas, may be more conditions are met. As outlined in the May 2011 Council Conclusions on the willing to deal with a unity Middle East Peace Process, the EU engagement with any unity government government. is conditional upon the terms for intra-Palestinian reconciliation outlined by President Abbas in his speech in Cairo in May 2011. The parties to the unity government must ‘uphold the principle of non-violence, and remain committed to achieving a two-state solution and to a negotiated peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict accepting previous agreements and obligations, including Israel’s legitimate right to exist’.
5.4 The EU and EP positions on Gaza Position of the EU
The general position of the EU is summed up in the Council Conclusions on The EU has stated that the the Middle East Peace Process (see Section 2). A specific Council Conclusion situation in the Gaza Strip is on the Middle East (Gaza) was issued on 15 August 2014, stating that ‘the unsustainable. situation in the Gaza Strip has been unsustainable for many years and a return to the status quo prior to the latest conflict is not an option’.
72 Al Monitor: Gazans rejoice as Qatar vows to pay one month of full salaries, 29 July 2016.
23 Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
Position of the EP
The European Parliament MEP Jean Arthuis (ALDE, France), Chair of the EP Committee on Budgets, has urged the EU to travelled to Israel, the West Bank and Gaza in July 2016. Five main participate effectively in the challenges stood out during the visit as stumbling blocks to improve the urgent humanitarian aid humanitarian and socio-economic situation in Gaza: access and mobility of effort and in the Gazans; chronic electricity deficits; water and treatment of sewage; the reconstruction of Gaza. limitations on imports caused by the list of dual-use goods; and the lack of political responsibility for the dire humanitarian situation. In its Resolution of 18 September 2014 on Israel and Palestine after the Gaza war, the European Parliament urged ‘the EU to participate effectively in the urgent humanitarian aid effort and in the reconstruction of Gaza’, stressing that the existing humanitarian and economic situation in Gaza was unsustainable. A few months earlier the Parliament had issued a Resolution calling for a ceasefire to the then Gaza-war.
6 Human rights
6.1 Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank About a quarter of the 775 000 Palestinian refugees registered in the West Almost 200 000 refugees in Bank live in camps73. In Gaza, over half a million people live in UNWRA-run the West Bank and 1.3 refugee camps and 1.3 of the 1.9 million people living in the Gaza Strip are million refugees in the Gaza refugees74. Strip live in refugee camps. Tensions between refugees in the West Bank camps and the Palestinian Authority’s secret services have escalated since mid-October 2016. The Some camps experienced camps the most subject to these clashes are Balata, Jenin and al-Amari. clashes as a result of Some clashes were linked to the Fatah Congress at the end of 2016, the intra-Palestinian rivalries, increasing violence reflecting the intense rivalry between Abbas and particularly in the lead up to Dahlan75. UN envoy Nikolay Mladenov expressed grave concerns for the the Fatah Congress. explosive situation in West bank refugee camps in November 201676.
6.2 The detention of children Over the last few years, Israel has tightened legislation on the detention of minors and introduced harsher sentencing guidelines.
In 2015 Israeli authorities took various legislative measures relating to stone-throwing. In July 2015, the Israeli Knesset passed a law extending maximum sentences for stone-throwing to 20 years77. In September 2015, Israel’s security cabinet approved temporary measures, which impose a
73 UNWRA: West Bank, 1 January 2015. 74 UNWRA: Gaza Strip, 31 October 2016. 75 Al Monitor: Refugee camp clashes increase as Palestinian security steps up raids, 1 November 2016. 76 Al Monitor: UN envoy warns West Bank camp could 'explode', 14 November 2016. 77 The World Post: Israel To Jail Stone-Throwers For Up To 20 Years, 21 July 2015.
24 Palestine: the two-state solution under threat
minimum sentence for stone-throwing. It also extended the authorisation In 2015 Israeli authorities for the use of live ammunition against stone-throwers to cases where police took various legislative deemed the life of a third person to be threatened78. Finally, in November measures relating to 2015, the Knesset approved a minimum prison sentence of three years for stone-throwing, including stone-throwing, with suspended sentences only allowed in exceptional extending maximum circumstances. The Knesset also approved measures to withhold welfare sentences for stone-throwing to 20 years. benefits from convicted stone-throwers (or the family of convicted children) 79 during their prison sentence . In August 2016, the Knesset passed a new law, known as the Youth Bill, In 2016 the Israeli Knesset allowing the imprisonment of minors under the age of 14 for ‘serious passed a ‘Youth Bill’ crimes’ such as murder, attempted murder or manslaughter. Several allowing the imprisonment 80 of minors under the age of newspapers reported that the law would apply to children as young as 12 , 14 for ‘serious crimes’. bringing East Jerusalem (where criminal law applies) in line with the rest of the West Bank (where military law applies to Palestinians, which already permits the imprisonment of 12-year-olds)81. The number of Palestinian The number of Palestinian children in detention has increased significantly children in detention has since the start of the stabbing attacks (referred to as the ‘Knife Intifada’), increased significantly since 82 October 2015. which began in October 2015 .
Table 2: Palestinian minors in the custody of the Israeli security forces84 Palestinian children in custody of the Israeli security forces (yearly average)83
Source: B’Tselem, Statistics on Palestinian minors in the custody of the Israeli security forces
78 The Atlantic: Israel Throws the Book at Stone-Throwers, 25 September 2015. 79 The Jerusalem Post: Increased penalty for rock-throwing becomes law, 2 November 2015. 80 Times of Israel: Israel approves jailing terrorists from age 12, 3 August 2016. 81 The New York Times: Surge in Palestinian Youths in Prison Tests Israel’s Justice System, 29 Apr 2016. 82 For further information, please read the European Parliament’s Policy Department for External Relations in-depth analysis ‘Israeli settlements and Palestinian rivalries frustrate hopes for a two-state solution’, Kirsten JONGBERG, 9 December 2016, p. 17. 83 Statistics on the detention on Palestinian children in Israel are difficult to obtain. B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, compiles statistics it receives directly from the Israeli military and the Israeli Prison Service. However, the statistics reported only show the number of minors in the custody of Israeli security forces on the last day of every month and reporting has been sporadic since May 2016. Figures on the overall number of minors in custody in a given month are not available. Further information is also available from Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association. 84 Administrative detention is imprisonment without charge or trial.
25 Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
The UN Secretary-General on children and armed conflict issued a report on Concerns have been raised 20 April 2016 raising concerns about the number of children being both over the number of detained as well as the conditions under which they were being detained. children being detained Of particular concern was the renewed use of administrative detention for and the alleged abuse they minors, which had not been used in the West Bank since 2011 (2010 for East experience while in Jerusalem). Human Rights Watch has accused Israeli police of abusing detention. detained children.
UNICEF has worked with Israeli authorities since 2013 to improve the UNICEF is working with situation of children in military detention in the West Bank. UNICEF has Israeli authorities to committed to providing regular updates and so far it has produced two improve the situation of reports on Children in Israeli Military Detention with observations and children in Israeli military recommendations. The first report, published in 2013, documented a detention. number of specific experiences and made recommendations for improvements. The second report, published in 2015, the progress made on each of the recommendations. The international legal policies and principles governing the detention of children are outlined in detail on pages 3-5 of the 2013 report.
Table 3: Common complaints and areas of concern between 2012 and 2015 Common complaints and Type of ill-treatment West Bank areas of concern between 2012 and 2015 Number Percentage of cases
Total affidavits collected 429 100 % 1 Hand ties 419 97.7 %
2 No lawyer/ 416 97.0 % Family present prior to or during interrogation 3 Not properly informed of rights 361 84.1 %
4 Blindfolds 379 88.3 % 5 Physical violence 324 75.5 %
Source: UN OCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin, January 2016
A European Parliament resolution of 14 March 2013 on the case of Arafat Jaradat and the situation of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails included a call for Israeli authorities to ensure that ‘Palestinian women and children prisoners and detainees receive appropriate protection and treatment in line with the relevant international conventions to which Israel is a party’.
26 Palestine: the two-state solution under threat
7 European Parliament policy options
Members may wish to raise the following points during their meetings: • The EU supports a two-state solution, based on the 1967 borders, with an independent, democratic, viable and contiguous Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace and security with Israel. The EU will recognise changes to the pre-1967 borders, including with regard to Jerusalem, only if agreed by both parties. • The EU is committed to continuing to support the capacity building of the Palestinian civil structures. • Rivalries and a lack of communication between the various Palestinian factions are detrimental to the Palestinian cause and undermine the negotiating platform. • The Palestinian Authority needs to make concerted efforts towards better governance and increased public service professionalism. This would facilitate international donor assistance. • The EP is concerned about the continued demolition of EU-funded projects in the Occupied Territories. • The EP supports the EU’s differentiation policy and the EU's commitment to ensuring that all agreements with Israel do not apply to the occupied territories. • Israel has repeated denied access to official EP missions to Gaza, although it did allow BUDG Chair Jean Arthuis (ALDE, France) access in July. • The EU condemns the proposed ‘Legalisation Bill’, which is seeking to retroactively legalise illegally-built settlements on private Palestinian land85.
85 At the time of writing, the Knesset has scheduled its final vote on the bill on Monday 6 February 2017.
27 Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
8 Map: Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories
Source: United Nations (January 2004)
28