NATIONALISM OR ‘ISLAM’ AS AN IDEOLOGY IN THE MAKING OF PJAEE, 17 (7) (2020)

NATIONALISM OR ‘ISLAM’ AS AN IDEOLOGY IN THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN Dr. Farzia Yashmeen Chaliha

Assistant Professor (Adhoc) Jagannath Barooah College (Autonomous) Jorhat-1, Assam Dr. Farzia Yashmeen Chaliha: Nationalism Or ‘Islam’ As An Ideology In The Making Of Pakistan -- Palarch’s Journal Of Archaeology Of Egypt/Egyptology 17(7), 1-14. ISSN 1567-214x

Keywords: 1. Islam, 2. Islamic State, 3. Ideology and 4. Nationalism.

Abstract Division of the during the year 1947 still holds significance in the South Asian history. The demand for Pakistan as a separate State during the pre-partition period was based on the ‘Two-Nation Theory’ upheld by the leaders of the who were speculative about the distinct identity of the Muslims within India. Accordingly, ‘Pakistan’ as a State was projected as the political expression for the Muslims in India. Towards this end, the very basis of demand for ‘Pakistan’ as a separate nation, was not so much on ‘Islam’ as an ideology as much on the Muslim Nationalism. But, after the dream of creation of Pakistan was fulfilled it couldn’t stick to the unity, integrity and secularity of the State as upheld by its then Governor Mohammad Ali Jinnah. After his death, the political leaders, bureaucracy and military started playing with the very idea of Pakistan in the name of religion i.e. Islam whenever they felt their legitimacy as a leader is questioned.

Objective The Objective of this study is to analyse whether ‘Islam’ was the basic ideology for the creation of Pakistan or it was mere nationalism for a separate State to protect the identity and culture of the Muslims from India.

Methodology The study undertaken is descriptive, analytical and correlational. For the purpose of this study, both primary and secondary sources are used. For example, UNDP, HDR, GGP, UNICEF, EFA Global Monitoring Report, World Bank Reports, PIHS and National Census Reports etc. had been used as primary sources. The Constitutions of Pakistan and periodic amendments to them, Governmental Five Year Plans, National education Policy Reports issued by the former governments and various other official reports on the economic and social status of citizens of Pakistan also proved helpful in acquiring more data for the study. The biographies and memoires of civilian

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and military leaders as well as their speeches and statements also formed part of the primary sources.

Study Area The area under study comprises the State of Pakistan bounded by the latitude 30 degree North and 69 degree East longitude. It is the world's fifth-most populous State with a population exceeding 212.2 million. In area, it is the 33rd-largest State, spanning 881,913 square kilometres. The total population of the State is 19.7 crore. The State is bordered by India to the east, Afghanistan to the northwest and Iran to the west while borders the State in the northeast.

Introduction With the advent of the Turks and later the Mughals the Muslim population within the South Asian region viewed themselves in majority especially in the Indian subcontinent. However, after the British colonial expansion this numerical majority was brought down to minority within a short period of time. Consequently, with the demise of the last Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar the Mughal dynasty in India came to an end and along with it the gradual diminishing of the Islamic ideological expansion and its culture and tradition as well. Following this, the events that led towards the demand for a separate State of Pakistan added to further conflict in regard to the rights and development of the citizens belonging to the Islamic community within India. Thereupon, following such conflicts and violence Pakistan attained statehood on 14th August 1947 under the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who became the first Governor General of Pakistan. Although Jinnah and other Muslim League leaders demanded for a separate State for all the Muslims residing in India but their main intention was to establish a democratic secular State with the citizens enjoying democratic rights of secularism and social justice. In this regard, Jinnah in his first speech in the Constituent Assembly as Governor General of Pakistan said that,

“You are free, you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed; that has nothing to do with the business of the State…We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State.”1

The above speech of Jinnah thereby justified that although the founding leaders of the State of Pakistan demanded a separate State for the Muslims in India but it also tried to accommodate people from all religious background under one democratic State. In short, it tried to bring about a happy blending of both modernism and Islam. Unfortunately, the periodic civil-military conflicts, together with the emergence of the dispute undermined the democratic development of the State. The outcome was a

1 For a complete transcript of the speech, see www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/constituent_address_11aug1947.html

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State in which democratic consolidation was sacrificed on the altar of national security and in which centralisation prevailed over the pluralist vision. Therefore, through this article an attempt would be made to answer an intriguing question as to how a State whose founding father being secular and one who followed him were secular people who believed in rule of law and democracy later drifted towards religious authoritarianism. Building on this an endeavour would be made to analyse whether ‘Islam’ was the basic ideology for the creation of Pakistan or it was just a product of circumstances. In this regard, an attempt would be made to discuss and analyse the various stages that had led towards the growth of Islamic ideology in Pakistan instead of a democratic secular State and how Islam had been used as a legitimizing factor by different leaders both civil and military whenever they felt any threat to their rule.

The Objective Resolution towards the Making of Pakistan After the inception of Pakistan both Governor General Jinnah and Prime Minister initiated the process of making a Constitution for Pakistan. Followed by it PM Liaquat presented the ‘Objective Resolution,’ a prelude to future constitutions, in the Legislative Assembly. On 12th March 1949 the Constituent Assembly adopted the Resolution. It proclaimed that the future would not be modelled on European pattern but on the ideology and democratic faith of Islam. The principles of the ‘Objective Resolution’ are as follows: 1. Sovereignty belongs to Allah alone but He has delegated it to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him as a sacred trust. 2. The State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people. 3. The principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed. 4. Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunna. 5. Adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to freely profess and practise their religions and develop their cultures. 6. Pakistan shall be a federation. 7. Fundamental Rights shall be guaranteed. 8. Judiciary shall be independent.

The Objective Resolution is one of the most important and illuminating documents in the constitutional history of Pakistan. The importance of this document lies in the fact that it combines the good features of western and Islamic democracy. The Objective resolution was made the preamble of the Constitution. Therefore, we can say that the ‘Objective resolution’ was like the ‘Magna Carta’ of Pakistan which sowed the seeds of Islamic unity and democratic vision in Pakistan. However, it is to be noted that the principles in the above Resolution and the ideals which the later civil-military leadership of Pakistan had upheld had virtually nothing in common with the secular views of Pakistan’s founding father. Thereby, slowly and gradually

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the Pakistani society had sought for a systematic change in which along with the religio-political parties, the ruling civil elite and the military soon began to seek out legitimacy and national cohesion through a selective use of Islamic ethos. In fact, Islam was seen both as a homogenizer for the State and a means for legitimizing power-sharing. However, even before the full implementation of the new Constitution Iskarder Mirza the then and Gen. , the commander-in-chief of imposed in the country. But, ironically in the name of a stable and reformist administration, assumed absolute power as the President of the State and abrogated the new Constitution. Following that, he also conducted other atrocities by banning political parties and asked Gen. Ayub Khan to run military courts. Thus, ultimately Iskander Mirza was outwitted by Ayub Khan, who refused to accept this duality.

Role of Islam under the first Military Coup by Mohammad Ayub Khan The first military coup of Pakistan on 28th October 1958 added a new dimension towards the civil-military relations in Pakistan. In the beginning, the citizens of Pakistan welcomed the military rule in the hope that it would bring stability and systematic overhaul. Towards this end, even Gen. Ayub Khan believed on the liberal version of Islam and brought social reforms like promolugation of a number of commissions like Marriage and Family Law Commission that provided protection and privileges to females, Press Commission and Labour Commission etc. Along with these in order to keep the politicians under check he also introduced Elective Bodies Disqualification Ordinance (EBDO) and Public Offices (Disqualification) Order (PODO) in 1959, which banned and marginalised key political parties and leaders. It cannot be completely denied that his pro-secular regime had no vision on the role of Islam in public life. In fact, Gen. Ayub used Islam as a force for political unity and projected Islam as a mechanism of socio- economic development. He believed that the benefit of the socio-economic development would trickle down and create a strong State capable of standing without the support of Islamist.2 Thus, his lack of outward religious observance, his distance from ulema and his careful choice of words, created his image as a latter day Ataturk abroad.3 Instead of the fundamentalist Ulema Gen. Ayub turned to the traditionalist Sufi Islamist. Further, in the 1962 Constitution, the prefix ‘Republic’ was added in front of the name of the State- ‘Republic of Pakistan’ and the word ‘Islamic’ was dropped but later it was re-incorporated due to the pressure from the fundamentalist.4 However, in the later half of his period of rule, Gen. Ayub used the Islamic card to continue to remain in power. In this regard, he sought the help of religious groups to issue fatwa that female cannot become a ‘Head’ of an Islamic State.5 But, by the end of his regime, the role of Islam in Pakistan’s public life remained an unresolved matter whose implications are seen in the successive regimes.

2 Farzana Shaikh, Making Sense of Pakistan (London: Columbia University Press, 2009). 3 Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan : Between Mosque and Military (Washington: Carnegie Endownment for International Peace, 2005). 4 L.D.Hayes, The Struggle for Legitimacy in Pakistan (: Vanguard Book Ltd., 1986). 5 Veena Kukreja, Contemporary Pakistan (New Delhi: Sage Publication Pvt. Ltd., 2003).

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After Gen. Ayub his successor General Yahya Khan took over the charges of the State and used the religion card to legitimize his rule. He unlike Gen. Ayub tactically formed alliance with the Islamist parties to remain in their favour. His alliance with the Jamate-i-Islami (JI) was the first military Islamists friendly relations JI called Gen. Yahya ‘Champion of Islam.’6 Further, in order to retain his power he even used the intelligence agaencies to systematize attacks by Islamic parties against mainstream political parties and Pakistan’s Peoples Party (PPP). Besides this, the Bengali citizens of the was looked down upon and neglected both in regard to resource distribution or providing jobs in public offices or military. Gen. Yahya even tried to impose language as the national language of Pakistan which thereby instigated the nationalist feelings in East Pakistan. Consequently, such incidents led to civil war and later dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. In Gen. Yahya’s later years, his addition to wine and women was interpreted as evidence that secularism had damaged the moral fabric of the leadership and hastened the disintegration of the State.

The Politics of Islam under the Democratic Regime of .

The loss of East Pakistan forced General Yahya Khan and his military personnels to finally step down. As such, on 20th Gen. Yahya Khan handed over power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto leader of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). The very motto of the party was, ‘Islam is our Faith, Democracy is our Polity and Socialism is our Economy, All power to People.’ Therefore, the basic objective of the party was the attainment of a secular and classesless society in Pakistan. Building on this, Bhutto in his first three years (1971-74) of rule resorted to socialist ways of rule-making. In this regard, PPP was the first political party in Pakistan who acknowledged the principle of distributive justice and nationalization of means of production. After the dismemberment of Pakistan he was determined to create a classless society which according to Bhutto was possible only through socialism. In addition, Bhutto also came up with the concept of ‘Islamic Socialism.’ The prefix of ‘Islamic’ was added to pre-empt any criticism by opponents. The implementation of Islamic socialism was aimed at bringing about all round development in the socio-economic and political sectors of the economy. As such, this very idea of Islamic Socialism reduced political Islam to the background for at least three years. But unfortunately, instead of any word of appreciation for his secular and justifiable actions he was criticised by the religious parties of the State. To quote Bhutto, “Pakistan can progress only if its economy is based on the principles of socialism. I advise the people to draw guidance from the Quran itself and not to be misled by the clever and twisted observations of selfish and hired maulvis.”7 However, Bhutto who was a charismatic leader of Pakistan later became mindful of the ongoing situation political situation within the State. Thereby in the later years of his rule 1974-77 he drifted his stance from being a secular

6 Christopher Jafferlot, The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience (Haryana: Random House Publisher, 2015). 7 C.A.Junejo, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto : A Memoir, National Commission on History and Culture ( 1996), p. 74.

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socialist to a pawn to Islamic fundamentalism. Although he never used religion to contest for his electoral position but he resorted to religion to strengthen his position as the Prime Minister vis-à-vis a contending army and religious parties. Through the process of Islamization he galvanised public opinion in his favour domestically and even in the international front it helped him cultivate cordial relations with the middle-eastern countries. Following these, along with declaring Friday as a weekly holiday, the prohibition of alchohol, ban on gambling in all its forms and shutting down of all night clubs and incorporating Islamic provisions in the newly made Constitution of Pakistan he even went to the extent of declaring Qadianis or Ahmadi sect of Pakistan as non-muslim community. Moreover, in order to include leaders of religio-political parties to implement Shariah laws the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) was reconstituted. Thus, from the above account of Bhutto’s drift of stance from socialism to religious fundamentalism highlights how the leaders of Pakistan used religion as a legitimizing factor to strengthen or protect his/her position in power politics. Even in case of Bhutto being a follower of scientific socialism he never wanted to Islamize Pakistan nor wanted it to become fundamentalist. However, it did set the stage for Zia-ul-Haq to use religion for justifying his long stay in power and converting Pakistan into a theocratical State.

The Rise of Islamic Statehood under General Zia-ul-Haq

The army staged the third coup d’etat in Pakistan’s history when Gen Zia-ul- Haq overthrew the government of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and took over as the Chief Martial Law Administer (CMLA) on July 5, 1979. After six weeks of the coup an Islamic Ideology Council was also set up as the highest decision making body.8 The council was entrusted with the task of preparing an outline of an Islamic theocratic state. Gen. Zia wished to introduce Sharia laws throughout Pakistan and Islamize politics, education, law, economy, and the armed forces of the entire state. To quote one of his statements, “Pakistan will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of the Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the state.”9 In this regard, he first of all brought changes in the political sphere, wherein, electoral procedures were reformulated with infusion of separate electorate for the muslims and non-muslims. In addition, he also made amendments and rules in the Political Parties Act 1962 which was opposed by most of the political parties.10 Towards this end, free democratic elections were discouraged as being components of a secular order, which in a way helped the military to retain power. Gen. Zia thereby, claimed that an election on the basis of adult franchise was un-Islamic. Moreover, as an opposition to elections political parties were banned on the grounds that they would spreads sectarian prejudices and weaken the Islamic community. Gen. Zia

8 The council had two panels, one dealt with Islamic law and social reforms while the other dealt with matters relating to economics and finance. 9 Ibid., p.150. 10Ibid.,p. 245.

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argued that since Islam already defines the broad contours of an Islamic social order therefore there is no need for a separate political party representing an independent programme of legislation. According to him the dismemberment of Pakistan took place only because the State had deviated from the path of Islam. Thus, Gen. Zia tried to infuse Islamization into every nerve of the Pakistani society. The theocratisation of Pakistani society had extended first into the economic sphere. He introduced the Zakat and Ushr (religious taxes), Islamic Hudood and Penal Code in the State. Zakat the Islamic wealth and welfare tax- is levied on people of Shia community. Under it on the first day of Ramadan 2.5 per cent as Zakat tax is deducted from the bank accounts of every citizen from the Shia community. After a mass demonstration by the Shias in , they were exempted from the tax. Apart from Zakat, the other Islamic taxes to be introduced were Ushr, an agricultural tax levied from 1983 on Rabi crop. Thus, in this way, Gen. Zia invoked the origins of Pakistan as providers of historical legitimacy for the creation of a theocracy. In addition, since Islam does not allow availing Bank interest therefore from 1st January 1980, Gen. Zia introduced the ‘Profit and Loss Sharing Sytem,’ according to which an account holder was to share the loss and profit of the bank.11 Besides this, Gen. Zia’s Islamization included the blasphemy laws, creation of Shariat courts with power to strike down and challenge laws that were deemed not Islamic, ordinances forbidding Ahmadis from engaging in any practice that might make them seem Muslims. In addition, the Pakistan Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code were amended to declare anything implying disrespect to the Holy Prophet, Ahle Bait (family of the prophet), Sahaba (companion of the Prophet) and Sha’ar-i-Islam (Islamic symbols), a cognizable offence, punishable with imprisonment or sentence to death. Instructions were issued for regular observance of prayers and made arrangements for performing noon prayers (Salat Al Zuhur) in the government and semi-government offices and educational institutions during office hours and official functions and in the airports, railway stations and bus stops. In the social sphere, a series of laws were sanctioned which represented a diversion from the past commitment of the Pakistani state to secular values. These included the Hudood Ordinance in 1979 (which changed the law of rape and adultery and made fornication a crime), the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (Law of Evidence Order) which relegates women to inferior legal status and, in some circumstances, renders the testimony of a women equal to only half the weight of a Muslim man and the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance (Islamic penal laws governing compensation and retribution in crimes involving bodily harm).12 Thus, women were supposed to return to the char divari (the four walls) of their homes and after the suspension of the 1973 Constitution the provision (Article 25) against sexual discrimination on the basis of sex too ended. As such, any individual or group not abiding to the Islamic laws or behaviour were punished in the form of stoning to death

11 S.S Binder, Politics of Islamization (New Delhi: Deep Publications, 1990), p. 13. 12 The amount of compensation payable for a murdered woman is half that is payable for a murdered man.

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for adultery,13 amputation of wrists and ankles for theft14 and eight lashes for drinking alcohol.15 Thus, women were the worst sufferers of inferior treatment in a male dominated society. For example, in 1978, female dancing on television was prohibited on the grounds that such ‘erotic practices’ are part of Hindu, not Muslim, culture.’16 In another case of discrimination against women was in 1981, when a woman’s athletics team was not permitted to participate in Tokyo, because they would be performing before men.17 Likewise, his hold over the then social media was also very conservative. For instance, television was under the Islamization campaign and news was read in Arabic and female anchors were required to cover their heads and along with that the Azan was relayed regularly on radio and television to announce time for prayers. Further, Gen. Zia also established ‘Majlis-i-shoora’ in 1980 which later became the Parliament in place of National Assembly but without any legislative powers. The military government amended Section 499 of the Pakistan Penal Code with the objective of prosecuting newspaper editors for publishing stories against the interest of the Gen. Zia regime. Towards this end, in the year 1978, for the first time in Pakistan’s history so far journalists were whipped under sentences passed by military courts.18 Gen. Zia also Islamized the education system in Pakistan.19 He made Islamic studies mandatory at all levels of education and reformed textbooks to remove content deemed un-Islamic. He created a new International Islamic University in Islamabad. Besides this, Gen. Zia also created the office of Nizam-e-Salaat (controller of prayers) for the adaptation of the practice of five daily prayers. To make this campaign a reality, he even appointed 100,000 prayer wardens for village and urban localities.20 Besides this, Pakistani Studies and Islamic studies were made compulsory for B.A, B.Sc, engineering, MBBS, Commerce, Law and Nursing students. For professional studies extra marks are given to those who were Hafiz-e-Quran. Thus, such monitoring and strict imposition of religious activity was considered a direct physical intervention by the state into areas considered private by the previous regimes. As such, democratic values were considered a constrain over practicing a theocratic order. But, the main idea behind the propagation of such Islamic culture for Pakistani military was to establish their hegemony over the civil-society at large.

13 The Zina Ordinance 1979. This weakened the position of women when they filed charges of rape. Several rape victims ended up being imprisoned for adultery under the law, raising the number of women prisoners nine years after the implementation of the Hudood Ordinance to around 6000. 14 The offence against Property (Enforcement of Hudood Ordinance 1979). 15 The Prohibition (Enforcement of Hudood Ordinance 1979). 16 FEER. Asia Year Book, 1979. p.72. 17 Ibid., p. 87. 18 Siddiqa, Op. Cit., p. 100. 19 Ibid., p.115. 20 Omar Noman, The Political Economy of Pakistan 1947-85 (London: KPI Limited, 1988), p.143.

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During the Gen. Zia era, the army had played the role of defenders of the ‘ideology’ of Islam and following it ‘the cause,’ of the very inception of the state of Pakistan as an Islamic state for the muslims from India. To quote, one of the slogans used by the Pakistan army in this regard, “Fighting in the name of Allah…is the supreme sort of worship, and anybody who does service in the armed forces with the intention of doing this job in worship, his life is worship.”21 Perhaps for the first time, it was under Gen. Zia’s regime that Islam as an ideology was taken seriously to guide the Pakistani society. In this regard, as Stephen Cohen puts it, there are three aspects of the relationship between Islam and the military, these are: (1) the way the military views Pakistan as an Islamic state (2) the application of Islamic principles within the military, and (3) the reconciliation of Islamic and contemporary strategic doctrines.22 Even within the army establishment, Gen. Zia made Islamic rituals and teachings as part of their day-to-day activities. He had changed the motto of the army from Jinnah’s ‘Unity, Faith and Discipline’ to ‘Iman, Taqwa, Jihad fi Sabeelillah’ (Faith, Obedience of God, and Struggle in the path of Allah). Thus, the army played the role of a religious vanguard and Gen. Zia as a theocratic leader in bringing back the state to the roots from where it was raised. In this regard, in one of his meetings in the Officers Training Academy at Kakul, Gen. Zia emphasised their role as ‘Soldiers of Islam,’ who are-“Guardians of ideological as well as geo-graphical frontiers.”23 Islamic training and thought was also introduced as part of the curriculum at the Command and Staff College and other military training centres, under the orders of Gen. Zia. Moreover, he even warned the officer about losing their honour and no promotions if they disobeyed religion. Thus, in this way the ideological imperatives for justifying the usurpation of power led the military to seek a remedy in the conversion of Pakistan into a theocratic state.24 In this regard, Gen. Zia said that, “Pakistan’s armed forces were responsible for not only safeguarding the state’s territorial integrity but also its ideological base.”25 Nevertheless, even after the death of Gen. Zia in 1988 the civilian governments that followed suit treated the Islamic question with greater caution. Benazir Bhutto a woman by gender came under the radar of the Islamists ulemas who considered her unfit to govern the state’s administration. Her successor was more forthcoming in the domestic front and in 1999 he tried to make Shariah part of Pakistan’s Constitution.

Role of Islam in Pakistan from the 21st century

The growing tensions between the military and the PML contributed to the civilian government’s unpopularity precipitated a crisis of governability- aggravating other problems, notably economic stagnation and growing

21 Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.86. 22 Ibid., p. 87. 23 Noman, Op Cit., p. 148. 24 Noman, Op Cit., p. 11. 25 Ibid. p.118.

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corruption-and eroded Sharif’s authority, and eventually led to the military coup of 1999. General ’s like Jinnah’s vision was committed to modernist and progressive society. He was very much influenced by Turkish leader Kamal Ataturk and desired for a liberal Pakistan like Turkey, where religion is considered a personnel matter of an individual. In this regard, he redefined the role and status of women and tried to alter the Blasphemy Laws, liberalize the electronic media and introduced the educational reforms and produced a new ‘wave of modernisation’ in Pakistan.26 Although it seemed that he marginally tried to reverse Gen. Zia’s course of Islamization but in practice his performance did not meet his claims. Instead of completely renouncing alliance with fundamentalist militant groups he tried to maintain a balance between the Western modernity and at the sametime tried to appease certain militant groups for his own political gains. As such, his regime had been no exception to the trends of earlier military rule. As its claim to secular military rule proved untenable, it turned to rely on Islamist forces to manage civilian-military relations. Gen. Musharraf sought to move beyond Gen. Zia’s model to look to the Gen. Ayub Khan era. His vision was one of allying the military with the modern middle classes and ‘liberal’ Muslims and leading Pakistan on the path of economic development. This approach was also viewed as necessary after the events of September 11, 2001, which changed the international climate. Having realized that the military had lost the control of mainstream Islamism to the PML, Gen. Musharraf saw no point in continuing to anchor the military’s strategy in a political and ideological position over which it could not have direct control. The military would be committed to its strategic vision rather than any ideology. Gen. Musharraf was successful in loosening the grip of Islamists over the public sphere, reducing their ability to enforce morality on the public or to use ‘Quran-Thumping’ to set the tone for public debates. The new regime even encouraged more laxity in popular culture. Political Islam became a less dominant force in the public arena especially in Punjab and Sind. The events in September 11 had a momentous impact on Pakistan. Gen. Musharraf and the military decided to support the U.S war against terrorism and also hunt for Al-Qaida in the Afghanistan-Pakistan corridor. This meant clamping down on the militant jihadi groups that the military had used as strategic assets to control Afghanistan and manage the conflict in Kashmir. At the sametime, it also implied severing the military’s last remaining overt ties with Islamism. However, it also reflected that the military had no other alternative because the former option might have cost them their interests. Thereupon, the civilian governments which completed their terms successfully post Gen. Musharraf era also did not show much inclination towards using the Islamic rhetoric being the only ideology towards the making of Pakistan to remain in power. Rather the relationship between the army and the civilians had turned more into a patron-client relationship. The military in Pakistan had set a new trend to exploit the resources of the state by not intending to directly control the state. Instead

26 I. Khalid and S. Ali, Psychoanalysis of Leaders: A Case Study of President Zia and President Musharraf Leadership in Conceptual Framework. Journal of Political Studies, Vol-22, No.2, p.529-553.

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they had shifted their stand from control of government to governance. This implied dominating strategic policy-making and ensuring that it’s institutional corporate interests and the parallel military economic empire is well guarded and funded without any hindrance.

CONCLUSION

After the death of Jinnah the very idea of making Pakistan a secular State died with him and ‘Islam’ gradually took deeper roots in both the political and social lives of the people. Economic and political issues had remained important, but in the contemporary world they had tend to get manifested in the search for a truly Islamic economy as well as for an Islamic polity, both of which concepts are encapsulated in the prominent and apparently potent phrase, ‘Nizam-e-Mustafa,’ which implied ‘Order of the Prophet.’ A 2009 report of the British Council states that more than 75 per cent consider themselves to be Muslims first and Pakistanis second.27 Likewise, in May 2011 the Gilani Research Foundation (A Pakistan based polling Organisation) founded that 67 per cent of Pakistanis favoured the State-led Islamization of their State. This is very much evident from the above analysis, whereby the Gen. Zia regime advocated towards the rise of Islamic ideology within Pakistan when he pointed out that the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 was mainly due to drift of the State from the path of Islam. As such, it was he who instilled Islamization into the heart and soul of Pakistan. The Islamization drive was not only confined to social or economic sectors it was further imposed even within the defence sector. This is reflected in Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani’s one of the statements during the 62nd Independence Day celebration of the State, where he said that, “Islam is the soul and spirit of Pakistan. It is our strength and we will always be an Islamic republic.”28 Besides this, Government policies and educational curricula, which have been designed to create a unified State by championing Islam at home and pan-Islamism abroad, have made it increasingly difficult for the government to control or subdue groups that justify violence against the perceived enemies of Islam. Thereby, because it derives so much of its identity and legitimacy from Islam, the Pakistani State had frequently succumbed to Islamist demands on a range of social and other questions. In addition, the impact of the government’s use of Islamist groups to