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Journal of APF Command and Staff College (2020) 3:1, 35-48 Journal of APF Command and Staff College Local Election in Nepal: Means for Ensuring Electoral Accountability Narendra Raj Paudel, Associate Professor Central Department of Public Administration,Tribhuvan University Email: [email protected] Srijana Pahari Faculty Member, Greenfield National College Email: [email protected] Article History Abstract Received 10 December 2019 The electoral accountability is considered a mechanism through which Accepted 27 December 2019 voters hold the government responsible for their performance. The main assumption in this article is that the more performance of local representatives as per their promise before elections under prevailing laws likely leads to more electoral accountability. To test this hypothesis, 455 questionnaires were collected from ordinary citizens and 28 interviews were taken with respective Rural Municipalities and Municipality’s chief, deputy chief, and an executive from Sindhuli and Surkhet district of Nepal. The result showed that the performance of Surkhet districts’ local governments have a better significant Keywords relationship with the electoral accountability index rather Sindhuli Election, electoral district. Despite this relationship, people were neither satisfied, nor accountability, unsatisfied with the performance of the local representatives. There performances, local bodies, are a lot of hindering factors associated with the performance of local Nepal representatives which include lack of financial resources, lack of knowledge on how to handle local government, lack of employees, lack of infrastructure, etc. Therefore, the study concludes that electoral accountability in Nepal is in the transitional stage. Corresponding Editor Ramesh Raj Kunwar [email protected] Copyright@2020 Authors Published by: APF Command and Staff College, Kathmandu, Nepal ISSN 2616-0242 36 Journal of APF Command and Staff College (2020) 3:1, 35-48 Electoral accountability The electoral accountability is considered one of the mechanisms through which voters hold the government responsible for their performance (Fumarola, 2016). The notion of periodic election allows sanctioning political parties if they do wrong and reward if they perform as per citizens‘ mandate. Electoral accountability depends on two sets of conditions: voters‘ ability to assign responsibility for performance outcomes to incumbents and voters' ability to act upon those assignments of responsibility (Hellwig and Samuels, 2008). The voter‘s ability to hold governments to account is greatly influenced by the contingent characteristics of the political context (Fumarola, 2016). Schedler (1999) defines the concept of accountability which is equal to answerability plus enforcement. Answerability is about the obligation of government to provide information and justification for the performances or series of performance carried out by political parties whereas enforcement stands for the sanction. Voters evaluate and judge the performance of political parties whether political parties act according to citizens' mandate or not. It is said that power holders are free to act as they choose without any checks and balances in the absence of answerability. In the absence of enforcement, where there are no consequences for failing to provide a satisfactory account, so the process of demanding and providing an account is undermined. In European democracies, voters‘ ability to express dissatisfaction with economic performance is affected by specific characteristics of political context (Fumarola, 2016). Government clarity of responsibility (Hobolt et al, 2013), the existence of available alternatives (Anderson, 2000), the influence of the electoral system (Powell, 2000), pluralistic mass media may contribute to the functioning mechanism of accountability, ensuring information about the political acts promoted by the incumbent and the possibility for voters to identify and potentially to sanction it (Fumarola, 2016, 56). In the absence of the competitive environment for politics would be fatal and other institutional environments would inhibit electoral accountability (Besley, 2006, pp. 124-128). Because conventional assumptions about electoral accountability hold that elections enable voters to sanction governments, it is important to recognize that the power of sanction might, in theory, lead to control or to influence, or to something in between (Maloy, 2015). The wave of democracy is spread throughout the world since 1990. However, there is questionable between democratic accountability and competitive election (Maloy, 2014). Problems of voter judgment may have no solution at all or no institutional solution, but theories of and experiments with deliberative assemblies are laudable efforts to investigate that question (Maloy, 2015). Federalism and intergovernmental policy making may reduce the voter‘s ability to hold their government (Cutler, 2004). Landa & Duell (2015) argue that social identities increase the weight of representatives‘ efforts in voters‘ reelection decisions. When economic conditions are bad, citizens vote against the ruling party (Lewis-Beck, Michael S., 1991). The majority/minority status of the government, party cohesion, opposition committee chairs, and opposition control affects electoral accountability. Hellwig and Samuels (2008) argue that regime type determines the ways and extent to which election enables voters to reward or sanction incumbents. They reveal that voters have greater potential to hold incumbents to accounts under the separation of powers than under parliamentarism. Micozzo (2012) argues drawing experiences from Argentine Senate that electoral Paudel/Pahari: Local Election in Nepal: Means for Ensuring Electoral Accountability 37 accountability makes a difference in the election system, career ambition, and legislative performance. Despite wide theoretical and comparative discussion in government‘s performance and electoral accountability there lacks systematic observation and analysis in Nepali issue. Nepal has experienced frequent political changes since 1990‘s (re) democratization. It waited for twenty years for third local election – held in 2017 – since 1997. Local government did not have elected representatives for fifteen years. It is a general assumption that Nepali political parties prepare a very good manifesto but they the elected representatives hardly work in office following pre-election promises. Does it continue in federal Nepal? Nepal has adopted a federal republic system in 2015 explaining individual and common rights of three different tires of government: local, provincial and federal governments. This study focus on the level and variances of accountability of local governments in changed context. In this research paper, electoral accountability refers to the capability of elected government representatives to furnish the activities prescribed in their political manifestos as well as in-laws proactively. It also refers to their sensitiveness towards the needs and aspirations of citizens in general and specifically marginalized communities, women, and children and marginalized groups of the community. The performance of the elected representatives refers to the delivery of health, education, drinking water, communication, light services. It also includes drainage management, up- gradation, and construction of road, vital registration and certification and social allowances. Political manifestos of Nepalese political parties All major political parties published written manifestos in 2017 local election. Communist Party of Nepal (United Maoist and Leninist) (CPN-UML) presented the main slogan given as ‗prosperous, equality and strong foundation for national development: local to central level‘s government of UML‘. According to UML‘s commitment, each Nepali Citizen will have a share in hydro-electricity. The connectivity will also be diversified. There will be roads, railways, cable cars, air route etc. Economic development will also be based on tourism development. The agriculture sector will be modernized. Arable farmland will have irrigation facilities. The more additional commitment as per UML manifesto includes ‗one province on industrial areas‘. Human resource development is also another area of commitment. Three international standards sports stadiums having more than 50 thousand capacities will be constructed. Foreign policy will be based on balanced international relations. Out of total revenue, 50 percent of revenue will go to the local government. Integrated settlement programs will be launched. Smart cities will be formed. Each citizen will get free education. 20 percent of the revenue will be allocated in the education sector. Health insurance facilities will be for all. Fifty percent premium will pay by the government for those who are below the poverty line. The local unit will have a well-equipped hospital having 25 beds in rural municipalities and 50 beds in the municipality. The economic policy is guided by the cooperative. As per its manifesto cooperative in each rural municipalities and employment opportunity for each household (Gaugauma Sahakari: Ghargharma Rojgari). Nepal will be upgraded from least 38 Journal of APF Command and Staff College (2020) 3:1, 35-48 developed country to medium level income through increasing per capita income more than 5000$, 15 thousand MW additional electricity would be generated within 10 years. The manifesto presented by Nepali Congress