THE BALKANS: OLD, NEW INSTABILITIES NEW OLD, THE BALKANS: Giorgio Fruscione Do, C. Quoditia dium hucient. Ur, P. Si pericon senatus et is aa. vivignatque prid di publici factem moltodions prem virmili THE BALKANS: patus et publin tem es ius haleri effrem. Nos consultus hiliam tabem nes? Acit, eorsus, ut videferem hos morei pecur que Founded in 1934, ISPI is OLD, NEW INSTABILITIES an independent think tank alicae audampe ctatum mortanti, consint essenda chuidem A European Region committed to the study of se num ute es condamdit nicepes tistrei tem unum rem et international political and ductam et; nunihilin Itam medo, nondem rebus. But gra? Looking for its Place in the World economic dynamics. Iri consuli, ut C. me estravo cchilnem mac viri, quastrum It is the only Italian Institute re et in se in hinam dic ili poraverdin temulabem ducibun edited by Giorgio Fruscione – and one of the very few in iquondam audactum pero, se issoltum, nequam mo et, introduction by Paolo Magri Europe – to combine research et vivigna, ad cultorum. Dum P. Sp. At fuides dermandam, activities with a significant mihilin gultum faci pro, us, unum urbit? Ublicon tem commitment to training, events, Romnit pari pest prorimis. Satquem nos ta nostratil vid and global risk analysis for pultis num, quonsuliciae nost intus verio vis cem consulicis, companies and institutions. nos intenatiam atum inventi liconsulvit, convoliis me ISPI favours an interdisciplinary and policy-oriented approach perfes confecturiae audemus, Pala quam cumus, obsent, made possible by a research quituam pesis. Am, quam nocae num et L. Ad inatisulic team of over 50 analysts and tam opubliciam achum is. Ute audam am eto termanu an international network of 70 ltorus cone norum pos ad nem sent fina, praet retem inata universities, think tanks, and di facchil istius in viveret auteres conderum dienteatquit research centres. In the ranking venihiliemus liciis Ahaet; horum nihilis egerit; ni consili issued by the University of Pennsylvania, ISPI placed first worldwide as the “Think Tank to Watch in 2020”. euro 12,00 THE BALKANS: OLD, NEW INSTABILITIES A European Region Looking for its Place in the World edited by Giorgio Fruscione © 2020 Ledizioni LediPublishing Via Alamanni, 11 – 20141 Milano – Italy www.ledizioni.it [email protected] The Balkans: Old, New Instabilities Edited by Giorgio Fruscione First edition: May 2020 Realized with the support of the Policy Planning Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation pursuant to art. 23-bis of Presidential Decree 18/1967 Print ISBN 9788855262477 ePub ISBN 9788855262484 Pdf ISBN 9788855262491 DOI 10.14672/55262477 ISPI. Via Clerici, 5 20121, Milan www.ispionline.it Catalogue and reprints information: www.ledizioni.it Table of Contents Introduction Paolo Magri............................................................................................ 6 1. After the Nineties: A Never-Ending Political Transition Giorgio Fruscione........................................................................... 11 2. Europe and the Balkans: The Need for Mutual Integration Nikola Burazer.............................................................................. 29 3. Making Inroads: Competing Powers in the Balkans Dimitar Bechev.................................................................................. 48 4. EU, NATO and Beyond: The Security Dynamics of the Western Balkans Katarina Djokic.............................................................................. 69 5. FDI in the Balkans: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly Tena Prelec......................................................................................... 96 6. The Importance of Social Movements in Western Balkans Chiara Milan........................................................................................ 114 About the Authors....................................................................... 134 Introduction For the Western Balkans, 2019 was the year of inconclusiveness. It was the umpteenth year without progress in the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, one more year of delay in the EU accession process for Albania and North Macedonia, and a year of renewed uncertainty for Bosnia-Herzegovina, a country that remained without a government until December. Western Balkan countries entered 2020 with slim hopes, and the novel coronavirus outbreak seemed to have dashed them altogether. It would have been the perfect scapegoat for putting many processes almost indefinitely on hold. Yet, paradoxically, this year and the next might prove crucial for the future of the region. Dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo is restarting. On March 24, during a meeting held by teleconference, the EU agreed to open negotiation talks with Albania and North Macedonia. And Bosnia-Herzegovina finally has an official government. Interestingly enough, the outbreak of the novel coronavirus has pushed the whole of Europe towards unexpected togetherness, stimulating cross-border solidarity involving Western Balkan countries as well. In a nutshell, as the title of this Report makes clear, this is a region looking for stability between “old and new instabilities”. Since the collapse of socialist regimes in the early 1990s, the region had been in transition for so long that one could never have foreseen such breakthroughs taking place this very year, as the worst pandemic in a century is sweeping across Europe. All this shows that something is undoubtedly, albeit slowly, Introduction 7 moving. And it shows both the extent of the Western Balkan countries’ ambition and determination and the magnitude of the challenges ahead. It is indeed, as the second part of the title of this Report states, a European region “looking for its place in the world”. In fact, the Western Balkans are “in transition” along many dimensions. At the political level, the transition has been stunted: democratic institutions are still weak and many countries are ruled by leaders with autocratic tendencies. It is no surprise, then, that many Western Balkan leaders have been attracted by models of “illiberal democracy” such as those embraced by Putin’s Russia. Economically, the region continues to be highly dependent on EU countries, with 72% of Western Balkan exports going to the EU, and 58% of imports coming from there. Even in terms of foreign direct investment, the EU continues to be in a dominant position, with 70% of total flows. By comparison, Russia makes up around 5% of FDIs towards the region, Turkey 2% and China just 1%. Despite this, Russia, Turkey, a number of Gulf countries, and recently even China, have been exerting a disproportionate amount of influence on the region. This condition also puts the Western Balkans at a geopolitical crossroads. As a result, many countries in the region have been reshaping their foreign policies – just as socialist Yugoslavia used to do – by attempting to rebalance their interests between the East and the West. The recent return of the United States in the region is no surprise, then, especially in its attempts to shape the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo. Since 2013, thanks to the Brussels Agreement, this dialogue had been led by the EU. However, in the latter half of 2019 the US started trying to compete with the EU over who should be in charge of mediating the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Finally, Western Balkan societies are at a crossroads, too. On political allegiances and ideologies, citizens are increasingly split between the West and the “rest”. Many others are leaving their 8 The Balkans: Old, New Instabilities families behind, as they look for work or a new life elsewhere in Europe. Indeed, the Balkans have one of the highest rates of emigration in Europe, and their population is shrinking fast. Many educated, talented youths are leaving their countries in search for their place in the world. A region in transition calls for a thorough investigation of the many dimensions of this transition process, and this is what the current Report sets out to do. In the first chapter, Giorgio Fruscione explores this “never- ending transition”, intended as a long journey away from former Yugoslavia and towards Western Europe. However, after various wars in the Nineties, the region’s instability actually morphed into the pursuit of stability. Democratic institutions are often merely a facade, only partially hiding what turn out to be leaderships with autocratic tendencies, but which nevertheless enjoy endorsement from the West. Rulers play the card of nationalism only to reinvigorate and bring their constituencies together. These leaders still fan the flames of nationalism, taking advantage of the destructive rhetoric of the 1990s that left open a series of bilateral disputes. This instability has also been exacerbated by competing external powers. On one side, there is the European Union, which has treated the region as its “friendzone” for too long, losing credibility in the process; on the other, there are shady partners from the east, which have succeeded in presenting themselves as more credible from time to time. What has the European Union failed to do so far? Nikola Burazer argues that the fault can be found in the “stop-and- go” approach of EU institutions over the last three decades. In particular, EU conditionality has faded away, after failing to reward countries of the region when needed – as in the recent case of Macedonia, which became “North Macedonia” to please the West. After that failure, EU methodology was reformed,