Iraq in Crisis

Burke Chair in Strategy Iraq in Crisis By Anthony H. Cordesman and Sam Khazai January 29, 2014 Request for comments: This report is a draft that will be turned into an electronic book. Comments and suggested changes would be greatly appreciated. Please send any comments to Anthony H. Cordsman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, at [email protected]. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] Iraq in Crisis: Cordesman and Khazai Final Review AHC/SK 27.1.14 ii Acknowledgements This analysis was written with the assistance of Burke Chair researcher Daniel Dewit. Iraq in Crisis: Cordesman and Khazai Final Review AHC/SK 27.1.14 iii Executive Summary As events in late December 2013 and early 2014 have made brutally clear, Iraq is a nation in crisis bordering on civil war. It is burdened by a long history of war, internal power struggles, and failed governance. Is also a nation whose failed leadership is now creating a steady increase in the sectarian divisions between Shi’ite and Sunni, and the ethnic divisions between Arab and Kurd. Iraq suffers badly from the legacy of mistakes the US made during and after its invasion in 2003. It suffers from threat posed by the reemergence of violent Sunni extremist movements like Al Qaeda and equally violent Shi’ite militias. It suffers from pressure from Iran and near isolation by several key Arab states. It has increasingly become the victim of the forces unleashed by the Syrian civil war. The country’s main threats, however, result from self-inflicted wounds caused by its political leaders. Its election in 2010 divided the nation rather than create any form of stable democracy, and drove Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki to focus on preserving his power and steadily becoming a more authoritarian leader. Other Shi’ite leaders contributed to Iraq’s increasing sectarian and ethnic polarization, as well, as did key Sunni and Kurdish leaders. Since that time, a brutal power struggle has taken place between Maliki and senior Sunni leaders, and ethnic tensions have grown between the Arab dominated central government and senior Kurdish leaders in the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). The actions of Iraq’s top political leaders have led to a rise in Sunni and Shi’ite violence accelerated by the spillover effects and extremism of the Syrian civil war. This has led to a level of Shi’ite and Sunni violence unprecedented in recent years. This violence now threatens to explode into a civil conflict equal to – or worse than – the sectarian civil war that broke out during the US occupation. This struggle has been fueled by actions of the Iraqi government, including broad abuses of human rights and misuse of the Iraqi security forces that has repressed and marginalized large segments of the Iraqi population and has been capitalized upon by Al Qaeda and other extremist groups. As a result, the very forces that should help bring security and stability have destabilized the country, contributed to increased violence, and have become part of the threat. This analysis also shows, however, that the factors that have created the crisis in Iraq go much further than its current political leadership and even extend beyond threats like Al Qaeda and other militant movements that plague the country. Chapter I, the introduction of this analysis, sets forth that Iraq suffers intense demographic pressure resulting from population growth, and from an economy that has failed to translate oil wealth into economic growth, or meaningful levels of employment, and adequate per capita incomes. Iraq is a nation burdened by the disruption and mistakes of a US-led invasion in 2003, and by the failure to create a viable political system and effective governance in the years that followed. It is a nation that is deeply divided along sectarian and ethnic lines and whose internal divisions have become steadily deeper and more violent since US and other outside forces left at the end of 2011. Chapters II through Chapter IV trace the patterns and trends of growing violence in Iraq. At the end of 2013, Iraq was again on the on edge of a serious civil war. The analysis of the trends in Iraqi violence in this report explores the rising rate of violence, and underscores the fact that its seriousness cannot be measured simply in terms of deaths, but the increasing number of wounded and refugees and sectarian and ethnic polarization. Iraq in Crisis: Cordesman and Khazai Final Review AHC/SK 27.1.14 iv The analysis also shows that current measures of violence focus far too much on the role of violent non-state actors, ranging from Al Qaeda to Shi’a militias, and grossly understate the role state actors like the Maliki government, the Iraqi security forces, and competing Sunni and Kurdish political factions have played in bring Iraqi back to the edge of a major civil conflict. Chapters V through Chapter IX analyze the actors that are now leading Iraq down the path to civil war. They show that the primary and empowering cause of Iraq’s current violence is not extremist movements, or sectarian and ethnic divisions, but its failed politics and system of governance. These failures are led by the current Maliki government, but only because it – and Iraq’s Shi’ites – are now the dominant force in Iraq’s government and security services. Iraq’s other political leaders, and Sunni and Kurdish factions – as well as other Shi’ite factions – share responsibility for Iraq’s instability. The US is also at fault for making many of the mistakes that led to Iraq’s current predicament and its long history of failed governance. Additionally, these chapters show the dangers created by Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic factions, the role Iran has played in dividing Iraq and seeking its own goals, and the reemergence of the threat from Al Qaeda and other militias. Moreover, they analyze the dangers of the growing interaction between violence in Iraq and the Syrian civil war. All are warnings that a dominant Shi’ite leader may be able to repress opposing factions for a time – as Iraqi dictators and authoritarian leaders have done in the past – but that the only hope Iraq has for real stability is a national government that both unifies Iraq’s warring factions and gives each faction a fair share of wealth and power. Such reforms are also the only basis for effective security forces, economic development, and the full exploitation of Iraq’s oil wealth. Chapter X analyzes the current strengths and weaknesses of Iraq’s security forces. It shows that they are making progress but face massive problems in terms of effectiveness, corruption, ties to the office of the Prime Minister and Shi’ite factions, and their use in repression of legitimate political opposition. Today, they are both a path to stability and security and a threat to that same stability and security. They will remain so until Iraq has a more unified and truly national government. Moreover, unless outside actors take full account of the degree to which they are both a potential solution to Iraq’s violence, and its cause, increased involvement may push Iraq deeper into civil conflict. Chapter XI examines Iraq’s options for economic development. It shows Iraq has economic potential, but has made little progress towards achieving stable economic growth. Concepts and rhetoric fall short of actual economic development, infrastructure building, and effective government reform and practice. Over-dependence on petroleum earnings, weak and grossly overstaffed state-owned enterprises, and an agricultural sector in crisis add to these strains. So do major problems in education and health, water, and the development of adequate infrastructure. Trying to impose economic development on an increasing violent and divided society will fail, particularly in the face of factional greed, poor governance, and gross corruption; concepts which are explored fully in Chapter XI. Iraq needs more unity and equity and effective execution for economic growth, not endless plans and concepts. Iraq in Crisis: Cordesman and Khazai Final Review AHC/SK 27.1.14 v Chapter XII concludes the study by examining the problems created by overdependence on petroleum earnings in more detail, and the challengers in Iraq’s petroleum development and potential. It again finds that Iraq is making progress, but that this progress is not tied to practical and realistic goals and plans. Moreover, increases in petroleum wealth will only move Iraq forward and help curb its violence, if tied to more effective use, more equitable wealth distribution, combating Iraq’s factionalism and growing violence, and more effective political leadership and governance. This study does not end with a chapter attempting to propose simple solutions or impractical calls for sudden change and unity. It shows all too clearly just how complex and real Iraq’s problems are. It also shows that Iraq cannot succeed without major internal political reform that comes from within. No outside power can change the situation. Given Iraq’s current political divisions and leadership, the most the US and other outside states can do is choose between bad alternatives and pursue the least bad options. It is hard to think of US actions that could be more disastrous than provoking Iraqi resistance by attempting to reintroduce US troops, but it is equally difficult to imagine measures that could do more damage than backing Maliki without regard to his relentless consolidation of power, marginalization of opposition groups, repression and misuse of the Iraqi security forces, and exploitation of Iraq’s volatile sectarian divisions. This is not an argument against support in counterterrorism linked to serious and real efforts by Maliki or a successor to move towards national conciliation and the creation of a real unity government.

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