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SOCIAL IMPACTS OF THE KOSOVAR REFUGEE CRISIS IN ALBANIA Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized KOSTA BARJABA (AGRICULTURAL UNIVERSITY, TIRANA, AND ALBANIAN CENTER ON STUDIES ON EMIGRATION)

AND

GLORIA LA CAVA (THE WORLD BANK) Public Disclosure Authorized THE WORLD BANK EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA REGION ENVIRONMENTALLY AND SOCIALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

JUNE 2000 Public Disclosure Authorized LIST OF ACRONYMS

CDD Community Driven Development

ECA Region Europe and Central Asia Region of the World Bank

EMG Emergency Management Group

FYROM Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia

INSTAT Albanian Institute of Statistics

NGOs Non Governmental Organizations

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers

UNHCR United Nations Higher Commission for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

WFP World Food Program

WHO World Health Organization i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This social assessment (SA) examines the effects on Albania of the 1999 Kosovar refugee crisis, when nearly half a million Kosovars fled across the border to escape Serbian ethnic cleansing. Albania’s remarkable response to this short but intense human emergency not only was critical to helping the refugees, but helped to transform civil society in Albania, and to foster longer-term links between the Albanians and the Kosovars. The study finds that activities on behalf of refugees carried out by local governments, NGOs, religious organizations, community groups, women’s groups, youth groups, and families helped to generate the kinds of social cohesion and local capacity in Albania that are considered preconditions for successful development—preconditions that, before the crisis, donors had considered largely absent.

The efforts of Albanians at all levels to house, feed, educate, and provide counseling and other services to the refugees generated trust between civil society and local governments, enhanced the credibility of the NGO sector, and gave Albanians a sense of empowerment that has carried over to post-crisis civic actions. These include a number of grassroots efforts to build roads across borders; pursue cross-border trade, education, and cultural initiatives; and in other ways maintain and expand the new relationship with the Kosovars. In addition, the study finds that the crisis created some new opportunities for the participation of different social groups in community-driven development (CDD) initiatives across borders.

Methodology

The quantitative portion of the social assessment consisted of a survey of 500 Kosovar families living with Albanian families, with respondents equally divided between male and female. The qualitative portion consisted of interviews with hosts, NGO representatives, public administrators, and Albanian and Kosovar leaders; and focus groups with Kosovar women and girls.

Findings

Refugee profile. The profile of the refugees that emerged from the survey was of very young (more than a third less than 14 years old) and predominantly rural population. The families taken into Albanian homes averaged 8.7 people. Most respondents said they had been treated well but that Kosovo had a higher standard of living and better economic resources, and that they would not invest in Albania.

Self-help efforts of the refugees. Due in large part to Albanian support, the Kosovars were able to organize themselves into leadership structures that focused on the distribution of supplies and the dissemination of information about missing family members. Most leadership structures were in the camps; refugees living in private homes were more isolated. Some Kosovar NGOs also became active in Albania, but received little or no support from the international community.

The Albanian response. The central government sought assistance from NATO, the European Union, the United Nations, and foreign nations, and set up an Emergency Management Group (EMG) to coordinate this aid. EMG’s work was impressive in supplying the refugees with food and water and transporting them to camps. However, it was not significantly relevant to the 70 percent of the refugees in private accommodation; nor was it accessible to NGOs. In the absence of any plan for care of most of the refugee population, local authorities assumed primary ii responsibility for identifying and preparing shelter sites and providing food, clothing, and medical care. They shared this responsibility with local NGOs, more informal volunteer groups, and religious organizations, and these interactions helped to overcome a longstanding mistrust of local government authority.

About 70 percent of the refugees were taken in by private families, despite their own extreme poverty and cramped living conditions (7 square meters per capita). About 52 percent of the families paid rent, out of their own resources or remittances from relatives. For the rest, even if UNHCR cash-for-shelter payments (US$10 per month per person, for up to 12 refugees per household) were not forthcoming, most hosts showed remarkable generosity and formed close bonds with their guests.

There were also ad hoc local initiatives to provide Kosovar children with schooling, with the refugees participating heavily in planning and carrying out education programs. The Ministry of Education contributed books and materials out of supplies for Albanian children, and also led planning for a longer-range nationwide program to absorb a 15 percent increase in the student body. Although the refugees returned home before this became necessary, the effort was a significant expression of acceptance and mutual interest between the two communities.

Albanian NGOs also played a critical role in assisting the refugees. They identified host families and helped arrangement through the UNHCR program, gathered testimony on Serbian war crimes, and provided psychological counseling. As a result, social services in Albania experienced a qualitative change during the crisis. In particular, the crisis showed the potential of using volunteers to carry out socially constructive activities.

Longer-term impacts of the crisis on Albanians. As noted above, the refugee crisis mobilized local governments, catalyzed civil society, created a belief in social and civic empowerment, gave credibility to the NGO sector, and fostered trust and communication among different segments of society, as well as between the Albanians and the Kosovars. The country’s performance at all levels became the focus of international interest, and the social cohesion and local capacity activated by the crisis laid the groundwork for future development efforts. Thus, after the crisis ended, the Bank and other donors not only provided loans and technical support in areas such as roads, water supply, and community works to address Albania’s post-conflict needs, but have also pledged significant support for the government’s evolving poverty alleviation strategy and the country’s long-term development.

Perhaps the most important impact in a longer-term could come from the initiatives that have been undertaken to give towns near the border access to their natural geographical trading outlets the closing off of which has been a primary cause of the economic decline and poverty in these areas.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Kosovo refugee crisis had important local, national, and regional outcomes that have implications for Bank support. But while the potential for regional change will only become fully apparent over the next few years, the impacts of the crisis at the local level, as identified in this social assessment, are already clear. First and foremost was the promotion of social cohesion at the local level, which has the potential to further development and democratization, and to be a significant factor in political stabilization efforts in the country. Thus it is of paramount importance that any future international assistance support and strengthen this aspect. Overall, a iii better understanding of the refugee crisis should allow the World Bank to more effectively assess some structural constraints to Albania development. In particular, the Bank should:

· Strengthen existing local capacities. Local level institutions can be strengthened by: (1) building capacity in local administrations to promote micro-projects involving collaboration with community groups, and to deliver services to vulnerable citizens in cooperation with local NGOs; (2) providing community groups (parent-teacher associations, ethnic communities such as the Goranis, etc.) with the training and resources necessary to manage infrastructure and services aimed at economic and cultural exchanges with their counterparts across the Kosovo and FYROM borders; (3) enhancing the management skills of Albanian NGOs active in secondary towns, and promoting the creation of new associations by building on existing informal networks;

· Stem the brain drain from Albanian NGOs. A strategy aimed at empowering local NGOs, rather than just international ones, can help to stem their current brain drain. The Bank should support the human capital that began to develop during the crisis by promoting two kinds of NGO activities: those aimed at assisting vulnerable people, in cooperation with local governments; and cultural projects aimed at creating incentives for young people to contribute to their society rather than leave Albania;

· Create opportunities for the employment and integration of Albanian youth by developing their management expertise and technological skills, and promoting the establishment of information systems to link different actors working to improve quality of life in Albanian society;

· Disseminate the social assessment findings and recommendations in key communities, and analyze local institutions and social capital, particularly in border areas, as a way to support CDD initiatives;

· Soften borders by integrating communities in border areas, to promote ties among neighboring populations and thereby help prevent future conflicts; and

· Work to create a consensus with other international donors on a strategy to bring together local and national administrations and NGOs, and encourage cross-border activities.

· Make the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PSRP) a vehicle for representatives of various civil society groups (youth, women, educators, etc.) to have input into shaping the social agenda. Participation in the PRSP should also be used as a vehicle for developing local capacity in social analysis and monitoring. 1

1. INTRODUCTION

1. This social assessment (SA)1 examines the effects on Albania of the 1999 Kosovar refugee crisis, when nearly half a million Kosovars flooded into Albania during more than 70 days of air strikes to their homeland. At the height of the crisis in May 1999, the refugees accounted for nearly 15 percent of the total population of Albania, and the country, particularly local governments, community groups, NGOs, religious organizations, and individual volunteers mobilized to assist them with housing, food, clothing, medical care, and education for their children. While about half the refugees could pay with much-needed cash, the costs of those who could not pay were absorbed by the Albanians.2 Although almost all of the refugees were able to return to their homes by September, the short-lived coexistence of these two groups—the Albanians of Albania and the Albanians of Kosovo, which had been completely divided from each other and had lived under different political and economic systems for more than 80 years—is a matter of great interest. This is particularly true since Albania’s remarkable response to this short but intense human emergency took place while it was in the midst of its own grave social, political, and economic crisis. The manner in which the Albanians mobilized themselves to respond to the refugee crisis could have a long-term transformative effect on Albania’s ability to participate meaningfully in development efforts.3

1 This assessment is based mainly on a Bank-commissioned study, “Social and Economic Impacts of Kosovar Refugees on Albania: Final Report,” Tirana (September 1999), by Kosta Barjaba, et al. We refer to that study throughout this report as Working Paper 1. Several other sources contributed additional information.

2 Estimates of the economic impact of the crisis have changed with each subsequent evaluation. Working Paper 2, “Albania: The Economic Impact of the Kosovo Crisis,” ECA Region, World Bank (July 9,1999), cites Albanian government estimates of a budgetary gap of US$154 million, over the amount financed by relief organizations, due to increased expenditures in health, education, public order, public works, and local infrastructure as a result of the crisis. Another World Bank document prepared seven months later, the Albania Country Assistance Strategy – Progress Report (February 22, 2000), puts the budgetary cost of the crisis at an estimated US$85 million, but says these expenditures were eventually balanced by an equal amount of foreign assistance. An even more positive view is presented in a later report by the International Crisis Group (ICG). That report, “Albania: State of the Nation,” ICG Balkans Report No. 87 (March 1, 2000), notes that, “according to the Bank of Albania, the refugee crisis had a positive effect on the economy, helping to create a current account surplus of 30 million USD in the second quarter. The influx of nearly half a million refugees, the import of Western food aid to feed them, and the deployment of a substantial NATO military force, helped Albania achieve a surplus in services of up to 80 million USD in the second quarter….[A bank official said that] during their stay in Albania…the Kosovo population spent considerable hard currency on top of that obtained from foreign aid” (p. 3).

3 A number of other agencies have studied various other impacts of the refugee crisis. For example, an assessment by the donor-financed Albania Development Fund focuses on physical needs in the 10 districts most affected by the refugee inflow; and a UNDP assessment focuses on impacts and opportunities for reform in the health, education, law, roads, and electric power sectors. 2

Background

2. The magnitude of the refugees’ impact was due largely to the fact that Albania’s social, economic, and political institutions were themselves fragmented, and therefore not strong enough to absorb them without being changed. In particular, Albanian society was suffering from: (1) political and social polarization along north-south lines; (2) a traditional clan-based social structure with no loyalty to political institutions; (3) urban areas that were crime-ridden (including drug and human trafficking and violence against women), with few social services for the many rural migrants who suddenly found themselves marginalized and were without adequate safety nets; and (4) the lack of government credibility in the eyes of the population and its constrained efforts toward cohesion, stabilization, and economic development. This lack of credibility had been exacerbated in 1997 by the collapse of the banking system in the wake of the transition and structural reform effort, resulting in a further deterioration of services, and triggered large-scale civil disturbances leading nearly to anarchy. The after-effects of this political volatility were still being felt when the refugees started to arrive.

3. The Albanian population was, at the time of the refugee crisis, keenly aware that it was the poorest population in Europe, with 20 percent of its people living below the poverty line: per capita GDP only a quarter of the average for Central European transition countries; infant and maternal mortality rates about twice as high as for those other countries; and declining male and female life expectancies. Thus, the government was under enormous pressure to develop the economy and bring the country up to the level of its wealthier neighbors. Even the Kosovars, whom the Serbs had been evicting from public life throughout the 1990s, had been exposed to Yugoslavia’s more developed economy. This exile from public life had forced the Kosovars to develop as an entrepreneurial class, so when they began to migrate in small numbers to Albania in the early 1990s, they were able to set up small trading and productive enterprises.

4. However, the process of building links between the two communities mainly occurred when the half million refugees poured across the border within a matter of days in March and April 1999. Although there was widespread fear that the crisis would precipitate another social breakdown, instead the crisis catalyzed change in the Albanian population, which was able to move beyond its fragmentation to act with a common purpose and vision.

Objectives of the Study

5. This study assesses the social changes that occurred in Albanian communities, institutions, and civil society as a result of the refugee crisis, in order to better understand the similarities and differences of the two populations, and build on the cooperative efforts that began during the crisis. By closely examining such issues as how the Albanians provided for the housing, food, and educational needs of the refugees, the study attempts to shed light on:

· Social profile of the refugees (age, gender, education level), hosting arrangements by district, the role of remittances from abroad in sustaining the refugees, and the nature of their interactions with Albanian society; 3

· characteristics of the Kosovars who had emigrated earlier, and the nature of their investments in Albanian society; and

· the role played by local governments, communities, NGOs and families in providing assistance to refugees, and how this effort enhanced social cohesion and local capacity.

6. Findings from this study will lay the groundwork for future policies and programs by the World Bank and other donors, and particularly for poverty alleviation efforts that build on social cohesion and local capacity developed during the crisis. The findings will also contribute to the Bank’s broader Social Development Initiative for the Balkans, which aims to integrate the concerns of populations affected by war in the design of reconciliation and reconstruction efforts. And finally, by contributing to a better understanding of Albanian society, the findings of this study will support regional stabilization initiatives under the Stability Pact for South East Europe.4

2. METHODOLOGY

7. The assessment was conducted over a period of 12 weeks (July-September 1999) by a team of local and international social scientists,5 using both quantitative and qualitative research tools. The quantitative work consisted of a household survey of 500 Kosovar refugee families, consisting of 4,354 individuals, or 8.7 persons per family.

The survey questions covered five broad areas:

· characteristics of the refugees (age, education level, area of origin);

· the refugees’ views of the comparative economic resources and cultural values of the two countries;

· their experiences with their hosts;

· their financial resources while in Albania, including the cost of rent, and whether they earned any income or received remittances from relatives abroad; and

4 The Stability Pact was established after the Kosovo Peace Settlement to promote peace, stability, and prosperity in Southeastern Europe. It calls for the countries to foster social inclusiveness, develop open democratic societies, improve governance, and initiate domestic structure reforms. See CAS Progress Report.

5 The team comprised Gloria La Cava, Senior Social Scientist, World Bank, and Prof. Dr. Kosta Barjaba, Agricultural University, Tirana, University of Shkodra, and the Albanian Center of Studies on Emigration (assessment leaders); Dr. Milva Ikonomi, INSTAT; Prof. Dr. Sulejman Sulce, Agricultural University of Tirana, Dr. Zamira Sinoimeri; and Amina Tirana, former staff member of the Emergency Management Group (EMG). The research was conducted by the local team after the bombing in Kosovo had stopped and the refugees were returning home, so the data gathering took place under less than ideal conditions. The local team is to be commended for carrying out its work under very difficult circumstances. The current report was reviewed by Professor Stefano Bianchini, Universita degli Studi Di Bologna and by Stephanie Schaudner-Sievers, School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, University of London. 4

· their view of future relations between Albania and Kosovo, including the possibility that they might invest in Albania in the future.6

8. The sample was randomly selected from lists provided by the Ministry of Local Authorities and the Albanian Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) local offices, and weighted according to the geographic distribution of the refugees (see Table 1). Fifty percent of the household heads in the sample were male, and 50 percent were female.

Table 1. Distribution of Families Participating in the Survey

No. of Questionnaires TIRANA 300 Tirana Municipality 240 Kamez Municipality 31 Kashar Municipality 29 DURRES 112 Durres Municipality 56 Rashbull Municipality 37 Katund I Ri Commune 19 SHKODER 95 Shkoder Municipality 80 Berdice Municipality 4 Rrethina Municipality 11 KURBIN 48 Lac Municipality 20 Mamurras Municipality 21 Fushe-Kuqe Commune 7 KAVAJE 45 Kavaje Municipality 27 Golem Commune 12 Helmas Commune 6

9. The qualitative work took place in the districts of Tirana, Durres, Kavaje, Shkoder, Kurbin, and Fier, as well as Elbasan, Korca and Kukes. The work consisted of interviews with host Albanian families, public administrators, and NGOs involved in efforts to assist the Kosovars; and with leaders of the Albanian and Kosovar communities. In addition, focus groups were conducted with Kosovar girls and women; Kosovar investors who had set up

6 The complete questionnaire is attached as Annex 1. 5 enterprises in Albania as early as 1991; and Albanian managers, bankers, historians, economists, academics, and representatives of NGOs.7

3. FINDINGS

10. The assessment found that the shock of nearly half a million Kosovars flowing into the country within a period of several weeks in 1999 had a number of profound social, economic, and political impacts on the Albanian population. The impacts like the response to the crisis, began at the household and community levels, even before the crisis brought international attention and donor funds. While the crisis also created possibilities for national development and regional cooperation, the SA found that the local impacts were the most profound.

In particular,

· The population’s identification with the suffering of the refugees helped to shift their focus from their dissatisfaction with their own situation and to catalyze positive action, including by urban youth groups.8 While many refugees could afford to pay for food and rent, and collectively brought in an estimated US$80 million in cash and transfers,9 assistance was forthcoming even for those who could not pay. Activities on behalf of the refugees were carried out by local governments, NGOs, religious organizations, community groups, and individuals; and these activities helped to catalyze the energy of local populations that had long been demoralized. The sense of empowerment they gained from that experience has created the potential for further development of social cohesion and inclusive local institutions—both of which have been identified as preconditions for successful poverty alleviation and development efforts.10

· At later stages, when the crisis began to attract international donor funds, a large proportion of those funds was channeled through the central government to local governments and NGOs, thus enhancing their ability to foster cohesion and support poverty alleviation and development efforts in local communities. On a negative note, however, the work of some local NGOs early in the crisis was overshadowed by the later work of international NGOs, some local NGOs did not receive donor funds, and some local NGO staff were eventually hired by these larger organizations, thus diminishing the capacity of the local groups.

The report’s more specific findings are elaborated below.

7 A matrix of NGOs interviewed and their capabilities is attached as Annex 2. 8 A World Bank study conducted in 1997-98 had identified urban youth as at risk for drug use and crime. See Albania: Filling the Vulnerability Gap, by Gloria La Cava and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, World Bank Technical Report 40 (2000).

9 See ICG report.

10 See CAS Progress Report. 6

Pre-crisis Relations between the Albanians and the Kosovar Immigrant Community

11. The response to the refugee crisis was all the more remarkable in light of the tensions that had developed between the Albanians and the Kosovars who had immigrated to Albania between 1991 and 1997.11 This first wave of migrants had coincided with radical measures taken by the Serbs in 1991 to fire all Kosovar Albanian workers from their jobs and to obstruct education in Albanian, forcing hundreds of thousands of Kosovars, primarily unmarried young males, to emigrate to Albania, the Federal Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and Western Europe in search of economic opportunity.12 The Kosovars who came to Albania found a very poor country with high unemployment. They used their capital to set up the first private services in Albania, opening bars, restaurants, bakeries, wood and silver processing firms, and other small enterprises—either alone or in joint ventures with Albanian partners—and making good returns on relatively small investments within a short period of time. Their contributions to the Albanian economy were recognized in 1992 by the adoption of laws on double nationality and on foreign direct investment, which put the Kosovars in a favorable position to purchase privatized Albanian enterprises. They then became engaged in larger activities such as civil construction and food processing factories.

12. The attitude of the Albanians became less welcoming, however, in 1993 and 1994, as they began to perceive that the Kosovars were treating them unfairly. Kosovars living in Albania, and their relatives abroad, began to buy land, apartments, and shops at speculative prices. In addition, although a remarkable 32 percent of the business licenses given to Albanians in 1993 were for joint activities with the Kosovars, a number of these activities were soon suspended, reportedly because of the Kosovars’ attempts to force the Albanians out of the partnerships.13 Although the lack of data makes analysis of this situation difficult,14 information from the Albanian Income Tax Office clearly shows the main characteristics and trends in Kosovar investment during this first wave of immigration. One hundred twenty enterprises with Kosovar capital were registered in 1991-1996, with total Kosovar capital amounting to US$10 million and comprising 96 percent of total investment in these enterprises. However, most of this investment occurred in 1993 and 1994, after which the level of Kosovar investment in Albania began to decline sharply (see Table 2).

11 The information in this section is based on interviews and research carried out by the local team (see Working Paper 1, sections 1.1-1.3).

12 The Albanian Minister of Information, citing not specified former Yugoslav Republic statistics, told a member of the local team that 438,000 Kosovars emigrated to other countries in 1993. Precise numbers of immigrants coming to Albania during this period are unavailable, due to the failure of state authorities and relevant institutions to regularly register them.

13 Interviews by local team.

14 According to INSTAT, there were about 3,109 foreign and joint enterprises in Albania at the end of 1998, but there are no data on the nationality of the foreign capital. 7

Table 2. Number of Enterprises with Kosovar Capital, by Year of Creation

Year of Creation No. of Enterprises Share of Kosovar Capital (%) 1992 5 1.4 1993 36 1.4 1994 56 96.8 1995 10 0.07 1996 8 0.07 Unidentified 5 0.04 Total 120 100 Source: Income Tax Office, 1997.

13. Although the pace of other foreign investment also declined during this period, due to the high level of country risk and the slow pace of reform, Kosovar investment fell more steeply. This has been explained largely by the growing antipathy toward the Kosovars, who, as noted above, came to be perceived by the Albanians as exploitative. Unlike Greek and Italian investment, which was distributed more widely throughout the country, and especially along the axis between the capital, Tirana, and the port of Durres, 99 percent of Kosovar investment was concentrated in Tirana, which had a more developed market and infrastructure than other cities.

The Refugees

14. When the huge wave of Kosovar refugees flooded into Albania in March-May 1999, on foot, in cars, and in buses, they were a persecuted and traumatized population that tended to congregate in public parks and squares, markets, telecommunications center, and distribution points, desperate for news of family members.15 Intense coverage by the Albania media emphasized the generosity of ordinary citizens and helped to catalyze widespread participation in the national relief effort. Much of this work was carried out through local governments, NGOs, private citizens, restaurant owners, and religious organizations, which quickly mobilized to provide the refugees with food and shelter, and their children with education. Thus, although the refugee crisis had at first precipitated widespread fears of another social breakdown, instead it revealed the existence of deep collective bonds in both the Albanian and Kosovar communities.

Profile of the refugees – survey results

15. The results of the survey reveal that the refugee population was largely young (more than a third were less than 14 years old, and more than half less than 24 years old); rural (two-thirds were from small villages); and with a mid-level education (22.7 percent had

15 For an account of the refugees’ experiences written during the height of the crisis, see “Report of Mission to Albania,” Refugees International, Washington DC (June 28, 1999). 8 finished an 8-year education, and 22.1 percent had finished high school or a technical/vocational training program). The preponderance of young people among the refugees helps explain the focus of both the Albanians and the Kosovar refugee leaders on providing schooling for Kosovar children (see below). Despite the ambivalent relationship between the two groups that had developed over the last decade, the Albanians took in families of Kosovars averaging 8.7 members, and, according to the survey, 48 percent of these hosts provided housing without charging rent.16 Thus the Kosovars were able to spend more than half their money (53 percent) on food, though they spent almost nothing (0.3 percent) on medical care. Of the small proportion of refugees (5 percent) who generated income while in Albania, many (41.4 percent) did so through trading activities, and more than half (58.6 percent) worked in teaching, construction, and urban services. Most of those who worked (93.1 percent) earned less than US$500 per month. The great majority (94.3 percent) also received remittances from emigrated relatives during the war period, which continued the pattern of remittances they had been receiving before fleeing Kosovo. The level of remittances appears to have risen during this period, with many relatives sending, during those several months, as much as or more than they would normally send in a year. That these remittances reached this sample of refugees, spread out as they were among 500 private homes, is evidence of the remarkable level of cooperation among all the organizations involved.

16. In terms of the refugees’ view of their experience with the Albanians and of Albania in general, most said their own country had a higher living standard (90.5 percent) and better economic resources (67.3 percent). Most, however, described their hosts as sincere (85.4 percent) and generous (92.6 percent), though, paradoxically, less than half (47.8 percent) thought they were rational. Nevertheless, the majority (61.6 percent) said the hosting fully met their expectations. And though a large majority (78.8 percent) said they expected to maintain their ties with Albanians after their return to Kosovo, only a small proportion (6.2 percent) said they would invest any money in Albania.

Self-help efforts of the refugees

17. Due in large part to Albanian support, the Kosovars were able to rapidly organize themselves into leadership structures that focused on issues such as the distribution of food and supplies and the dissemination of information about missing family members. Especially in the camps and collective centers, impressive leadership structures emerged for managing food distribution, education, sanitation, and security. Refugees living in private homes were more isolated, since no structures existed to provide them with information (many, for example, did not know of the availability of free medical care, or of ways to trace missing family members);17 but leadership was still able to emerge among the refugees in a number of communities. In Korca, for example, the Kosovars formed a 15-member committee that assumed responsibility for administration and

16 The Refugees International report on the other hand, estimates that approximately two-thirds of Kosovar refugees living in private accommodation countrywide paid rent. By area, according to that report, 80-90 percent of hosted refugees paid rent in Tirana and Durres; 65-70 percent paid rent in Skhodra; 50 percent paid rent in Elbesan; and 25-30 percent paid rent in Korca.

17 Refugees International report. 9 oversight of various issues of concern to the refugees. And in Durres, the Kosovar Youth Council was created between Albanians and Kosovars.18 Representative structures also emerged among refugees in smaller towns and villages, although dialogue did not extend easily across cities and their public visibility was low.19 In addition to these leadership groups, some Kosovar NGOs became active in Albania. A small Kosovar NGO known as SMS furnished fresh vegetables and cheese to refugees living in private homes, and the Kosovar-run Mother Theresa Society, the largest NGO in Kosovo even before the war, worked on food distribution and education programs. However, these and other Kosovar organizations in Albania received little or no support from the international community.20

The Albanian Response to the Refugees

Central Government

18. When the first refugees crossed into Albania on March 24 at the northeastern border between Kosovo and Kukes prefecture, the government’s political response was unequivocal. The refugees were welcomed without limit on numbers or length of stay, and reception at the border was open and unhindered, thus alleviating growing international concern about where the Kosovars could find a haven. To meet the costs of the crisis, the Parliament quickly approved an emergency budget that reallocated funds to the ministries most involved, including health, transport, education, public order, public works, and local government. An announced salary increase for public employees was delayed without outcry from the workers.21

19. The government also made a practical and strategic choice to seek direct international assistance from NATO, the European Union, the United Nations, and foreign countries, and to impose few conditions on this aid, which brought international attention and resources to Albania. This aid was coordinated by the Emergency Management Group (EMG), a government-led, joint national-international coordination mechanism created by the prime minister on March 31, within days of the first influx of refugees. This mechanism was formed, at the suggestion of the head of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and with the enthusiastic backing of the United States embassy.22 EMG combined technical and sector desks in food, shelter, transport, health, information, and security with coordination meetings and information sharing among all main actors,

18 Refugees International report.

19 Interviews by the local team.

20 Refugees International report.

21 Working Paper 3, “National and Local Government and Community Response to the Kosovar Refugee Emergency in Albania,” by Amina Tirana, mimeo, (December 1999).

22 “Coordination in the 1999 Kosovo Refugee Emergency: The Emergency Management Group (EMG), Albania—An Evaluation,” by John Telford, DFID, United Kingdom (February 15, 2000). 10 including NATO, UNHRC, WFP, and WHO, the international agencies responsible for transport, accommodation, food, and health services, respectively.

20. Subsequent evaluations judge EMG to have been an impressive emergency coordination mechanism, considering the lack of an overall strategy for handling the refugees; though its functioning was far from ideal in several important aspects.23

21. On the positive side, EMG oversaw the arrival and registration of refugees, the provision of identity cards, the vaccination of children against measles and poliomyelitis, and the construction of tented camps. It also set priorities, first on a daily and then on a weekly basis, for supplying the refugees with food and drinking water, and mobilized public and private resources to transport nearly two-thirds of the refugees from Kukes (see Box 1) and other insecure, hard-to-access, and over-crowded northern border areas to central and southern parts of the country.24 And during repatriation, EMG coordinated with UNHCR to provide the refugees with identification papers; beds, blankets, kitchenware, and foodstuff; and logistical support for their return to Kosovo.25

Box 1. The Refugees in Kukes

Kukes is a city of 25,000 in northeastern Albania, through which 92 percent of the refugees passed after crossing over to Albania through the Morine border pass. With extreme poverty (38 percent of the population living on economic assistance from the state), an almost total lack of infrastructure, a network of destroyed canals, and shortages of drinking water and electricity, Kukes managed to shelter and feed an estimated 50,000 refugees per day as they waited to be transported to other areas of the country. Individuals, families, and all state structures were put at the disposal of the emergency situation.

The national and international coordination mechanisms in Kukes were linked but operated separately—the national authorities through one mechanism, and the internationals (under UNHCR) through another. On a daily basis, the prefect of Kukes and UNHCR met to link the two fora and coordinate relevant action. Despite significant tensions, Kukes became a model for future national/international cooperation.

Sources: Working Paper 1 and EMG report.

22. On the negative side, EMG was—in line with the international relief operation in general—almost exclusively preoccupied with the needs of the refugees in camps and collective centers, and was “not significantly relevant to the well-being of the majority of the refugee population who were in private accommodation.”26 In addition, EMG was not accessible to NGOs,27 and the lack of clarity as to EMG’s role made it necessary for line

23 See in particular, DFID report. See also Working Paper 1 and Working Paper 3.

24 The distribution of refugees by district is shown in Annex 3. 25 Working Paper 1.

26 DFID report (p. 36).

27 DFID report. 11 ministries, prefects, mayors, and local organizations to coordinate with international relief agencies in parallel with EMG. This helped perpetuate the “confusion and lack of coordination in providing the minimal living conditions for the refugees [that] characterized the emergency”28 from the beginning. It also meant that in the initial weeks, the “local authorities and communities throughout Albania organized the reception and accommodation of refugees largely through their own initiatives.”29

Local governments and civil society

23. While national and international attention was focused on the large concentrations of refugees in Kukes, Durres, and Tirana, by April 13 more than two-thirds of the refugees were in the southern and central parts of Albania. In the absence of any national plan or guidelines for care of this population, the Ministry of Local Governments distributed the country’s stockpiles of grains, oils, military blankets, tents, and mattresses to local authorities, who assumed primary responsibility for identifying shelter sites and providing food and medical care. The local authorities, in turn, divided this responsibility with local NGOs and more informal volunteer groups, which became central to the work of distributing food and supplies, and of rehabilitating deteriorated large public buildings, including schools, factories, and sports arenas, for use as collective centers. Interviews by the local team indicate that these interactions helped to overcome a longstanding lack of trust of local government authority. The Orthodox church, women’s groups, and youth groups collected clothing and medicine for the centers in their areas, and local restaurants donated food or supplied hot meals under modest contracts with municipal governments (see Box 2).

Box 2. Local Response – The Collective Centers

Unlike in the camps, which were run by international agencies, Albanians had a pronounced role in the collective centers, many of which were identified, opened, and run by local authorities. By early June, about 95,000 refugees lived in more than 300 collective centers across Albania, and many more had passed through them. Even after the arrival of international organizations, which provided food, health, sanitation, and other services, local authorities retained responsibility for managing a number of collective centers that were more distant from the capital. The condition of the sites and supply of goods and programs at each center depended on the strength of the local authority, involved NGOs, and the community, as well as on (often less consistent) international aid.

In the south, where 10,000 refugees were suddenly brought in by bus from FYROM, the Korce prefecture office immediately dispatched them throughout the prefecture. In Korce city, the mayor and deputy mayor coordinated the reception of several thousand sent to their municipality. The sports palace, a former pioneer camp, and several factories were identified as shelter sites, and the municipality sought assistance from the community Restaurants donated food, and municipal employees used their own cars to transport food and goods to the centers. The government approved a limited diversion of funds from regular budgets and with these funds, the deputy mayor negotiated contracts with three restaurants to provide hot meals for the refugees. As of April 10, Korce had received some blankets, emergency ready-to-eat rations, and other limited supplies from national and international sources, but was without regular national or international assistance. In interviews, the deputy mayor credited the municipal staff and cooperation of Korce 28 Workingresidents, Paper businesses, 1 (para. 1.3.6.)and the Orthodox church and community with having met the needs of 29 Workingthe refugees. Paper 3 (p.4).

Source: Working Paper 3, and local team interviews with mayor, deputy mayor, and other officials in Korce. 12

24. Even more notable than the response to the needs of refugees in collective centers was its response in providing private housing and education. In fact, the host family system and education for school-age children became the most important areas of interaction and understanding between the Albanian and Kosovar communities.30

· Host family system. Despite the extreme poverty, lack of living space (7 square meters per capita), almost total lack of infrastructure, and shortages of drinking water and electricity in many areas of Albania, about 70 percent of the refugees were taken in by private families, some of whom drove across the border in their own cars to rescue the Kosovars. Many districts, especially in the north, absorbed between 10 and 30 percent of their total populations,31 and in some cities, such as Kukes, the first stop for many refugees, the proportion was much higher (see Box 1).

Findings from the survey indicate that about 52 percent of those living with families paid rent, either with their own resources or with remittances from relatives abroad. The rents ranged from DM 150 to 300 per month, with the highest percentage of renters (80-90 percent) living with families in Tirana and Durres, and the lowest (25-30 percent) in Korca. Among those not paying rent, most felt the host family would have allow them to stay until it was possible for them to return safely to Kosovo. A number of these hosts were relatives or friends of the family who would not have put their guests out under any circumstances. While there were some cases of hosts progressively increasing rent until the refugees were forced to leave for camps in Korca, Elbasan, and Durres, and other cases of hosts telling their guests they would have to leave if payments promised under the UNHCR cash-for-shelter program (US$10 per refugee per month, for up to 12 refugees per household) were not forthcoming, the majority of those who had no previous relationship with their guests showed remarkable generosity and formed close bonds with them. Some local people clearly exploited the refugees situation in order to gain short-term economic advantages, yet nearly all refugees told the local team that they would open their own homes to as many of their countrymen as possible upon their return to Kosovo.

· Education. During the first two months, there were ad hoc local initiatives to provide Kosovar children with schooling, particularly in areas where Albanian NGOs, international aid agencies, and teachers within the Kosovar refugee community were present. Local education had an early start in Durres, Kukes, Tirana, and Elbasan (see Box 3), with the refugees participating heavily in planning and carrying out the education programs, undoubtedly a result of their nine years of experience conducting a parallel education system in Kosovo. The Ministry of Education contributed books and materials to the local efforts, out of supplies for Albanian children. The ministry also encouraged and supported the opening of summer schools to make up for the months of school the Kosovar

31 For the local team’s estimates of refugee distribution by district, see Annex 2. 13

children had missed. Summer schools in many areas of the country opened on June 7.

At the same time, the ministry led planning for a longer-range nationwide refugee education program that was to be implemented by local authorities. The challenge was to absorb a 15 percent increase in the student body and the increased burden on the school system, while taking account of cultural differences between the children of the two populations. The Albanian teachers were to be paid with funds from UNICEF or other donors, while the issue of whether Kosovar teachers would be paid remained unresolved. On the negative side, this national planning created some tensions with local Albanian education authorities, who had been granted increasing autonomy through decentralization over the past few years. In addition, the ministry and Kosovar leaders at times disagreed as to what would be in the best interest of Kosovar students and how to integrate them into the Albanian school system while matching academic qualifications (issues that were not played out, as the refugees returned home several months before the education program was to be finalized).32 Nevertheless, the efforts of the Albanian and Kosovar leadership to provide for the needs of Kosovar children was a significant expression of acceptance and mutual understanding between the two communities.

Box 3. Local Response – Education

The central industrial city of Elbasan has a strong tradition of civic participation and a sizable population of Kosovar descent. It is also the national home of the retired teachers’ association and the national secondary school for teachers.

With 7,600 refugees in the city (4,000 of whom were staying with host families), the mayor called for all Kosovar intellectuals to attend meetings in the town hall to discuss the relief effort and share information. By April 12, this group had met four times, and educators and religious groups had organized classes for Kosovar children in churches, even though emergency food and other goods were still lacking. Albanian teachers and refugees who were teachers in Kosovo volunteered to run these classes.

Source: Local team interviews with mayor of Elbasan and with Kosovar refugees.

25. Non-governmental organizations. Albanian NGOs also played an important role in providing for the needs of the refugees. They identified host families and, in cases where refugees did not have their own resources, helped arrange payment through the UNHCR’s cash-for-shelter program or through refugees’ families in the diaspora. NGOs also gathered testimony on Serbian war crimes, supported refugee leadership structures, and provided entertainment, legal help, and psychological counseling for those who had been traumatized by the war, especially women and children.33 Interviews by the local team indicate that about

32 Working Paper 3.

33 See Working Paper 4, “Refugees’ Impact on Albanian Civil Society: The Role of Local NGOs,” by Luisa Chiodi, mimeo (October 1999). The report divides the country’s several hundred NGOs into two basic types: those set up by donors in the early 1990s according to the Western model, including youth, 14

2,800 social workers, medical workers, and educators from 126 local NGOs participated in this effort, which was carried out mostly in the camps and collective centers. As a result, social services in Albania experienced a qualitative change during the crisis. Even during the crisis, NGOs with preexisting relationships with donors received financial resources, while those without such relationships were marginalized, or else used by the international NGOs as local service deliverers rather than viewed as partners. Some international NGOs hired local NGO staff rather than work in partnership with their organizations, which had the post- crisis effect of diminishing the local human resource capacity in the country, especially at the community level.34

26. Despite these problems, the involvement of NGOs in assisting and supporting the refugees marked a significant change in the NGOs’ relationship with both government and the population. Before the crisis, public trust in the NGOs had been low, for two major reasons. First, most had been created and promoted by donors in the early and mid 1990s to carry out projects that were a focal point for the transition. And second, the NGOs’ relations with public institutions had been dominated by the competition for foreign resources. Thus, they had been perceived either as self-interested or as instruments of foreign efforts to change Albania, rather than as a source of socially beneficial activity.35

27. The crisis helped to transform the NGO sector by showing the potential of using volunteers to help carry out their activities. Urban youth participated extensively with NGO refugee activities on a voluntary basis, and women’s NGOs were active in collecting food, clothing, and medicine from the population, especially before the international organizations began their operations. since volunteerism had been heavily manipulated by the former regime, and was associated with authoritarianism rather than with self-empowerment, NGO representatives had not considered it appropriate to promote such a practice after the transition. However, Albanians said in interviews with a member of the study team36 that the experience of being highly motivated and engaged helped to change their view of civic engagement. It also helped some NGOs to develop a reputation for significant work, to learn new skills, and to gain the trust of Albanian citizens who are the potential beneficiaries of other NGO services. The refugee crisis also gave NGOs a chance to establish new relations with Kosovar partners—for example, the Kosovar Youth Council mentioned above—and, in some cases, to directly contribute to the formation of equivalent NGOs among the refugees they worked with. All NGO representatives interviewed for this study reported being eager to maintain contact with their counterparts, and some have already visited them in Kosovo. While logistical problems have so far limited the scope of interaction between the two communities, some Albanian NGOs also reported being willing to contribute to the formation of civil society in Kosovo.37 women’s, and environmental organizations; and those that arose more recently from the grassroots to fight for increased social services. These distinctions became immaterial during the refugee crisis. The paper estimates that 180 Albanian NGOs of all types participated in crisis relief efforts.

34 Working Paper 4.

35 Working Paper 4.

36 Luisa Chiodi, as reported in Working Paper 4.

37 Working Paper 4. For more on how Albanian NGOs developed capacity during the crisis, see Annex 4. 15

Longer-term Impacts of the Crisis on Albanians

28. The foregoing discussion makes clear that the refugee crisis had a profound effect on Albania. It mobilized local governments, catalyzed civil society, created a momentum for social and civic engagement, gave some credibility to the NGO sector, and fostered trust and communication among different segments of society, as well as between the Albanians and the Kosovars. The country’s performance at all levels became the focus of international interest; and the social cohesion and local capacity activated by the crisis laid the groundwork for future development efforts. Thus, after the crisis ended, the Bank and other donors have not only provided loans and technical support in areas such as roads, water supply, and community works to address Albania’s post-conflict needs, but have also pledged significant support for the government’s evolving poverty alleviation strategy and the country’s long- term development.38

29. There have also been efforts to promote greater social and cultural ties between Albania and Kosovo, although no greater investments in Albania by Kosovars should be expected at a time when they are trying to re-build their own homeland. Perhaps the most important impact in a longer term will come from the initiatives that have been undertaken to give towns near the border access to their natural geographical trading outlets, the closing off of which had been a primary cause of the economic decline and poverty in these areas.39 On the national level, the Albanian government is focusing on expanding road and rail links between northern Albania and Kosovo, to promote the economic development of northern Albania and reduce Kosovo’s economic dependence on Serbia. The prime minister announced in August 1999 that developing links with Kosovo was a priority for his government, and asked for donor financing and contributions of the Albanian people to build a road starting at the port of Durres that would link Tirana, the capital of Albania, with Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, via the Morina border crossing in northern Albania. He also offered Durres as Kosovo’s port city, so that Kosovo would have a port free of Belgrade’s control. And the World Bank-funded Albanian Development Fund, has financed reconstruction of a road linking northeast Albania with the Kosovo town of Gjacova (Djakovica), bringing both areas out of the isolation they had suffered since the countries were divided.40

30. During the same month, the prime minister also asked officials in Tirana to draw up plans to unify the education systems of Albania and Kosovo, and to intensify cooperation among the universities of Tirana, Pristina, and Tetovo. Three Tirana universities will soon sign an agreement of cooperation with Pristina University, which will enable an exchange of teaching staff and the organization of joint research projects. There will also be workshops aimed at coordinating a unified university curriculum. In addition, officials are discussing the inclusion of education programs for ethnic Albanians in Montenegro.41

38 CAS Progress Report.

39 ICG report.

40 ICG report.

41 ICG report. 16

31. There have also been important initiatives on the grassroots level. One notable example is a road built by the Gorani minority. The Goranis are Muslim Slavs who speak a language akin to Macedonian and live in a collection of 20 villages, 8 of which are in eastern Albania, 3 in FYROM, and 9 in the southwestern tip of Kosovo. When the crisis ended, the Goranis in the northern Kukes district funded, out of their own resources, construction of a road to connect these 20 villages, irrespective of national borders. In addition, inhabitants of the Gorani village of Borja paved the 3 km road from their village to the border and on to the village of Globocica in Kosovo.42

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

32. The refugee crisis was unexpectedly short. Because of the urgent need to respond to the Serbian persecution of the Kosovars, it brought hosting and refugee populations together, triggering the long-established Albanian tradition of hospitality and unity against an external threat. It is difficult to predict what would have happened had the refugees stayed much longer. In addition, the medium and long-term sustainability of the collective response should not be over-estimated, as indicated by the renewed political conflict within Albania as soon as the crisis was over.

33. Nevertheless, the refugee crisis shed light on the positive effects of local solidarity and civic engagement. In particular, this assessment indicates that not only the immediate response, but also the overall challenge to handle and accommodate refugees was primarily met by the Albanian people, especially at the local level. Of course the international support and attention were instrumental, but without the effective coping strategies set up by Albanians and Kosovars, this would have been insufficient.

34. By creating a sense of cohesion and purpose that extended from the national level to local communities, the crisis helped, at least for some time, to overcome feelings of powerlessness, lack of self-esteem and social disintegration that had characterized the country over the last decade. One of the most important outcomes of the crisis was the civic mobilization and the promotion of social cohesion at the local level. It is therefore of paramount importance that any future international support and strengthen these elements. This social cohesion has the potential to further development and democratization, and to be a significant factor in political stabilization efforts in the country. Thus the Bank should systematically promote the empowerment of local administrations and the work of local communities and NGOs. In addition—since Albania has been identified as one of four pilot countries in the ECA Region for community-driven development (CDD) initiatives—the Bank should identify opportunities in Albanian for CDD.

35. Overall, a better understanding of the refugee crisis should allow the World Bank to more effectively address some structural constraints to Albania development. In particular, the Bank should consider the following priority actions:

· Strengthen existing local capacities.

42 ICG report. 17

w Local level institutions can be strengthened by: (1) building capacity in local administrations to promote micro-projects involving collaboration with community groups, and to deliver services to vulnerable citizens in cooperation with local NGOs;43 (2) providing community groups (parent-teacher associations, ethnic communities such as the Goranis, etc.) with the training and resources necessary to manage infrastructure and services aimed at economic and cultural exchanges with their counterparts across the Kosovo and FYROM borders; (3) enhancing the management skills of Albanian NGOs active in secondary towns, and promoting the creation of new associations by building on existing informal networks. The capacity building effort should focus on management, financial aspects, and the generation of new ideas and strategies, and should be carried out systematically in different sectors, according to the needs in each area. The goal should be to improve the expertise of local groups and NGOs and enhance their ability to interact with local government.

· Stem the brain drain from Albanian NGOs.

w A strategy aimed at empowering local NGOs, rather than just international ones, can help to stem their current brain drain. The Bank should support the human capital that began to develop during the crisis by promoting two kinds of NGO activities: those aimed at assisting vulnerable people, in cooperation with local governments; and cultural projects aimed at creating incentives for young people to contribute to their society rather than leave Albania. To this end, specific attention should be paid to building capacity among local administration officials, local leaders and NGO personnel in social/cultural activities and policy making. This approach could have a positive impact in both economic and social terms. It could attract investors and tourists, while helping establishing a network of social relations that could enhance the sense of security in local communities.

· Create opportunities for the employment and integration of Albanian youth.

w Precisely because youth groups were most active as volunteers during the refugee crisis, they need to be engaged at the core of the participation process for CDD activities. In addition, the Bank should support efforts to develop the management expertise and technological skills of Albanian youth, and develops associated local employment opportunities in the private sector and local administrations. To this end, the Bank should promote the establishment of information systems in local administrations, schools, social service agencies, and the health care system. Information systems would significantly raise the quality of services while fostering links among the different actors working to improve quality of life in Albanian society.

· Disseminate the social assessment findings and recommendations in key communities, and analyze local institutions and social capital, particularly in border areas.

w As part of the CDD strategy, workshops should be held with different local leaders and stakeholders, particularly in border areas such as Kukes, Korca, and Pogradec, to develop CDD and other ideas for pilot projects. CDD initiatives should

43 Promoting such cooperation is the goal of the Albania Social Service Delivery Project, now under preparation. 18 include an upstream social analysis of power relations, informal social networks, and local social capital, to identify ways that investments can build on informal traditions of collaboration, and mechanisms that would ensure maximum inclusion and equitable distribution of benefits. To this end, a Kosovo Social and Institutional Assessment will be finalized by the end of FY 2000. In addition, two in-depth studies on local institutions and social capital will be developed in FY 2001 in Albania and FYROM, with special attention to developing cross-border synergies.

· Soften borders by integrating communities in border areas, to help prevent future conflicts

w It should be emphasized that one of the most important impacts of the crisis was of a regional nature, as populations that had barely interacted with each other for decades were suddenly brought together to face a common challenge. Before the crisis, the orientation of the Albanian population was outward, toward Europe and the United States. The crisis, however, marked the beginning of what could appear as a new trend, with many well-educated emigrants deciding to return, spend longer periods in the country, or invest there. If properly supported, this trend could bring about a new continental or southern European orientation, capitalizing on greater exchanges with Kosovo, FYROM, and Greece. In the medium term, this could partially reverse the outward migration from northeastern parts of Albania, and could contribute to reducing demographic pressures on the larger central and coastal cities, where vulnerable migrant populations have been increasing.

w In the context of the new regional awareness of social development in South Eastern Europe, this would mean strengthening horizontal links with neighboring communities through trade, common infrastructure and local institutions, as well as cultural exchanges. Through well-targeted regional development plans, areas such as Kukes (neighboring Kosovo, especially Prizren), Korca and Saranda (neighboring Greece) and Pogradec (neighboring FYROM through Lake Okrid) could progressively become new poles for development. One lesson from the social assessment is that some of these communities are already increasing their interactions in a spontaneous way. What is required now is to maintain the momentum and systematically support this trend, by promoting the right kinds of incentives. Cross- border CDD pilot projects are a step in that direction, but they need to go further. For example, GEF’s Lake Okrid Conservation Project is successfully developing trans- border cooperation among the Albanian and Macedonian towns around the lake.

· Work to create a consensus with other international donors on these issues.

w Stabilization and development in Albania and the region depend on cooperation and interaction among government institutions, local administrations, and NGOs. In this framework, it is extremely important that the rule of law and the concept of mediation be accepted as fundamental tools for managing change in the political, economic, and social spheres.

w To this end, the Bank should cooperate with other international donors in encouraging institutions in the region to work together. All donors should agree on a 19 common strategy and programs that will bring together local and national administrations and NGOs and encourage cross--border activities, including trade, cultural exchanges, the construction of cross--border infrastructure, and further integration of the Albanian and Kosovar education systems. The involvement of Western NGOs in these efforts, in equitable partnerships with local NGOs, may be useful for disseminating experience and skills, including in mediation.

· Implications for the PRSP.

w To continue the momentum of civic engagement that began during the refugee crisis, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PSRP) should become a vehicle for non-governmental representatives of the health, education, social services, gender, and youth sectors to help government representatives shape the social development agenda. Participation in the PRSP should also be used as a vehicle for developing local capacity in social analysis and monitoring. The following measures will be essential:

· Strengthen the capacity of INSTAT by providing it with adequate budget and promoting the hiring of well-trained applied social researchers; this should be preceded by a skills analysis and an assessment of the impact of previous technical assistance efforts; · Strengthen the Social Policy Unit of the Ministry of labor and Social Affairs, particularly with expertise in social assessments, social monitoring, and participatory techniques, to make it a key player in the PRSP; · Develop applied social science expertise in the University of Tirana’s School of Sociology, which is presently lacking; · Launch a regional social science network, including Albanian researchers, as part of the Social Development Initiative for Southeast Europe. The objective of this network would be not only to sharpen skills in social assessment methodologies, but to create applied research opportunities for social scientists in neighboring countries, in order to develop a broader vision of the regional dimensions of social development and peace building. 20

ANNEX 1. QUESTIONNAIRE

EVALUATION OF THE EVENTS IN KOSOVO AND ALBANIA

1 How do you imagine the general situation of Kosova after five years? 1. It will get better 1 2. It will improve a little 2 3. It will not change 3 4. It will get worse 4 5. It will get a little worse 5 6. I don' know 6

2 According to your opinion, who has higher living standard ? 1. Kosovars in Kosovo 1 2. Albanians in Albania 2 3. Have the same standart 3 4. I don't know 4

3 How do you imagine the future of Albania after five years? 1. It will get better 1 2. It will improve a little 2 3. It will not change 3 4. It will get worse 4 5. It will get a little worse 5 6. I don' know 6

4 In what field can the relations between Albania and Kosovo be broaden (note three acording to the priority) 1. Economical 2. Trade 3. Education - culture 4. Political 5. Military 6. All together 7. I don't know

5 According to your opinion, which country has better economic sources 1. Kosovo 1 2. Albania 2 3. Have the same economical level 3 4. I can't evaluate 4

6 According to your opinion which are these sources 21

CULTURAL VALUES

7 Can you tell three features which are more cultivated in Kosovars than in Albanians of Albania

8 Can you tell three features which are more cultivated in Albanians of Albania than in Kosovars

9 Whom do you have more close relationship with 1. With the members of your family 1 2. With neighbors 2 3. With friends 3 4. With colleagues 4 5. The same with all 5 6. With nobody 6 7. I do not know 7

10 If it is done any injustice to you that touches your dignity and your honor, how will your reaction be? 1. You will bring the case to the Juridical system 1 2. You will put the justice by yourself 2 3. You will ask relatives for help 3 4. You will not take any action 4 5. Don’t know 5

11 To solve a problem or injustice you would ask assistance from 1. Albanian authorities of Kosovo 1 2. Civil Foreign Authorities 2 3. Foreign Military-Police Authorities 3 4. I do not know 4

12 How much do you feel alike with Not at Much all 1. Your town/village 1 2 3 4 2. Kosovo 1 2 3 4 3. Albania 1 2 3 4 22

4. Europe 1 2 3 4 A little Don't know 13 Now we will propose to you e series of oposite values. Put in circle one of the numbers, as it comes first in your mind without thinking over

A. People of your town/village are: B. Kosovars are Sincere 2 1 0 1 2 Insincere Sincere 2 1 0 1 2 Insincere Good 2 1 0 1 2 Bad Good 2 1 0 1 2 Bad Clean 2 1 0 1 2 Dirty Clean 2 1 0 1 2 Dirty Safe 2 1 0 1 2 Unsafe Safe 2 1 0 1 2 Unsafe Free 2 1 0 1 2 Opressed Free 2 1 0 1 2 Opressed Rational 2 1 0 1 2 No rational Rational 2 1 0 1 2 No rational Calm 2 1 0 1 2 Disturbed Calm 2 1 0 1 2 Disturbed Generous 2 1 0 1 2 Stingy Generous 2 1 0 1 2 Stingy

C. Albanians are: D. Serbs are: Sincere 2 1 0 1 2 Insincere Sincere 2 1 0 1 2 Insincere Good 2 1 0 1 2 Bad Good 2 1 0 1 2 Bad Clean 2 1 0 1 2 Dirty Clean 2 1 0 1 2 Dirty Safe 2 1 0 1 2 Unsafe Safe 2 1 0 1 2 Unsafe Free 2 1 0 1 2 Opressed Free 2 1 0 1 2 Opressed Rational 2 1 0 1 2 No rational Rational 2 1 0 1 2 No rational Calm 2 1 0 1 2 Disturbed Calm 2 1 0 1 2 Disturbed Generous 2 1 0 1 2 Stingy Generous 2 1 0 1 2 Stingy

E. Europeans are Sincere 2 1 0 1 2 Insincere Good 2 1 0 1 2 Bad Clean 2 1 0 1 2 Dirty Safe 2 1 0 1 2 Unsafe Free 2 1 0 1 2 Opressed Rational 2 1 0 1 2 No rational Calm 2 1 0 1 2 Disturbed Generous 2 1 0 1 2 Stingy

14 How much did the hosting in Albania met your expectations? 1. Completely 1 2. Partially 2 23

3. More than you expected 3 4. Not at all 4 5. I do not know 5

15 After your return, do you expect to keep ties with Albanians? 1. Yes 1 2. No 2 3. Do not know 3

PAST ECONOMIC SITUATION

16 Do you have your ownership or joint ownership in Kosovo? 1. Land 1 ---> (20) 2. Country land 2 ---> (21) 3. Shops 3 ---> (21) 4. Enterprise 4 ---> (21) 5. Apartment or house 5 ---> (21) 6. Not any property 6 ---> (21)

17 How many hectares do you own? 1. More than 10 ha. ha 2. 2 to 10 ha. ha 3. Less than 2 ha. ha

18 The house where you live in Kosovo is: 1. Private house for one family 1 2. Private huose for more than one family 2 3. Apartment 3 4. Other (specify 4 ______)

19 The monthly income of your family permits you to live: 1. With too much difficulty 1 2. With difficulty 2 3. With not too much difficulty 3 4. In good conditions 4 5. In quite good conditions 5 6. In very good conditions 6

20 Except your main job, do you have any other activity that helps you improve your financial condition? 1. Yes 1 2. No 2

21 Did you own? 1. Car 1 2. Truck or other transport means 2 3. Animal for work 3 4. TV 4 5. Washing machine 5 6. Refrigerator 6 7. Video 7 24

8. Satellite antena 8 9. Dishwashing machine 9 10. Vacoom cleaner 10 11. Electric or gas cooking stove 11 12. Computer 12

22 How did you spend the money of your family budget in Kosovo. (note acording to the priority the first four ) 1. House 2. Food 3. Clothes 4. Transport 5. Medical service 6. Education 7. Social insurance 8. Entertainment 9. Savings 10. Other (specify______)

23 How did you use or save your money. (You can choose more than one alternative) 1. You deposit them in Bank 1 2. Invest them 2 3. Keep in home 3 4. You can't save money 4

COPING MECHANISMS IN ALBANIA

24 How did you spend the money of your family budget in Albania 1. House 1 2. Food 2 3. Clothes 3 4. Transport 4 5. Medical Service 5 6. Education 6 7. Social Insurance 7 8. Entertainment 8 9. Savings 9 10. Other 10

25 How were you hosted ? 1. For free 2. For a rent

26 How much did you spend for renting a room /apartment? 1. Less than US$200 1 2. Between US$200 and $500 2 3. Between US$500 and $800 3 4. More than US$800 4 5. Nothing

27 Did you generate any income during your stay in Albania? 25

1. Yes 1 2. No 2

28 If yes, indicate type of activity 1. Trade 1 2. Translations 2 3. Other urban services 3 4. Rural activities 4 (specify______) 5. Others 5 (specify______)

29 If yes, indicate range of monthly income 1. Less than US $500 2. Between US $500 and 1,000 3. Between US $1,000 and 2,000 4. More than US $2,000

30 What is the yearly average amount that you receive in remitttanes from your emigrated relatives 1. Up to 1000 marks 1 2. 1001 - 2000 marks 2 3. 2001 - 3000 marks 3 4. 3001 - 4000 marks 4 5. 4001 - 5000 marks 5 6. 5001 - 6000 marks 6 7. Over 10000 marks 7

31 What is the total amount you received during the war period (March to June 1999) 1. Up to 1000 marks 1 2. 1001 - 2000 marks 2 3. 2001 - 3000 marks 3 4. 3001 - 4000 marks 4 5. 4001 - 5000 marks 5 6. 5001 - 6000 marks 6 7. Over 10000 marks 7

32 Have you decided to: 1. Remain in Albania 1 2. Go back to Kosovo in the short term 2 3. Go back to Kosovo within a year 3 4. Migrate to third countries 4

33 If you decided to remain in Albania, why so? 1. More security 1 2. Protection of relatives 2 3. Other 3 (explain______,

34 Do you have free access to: 1. Health 1 2. Education 2 26

3. Child care services 3 4. Services for the elderly 4 5. None of the above 5

ECONOMIC PROSPECTS

35 Which are the household priority problems ( I - the first most important, II - the second most important, III - the third most important) once you return to Kosovo I II III 1. Unemployment 1 1 1 2. Inadequate income 2 2 2 3. Low wages 3 3 3 4. Political instabiliy 4 4 4 5. Transportation problems 5 5 5 6. Health problems 6 6 6 7. Bad housing conditions 7 7 7 8. Drinkable water problems 8 8 8 9. Heating problems 9 9 9 10. Shortage of land 10 10 10 11. Land conflicts 11 11 11 12. Inadequate irrigation 12 12 12 13. Inadequate schools 13 13 13 14. Inadequate child care 14 14 14 15. Inadequate food supply 15 15 15 16. Inadequate health care 16 16 16 17. Other (specify 17 17 17 ______)

36 If you would emigrate, would you like to sell Ye No Don't know s 1. Your house 1 2 3 2. Furnishings and equipment 1 2 3 3. Land 1 2 3 4. Other movable property 1 3 3

37 If you would have money would you invest them in 1. Kosovo 1 2. Albania 2 3. Other country 3 4. I prefer to deposit them in bank 4 5. I prefer to keep them in home 5

38 Do you have any family member working abroad? 1. Yes 1 ---> (33) 2. No 2 ---> (37)

39 [If yes] where are them? 1. Germany 1 2. Switzerland 2 3. Italy 3 4. Scandinavian countries 4 4. U.S.A. 5 5. Another country 6 (specify______) 27

40 Do you have any income from your relatives in emigration? 1. Yes 1 ---> (29) 2. No 2 ---> (32)

41 How do they send you the money 1. Through relatives 1 2. Bank transfer 2 3. Through friends 3 4. Other 4 (specify______)

42 What are your plans for the future 1. You will return in Kosovo to build your life there 1 2. I will return in Kosovo but after that I will emigrate in another western 2 country 3. I will return in Kosovo and after that I will return in Albania 3 4. I will stay in Albania 4

43 How do you expect to go back? 1. By private transport? 1 2. Through UNHCR 2 3. Others (specify______) 3

44 What are the institutions, back in Kosovo, that you will trust or rely on to help resettle? 1. KFOR 1 2. UNHCR 2 3. Local Administrations 3 4. Relatives 4 5. International relief NGOs 5 6. Others 6

45 FUNDI I PYETESORIT

46 What resources can you count on when you go back home? 1. Savings 1 2. Remittances 2 3. Other (specify ______) 3 28

ANNEX 2: FINDINGS FROM SURVEY OF KOSOVAR REFUGEES HOSTED BY ALBANIAN FAMILIES

Characteristics Gender of respondents Male: 50.0% Female: 50.0%

Age of family members Up to 14 years: 15-24 years: 25-44 years: 45-54 years: Over 55 years: 33.3% 20.1% 27.2% 7.9% 11.4% Education level None: 19.1% Finished only Finished 8-year educ.: Fin. HS/tech Higher ed.: elem.: 6.6% 22.7% ed.: 22.1% 5.4% Area of origin Urban: 35.6% Rural: 64.4%

Opinions of Albania and the Albanians Which country has the Kosovo: 90.5% Albania: 2.6% Same in both countries: higher living standard? 4.5% Which country has the Kosovo: 67.3% Albania: 5.9% Same in both countries: better economic resources? 8.6% Albanians are: Sincere: 85.4% Free: 67.6% Generous: 92.6% Clean: 70.9% Rational: 47.8%

Experience with Hosting Family How were you hosted? Free: 48.2% Rent: 51.8% How much did the hosting Fully: 61.6% Partially: 4.6% More than expected: meet your expectations? 33.2% How much did you spend on Less than US$200-500: US$500-800: 0.3% rent? US$200: 72.4% 27.2% How did you spend your Housing: 38.2% Food: 53.0% Clothes: 7.1% Transport: Medical: 0.3% budget in Albania? 1.0%

Financial Resources Did you generate any Yes: 5.0% No: 95.0% income while in Albania? If yes, what type of Trade: 41.4% Other urban Construction, teaching, activity? services: 3.4% other: 55.2% If yes, what was the Less than US$500-1,000: monthly income? US$500: 93.1% 6.9% Do you have any income Yes: 63.3% No: 36.7% from emigrated relatives? If yes, how much do they Up to DM 1,000: DM 1,001- DM 3,001-4,000: DM 4,001- More than DM send you every year? 16.0% 3,000: 59.3% 10.6% 5,000: 4.3% 5,000: 9.8% If yes, how do they send Through Bank transfer: Through friends: 15.2% Other: 1.6% you the money? relatives: 48.6% 34.2% How much did you receive Up to DM 1,000: DM 1,001- DM 3,001-4,000: More than Nothing: 5.7% from relatives during the 21.2% 3,000: 44.6% 15.2% DM 4,000: war (March-June 1999) 13.4%

Future Relations with Albania If you had money, where Kosovo: 79.7% Albania: 6.2% Other country: 2.8% Deposit in Keep at home: would you invest it? bank: 1.2% 10.2% Do you expect to keep ties Yes: 78.8% No: 3.7% Don’t know: 17.6% with Albanians after your return? In what areas can relations Economic: Trade: 13.8% Education/culture: Political: Military: 1.9% between Albania and 27.2% 17.0% 16.4% 29

Kosovo be broadened? 30

ANNEX 3. DISTRIBUTION OF REFUGEES BY DISTRICT District Total Refugees No. Hosted Families Refugees as % of Pop.

Tirana 100,031 86,421 17.36 Durres 85,649 67,994 30.84 Shkoder 41,645 28,439 13.71 Kurbin 13,787 12,135 18.39 Kavaje 21,724 13,214 12.85 Kruje 9,516 7,509 10.84 Elbasan 20,514 11,480 4.53 Fier 15,003 8,268 3.40 Lezhe 15,444 4,567 5.95 Puke 3,242 3,242 6.05 Vlore 15,062 5,295 2.62 Lushnje 8,363 5,202 3.18 Diber 6,082 4,182 3.98 Peqin 3,250 1,450 3.95 Korce 8,976 4,324 2.23 Mallakaster 2,545 1,252 2.52 Berat 5,975 1,653 1.04 Librazhd 3,071 991 1.14 Mallakaster 839 829 1.56 Skrapar 2,485 807 1.61 Gjirokaster 1,838 855 1.18 Delvine 1,400 616 1.83 Mat 4,208 864 1.12 Kucove 1,552 682 1.51 Sarande 2,631 458 0.64 Mirdite 1,179 445 0.87 Bulqize 2,428 332 0.57 Permet 940 182 0.44 Kolonje 900 125 0.44 Pogradec 1,876 125 0.15 Tepelene 682 19 0.04 Devoll 1,755 0 0.00 Gramsh 1,188 0 0.00 Total 405,780 273,957 Source: Estimates by local team. 31

ANNEX 4. MATRIX OF ALBANIAN NGOS Matrix n. X.X: Interviewed local NGOs institutional capabilities: Interviewed local NGOs Geographical coverage Participation of Use of locally Significant increase of Contributed to volunteers (a) generated resources the NGOs activities (b) establishment of financial or in kind Kosovars organizations Albanian Youth Council High High No Yes High

Debate Program High High No No Medium

Young Artists of Theater League Medium High No Yes Medium

DelfiXs Youth Center Medium Medium No Yes Medium

Vlora Youth Center Low High No Yes Medium

Independent Forum of Albanian Women High Medium Yes Yes Medium

Useful to Albanian Woman High Medium No Yes Low

Albanian Family Planning Ass. High Medium No Yes Medium

Albanian Woman Center Low Medium No Yes High

Professional and Business Women Ass. Medium High Yes Yes Medium

Woman Lawyer Association Low High Yes Yes High

Institute for contemporary studies Low Low Yes No Medium

Albanian Human Rights Group High Medium No Yes Medium

Albanian NGO forum Low Medium No Yes Low

Society for Democratic Culture High High No Yes High

Crystal Club High Medium No Yes Medium

Health for All Center Low Medium No Yes Low

Red Cross High High Yes Yes No

(a) HIGH when it was totally voluntary participation and people received only reimbursement for expenses. MEDIUM when people were recruited for the new positions opened by the crisis. LOW when simply the permanent staff was occupied in new projects. (b) YES stands for the NGOs that increased substantially the amount of work carried on. NO stands for a diversion of the attention meaning that the NGO interrupted the previous activities to concentrate on a new issue without widening its engagement. 32

P:albania/Rurenv/General/ESW.doc