Would Be Like. We Are Normally Buffeted by 20-25 Typhoons a Year, the Fiercest Three In
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Special thanks to our partners: UPDATE NO. 1 Period: December 1-31, 2013 Tear Fund New Zealand Haiyan Challenge By Melba Padilla Maggay, Ph.D. No one imagined what a ‘storm surge’ would be like. We are normally buffeted by 20-25 typhoons a year, the fiercest three in the past four years with winds of up to 290 kph. But this one has left us dumbstruck, leveling down the entire city of Tacloban, Guiuan and most of Eastern Samar in three hours, and reducing our people into bewildered hopelessnes. To date, official statistics put the dead at more than 5,000, a very conservative estimate, with maybe twice this dead under the rubble or unaccounted for. Other estimates are as high as 40,000. Bodies still surface as debris are being cleared. According to the Mayor of Tacloban, Alfred Romualdez, about 70-80 bodies were still being recovered every day, a month after the typhoon. According to the UN, half a million homes were damaged and about 14.2 million people have been affected. About 4.9 million of these are children. It was also reported that 3 million jobs disappeared, and a similar number of people were displaced and rendered homeless. 1 Page For the first five days, we are told, government was absent, partly because the local bureaucracy and other instrumentalities were just as traumatized as the general population. ISACC, like many other international and local NGOs, rushed into the breach. We took a trip to Tacloban December 4 to 7, 2013 to do a rapid appraisal of the situation and quickly connect with institutions and potential partners on the ground. On the next trip, December 16 to 24, we piloted a psycho-spiritual intervention, which consisted of: a) three trainors’ training workshops for stress debriefing and psychological first aid – one for faculty of two universities, the Eastern Visayas State University and Leyte Normal University; one for pastors and staff of faith-based organizations; and one for teachers of pre-schools who wish to help their traumatized children; b) community theater and play therapy for children of barangays 89 and 69, two of the hardest-hit areas; c) a community healing ritual, to help the people come to terms with the loss of their loved ones, participated in by children and the entire community. In addition, we started some social investigation, particularly of the community we have decided to walk with for the long term – barangays 89 and 90 – looking into demographics, extent of damage, number of dead and of grieving families, the occupations and jobs lost, etc. e THE PROCESSION Helping the people to 2 grieve for their loved ones Page The following outlines our initial impressions and thoughts on the way forward. T ALES OF THE A FTERMATH Slow relief and continuing hunger. Aid of all forms are coming from different agencies and organizations from all over the world. There should be enough help to feed the affected people in the short term, but the goods are not moving quickly and sufficiently enough due to poor infrastructure, expensive transport, and bad politics. A month and a half after the supertyphoon, the people of barangays 89 and 90 report that relief distribution is spotty, and few and far between. “We still eat only once a day,” according to the barangay 89 Kapitana, Melba Villalino. A young volunteer from barangay 69 informed us that by the time relief gets to them, the goods have been through a series of repacks and considerably reduced, -- say, from 5 kilos of rice they get only 1 kilo, and ten sardine cans are down to 3. This story seems to be universal. A staff of a government agency has intimated that USAID personnel have complained of the way their relief boxes, each deemed sufficient for an entire family, get whittled down to small plastic bags, or worse, looted and replaced by local goods in the DSWD warehouse. No work, no cash. Besides government corruption and inefficiencies, hunger stalks the people for lack of work and ready cash. Sick of noodles and sardines, some have resorted to selling their relief packs for a bit of cash, which they need for buying vegetables, transport, kerosene and matches for firewood rescued from the debris, and so on. For this reason, the cash-for-work program of Tzu Chi, a Buddhist foundation, has been most popular among the people. About 90% of the store owners in the city, we are told, have left and seem not to be planning to go back and re-establish their businesses. And even if they do, it will take time to be up on their feet. This means the jobs lost are not likely to be replaced in the near future. Without work or any means of subsistence, hunger among the people will recur as food aid dries up in about three months. The political sub-text. The very public display of political animosity between the national and the local government, as represented particularly by the Secretary of Local 3 Page Government, Mar Roxas, and the Mayor of Tacloban, Alfred Romualdez, seems to have stemmed from the perception of inaction and ineptitude on the part of the latter, and the insensitivity of the former to the realities on the ground. Underlying the tension is the unresolved historical conflict between the Marcoses and the Aquinos, replayed in the coldness between the Mayor, a nephew of Imelda Romualdez Marcos, and the President, scion of Marcos’ arch enemy, Benigno Aquino Jr. Mayor Romualdez informed us that both the Defense Secretary, Voltaire Gazmin, head of disaster operations, and Secretary Roxas, were in Tacloban the day before. “They did not inform me that Yolanda would have winds of more than 300 kph. We were quite used to supertyphoons. But not anything like this one.” They met the evening before the typhoon, November 7, and were supposed to meet again at 8 am the following day to discuss disaster risk reduction. Yolanda struck early morning of November 8, not at 2 pm as forecasted. Some military officers forced to report for duty that day in the armory at the airport were swept away. The prisoners locked in the same area were released as they were in harm’s way. Out of the police force of 293, only 24 managed to turn up. The Mayor had asked for 500 Marines to help in rescue operations, as they were trained to do this. But none were sent. Likewise, he asked for 700 body bags for the dead in the streets. Only 70 came. The intrusion of petty politics proved deadly. Medical professionals informed us that thousands of lives could have been saved if help had come the first five days. Many of those who could have survived died for lack of food and water and medicines, especially the children and the elderly. Miraculously, a thirteen-year old girl was rescued under the rubble on the sixth day, surrounded by the decaying bodies of her dead family and relatives. A young participant in the psycho-spiritual seminar says that for the first three days they had no food nor water. When word spread that a C-130 has landed, laden with food, he walked many miles to the airport, along with many others, only to be told that the relief could not be distributed. Distribution will have to wait till the DSWD chief has arrived and a photo shot of the event. Another informant tells us of a similar tale of hunger the first few days in spite of the fact that relief supplies have arrived. When asked why, he said “the relief had to go through DSWD and repacked, and stamped ‘DSWD.’“ Another workshop participant, who lives right at 4 Page the center of town, reported that her family did not receive any aid till day 22. Apparently, her family was not considered priority, because she was not in the voters’ list. Massive trauma. The narratives of participants in the psycho-spiritual seminars proved to be a minefield of local information and insights. With a fluid attendance of about 80-90, as some were coming and going, 59 participants filled up a survey form assessing the level of trauma. (Please refer to Appendix A) Initial analysis of the data revealed that the respondents experienced many stressors during and after Yolanda: a) More than half of the respondents (55.8%) at one point thought that they might die; b) Many more (68.6%) thought they would be seriously injured; c) Most of their homes were damaged (88.5%); d) Most of them required aid of food and water (85.2%); e) About 22% were physically injured; f) Three participants lost a member of their immediate family. About six of the respondents had a PCL score – a measure of post-traumatic stress – greater than 50. Although this score in itself isn't diagnostic of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder per se, it indicates to us that these individuals suffered a great deal of trauma and need care. Of the six, it is worth noting that five belong to the group of participants from churches and faith-based organizations. This could be due to such factors as a) they are people helping others on the ground and so are heavily stressed by having to attend to needs, not just of disaster victims, but also of visiting churches/organizations who want to help; b) their faith and the perplexities posed by the realities they had to face had created a great deal of internal dissonance. One participant, particularly, felt more despair in the aftermath than in the actual experience of the typhoon, faced with the task of rebuilding without any resources.