%e Odessa Network Mapping Facilitators of Russian and Ukrainian Arms Transfers — by Tom Wallace & Farley Mesko
September !"#$
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'5$6! 74'%& '5$6! !"# '6!"$*& C&ADS is a -./c, nonpro0t research or- Tom Wallace is a Senior Analyst at C4ADS. ganization whose mission is to under- He received his undergraduate degree from stand global con1ict and security through the University of Michigan in Political Sci- on-the-ground research and data-driven ence and Russian Studies, where he was analysis. We seek to alleviate the analytical named the National Russian Scholar Laure- burden carried by public sector institutions ate, and is a Wolcott Fellow at the George by applying manpower, depth, and rigor to Washington University, where he is cur- questions of con1ict and security. rently receiving his master's in Security Our approach to understanding the driv- Policy Studies. Tom’s research focuses pri- ers and enablers of global con1ict leverages marily on government-private collabora- nontraditional investigative techniques and tion in Russian and Chinese foreign policy. emerging analytical technologies. We rec- Tom has lived in Russia and China, and ognize the value of working on the ground speaks Russian and Mandarin. in the 0eld, capturing local knowledge, and collecting original data to inform our anal- Farley Mesko is the Chief Operating Of- ysis. At the same time, we employ cutting- 0cer, and a specialist on illicit maritime edge technology to manage and analyze networks. He received his undergraduate that data. 2e result is an innovative ana- degree in Natural Resource Policy and Eco- lytical approach to con1ict prevention and nomics from Bowdoin College. He is a con- mitigation. sultant for World Bank, a freelance journal- ist, and sits on the Board of Directors of a © 3./, C4ADS Somali NGO. Prior to joining C4ADS, Far- ley ran a successful small commercial 0sh- ing business in Maine. His research focuses primarily on aid, governance, transnational crime, and con1ict in Africa. Farley has worked and traveled extensively in East and West Africa, and speaks Arabic.
'7+($)8#%9#:#(!& We would like to thank Palantir for their generous support; this project would not have been possible without it.
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Executive Summary
A network of Ukraine-based individu- Weapons and legitimate shipping activi- als and logistics companies—referred to ties generate large pro0ts for Odessa Net- herein as the “Odessa Network” due to its work leaders. 2ey launder their money key leadership being located in Odessa, through legitimate ventures (such as real Ukraine—is responsible for transporting estate), and through a well-known laun- weapons out of Russia and Ukraine on be- dering network of Panamanian shell com- half of government sellers. Evidence sug- panies and blacklisted Latvian banks, also gests that their clients include the Assad used by Hezbollah and the Sinaloa Cartel. regime in Syria, among other notorious 2ey also are active users of US and EU 0- violators of human rights. nancial institutions. 2e Odessa Network is a logistics con- Understanding and tracking Odessa Net- tractor for the governments of Russia and work activities is valuable in several ways. Ukraine, not an independent arms dealer. Since the Odessa Network is the prime It works with state weapons export agencies transportation contractor for Russian and such as Rosoboronexport and Ukrspetsex- Ukrainian weapons export agencies, track- port. Odessa Network leaders have person- ing their ship movements (via commercial al and 0nancial relationships with cabinet- AIS so?ware) is an e;cient way of deter- level o;cials in the Russian and Ukrainian mining weapon destinations. 2is is partic- governments, including a personal advisor ularly helpful because Russia and Ukraine to Putin and senior Russian military-indus- are the main weapons suppliers to coun- trial 0gures. 2e Odessa Network centers tries such as Syria and the DRC. 2is report on a group of Odessa-based private com- identi0es over 3. previously undiscovered panies that regularly move large arms ship- shipments of unknown cargo by Odessa ments. A;liated EU and Russian shipping Network-linked shipping companies from 0rms play an important specialized role Oktyabrsk to Syria. in transporting particularly large or illicit shipments. 2e network is deeply intercon- nected. Personnel and equipment frequent- ly cycle between di
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Table of Contents
Table of Figures E
@ Introduction H
A Weapons Shipment Data @A
B Preliminary Insights BA
C End-to-End Logistics Integration: Odessa BF
D Government Connections: Moscow & Kiev CF
E Port of Origin: Oktyabrsk DC
F EU & Russian Shipping: Specialized Services DG
G African Private Security Companies EI
H Latvia: Financial Services & Laundering EE
@I 2e Odessa Network: Overview FI
@@ Case Study: Syria F@
@A Conclusion FG
@B References GI
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Table of Figures
JK96*# @: Odessa Network by Location & Function H JK96*# A: Tanks for Yemen @C JK96*# B: Tanks for Yemen, Cont. @C JK96*# C: APCs for Angola @C JK96*# D: Tanks Being Loaded @D JK96*# E: Ammunition for Uganda @H JK96*# F: Tanks/Apcs for Cambodia A@ JK96*# G: Tanks/Apcs for Cambodia, Cont. A@ JK96*# H: Miscellaneous Arms to Venezuela AA JK96*# @I: Tanks for Ethiopia AE JK96*# @@: Patrol Boats for Vietnam AF JK96*# @A: Tanks & APCs for Cambodia AG JK96*# @B: Tanks & APCs for Cambodia, Cont. AG JK96*# @C: Assault Ri1es to Libya AH JK96*# @D: Arms Shipment Count BA JK96*# @E: In Our Dataset. All Possible Candidate Countries BA JK96*# @F: Ukrainian Defense Industrial Agency BB JK96*# @G: Ukrainian Defense Industrial Agency BB JK96*# @H: Shipment Counts BD JK96*# AI: Port of Oktyabrsk BD JK96*# A@: Descriptive Statistics BE JK96*# AA: Geographic & Functional Map of Odessa Network BF JK96*# AB: Kaalbye Shipment Events BG JK96*# AC: Kaalbye Subsidiaries, Shells, etc. BH JK96*# AD: Kaalbye Guards BH JK96*# AE: Dual-Listed Personnel CI JK96*# AF: Academic Connections C@ JK96*# AG: Kaalbye Projects Incorporation Documents CA JK96*# AH: Varvarenko Shipment Events CB JK96*# BI: Varamar O;ce CB JK96*# B@: Barwil Shipment Events CB JK96*# BA: Phoenix Shipment Events CC JK96*# BB: Phoenix O;ce CC JK96*# BC: Alperin Shipment Events CC JK96*# BD: Alperin & Ukr. Intelligence (Mykola Malomuzh, Head of Szr) CD JK96*# BE: Hares Youssef (Second From Right), with Rinat Akhmetov CD & Vadim Novinsky to His Le?) JK96*# BF: Vadim Alperin & Faina CD JK96*# BG: Waterlux O;cial Seal & Signature CD JK96*# BH: Levitin & Putin CE JK96*# CI: Igor Urbansky CF JK96*# C@: Ministry of Transportation CF JK96*# CA: Kogan Connections CG JK96*# CB: Russian Technologies Subsidiaries (Non-Exhaustive) CG JK96*# CC: Valentin Varvarenko CH JK96*# CD: Ports Associated with Valentin Varvarenko CH JK96*# CE: Olerskiy & Levitin D@ JK96*# CF: Aleksandr Annenkov D@ JK96*# CG: Political Connections of the Odessa Network DB JK96*# CH: Oktyabrsk Versus St. Petersburg Transit Times DC JK96*# DI: FSU Weapons Export Pathways DD JK96*# D@: Andrei Yegorov DE JK96*# DA: Excerpt From Ukrainian Newspaper Article DE JK96*# DB: Vadim Novinsky with President of Ukraine DE
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Table of Figures Cont.
JK96*# DC: Oktyabrsk Photographs DF JK96*# DD: Eide Ships DG JK96*# DE: Eide Shipment Events DH JK96*# DF: Briese Shipment Events DH JK96*# DG: Briese Ad In Odessa DH JK96*# DH: Primetransport & Kaalbye DH JK96*# EI: Briese-Kaalbye Ties EI JK96*# E@: Briese Corporate Structure EI JK96*# EA: Beluga Shipment Events E@ JK96*# EB: Splietho< & Eckho< Shipment Events E@ JK96*# EC: Balchart Shipment Events EA JK96*# ED: Balchart Current & former Employees EA JK96*# EE: FEMCO Shipment Events EB JK96*# EF: North-Western Shipment Events EB JK96*# EG: Westberg Shipment Events EB JK96*# EH: Moran Security EC JK96*# FI: Bossaso Port EC JK96*# F@: Bossaso Cargo EC JK96*# FA: Private Security Companies ED JK96*# FB: Statement of Russian O;cial On Money Laundering EE JK96*# FC: EU Statement EF JK96*# FD: ABLV Sponsorship of Odessa Network Event EG JK96*# FE: Waterlux AG Court Documents EG JK96*# FF: Waterlux AG Court Documents, Cont. EH JK96*# FG: N Weapons Shipments By Facilitator FI JK96*# FH: Syria-Oktyabrsk Maritime Tra;c, 3./3 FC–FF
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Glossary of Terms
'K& Automatic Identi0cation System. Remote tracking system used on ships. '98 Automatic grenade launcher 'P7 Armored personnel carrier '&: Anti-ship missile '!9: Anti-tank guided missile 5QK British Virgin Islands %)! Deadweight tonnage. A ship’s maximum weight capacity. #RKJ Exchangeable image 0le format. Stores metadata about a digital image. J&5 Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti; Russian domestic intelligence agency J&6 Former Soviet Union 9$* Government of Russia 9$6 Government of Ukraine 9*6 Glavnoe Razvedyvatelnoe Upravlenie; Russian military intelligence agency 9! Gross tonnage. A measure of a ship’s cargo volume capacity. "#'! High explosive anti-tank round K:$ International Maritime Organization K:$K% International Maritime Organization ID. Ship unique identi0cation code. K*K&8 Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines ::&K Maritime Mobile Service Identity. Ship unique identi0cation code. :Q Marine vessel. Appended in front of a ship’s name, e.g. MV Victoria. *$# Rosoboronexport; main Russian state weapons export agency *$-*$ Roll on, roll o<. Cargo ship with a specialized ramp for wheeled vehicles. &'8) Small arms and light weapons &': Surface to air missile &KP*K Stockholm International Peace Research Institute &56 Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukrayiny; Ukrainian state security agency &%( Specially designated national &:9 Somalia Monitoring Group &P5 St. Petersburg, Russia. &Q* Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki; Russian foreign intelligence agency &S* Sluzhba Zovishnoi Razvedki; Ukrainian foreign intelligence agency &)KJ! Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications. !#6 Twenty-foot equivalent unit. Standard unit of measurement for cargo. 6&P#* US Person 6&# Ukrspetsexport; one of Ukraine’s state weapons export agencies
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# Introduction
$Q#*QK#) When an arms deal is negotiated between Russian o;cials and foreign dignitaries, little attention is paid until months later, when newspaper articles announce that the purchaser has received the weapons. Pundits examine the political impact (why is Putin antagonizing the West?), and assess its impact on military capability (how does the S–!"" a#ect a potential intervention in Syria?). 2e question not asked, and the fundamental goal of this investiga- tion, is how did the arms transfer occur? What logistical, 0nancial, and contractual pro- cesses are necessary for moving literally tons of military equipment worth millions or even billions of dollars halfway around the globe? Who performs these tasks? 2is report is the culmination of a /.-month investigation into Ukrainian and Russian state arms transfers, with these questions in mind. Key 0ndings include: previously un- known or under-reported arms transfers; speci0c companies and individuals facilitating these arms transfers; familial, 0nancial, and professional links between key facilitators and the governments of Russia and Ukraine. In short, the report analyzes the web of entities and processes through which an arms transfer is executed. We collectively refer to this web as the Odessa Network on account of many of the key personnel and companies being based in Odessa, Ukraine. 2e Odessa Network is not a hierarchical organization. It consists of clusters of individu- als and 0rms geographically concentrated in a particular area, and performing a speci0c sub-task of the weapons-export process. For example, the primary logistics contractors for Russian and Ukrainian weapons exports are shipping companies headquartered in the city of Odessa, while the money-laundering rings used to ‘clean’ pro0ts are located in Lat- via. We have categorized six main clusters, as shown in Figure '. 2ese clusters are both intra– and inter-linked. For example, the various Odessa-based shipping companies share common owners and equipment and coordinate with each other on projects, but also are connected to di 8$7'!K$( #(!K!T J6(7!K$( Moscow and Kiev Government Agencies Ownership of Weapons Odessa, Ukraine Shipping Companies A-Z Logistics Integration EU and Russia Shipping Companies Specialized Shipping Services Oktyabrsk, Ukraine Port and Port Authority Loading of Weapons onto Ships Africa and Middle East Private Security Companies Protection of Sensitive Cargo Latvia Banks Money Laundering Figure U: Odessa Network by Location and Function K(Q#&!K9'!K$( *$'%:'P 2e analysis presented herein is centered on several datasets of Russian and Ukrainian weapons shipments, which were analyzed for patterns. Chapter ( presents this data. Our key assumption is that transporting state-sanctioned arms shipments to sensitive for- eign customers such as Syria requires a great deal of trust between contractor and gov- ernment. As such, these governments are likely to replicate the use of companies, ships, and patterns of behavior found in previous weapons exports. To identify patterns, we re- searched and assembled a database of Russian and Ukrainian arms shipments spanning /3 years and 33 recipient countries, some licit and documented and others undocumented (i.e. shipments to sanctioned states such as Syria, Myanmar, DPRK, etc.). Each shipment event has up to /3 properties, including ship name, ship owner, ship manager, cargo owner, port of origin, dates, etc. A cursory analysis of this dataset reveals several key preliminary insights, which are presented in Section ). Importantly, the Russian and Ukrainian governments appear to be the dominant owner and seller of weapons leaving their respective countries. 2e = !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ popular image of post-Soviet private individuals and criminal groups smuggling ma- jor weapons systemsi is a relic of the /==.s, when state control of strategic assets was considerably weaker. Our data also shows that relatively few shipping companies are responsible for facilitating a high percentage of arms transfers, implying there is a per- sistent group of trusted contractors upon whom Moscow and Kiev rely. Lastly, our data shows the importance of Oktyabrsk, Ukraine as a port of origin for a high percentage of Russian weapons shipments, again implying some sort of special relationship with the Russian and Ukrainian governments. Having derived these big-picture insights, Chapters &–'* go on to investigate and ana- lyze the weapons export process in greater detail. We identify key individuals, companies, and locations, drawing upon a wide range of open-source data: local media reports in Arabic, Spanish, Russian, and Ukrainian, court cases and contract disputes from Russia, Ukraine, and the United States, incorporation documents made available as exhibits in those cases, and business directories from Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and more. 2ese sections make use of the Palantir Gotham analytical platform to perform network and link analysis on key entities. 2e overarching 0nding is that there is a persistent, pre- dictable network by which Moscow and Kiev export weapons: a certain group of people own the ships, a certain group of people handle the money, and so on. 2ere are several applications of this data and analysis. Identifying patterns of weap- ons tra;cking should lead to better predictions of weapons 1ows out of the Former Soviet Union. Put simply, observing a known weapons tra;cker leaving a known port of origin for weapons, headed for a country known to buy Russian and Ukrainian weapons leads to stronger predictions about the nature of otherwise unknown cargo. Chapter '' applies this inductive analytical approach to the issue of Syria. Russian material sup- port for the Assad regime is well known, but exactly how the Kremlin funnels military equipment into Syria is less well understood. 2e key question for this section is how to identify arms shipments, or at least narrow the 0eld of candidate shipment events, from among the thousands of shipsii transiting the Eastern Mediterranean each year. To answer this question, we built a large dataset of Automated Information System (AIS) iii logs for all of Russia, Ukraine, and Syria in 3./3. 2is log of >.,...+ port calls and /.,...+ ships very likely contains covert weapons shipments from Russia or Ukraine to the Assad regime. We use our insights about the detectable signature of weapons trans- fers to 0nd ships that are operated or covertly controlled by Odessa Network a;liates, and have recently delivered unknown cargo to Assad. 2e paper concludes in Chapter /,, which summarizes the hard facts uncovered about the Odessa Network and presents our de0nitive analytical judgments on them. i. 2ere is no doubt private entities still export small arms and ammunition without governmental knowledge, but submarines, tanks, missiles, etc. appear to generally be under state control. ii. Of course, commercial ships are not the only vehicle for transporting weapons. Military vessels, airplanes, rail, truck, etc. are all viable options. With that said, there are signi0cant drawbacks to these alternate vehicles that make commercial ships the best option in most cases. Planes can only carry cargo of relatively small volume and weight, and are under the jurisdiction of whatever country they happen to over1y, creating the risk of interdic- tion. For example, Turkish 0ghter jets interdicted a Syrian Air Airbus carrying weapons from Russia in October 3./3. In contrast, specialized cargo ships have massive holds capable of carrying almost any equipment, and ships in international waters are generally under the jurisdiction of whatever country they are 1agged in (o?en weak states like Panama or Liberia unlikely to interfere), meaning they can only be legally interdicted if they enter territorial waters. Rail and truck are similarly limited to relatively small equipment, as they must 0t onto a standard rail gauge or highway. 2ey also are vulnerable to interdiction as they pass through intermediary coun- tries. Military vessels are obviously safe from interdiction, but are generally not designed for large cargo, and are highly conspicuous, making them a poor choice for covert arms transfers. For all these reasons, we focused our investigation on commercial vessels. iii. A ship-based transponder that records port calls at a particular date and time, and the stated destination for all ships on their journey past a series of land-based antennas. /. !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ 9$'8& 2is report has two goals. 2e 0rst is to empower global policymakers. As the 3nd and /.th largest arms exporters in the world, respectively, Russia and Ukraine sell to many countries of interest to the international community. In particular, some of their best customers are states with poor human rights records or active sanctions: Venezuela, Sudan, etc. Russian support (including but not limited to weapons) has kept the Assad regime armed and vi- able through two years of brutal civil war. Russian anti-ship and anti-air missiles shield Assad from international intervention; Russian bullets and bombs kill Free Syrian Army members, jihadis, and civilians alike. Some weapons shipments from Russia to Syria have been publicly exposed—e.g. the ships Alaed, Professor Katsman, and Chariot, and various Russian warships—but these logically must be simply the tip of the iceberg. 2e sheer quantity of materiel required to 0ght a conventional war for over two years dictates there must be far more Russian weapons 1owing to Syria than these few ships.3 Policymak- ers armed with better information about arms transfers from the former Soviet Union to sanctioned states and con1ict zones like Syria will be better able to monitor, shape, deter, or publicize these weapons 1ows. If limiting access to FSU weapons is a policy priority, the Odessa Network is a useful place to start. Second, this report demonstrates the utility of combining open-source data, foreign language and regional expertise, and cutting-edge technology in answering complex re- search questions, and bridging the gap between tactical data and strategic insight. 2e best policy-level insights are those derived from tactical data that has been traced upwards into abstraction. For example, deep investigation into the weapons export process provides not just names and locations, but also political insights into the workings of Putin’s Russia. Ab- stract themes 0nd detailed expression in the Odessa Network: reassertion of state control over strategic assets, keeping regime stakeholders loyal through sanctioned corruption, “power vertical” relationships, and fusion of public and private entities. %K&78'K:#* 2is project was conceived, funded, and carried out independently. It has received no ex- ternal funding, public or private. All data was obtained open-source or commercially pur- chased. Although the authors travelled to Ukraine (including Kiev, Odessa, Nikolaev, and Oktyabrsk) for 0eld research, the vast majority of work was done in the US. // !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ ! Weapons Shipment Data $Q#*QK#) 2is section presents our dataset on Russian and Ukrainian weapons shipments, and the ships, companies, and ports used to facilitate them. Preliminary insights derived from this dataset are presented in Chapter ). Countries and shipments were determined by comparing lists of recipient countries to values of arms transfers from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SI- PRI) Arms Transfers and Military Expenditures databases, and searching for international media coverage of shipment events (for those that were of su;cient size or nature to war- rant international media coverage), and native-language local media coverage of the arriv- als of shipments. 2is database draws heavily on unconventional open data sources such as photos posted by local Venezuelan military bloggers or Cambodian activists of ships unloading weapons. Ship or owner names were determined from pictures (if visible) or from searching for unique IMOID identi0ers (if visible). A note on terms: exporting country refers to the country that owned and sold the weap- ons (i.e. Russia or Ukraine). Government involvement refers to whether the Russian or Ukrainian government was the owner and broker of the sale; if not explicitly stated in our sources, we assumed this was the case if the arms transfer could be corroborated with known government sales. Port of origin refers to the port from which the shipment of weapons originated. 2is is o?en di #Q#(! X@ #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Ukraine3 K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Iran 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 No (Corrupt O;cial) 7'*9$ Kh–55 (NATO: AS–15 Kent) cruise missiles. US intelligence o;cials are quoted as saying 6 missiles were shipped,4 while Ukrainian sources have said 12.5 P$*! $J $*K9K( - P$*! $J '**KQ'8 - %'!# 2000 or 2001 &"KP - K:$K% - J8'9 - 9*$&& !$(('9# - %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# - &"KP $)(#* Kaalbye Shipping6 &"KP $P#*'!$*/5*$+#* Kaalbye Shipping ($!#& Covert deal brokered by corrupt Ukrainian and Russian officials, including from Min- istry of Defense and State Security Service. Used fabricated contract with Russian de- fense export firm Rosvooruzhenie and series of front companies (including “Progress” and “Far West Ltd.”) to export missiles inherited from USSR and held in Ukraine. All parties involved except Igor Urbansky (of Kaalbye Shipping) died under mysterious circumstances: then-head of Ukrspetsexport Valeri Maleev died in a car crash on $ March %&&%, Australian-Iranian Haider Sarfraz died in a car crash in %&&' , Oleg Orlov was arrested in the Czech Republic and extradited to Ukraine, where his throat was slit in prison, Sergei Petrov died in a car bombing in Africa in %&&',V and Vladimir Filin disappeared.W /3 !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #Q#(! XA #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Ukraine K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T China 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 No (corrupt o;cials) 7'*9$ 6 Kh–55 cruise missiles. P$*! $J $*K9K( - P$*! $J '**KQ'8 - %'!# 2000 or 2001 &"KP - K:$K% - J8'9 - 9*$&& !$(('9# - %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# - &"KP $)(#*/$P#*'!$* Kaalbye Shipping ($!#& Carried out by same group as Event (). #Q#(! XB #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia (Rosvooruzhenie)9 K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Angola (some sources report the government acting through state 0rm Simportex was the purchaser,10 while others report the rebel group UNITA11) 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ 636 tons of assault rifles, ammunition, grenades, mortar shells, NVGs, and more.12 P$*! $J $*K9K( Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine13 P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Intended for Luanda, Angola; intercepted in Las Palmas, Spain14 %'!# 24 February 2001 &"KP MV Anastasia K:$K% - J8'9 St. Vincent and Grenadines/Georgia 9*$&& !$(('9# - %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# - &"KP $)(#*/:'('9#* Kaalbye Shipping15 ($!#& Igor Urbansky, founder of Kaalbye, was directly involved. Ship was intercepted in Las Palmas in the Canary Islands, where Spanish officials uncovered weapons and im- pounded the ship. After an *+&&,&&& bail was paid, the ship continued on to Angola and delivered its cargo. Ship was illegally flying the Georgia flag, and in fact was regis- tered in St. Vincent and Grenadines. #Q#(! XC #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Ukraine K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Myanmar 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 - 7'*9$ - P$*! $J $*K9K( Unknown, Ukraine P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Rangoon, MyanmarUY %'!# Z[ February Z\\] &"KP - K:$K% - J8'9 - 9*$&& !$(('9# - %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# - &"KP $)(#*/:'('9#* - #Q#(! XD #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Ukraine K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Angola and Yemen? 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes /, !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #Q#(! XD 7$(!. 7'*9$ 32 T–72 tanks for Yemen and 11 BTR–80 APCs for Angola? P$*! $J $*K9K( Unknown, Ukraine P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Unknown %'!# 15 October 200317 &"KP - K:$K% - J8'9 - 9*$&& !$(('9# - %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# - &"KP $)(#* - &"KP :'('9#* - ($!#& Phoenix Trans-Servis (Odessa, Ukraine) brokered the shipment. Data on this ship- ment was obtained by locating several pictures on Phoenix’s website showing various military equipment—including tanks and APCs—being loaded onto one or more un- identified ships.)+ The tanks and APCs appear to be loaded on the same ship. EXIF data reveals the pictures are from ), October %&&-. We cross-referenced SIPRI arms transfer databases). for tanks and APCs delivered from Russia or Ukraine to a foreign customer for whom maritime transport would be necessary (i.e. not a landlocked neighbor like Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan.) Based on this dataset, Yemen is the only plausible candi- date for the tanks, and Angola the only plausible candidate for the APCs. Nevertheless, it is possible this delivery was not previously detected and hence not included in the SIPRI dataset, in which case we do not know to whom the arms were sold. Figures Z & ]: Tanks for Yemen Figure ^: APCs for Angola #Q#(! XE #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia (Rosoboronexport) K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Eritrea 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ Pechora–2 SAMs. /4 !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #Q#(! XE 7$(!. P$*! $J $*K9K( Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Massawa, Eritrea %'!# Contract was signed 12 May 2004 &"KP - K:$K% - J8'9 - 9*$&& !$(('9# - %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# - &"KP $)(#* - &"KP :'('9#* - ($!#& Involved parties included Rosoboronexport, Gorizont, and Almaz-Antei. Data gath- ered from Russian court case%& that contains a wealth of information on ROE contract- ing procedures. SIPRI does not contain information for this arms transfer; either it never occurred, or was previously undetected. #Q#(! XF #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Ukraine or Russia K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Georgia? Algeria? South Korea? 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ T–72 or T–80 tanks P$*! $J $*K9K( Unknown, Ukraine P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Unknown %'!# 7 May 200521 &"KP MV Clipper Century K:$K% 9252826 J8'9 Bahamas 9*$&& !$(('9# 6714 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 8729 &"KP $)(#* Clipper Project Shipping Ltd. &"KP :'('9#* Clipper Project Shipping Ltd.ZZ ($!#& Data was uncovered by locating a picture on Nortrop’s website of tanks being loaded onto a ship whose name and IMOID were visible, allowing identification of ship own- ership and management.%- EXIF data revealed the picture’s date and time. Querying SIPRI databases for tanks delivered from Ukraine or Russia in %&&, revealed three possible candidates: Algeria (received %) T–/% tanks from Ukraine in %&&,), Georgia (received .& T–/% tanks from Ukraine between %&&, and %&&/), and South Korea (received )& T–+& tanks from Russia between %&&, and %&&$.) It is possible this was a previously undetected shipment to an unknown customer. Figure [: Tanks being loaded #Q#(! XG #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T China24 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ 2 Kilo-class attack submarines25 P$*! $J $*K9K( Severodvinsk, Russia26 /- !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #Q#(! XG 7$(!. P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Unknown, China %'!# Submarines loaded 30 May 2006 &"KP MV Eide Transporter K:$K% 8030130 J8'9 Bahamas 9*$&& !$(('9# 19579 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 11434 &"KP $)(#* Eide Marine Services AS27 &"KP :'('9#* Eide Marine Services AS ($!#& - #Q#(! XH #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Ukraine (Ukroboronservis)28 K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Democratic Republic of Congo (Ministry of Defense) 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ Signi0cant quantities of ammunition and armored vehicles P$*! $J $*K9K( Unknown, Ukraine26 P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Unknown, China %'!# 26 July 2006 &"KP MV BBC Singapore K:$K% 9137727 J8'9 Gibraltar 9*$&& !$(('9# 4078 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 4900 &"KP $)(#* Juister Balje (listed at same address as Briese Schi #Q#(! X@I #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia (Rosoboronexport)30 K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Morocco 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ Likely repaired and serviced tanks P$*! $J $*K9K( Oktyabrsk, Ukraine P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Unknown, Morocco %'!# Late 2006 &"KP - K:$K% - J8'9 - 9*$&& !$(('9# - %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# - &"KP $)(#* - &"KP :'('9#* - ($!#& - #Q#(! X@@ #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia (Rosoboronexport)31 K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Algeria and South Korea 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ For South Korea, some portion of the “Red Bear–2” deal that included 2000 AT–13 anti-tank missiles, 37 BMP–3 IFVs, 23 Il–103 aircra?, 7 Ka–32 helicopters, 3 Murena landing cra?, and 10 T–80U tanks. For Algeria, unknown. P$*! $J $*K9K( Oktyabrsk, Ukraine P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Unknown %'!# Late 2006 /> !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #Q#(! X@@ 7$(!. &"KP - K:$K% - J8'9 - 9*$&& !$(('9# - %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# - &"KP $)(#* - &"KP :'('9#* - ($!#& - #Q#(! X@A #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Ukraine K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Reported as Iraq, actual purchaser unknown 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes (Con0rmed by Ukrainian government) 7'*9$ Fagot ATGMs P$*! $J $*K9K( Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Reported as Um Qasr, Iraq, actual destination unknown %'!# 21 July 2007 &"KP MV Slavyanin K:$K% 8300169 J8'9 St. Vincent and Grenadines 9*$&& !$(('9# 6327 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 6258 &"KP $)(#* Starway Management Property (listed at same address as AnShip)32 &"KP :'('9#* Anship LLC (subsidiary of AnRussTrans, a major Russian transportation company owned by Aleksandr Annenkov, a former Russian Ministry of Transportation deputy minister).33 ($!#& - #Q#(! X@B #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Vietnam34 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ 2 Tarantul-class missile corvettes, each armed with 16 SS-N–25 anti-ship missiles.35 P$*! $J $*K9K( Unknown, Russia P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Cam Ranh, Vietnam %'!# 21 December 2007 &"KP MV Eide Transporter K:$K% 8030130 J8'9 Bahamas 9*$&& !$(('9# 19579 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 11434 &"KP $)(#* Eide Marine Services AS36 &"KP :'('9#* Eide Marine Services AS ($!#& - #Q#(! X@C #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Ukraine K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T South Sudan 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ Con0rmed as military shipment as part of overall arms transfer (see events #15 and #16), but exact cargo is not known. P$*! $J $*K9K( Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Mombasa, Kenya %'!# Le? port 14 September 2007, arrived 29 October 2007 /M !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #Q#(! X@C 7$(!. &"KP MV Radomyshl K:$K% 7415527 J8'9 Ukraine 9*$&& !$(('9# 4966 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 5657 &"KP $)(#* Ukrainian Danube Shipping Company37 &"KP :'('9#* Ukrainian Danube Shipping Company ($!#& Marine Energy Trading Company Ltd. (representing Milltown Corporate Services and Ireland & Overseas Acquisition Company) and Phoenix Trans-Servis involved in chartering and brokering. Use of Latvian proxies (detailed in later chapter.)38 #Q#(! X@D #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Ukraine K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T South Sudan 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ 42 T–72 tanks, 138 packages of spare parts for them, 15 ZU–23–2 anti-aircra? guns, 90 packages of spare parts for them, 26 packages of RPG–7 weapons and spare parts, 2 BM–21 122 multiple launch rocket launchers on Ural wheelbase, 10,000 AKM assault ri1es. P$*! $J $*K9K( Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Mombasa, Kenya %'!# 21 December 2007 &"KP MV Beluga Endurance K:$K% 9312169 J8'9 Antigua and Barbuda 9*$&& !$(('9# 9611 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 12714 &"KP $)(#* Martin Schi #Q#(! X@E #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Ukraine40 41 42 K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T South Sudan 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ 33 T–72 tanks, 8,926 rounds of VOF–36 high explosive fragmentation 125 mm tank ammunition, 5,000 rounds of VDK–10 HEAT 125 mm tank ammunition, 73 packag- es of spare parts for tanks, 6 ZPU–4 AA guns, 36 packages of RPG–7V launchers and spare parts, 6 BM–21 122 mm multiple launch rocket launchers on Ural wheelbase. P$*! $J $*K9K( Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Mombasa, Kenya %'!# Le? port 1 September 2008, captured by pirates 25 September 2008, arrived 10 February 2009 &"KP MV Faina K:$K% 7419337 J8'9 Belize 9*$&& !$(('9# 10931 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 9019 &"KP $)(#* Waterlux AG &"KP :'('9#* Almar ($!#& Ship is widely reported to actually be owned and operated by Kaalbye Shipping and Tomex Team (closely linked to Ukrainian businessman Vadim Alperin). 0e crewing /O !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #Q#(! X@E 7$(!. ($!#& 7$(!. agency is Carvel Shipping Ltd. Phoenix Trans-Servis and Ace Shipping Ltd. and Marine Energy Trading Company Ltd. (representing Milltown Corporate Services and Ireland & Overseas Acquisition Company) involved in chartering and brokering. Political connection was Hares Youssef, who acted as the agent of President Yush- chenko and contacted Alperin.43 #Q#(! X@F #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Ukraine (Ukrinmash) K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Uganda (Ministry of Defense) 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ 1000 tons of ammunition P$*! $J $*K9K( Oktyabrsk, Ukraine P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Dar es Salaam, Tanzania %'!# 24 June 2008 &"KP MV Ann Scan K:$K% 9145126 J8'9 Antigua and Barbuda 9*$&& !$(('9# 2528 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 3526 &"KP $)(#* Hasetal Mardex Schi Figure Y: Ammunition for Uganda #Q#(! X@G #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Ukraine K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Myanmar 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ APC components, AGLs, ATGMs, and tank machine guns.46 P$*! $J $*K9K( Unknown, Ukraine P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Unknown, Myanmar %'!# Mid-August 2009 &"KP MV Beluga Eternity /= !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #Q#(! X@G 7$(!. K:$K% 9283966 J8'9 Antigua and Barbuda 9*$&& !$(('9# 9611 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 12806 &"KP $)(#* Beluga Eternity GmbH and Co. (listed at same address as Beluga Shipping)47 &"KP :'('9#* Beluga Fleet Management GmbH and Co. ($!#& - #Q#(! X@H #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Ukraine K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Algeria 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Unknown 7'*9$ 6.9 tons of ammonium nitrate P$*! $J $*K9K( Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine48 P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Skidda, Algeria %'!# 18 December 2009 &"KP Lady Juliet K:$K% 8225204 J8'9 St. Vincent and Grenadines 9*$&& !$(('9# 12296 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 15896 &"KP $)(#* White Albatross Ltd. (listed at same address as Kaalbye Shipping)49 &"KP :'('9#* Kaalbye Shipping ($!#& Ship was dead in the water in Dardanelles.50 Ship previously was victim of attempted pirate hijacking o# the coast of Somalia, but ship was defended by armed personnel aboard.51 #Q#(! XAI #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Vietnam 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ Two Svetlyak-class patrol boats52 P$*! $J $*K9K( Unknown, Russia P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Unknown, Vietnam %'!# 2010 &"KP MV Eide Transporter K:$K% 8030130 J8'9 Bahamas 9*$&& !$(('9# 19579 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 11434 &"KP $)(#* Eide Marine Services AS53 &"KP :'('9#* Eide Marine Services AS ($!#& - #Q#(! XA@ #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Ukraine54 K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Democratic Republic of Congo 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ 20 T–72 tanks, 100 lorries, 60 anti-aircra? guns, 10,000 Kalashnikov assault ri1es, several hundred thousand rounds of ammunition P$*! $J $*K9K( Unknown, Ukraine P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Matadi, DRC %'!# 6 March 2010 &"KP Unknown K:$K% - 3. !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #Q#(! XA@ 7$(!. J8'9 - 9*$&& !$(('9# - %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# - &"KP $)(#* - &"KP :'('9#* - ($!#& Deal reportedly worth $80 million. #Q#(! XAA #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Unknown, presumed Russia K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Sudan and Singapore55 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Unknown 7'*9$ Tanks for Sudan, explosives for Singapore56 P$*! $J $*K9K( Unknown port in Norway57 P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Intercepted while docking at Limassol, Cyprus58 %'!# 11 June 2010 &"KP MV Santiago K:$K% 9145114 J8'9 Antigua and Barbuda 9*$&& !$(('9# 2528 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 3525 &"KP $)(#* Pewsum Briese Schi #Q#(! XAB #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Czech Republic and Poland, or Ukraine K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Cambodia61 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ 50 T–55 tanks and 40 PTR–26 APCs62 P$*! $J $*K9K( Unknown P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Sikhanoukville, Cambodia %'!# 10 September 2010 &"KP MV BBC Paci1c K:$K% 9427081 J8'9 Antigua and Barbuda 9*$&& !$(('9# 5261 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 6192 &"KP $)(#* Norderloog. Listed at same address in Germany as Briese Schi #Q#(! XAC #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Vietnam 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ One Gepard-class frigate66 P$*! $J $*K9K( Unknown P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Cam Ranh, Vietnam %'!# 5 March 2011 &"KP MV Eide Transporter K:$K% 8030130 J8'9 Bahamas 3/ !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #Q#(! XAC 7$(!. 9*$&& !$(('9# 19579 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 11434 &"KP $)(#* Eide Marine Services AS67 &"KP :'('9#* Eide Marine Services AS ($!#& - #Q#(! XAD #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Ukraine K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Iraq 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ 26 BTR–4 APCs, two maintenance and repair vehicles, and two armor trainers68 P$*! $J $*K9K( Unknown, Ukraine P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Um Qasr, Iraq %'!# Le? 20 April 2011, arrived 29 May 2011 &"KP - K:$K% - J8'9 - 9*$&& !$(('9# - %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# - &"KP $)(#* - &"KP :'('9#* - ($!#& - #Q#(! XAE #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia69 K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Venezuela 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ 35 T–72 tanks, 16 BMP–3 IFVs, 32 BTR–80A APCs, 4 1B152 armored command vehicles, 13 2c23 Nona-SVK self-propelled 120 mm artillery, 24 2C12 Sani 120 mm artillery, 24 BM–21 truck-mounted rocket launchers, unknown quantity of ZI–23–2 AA guns, and unknown quantity of military automobiles P$*! $J $*K9K( Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine Figure _: P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Puerto Cabello, Venezuela Miscellaneous Arms to Venezuela %'!# 25 May 2011 &"KP MV Sluisgracht K:$K% 9202522 J8'9 Netherlands 9*$&& !$(('9# 16639 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 21250 &"KP $)(#* Sluisgracht Rederij (listed at same address as Splietho<)70 &"KP :'('9#* Splietho< ($!#& Use pictures. Splietho# also is contracted to transport weapons for the US Military Sea- li2 Command; for example, its ship MV Schippersgracht transported military cargo from the United States to Egypt in March 2012.71 #Q#(! XAF #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Vietnam 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ One Gepard-class frigate P$*! $J $*K9K( Unknown, Russia P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam72 %'!# 25 July 2011 &"KP MV Eide Transporter K:$K% 8030130 33 !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #Q#(! XAF 7$(!. J8'9 Bahamas 9*$&& !$(('9# 19579 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 11434 &"KP $)(#* Eide Marine Services AS73 &"KP :'('9#* Eide Marine Services AS ($!#& - #Q#(! XAG #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Syria 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ Between 35 and 60 tons of munitions and explosives74 P$*! $J $*K9K( St. Petersburg, Russia P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Intended for Al Ladaqiyah, Syria, detained in Cyprus %'!# Le? SPB on 9 December 2011, detained in Limassol, Cyprus on 10 January 201275 &"KP MV Chariot K:$K% 8302882 J8'9 St. Vincent and Grenadines 9*$&& !$(('9# 845 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 922 &"KP $)(#* Westberg Management AG (listed at same address as Westberg Ltd.)76 &"KP :'('9#* Westberg Ltd. ($!#& Shipment chartered by Balchart. #Q#(! XAH #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Venezuela 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ See notes P$*! $J $*K9K( Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Puerto Cabello, Venezuela %'!# 20 March 201277 &"KP MV Ocean Voyager K:$K% 9111216 J8'9 St. Vincent and Grenadines 9*$&& !$(('9# 7249 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 7278 &"KP $)(#* Unicorn Enterprises (listed at same address as Kaalbye)78 &"KP :'('9#* Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine KSU ($!#& Part of group shipment consisting of Events #29–30 and #32–34, consisting of S–300 SAMs, Buk-M1–2 SAMs, BM–30 Smerch heavy rocket multiple launcher, and SSC–6 Sennight coastal defense missile system (including the SS-N–25 Switchblade missile.) It is unclear which weapons were on which ship. #Q#(! XBI #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Venezuela 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ See notes P$*! $J $*K9K( Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Puerto Cabello, Venezuela %'!# 20 March 201277 &"KP MV Ocean Fortune79 K:$K% 9512434 J8'9 Liberia 3, !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #Q#(! XBI 7$(!. 9*$&& !$(('9# 6479 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 8058 &"KP $)(#* Ocean Fortune Ltd. (listed at same address as Kaalbye) &"KP :'('9#* Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine ($!#& Part of group shipment consisting of Events #29–30 and #32–34, consisting of S–300 SAMs, Buk-M1–2 SAMs, BM–30 Smerch heavy rocket multiple launcher, and SSC–6 Sennight coastal defense missile system (including the SS-N–25 Switchblade missile.) It is unclear which weapons were on which ship. #Q#(! XB@ #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia80 K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Venezuela 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ T–72 tanks, a?er having undergone renovations and modernization at the 103rd Tank Factory in Atamanovka (Zakbaykaylsky Krai) P$*! $J $*K9K( Kronshtadt, Russia (Near St. Petersburg) P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Puerto Cabello, Venezuela %'!# 27 March 2012 &"KP MV Sluisgracht K:$K% 9202522 J8'9 Netherlands 9*$&& !$(('9# 16639 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 21250 &"KP $)(#* Sluisgracht Rederij (listed at same address as Splietho<) &"KP :'('9#* Splietho< ($!#& - #Q#(! XBA #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia80 K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Venezuela 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ See notes P$*! $J $*K9K( Oktaybrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Puerto Cabello, Venezuela %'!# March 2012 &"KP MV Stade K:$K% 9535620 J8'9 Antigua and Barbuda 9*$&& !$(('9# 8059 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 10872 &"KP $)(#* Stade BV &"KP :'('9#* Eckho<81 ($!#& Part of group shipment consisting of Events #29–30 and #32–34, consisting of S–300 SAMs, Buk-M1–2 SAMs, BM–30 Smerch heavy rocket multiple launcher, and SSC–6 Sennight coastal defense missile system (including the SS-N–25 Switchblade missile.) It is unclear which weapons were on which ship. #Q#(! XBB #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia80 K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Venezuela 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ Unknown weapons P$*! $J $*K9K( Unknown P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Puerto Cabello, Venezuela %'!# 13 April 2012 34 !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #Q#(! XBB 7$(!. &"KP MV Socol 682 K:$K% 9004516 J8'9 Panama 9*$&& !$(('9# 6030 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 9597 &"KP $)(#* Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine83 &"KP :'('9#* Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine ($!#& Part of group shipment consisting of Events #29–30 and #32–34. #Q#(! XBC #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia84 K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Venezuela 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ 85 kilogram of Class I explosives (ammunition) and other unknown cargo85 P$*! $J $*K9K( Unknown P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Puerto Cabello, Venezuela %'!# March 2012 &"KP MV Socol 3 K:$K% 9004487 J8'9 St. Vincent and Grenadines 9*$&& !$(('9# 6030 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 9500 &"KP $)(#* Arcadia Shipping (listed at same address as Kaalbye) &"KP :'('9#* Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine86 ($!#& Part of group shipment consisting of Events #29–30 and #32–34. Su#ered mechani- cal failure in the Aegean Sea, had to stop for repairs and continued on to Venezuela. All 23 crewmembers were Ukrainian.87 Prior to 2001 ship was owned by Rosvooru- zhenie, a Russian state weapons export agency. Kaalbye Shipping became the manager in March 2003, at which point Oboronprom (a Russian state defense holding) became the owner.88 Ownership was transferred to Arcadia Shipping (a Kaalbye shell com- pany) in 2004. Ship was previously known as MV BBC Ukraine; BBC Chartering is a subsidiary of Briese.89 #Q#(! XBD #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia90 K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Syria 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ Rotor blades for helicopters, some reports of heavy weapons91 P$*! $J $*K9K( Kronshtadt (St. Petersburg), Russia P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Tartus, Syria %'!# Departed Kronshtadt on 6 May 2012, arrived in Tartus on 26 May 201292 &"KP MV Professor Katsman K:$K% 9368261 J8'9 Russia 9*$&& !$(('9# 4970 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 5465 &"KP $)(#* Rusich–12 Ltd. (listed at same address as and subsidiary of North-Western Shipping Co.)93 &"KP :'('9#* North-Western Shipping Co. (ultimately owned by UCL Holding) ($!#& Cargo owner listed as Lira LLC. Formerly managed by INOK NV.94 #Q#(! XBE #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia95 K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Vietnam 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Unknown 3- !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #Q#(! XBE 7$(!. 7'*9$ Unknown weapons and explosives P$*! $J $*K9K( Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Unknown, Vietnam %'!# Le? port on 13 June 2012, crossed the Suez Canal on 19–20 June, stopped in India for repairs on 27 July &"KP MV Socol 6 K:$K% 9004516 J8'9 Panama 9*$&& !$(('9# 6030 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 9597 &"KP $)(#* Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine96 &"KP :'('9#* Kaalbye Shipping ($!#& All crewmembers were Ukrainian. #Q#(! XBF #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia98 K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Syria 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ Refurbished Mi–25 attack helicopters and munitions99 P$*! $J $*K9K( Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg, Russia100 P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Tartus, Syria %'!# June and July 2012. Ship was originally forced to turn back a?er senior US o;cials and international media publicized its journey, and its British insurer revoked its in- surance, but made another voyage under the protection of a Russian naval 1otilla.101 &"KP MV Alaed K:$K% 9574999 J8'9 Russia 9*$&& !$(('9# 7579 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 9000 &"KP $)(#* FEMCO-West Ltd.102 &"KP :'('9#* FEMCO Management ($!#& 0e Alaed also has been used to transport parts for Russian Navy ships under con- struction between di#erent parts of the country.103 #Q#(! XBG #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Ukraine104 K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Ethiopia 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ Two T–72–UA1 tanks99 P$*! $J $*K9K( Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine P$*! $J '**KQ'8 - Figure U\: %'!# 25 July 2012 Tanks for Ethiopia &"KP - K:$K% - J8'9 - 9*$&& !$(('9# - %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# - &"KP $)(#* - &"KP :'('9#* - ($!#& Part of a contract with Ethiopia for 200 T–72 tanks, worth $100 million, signed in June 2011.105 106 3> !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #Q#(! XBH #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia107 K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Vietnam 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ Two Svetlyak-class patrol boats P$*! $J $*K9K( Vladivostok, Russia P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Unknown, Vietnam %'!# 16 August 2012 &"KP MV Eide Transporter K:$K% 8030130 J8'9 Bahamas 9*$&& !$(('9# 19579 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 11434 &"KP $)(#* Eide Marine Services AS108 &"KP :'('9#* Eide Marine Services AS ($!#& - Figure UU: Patrol boats for Vietnam #Q#(! XCI #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Ukraine (Ukrspetsexport and Ukroboronprom) K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Iraq 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ 62 BTR—4 APCs109 P$*! $J $*K9K( Odessa, Ukraine110 P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Um Qasr, Iraq %'!# 13 September 2012 &"KP Unknown K:$K% - J8'9 - 9*$&& !$(('9# - %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# - &"KP $)(#* - &"KP :'('9#* - ($!#& Part of $550 million dollar deal.111 3M !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #Q#(! XC@ #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Unknown K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Nigeria 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 No 7'*9$ 14 AK–47 ri1es and 3,643 rounds of ammunition, as well as 22 Benelli MR1 ri1es with 4,955 rounds of ammunition112 P$*! $J $*K9K( Unknown P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Detained in Lagos %'!# 20 October 2012113 &"KP MV Myre Seadiver K:$K% 6505662 J8'9 O;cially listed as Cook Islands, but witnesses indicate it was 1ying a Dutch 1ag at time of seizure114 9*$&& !$(('9# 541 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 315 &"KP $)(#* Midas Pete Ltd.115 &"KP :'('9#* Westberg Ltd. ($!#& Operated and used by Moran Security Group, a Russian private security 1rm.116 All crew members were Ukrainians and Russians.117 #Q#(! XCA #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Ukraine118 K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Cambodia119 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ 100 tanks and 40 eight and six wheel APCs120 P$*! $J $*K9K( Unknown, Ukraine P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Sikhanoukville, Cambodia %'!# 31 October 2012 &"KP - K:$K% - J8'9 - 9*$&& !$(('9# - %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# - &"KP $)(#* - &"KP :'('9#* - ($!#& Pictures available, but unable to locate identifying characteristics. Figure UZ: Tanks and APCs for Cambodia Figure U]: Tanks and APCs for Cambodia cont. #Q#(! XCB #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia121 K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Libya 9$Q#*(:#(! 7$(!*$8 Yes 7'*9$ AK–47 style assault ri1es and Igla MANPADs. P$*! $J $*K9K( Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, Ukraine P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Tripoli, Libya 3O !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #Q#(! XCB 7$(!. %'!# Unknown &"KP - K:$K% - J8'9 - 9*$&& !$(('9# - %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# - &"KP $)(#* - &"KP :'('9#* - ($!#& Pictures available, but unable to locate identifying characteristics. Figure U^: Assault Ri3es to Libya $6! $J &':P8# %'!' 2e below events are excluded from our main weapons shipment dataset because they are not weapons sales from Russia or Ukraine to a foreign party. However, these ‘out of sample’ events are analytically useful, as they show the involvement of known weapons transport- ers in transporting other interesting cargos. For example, the German shipping company Beluga has carried out several weapons shipments, but also owned and operated the ship on which A.Q. Khan centrifuges were transported to Libya. #Q#(! ' #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T A.Q. Khan network K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Libya 7'*9$ Nuclear centrifuges and components thereof P$*! $J $*K9K( Dubai, UAE P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Intercepted in Taranto, Italy, intending to go to Tripoli, Libya122 %'!# 4 October 2003 &"KP MV BBC China123 K:$K% 9219082 J8'9 Antigua and Barbuda 9*$&& !$(('9# 5548 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 6500 &"KP $)(#* Beluga Superstition124 &"KP :'('9#* Beluga Shipping GmbH ($!#& Chartered by BBC Chartering.125 #Q#(! 5 #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia126 K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T France 7'*9$ 182 tons of Uranium 3= !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #Q#(! 5 7$(!. P$*! $J $*K9K( St. Petersburg, Russia P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Le Havre, France %'!# 3 July 2009 &"KP MV Kapitan Lus K:$K% 9077551 J8'9 Malta 9*$&& !$(('9# 4998 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 4618 &"KP $)(#* Shipline Two Ltd. (listed at same address as NB Maritime) &"KP :'('9#* NB Maritime Management Cyprus ($!#& Ship collided with another ship o# the coast of Sweden and Denmark. NB Maritime Management Cyprus also was the owner of the MV Monchegorsk, which was inter- dicted in Cyprus for attempting to ship more than 2,000 tons of Iranian munitions to Syria.127 #Q#(! 7 #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Egypt (Ministry of Defense) K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Democratic Republic of Congo (government) 7'*9$ 2ousands of grenades, 7,000 mortars, four million rounds of ammunition, and 700 rockets128 P$*! $J $*K9K( Alexandria, Egypt P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Unknown, DRC %'!# June 2011 &"KP MV Chariot129 K:$K% 8302882 J8'9 St. Vincent and Grenadines 9*$&& !$(('9# 845 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 922 &"KP $)(#* Westberg Management AG (listed at same address as Westberg Ltd.)130 &"KP :'('9#* Westberg Ltd. ($!#& Westberg and Chariot previously shipped weapons to Syria and the DRC, as described in the main dataset. #Q#(! % #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Iran? K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Syria? 7'*9$ Reports of unknown weapons131 P$*! $J $*K9K( Djibouti P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Detained in Turkey %'!# 13 April 2012 &"KP MV Atlantic Cruiser K:$K% 9210347 J8'9 Germany 9*$&& !$(('9# 4970 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 5465 &"KP $)(#* Atlantic Cruiser Co. (listed at same address as Bockstiegel Reederei.) &"KP :'('9#* Bockstiegel Reederei KMBH and Co.132 ($!#& Media reports that military goods had been transferred from an Iranian ship onto the Atlantic Cruiser during a stopover at Djibouti. C.E.G. Bulk Chartering was cargo owner, ship had been chartered by White Whale Shipping (linked to Aleksandr Varva- renko, who was or is director of Kaalbye Projects).133 #Q#(! # #RP$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Russia K:P$*!K(9 7$6(!*T Unknown ,. !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #Q#(! # 7$(!. 7'*9$ Likely advanced military equipment P$*! $J $*K9K( Jakobstad, Finland P$*! $J '**KQ'8 Unknown %'!# 24 July 2009 &"KP MV Arctic Sea K:$K% 8912792 J8'9 Malta 9*$&& !$(('9# 3988 %#'%)#K9"! !$(('9# 4706 &"KP $)(#* Solchart134 &"KP :'('9#* Solchart ($!#& The Arctic Sea was ostensibly loaded with timber in Finland bound for Algeria. 0e ship was hijacked o# the coast of Sweden by 10 English-speaking men posing as counter-narcotics o4cers, who then turned o# its AIS transponder and 3ed for points unknown. Russia dispatched two nuclear submarines and three warships from the Black Sea Fleet to recover it.135 0e ship was located o# the coast of Cape Verde, at which point it was taken back into Russian custody. 0is is widely believed to be a case of illicit arms smuggling, with numerous Russian sources and most foreign analy- sis stating their belief that the Arctic Sea was carrying advanced military equipment (most o2en named as S–300 SAMs) to Iran.136 ,/ !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ $ Preliminary Insights K(&K9"! / Our weapons shipment dataset is broadly representative of overall Russian and Ukrainian seaborne weapons exports. A basic research question is whether the sampled data (Figure ',) is representative of the larger population under study. We are interested in Russian and Ukrainian seaborne weapons exports, and while a complete listing of all shipment events (many of which go unreported) is not possible, our sample should be as large and diverse as possible. Our dataset includes 4, separate shipment events, and at least 3/ di Figure UY: In our dataset. All possible candidate countries. iv. India is the most glaring exception. New Delhi has become the largest purchaser of Russian weapons in recent years, but is absent from our dataset. Other notable omissions include Indonesia, Kuwait, Turkey, and potential customers like Saudi Arabia and Brazil. ,3 !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ K(&K9"! 3 !e Russian and Ukrainian governments own and sell the vast majority of advanced weapons leaving their countries. Our dataset indicates government ownership and control of virtually all weapons being shipped abroad. In some cases there is direct evidence. For example, the cargo manifest for the Ann Scan, which shipped /... tons of ammunition to Uganda in 3..O, lists state 0rm Ukrinmash as the owner; crates of ammunition uncovered in Libya have Rosobo- ronexport information printed on their side. In other cases, we cross-referenced weapons shipments in our dataset with acknowledged state arms transfers. For example, we did not obtain cargo manifests for the multiple ships carrying weapons to Venezuela in 3./3, but extensive media reporting of multi-billion dollar arms sales between the Russian and Venezuelan governments during this time period leave us con0dent that this was not a pri- vate sale./4. 2e only instance of advanced weapons systems de0nitely being sold without governmental knowledge was the chronologically 0rst event in our dataset, the export of Ukrainian X–-- missiles by rogue Russian intelligence o;cers in collaboration with cor- rupt Ukrainian o;cials and Kaalbye Shipping to Iran and China in 3../. We acknowledge potential selection bias. Heavy weapons—tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), artillery, etc. —are larger, easier for governments to keep track of, and presumably less likely to be illicitly sold than small arms and light weapons (SALW). Be- cause heavy weapons are so conspicuous, they also are easier for researchers to track, and make up a high percentage of our shipment dataset. 2ese factors mean it is quite possible that there are private arms dealers moving large quantities of small arms, which we did not detect. We also acknowledge the troublesome ambiguity of ‘governmental control,’ a term assuming both unity of purpose among state entities and a distinction between the public and private sectors, neither of which are very applicable to the o?en chaotic and corrupt Russian and (especially) Ukrainian political systems. For example, assessing whether defense-industrial o;cials who sell state-owned weapons but personally retain pro0ts are acting under government mandate is problematic. Our decision criteria was the involvement of o;cial state weapons export agencies (ROE, USE, etc.); such arms transfers could be categorized as institutional, not personal. We note that this does not preclude non-transparency or corruption, but that such behavior continually occurring under a government roof indicates it is in some sense sanctioned. Figure UV: Ukrainian Defense Industrial Agency Figure UW: Ukrainian Defense Industrial Agency Under this de0nition, the weapons in our dataset are overwhelmingly government owned and sold, which has important implications. 2ere is little evidence to support the hypothesis that private actors sell major military hardware to the highest bidder. 2e chaos and weakening of state control in Russia and Ukraine in the /==.s led many Western ana- lysts to believe FSU organized crime groups would export weapons (nuclear was the most feared, but also conventional)./4/ 2ese fears were not unfounded, as arms smugglers like Victor Bout, Leonid Minin, and Arkadiy Gaydamak moved weapons to customers such as the RUF in Sierra Leone and FARC forces in Columbia./43 /4, /44 But our dataset, which largely coincides with the Putin era, indicates the Russian and Ukrainian governments have fairly good control over their major weapons systems; if they are exported, it is be- cause someone in the government wishes it so. ,, !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ Moscow and Kiev’s dominant role in the weapons export process also indicates the facilita- tors of weapons shipments are an important foreign policy tool. Most analysts would agree that selling weapons is a Russian foreign policy lever, in particular to bolster states against the perceived threat of American intervention that Russia 0rmly opposes as hegemonic meddling. If this is so, then the facilitators of arms transfers are of critical importance for Russian foreign policy: they are the vehicle by which Moscow aids allied militaries and favored factions. Governmental ownership of exported weapons since the early 3...s also con0rms a nar- rative of Russian politics that emphasizes reassertion of state control over national assets (de- fense plants, oil and gas, industrial concerns, etc.) and pro0ts resulting from sale of these assets being distributed to regime stakeholders via sanctioned corruption in exchange for political loyalty. As the story goes, the chaos of the /==.s and corrupt privatization of former- ly Soviet assets meant a few oligarchs and criminals seized control, became incredibly rich and powerful, and ran the country into the ground while the ine K(&K9"! , A relatively small number of companies facilitate a high percentage of Russian and Ukrai- nian weapons exports. Most of these companies are based in Ukraine or the EU. As shown in the table and chart below, Ukrainian 0rms (particularly Kaalbye and Phoenix) play a particularly prominent role, as well as EU 0rms Eide and Briese. Key research ques- tions include: who are these companies, and their key personnel? What qualities do they pos- sess that allow them to carry out so many arms shipments? Are these 0rms connected? If so, how? Do some 0rms have a particular specialty (i.e. a certain kind of weapon or customer)? v. Stephen Blank terms this the boyar class, a?er the medieval Russian nobility. See “Russian Democracy Revisited”, International Journal of Security A#airs, Spring 3..M, No. /3. vi. 2is implies money laundering is a similarly essential part of the Putin system, a topic which is covered in depth in Chapter =. ,4 !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ &"KP:#(!& 5T 7$:P'(Tvii 7$6(!*K#& 7$6(! J'7K8K!'!$* ('!K$('8K!T Kaalbye 6+*'K(# 10 Eide ($*)'T 7 Phoenix Trans-Servis 6+*'K(# 4 Briese 9#*:'(T 3 Westberg Ltd. *6&&K' 2 Beluga Shipping 9#*:'(T 2 Splietho< (#!"#*8'(%& 2 Nortrop 6+*'K(# 1 Ukrainian Danube Shipping Co. 6+*'K(# 1 Barwil Ukraine 6+*'K(# 1 FEMCO *6&&K' 1 North-Western Shipping Company *6&&K' 1 AnRussTrans *6&&K' 1 Balchart *6&&K' 1 Eckho< 9#*:'(T 1 Held Bereederungs 9#*:'(T 1 Clipper Group %#(:'*+ 1 Figure U_: Shipment counts K(&K9"! 4 Most weapons shipments originate at the port of Oktyabrsk, Ukraine. !is is true regard- less of whether the weapons being exported are Russian or Ukrainian. Our data on port of origin for weapons Figure Z\: Port of Oktyabrsk shipments is inconsistent. Sometimes sources list a speci0c port, other times they list only a country (e.g. shipment le2 Rus- sia on September 56), and in some cases they entirely omit information. Regardless, it is unambiguous that Oktyabrsk is the most common port of origin for Russian and Ukrainian weapons shipments. Weapons shipments with a known port of origin were over four times as likely to originate in Oktyabrsk as the next most common port (St. Petersburg). For shipments in which at least the country (if not speci0c port) of or- igin was known, Ukrainian ports (primar- ily Oktyabrsk) accounted for nearly 0ve times as many shipments as Russian ports (see Figure (' on the next page). 2is 0nd- ing raises more questions. What is unique about Oktyabrsk that makes it the preferred port from which to export FSU weapons? If the governments of Ukraine and Russia Oktyabrsk lies in Southern Ukraine on the Bug River, which ship so many weapons from there, what are feeds into the Black Sea. It is in the city of Nikolaev, which their mechanisms for controlling and safe- has its own port. Because the two ports are so close, we of- guarding this vital port? Since Oktyabrsk is ten refer to Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev as a single destination. vii. 2is chart lists the number of shipments in which the listed company participated. Because multiple companies can collaborate on a single shipment, the total number of shipments listed here is higher than the actual number of shipments which occurred. ,- !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ in Ukraine, how does the Kremlin exert in1uence over a port that lies outside of Russia de jure? Chapter , addresses these questions. One important exception to the general dominance of Oktyabrsk is that none of the publicly known maritime weapons shipments from Russia to Syria (i.e. the ships Chariot, Professor Katsman, and Alaed) originated at Oktyabrsk, instead departing from the north- ern Russian ports of St. Petersburg or Kaliningrad. We have two, non-mutually exclusive hypotheses to explain this anomaly. It could be that there are ships transporting Russian weapons from Oktyabrsk to Syria, and they simply have not been publicly exposed. It also could be that St. Petersburg has particular advantages for shipments to Syria: it is much larger and busier than Oktaybrsk (possibly providing more cover for covert shipments), and is located inside Russia, making it relatively immune from foreign political pressures (as opposed to Oktyabrsk, in which case the Ukrainian government may be under signi0- cant political pressure from the West to disallow Russia’s Syria-bound weapons shipments). &"KP:#(!& 5T &"KP:#(!& 5T 7$6(!*T $J P$*! P$*! $J $*K9K( Figure ZU: Descriptive Studies )#'P$(& #RP$*! P$*!& $J $*K9K( ,> !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ % End-to-End Logistics Integration: Odessa 2e overarching hypothesis of this analysis is that the Odessa, Ukraine-based 0rms com- prise the end-to-end logistics integration backbone behind many Russian and Ukrainian weapons shipments, and the key nodes of the network. 2ere is some empirical evidence to motivate this assumption: Odessa-based 0rms are collectively responsible for the largest share of weapons shipments in our dataset. But to simply count shipments would ignore the Odessa companies’ greatest asset: connections. Link and network analysis reveals that the Odessa companies and personnel are the center of a rich network of businesses and individuals who provide all the services necessary for a weapons shipment to occur. 2is hyper-connectedness includes both other Odessa companies and their partners abroad (e.g. other nodes of the Odessa Network.) We judge that Odessa companies’ unique access to everything from heavy-li? vessels to skilled crews to powerful defense-industrial o;- cials helps explain their prominence as weapons export facilitators. Before identifying and analyzing this network in detail, we must make a few conces- sions to readability. 2e Odessa maritime industry is a bewildering sprawl of companies, subsidiaries, joint ventures, personnel (o?en working at one or more of said companies at the same or di ,M !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ !"# +''85T# 9*$6P By far the most important Odessa Network 0rm is Kaalbye. Kaalbye has engaged in at least /. separate weapons shipments over the course of a decade, and likely more. Founder Igor Urbansky, a former captain in the Soviet merchant 1eet, created his 0rst company Evas in /==3 before founding Kaalbye Shipping in /==>./4- It is important to understand this particular time and place, which spawned not just Kaalbye but many of the other entities we mention. 2e botched post–/==/ privati- zation of formerly Soviet assets, in which a &"KP:#(! #Q#(!& small group of businessmen and organized #1 Cruise Missiles to Iran criminal 0gures (o?en working in concert) #2 Cruise Missiles to China managed to control vast swathes of the new #3 Assault Ri1es and Grenades to Angola economy, created lucrative opportunities #16 Tanks, RPGs, and More to if one knew how to exploit them. Huge South Sudan amounts oil, gas, timber, and steel formerly #19 Explosives to Algeria locked away in Soviet holdings were sud- #29 Mega-shipment of SAMs, Rocket denly on the free market. 2e overwhelm- Launchers, ASMs, and More to ing /==.s FSU business theme was getting Venezuela one’s hands on these newly privatized as- #30 " sets, and moving them out of the country to #33 " Western and Asian markets as fast as pos- #34 " sible. Odessa has been a center of shipping #36 Unknown Weapons to Vietnam and trade for centuries: much of the Soviet merchant 1eet was based out of there, and Figure Z]: Kaalbye Shipment Events multiple oil and gas pipelines terminated at the city. 2e race was on to grab old Soviet ships, privatize them into new companies, and use them as vehicles to export valuable resources that foreign countries and companies so dearly coveted. Not all of this was strictly legal. Weak governance, vast stockpiles of Soviet weaponry, and foreign demand meant Odessa also was a hub of international arms tra;cking in the /==.s. One tra;cker, Leonid Minin, was a major broker of arms to Charles Taylor in Liberia, the RUF in Sierra Leone,/4> the Ivory Coast, and even tried to sell an aircra? carrier to Turkey./4M Another arms dealer, Arkady Gaydamak, funneled over `-.. million of Russian weapons to Angola during the same time period in partnership with the son of French President Mit- terand./4O It is important to note that these businessmen were equal opportunists, exporting whatever held value: sometimes weapons, but sometimes not. For example, Minin also dealt in timber, oil, metal, and the like, primarily operating out of Odessa Port in conjunction with organized crime 0gures like Aleksandr Angert./4= 2e situation was such that US intel- ligence 0gures singled out Odessa as the epicenter of post-Soviet arms tra;cking./-. Average Odessites and dock-workers interviewed by the authors con0rmed that the city still is (or at least is perceived as being) a hub for contraband. Dockworkers maintain that they do not know the contents of the cargo they load or unload, but do know a signi0cant portion of it is illegal. 2ey also allege that one group with multiple front companies controls most contraband moving through the port./-/ 2e existence or extent of Kaalbye’s involvement in the weapons trade during the /==.s is unknown, but it certainly engaged in the Odessa port trade writ large, with companies like Kaalbye Oil Services, Ukrainian Maritime Agency, and Kaalbye Shipping providing oil services, crewing, and cargo transport, respectively. 2is business diversi0cation is a major theme of Kaalbye. Kaalbye certainly entered into the weapons trade by the early aughts, and stayed there for the next decade. Kaalbye’s entry into the weapons transportation mar- ket coincided with the exit of traditional facilitators: Minin was arrested in Italy in 3...,/-3 and Gaydamak indicted in France in April /=== and June 3..../-, It also coincided with the emergence of Putin, and reassertion of state control over major weapons systems and other national assets. 2e 3... sale of Ukrainian X–-- cruise missiles to Iran and China by corrupt o;cials, which Kaalbye facilitated,/-4 is one of the very last instances of the private sale of major FSU weapons systems. Kaalbye clearly adapted to the new state-dominated weapons market, as its long list of subsequent shipments shows. ,O !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ Figure Z^: 2ere are three factors that explain Kaalbye’s prominence. 2e most immediate is its Kaalbye subsidiaries, shells, etc. government connections. Founder Igor Urbansky was a Deputy Minister of Transpor- tation in Ukraine from 3..>–3..=, and is linked to senior Ukrainian defense o;cials. Kaalbye Shipping Boris Kogan, a co-founder of Kaalbye Shipping, is partner to some of the most power- Kaalbye Shipping International ful defense-industrial 0gures in Russia, including a deputy director of RosTech (the state Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine defense industry holding 0rm—see Chapter , for details). 2ese personal connections Kaalbye Shipping Cyprus are of immense importance, as government o;cials must have great trust in a facilitator’s Kaalbye Bulk competence and honesty in order to feel comfortable handing over immensely valuable Kaalbye Heavy Li? and powerful weapons systems to this private individual. Our weapons shipment dataset Kaalbye Projects empirically shows that the Russian and Ukrainian governments are willing to let Kaal- Kaalbye Logistics bye carry out even the most sensitive foreign policy maneuvers: the transfer of S–,..s Kaalbye Yachting to bolster Venezuela against the US is a prominent example. We judge there is a direct Kaalbye Oil Services correlation between the ties of senior Kaalbye personnel to organs of state power, and the Kaalbye Group lucrative weapons transportation contracts they receive. Kaalbye Group Holding Second is Kaalbye’s business diversi0cation. Kaalbye is not so much a company as an Kaalbye Ltd. interlocking network. 2rough its subsidiaries, Kaalbye is one of the largest crewing (i.e. Kaalbye Agency Services providing trained seamen for Ukrainian and foreign companies), chartering and freight Ukrainian Maritime Agency forwarding (match-making of cargo owners with transportation companies), container Deutscheland Prime Transport shipping, bulk shipping (grain, coal, etc.), and project and heavy-li? (very large and un- New Challenge Ltd. usually shaped cargo) 0rms in Ukraine. It even has a yacht division, which crews and man- Olva Shipping Ltd. ages luxury ships. 2is is relatively rare for the international shipping industry, in which Silver Streams Limited many 0rms pick a specialty; it is even truer for the international weapons shipping indus- White Albatross Ltd. try. For example, Norwegian 0rm Eide Marine Services specializes in massive barges that can comfortably 0t a warship or submarine. 2is means Eide is the preferred partner when %'!': *6&&K'(, 6+*'K(K'(, 5QK, '(% Russia exports Kilo submarines to China or missile corvettes to Vietnam, but it also means P'(':':K'( 56&K(#&& *#7$*%& Eide cannot handle any shipments outside of its lane. In contrast, Kaalbye has general car- go ships for crate-able military cargo, heavy-li? vessels for tanks and artillery, and more. 2is wide range of services lets it handle shipments of diverse military cargo end-to-end. 2e spread of weapon types and destinations that Kaalbye has shipped over the past de- cade is remarkable, including everything from advanced missile systems to boxes of rusty bullets, from well-heeled licit customers like Vietnam to third-world con1ict zones like South Sudan. No other 0rm in our dataset has such a wide collection of cargo and destina- tions. Our assumption is that this ability to perform A-Z logistics integration for almost all cargos is a major reason why Moscow and Kiev turn to Kaalbye with such frequency. 2e third factor is Kaalbye’s external connectedness. If Kaalbye itself cannot perform a particular shipment for customers (either because all its ships are booked, or it does not have the requisite ships or personnel), it almost certainly knows someone either in Odessa or abroad who does. Virtually all of the other Odessa companies we examined are subsidiaries of Kaalbye, have collaborated with Kaalbye in the past, are sta ,= !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ Figure ZY: Dual-listed personnel 4. !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ Figure ZV: Academic connections 4/ !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ Case 1:08-cv-09951-SAS Document 20-8 Filed 08/13/09 Page 4 of 8 Figure ZW: Kaalbye Projects incorporation documents 43 !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ !"# Q'*Q'*#(+$ J':K8T '(% !"#K* 'JJK8K'!#& Along with Kaalbye, Aleksandr Varvarenko is one of the most key connectors in the Odessa Network. Either through himself, his family, or his associates, Aleksandr is con- nected to almost every corner of the Odessa Network. He was or is a director of Kaalbye Projects,/-= dating back to 3..> and continuing to at least 3..=; Kaalbye carried out mul- tiple heavy weapons shipments during this period. Since 3..=, Aleksandr has been the owner and director of Varamar/White Whale Shipping, alleged to have smuggled weap- ons onboard the Atlantic Cruiser to Syria in 3./3. Interestingly, Varamar has a track record of operating or chartering the Alaed, a ship caught delivering Russian weapons to Syria in 3./3./>. Varamar’s o;ce is located in one of the most prestigious and expensive areas of Odessa; its closest neighbors are a large consulate of the People’s Republic of China and luxury restaurant. &"KPPK(9 #Q#(!& #7 ($*!*$P Tanks to Unknown Customer % Q'*':'* / )"K!# )"'8# Alleged Iranian Weapons to Syria Note: Does not include Kaalbye weapons shipments which occurred when Aleksandr worked there. Figure Z_: Varvarenko Shipment Events Aleksandr’s brother, Andrei Varvarenko, runs another Odessa maritime company, Nortrop, which has shipped weapons in the past./>/ 2eir father, Valentin Varvaren- ko, is one of the most powerful men in the FSU transportation industry (see Chapter ,), and worked in Latvia and Belgium for decades before returning to Russia and Ukraine to run several national transpor- tation companies./>3 Aleksandr and Andrei grew up in Latvia and Belgium,/>, and have Figure ]\: extensive ties there: Aleksandr started his Varamar o4ce career a?er graduating from Odessa Na- tional Maritime University at Belgian 0rm OXL-Flamar, while Andrei’s 0rm Nortrop is part owned by Belgian 0rm Noord Natie (where Valentin used to be a senior executive.)/>4 Aleksandr’s lieutenant Evgenii Poltavets has formerly worked at Kaalbye, Beluga (a known German facilitator), Phoenix (another Odessa facilitator), is the commercial direc- tor of Varamar, and is a close personal associate of Varvarenko (for example, they appear in each other’s wedding photos). Vsevolod Ivanov is a Chartering Manager at Varamar./>- Previously, he worked at Kaal- bye Projects under Varvarenko, and before this was employed at Barwil Ukraine,/>> which shipped /... tons of ammunition to Uganda while he was employed there. While his di- rect involvement in this shipment is unknown, he worked out of the Nikolaev/Oktyabrsk o;ce, which is known as a hub of weapons tra;cking and was the port of origin for the Uganda shipment. 5'*)K8 &"KP:#(! #Q#(!& Barwil Ukraine is a Ukrainian joint venture of Norwegian 0rm Wilh. Wilhelmsen Hold- #17 Ammunition to Uganda ing with an unknown FSU partner. Cargo manifests from a 3..O shipment of Ukrainian ammunition to the Ugandan Ministry of Defense show Barwil as the shipping agent./>M Figure ]U: Barwil shipment events Barwil Ukraine has its main o;ce in Odessa,/>O but also maintains an o;ce and person- nel at the port of Oktyabrsk./>= 2e general manager of Barwil Ukraine at the time of the Ugandan weapons shipment, Vsevolod Ivanov, now is a chartering manager at Kaalbye and Varamar./M. Ivanov also is a graduate of Odessa National Maritime University, which he attended at the same time as Andrei Varvarenko./M/ 4, !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ P"$#(KR &"KPPK(9 Phoenix is an Odessa-based company specializing in military logistics, and has deep con- nections to Kaalbye and defense-industrial 0gures. Phoenix acts primarily as a freight forwarding 0rm, arranging for the transportation of goods along Ukrainian railways P"$#(KR &"KP:#(! #Q#(!& to port, onto ships, and on to their destination. Regular Phoenix customers include #4 Tanks and APCs to Ukrspetsexport, Ukrinmash (a Ukrainian state holding company which controls much Yemen and Angola of the defense industry), the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, and Israeli defense 0rm /M3 #14 Tanks, RPGs and Ammunition LR Avionics. Phoenix is co-owned by Ukrainian nationals Yuri Tupchi and Igor Kole- /M, to South Sudan sov. 2e three co-founders of Phoenix—Tupchi, Kolesov, and Aleksandr Tarasik—are #15 " reported to have served together in military maritime logistics posts in Odessa, with /M4 #16 " Phoenix continuing to act as a “so? landing” for retiring o;cers. On this note, Igor Levitin, the Russian Minister of Transportation from 3..4–3./3 and current personal Figure ]Z: Phoenix shipment events advisor to Putin, was a senior executive at Phoenix in the /==.s a?er retiring from the military (see Chapter , “Government Connections” for more), and may continue to exert in1uence. Phoenix both directly collaborates on weapons shipments with Kaalbye and other Odes- sa maritime companies, and has personnel integrated into their structures. Yuri Tupchi is the founder of Ace Shipping,/M- an Isle of Man-registered company, which helped (along with Phoenix, Kaalbye, Tomex Team, and Almar) transport multiple weapons shipments from Ukraine to South Sudan between 3..M and 3..=. A Phoenix spokesperson claims that Ace acts as a tax and accounting vehicle for Phoenix./M> Sergei Nazarenko and Oksana Popova are listed in 3..O and 3./. as employees of Phoenix,/MM /MO and in 3./3 as employees at maritime transportation 0rm Dealex./M= Evgenii Poltavets, Varvarenko’s lieutenant at Kaalbye and Varamar,/O. self-reports working at Phoenix from 3..4 to 3..M, but a “Mr. E Poltavets” also self-reports working at Phoenix as of 3./3,/O/ raising the possibility he is still employed. Phoenix also has EU connections. It collaborated with German 0rm Beluga Shipping on arms transfers to Sudan in 3..O; Beluga has also moved Ukrainian APCs to Myanmar in 3..=. Common personnel may aid this business cooperation. Evgenii Poltavets was a chartering manager at Beluga from at least 3..M–3..=,/O3 and still likely has contacts in the German heavy-li? industry. While we have no direct evidence showing he brokered Figure ]]: Phoenix o4ce the Myanmar deal, it is interesting that all of Beluga’s known transportation of Ukrainian weapons occurred while Poltavets was at Beluga. 2e authors visited Phoenix’s putative o;ces in Odessa, which were closed at , PM on a working day, and consisted of a single, unlabeled door in an alleyway far o< the main drag. 2is is somewhat understandable, as brokering companies such as Phoenix make their living through connections (i.e. matching cargo owners with ship owners), and therefore do not possess signi0cant physical assets. With that said, the relative squalor of Phoenix, as well as the presence of so many former military and transportation o;cials, leads us to believe the company’s ‘real’ business is located elsewhere. Q'%K: '8P#*K( '(% 'JJK8K'!#& Vadim Alperin is a Ukrainian-Israeli businessman prominent in Odessa, and famous for '8P#*K( &"KP:#(! #Q#(!& his connection to the Faina, a ship carrying Ukrainian weapons for Sudan which was hi- #16 Tanks, RPGs and Ammo to jacked by Somali pirates in 3..O./O, /O4 As his stamp and signature below show, Alperin is South Sudan the director of Waterlux AG, the Panama-registered company which owns the Faina,/O- and also controls Tomex Team, another Panama-registered company which operates the Figure ]^: Alperin shipment events Faina. Victor Murenko is another director of Tomex./O> Together, these two men control a wide range of Panama-registered but Odessa-based maritime companies, including Al- mar Shipping, Stonehill Maritime, and Lyumar Odessa./OM Alperin also is a former Party of Regions deputy in the Odessa city council, and owns many other businesses in real estate, transportation, and cargo brokering, including the 0rms Temp-Progress,/OO Logistic Servis,/O= and Metalloproduct./O= Alperin also is reported to be business partners with Aleksandr Oiberman, another in1uential Israeli-Ukrainian Odessa businessman and deputy on the Odessa City Council./=/ Interestingly, Alperin appears to have ties to Syria. It was widely reported that when the 44 !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ Figure ][: Figure ]Y: Figure ]V: Alperin and Ukranian Intelligence Hares Youssef (second from right), with Vadim Alperin and Faina (Mykola Malomuzh, head of SZR) Rinat Akhmetov and Vadim Novinsky to his le2 Ukrainian government wanted to export weapons to South Sudan in 3..M, it was Hares Youssef, a Syrian businessman living and operating in Ukraine/=3 and personal advisor to then-President Victor Yushchenko,/=, who selected Alperin and the Faina as the facilita- tors of the shipment,/=4 possibly indicating a pre-existing relationship. Youssef founded the conglomerate Hares Group, and is a business partner of some of FSU’s most powerful oligarchs. For example, he co-owns a large steel factory in Moldova along with Alisher Usmanov and Vadim Novinsky, among others./=- Youssef been the subject of intense me- dia scrutiny for his alleged ties to international arms tra;cking, Semen Mogilievich (for whom he is accused of being a representative), smuggling of antiquities, business part- nership with Syrian-Slovakian metals trader Akthar Barakat, and ties to Maher al-Assad. Vadim Alperin appears to have additional contacts in Syria beyond Youssef. For example, he recently leased his ship Etel to an unnamed Syrian businessman using it for trade with Case 1:09-cv-05705-SHS Document 1 Filed 06/22/09 Page 25 of 37 Libya./=> /=M Figure ]W: Waterlux o4cial seal and signature 4- !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ & Government Connections: Moscow & Kiev 2e Odessa Network is a logistics contractor for the Russian and Ukrainian govern- ments, not an independent arms merchant. State agencies such as Rosoboronexport and Ukrspetsexport own the weapons and broker almost all foreign sales. 2e Odessa Net- work plays a critical role in making these arms transfers happen, but it only does so on behalf of powerful customers in Moscow and Kiev. 2e key assumption is that there must be persistent links and contractual relation- ships between the Odessa Network and government o;cials. 2e Odessa Network has moved billions of dollars of advanced military hardware, which indicates a high level of government trust in its competency and honesty, implying contact between leaders on both sides. 2e need to keep track of what weapons are being shipped where and when necessitates contracts between state agencies and the Odessa Network. 2is hy- pothesis is supported by Rosoboronexport court cases specifying detailed contractual arrangements with other (i.e. non-Odessa Network) facilitators./=O 2e Odessa shipping companies must be compensated for their services, implying exchange of bank account information, payment schedules, etc. Although we lack direct evidence for most of these links, we have uncovered multiple personal relationships between Odessa Network per- sonnel and Russian and Ukrainain o;cials, including cabinet level ministers and senior defense-industrial personnel. 2ese relationships may be the pathways along which in- formation and trust 1ows. K9$* 8#QK!K( Phoenix Trans-Servis is an Odessa ship- ping firm that has brokered multiple weapons shipments, and openly advertis- es its connections to Russian and Ukrai- nian defense industrial concerns./== One former Phoenix employee is Igor Levi- tin, who served as the Russian Minister of Transportation from 3..4–3./3 and currently works as a personal advisor to Vladimir Putin, in addition to stints on the board of directors at Sheremetevo Airport and Aeroflot.3.. Levitin served in the Soviet and then Russian army from /=M. to /==4, primarily as a logistics and transportation specialist, before being ca- shiered in /==4. Between /==- and /==> he worked at Phoenix Trans-Servis, where he served as Vice-President.3./ Levitin is the most high profile, but by no means only military-logistics figure connected to Phoenix. The three co-founders of Phoenix—Yuri Tupchi, Aleksandr Tara- sik, and Igor Kolesov—are reported to have served together in military mari- time logistics posts in Odessa, with Phoe- nix continuing to act as a “soft landing” for retiring officers.3.3 Although we have no data on whether Levitin continues to have contact with Phoenix, it is interest- ing that one of the most powerful men in Russia just happened to work at one of the major exporters of Russian and Figure ]_: Ukrainian weapons. Levitin & Putin 4> !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ K9$* 6*5'(&+T Igor Urbansky is the founder of Kaalbye, served as Deputy Minister of Transport in Ukraine from 3..> to roughly 3..=, and enjoys extensive contacts among the Ukrai- nian defense establishment and Party of Regions clique. 2e son of a Soviet KGB colonel, Urban- sky was born in Georgia, where one of his close friends grew up to become former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze’s personal bodyguard.3., Urbansky was edu- cated at Moscow State Institute of Inter- national Relations (MGIMO).3.4 MGIMO is the diplomatic school of the Soviet (and then Russian) Ministry of Foreign A 4M !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ 5$*K& +$9'( Boris Kogan is one of the cofounders of Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine and serves as a director and senior manager of the compa- ny.3/4 He is a close business partner of Kaal- bye co-founder Igor Urbansky.3/- Kogan is also on the board of directors of a Russian company, RT-Logistika. RT Logistika is -/b owned by Russian Technologies, the enormous state holding 0rm (headed by Putin’s former KGB colleague and close ally Figure ^Z: Kogan Connections Sergei Chemezov) which owns a variety of Igor Zavyalov, Deputy Director (i.e. (% man) at Russian industrial companies, including Rosobo- Technologies, and Sergei Kulokov, Executive Director. ronexport and much of the Russian defense Kogan knows and works with both. industry. RT-Logistika is deeply involved in transporting weapons. For example, in Oc- tober 3./3 RT-Logistika arranged a cargo *$&$5$*$(#RP$*! plane to transport sensory equipment for State weapons export agency Syrian Pantsir SAM complexes from Mos- cow to Damascus, which the Turkish Air *6&&K'( "#8K7$P!#*& Force intercepted.3/> Kogan is the only RT- Military helicopters Logistika board member who is not a se- nior Russian defense-industrial 0gure. QT&$+$!$7"(T# +$:P8#+&T 2e list of government o;cials a;li- Missile targeting systems ated with RT-Logistika includes:3/M Valerii Yemets, director of logistics at Rosobo- +5 :'&"K($&!*$#(KT' ronexport; Igor Zavyalov, deputy director Tactical ballistic missiles of Russian Technologies, board member at Rosoboronexport,3/O and close connec- $*K$( tion of Sergei Chemezov, a key Putin ally Military satellites and communications and one of the most powerful men in Rus- sia; Andrei Shipilov, Sergei Kulikov, and 'K*7*'J! #(9K(##*K(9 7$(7#*( Vladimir Litvin, all of whom are senior Fighter jets executives at Russian Technologies. Many other senior Russian defense-in- 6(K!#% #(9K(# 7$*P$*'!K$( dustrial 0gures, including Aleksandr Ku- High-performance military turbofans zhekin (an executive at Vladikinski Factory and Avtovaz),3/= Yuri Churchen, Aleksan- :'7"K(# #(9K(##*K(9 !#7"($8$9K#& dr Kuznetsov, Aleksandr Vetvitskii, and Artillery and rocket launchers more. 2e signi0cance of this is di;cult to KS":'&" overstate: Boris Kogan personally knows One of world’s largest small arms maker and works with some of the most senior de- fense-industrial 0gures in the Russian gov- Figure ^]: Russian Technologies Subsidiaries ernment. 2e company linking them, RT- (Non-Exhaustive) Logistika, actively moves Russian weapons to Syria. 2e other company Kogan is in- volved with (Kaalbye) is by far the most frequent facilitator of Russian and Ukrai- nian weapons shipments. Taken together, this data indicates a convincing hypothesis about Kaalbye’s connections to the Krem- lin, and possible role in arming Assad. At the very least, it seems probable that Kogan is a go-between for the Odessa Network and government agencies. 4O !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ Q'8#(!K( Q'*Q'*#(+$ Valentin Varvarenko is the father of Alek- sandr Varvarenko and Andrei Varvaren- ko, (both of whom own or run key nodes of the Odessa Network), and one of the most powerful men in the FSU transporta- tion industry. Valentin worked at Ventspils Port in Latvia from /=M4 to /==/, eventually rising to become port manager.33. Multiple Russian oil pipelines end at Ventspils, mak- ing it one of the most important ports for oil export in the region.33/ During this pe- riod, the Soviet government sent Valentin to Belgium for unknown professional pur- poses.333 A?er the Soviet collapse, Valentin relocated to Antwerp, where he worked from /==/ to 3..M at a variety of companies, including Allied Stevedores (a formerly Soviet 0rm responsible for loading and un- loading of all Russian ships at Antwerp),33, Noord Natie NV, and the Port of Antwerp. It is worth noting that Antwerp is one of the largest, busiest ports in the world, and for- Figure ^^: merly a center of Soviet shipping. Valentin Varvarenko Figure ^[: Ports Associated with Valentin Varvarenko Upon returning to Russia in 3..M, he has held a variety of executive positions in some of the largest, most politically connected transportation 0rms in FSU. Valentin is a Vice President at the National Container Company. NCC is the largest container port opera- tor in the former Soviet Union, and one of the 3. largest container port operators in the 4= !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ world, operating ports in St. Petersburg, Ust-Luga, and Illichevsk (near Odessa.)334 Valentin is responsible for the entire Southern Region (i.e. Ukraine and Southern Russia), and also is the CEO of wholly owned NCC subsidiary Ukrtranscontainer.33- In this capacity, Valentin exerts in1uence over virtually all FSU Black Sea shipping. NCC is owned by First Quan- tum Group,33> a multi-billion dollar holding company, which is in turn owned by Vitalii Yuzhilin, a Russian State Duma Deputy and United Russia member,33M and his business partner Andrei Kobzar. Both have extensive ties to St. Petersburg and United Russia politi- cal elites; for example, they are alleged to personally know Vladimir Putin, and have worked with Alexei Miller (Gazprom CEO).33O 33= We mention these ties to impress upon the readers what kind of high level political waters Valentin swims in. Valentin also is the general director of UCL Port,3,. which operates St. Petersburg, Tuapse, and Taganrog ports. UCL Port is a subsidiary of UCL [Universal Cargo Logistics] Holding, owned by oligarch Vladimir Lisin. With a personal fortune of `/4 billion,3,/ Lisin is Rus- sia’s second richest man, and a Kremlin insider. Lisin-owned companies have previously shipped weapons to Syria, such as the Professor Katsman incident, involving helicopter parts bound for Tartus.3,3 In his capacity as director of UCL Port, Valentin regularly meets and cooperates with government maritime and transportation o;cials (for example, with the state-owned 0rm Rostransmodernizatsia [Russian Transportation Modernization.])3,, In sum, Valentin’s portfolio gives him in1uence over many of the largest container ports in the FSU, political connections across Russia and Europe, and likely regular contact with government o;cials (Ministry of Transportation, customs, port o;cials, cargo owners, etc.). 2ere is some evidence that Valentin has used his in1uence and power to aid his sons. Andrei Varvarenko’s company Nortrop, a con0rmed weapons shipper, is partially owned by Noord Natie NV, where Valentin was a senior executive for years.3,4 Nortrop operates out of Ventspils, where Valentin was senior management.3,- Aleksandr began his career at Belgian shipping 0rm OXL-Flamar, likely with assistance from Valentin’s decades of contacts in the Belgian shipping industry.3,> We have no evidence indicating a direct role for Valentin in the weapons shipment pro- cess. 2at said, it is a fact that he is one of the most powerful men in the FSU transportation industry and operates among the Russian business and governmental elite, and it is a fact that his sons are among the most active transporters of Russian and Ukrainian weapons. QK+!$* $8#*&+KT Viktor Olerskiy is the current Russian Deputy Minister of Transportation.3,M Before enter- ing this position in 3..=, Olerskiy was a long-time member of the board of directors at North-Western Shipping, a large Russian company which managed the Professor Katsman when it delivered weapons to Syria in 3./3.3,O Olerskiy con0rmed this fact in an interview with a Russian newspaper.3,= 2is leads us to believe Olerskiy is one of the vectors by which the Russian government can coordinate with private shipping companies such as North- Western to facilitate weapons transfers. Some sources also report Olerskiy as being a former director of Inok, a Belgian company which was a previous manager of the Professor Katsman.34. 2e company has strenuously denied any connections to North-Western Shipping, the Kremlin, or weapons shipping. While we have no de0nitive judgments here, multiple other North-Western Shipping ex- ecutives currently serve as executives at Inok,34/ and Olerskiy was previously a Belgian citizen (he renounced it when he assumed governmental o;ce),343 34, lending credence to the claims that he worked for Inok. 2ese facts would seem to contradict Inok’s claims, and indicate relationships to Russia. Interestingly, North-Western Shipping is owned by UCL,344 a holding company of oli- garch Vladimir Lisin; Valentin Varvarenko is an executive at UCL Port. In light of both Olerskiy and Varvarenko’s long-time residence in Belgium, work at Belgian ports, and cur- rent employment at UCL, it seems probable they know each other. In addition, the oddity of two weapons-shipments-linked political 0gures having worked in Antwerp, and the fact that Antwerp was one of the centers of Soviet shipping, means further investigation of the Russian maritime industry in Belgium as a trans-shipment point for illicit goods may prove fruitful. -. !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ Figure ^Y: Olerskiy and Levitin From le2 to right: two unidenti1ed Russian military o4cers, Viktor Olerskiy, Igor Orlov (governor of Archangelsk), and Putin’s personal advisor Igor Levitin (previously covered in this section). '8#+&'(%* '((#(+$Q Aleksandr Annenkov is the Chairmen of the Board of Directors at AnRussTrans,34- the ultimate owner of the Slavyanin,34> which delivered weapons supposedly bound for Iraq to some unknown customer in 3..M. Annenkov was a long-time bureaucrat in Russian transportation ministries, rising to the rank of Deputy Minister of Transportation in /===–3....34M Annenkov also owns Morskoi Bank.34O Annenkov is based out of Sevastopol, which is home of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Annekov’s current connections either to the Russian or Ukrainian governments, or to Odessa Network leaders, are unknown. Despite the paucity of data on him, we believe that using Annenkov as a transporter for weapons con0rms our hypothesis about the strong requirement for trust between state weapons agencies and their logisticians; Annenkov’s long service as a government transportation specialist likely played some role. Figure ^V: Aleksandr Annenkov -/ !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ 7$((#7!K$(& !$ J'7K8K!'!$*& '(% #'7" $!"#* As shown on Figure &* on the next page, almost all the major Odessa-based facilitators are connected to organs of Russian and Ukrainian state power through the personal con- nections covered in this section. We believe that the fact that the most active shippers of weapons are also the most politically connected is no coincidence. Such connections are presumably vital to establishing the trust for the state to hand over advanced weapons systems to ostensibly private transporters, to communicating what weapons need to go where, and to verifying that they have done. Interestingly, the government o;cials examined in this section not only know and work with the facilitators, but also with each other. As co-founders of Kaalbye and long-time business partners, Igor Urbansky and Boris Kogan undisputedly know each other and collaborate on weapons shipments. Victor Olerskiy served as Deputy Minister of Trans- portation under Igor Levitin for three years; this and photographic evidence in Figure &+ (on the previous page) make it clear they also have a working relationship. It is highly probable that Valentin Varvarenko knows Urbansky, given that Urbansky was Deputy Minister of Transportation for Ukraine during the same time period during which Valen- tin was the CEO of the single largest transportation company operating in Ukraine (NCC / Ukrtranscontainer), and that Valentin’s son Aleksandr worked for Kaalbye (founded by Urbansky.) It also is highly probable that Valentin Varvarenko knows Victor Olerskiy: both were Russian emigres, living in Antwerp, working in the same industry, as senior executives, in the same port, for over a decade, for subsidiaries of the very same company. -3 !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ Figure ^W: Political connections of the Odessa Network -, !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ ' Port of Origin: Oktyabrsk 2e port of Oktyabrsk is the point of origin for almost all Russian and Ukrainian weapons exports in our dataset. Located in the city of Nikolaev in Ukraine, and specially built by the Soviet Union to ship weapons, Oktyabrsk possesses a number of qualities making it well-suited for arms exports: advantageous geography, specialized equipment, transporta- tion infrastructure to major FSU defense-industrial plants, and more. It is for this reason that many of the previously mentioned Odessa shipping companies (including Kaalbye and Nortrop) and Russian state weapons exports agencies maintain o;ces and personnel in Oktyabrsk. Our data suggests that Moscow exerts signi0cant control over Oktyabrsk, despite technically being in Ukraine: the port’s owner and operators have close ties to the Russian military and Kremlin. 2e government owns the weapons and facilitators operate the ships, but Oktyabrsk is where a weapons ship’s journey physically begins. Oktyabrsk’s geographic position is advantageous for weapons exports. Because Russia and Ukraine are near the top of the Northern Hemisphere, virtually all their customers are located to the south. Ships leaving northern ports like St. Petersburg and Murmansk must traverse great distances to reach destinations in Africa, Asia, and South America, if they can depart at all—winter ice slows or shuts down these ports for part of the year. In con- trast, Oktyabrsk’s location on the Black Sea, nearly /... miles south of busier ports such as St. Petersburg or Kaliningrad, allows ships departing from there to reach typical weapons export destinations much more quickly. A?er transiting the Bosphorus, they can continue through the Mediterranean or Suez Canal, entering the Indian Ocean and gaining access to sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. 2e economics of maritime transport make the time and distance savings of leaving from Oktyabrsk very signi0cant. From a shipper’s perspective, every extra mile and day eats away pro0t—more fuel costs, more crew costs, and more time spent ful0lling one contract, when pro0tability o?en depends on 0tting as many voy- ages into a year as possible. 8$7'!K$( '89#*K' &T*K' K(%K' QK#!(': Figure ^_: -.. /0.01-2314 /=.= %'T& 3O.3 %'T& ,>.= %'T& 44.> %'T& Oktyabrsk versus 56.7821-6 /..O %'T& =.M %'T& 3,.> %'T& ,-.4 %'T& St. Petersburg transit times -4 !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ Oktyabrsk also possesses specialized infrastructure for shipping weapons discreetly and safely, and is widely known as a hub of arms export.34= 2e Soviet Union specially built Okty- abrsk to move weapons from the USSR to Communist allies across the world. For example, many of the Soviet missiles sent to Cuba in Operation Anadyr, which triggered the Cuban Missile Crisis, departed from Oktyabrsk.3-. It still is heavily used for weapons exports; a senior Ukrainian government o;cial estimates 4. weapons shipments a year,3-/ and the photo gallery on the port’s o;cial website contains several shots of military cargo.3-3 Oktyabrsk possesses heavy cranes, which are necessary for handling military cargo such as tanks or missiles. 2ere also are special ammunition storage buildings separated by dirt berms, which would absorb the blast of accidentally exploding ammunition and prevent the entire stockpile from going up. Workers at Oktyabrsk are reputed to earn much higher wages and perform at a much higher level than other ports, perhaps re1ecting unusual demands on competency and secrecy.3-, Although Oktyabrsk is no longer a completely closed port, as it was during Soviet times, only trusted personnel work there and the 1ow of information is controlled.3-4 2e port was clearly engineered for operational security. Located six kilometers south of Nikolaev amidst empty farmland, there is little tra;c near the port. In addition, a thick man-made forest provides a multi-kilometer bu Figure [\: FSU Weapons Export Pathways -- !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ 2e background of Oktyabrsk's leadership adds to the perception that the Kremlin functionally controls the port. Port manager Andrei Yegorov was born in Sochi (now part of Russia), served as a submarine commander in the Russian Navy Black Sea Fleet until 3... and achieved the rank of Captain, is a graduate of multiple elite Soviet/Russian mili- tary academies, and only received Ukrainian citizenship in 3....3-= Yegorov is reported to be a tool of the Russian-Ukrainian oligarch Vadim Novinsky, who is reputed to own Oktyabrsk.3>. Novinsky, whose wealth has been estimated between `/.= and `4.4 billion,3>/ 3>3 is a co- owner of Smart-Holding, through which he controls a wide range of primarily metallur- gical and shipbuilding businesses in Ukraine and Russia. Novinsky is a business partner of and closely linked to Party of Regions 0gures such as Rinat Akhmetov (with whom he co-owns multiple steel and agricultural holdings),3>, 3>4 Dmitrii Firtash, and Victor Ya- nukovich, who in turn are closely tied to organized crime and the Kremlin. Novinsky Figure [U: also co-owns a steel factory in Rybnita, Moldova, along with Hares Youssef, Alisher Us- Andrei Yegorov manov, and Grigori Surkis.3>- Novinsky was born in Russia and only acquired Ukrainian citizenship in 3./3, when President Yanu- kovich personally granted him citizenship for unnamed services.3>> He splits his time between St. Petersburg and Kiev. Although Since the Soviet era, weapons “FSB-spotting” is somewhat of a media shipments to various countries sport in Ukraine, Novinsky has come under particular scrutiny for his perceived ties to of the world have gone through Russian power ministries: a recent Ukrai- exactly this port [Oktyabrsk.] nian article entitled “Is Murky Business- man Vadim Novinsky a Stooge of Russian 0e port has preserved this Intelligence?” gives some indication of this specialty even a2er Ukrainian distrust.3>M 3>O Novinsky’s control of Oktyabrsk is par- independence. How this relates ticularly interesting with additional con- to the unfolding privatization text. 2e Ukrainian government recently privatized or granted private concessions of Ukrainian ports is unclear, on most of the country’s major ports.3>= especially if a certain fact is Because Ukraine has emerged as a trans- portation hub for Eastern Europe and taken into consideration: Vadim FSU, control of these ports is highly lu- Novinsky is a citizen of Russia. crative. Unsurprisingly, the privatization process has been marred by charges of Figure [Z: corruption, with government o;cials col- Excerpt from Ukrainian Newspaper Article laborating with oligarchs for sweetheart deals and kickbacks. 2ere has been 0erce competition between competing factions for control of the busiest ports. Yet Okty- abrsk, which moves hundreds of thousands of tons of cargo a month3M. and generates enough revenue to be among the top tax- payers in the entire province,3M/ has been largely exempt from this competition. No government o;cial or oligarch has made a move on Oktyabrsk or challenged Novin- sky’s control.3M3 3M, No other port has been so exempted. We interpret this as recognition of the Kremlin’s special interest in Okty- abrsk, i.e. that the Russian government has communicated to oligarchs that it will not tolerate disruptions or intrigue (ownership Figure []: change, personnel turnover, etc.) that could Vadim Novinsky with President of Ukraine -> !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ impede the multi-billion dollar 1ow of weapons through Oktyabrsk. 2ere are few forces that can tame the chaotic, no-holds-barred competition of post-Soviet big business, but a highly motivated Russian power ministry is one of them. Virtually all of the Odessa Network-linked shipments uncovered during this investiga- tion departed from Oktyabrsk. 2e one persistent exception is weapons leaving Russia bound for the Assad regime. On multiple occasions, Russian ships have attempted or suc- ceeded at delivering military equipment to Tartus. We are unaware of any Syria-bound weapons shipments that did not originate in St. Petersburg. As an anomaly, this deserves further examination. 2e reasons why not to use St. Petersburg are clear. Its extreme north- ern location adds roughly ,,... nautical miles and /. days of travel to an average arms shipment, as compared to Oktyabrsk. A ship leaving St. Petersburg must pass through the North Sea, which thanks to the Cold War is ringed by long-time US allies (Germany, UK, Denmark, Netherlands, etc.) and extensive surveillance equipment. 2ese states can and have interfered with Syria-bound shipments; for example, the Alaed, which was carrying helicopter parts for Assad, had its insurance revoked by the British underwriter. Lastly, St. Petersburg is one of the busiest ports in the former Soviet Union. Maintaining secrecy or operational security in such an environment would be highly challenging. Lastly, it also is possible that Western governments aware of the Kremlin’s use of Oktyabrsk as a weapons port have placed signi0cant pressure on the government of Ukraine (perhaps using its EU membership bid as a bargaining chip) to disallow Syria-bound shipments from transiting Ukrainian ports. Figure [^: Oktyabrsk Photographs -M !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ ( EU & Russian Shipping: Specialized Services Although Odessa-based companies carry out the majority of Russian and Ukrainian weapons shipments, EU and Russia-based companies are responsible for a signi0cant minority. We believe they play a complementary role to the Odessa-based facilitators by providing specialized services outside of Kaalbye or Phoenix’s competency if necessary. Speci0cally, we judge that they provide specialized heavy-li? ships for unusually large shipments (warships, submarines, etc.), surge capacity during periods of high demand, and highly illicit shipments. Based in cities like Hamburg, Rotterdam, and St. Petersburg, these companies load weapons at Oktyabrsk and deliver them to locations like Myanmar, Libya, and Sudan. 2is section pro0les the EU and Russian companies known to facilitate weapons transfers, and explains in detail their specialized role in the overall weapons ex- port process, including their connections to both GoR/GoU and Odessa Network leaders. #K%# :'*K(# &#*QK7#& (($*)'T) Warship and Submarine Transportation 2e Norwegian 0rm Eide Marine Services is the second most frequent weapons trans- porter in our dataset (a?er Kaalbye). Eide is a perfect example of how EU 0rms pro- vide specialized ships to handle large or un- usual cargo the Odessa 0rms cannot, such as warships and submarines. If the Russian government has multiple billion-dollar contracts to deliver Kilo attack submarines to Asian customers, it is not immediately obvious how exactly to deliver a 343 foot long, ,3 foot wide steel tube from European Russia to the Paci0c Rim. Delivering the submarine under its own power is out of the question, given the expensive wear and tear it would in1ict on a brand new ma- chine. Most cargo ships—including those owned by trusted logistics contractors in Odessa—are unable to accommodate such huge, irregularly shaped cargo. Cargo ships are typically designed to handle granular cargo such as grain or coal (i.e. bulk carri- ers), liquids (i.e. tankers), 3.–foot long in- termodal containers (i.e. container ships), or small wheeled vehicles (i.e. ro-ros and car carriers.) Only a submersible barge, which has a single huge 1at cargo bay de- signed to sink into the water, could handle the Kilo submarine. Eide is one of the few 0rms which possesses exactly such a ship, the Eide Transporter, which has been used Figure [[: Eide Ships multiple times to move unusual Russian From top to bottom: two Gepard frigates, military cargo to foreign customers. 2is two Kilo attack submarines, one Tarantul includes Tarantul-class missile corvettes, missile corvette Gepard-class frigates, and Svetlyak-class patrol boats to Vietnam, and Kilo-class sub- marines to China. Eide’s connections to either the Kremlin or Odessa shipping companies are unclear. Given how o?en Eide has moved Russian -O !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ weapons, it clearly has some relationship with Russian weapons export agencies, but de- tails of this are unknown to us. We speculate that Eide interacts with Rosoboronexport directly, and does not go through the Odessa 0rms. 2is judgment is motivated in part by #K%# &"KP:#(! #Q#(!& the lack of data on Eide-Odessa connections. While our research uncovered personal and #8 Attack submarines to China 0nancial ties between many EU shipping 0rms and Odessa, we did not 0nd any for Eide. #13 Missile corvettes to Vietnam 2inking more broadly, Eide’s specialized role also explains the lack of ties to Odessa: it #20 Patrol boats to Vietnam operates in an entirely di 5*K#&#, 5#869', &P8K#!"$JJ, #7+"$JJ, c 78KPP#* (9#*:'(T '(% (#!"#*8'(%&) Heavy-Li2 Transportation 5*K#&# &"KP:#(! #Q#(!& 2e German 0rm Briese Schi -= !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ located at the same o;ce building in Odessa as Kaalbye, as Figure ,: shows. Primetrans- port lists BBC Chartering (a Briese subsidiary) as one of its clients, and counts BBC Conan as part of its 1eet.3OO It is clear they have an existing business relationship, in ad- dition to the personal ties described above. Figure Y\: Briese-Kaalbye ties Figure YU: Briese corporate structure >. !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ Beluga Shipping is a now-insolvent3O= German shipping company that previously was one of the largest in Germany, and one of Briese’s chief competitors. Like Briese, Beluga spe- cialized in heavy-li? shipping and possessed an extensive heavy-li? 1eet.3=. 2is allowed it a similar functional specialty within the Odessa Network in heavy-weapons shipments to low-infrastructure countries (note the countries and cargo in Figure +(). Beluga also appeared to specialize in spectacularly illegal cargo and customers: it was responsible for moving A.Q. Khan nuclear centrifuges to Libya, tanks and APCs to Myanmar (which was then under active UN sanction), and tanks, rockets, ammo, and more to South Sudan (also in violation of UN sanctions). 5#869' &"KP:#(! #Q#(!& Beluga has multiple connections to the FSU and Odessa Network. Evgenii Poltavets, a #15 Tanks, ammo, rockets to close personal associate of Aleksandr Varvarenko, worked at Beluga before going over to South Sudan Kaalbye.3=/ Poltavets also is a former (possibly continual) employee of Phoenix Trans-ser- #19 APCs, ATGMs to Myanmar vis, the previously mentioned Odessa-based weapons shipper. Phoenix chartered the Be- #' A.Q.Khan nuclear centrifuges luga Endurance to deliver a large weapons shipment to Sudan during the period Poltavets to Libya worked at one or both companies, leading us to suspect he was the vector of cooperation between the two companies. Beluga also established a joint stock venture, Beluga Projects Figure YZ: Logistics,3=3 with an unnamed Russian transportation company to specialize in the Rus- Beluga shipment events sian and Eastern European market.3=, Beluga also worked closely with BBC (Briese); for example, the ship that moved centrifuges to Libya was owned by Beluga but chartered by BBC.3=4 Beluga and BBC (Briese) even signed a strategic alliance to coordinate business activities.3=- In addition to these documented ties, Beluga employees had ample oppor- tunity to form personal contacts with Odessa Network 0rms, seeing as they frequently attended the same Russian shipping trade conferences. For example, Beluga representa- tives Harry Kaegebein, Nikolai Mishkin, Sergey Ovsienko, and Olga Gulyaeva attended the 3./. Heavy Li? Russia Trade Conference, also attended by Aleksandr Varvarenko and Varamar.3=> Other guests of interests included representatives from BBC Chartering (i.e. Briese), Atomstroyexport (the Russia government’s nuclear technology export 0rm), and a Libyan shipping 0rm.3=M &P8K#!"$JJ c #7+"$JJ Splietho; (Netherlands) and Eckho; (Germany) provide another interesting example &"KP:#(! #Q#(!& of EU companies’ cooperation with the Odessa Network. Between 3..- and 3..M, Ven- #26 Venezuela mega-shipment ezuela signed `4 billion worth of arms deals with Russia (Sukhoi 0ghter jets, combat he- #31 Tanks to Venezuela licopters, and small arms) and in 3./. received a `3.3 billion Russia loan to buy S–,.. #32 #Venezuela mega-shipment SAMs, T–M3 tanks, BMP–, IFVs, BTR–O. APCs, Grad MRLs,3=O and more,3== making it the single largest importer of Russian ground weapons in the world. Arms transfers of such Figure Y]: magnitude required equally extensive logistical processes to physically move the weapons Splietho# and Eckho# shipment events from Russia to Venezuela. In 3./3 alone, four separate Kaalbye ships—Socol ,, Socol >, Ocean Voyager, and Ocean Fortune —delivered Russian weapons to Venezuela. 2ey were not alone: the Splietho< ship Sluisgracht and Eckho<-managed ship Stade accompanied Kaalbye in transporting weapons to Venezuela. 2eir behavior con0rms our hypothesis about EU 0rms specializing in heavy li?: the Sluisgracht was responsible for transporting the T–M3 tanks, presumably leaving the lighter cargo for Kaalbye. We lack information on the nature of Splietho< and Eckho<’s connections to the Russian government or Odessa Network. One source names Splietho< as a long-time partner of Rosoboronexport.,.. 2is seems plausible, especially since Splietho< appears to ship weapons for other countries as well (i.e. military transportation is a consistent business for them.) At the same time Sluisgracht was in Venezuela in 3./3, another Spliedo< ship, Schippersgracht, was deliver- ing arms to Egypt on behalf of US Military Seali? Command.,.. We also believe Sluisgracht has some contacts with Kaalbye; the level of coordination required to move such large quantities of weapons in concert would seem to demand it. Clipper Group is a Denmark-based shipping company that moved Ukrainian tanks in 3..- in cooperation with Nortrop, the Odessa shipping 0rm owned by Andrei Varvarenko. 5'87"'*!, )#&!5#*9, J#:7$, ($*!"-)#&!#*( &"KPPK(9 7$:P'(T, '(*6&&!*'(& (*6&&K') Highly Illicit Shipments Russian shipping companies play a surprisingly small role in the maritime export of FSU weapons. Our dataset shows only four arms transfers facilitated by Russian companies: >/ !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ three to Syria, and one to an unknown customer of su;cient interest that the US State Department formally complained about the transfer. Russian shipping companies have been linked to a number of other incidents, which while not ‘true’ FSU arms transfers and hence excluded from our dataset, are also interesting. 2is includes the transportation of weapons from Iran to Syria in 3..=,viii weapons of unknown nationality from Egypt to DRC in 3./3, and the Arctic Sea incident in 3..=, in which a Russian-operated ship was hijacked o< the coast of Sweden, allegedly by Mossad in order to prevent it from delivering S–,.. missiles to Iran. 2ese events all share two qualities. 2e 0rst is that the customers and/or intermedi- ary nations make these events highly illicit.ix Syria, Iran, and the DRC are all under arms embargos and subject to intense scrutiny from Western governments. Strikingly, we can 0nd no weapons transfers facilitated by a Russian shipping company that were not highly illicit (whereas the Ukrainian and EU elements of the Odessa Network have plenty of licit shipments to Vietnam, Venezuela, etc.). Similarly, the second common feature is that the Russian government is deeply involved. For example, Russian arms transfers to Assad during the heat of the Syrian civil war are far more politically motivated than ‘typ- ical’ weapons sales, and thus imply more direct military, SVR, FSB, and GRU involve- ment. While the small sample size of shipments means that any analytical judgments are fairly low con0dence, these factors lead to two tentative hypotheses. One, Russian shipping companies ‘specialize’ in illicit shipments, i.e. are more likely to be contracted by state weapons export agencies for this kind of shipment. Two, they have particularly strong connections to the Russian government, including through the Odessa Network. 2e remainder of this chapter pro0les the Russian shipping companies known to facili- tate arms transfers, and how they con0rm or deny the above two hypotheses. Balchart is a chartering company spe- 5'87"'*! &"KP:#(! #Q#(!& cializing in shipments throughout the Bal- Sergei Cherkasov Aleksei Pestrikov #28 Munitions to Syria tic region, with o;ces in Riga, Latvia,,.3 Igor Evstigneev Nikolai Potiavin Tallinn, Estonia,., and St. Petersburg, Rus- Evgenii Gunchev Tatiana Shimskaya Figure Y^: sia. 2e company is managed by Russian Oleg Katrechko Andrei Shuklenkov Balchart shipment events national Andrei Shuklenkov, and Estonian Aleksandr Lisitsky Evgenii Sklyarov nationals Evgenii Sklyarov and Aleksei Pavel Machalov Konstantin Volanskis Pestrikov.x 2e list to the right contains all current or former Balchart employees we Figure Y[: were able to locate.,.- As Balchart is primar- Balchart current and former Employees ily a chartering company, not a ship owner or operator, it is fairly di;cult to locate open-source records of the companies and ships they work with. 2e only result we could 0nd was an international shipping registry listing Balchart Estonia as the manager of Porhov. ,.> Balchart’s connections to the Russian government and Odessa Network leaders are not so hard to 0nd. 2e company’s website lists Rosoboronexport, Izhmash (a Russian Technologies-owned defense 0rm that is one of the largest small arms producers in the world), and IRISL as clients,,.M and openly states the company’s specialty in military lo- gistics. Balchart lists White Whale (a Varvarenko company) as one of its clients,,.O imply- ing a persistent business relationship. Both Aleksandr and Andrei Varvarenko personally know,.= Aleksandr Lisitsky, a current or former employee of Balchart.,/. Another Balchart employee, Vladimir Shavrak, is a /=O. graduate of Odessa National Maritime University, the alma mater of a high percentage of the Odessa Network.,// Balchart representatives have attended many of the major trade conventions at which senior Odessa Network per- viii. 2e MV Monchegorsk incident ix. To be clear, we use the term ‘illicit’ to emphasize that the listed states are widely perceived as violating interna- tional norms, and sending weapons to them is highly controversial. Judging the exact legality of these arms transfers is beyond our purview. x. Judging by name, ethnic Russians. >3 !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ sonnel were present, giving them ample opportunity to establish or maintain contact. For example, Balchart representative Igor Yevstigneev attended the 3..O Novo International J#:7$ &"KP:#(! #Q#(!& Shipbrokers and Shipowners Conference in Novorossiysk,,/3 also attended by Evgenii Pol- #37 Attack helicopters to Syria tavets (then with Beluga), Nikolai Melnikov and Artur Nitsevich (Interlegal), Victor Puyu (Kaalbye), Andrei Varvarenko and Mikhail Vasilyev and Deniz Geldigitti (Nortrop), as Figure YY: well as other interesting guests such as IRISL.,/, FEMCO shipment events FEMCO operated the Alaed,,/4 which moved weapons to Syria in 3./3. According to the company’s website, FEMCO provides marine management services for oil and natural gas development. FEMCO appears to be a contractor for Gazprom on the Barents Sea, and for the Sakhalin oil 0eld under development by Rosne?. FEMCO is in fact a spino< from Rosne?, of which it previously was a subsidiary.,/- It goes without saying that these two companies are the archetype for “power vertical” politics and headed by United Russia ap- paratchiki such as Igor Sechin and Viktor Zubkov. FEMCO has performed military logis- tics tasks within Russia, for example shipping the bulkhead of a new Russian navy corvette ($*!"-)#&!#*( from the construction yard to Komsomolsk-na-Amur for assembly.,/> In addition to these &"KP:#(! #Q#(!& government ties, FEMCO also has direct business relationships with key Odessa Network #35 Helicopter parts to Syria 0rms. Varamar (a Varvarenko company) has operated and/or chartered the Alaed, the FEMCO-owned ship, implying a contractual relationship between the two.,/M Figure YV: Northwestern Shipping Company was the owner and operator of the Professor Katsman, North-Western shipment events which delivered helicopter parts to Syria in 3./3. Northwestern is a subsidiary of UCL, the holding company of oligarch Vladimir Lisin. Valentin Varvarenko is a senior execu- tive at UCL; while we have no evidence suggesting he had an active role in the Professor Katsman incident, it is certainly interesting that the father of the most active facilitator of Russian weapons exports happens to work at a company called upon by the Kremlin to facilitate weapons export. In addition, Northwestern personnel have almost certainly met and interacted with other Odessa Network 0rms at various events attended by high-level personnel. For example, the then-Deputy Director of Northwestern Shipping, Aleksei Mo- rozov, attended a 3..= trade conference in Odessa at which Aleksandr Varvarenko was )#&!5#*9 8!%. a keynote speaker.,/O Other attendees included representatives from Nortrop and Phoe- &"KP:#(! #Q#(!& nix Trans-servis. Similarly, in 3.//, Northwestern sent representatives Tatiana Morozova #28 SALW and rockets to Syria and Yulia Gorbunova to that year’s conference; other attendees included Nortrop, Phoenix Trans-Servis, ABLV,xi and other Odessa Network mainstays. Figure YW: Westberg Ltd. was the owner and operator of the Chariot, which transported AK–4M Westberg Ltd. shipment events and rocket launcher ammunition to Syria in January 3./3. Registered in the Marshall Is- lands but operating out of St. Petersburg,,/= Westberg has a complicated ownership struc- ture of multiple subsidiaries and proxy companies, including Trolle Shipping (BVI), Midas Pete Ltd. (Belize), Goldwick Maritime Inc., and Valetta Holding Corp. According to the company’s website and con0rmed by Russian business records,,3. Westberg is managed by Oleg Aleksandrovich Smolyan. Interestingly, Westberg is the owner of the Myre Seadiver, a ship used by Moran Security Group, a private maritime security company linked to the Odessa Network. 2is is covered in more detail in the following chapter. xi. A Latvian bank used by the Odessa Network. See Chapter =. >, !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ ) African Private Security Companies &"KP '(% 7'*9$ P*$!#7!K$( Odessa shipping companies appear to own or control multiple private maritime security companies [PMSC], including Moran Security Group, Muse Professional Group, Helicon Security, Changsuk Security Group, and Al Mina Security Group. 2ese companies’ busi- ness model revolves around sta;ng ships transiting dangerous areas (particularly the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea) with heavily armed FSU military veterans, who provide protec- tion from pirates.,3/ 2ough hijacking is a threat for any ship-owner, it is particularly trou- bling when the cargo is sensitive military equipment, as happened with the 3..O MV Faina incident in which Somali pirates hijacked a Kaalbye ship carrying Ukrainian weapons to South Sudan. We believe the Odessa Network uses PMSCs as protection for its military cargos to avoid a repeat of this kind of event. Although we lack direct evidence of PMSC participation in Odessa Network weapons shipments—e.g. photos of PMSC personnel on a ship de0- nitely carrying weapons—we judge that this is so. Logically, it is fair to assume if a group of companies specializing in weapons shipments has extensive connections with a group of companies specializing in guarding shipments, the guarding of weapons shipments is likely the basis for their cooperation. It seems highly improbable that the Odessa Network would not upgrade their security a?er the Faina incident; having their sensitive military Figure Y_: cargo hijacked would demand some kind of security solution. Moran Security Moran Maritime Group is registered in Belize,33 but based in Moscow.,3, Moran is sta >4 !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ as Somalia and the DRC. FSU entities o Figure VZ: Private security companies >- !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ * Latvia: Financial Services & Laundering Russian and Ukrainian weapons are big business, both for the governments who export them and the Odessa Network companies contracted as transporters. Russia exported over `/M.> billion of weapons in 3./3 alone,,44 with Ukraine coming in at `/., billion.,4- 2e Odessa Network leaders facilitating these weapons 1ows clearly earn signi0cant pro0ts from doing so. 2ey drive Mercedes and BMWs, vacation in the South of France, and have numerous real estate and business investments. For example, Kaalbye co-founder Boris Kogan is reputed to own multiple Odessa nightclubs,,4> while Tomex head Victor Murenko is a VIP customer at Odessa Alfa Bank.,4M 2ere is also evidence that they launder money, primarily using Latvian banks and a series of Panamamian shell companies run by Latvian nationals who act as “proxy directors.” 2e Odessa Network operates in a region of the world where 0nancial crime is en- demic, large-scale, and persistent. Precise … o4cial 1gures from the numbers for the value of money laundering Central Bank show that in in FSU are of course nonexistent, but in 3../ the UN estimated Russia alone was launder- 7"55, 76",""" Russian 1rms ing more than `/.. billion of “dirty money” paid no taxes and submitted every year.,4O In 3./3, the Bank of Russia esti- mated that a full 4b of Russia’s GDP was ille- annual reports reporting gally siphoned out of the country every year, no business activities. and that 4.b of all capital leaving Russia was in fact laundered.,4= 2e outgoing head of Simultaneously, the Central the Russian central bank, Sergei Ignatiev, re- Bank found that more than cently gave a more conservative estimate of ,-. 8 trillion rubles (95!" billion) `4=–-3 billion yearly. Redistribution with- in Russia is also a problem: experts estimate had been processed through that the total value of corruption in Russia, which ranks /,,rd out of /M> on Transpar- the accounts of these inactive ency International's Corruption Percep- companies. tions Index [TICPI],,-/ is between - and /.b of GDP (`=4-`/=. billion).,-3 Ukraine ranks even lower at /44th on the TICPI. In this “ 0at is almost half the budget context of massive and systemic 0nancial evasion, it would be more unusual if a group of Russia in 7"55,” he said. of highly pro0table and 0nancially savvy And that is just the o4cial companies such as the Odessa Network were not laundering proceeds.,-, accounting 2ere are also functional reasons why money laundering is useful in arms tra;ck- ing, particularly in concealing illegal arms “Uno 4cially, we believe transfers. Although some of Russia and that of the 6 million 1rms Ukraine’s weapons exports are perfectly legal (e.g. Vietnam, Venezuela, etc), some are in registered in Russia, ! million violation of international sanctions (Sudan, or even more are phantom Myanmar, Syria, etc.) 2e shipping compa- nies and o;cials involved in such transfers companies, which don’t would be wise to conceal their involvement conduct any real commercial for fear of public identi0cation or legal retri- bution. Since the “money trail” is one of the activities and are aimed only most powerful and widely used ways to con- at money laundering.” nect criminals to crimes, obscuring illicitly obtained 0nances via o<-shore shell compa- Figure V]: nies, proxy directors, and the like is a useful Statement of Russian O4cial on Money Laundering strategy for evasion. >> !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ Lastly, we argue that money laundering and corruption are built-in features of the Putin political system, and so we should expect military-industrial exporters to engage in it. As stated in Chapter ,, illegal redistribution of national wealth to regime stakeholders is how United Russia and the Party of Regions maintain stability, by making collaboration with the state more pro0table than challenging it. By de0nition, money laundering is essential for such corrupt redistribution. It is the mechanism by which favored o;cials can steal tax revenue,,-4 well-connected generals can sell military property to the highest bidder,,-- and trusted oligarchs can receive sweetheart deals on state assets. Money laundering also plays an important role in Russian foreign policy by bankrolling the Kremlin’s ability to manipu- late and in1uence countries of interest. A small but well-documented example would be the SVR funding the election of a pro-Russian candidate in a Latvian city mayoral election;,-> the slush funds for such operations do not come about legally. An o;cial EU statement on the Magnitsky a >M !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ a large ethnic Russian population, and the Russian language (the lingua franca of FSU) is widely spoken. Most importantly, it is a member of the EU, and so money cleaned through Latvia can readily be transferred into safe havens in Zurich or London. Over half of the `3- billion held in Latvian banks is held by foreign depositors; the IMF estimates FSU entities account for =.b of this.,>- 2e US Treasury blacklisted two Latvian banks in 3..- under the Patriot Act for the role their money laundering services played in terrorist 0nancing.,>> 2e EU, IMF, ,>M and Council of Europe,>O (among others) have all expressed their concern about Latvian money laundering, with the Magnitsky a '58Q 5'(+ ABLV Bank is one of Latvia’s largest 0nancial institutions, a known money launderer, and closely connected to the Odessa Network. ABLV is the largest Latvian-owned bank by assets,,>= and holds the largest amount of non-resident deposits of any bank.,M. 4.b of its clients are Russian.,M/ ABLV has been recently linked to two high-pro0le cases of money laundering. 2en known as Aizkraules, ABLV was one of the six banks through which illicit money in the Mag- nitsky case was laundered (along with Baltic Figure V[: International Bank, Trasta Kommercbank, ABLV sponsorship of Odessa Network event xii Rietumu Bank, Baltic Trust Bank, and Case 1:09-cv-05705-SHS Document 1 Filed 06/22/09 Page 28 of 37 PrivatBank.),M3 In addition, the anti-corrup- tion group Global Witness accused ABLV in August 3./3 of laundering roughly `,. mil- lion out of Kyrgyzstan.,M, Aleksandr Varvarenko, in conjunction with his brother and various other Odessa business 0gures, runs a yearly event called “Maritime Days in Odessa” (essentially a trade convention for the Odessa maritime transportation industry). ABLV Bank has been a 0nancial supporter of the event from its inception,,M4 and has sent senior execu- tives to the event multiple times, o?en as keynote speakers. 2ey have done the same for other conferences heavily attended by the Odessa Network 0rms. For example, ABLV Head of the Regional Development Department Kazimir Rezvy and Head of the Private Bankers Department Igor Shlivko both made the trip from Riga to Odessa for the 3.// "Practice of Maritime Business 3.//" Figure VY: conference in Odessa, attended by represen- Waterlux AG court documents tatives from Phoenix Trans-servis, North- Western Shipping, Interlegal, and others. ,M- We infer that this is evidence for a 0nan- cial relationship between ABLV and Odessa xii. Rietumu Bank also attended some of the Odessa Network-sponsored events, similar to ABLV. >O !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ Network shipping 0rms, and a personal relationship between senior ABLV personnel and Odessa Network leaders such as the Varvarenkos (i.e. they de0nitely know each other and have interacted at these events). Strengthening this inference is data directly indicating the Odessa Network uses ABLV bank. 2e below document is from a 3..= US court case involving Waterlux AG and Phoenix Trans-Servis (owner and manager of the Faina, and closely tied to Kaalbye) show one of their business partners using “Aizkraukles Bank.”,M> 2is was the previous name of ABLV. *#9K$('8 K(Q#&!:#(! 5'(+ e&9 Documents from a 3..= court case,MO show that some elements of the Odessa Network use Regional Investment Bank JSG. Again, this Latvian bank has a track record of being used for money laundering; a US Securities and Exchange Commission 0ling indicates it as the desti- nation for money a `// million Ponzi scheme.,M= As the below documents show, Waterlux AG and Phoenix Trans-Servis (the owner and manager of the weapons ship Faina, and closely linked to Kaalbye) both appear to have regularly used Regional Investment Bank JSG. Case 1:09-cv-05705-SHS Document 1 Filed 06/22/09 Page 23 of 37 Case 1:09-cv-05705-SHS Document 1 Filed 06/22/09 Page 27 of 37 Case 1:09-cv-05705-SHS Document 1 Filed 06/22/09 Page 21 of 37 Figure VV: Waterlux AG court documents continued >= !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #" +e Odessa Network: Overview 2e quantity and complexity of inter-con- nected entities in this investigation have thus far compelled us to divide them into location-function clusters (e.g. Odessa— Logistics Integration, Oktyabrsk-Port of Origin, etc.) and examine one by one. 2ough this allows granular analysis, it risks losing the forest for the trees. In this section, we present a more abstract over- view of the network. One of the preliminary insights from the weapons shipment dataset was that a relatively small amount of facilitators ac- counted for a high percentage of Russian and Ukrainian arms transfers, with many ‘repeat o xiii. As previously discussed, Eide Marine is a unique case. It is one of the few companies in the world that pos- sesses huge submersible-bay barges capable of transporting warships and military submarines. 2e fact that it o M. !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ ## Case Study: Syria 2e main value of this research lies in prediction. We have identi0ed the companies, fa- cilities, and processes through which Russia and Ukraine have exported weapons by sea to foreign customers in the past. Under the assumption that past behavior is indicative of future behavior, we should be able to make better guesses about where FSU weapons are 1owing by looking for the patterns of weapons tra;cking uncovered by our analysis. In practical terms, this means ships owned by companies that have moved weapons in the past, are loading cargo at Oktyabrsk, and are delivering it to a state known to purchase Russian or Ukrainian weapons, are more likely to be transporting Russian or Ukrainian weapons to that state than a ship not matching these criteria. Syria provides a compelling case study for this approach. 2ere is no doubt that Russia is supplying Assad, but the extent of arms transfers is less well known, at least in the public sphere. Multiple ships—the Professor Katsman, Chariot, and Alaed, among others —have been interdicted carrying Russian weapons to Syria, as have aircra? such as the Syrian Air- bus ,3. intercepted over Turkey. 2ese few cases where Russia has been publicly “caught” are likely indicative of a larger trade. Assad-controlled Syria cannot domestically produce enough ammunition, military equipment, diesel fuel, etc. to sustain a two-year-long con- ventional war. Large-scale Russian (and Iranian) support is the only logical explanation for how it has been able to do so. Identifying and closing the avenues by which the Kremlin is arming Assad with everything from tank parts to missiles is a possible tactic for reducing this support and weakening Assad. By obtaining AIS transponder records for all ports in Syria, Ukraine, and Russia between / January 3./3 and ,. June 3./,, we constructed a near-complete log of commercial mari- time tra;c entering or exiting ports in these countries over the given timeframe, complete with exact date, time, and location. Using the unique IMOID identi0er for each ship, we cross-referenced the port call dataset against ship registry records, allowing us to deter- mine ship owner, manager, tonnage, 1ag, etc. Given the byzantine 0nancial and organiza- tional arrangements used by the Odessa Network, this entailed signi0cant investigative re- search into identifying the ownership structure of shell companies; this was accomplished by using Palantir to integrate diverse datasets drawn from sources such as Ukrainian court records, SWIFT transaction receipts, Russian business directories, international shipping registrars, and more. Once this combined database was complete, we searched it for the “signature” of FSU arms shipments discovered through our analysis: ships owned or oper- ated by companies with a track record of transporting Russian and Ukrainian weapons, transiting from Oktyabrsk, St. Petersburg, or Kaliningrad to Syrian ports such as Tartus, Al Ladaqiya, and Baniyas. We added one more possible selection criteria of “AIS discrep- ancy.” Ships can turn o< their transponders, broadcast a false name or IMOID or MMSI, or even “spoof” their signals to appear as if they are in an entirely di $%#&&' (#!)$*+ '(% &T*K' Kaalbye is the single most active shipper of Russian and Ukrainian weapons; it also actively transports unknown cargo between Oktyabrsk, St. Petersburg, and Tartus. 2e Kaalbye- owned Ocean Voyager entered St. Petersburg on /, January 3./3, where it remained for two days. It then le?, and arrived in Tartus on , February 3./3. A?er completing this shipment, it transited to Oktyabrsk, loaded cargo, and delivered Russian weapons to Venezuela as part of a multi-ship convoy completing a `4 billion arms transfer that included S–,.. mis- siles. Ocean Voyager made many other port calls in Oktyabrsk in 3./3, including 33 May, 3O May, /, October, and /4 November. 2e same is true for all of Kaalbye’s other ships; literally their entire 1eet transported cargo from Oktyabrsk to points abroad in 3./3 and M/ !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ 3./,, o?en multiple times. 2ese ships include LS Aizenshtat, Ocean Fortune, Ocean Winner, Ocean Force, Ocean Energy, and Ocean Power. Many of Kaalbye’s 3./, port calls at Oktyabrsk are followed by long periods with its ships missing from AIS coverage. 2ese ships call in Oktyabrsk, are detected transiting through the Bosphorus into the Mediterranean by Turkish AIS receivers, and then go “o< the grid” for weeks or even months. 2is is not inherently criminal, as AIS coverage is imperfect; ships are o?en undetectable when on the high seas, far away from land-based AIS receiv- ers, and many under-developed ports lack adequate AIS infrastructure. Yet these areas are relatively few. Virtually all of Europe, North America, Brazil, Russia, China, Japan, Korea, Australia, and much of the Middle East and North Africa are covered by commercial AIS services. 2e fact that so many of Kaalbye’s destinations a?er leaving Oktyabrsk are not detected on AIS means either they are docking at areas with poor AIS coverage, or are deliberately turning o< their AIS transponders to avoid detection. Both of these conditions apply to Syria; AIS data is di;cult to come by,xiv and many of the known Russian and Ira- nian weapons shipments (such as Katsman and Chariot) have turned o< or spoofed their AIS transponders when approaching Syria to avoid detection. 2is pattern of Kaalbye ships docking at Oktyabrsk, entering the Mediterranean, then disappearing from AIS coverage has been most prevalent during periods of heavy Russian military aid to Syria. Russia allegedly surged heavy weapons shipments to Syria in Spring 3./,, a period during which the majority of the Kaalbye heavy li? and ro-ro 1eet loaded cargo at Oktyabrsk, entered the Mediterranean, and then disappeared for weeks on end. 2ese voyages fall into three categories: innocuous voyages, where the transit times and distances line up, and gaps in coverage coincide with long periods of high seas transit; moderately suspicious voyages, where transit times indicate major delays or diversions, but could be o xiv. Many of the major commercial AIS vendors lacked information on Syria; we leveraged AIS “Destination” data from smaller EU and FSU AIS providers, who maintain land-based receivers in the Eastern Mediterranean. xv. Average travel times and speeds calculated using the Transit Time/Distance Calculator at http://www.searates. com/reference/portdistance/. M3 !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ Kaalbye was not the only Odessa Network company delivering unknown cargo to Syria in 3./3 and 3./,: t Almar is a known weapons transporter, having been involved in the 3..= Faina incident, and is tied to Vadim Alperin, who has multiple business contacts in Syria. Almar manages a ship called the Aviva. 2e Aviva en- tered Odessa on 3 May 3./3, and le? for Tartus on /4 May 3./3. It arrived in Syria on 3/ May 3./3. Aviva also loaded cargo at Novorossiysk, departed on /, March 3./,, and arrived in Tartus on either 33 or 3= March. Again, this corresponds with the surge in Russian weapons deliveries to Syria in Spring 3./,. t Ukrainian Danube Shipping Company, which was the ship owner and operator for a delivery of Ukrainian weapons to South Sudan in 3..M, also owns the Viano do Castelo and Tatarbunary. 2ese ships delivered or loaded some unknown cargo in Tartus on 33 February 3./3 and /3 July 3./3, respectively. Viano do Castelo has made many other port calls in Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev, including 3/ May 3./3, 3O May 3./3, and 34 December 3./3. t 2e German company Briese is one of the most active European nodes of the Odessa Network. It owns and operates Martin, which was previously used to deliver Ukrainian weapons to South Sudan in 3..M. 2e Mar- tin docked in Oktyabrsk on 3M June 3./3, le?, and arrived in Tartus on 4 July 3./3, where it delivered and/or loaded some unknown cargo. Briese also owns Bonacieux, which delivered or unloaded unknown cargo in Al Ladaqiyah, Syria on /, March 3./3. Finally, Briese also owns Wybelsum, which entered Al Ladaqiyah on 3= December 3./3, > January 3./,, /, January 3./,, and 3. January 3./,, respectively. t Inok NV was involved in shipping Russian weapons to Syria aboard the Professor Katsman, which it managed, and it has political connections to Kremlin. 2is was not Inok’s 0rst trip to Syria: it owns and operates the Pola Atlantic, which docked in Tartus between 33 April 3./3 and 3O April 3./3 (before the Katsman). t Eckho< Reederei was the ship manager for a shipment of Russian weapons to Venezuela in early 3./3. Eckho< Reederei also manages the OXL Emir, which docked in Tartus on 3 May 3./3 and then arrived in St. Petersburg on ,. May 3./3. t Solchart Archangelsk was the owner and operator of the Arctic Sea, widely suspected of attempting to trans- port S–,..s to Iran in 3..=. Solchart also is the owner and operator of Arctic Sky, which has made multiple trips from Kaliningrad to Syria, the exact path by which known weapons shipments have traversed. Arctic Sky le? Kaliningrad on /4 April 3./3, and arrived in Tartus on /3 May 3./3. It returned to Kaliningrad on O August 3./3, and then again transited to Tartus between /4 and 3/ October. Arctic Sky also made multiple stops in Oktyabrsk/Nikolaev. t Dutch 0rm Splietho< has been linked to multiple Russian weapons shipments in the past. Splietho< owns and operates Artisgracht, which docked in Al Ladaqiyah on /3 March 3./3. While it is impossible to say using only open source and commercial data exactly what car- go was contained in each of the above shipments, the key takeaway is that in 3./3 and 3./, many ships from the Odessa Network le? from known ports of origin for Russian weap- ons shipments and went directly to Syria or embarked on voyages that only make sense if large portions of their movements were obscured. 2e evidence (i.e. Syrian port calls by Odessa Network-linked ships, AIS discrepancies coinciding with known Russian seaborne arms shipments) presents a strong circumstantial case that these ships and companies are moving weapons or other sensitive cargo to the Assad regime, which is bolstered by the fact that most of the interdicted and publicly reported Russian arms shipments were also carried out by members of this network. '8!#*('!KQ# "TP$!"#&K&: &T*K'( &"KPPK(9 7$:P'(K#& An assumption of this paper has been that when the governments of Russia or Ukraine sell weapons abroad, they (not the purchaser) coordinate the transportation of said weapons, most o?en through the Odessa Network. While we believe this is the case for the vast majority of arms transfers, it is plausible that in some cases the purchasing country itself M, !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ would handle logistics. 2e two are not mutually exclusive: it could be that both Russia or Ukraine and the purchasing country handle di -<=/ >8?0 =?5=@ /51. A8BB- => (*'( -<=/ ?8>8401 A53>.17* -71=8 >=6/56. A5?2=>0@ :;<= > 7725697 14 12 26 Yass Marine Co Ltd Lebanon & Syria ?. @. AB<>C@ 7722621 20 1 21 Melody Shipping Co Greece, Turkey DB:;E > 7725673 12 9 21 Yass Marine Co Ltd Lebanon & Syria BFF=GH-> 7821635 8 11 19 Yass Marine Co Ltd Lebanon & Syria ;I:BCE :CJ;CHH; * Refers to where company is based xvi. 2e overall percentage is still quite low (< //b), but it is higher than that found at other Ukrainian ports (< 4b.) Of course, this could be an artifact of Oktyabrsk being a smaller sample size than, say, Odessa. M4 !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ -<=/ >8?0 =?5=@ /51. A8BB- => (*'( -<=/ ?8>8401 A53>.17 -71=8 >=6/56. A5?2=>0@ =?CB<;? IAB@ 7818353 8 4 12 UFC Ship Management Co Ltd Syria @BIJB F 8113140 7 5 12 Rasha Shipping Ltd Lebanon & Syria CB>EC 7521170 8 3 11 Abdul Rahman Othman Ismail Co Syria K=LBE<;B JBEC:FB 8701935 8 3 11 BNY Shipping Ltd Marshall Islands EBHM @;:B 7908782 3 8 11 Mercator Marine Ltd Marshall Islands, UK B= C M- !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ -<=/ >8?0 =?5=@ /51. A8BB- => (*'( -<=/ ?8>8401 A53>.17 -71=8 >=6/56. A5?2=>0@ :BIJAB BQQB@ 8414283 4 1 5 Jomarine Shipping and Trading Co. Jordan, Syria =?CB< P=MB>C@ 9111216 1 4 5 Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine KSU Ukraine L@;B IAB@ 7729198 2 2 4 ISM Group Ltd. Syria :-A LBQB@ 8871003 1 3 4 Granmar Denizcilik Turkey M> !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ -<=/ >8?0 =?5=@ /51. A8BB- => (*'( -<=/ ?8>8401 A53>.17 -71=8 >=6/56. A5?2=>0@ =:B@ F 8012243 1 1 2 Bayazid Shipping Co. Lebanon, Syria @C;I-> 8413186 1 1 2 Negmar Denizcilik Ve Yatirim Turkey @;:C= 8324713 1 1 2 Rimenes Shipping and Transport Turkey ICFB : 7511199 1 1 2 Rabunion Maritime Agency Sarl Lebanon I;HC@ OB;=?J 8602555 1 1 2 Sider Navi Spa Italy IA.PBEC MM !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #! Conclusion As stated in the introduction to this paper, abstract post-Soviet themes 0nd detailed ex- pression in the Odessa Network. We have presented an abundance of hard data on weapons shipments, the facilitators enabling them, and senior o;cials in the Russian and Ukrainian governments. We also have made analytic judgments about this data, speci0cally how it relates to Russian foreign policy writ large. We conclude this paper by summarizing the de0nitive facts about Russian and Ukrainian weapons shipments and facilitators, as well as our inferential insights on them. %#JK(K!KQ# JK(%K(9& 2is report documents over forty weapons shipment events from the o;cial state weapons export agencies of Russia and Ukraine to a wide variety of customers. 2ese shipments in- clude weapons ranging from crates of surplus ammunition to state of the art SAM systems, customers ranging from countries in good international standing to states under active international sanction, and span over a decade of time. Some of these arms transfers are well-known, while others were previously undetected. 2ese shipments were facilitated by a comparatively small group of Ukrainian and EU companies and individuals with close ties to one another, and to senior Russian and Ukrai- nian governmental and military-industrial o;cials. To some extent, the key facilitators in the weapons export process provide similar services: project and heavy-li? cargo, end- to-end logistics, and freight forwarding. However, di K(J#*#(!K'8 JK(%K(9& 2e diverse array of customers and weapons in our dataset lead us to believe that it is ad- equately representative of overall Russian and Ukrainian sea-born arms transfers. Analytic judgments about the entities in our admittedly non-exhaustive dataset are still indicative of some larger truth. We believe the weapons sales documented in this paper serve three non-mutually ex- clusive purposes. First, arms exports have signi0cant commercial value to the state, and the weapons industry keeps entire regions employed. Russia alone exported `/M.> billion USD of weapons in 3./3;,O- the Black Sea Shipyard in Nikolaev supports =-,... pension- ers.,O> Second, the proceeds of these sales are used to buy loyalty and stability within the Russian and Ukrainian political patronage systems, which hinge on delivering rewards to a small coalition of regime stakeholders. In particular, allowing Russian military and intel- ligence sectors to take a cut of pro0ts keeps them loyal and funded. 2ird, arms transfers are an important foreign policy tool. Russia, consistent with its opposition to perceived American hegemony and interventionism, appears to be arming strategic antagonists of the United States, including Libya, Venezuela, and Syria. Ukraine is more commercially oriented, but still uses arms transfers as a policy tool; for example, the anti-Russian Yush- chenko government selling heavily discounted anti-aircra? systems to Georgia under the similarly anti-Russian Saakashvili government.,OM In sum, these factors mean arms trans- fers are deeply important to the Russian and Ukrainian governments. 2at a small and tight-knit group of ostensibly private companies is trusted to move such a high percentage of state weapons exports implies that these facilitators are e MO !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ weapons shippers such as Kaalbye, Phoenix, and North-Western Shipping, and organs of Russian state power such as Rosoboronexport, the Ministry of Transport, and Putin’s personal advisors, 0t this pattern. We believe that these connections serve as a means of communication, coordination, and veri0cation. In other words, it is not a coincidence that Boris Kogan has close business and personal ties to the deputy director of Russian Tech- nologies and director of logistics at Rosoboronexport, and that his company, Kaalbye, was trusted to move `4 billion USD of Russian weapons (including the S–,.. SAM system) to Venezuela, a US strategic antagonist. 2e Kremlin’s use of 0nancial rewards, personal connections, and implied coercion to induce private companies to carry out useful tasks matches a larger “power vertical” narrative. To some extent, the shipping business as a whole relies on degrees of separation between owners and operators of assets in order to minimize liability, and the Odessa Network is no exception. However, the opacity and complexity of the 0nancial and social network surrounding these core facilitators provides a vehicle for wide distribution of pro0ts and additional space to conduct sensitive foreign policy without interference. O M= !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ #$ References @ “Pentagon o;cial: Russian warships may be carrying weapons to Syria,” CNN, - June 3./,. http://www.cnn.com/3./,/.>/.-/world/meast/syria-russia-shipments A “Syrian rebels: Russian ships transferring Hezbollah 0ghters to Syria,” Y-Net, 34 July 3./,. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/.,M,4.,L-44.=4.-,...html B “Cruise missile row rocks Ukraine,” BBC, /O March 3..-. http://news.bbc.co.uk/3/hi/europe/4,>/-.-.stm C “Ukraine leader con0rms missile sales to Iran,” NBC News, ,/ March 3..-. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/M,4=,.,/ns/world_news/t/ukraine-leader-con0rms-missile-sales-iran/N.UazoyEDvtBY D “Ukraine admits missiles sold to Iran and China,” Telegraph (London, UK), /O March 3..-. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news//4O-=,,/Ukraine-admits-missiles-sold-to-Iran-and-China.html E Куда «плывем», боцман? 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H Испанские власти задержали украинский экипаж судна «анастасия» по подозрению в контрабанде более >.. тонн оружия и взрывчатки и требуют выплаты штрафа в размере O-. тысяч долларов [Spanish authorities held the Ukrainian crew of the ship Anastasia in suspicion of transporting more than >.. tons of weapons and explosives and demand a 0ne of more than `O-.,...] Argumenti I Fakti, , March 3../. http://srv/.fakty.ua//./4>3-ispanskie-vlasti-zaderzhali-ukrainskij-ekipazh-sudna-quot-anastasiya-quot-po-podozreniyu-v-kontrabande-bolee->..- tonn-oruzhiya-i-vzryvchatki-i-trebuyut-vyplaty-shtrafa-v-razmere-O-.-tysyach-dollarov @I Куда «плывем», боцман? [“Where are we sailing, captain?”] Rabochaya Gazeta, > March 3..O. http://rg.kiev.ua/page-/article=/M=/ @@ “Spain halts Angolan-bound ship carrying Russian arms: press,” Agence France-Presse, 3O February 3../. http://reliefweb.int/report/angola/spain-halts-angolan-bound-ship-carrying-russian-arms-press @A “Illegal small weapons pose global threat,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, = July 3../. http://www.commondreams.org/headlines.shtml?/headlines.//.M.=-.,.htm @B “Georgian vessel, laden in Ukraine, was carrying weapons,” Pravda, / March 3../. http://english.pravda.ru/news/russia/./-.,-3..//,=>.3-./ @C “Angola buys >,. tons of arms,” CNBC Africa, 3 March 3../. http://cms.privatelabel.co.za/pls/cms/iac.page?p_t/=334-&p_t3=.&p_t,=.&p_t4=.&p_dynamic=YP&p_content_id=33MM4,&p_site_id=//, @D Equasis @E “Ukrainian 0rms setting up in Burma,” 0e Irrawady, > April 3..4. http://www3.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=,=-/ @F EXIF data @G Available at http://www.phoenix.odessa.ua/ @H Available at http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers AI Арбитражный суд города Москвы решение от 3, мая 3.// года Дело N А4.-/=3M//3./. [Arbitrage Court of Moscow, Decision from 3, May 3.//, Case Number A-4.-/=3M//3./..] Available at http://docs.cntd.ru/document/4-4.,4=,/ A@ EXIF data AA Equasis AB Available at http://www.nortrop.com.ua/ AC “Eide Marine Services A/S”, ISS Report, Autumn 3..>. http://www.iss-shipping.com/Attachments/4=//>,4>._iss_issue_one.pdf AD Obtained by comparing to SIPRI databases. AE SevMash [submarine producer] website. http://www.sevmash.ru/eng/production/millitary/vsotrud AF Equasis AG Interim report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, pursuant to Security Council resolution />=O. 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Arms transfer to the Democratic Republic of Congo: Assessing the System of Arms Transfer Noti1cations, 7""S-7"5". Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, October 3./., p. M DD “Cyprus detains Sudan-bound arms ship,” BBC, 33 June 3./.. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news//.,MM=/M DE “На Сантьяго росиийско-украинский экипкаж,” [A Russian-Ukrainian crew on the Santiago], Oruzhie Rossii, 34 June 3./.. http://www.arms-expo.ru/.4=.-M.-3.4O/34.4=.-4.-3.-,.->.html DF “German freighter Santiago with Russian-Ukranian crew detained in Cyprus with illegal arms,” Maritime Bulletin, 3, June 3./.. http://www.odin.tc/eng/articles/,==-German-freighter-Santiago-with-Russian-Ukranian-crew-detained-in-Cyprus-with-illegal-arms.asp DG “2e Santiago ship laden with weapons and ammunition, detained at the Cyprus Limassol,” PortNews, 3, June 3./.. http://portnews.ru/news//33O>-/ DH Equasis EI Славяне с оружием в трюме “2e Slavs with weapons in the cargo hold.” Rossiskaya Gazeta, 34 June 3./.. http://www.rg.ru/3././.>/3,/tanki-site.html E@ “=4 European tanks purchased, enroute: o;cials,” Voice of America Cambodia, /> September 3./.. http://www.voacambodia.com/content/article-=4-european-tanks-purchased-en-route-o;cials-/.,.M.-4=//,->=M/.html EA “Cambodia buys -. T--- tanks and 4. PTR-3> APCs,” Cambodia Air Defense, /O September 3./.. http://cambodiaairdefense.wordpress.com/3././.=//O/cambodia-buys--.-t---tanks-and-4.-ptr3>-apcs/ EB Equasis EC “Cambodia buys -. T--- tanks and 4. PTR-3> APCs,” Cambodia Air Defense, /O September 3./.. http://cambodiaairdefense.wordpress.com/3././.=//O/cambodia-buys--.-t---tanks-and-4.-ptr3>-apcs/ ED “Tanks and APCs arrive in Sikhanoukville port,” Phnom Penh Post, ,/ October 3./3. http://www.phnompenhpost.com/3./3/.,/-=4O4/National/tanks-and-apcs-arrive-in-sihanoukville-port.html EE “Vedette-boat lands at Cam Ranh port,” Vietnam News, O August 3.//. http://english.vietnamnet.vn/en/society///>44/vedette-boat-lands-cam-ranh-port.html EF Equasis EG “Ukrainian plant to make second shipment of BTR-4 vehicles to Iraq on time,” Kiev Post, /4 July 3.//. http://www.kyivpost.com/content/business/ukrainian-plant-to-make-second-shipment-of-btr-4-v-/.O>3,.html EH “Прибытие нового российского вооружения в Венесуэлу” [“Arrival of new Russian weapons in Venezuela”], BPMD, 3O May 3.//. http://bmpd.livejournal.com/->OM.html FI Equasis F@ “‘Ship of Shame’ carrying weapons and explosives to Egypt should not be allowed to deliver cargo,” Amnesty International press release, /- March 3./3. http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/ship-of-shame-carrying-weapons-and-explosives-to-egypt-from-united-states-should-not-be- allowed-to-d FA “Second Gepard frigate delivered to Vietnam,” RusNavy, - August 3.//. http://rusnavy.com/news/newsofday/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=/3>,/ FB Equasis FC “Cyprus releases a Russian Syria-bound ammunitions ship,” Al Arabiya, // January 3./3. http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/3./3/.//////OMM3,.html FD Кипр подтверждает задержание судна из России с грузом для Сирии [Cyprus con0rms detainment of a ship from Russia with cargo for Syria,” RIA Novosti, // January 3./3. http://ria.ru/arab_sy/3./3.////-,>==3,.3.html FE Equasis FF Прибытие в Венесуэлу третьей партии вооружения из России [“2e third party of Russian weapons arrives in Venezuela”], BPMD, 3- March 3./3. http://bmpd.livejournal.com//O>3/O.html FG Equasis FH Ibid. GI “Венесуэла завершает получение танков Т-M3Б/В из России” [“Venezuela completes receipt of T–M3B/V tanks from Russia”], BPMD, ,. March 3./3. http://bmpd.livejournal.com//=..O..html G@ Equasis GA Ibid. GB Equasis GC “Vessel with Russian explosives bound for Venezuela stuck in Greece,” Turkey Sea News, 3= April 3.//. http://www.seanews.com.tr/article/ACCIDENTS/>.>O-/Socol-,-Russian-Explosives GD Российские боеприпасы для Венесуэлы застряли в Греции на украинском судне Сокол-, [Russian ammunition for Venezuela is stuck in Greece on the Ukrainian ship Sokol-,]. Morskoi Bulletin Sovfracht, 3O April 3.//. http://www.sovfracht.info/?PageID=3--- GE Equasis GF “Судно с украинскими моряками в Греции не просило о помощи – Мининфраструктуры” [2e ship with Ukrainian seamen in Greece did not ask for help – Ministry of Infrastructure] Podrobnosti, 3O April 3.//. http://podrobnosti.ua/society/3.///.4/3O/M>>M-O.html GG Financial documents of ZAO Oboronprom, available at http://www.lin.ru/db/emitent/3/.B3.D=COM4A4DAC,3->DAD..,EC,3D/discl_doc.html GH Equasis HI “Russian freighter Professor Katsman sneaked to Tartus violating Syrian arms embargo,” Reuters 3M May 3./3. http://www.reuters.com/article/3./3/.-/3-/us-syria-arms-russia-idUSBREO4O/3F3./3.-3- H@ “U.S. condemns reported Russian arms shipment to Syria,” Reuters, ,/ May 3./3. http://www.reuters.com/article/3./3/.-/,//syria-arms-russia-idUSL/EOGVBXJ3./3.-,/ HA AIS records. HB Equasis HC Equasis HD Украинский сухогруз Сокол > стоит в Индии, груженый оружием и загадками [Ukrainian cargo ship Socol > sits in India, loaded with weapons and mysteries.] Morskoi Bulletin, /, August 3./3. http://www.odin.tc/newsru/read.asp?articleID==43 HE Equasis HF “Vessel carrying arms develops technical snag; docked at WISL amid tight security,” Navhind Times, /3 August 3./3. http://www.navhindtimes.in/goa-news/vessel-carrying-arms-develops-technical-snag-docked-wisl-amid-tight-security HG МИД РФ признал, что «Алаид» вез в Сирию оружиe [“2e Russian Ministry of Foreign A O/ !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ @IA Equasis @IB Надстройка для корвета «Совершенный» доставлена в Комсомольск-на-Амуре [“Bulkhead for the ‘Sovershenni’ corvette is delivered to Komsomolsk-na-Amur,”], BMPD, /3 October 3./3. @IC В украинских люкс-БТРах установили двигатели «Мерседес» и кондиционеры (фото) [In Ukrainian luxury APCs there are Mercedes engines and air conditioners.] Segodnya, 3- July 3./3. http://www.segodnya.ua/ukraine/ljukc--btr-c-konderom-i-korobkoj-avtomatom-cpetsekcport-n-ukraina-otpravit-v-tailand-3,,-mashiny-za-3M.- mln.html @ID “Эфиопия начинает получение танков Т-M3УА/” [Ethiopia is begins receipt of T–M3 tanks.] BPMD, 3> July 3./3. http://bmpd.livejournal.com/3==3--.html @IE “Эфиопия купила две сотни украинских танков,” [Ethiopia has bought 3.. Ukrainian tanks], Lenta, = June 3.//. http://lenta.ru/news/3.///.>/.=/tanks/ @IF “Отправка во Вьетнам «Светляков» из Владивостока,” [Shipment of Svetlyaks from Vladivostok to Vietnam.] BPMD, /> August 3./3. http://bmpd.livejournal.com/,/4>=4.html @IG Equasis @IH “Ирак получил вторую партию БТР-4» [Iraq received the second party of BTR-4], press release from Malyshev plant, /= October 3./3. http://www.malyshevplant.com/content/irak-poluchil-vtoruyu-partiyu-btr-4 @@I “2e second batch of BTR-4 armored personnel carriers shipped to Iraq from Odessa Seaport,” Army Guide, /4 September 3./3. http://www.army-guide.com/eng/article/article.php?forumID=3-3, @@@ “Ukraine to supply armored vehicles to Iraq,” Kyiv Post, 3- March 3.//. http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/ukraine-to-supply-armored-vehicles-to-iraq-/..O/4.html @@A “Russian gun dealers charged in Nigerian court,” BBC, /= February 3./,. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-3/-.=-,- @@B “Задержанное в Нигерии судно с российским экипажем имело разрешение на перевозку оружия” [2e detained ship in Nigeria with a Russian crew had permission for transportation of weapons] ITAR-TASS, 3, October 3./3. http://www.itar-tass.com/c//--,,>=.html @@C “Russian gun dealers charged in Nigerian court,” BBC, /= February 3./,. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-3/-.=-,- @@D Equasis @@E Press release by Moran Security Group. http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/why-doesnt-nigeria-implement-imo-resolutions-3...4OM./.html @@F “Arrested in Nigeria Russian m/v Myre Seadiver most probably, is a 1oating arsenal,” Maritime Bulletin, 3, October 3./3. http://www.odin.tc/news/read.asp?articleID=/4>4 @@G “Tanks and APCs apparently come from Ukraine,” Phnom Penh Post, // November 3./3. http://www.defence.pk/forums/china-far-east/3/>4,=-tanks-apcs-cambodia-arrive-sihanoukville-port.html @@H “Tanks and APCs arrive in Sikhanoukville port,” Phnom Penh Post, ,/ October 3./3. http://www.phnompenhpost.com/3./3/.,/-=4O4/National/tanks-and-apcs-arrive-in-sihanoukville-port.html @AI “Government mum on tank origins,” Phnom Penh Post, / November 3./3. http://www.phnompenhpost.com/3./3//./-=-/O/National/government-mum-on-tanks-origins.html @A@ Arms Transfers to the Middle East and North Africa: Lessons for an E#ective Arms Trade Treaty. Amnesty International (Amnesty International Ltd.: London, 3.//), 44. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT,.///M/3.///en/.4=fdeee->>fe-4b/,-a=.e->dMMM,d>a-4>/act,.//M3.//en.pdf @AA “Press release by inspector-general of police in relation to investigation on the alleged production of components for Libya’s uranium enrichment program,” 0e Star (Malaysia), 3/ February 3..4. http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?0le=/3..4/3/3//nation/M,>=-.M&sec=nation @AB David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, ”Libya’s gas centrifuge procurement: much remains undiscovered,” Institute for Science and International Security, / March 3..4. http://www.isis-online.org/publications/libya/cent_procure.html @AC Equasis @AD Al Venter, Allah’s Bomb: 0e Islamic Quest for Nuclear Weapons, p. 8!. @AE “Cargo vessel carrying uranium collides with chemical tanker o< Swedish and Danish coasts,” Dagens Nyheter, 4 July 3..=. http://www.wise-uranium.org/utiss.html @AF Je O3 !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ @CF “Leonid Yefrimovich Minin: from Ukraine, a new kind of arms tra;cker,” PBS, May 3..3. http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/sierraleone/minin.html @CG “Angling in on Angola,” Haaretz, 4 January 3..3. http://www.haaretz.com/angling-in-on-angola-/.M=.O= @CH “Drugs, diamonds and deadly cargoes,” Center for Public Integrity, /O November 3..3. http://www.publicintegrity.org/3..3/////O/->=M/drugs-diamonds-and-deadly-cargoes @DI “Arms and the Man,” New York Times, /M August 3..,. http://www.nytimes.com/3..,/.O//M/magazine/arms-and-the-man.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm @D@ Author’s personal interviews. @DA Леонид Минин: Деркач и Рабинович – сообщники во всех операциях с нелегальной продажей оружия [Leonid Minin: Derkach and Rabinovich were associates in all operations concerning the illegal sale of weapons.] Ukrainskaya Pravda, /4 June 3..3. http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/3..3/.>//4/4,>O/MO/ and “Comrades in Arms,” Washington Monthly, January/February 3..3. @DB “Anatomy of two arms dealers,” Asia Times, /= June 3..4. http://atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/FF/=Aa./.html @DC “Продажей» украинских ракет Ирану займется Дума [2e Duma is handling the sale of Ukrainian rockets to Iran], Obozrevatel, 4 July 3..>. http://obozrevatel.com/news/3..>/M/4//333>3.htm @DD http://o O, !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ AIC Непотопляемый Урбанский: адмирал «секретного флота» [2e unsinkable Urbansky: admiral of a ‘secret 1eet,’], Tribuna, 34 April 3..O. http:// tribuna.com.ua/articles/persons//>/O//.htm AID Вечный зам [2e eternal deputy], Tribuna, /. January 3..O. http://tribuna.com.ua/articles/persons//->3.M.htm AIE “Международный крестный отец» Леонид Минин [International mob boss Leonid Minin], Ukrainskaya Pravda, , February 3..,. http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/3..,/.3/,/4,M/4=4/ AIF “Leonid Yefrimovich Minin: from Ukraine, a new kind of arms tra;cker,” PBS, May 3..3. http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/sierraleone/minin.html AIG See weapons shipment dataset. AIH Liga dossier. http://0le.liga.net/person/M3>-igor-yrbanskii.html A@I Владелец судна «Фаина» - важный украинский чиновник? [2e owner of the ship Faina – an important Ukrainian o;cial?] Newsland, /- October 3..O. http://newsland.com/news/detail/id/,.M4.O/ A@@ Более 4. укркомпаний попали в крупнейшую базу оффшоров [Over 4. Ukrainian companies found in the database of o O4 !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ ADE ДЕВЯТЫЙ АРБИТРАЖНЫЙ АПЕЛЛЯЦИОННЫЙ СУД ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ г. Москва //..M.3..> г Дело № .=АП-M.4O/.>-АК [/.th Arbitrage Court of Appeals Decision on Case No. .=AO-M.4O/.>-AK] ADF “Непотопляемый Урбанский: адмирал «секретного флота,» [“2e Unsinkable Urbansky: Admiral of a ‘Secret Fleet,’”] Tribuna (Ukraine), 34 April 3..O. http://tribuna.com.ua/articles/persons//>/O//.htm ADG Российская Федерация Одиннадцатый арбитражный апелляционный суд, Постановление от 3O октября 3..O года № //АП->==-/3..O По делу № АM3-/O,,/3..O [Russian Federation //th Arbitrage Court, Decision from 3O October No. // AO->==-/3..O on Case No. № АM3-/O,,/3..O] ADH Ставка порта [Headquarters of the port.] Yuzhnaya Pravda, /O December 3./3. http://www.up.mk.ua/cgi-bin/page3st.php?param=--/3 AEI Враг не пройдет! - Егоров, начальник военного порта Октябрьск [2e enemy shall not pass! – Egorov, the boss of Oktyabrsk military port.] Korabelov, /. July 3./3. http://www.korabelov.info/ekonomika/voennyiy-port-egorov.html AE@ Forbes Russia. http://www.forbes.ru/pro0le/vadim-novinskii AEA Треть самых богатых украинцев - депутаты и чиновники [One third of the richest Ukrainians are deputies and bureaucrats.] Argument, ,. March 3./3. http://argumentua.com/novosti/tret-samykh-bogatykh-ukraintsev-deputaty-i-chinovniki AEB “Deal of the Century. 2e Mining and Metals sector of Ukraine Gets a Flagship,” Delovaya Stolitsa, / October 3..M. http://www.scmholding.com/en/media-centre/coverage/view/-O/ AEC “Akhmetov’s SCM, Smart Holding Create Ukraine Agricultural Group,” Bloomberg, M June 3.//. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/3.//-.>-.M/ akhmetov-s-scm-smart-holding-create-ukraine-agricultural-group.html AED Президент Hares Group Харес Юссеф: «Рентабельность строительства в Украине колеблется между >.b и /..b годовых. На меньшее строители просто не согласны».http://haresgroup.com/html/media/econ_izvestiya_hy.pdf AEE Бизнес-партнер Ахметова Новинский получил украинское гражданство [Akhmetov’s business partner Novinsky has received Ukrainian citizenship.] Nezavisimoe Bureau Novosti, / June 3./3. http://nbnews.com.ua/ru/news/43=3./ AEF Вадим Новинский: «мутный бизнесмен» или проект российских спецслужб? [Is Murky Businessman Vadim Novinsky a Stooge of Russian Intelligence] Argument, /4 June 3./,. http://argumentua.com/stati/vadim-novinskii-mutnyi-biznesmen-ili-proekt-rossiiskikh-spetssluzhb AEG Самый секретный порт Украины попал под контроль Вадима Новинского [2e most secret port in Ukraine has fallen under the control of Vadim Novinsky.] Novosti-N, 33 May 3./3. http://novosti-n.mk.ua/news/read/4.,-4.html AEH Приватизация портов. В Украине разрешили концессию портов на 4= лет. [Privatization of the ports. In Ukraine, concessions on ports are granted for 4= years.] Korabelov, /- June 3./,. http://www.korabelov.info/ekonomika/privatizatsiya-portov-v-ukraine-razreshili-kontsessiyu-morskikh-portov-na-4=-let.html AFI Грузооборот порта «Октябрьск» составил />.,, тыс. т в апреле 3./, года [Port Oktyabrsk moved />.., tons of cargo in April 3./,.] Morskie Biznes-novosti Ukrainy, 3, May 3./,. http://www.maritimebusinessnews.com.ua/news/cargo/3./,/.-/3,/3/>O4.html AF@ В первую тройку добросовестных налогоплательщиков вошел СМП «Октябрьск» [Specialized maritime port Oktyabrsk is among the top three taxpayers.] Korabelov, 3. March 3./,. http://www.korabelov.info/ekonomika/v-pervuyu-troyku-dobrosovestnyih-nalogoplatelschikov-voshel-smp-oktyabrsk.html AFA Украина раздала порты «пацанам» [Ukrainian ports have been handed to buddies.] Ukrainskaya Pravda, 3/ November 3./3. http://www.epravda.com.ua/rus/publications/3./3////3//,4-M-./ AFB Николаевский порт: «прощай, оружие!» [Nikolaev Port: Enter, weapons!] Port News, 3, December 3..O.http://portnews.ru/digest/43,>/ AFC “Domestic Stories: HMCS CHICOUTIMI arrives in Halifax,” Royal Canadian Navy, / February 3..-. http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/,/,-a_eng.asp?category=M&id=33- AFD US Military Seali? Command website. http://www.msc.navy.mil/seali?/3./,/July/lantlines.htm AFE “Swedish Submarine HMS Gotland Arrives in San Diego,” United States Navy o;cial website, ,. June 3..-. http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=/O=O4 AFF O;cial BBC website. http://www.bbc-chartering.com/informations/news/archive/ AFG “Supplies for Assad: German ship carrying weapons stopped near Syria,” Der Spiegel, /4 April 3./3. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-ship-carrying-iranian-weapons-stopped-near-syria-a-O3M--,.html AFH See company website. http://www.lueddeke-reedereiagentur.com/about-us.html AGI http://www.briese.de/0leadmin/user_upload/PDF-Daten/Briese_news_,-3./3_web.pdf AG@ See Briese Ukraine website. http://www.briese.net.ua/contacts/ AGA Ibid. AGB See Briese Russia website. http://briese.ru/ AGC See Briese Russia website. http://briese.ru/Filialy AGD See Kaalbye Transport website. http://kaalbye-group.com/ktransport.html AGE See Primetransport website. http://www.primetransportltd.com/?page=team&lang=de AGF e.g. Victor Puyu. AGG Primetransport website. http://www.primetransportltd.com/?page=1eet&lang=de AGH “Beluga Files for Bankruptcy,” Journal of Commerce, /> March 3.//. http://www.joc.com/maritime-news/beluga-0les-bankruptcy_3.//.,/>.html AHI “Beluga Shipping Announces Restructuring,” Journal of Commerce, , March 3.//. http://www.joc.com/maritime-news/international-freight-shipping/beluga-shipping-announces-restructuring_3.//.,.,.html AH@ Global Projects Logistics Newsletter, January 3..=. http://www.gpln.net/Issueb3.NoO.pdf AHA http://www.beluga-projects.com/ AHB Heavyli? PFI Newsletter, September/October 3./., p. /,.. AHC Al Venter, Allah’s Bomb: 0e Islamic Quest for Nuclear Weapons, p. 8!. AHD Beluga press release. http://www.docstoc.com/docs/4O/O33/4/Beluga-Group-and-BBC-Chartering-Logistic-form-Americas-Joint AHE Guest list. http://www.novpt.ru/doc/list-eng.pdf AHF Ibid. AHG “Venezuela ranked top importer of Russian arms,” RIA-Novosti, 3M December 3.//. http://en.rian.ru/world/3.///33M//M.-/=/4-.html AHH “Russia to lend Venezuela `4 bln to pay for arms deals,” RIA-Novosti, M October 3./.. BII Прибытие в Венесуэлу третьей партии вооружения из России [“2e third party of Russian weapons arrives in Venezuela”], BPMD, 3- March 3./3. http://bmpd.livejournal.com//O>3/O.html BI@ “Halt ships of shame from the USA carrying weapons to Egypt,” Amnesty International, /- March 3./3. http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/halt-ships-shame-usa-carrying-weapons-egypt-3./3-.,-/- BIA http://www.best-maritime-crewing.info/catalogue_companies_list/company_source_>M/=_/.html BIB http://www.equifax.co.uk/equifax/commercial/pdf/Estonia.pdf BIC Balchart website. BID Latvian, Russian, and Ukrainian business records. BIE Equasis BIF Balchart website. BIG Disrupting Atrocity Enablers: Maritime Arms Shipments from Russia to Syria, Human Rights First, August 3./., p. =. BIH 2ey are friends on Facebook. B@I Latvian business records B@@ Alumni website ”Водники: содружество выпускников и студентов”, available at http://www.vodniki.odessa.ua/s.html?sphere== B@A Program brochure. Available at http://novoconference.ru/eng/user0les/File/NOVO3..O_prog_ENG_/.-.4-.O.pdf B@B Guest list. Available at http://novoconference.ru/eng/novo/3..O/participants/ B@C ФЕМКО ответила за Сирию [FEMCO answers for Syria], PortNews, /> July 3./3. http://portnews.ru/comments//44M/?backurl=b3Fcommentsb3Fs/b3Fp,b3F O- !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ B@D Губернатор Мурманской области и глава «Роснефти» обсудят перспективы освоения Приразломного месторождения нефти [2e governor of Murmansk oblast and the head of Rosne? discuss perspectives on reclaiming fault-line oil], RosBalt, 3, April 3..,. http://www.murman.ru/themes/oil-rosbalt.shtml?page=>&name=themes&base=oil&0le=oil-rosbalt&print=/ B@E Надстройка для корвета «Совершенный» доставлена в Комсомольск-на-Амуре [“Bulkhead for the ‘Sovershenni’ corvette is delivered to Komsomolsk-na-Amur,”], BMPD, /3 October 3./3. B@F Varamar website B@G Program attendees list. Available at http://www.interlegal.com.ua/en/events/eng_participants_3..=.pdf B@H O;ce ,3, 3.-ya Liniya -/M, St Petersburg, /==/.>, Russia. Equasis. BAI http://westberg.ru/the-company/structure/ BA@ For a full list of private security companies, see signatory list of “2e International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers”, a Switzerland-based NGO and trade association seeking to promote transparency and common standards in the private security industry. Available at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/OO=OM34./ICoC-Signatory-Companies-Total-December-3./3 BAA As evidenced by registration certi0cates on the Moran website. http://moran-group.org/upload/about/ISO_=../.jpg BAB “Задержанное в Нигерии судно с российским экипажем имело разрешение на перевозку оружия” [2e detained ship in Nigeria with a Russian crew had permission for transportation of weapons] ITAR-TASS, 3, October 3./3. http://www.itar-tass.com/c//--,,>=.html BAC “Massive Floating Armories Filled With Weapons Are A Pirate›s Sweet Dream,” Guardian, /. January 3./,. http://www.businessinsider.com/massive-1oating-armories-0lled-with-weapons-are-a-pirates-sweet-dream-3./,-/ BAD Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 3..3 (3.//), 3M=-3O/. http://www.un.org/sc/committees/M-//mongroup.shtml BAE Equasis. BAF “Оружие для Сирии везут из Петербурга?» [Are weapons for Syria being transported from St. Petersburg?] Fontanka, / November 3./3. http:// www.fontanka.ru/3./3/.//////.4/ BAG “Arrested in Nigeria Russian m/v Myre Seadiver most probably, is a 1oating arsenal,” Maritime Bulletin, 3, October 3./3. http://www.odin.tc/news/read.asp?articleID=/4>4 BAH See Moran website. http://moran-group.org/en/about/index BBI “Hansa Builds New Heavy-li? Competitor,” BreakBulk, // March 3./,. http://www.breakbulk.com/breakbulk-news/transportation-logistics/hansa-builds-new-heavy-li?-competitor/ BB@ “Beluga rebranded as Hansa Heavy Li?,” World Cargo News, 3 June 3.//. http://www.worldcargonews.com/htm/w3.//.>.3..-4>O..htm BBA See HHL website. http://www.hansaheavyli?.com/kontakt/fuehrungsteam.html BBB Hansa newsletter. http://www.hansaheavyli?.com/0leadmin/pdf/HHL_Tradewinds_/-.M3.//.pdf BBC “Hired guns secure ships, stir controversy,” Stars and Stripes, /- February 3./.. http://www.stripes.com/news/hired-guns-secure-ships-stir-controversy-/.=O=>O BBD PMSC forum. http://www.closeprotectionworld.com/members-looking-work///O/M-advice-needed-urgently-,.html BBE PMSC forum. https://www.socnet.com/showthread.php?t=/.O-== BBF Ibid. BBG We characterize them as fronts based on the fact that their websites contain identical quotes, brochures, personnel, etc. BBH PMSC forum. http://www.closeprotectionworld.com/members-looking-work///O/M-advice-needed-urgently-,.html BCI Ripo< Report. http://www.ripo O> !"# $%#&&' (#!)$*+ BEG Report on Fourth Assessment Visit –Summary of Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, Latvia. Council of Europe, Committee Of Experts On 2e Evaluation Of Anti-Money Laundering Measures And 2e Financing Of Terrorism, - July 3./3. https://wcd.coe.int/ com.instranet.InstraServlet?Command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&DocId=/=--/M3&SecMode=/&Admin=.&Usage=3&InstranetImage=3/OM3.O BEH “Latvia sees good and bad as Russian money haven,” Reuters, 3, October 3./3. http://www.reuters.com/article/3./3//./3,/us-latvia-russia-banks-idUSBREO=M.S/3./3/.3, BFI “Swiss-Style Latvian Banking Hub 2rives on Ex-Soviet Cash,” Bloomberg, ,. August 3./3. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/3./3-.O-3=/swiss-style-latvian-banking-hub-thrives-on-ex-soviet-cash-1ood.html BF@ “Swiss-Style Latvian Banking Hub 2rives on Ex-Soviet Cash,” Bloomberg, ,. August 3./3. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/3./3-.O-3=/swiss-style-latvian-banking-hub-thrives-on-ex-soviet-cash-1ood.html BFA “Latvian Regulator Imposes Largest Possible Fine on a Latvian Bank involved in Money Laundering Connected to the Magnitsky Case,” Law and Order in Russia, /= June 3./,. http://lawandorderinrussia.org/3./,/latvian-regulator-imposes-largest-possible-0ne-on-a-latvian-bank-involved-in- money-laundering-connected-to-the-magnitsky-case/ BFB “Swiss-Style Latvian Banking Hub 2rives on Ex-Soviet Cash,” Bloomberg, ,. August 3./3. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/3./3-.O-3=/swiss-style-latvian-banking-hub-thrives-on-ex-soviet-cash-1ood.html BFC Odessa Maritime Days press release, http://www.maritimedays.odessa.ua/?r=site/page&src=release&print=page BFD Attendees list available at http://www.interlegal.com.ua/en/comnfacts/pdf/participants3.//.pdf BFE Waterlux AG vs. Atlas Uluslararasi Nakiyat Proje Tasimaciligi Sanayi ve Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi, Atlasium Denizcilik Ve Proje Kargo Tasimaciligi Limited Sirk and General Co. Ltd. /:3..=cv.-M.-, 3..=. BFF See ABLV website. http://www.ablv.com/en/about/history BFG Waterlux AG vs. Atlas Uluslararasi Nakiyat Proje Tasimaciligi Sanayi ve Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi, Atlasium Denizcilik Ve Proje Kargo Tasimaciligi Limited Sirk and General Co. Ltd. /:3..=cv.-M.-, 3..=. BFH Securities and Exchange Commission v. Rockford Funding Group, et. al., Civil Action No. /:3..=CV/..4M (PGG)(SDNY). http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/3..=/lr3/,3=.htm BGI “Iranian oil tanker signals conceal ships to Syria,” Jerusalem Post, > December 3./3. http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Iranian-oil-tanker-signals-conceal-ships-to-Syria BG@ “Have Tehran’s Tankers Hijacked the Tanzanian Flag?” Forbes, /3 July 3./3. http://www.forbes.com/sites/claudiarosett/3./,/.M//3/have-tehrans-tankers-hijacked-the-tanzanian-1ag/ BGA UN Comtrade data BGB “Syrian grain imports pick up despite worsening war,” Reuters, /M May 3./,. http://www.reuters.com/article/3./,/.-//M/syria-food-idUSL>N.DR/V=3./,.-/M BGC United States of America vs. Monzer al Kassar, 3..M. BGD Рособоронэкспорт объявил о рекордном количестве контрактов в 3./3 году [Rosoboronexport informs about the record quantity of contracts in 3./3,] Vzglyad, /, February 3./,. http://vz.ru/news/3./,/3//,/>3./43.html BGE Author personal interview with Nikolaev residents BGF “Putin Sharply Criticizes Ukraine Over Georgian Arms Reports,” Radio Free Europe, , Octob er 3..O. http://www.rferl.org/content/Putin_Sharply_Criticizes_Ukraine_Over_Georgian_Arms_Reports//3=,>/,.html OM