Research Report

Is Christmas Really Over? Improving the Mandating of Peace Operations

Council members confer with the Director of the Security Council Introduction: Better Process for Better Mandates Affairs Division ahead of a 24 February 2018 meeting. (UN Photo/ Mark Garten) A core task of the Security Council is to adopt Central as mandate-crafting is to its work, the peace operations mandates and assess their imple- Council has been criticised for “Christmas-tree 2019, No. 1 22 February 2019 mentation. Council members meet throughout mandates” that respond inadequately to realities the year to discuss the challenges and achieve- on the ground, are circumscribed by political and This report is available online at securitycouncilreport.org. ments of missions with a range of mandates, from cost considerations of member states rather than

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Security Council Report Research Report February 2019 securitycouncilreport.org 1 Introduction: Better Process for Better Mandates

regional political dynamics, the performance peacebuilding. Once consultations were 1 Introduction: Better Process for of civilian and uniformed personnel, the concluded, the Secretariat, in consultation Better Mandates availability of resources, and the engagement with member states, proceeded to draw up 2 The Role of the Council in and support of senior leadership at head- a Declaration of Shared Commitments that Mandating and Overseeing quarters and at the mission are important had by the end of 2018 been endorsed by Peace Operations contributing factors. However, mandates are 151 countries and four intergovernmental 4 The Longstanding Gap among the few elements entirely under the organisations. between Mandates and Reality purview of the Council, which could invest The member state consultations on poli- 6 Weaknesses in Mandating in rethinking how mandates are designed tics were led by Côte d’Ivoire and the UK. At 9 Action for Peacekeeping: An and reviewed. a 25 June 2018 meeting, many member states Opportunity to Re-engage At a Council open debate on 28 March underscored the primacy of politics in guid- 2018, Secretary-General António Guterres ing peacekeeping operations and expressed 10 Improving the Mandating Process announced the launch of “Action for Peace- overall agreement about the need to improve keeping” (A4P), an initiative aimed at renew- the mandating process. Issues raised includ- 13 Time to Deliver ing states’ political commitment to peace- ed the need for more realistic mandates, the 14 Selected UN Documents on keeping operations. Guterres urged Council importance of consultations with relevant Peace Operations members to put an end to mandates that stakeholders and the interest in setting clear 14 Useful Additional Resources look like “Christmas trees”, trailing streams strategic objectives for peacekeeping opera- of templated components. “Christmas is tions. Although the Declaration was informed over”, he declared, calling for sharpened and by the statements made in that meeting, streamlined mandates and pointing out as one Council members have not agreed on how example that the UN Mission in South Sudan the Council might adjust its own practices. A (UNMISS) could not possibly implement draft resolution on mandating circulated by its 209 mandated tasks. “By attempting too Côte d’Ivoire and the Netherlands in mid- much, we dilute our efforts and weaken our November 2018 was met with reluctance by impact. I hope that our mission reviews will some permanent members collectively to set help to end this mandate inflation,” he said. parameters for the mandating process and Since that open debate, much has hap- was put on hold at the end of the year. pened within the framework of the A4P What follows is the case for improving initiative. The UN Secretariat partnered the mandating process, and ideas to help with ten member states to lead broad con- those in the Council and beyond chart a sultations on five priority areas: politics, way forward to making mandates more real- partnerships, performance, people and istic and achievable.

The Role of the Council in Mandating and Overseeing Peace Operations

Mandates are the legal and political basis and the Sinai in response to the internation- for the deployment of peace operations— al crisis over the blockade of the Suez Canal and much more besides. Mandates are the in 1956, and the UN Security Force in West mission’s broad marching orders, identify- New Guinea in 1962 to monitor a cease- ing its overall “deliverables”. They can be fire agreement between Indonesia and the an instrument for coordinating regional and Netherlands and support the work of a UN international presences, a de facto contract transitional administration. with the host government, and a powerful In 2015, the number of UN peacekeep- messaging tool. Whereas most mandates of ing and special political missions reached a peacekeeping operations are established by historic high with more than 128,000 civil- the Security Council, in the past the Gen- ian and uniformed personnel serving in 39 eral Assembly has done so as well, setting up missions across four continents, according to the first UN Emergency Force interposed the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace between Egyptian and Israeli forces in Gaza Operations (HIPPO). Several have now

2 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Research Report February 2019 The Role of the Council in Mandating and Overseeing Peace Operations ended, and more, like the UN-AU Hybrid UN Mission for the Verification of Human Secretariat representative around 15 days Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), may end Rights and of Compliance with the Commit- before mandate expiry. In the past, mandat- soon, but the bulk of Council meetings still ments of the Comprehensive Agreement on ing resolutions would simply endorse the pertain to the mandating and oversight of Human Rights in Guatemala, MINUGUA) proposal laid out in the Secretary-General’s peace operations. The Council regularly or by the Secretary-General, as in the case report, but this practice was discontinued renews the mandates of 11 of the 14 peace- of the offices of the Special Coordinators for sometime in the 1990s. In the case of SPMs, keeping operations and six special political Lebanon and the Middle East Peace Process. the Security Council tends to request reports missions deployed at the close of 2018. Two The Council is briefed regularly by the of the Secretary-General less frequently than peacekeeping operations have open-ended head of mission, who normally introduces for peacekeeping operations, and mandate mandates and do not report regularly to the the most recent periodic report of the Sec- renewal discussions can be based merely on Council. They were the first and second such retary-General, adds newer developments the briefing by a high-level official. operations to deploy: the UN Truce Super- on the ground, and describes progress and Some of the analysis put forward in the vision Organization (UNTSO, 1948) and setbacks in mandate implementation. In a Secretary-General’s reports since 2017 has the UN Military Observer Group in India few settings, the political lead is not with been informed by independent strategic and Pakistan (UNMOGIP, 1949). The man- the Special Representative of the Secretary- reviews conducted at the initiative of the Sec- date of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK, General and head of mission, but with a retariat or the Council. These reviews often 1999) is also open-ended, although Coun- different official altogether. In those cases, have an external lead and a “red team” com- cil members are briefed regularly on its which include UNFICYP and MINURSO, posed of non-UN experts in peace operations implementation. the Council will usually hear from both to challenge the review’s assumptions. The Most mandates are renewed annually, ahead of the mandate renewal. Although the Council’s access to the analysis and recom- with a few exceptions. The UN Peacekeep- head of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon mendations contained in these reviews has ing Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has tradi- (UNIFIL), who is the Force Commander, varied. Some of the review reports have been tionally been renewed every six months. In rarely briefs the Council, a representative of shared with the Council and made pub- recent years, more exceptions have appeared, the Department of Peace Operations usu- lic, mainly where the Council initiated the with six-month renewals of the UN Mis- ally briefs the Council alongside the Special review. This was the case of the UN Orga- sion for the Referendum in Western Sahara Coordinator for Lebanon. Briefings vary in nization Stabilization Mission in the Demo- (MINURSO) and the UN Interim Security frequency from quarterly meetings on the cratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), Force for Abyei (UNISFA). In its final year, UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabili- UNAMID, UNFICYP and UNAMA. How- 2010, the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) zation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and ever, in most cases only a summary of the was renewed every four months. In the case the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan analysis and a selection of recommendations of MINURSO and UNISFA, the shorter (UNAMA), to semi-annual meetings on have been conveyed to the Council in the mandate periods are intended to pressure MINURSO and UNISFA. The frequency of Secretary-General’s report. the parties to re-engage in the political pro- meetings, as well as whether reports are to Depending on what is at stake in the man- cess. In certain circumstances—such as unre- be submitted in writing or can be delivered date renewal, local and international NGOs solved differences among Council members orally, depends on the specificity of the man- may conduct advocacy around critical issues or while the Council awaits developments in date and the initiative of Council members by publishing reports, writing letters to the a negotiating process or the outcome of a or the Secretariat in requesting additional Council, organising events, or holding bilat- strategic review—the Council has renewed meetings. Although most such meetings eral meetings with Council members. a mandate unchanged for a short period (a include a briefing in the open chamber fol- Around 12 days before the mandate “technical rollover”) to accommodate the lowed by closed consultations, it is the prac- renewal of a peacekeeping operation, Council need for extra time. tice to discuss UNIFIL, MINURSO, and members hold a private meeting with troop- In addition to peacekeeping operations, UNISFA mostly in consultations. and police-contributing countries (TCCs/ this analysis will consider the mandates of For peacekeeping operations, the basis PCCs) at which the Secretariat presents the field-based special political missions (SPMs) for any mandate renewal is a Secretary- Secretary-General’s report. These meetings in Afghanistan, Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, General’s report circulated around 21 days now take place earlier in the renewal cycle: Iraq, Libya and Somalia, which emanate before the end of the mission’s mandate. An when the practice began in the 1990s, they from Council resolutions and are renewed advance copy of this report goes to Council would take place a matter of days before the regularly. SPMs can also be established members before its formal publication in all adoption of the resolution, when discussions through an exchange of letters between the six official UN languages. Given the dispar- were unlikely to have an impact on man- Secretary-General and the President of the ity of resources and global diplomatic pres- date negotiations. Currently no TCC/PCC Council, as was done in the case of the UN ence, particularly among elected members, meetings are held for missions with open- regional offices in West Africa and the Sahel, the report plays an important equalising role ended mandates (UNTSO, UNMOGIP and Central Africa and Central Asia. There are in providing detailed information to every UNMIK), or for UNISFA, given that 92 per- examples of a wide range of missions estab- Council member. It is then presented to the cent of its uniformed personnel are from a lished by the General Assembly (such as the Council by the Special Representative or a single country, Ethiopia. Such meetings used

Security Council Report Research Report February 2019 securitycouncilreport.org 3 The Role of the Council in Mandating and Overseeing Peace Operations to take place annually before the renewal of the P3 (France, the UK and the US)—will where they hold the pen, sometimes inviting the mandate of the UN Stabilization Mission circulate the first draft and usually call for a other P3 members. The fact that other per- in Haiti, but no meeting was held in 2018 first meeting to read through the text. While manent missions do not or cannot prioritise before the renewal of the UN Mission for all Council experts generally convene in per- the exposure of their experts to field missions Justice Support in Haiti, which includes over son for one or two rounds of negotiations, a further increases the gap between the pen- 1,200 police. These meetings are supposed large part of the negotiations may take place holder and other Council members and the to encapsulate the collective nature of peace- via emails or bilateral exchanges between the reliance on the analysis and options put for- keeping—based on a “triangular” relation- penholder and other Council members. An ward by the former. Some elected members ship involving the Council, the TCCs/PCCs exception to this practice occurred in 2018 have begun to invest expanding their relevant and the Secretariat—but have been criticised with the holding of five rounds of negotia- regional presences and in field visits for their as lacking interactivity and not resulting in tions on the renewal of UNAMA, led by the experts, however. In early 2019, some E10 incorporating advice from TCCs/PCCs on Netherlands as the penholder. Although the diplomats joined France for the first time on the mandate. Some Council members have use of Groups of Friends was more common one such visit to the DRC also criticised the unreadiness of TCCs/ in this connection in the past, today three Most resolutions renewing Council man- PCCs to discuss substantive issues in these Groups of Friends (on Afghanistan, Haiti dates are adopted unanimously. Although meetings. In an effort to address this, in 2015 and Western Sahara) and the Contact and Council members may be divided over ele- New Zealand, and then France, started con- Drafting Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina ments of the mandate, importance is ascribed vening informal meetings of the main TCCs/ negotiate Council drafts before their circula- to unanimity (that is, sending a unified mes- PCCs, Council members and the Secretariat tion to all Council members. In recent years, sage) when adopting mandates. After the vote, on some peacekeeping operations with the it has proven difficult to reach consensus in Council members may explain their vote, but objective of enhancing the frankness of the some of these configurations as a result of not all do so systematically. discussions with TCCs/PCCs. Although this divergent priorities among their members, Although the Council authorises the practice has continued on some files, it is far limiting what could otherwise be a valuable deployment of peacekeeping operations, how from systematic, and relies on the willing- mechanism that includes key actors who do this decision translates into field-level imple- ness of the penholder or another particularly not sit in the Council. Engagement with host mentation is heavily influenced by negotia- engaged elected member. In the 2018 ses- states, although not institutionalised, is usu- tions in the Fifth Committee of the General sion of the General Assembly’s Special Com- ally undertaken bilaterally by the penhold- Assembly, which is responsible for adminis- mittee for Peacekeeping Operations (C34), ers and other interested Council members. trative and budgetary matters. Every year in Pakistan and the UK presented a non-paper Similarly, although Secretariat officials follow May-June, the committee adopts the bud- on triangular cooperation which highlighted the negotiations and engage directly with the get of peacekeeping operations, with effect the importance of keeping a mix of formal penholder and other member states through- from 1 July. The budgets are based on pro- and informal meetings and improving exist- out the process, their role in the drafting of posals from the Secretary-General and are ing mechanisms instead of creating new ones. mandates remains informal. first considered by the Advisory Committee These conclusions were incorporated into the Penholders generally bring an especially on Administrative and Budgetary Questions 2018 report of the C34. strong knowledge of the relevant country (ACABQ), which holds hearings and issues The actual negotiation of the mandating situation—often as a result of historical and recommendations to the Fifth Committee. text takes place over ten days, on average. continuing ties and interests which influence The process can border on being a review of Generally, Council members are represented their positions. In addition to their institution- the mandate of a particular mission, given by diplomats known as “experts”, normally al memory, longstanding links and diplomatic the level of detail (post by post) considered at the level of Secretary, and the involvement presence in the host state, it is not uncom- by the committee and the ACABQ. The of permanent representatives is rare unless mon for these states to dispatch their own rigidity of the staffing tables approved by compromise is particularly difficult to achieve. experts (from New York or their capital) for the General Assembly limits the flexibility of The penholder—almost always a member of regular, self-financed visits to the operations missions to adapt to new or changing needs.

The Longstanding Gap between Mandates and Reality

The 2018 report of the C34 stressed the need resources based on a realistic assessment of As early as 2000, the report of the Panel on for “congruity among mandates, resources the situation and secure financing in support UN Peace Operations, which was chaired by and realizable objectives.” It highlighted the of efforts to achieve peaceful solutions to con- Lakhdar Brahimi, expressed concern about importance of providing peacekeeping opera- flicts”. As relevant as it is today, the difficulty the ambiguity of mandate language, which tions with “clearly defined mandates, objec- of designing achievable mandates has featured stemmed from compromises required to tives and command structures, adequate in peacekeeping discussions for a long time. build consensus in the Council over peace

4 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Research Report February 2019 The Longstanding Gap between Mandates and Reality operations. The Brahimi report argued for differentiate between sets of priority tasks and for an initial presence on the ground, with time “clear, credible and achievable mandates”. other tasks that are “mutually reinforcing”. for consultations with the host government, It also raised concerns over the disparity These mandates include references to the civil society and, to the extent possible, par- between mandates and resources, especially implementation of secondary tasks as long as ties to the conflict, and for the development of in respect of force levels. The report warned they do not impede the mission’s capacity to detailed assessments with partners. The initial that in advising the Council, the Secretariat implement priority tasks (MINUSMA) and proposals should then be adjusted in light of must not set force and other resource levels request the Secretary-General to reflect the available capabilities and resources, as well as according to what it presumed to be politi- prioritisation in the deployment of the mission discussions among the Council, TCCs/PCCs cally acceptable to the Council, noting that and to align budgetary resources accordingly and the Secretariat to forge a common under- such self-censoring and consequent under- (MONUSCO). In other cases, the reference standing about the mission, “ideally in a fairly resourcing sets the UN up for failure. to priorities is less clear. While prioritisation informal and interactive format”. The critique laid out in the 2015 HIPPO provides useful guidance to the mission lead- Although the Council has embraced the report, which built on the Brahimi report of ership, some argue that retaining most mis- notion of sequencing in principle, it has 15 years earlier and subsequent practice, was sion tasks, even as secondary, fails to address found sequencing difficult to apply to exist- more broad-ranging. It observed that man- the problem posed by “Christmas-tree man- ing missions. While no new UN peacekeeping dates had become lengthier, more specific dates”. In the Declaration, the Secretary-Gen- operation has been established since 2015, a and prescriptive, and at times less realistic, eral committed to proposing to the Council sequenced approach was, in a way, taken in manageable and achievable. It maintained parameters for the sequencing and prioritisa- the design of the UN Mission in Colombia in that “too often, mandates and missions are tion of mandates. The Brahimi report argued 2016 and its successor, the UN Verification produced on the basis of templates instead of for mandates to be sequenced in the initial Mission, established in 2017. Their mandates tailored to support situation-specific political stages of mission establishment to allow the were quite distinct, and they responded to strategies”. The Secretariat and the Coun- Secretariat to identify troops for deployment. different needs expressed by the parties dur- cil have been unable to overcome the so- Brahimi also recommended that the Council ing the negotiation of the peace agreement. called “Christmas-tree mandate” dilemma, keep in draft form any mandating resolution The UN Mission in Colombia was respon- in which identical language for many tasks that contemplated a sizeable force until the sible for the monitoring and verification of routinely appears in mission mandates. This, Secretary-General was able to confirm that the laying-down of arms, and it coordinated the HIPPO report noted, is influenced by such commitments had been received. The a tripartite mechanism that monitored and the lack of restraint of Council members— report warned against deploying partial forces verified adherence to the definitive bilateral and those lobbying them—in pushing spe- incapable of solidifying a fragile peace, which ceasefire and cessation of hostilities agreed cific issues without due consideration given “would first raise and then dash the hopes of a to by the parties. Its successor, the UN Veri- to the prospects of success in performing population engulfed in conflict or recovering fication Mission in Colombia, is mandated certain mandated tasks. The HIPPO report from war and damage the credibility of the to verify the implementation of several mea- called on the Council to resist the inclusion UN as a whole.” sures of the peace agreement, including the of tasks in mandates unless they are founded The HIPPO report, too, proposed a two- political, economic and social reincorpora- upon a clear and convincing rationale, jus- stage, sequenced mandating process, and did tion of the former members of the guerrilla tified by well-identified needs and the fea- so with broader scope, looking beyond the group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de sibility of timely implementation. It warned issue of troop availability. Its recommendation Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP); against those recommendations from the was aimed at helping design more effective, sit- personal and collective security guarantees; Secretary-General that reflect an arbitrage uation-specific missions with realistic, stream- and comprehensive programmes on security of departmental interests rather than genu- lined and prioritised tasks. This would require and protection measures for communities ine prioritisation. Secretariat proposals to be prioritised on the and organisations in conflict-affected areas. In the last few years the Council has basis of “a realistic assessment of political com- It is worth noting that the sequencing of embraced, at least rhetorically, the need to pri- mitments, the comparative advantage of UN the Colombia missions was possible in part oritise tasks within the mandates it authorises. peace operations and others, the conditions on because this approach came from the parties At present, of the 17 peace operations whose the ground and realistic prospects of success.” themselves, on an issue that is before the Coun- mandates are renewed regularly, eight articu- The HIPPO report advocated establishing “an cil at their request. A potential risk of sequenc- late some sort of prioritisation. In some cases, initial mandate with an overall political goal, ing, however, is that existing budgetary prac- the prioritisation is clearer. The mandates of a limited number of initial priority tasks and tices and the current financial climate could the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabili- an explicit planning mandate that requests the mean forgoing permanently some critical tasks zation Mission in the Central African Repub- Secretary-General to return within six months not championed by key member states, such as lic (MINUSCA), the UN Organization Stabi- with a proposal for sequenced activities based human rights monitoring or rule of law-related lization Mission in the Democratic Republic on a limited number of achievable benchmarks tasks, if they are not included from the outset of of the Congo (MONUSCO) and MINUSMA for mission performance.” This would allow UN involvement in a conflict situation.

Security Council Report Research Report February 2019 securitycouncilreport.org 5 Weaknesses in Mandating

Council members have developed working the Council and the review teams, and the fact over implementing Council mandates. Mem- methods that frame the way the Council that the reviews are intended as guidance for ber states involved in the conflict may fail to undertakes mandating. However, some of the Secretary-General, and usually not shared cooperate with the peace operation, TCCs/ these practices are counterproductive and with the Council. It has also become apparent PCCs may not strictly adhere to the mission’s ultimately hamper the outcome that the that the Secretariat continues to experience chain of command but instead respond pri- Council aims to achieve. pressure from member states to shape the marily to their own capitals, and members, findings of some reviews. On 21 September including the P5, may unduly influence the The limited quality of information and 2018, the Council adopted resolution 2436 Secretariat to shape or to block the options analysis which, building on language from the Dec- put before the Council. The work of the Secretariat and the mis- laration of Shared Commitments, requested sions on the ground in conveying frank the Secretary-General to ensure that pertinent The disconnect between mandates and information and analysis to the Council is findings of future reviews be shared with the resources essential to a good mandating process. One Council and with relevant member states, as The disparity between mandates and resourc- of the most quoted lines of the Brahimi appropriate, alongside the Secretary-Gener- es regularly becomes apparent in the negotia- report is that “the Secretariat must tell the al’s integrated analysis, strategic assessment tion of budget resolutions in the Fifth Com- Security Council what it needs to know, not and frank advice. mittee. This happens notwithstanding the fact what it wants to hear”. This was echoed in that the central role of the P5 in the budgetary the HIPPO report, which argued that the Council members have not taken up process—both as members of the committee Secretariat must be frank in its assessments the concept of a spectrum of peace and of the ACABQ, although the members of and not bow to concerns about what the operations the latter are supposed to be appointed in their market can bear but provide options setting One of the signal contributions of the HIP- personal capacity—would be expected to pro- out what can be achieved with varying levels PO report was its call for flexible use of the mote coherence. An important trend over the of resources. full spectrum of UN peace operations. It last few years has been the push from the US Secretary-General’s reports, particular- argued that the sharp distinctions—in bud- and others to reduce the peacekeeping budget. ly those before a mandate renewal, are key gets and management—between peacekeep- In addition to financial pressure, some Coun- to the Council’s decision-making processes. ing operations and SPMs should give way cil members have used the budget process to Over the years, Council members have com- to a continuum of responses and smoother address substantive issues. Recently, Russia plained that the reports, which mostly con- transitions between different phases of peace and China, for example, have let language in sist of fact-based narratives, lack strategic operations. Despite this recommendation, the Council negotiations pass regarding human focus and could be a better source of analy- distinction between peacekeeping operations rights or the protection of women while lead- sis and recommendations at a critical time. and SPMs appears as sharp as ever, with no ing the charge to significantly defund some It is common for these reports to present momentum towards a change in the terminol- of those positions in the Fifth Committee, a options for the Council even when only one ogy used in the Council and the C34 or the process that sparks less attention and media option is manifestly feasible, and there have relevant funding mechanisms (as discussed coverage than Council negotiations. been instances of influential Council mem- earlier, SPMs are funded through the UN’s At $1.11 billion, the 2018-2019 approved bers applying pressure to shape the content regular budget and peacekeeping operations budget for MONUSCO was a full $38.8 mil- of these reports. through their own support account). As far lion less than the Secretary-General’s propos- After the Council started requesting inde- as the Secretariat is concerned, although the al, and $32 million below the ACABQ recom- pendent strategic reviews of some peace oper- review of the peace and security architecture mendation. Although it is unusual for Council ations in 2017 at the initiative of the US, the led to the establishment of a Department of briefers to raise the impact of budgetary deci- Secretariat itself began to commission reviews Peace Operations (DPO) in January 2019, the sions on their ability to lead on the imple- of longstanding missions. These reviews con- management of field-based SPMs (such as mentation of mandates, a rare example of this sisted of a small inter-agency team of UN staff, in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya) remains with took place after the new MONUSCO budget led by a former or current senior UN offi- the Department of Political and Peacebuild- was adopted. On 26 July 2018, MONUSCO cial. In most cases they included a “red team” ing Affairs (DPPA). UN staffers backstopping head Leila Zerrougui told the Council that tasked with challenging the assumptions all peace operations are co-located, however, the budgetary reduction “further compounds underpinning the review in the early stages which is expected eventually to help overcome the impact on our operational ability follow- of the process. The independent strategic old mindsets with turf-related tensions and ing last year’s budget cuts. I do not mention reviews were designed with the stated aim of template approaches. that to make a plea for more resources; we examining in depth the conditions for success all know the new financial reality facing all of each operation and informing a strategic National interest can trump mandate peacekeeping missions. I highlight it because dialogue with member states on the efficien- implementation it is important that we collectively understand cy, role and perspectives of UN peacekeeping. Despite their obligation to accept and carry that while MONUSCO’s resources continue However, some Council members have been out the decisions of the Council, member to shrink, its mandate remains the same and frustrated by the limited engagement between states may prioritise their national interest expectations only continue to grow”.

6 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Research Report February 2019 Weaknesses in Mandating

Sometimes the disconnect between man- the Council, upon its request, in particular may act as co-penholders, when it is deemed date and resources is already clear before the ahead of relevant mandate discussions. It also to add value, taking into account as appro- mission’s budget is discussed in the Fifth Com- encourages it to continue to align its work priate the expertise and/or contributions of mittee. For example, resolution 2448 added with the Council’s calendar and relevant Council members on the subjects”. The issue a new task to the mandate of MINUSCA, to meetings (a practice that the PBC has sought of co-penholders is raised regularly in work- provide limited logistical support to the armed to adhere to following a 2016 working meth- ing methods discussions, with the idea of an forces of the Central African Republic (CAR), ods review). The PBC and its country-specif- E10 member joining the P3 in that task. In while stressing that the mission was to perform ic configurations (CSCs) are considered well mid-2018, Russia submitted to the Informal this task “by reallocating approved resources”. placed to convene meetings with internation- Working Group on Documentation and Oth- al financial institutions, the UN country team, er Procedural Questions a draft that would Limited institutional cross-pollination regional organisations, and civil society dur- establish an annual review of penholder/ Despite the collective nature of peace opera- ing the months preceding mandate renewals, co-penholder arrangements to extend those tions and the need to keep a wide array of but this cannot be achieved without allow- responsibilities to all Council members. On stakeholders on board, the mandating pro- ing for the time and space for such strate- 13 November 2018, the E10 and incoming cess does not encourage engagement with gic advice to be developed. Although there five Council members sent a letter to the other actors, even those closely affiliated are good practices in this regard, such as the Council president emphasising the need for with the Council, such as the Military Staff Council-PBC relationship during transitions fair burden-sharing and an equal distribution Committee (MSC), the Peacebuilding Com- on Liberia and Sierra Leone, engagement of work among all Council members. The sig- mission (PBC), and the chair of the relevant between the Council and relevant CSCs natories advocated making better use of the sanctions committee. Although only the could be sought more systematically in criti- expertise developed by the chairs of sanc- P5 are members of the MSC, all Council cal moments regarding, for example, Burun- tions committees by automatically enlisting members’ military advisors participate in its di, CAR, Guinea-Bissau and the Sahel. An them as co-penholders on the related dossiers, biweekly meetings. The MSC schedules rele- important development occurred in October should they so wish. In January 2019, several vant mission-specific meetings ahead of man- 2018 when Morocco, the chair of the CAR co-penholder arrangements were introduced, date renewals, but it works more as a forum CSC, wrote to the Council after a consulta- including Germany and the UK for Libya for military-related discussions than fulfilling tive process presenting observations for the sanctions and UNAMID. any type of collective advisory role. While not Council’s consideration before MINUSCA’s intended to work in this way, the MSC could mandate renewal. PBC and CSC chairs, par- Difficulties in operationalising the be used as a sounding board, particularly ticularly those who carry out visiting missions primacy of politics when the Council considers adjustments to regularly, could also convey inputs ahead of The HIPPO report emphasised the cen- troop and police ceilings or mission mandates. mandate renewals through informal meetings trality of political solutions in the design The PBC was created in 2005 as an advi- with Council members. Since 2012, Council of peace operations, and stressed that the sory body to the Council, the General Assem- members have organised an annual Informal political strategies that underpin peace oper- bly and the Economic and Social Council to Interactive Dialogue (IID) with the PBC, ations should enjoy the support of a united maintain attention to post-conflict countries usually on thematic issues. Security Council as well as of regional enti- and help prevent their relapse into conflict. ties and others vested in ending a conflict. However, it has struggled to carry out this The role of the penholder and its The Brahimi report had already stressed function and provide relevant advice to these limitations the importance of the Council’s translat- organs. Recent years have seen renewed inter- In recent years, the P3 have divided most situ- ing its statements into action, saying that est in enhancing and fulfilling its advisory role, ation-specific agenda items among themselves, it was “incumbent that Council members particularly to the Council. each taking the role of the so-called “penhold- and the membership at large breathe life The Declaration included a commit- er”. This informal arrangement, often pre- into the words that they produce”. The ment to “strong coordination, coherence sented as a way to promote continuity and Council has underlined that the primacy of and cooperation” between the Council and efficiency, goes beyond the drafting of Coun- politics should be the hallmark of the UN’s the PBC during peacekeeping mandates, as cil outcomes. It tends to discourage members approach to the resolution of conflict, includ- appropriate. On 18 December 2018, the from taking initiatives on country situations ing through mediation, the monitoring of Council adopted a presidential statement for which they do not hold the pen, and when ceasefires, and assistance in implementing on the PBC’s advisory role to the Security new crises emerge, elected members often peace accords. A 14 May 2018 presidential Council on peacebuilding and sustaining expect one of the P3 to take the lead. Further- statement stressed that political solutions peace. The statement was drafted by Sweden, more, penholders themselves can be reluctant should guide the design and deployment of which served for two years as the coordina- to acknowledge negative trends in countries UN peacekeeping operations, that they are tor of Council-PBC stock-taking sessions. within their sphere of influence. the cornerstone of mandate implementa- The presidential statement encourages the According to the 2017 iteration of Note tion and remain key to reaching sustainable PBC to present concise, targeted, context- 507, which compiles the Council’s working peace and security. In that statement, the specific and applicable recommendations to methods, “more than one Council member Council recognised “the need to weigh the

Security Council Report Research Report February 2019 securitycouncilreport.org 7 Weaknesses in Mandating full range of responses, when addressing a the table below shows, the Council rarely not voted in favour of a particular renewal situation which may endanger international adopts non-unanimous resolutions to renew (UNFICYP). The non-unanimous votes are peace and security, and to deploy UN peace- mission mandates, although the year 2018 rooted in substantive disagreements, but in keeping missions and pursue peacebuilding was an outlier, with four such examples. explaining their votes, Council members not efforts only as an accompaniment, not as In general, considerable effort goes into supporting the draft in blue have recurrent- an alternative, to a political strategy that reaching consensus. In some cases, mem- ly expressed frustration with the penhold- addresses, among other elements, the root bers explain their abstentions (or dissent- er’s handling of negotiations. As the table causes of conflict”. Despite overall support ing votes by elected members) by criticis- reflects, most mandating resolutions that for this concept, Council members have ing the drafts in blue as unbalanced (such were not adopted unanimously were drafted struggled to make it operationally coherent. as in the case of MINURSO), or as exert- by the US. Although the Council has a broad range of ing undue pressure on the host government The last mandate resolution to be vetoed tools at its disposal—including political mes- (UNMISS). In December 2016, there was a was the two-week technical rollover of the saging, imposing or threatening to impose rare abstention of three permanent Coun- mandate of the UN Observer Mission in sanctions, conducting visiting missions and cil members (France, Russia and the UK) Georgia in June 2009, which was vetoed by directly interacting with the main stakehold- who questioned the terms under which the Russia, with four members abstaining. In ers—these are not deployed always tactically mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia was exerting its leverage the Council is also handi- in pursuit of the overall political goal. renewed before its closure. Although unusu- capped when unanimous support is shal- Council members have historically val- al in mandating resolutions, Council mem- low and glosses over profound divergences ued unanimity in mandating resolutions. As bers close to a conflict party have at times among Council members.

NON-UNANIMOUS MANDATING RESOLUTIONS SINCE 2010

Mission Penholder Resolution Vote Meeting Record

MINUSCA France Resolution 2448 of 13 December 13 in favour, 2 abstentions (China, Russia) S/PV.8422 2018

MINURSO US Resolution 2440 of 31 October 12 in favour, 3 abstentions (Bolivia, Ethiopia, S/PV.8387 2018 Russia)

MINURSO US Resolution 2414 of 27 April 2018 12 in favour, 3 abstentions (China, Ethiopia, S/PV.8246 Russia)

MINUJUSTH US Resolution 2410 of 10 April 2018 13 in favour, 2 abstentions (China, Russia) S/PV.8226

UNMIL US Resolution 2333 of 23 December 12 in favour, 3 abstentions (France, Russia and S/PV.7851 2016 the UK)

UNMISS US Resolution 2304 of 12 August 2016 11 in favour, 4 abstentions (China, Egypt, Russia, S/PV.7754 Venezuela)

MINURSO US Resolution 2285 of 29 April 2016 10 in favour, 2 against (Uruguay, Venezuela), 3 S/PV.7684 abstentions (Angola, New Zealand, Russia)

UNMISS US Resolution 2252 of 15 December 13 in favour, 2 abstentions (Russia and Venezuela S/PV.7581 2015

UNMISS US Resolution 2241 of 9 October 2015 13 in favour, 2 abstentions (Russia, Venezuela) S/PV.7532

UNFICYP US Resolution 2114 of 30 July 2013 13 in favour, 2 abstentions (Azerbaijan, Pakistan) S/PV.7014

UNFICYP US Resolution 2089 of 24 January 14 in favour, 1 abstention (Azerbaijan) S/PV.6908 2013

UNAMID UK Resolution 2063 of 31 July 2012 14 in favour, 1 abstention (Azerbaijan) S/PV.6819

UNFICYP US Resolution 2058 of 19 July 2012 13 in favour, 2 abstentions (Azerbaijan, Pakistan) S/PV.6809

UNFICYP US Resolution 1953 of 14 December 14 in favour, 1 against (Turkey) S/PV.6445 2010

UNFICYP US Resolution 1930 of 15 June 2010 14 in favour, 1 against (Turkey) S/PV.6339

8 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Research Report February 2019 Weaknesses in Mandating

Navigating relations with host states commitments with the government and other response to ground-level changes. Mandates One of the main features of discussions about relevant actors. are almost always reviewed at the end of their peace operations in the Council is the chal- The HIPPO report argued for the develop- cycles, irrespective of developments on the lenge of securing host-state consent and ment of compacts between the UN and the ground. Even though important factors may deploying operations in environments in host government as a package of measures change (for example, the unravelling of the which government-affiliated forces are among to be reviewed together with mandate renew- political process or the emergence of new those targeting civilians. One example was res- als. A 2015/2016 DPKO initiative to develop threats to civilians), Council members may olution 2303, adopted on 29 July 2016 with compacts between peacekeeping operations not wish to reassess mid-cycle the appropri- four abstentions. While the resolution did not and host governments as a way to secure com- ateness of mandates. mandate a new mission, it provided for the mon understanding of and commitment to There are cases where the deterioration of deployment of a police component to Burun- mandates and status-of-mission agreements a particular situation has made a change in di which was never deployed, given the gov- has not been actively pursued. In June 2018, mandate unavoidable, as in South Sudan in ernment’s opposition. Government hostility the Secretary-General proposed the devel- December 2013. Mandates are also amended towards peace operations, which can escalate opment of a Pact for Peace in Mali, building and renewed off-cycle when there is a new in critical times, has been a serious impedi- on recommendations from an independent peace agreement whose implementation the ment in recent years in Darfur, the DRC and strategic review of MINUSMA. The review peace operation will be required to support, South Sudan, among other theatres. had proposed such a pact between the gov- again as in South Sudan in October 2015. The Council could seek more active ernment of Mali, the Security Council, the An example mentioned above is the push by engagement with host state representatives, UN and international partners, under which the US for shorter mandates (six months as which formally rarely goes beyond the lat- assistance would be associated with progress opposed to the usual one year) in situations ter’s participation in briefings in line with on clear benchmarks, including good gover- where they feel that they can pressure the par- rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, nance and political reforms. While the Coun- ties in a conflict to reengage in the political after which Council members often with- cil requested the Secretary-General to take process. However, these shorter mandates draw into closed consultations. In order to appropriate steps to allow for the swift con- also add pressure to mission administration address this issue, the Declaration reflects clusion of the pact in resolution 2423 on 28 and planning and fuel insecurity among the the commitment “to consider options for June 2018, it made no reference to its own mission ranks, making it difficult to recruit further direct engagement between host role, or that of international partners, in the new staff. In most cases, rather than focusing governments and the Security Council”. In pact’s creation or implementation. on frequent mandate adjustments, it would addition to more direct and interactive dis- appear more important that the Council’s cussion with government representatives in Council responsiveness to changing understanding of a situation stays up to date, New York, Council members could conduct realities on the ground and that the Special Representative or Special visiting missions before a peace operation is There is a question as to whether the Coun- Envoy feels that the mandate covers the nec- established to discuss initial expectations and cil should be asked to review mandates in essary bases at any given time.

Action for Peacekeeping: An Opportunity to Re-engage

In March 2018, the Secretary-General by member states, there were extensive dis- protection, and partnership with region- announced the need for “a quantum leap cussions to make sure that key stakeholders, al organisations. It seems that the process, in collective engagement” on peacekeeping. including TCCs/PCCs and permanent mem- which was received with interest by mem- Soon afterwards, the Secretariat asked ten bers of the Security Council, would endorse ber states, was also shaped by their interest member states to lead broad consultations it. On 25 September 2018, the Secretary- in protecting their different spheres of influ- on five priority areas: politics (Côte d’Ivoire General convened a high-level meeting on ence (whether in the Council or the C34) and and the UK), partnerships (Ethiopia and Action for Peacekeeping in the margins of avoided commitments to significant innova- France), performance (the Netherlands and the general debate of the General Assembly, tion. A reference to the Secretary-General’s Rwanda), people (Bangladesh and Uruguay), which included the participation of several commitment to report all caveats and their and peacebuilding (Brazil and Indonesia). heads of state and government. operational impact to the appropriate UN Member states’ consultations led to the The process, which was aimed at achiev- organs was deleted from the final draft. adoption of a Declaration of Shared Com- ing the highest possible number of endorse- The Declaration includes the commit- mitments prepared by the UN Secretariat ments, generally avoided controversial ele- ment “to provide clear, focused, sequenced, and endorsed by 151 member states and four ments by building on agreed language and prioritized and achievable mandates by the organisations by the end of 2018. Although broad statements. This was the case with its Security Council matched by appropriate the Declaration was not directly negotiated language on the use of force, human rights resources; to seek measures to enable greater

Security Council Report Research Report February 2019 securitycouncilreport.org 9 Action for Peacekeeping: An Opportunity to Re-engage coherence between mandates and resources; to foreground the role of the C34 in the reform initiative and focus on parameters for and to support the implementation of Secu- peacekeeping policy-making landscape. Dur- the mandating process, soon faced opposition rity Council resolutions through bilateral and ing the negotiation of a 14 May 2018 Coun- from Russia and the US. Russia refused to multilateral engagements”. This provides an cil presidential statement on peacekeeping engage on the draft, reiterating concerns with opportunity for Council members and other operations, a source of division was the level some of the content of the Declaration. The member states to undertake a much-needed of detail in the statement regarding tasks to US opposed the effort, arguing that it would reflection on the mandating process. improve peacekeeping. Another illustration limit the freedom of manoeuvre of penhold- Follow-up language in the Declaration of these dynamics was the letter that Russia ers in carrying out their duties. Although was intentionally vague, leaving it up to mem- sent to the Secretary-General endorsing the elected members expressed support for the ber states to determine how to translate these Declaration of Shared Commitments while initiative, other permanent members also commitments into positions and practices in expressing reservations over the inclusion of raised questions about the need for a reso- the relevant UN bodies (the General Assem- language tying human rights efforts to the lution on the mandating process, and the bly and the Security Council). The Decla- protection of civilians and using for that pur- effort was put on hold at the end of the year, ration includes the commitment to meet pose “all necessary means”, and references to when the Netherlands left the Council. Côte periodically “in relevant formats to review engagement with civil society and the local d’Ivoire has committed to continue pursu- progress, including at field-level”. What this population. In the end, government positions ing this initiative in 2019, and other Council will mean in practice has not been spelled on peacekeeping, while being justified on members may join the effort. out, and is likely to depend on committed institutional grounds, reflect tensions around With almost universal endorsement and Council and C34 members initiating dedi- the principles of national sovereignty and non- buy-in at the highest levels of a broad range cated discussions. interference, which are often at the forefront of governments, the Secretariat has been able This will not be easy, given that peacekeep- of Council discussions. Perversely, its current to conceive, through the Declaration, a new ing discussions are readily bogged down by inefficiencies make the system more appealing basis for a conversation. Notwithstanding its institutional tensions particularly between to those wary of international interventions. broad support, the fate of the draft resolution the C34 and the Council. The annual nego- A draft resolution on mandating was cir- on mandating illustrates that there are still tiation process in the C34 is an example of the culated by Côte d’Ivoire and the Netherlands significant differences among member states. change-resistant policies of some key mem- in mid-November 2018. The draft, which The ultimate impact of the Declaration will ber states, and Council negotiations have was originally intended to welcome the Dec- depend on whether member states treat it as been affected by the wish of some members laration and the “Action for Peacekeeping” a departure point.

Improving the Mandating Process

Much can be done to make the mandating the way business has been conducted and resolutions that state more clearly in resolu- process more inclusive and results-oriented. facilitate a fresh process. tions the strategic objectives of peacekeep- Although a resolution on mandating would ing operations (including MONUSCO, send an important signal, Council members The need for strategic discussions on MINUSMA and MINUSCA). This has not have the possibility of enhancing the pro- objectives rather than tasks been systematic, and the focus on tasks is cess with every mandate renewal—that is, Well-established mandate cycles provide a unchanged. as often as 20 times a year. Before the cur- tentative timeframe that can be used to forge In general, the mandating process could rent trend of mandate inflation, the Council a common strategic approach among Council benefit from a discussion among all Coun- was able at times to craft focused and effec- members ahead of these renewals, but such cil members—and others—about the over- tive mandates with realistic objectives and exercises are uncommon. Most discussions all direction of the mission before the proper a clear political direction, as in the cases among all Council members regarding man- negotiation of the renewal resolution. Before of the UN Preventive Deployment Force in date renewals happen only after a first draft beginning to negotiate language in drafts, the the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo- resolution has been circulated by the penhold- Council, working with the Secretariat, could nia and the UN Transitional Administration er to the full Council. The time pressure gen- start the mandating process by addressing— in East Timor. erated by the pattern of late circulation to all and as far as possible agreeing on—the main The challenge is to learn from what works Council members raises barriers to significant objective(s) for the mission. The scripted and rein in unhelpful dynamics. The modi- reflection. The fact that much of the subse- quality of consultations, and their closed fications proposed below would not require quent negotiation takes place over email or in nature, limit their potential to be used in this formal decisions or lengthy negotiations but bilateral discussions also tends to preclude the regard. Strategic discussions could help shift rather the leadership of a few Council mem- collective development of strategic thinking. the current focus on delineating tasks, or out- bers, permanent or not, willing to question Penholders have led a recent trend in puts, to intended outcomes. A more strategic

10 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Research Report February 2019 Improving the Mandating Process articulation of objectives would spark ques- negotiate drafts, Council members are choos- discussions throughout the year. In the same tions about how every mandated task and ing to ignore what could be a critical source way in which other subsidiary organs of the mission component supports the achieve- of feedback and new ideas. Council and the C34 of the Fifth Commit- ment of those aims. Higher-level engagement tee organise field trips, the Working Group early in the process would be needed, with Increase Council members’ on Peacekeeping Operations could organise permanent representatives or their depu- understanding of how language an annual familiarisation trip to visit several ties working with senior Secretariat staff on translates into action operations. Arrangements should be put in strategic objectives before Council experts A better understanding of how mandates place to allow all Council members to take negotiate the draft text. Ahead of the annual are implemented could result in restraint by part, irrespective of their financial capabilities. session of the C34 in February-March, the Council members in pushing specific issues Secretariat prepares a guiding document, for when disconnected from operational con- Changing the routines to prioritise better information purposes only, which includes siderations. Most Council interaction with The drafting process often starts by updat- mostly technical suggestions regarding lan- mission-based actors is with the head of mis- ing the previous mandating resolution. Given guage. While the negotiation of the report of sion and, once a year, the heads of military the short timeframe in which negotiations are the C34 remains a responsibility of member and police components; engagement with the held (usually with initial discussion among states, this approach, which is considered heads of other mission components is limited. permanent members and late circulation to helpful ahead of the negotiations, could be Between 2012 and 2017, Council members the full membership), there is a tendency to replicated ahead of mandate renewals. held four Arria-formula meetings with the preserve already “agreed language” on issues heads of human rights components, which susceptible to controversy and to add new Allow more time to negotiate mandates allowed an informal exchange to strengthen paragraphs as proposed by Council members, Elected and sometimes also permanent mem- understanding of how human rights compo- without deleting provisions that are no longer bers complain that penholders allot too little nents contribute to the implementation of relevant. Council members could consider time for substantive contributions to a new missions’ mandates. Another forum for bet- starting the mandating process by analysing draft. Many countries seek inputs to draft ter understanding mandate implementation the old text with input from the Secretariat mandate resolutions from the permanent is the Informal Expert Group on the Pro- and assessing the contribution of mandate mission in New York, departments in the tection of Civilians: at its meetings, OCHA, elements to the overall objective of the mis- capital (in the foreign affairs and defence which acts as the expert group’s secretariat, sion. This exercise could take place before a ministries) and embassies in the country or presents possible language for inclusion in an first draft is circulated. On the basis of advice region concerned. It is unrealistic to expect upcoming mandate renewal, explaining the from the Secretariat and the missions on the the process of consolidating their inputs to rationale behind different language propos- ground, Council members would be able to happen in just a few days. als. The Informal Expert Group on Women, develop a multi-year frame of reference that Note 507 includes provisions on the early Peace and Security has also proved a useful flags, from the outset, anticipated needs of circulation of drafts and the holding of in- forum ahead of mandate renewals and Coun- the host country and the projected adjust- person meetings to negotiate drafts. Most of cil visiting missions. Council members could ments over time to the mandate of the peace this language was only included in the third, enhance interaction with senior mission lead- operation deployed there. The financial pro- most recent, version of the note. It establish- ership, including protection advisers, to rein- cess should also be sufficiently responsive to es that the negotiation of Council outcomes force their understanding of the impact of prevent the protective front-loading of posts “should be carried out in an inclusive manner mandate wording on the ground. and resources for fear that if not budgeted at that will allow participation of all members Some thematic issues have champions that the outset, they will prove difficult to add later. of the Council”, encourages the penholder prioritise their mainstreaming and general or co-penholders to circulate drafts “as early advancement. A Council member, or group Using benchmarks to assess progress as possible”, and encourages them to present of members, could assume a similar role with against objectives and discuss the draft with all members of the regard to mandating, and work with the pen- Benchmarks have been a useful tool for pacing Council “in at least one round of informal holders to identify best practices. This could and evaluating the work of peace operations. consultations or informal-informals”. This also help maintain consistency on mandating, On several occasions, missions have used the has not materialised sufficiently in practice. which is handled by diplomats covering the elaboration of benchmarks to agree on shared Penholders complain that, absent a dead- different country-specific files. objectives with the host state and other local line by which the draft needs to be adopt- The Working Group on Peacekeeping partners and develop a joint vision regarding ed (which is often the mandate’s expiration Operations, which is chaired by an elected the different actors’ roles and responsibili- date), negotiations would go on forever, with member, can play a role in increasing Coun- ties. The New Horizon peacekeeping reform the risk of opening important aspects of the cil members’ understanding of how language initiative in 2009 highlighted the importance draft to criticism. The short timeframe makes translates into action. However, the impact of distinguishing between core benchmarks all Council members pick their battles and of the Working Group is highly dependent for which peacekeepers are responsible not focus unnecessarily on detail. However, on the engagement of its chair, and its role and broader targets that reflect wider prog- by accepting artificially tight timelines to is often limited to the holding of thematic ress in peace consolidation and rely on the

Security Council Report Research Report February 2019 securitycouncilreport.org 11 Improving the Mandating Process performance of others. Benchmarks have also not only ahead of the mandate renewal but one of the recommendations in the Brahimi been used to inform transition processes and throughout the mandate cycle. report regarding the need to institutionalise mission exit strategies, even if these decisions The issue of the Council’s sustained the advice from TCCs to the Council, includ- are ultimately driven by political and finan- attention and political engagement beyond ing during the mandate formulation process. cial considerations. Even though most peace the mandate renewal is especially relevant The Working Group became a forum operations have developed benchmarks that where a UN peacekeeping operation does where Council members could discuss peace- were at some point endorsed by the Security not have the lead in facilitating the political keeping issues, along with TCCs (and later Council, Council members have not been process. The situations in the CAR and South PCCs). All C34 member states (154) are systematic in using them to assess progress Sudan, for example, underline the need for invited to participate in its meetings. or redefining them as a situation evolves. the Council to increase its formal and infor- The Working Group’s impact has been mal interaction with those driving the peace greater when its discussions, which are more Sustained attention and political process. While the Special Envoy for South often thematic than country-specific, link engagement beyond the mandate Sudan of the Intergovernmental Authority on strategically with Council discussions and renewal Development (IGAD) briefs the Council reg- decision-making processes. While the Work- The Council has been able to have a positive ularly, this has not been the case as much with ing Group has been involved in the strate- impact on conflict situations when it deliv- other regional mediators involved in the CAR gic and action-oriented discussion of issues ered unified messages directly to the parties, or Sudan-South Sudan. Given the Council’s (including the negotiation of resolution 1353 either through visiting missions or demarch- observance of strict rules limiting the par- and a Note by the President of the Council es by its president, or to the public more ticipation of non-UN officials in consulta- in 2001), it has not done so recently. Mem- generally, in press statements or comments tions, Council members could hold informal bers could consider holding meetings of the to the press. It could invest more effort into interactive dialogues with those involved in Working Group ahead of mandate renewals, communicating the outcome of Council dis- facilitating peace processes, including mem- as was done when, under the chairmanship cussions effectively to the parties, provided ber states. Sometimes Council members have of Senegal, the Working Group held a meet- there is a common message. In recent years, issued invitations but scheduling has proven ing focused on challenges in implement- several Council members have tried to pro- challenging, it took several attempts to dis- ing MINUSMA’s mandate on 8 June 2017, mote the idea that every meeting held in con- cuss progress in the political process in the ahead of the mandate renewal at the end of sultations during their presidency conclude CAR with AU Commissioner for Peace and that month. with some press elements that, although Security Smail Chergui in early 2019. Discussing peacekeeping issues in a informal, can be agreed quickly at the meet- broadened forum would also help respond ing and are later delivered by the president of Revisiting the concept of Groups of to the problem of the persistent gap between the Council at the media stakeout. Doing so Friends those who decide on the mandates of peace means that they are broadcast worldwide and Groups of Friends emerged in the mid-1970s operations and carry their financial burden can be accessed via UN video archives. This as constellations of countries both inside and those who deploy the troops and police and other efforts to make sure that key mes- and outside the Council that were involved for their implementation. The current con- sages reach their intended audience could directly in peace efforts or in the implemen- text could be an opportunity for strength- be incorporated into the Council’s practice tation of peace agreements. Although some ening engagement with the wider member- more systematically. of these groups were divided along the lines ship. As an example, the Council could use The pressure of time leads Council mem- of the conflict itself or favoured one party to its Working Group to draw lessons on how it bers, once the mandate resolution is adopted, the conflict, they could also be helpful in pro- agrees on strategic objectives for peacekeep- to shift their attention immediately to other viding international backing for peace efforts ing operations, designs mandates, and moni- pressing issues. It might be helpful, rather and linking up the Council’s work with that tors the capacity to achieve them. The Work- than considering adoptions an end in them- of other, outside, actors. Learning from his- ing Group could submit recommendations selves, to view them as a stage in a process. torical examples and the current limitations for the Council’s consideration after engaging Ideally, the Council would consistently exer- of the few Groups of Friends that still discuss with a broad range of actors, including Sec- cise its collective leverage, and that of its draft resolutions, Council members could retariat officials and TCCs/PCCs. At times of members, throughout the lifespan of peace rethink how modified Groups of Friends tensions between the C34 and the Council, operations using a variety of formal and configurations, including regional actors, this could be a useful bridging exercise. informal mechanisms at its disposal, such as particularly engaged Council members, and For this strengthened role to be possi- the ones mentioned above. Once a mandat- other member states, or neutral actors, could ble, measures could be taken to promote ing resolution is adopted, Council members be mobilised in support of political solutions. continuity in the Working Group, whose could also allocate time to discuss the con- work is largely influenced by the varying crete steps that they can take, both bilaterally A strengthened role for the Working capacity of its rotating chairmanship (usu- and multilaterally, to support its implemen- Group on Peacekeeping Operations ally an elected member which contributes tation. Similarly, formal and informal meet- The Working Group on Peacekeeping Opera- significantly to peacekeeping). This could ings with TCCs/PCCs should be convened tions was established in 2001 as a result of be achieved through a co-chair or chair/

12 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Research Report February 2019 Improving the Mandating Process vice-chair system in which E10 members Council only had access to a summary of sustain the progress achieved. In integrated with non-contiguous terms overlap for one findings and selected recommendations con- missions, the role of the triple-hatted Deputy year with their predecessor and successor. veyed by the Secretary-General. Despite the Special Representative/Resident Coordina- Although this would constitute a departure general interest of Council members in the tor/Humanitarian Coordinator is central to from past practice it could be particularly outcomes of subsequent reviews, whether continuity. The UN country team is expected effective in increasing the capacity of the requested by the Council or initiated by the to play a more significant role when a mission Working Group and its relevance. Secretariat, this type of interaction has not finishes its work. Recognising that the Coun- been replicated. Council members could dis- cil does not mandate UN agencies, funds and Devising a systematic way to address cuss with the Secretary-General what kinds of programmes, the interaction between the strategic reviews information, analysis and options developed Council and country teams is nonetheless One of the early manifestations of the cur- by external reviews are pertinent to feed into limited in light of their significant investments. rent push for peacekeeping reform was the the Council’s deliberation on mandates. It is unclear how the reform of the develop- US request for independent strategic reviews ment system, particularly regarding the role of several peace operations. Most reports of Encouraging coordination with the UN of Resident Coordinators, will affect this reviews sought by the Council were shared country team process, but interaction with country teams with it. On 7 February 2018, Council mem- In the current context of budgetary pres- could usefully be deeper than the usual rela- bers held an informal interactive dialogue sure and with the recent termination of mis- tively short meeting during Council visiting with the lead consultants for the external sions in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia and pres- missions. Whether through existing channels assessment of the structure and staffing of the sure to close UNAMID, MINUJUSTH and of communication, such as the PBC, or new UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) MONUSCO, the Council routinely refers ones, members of the Council could make and related resources. A representative of the to the need to develop exit strategies. Mis- an effort to engage formally and informally Department of Political Affairs also partici- sions have been encouraged to map out exist- with representatives of the UN country team, pated in this discussion. In cases where the ing capacities, lay out financial and political particularly as transitions get under way. review was initiated by the Secretariat, the challenges, and identify courses of action to

Time to Deliver

This is a critical time for peace operations. Better mandates and better mandating realistic and achievable mandates. Mandat- As multilateral tools to address intractable processes will not by themselves solve the very ing is thus to be considered a core element conflicts come under increased scrutiny, it significant challenges that peace operations of mission performance. is vital to sharpen uptake of what works and face today. However, they can contribute to The present report has discussed how deepen action on what needs improvement. addressing the existing divisions between the Council’s own working methods can Despite marked divisions on other files, those designing mandates and those imple- be a hurdle for the emergence of collective peace operations still represent an area of menting them and bridge the gap between thinking and results-based decision-making. broad agreement for the Security Council, at expectations and reality. An investment in transforming existing prac- least on the surface, with perceived successes Revising the mandating process should tices could lead to significant returns if the including the recent closure and transition be a core element of the current push to Council is able to become more accountable of several operations. improve the effectiveness of peace opera- towards those in need and those deployed to The Declaration of Shared Commitments tions. With recent efforts to reform peace implement its mandates. For this to happen, on UN Peacekeeping Operations includes operations has come a broadening of the the Council would need to be willing to exert commitments to provide clear, focused, concept of performance. This was tradi- political leverage throughout the lifecycle of sequenced, prioritised and achievable man- tionally used to refer to the capabilities and peace operations and become more strategic dates; enable greater coherence between man- preparedness mainly of uniformed per- in prioritising mission objectives. In doing so, dates and resources; and support the imple- sonnel, but over the last few years, TCCs/ the Council will send a strong signal to TCCs/ mentation of Council resolutions through PCCs have promoted an understanding PCCs, the Secretariat and host states about bilateral and multilateral engagements. Those of the concept of performance, whether in its seriousness regarding reform and contrib- three critical actions will require the exertion the C34 or the Council, that includes the ute to rebuilding trust in the mandating pro- of political will by Council members. work of the Council in crafting well-defined, cess along the way.

Security Council Report Research Report February 2019 securitycouncilreport.org 13 Selected UN Documents on Peace Operations

Security Council Resolutions Secretary-General’s Reports Note by the President of the Security Council S/RES/2436 (21 September 2018) was on peace- A/72/573 (3 November 2017) was on the implemen- S/2017/507 (30 August 2017) was a compendium of keeping performance. tation of the recommendations of the Special Com- the Council’s working methods. mittee on Peacekeeping Operations. S/RES/2378 (20 September 2017) was on UN Security Council Meeting Records peacekeeping reform. S/2017/454 (26 May 2017) was on options for S/PV.8360 (21 September 2018) was the meeting at authorisation and support for AU peace support S/RES/1353 (13 June 2001) included a statement which resolution 2436 was adopted. operations. of principles on cooperation with troop- and police- S/PV.8349 (12 September 2018) was a debate on contributing countries. S/2015/682 (2 September 2015) was on the imple- peacekeeping reform during the US presidency. mentation of the HIPPO report. Security Council Presidential Statements S/PV.8218 (28 March 2018) was an open debate on S/2000/809 (21 August 2000) was the Brahimi S/PRST/2018/20 (18 December 2018) was on the peacekeeping, chaired by the Prime Minister of the Report. PBC’s advisory role to the Council. Netherlands, Mark Rutte. Security Council Letters S/PRST/2018/10 (14 May 2018) was on peacekeep- S/PV.8051 (20 September 2017) was a high-level ing operations. S/2018/1024 (13 November 2018) was a letter by the open debate entitled “Reform of UN peacekeeping: E10 and the five incoming Council members empha- implementation and follow-up”, organised by Ethiopia. S/PRST/2017/27 (21 December 2017) laid out the ele- sising the need for fair burden-sharing and an equal ments related to peacebuilding and sustaining peace S/PV.8033 (29 August 2017) was an open debate distribution of work among all Council members. to be considered when reviewing the mandates and organised by Egypt on UN peacekeeping operations configuration of peacekeeping missions. S/2018/934 (18 October 2018) was from the chair of and their potential contribution to the overarching the CAR CSC, Ambassador Omar Hilale of Morocco, goal of sustaining peace. S/PRST/2015/26 (31 December 2015) underscored containing observations for the Council. the importance for peacekeeping of sustained S/PV.7918 (6 April 2017) was a briefing on peace- cooperation among the Council, the Secretariat and S/2018/815 (31 August 2018) was from Russia keeping operations held at the initiative of the US. TCCs/PCCs. addressed to the Secretary-General on the “Dec- General Assembly Documents laration of Shared Commitments on United Nations S/PRST/2015/22 (25 November 2015) took note of Peacekeeping Operations”. A/72/19 (15 March 2018) was the final report of the the recommendations of the HIPPO report and the C34. Secretary-General’s implementation report. S/2015/446 (17 June 2015) was the HIPPO report.

Useful Additional Resources

A New Partnership Agenda. Charting a New Horizon Richard Gowan, The Politics of A4P, Challenges The Security Council and UN Peace Operations: for UN Peacekeeping, Department of Peacekeeping Forum Policy Brief 2019: 3 February 2019. Reform and Deliver, Security Council Report, May Operations and Department of Field Support, July 2016. Richard Gowan, Political Gap in Reform Agenda 2009. Leaves Questions on A4P Mechanisms, IPI Global Lisa Sharland, How Peacekeeping Policy Gets Made: Adam Day and Jake Sherman, Political Solutions Must Observatory, 19 July, 2018. Navigating Intergovernmental Processes at the UN, Drive the Design and Implementation of Peace Opera- International Peace Institute, May 2018. Richard Gowan, “The Security Council and Peace- tions, IPI Global Observatory, 20 June, 2018. keeping” in Sebastian Von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, Jake Sherman, Action for Peacekeeping: Will Political Adam Day, To Build Consent in Peace Operations, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte, eds., The UN Secu- Consensus Lead to Change in Practice?, International Turn Mandates Upside Down, UN University Centre rity Council in the Twenty-First Century. (Boulder, Peace Institute, September 2018. for Policy Research, 19 January, 2017. CO: Lynne Rienner, 2016). Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peace- Karin Landgren, Nailing Down the Primacy of Politics keeping Operations, available at https://peacekeep- in UN Peacekeeping: An Insider Perspective, IPI Glob- ing.un.org/sites/default/files/a4p-declaration-en.pdf al Observatory, 16 August, 2018.

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