March 15, 2019 by Electronic Submission Commodity Futures
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March 15, 2019 By Electronic Submission Commodity Futures Trading Commission Christopher Kirkpatrick, Secretary 1155 21st Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20581 Re: Public Comment on Swap Execution Facilities and Trade Execution Requirement (RIN 3038- AE25); Public Comment on Request for Comment on Post-Trade Name Give-Up on Swap Execution Facilities (RIN 3038-AE79). Ladies and gentlemen, Better Markets, Inc.1 (“Better Markets”) appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (“CFTC”) proposal to implement substantial revisions to regulations governing the trading protocols and operations of swap execution facilities (“SEFs”).2 Better Markets also appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the proposed elimination of the made- available-to-trade process (“MAT Process”) for establishing the trade-execution requirement under section 2(h)(8) of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”).3 Although the CFTC should always explore improvements to the U.S. derivatives market structure and SEF regulations, in particular, the current proposal is deeply flawed in critical respects and too often conflicts with the letter and explicit statutory objectives of the CEA. The CFTC’s proposed rulemaking therefore must be withdrawn, re-thought, and, if appropriate, re-proposed to avoid significant disruption of the SEF marketplace, the likely costly unintended consequences to the U.S. financial system, and the potential for post-rulemaking litigation, which will only increase regulatory uncertainty in the markets and 1 Better Markets is a non-profit, non-partisan, and independent organization founded in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis to promote the public interest in the financial markets, support the financial reform of Wall Street, and make our financial system work for all Americans again. Better Markets works with allies—including many in finance—to promote pro-market, pro- business, and pro-growth policies that help build a stronger, safer financial system, one that protects and promotes Americans’ jobs, savings, retirements, and more. 2 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Swap Execution Facilities and Trade Execution Requirement, 83 Fed. Reg. 61946 (proposed November 30, 2018), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-11-30/pdf/2018- 24642.pdf (“SEF Proposal”). See also 7 U.S.C. § 7b–3 (establishing the SEF registration requirement and setting forth a core principles regulatory framework) and 7 U.S.C. § 1a(50) (defining SEFs as “trading system[s] or platform[s] in which multiple participants have the ability to execute or trade swaps by accepting bids and offers made by multiple participants in the facility[ies] or system[s], through any means of interstate commerce, including any trading facility[ies], that facilitate[] the execution of swaps between persons; and is not a designated contract market”). 3 Id. See also 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(8). The CEA is codified at 7 U.S.C. 1 et seq. render effective CFTC oversight all but impossible.4 The SEF proposal also would dangerously dismantle many of the critical pillars of the multilateral swap execution framework adopted in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and improperly codify statutory interpretations that are inconsistent with the plain language and intent of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd- Frank Act”).5 For these reasons, Better Markets urges the CFTC to reconsider its proposal in almost all respects. However, it supports the CFTC’s proposal in one critical respect: abolishing the MAT Process for establishing the trade execution requirement and instead relying, in part, upon the CFTC’s clearing determination process under CEA section 2(h).6 Better Markets appreciates the opportunity also to provide comments in response to the request for comment on the practice of disclosing counterparty names upon execution of cleared transactions on swap execution facilities (“Name Give-Up”).7 The practice of Name Give-Up (1) does not support any legitimate risk management objective in connection with cleared, anonymously executed swaps; (2) promotes continued access to privileged liquidity by a very small number of dominant swap dealers, contrary to the statutory purposes and core principles of the SEF regulatory framework; and (3) deters SEF participation on account of trading advantages provided to dealers that collect and analyze counterparty trading information. Despite these realities, a handful of dealers has prevented SEFs from eliminating the practice of Name Give-Up and facilitating a transition to a better diversified, more liquid, and more transparent market structure. Table of Contents I. The Dodd-Frank Act was adopted in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis to address numerous risks arising from trading in the dealer-dominated over-the-counter derivatives market structure 4 II. The CFTC’s misconstruction of CEA section 5h(a)(1) is based on arbitrary and capricious reasoning that violates the CEA’s letter and intent and is plainly inconsistent with Congress’ statutory objectives ..................................................................................................................... 9 A. The CFTC’s misconstruction of the SEF registration requirement continues to violate the letter and intent of the CEA section 5h(a)(1) ............................................................................... 10 1. Single-dealer facilities for the trading of swaps must register as SEFs and transform their operations to comply with the CEA’s SEF definition and core principles .................. 16 4 Independently, the CFTC is required under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) to re-propose or withdraw the present SEF rulemaking, or at a minimum reopen the public comment period, before adopting final regulations, because the administrative record is incomplete and therefore denies the public a meaningful opportunity to review and respond to substantive information provided to key CFTC personnel during the comment period. Extensive ex parte communications, in particular, have been inaccurately, insufficiently, or confusingly disclosed, and, in some cases, potentially not disclosed at all, preventing informed public responses to substantive discussions affecting core elements of the SEF Proposal. 5 Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 6 7 U.S.C. § 2(h). 7 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Post-Trade Name Give-Up on Swap Execution Facilities, 83 Fed. Reg. 61571 (Nov. 30, 2018), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2018-11-30/pdf/2018-24643.pdf. 2 2. Single-Dealer Aggregator Platforms would not be required to register as SEFs under a CEA section 5h(a)(1) interpretation grounded in the CEA’s statutory text, context, and purposes ....................................................................................................................................... 18 3. CEA section 5h(g) provided SEF-specific exemptive authority for facilities subject to a U.S. prudential regulator’s comparable and comprehensive supervisory and regulatory framework in contemplation of a broad SEF registration requirement that included bank- affiliated single-dealer platforms ................................................................................. 19 4. The CFTC must apply CEA section 5h(A)(1) to interdealer broking entities, but such brokers should be registered as introducing brokers as well and eligible for judiciously provided exemptions .................................................................................................... 21 B. The CFTC should codify its statutory interpretation with respect to SEF registration in the regulations themselves, not solely in preamble discussion ................................................ 29 C. The CFTC’s order exempting certain multilateral trading facilities and organized trading facilities was improperly executed and contrary to the letter and intent of the SEF regulatory framework .......................................................................................................................... 30 D. The CFTC’s SEF registration delays for U.S. interdealer brokers and Single-Dealer Aggregation Platforms are reasonable, but the two-year registration delay for foreign brokers is excessive ......................................................................................................................... 32 III. Significant multilateral trading in the derivatives markets will be possible only in a market structure that embraces straight-through processing to minimize market, credit, and operational risk ... 34 A. The STP regulatory framework for the routing and acceptance of trades has improved the derivatives market structure and substantially advanced CEA section 5h(e)’s statutory objectives ............................................................................................................................ 38 1. The CFTC’s proposed codification of guidance relating to pre-execution credit screening promotes responsible risk management and trading on SEFs ...................................... 42 2. SEFs must execute direct and independent clearing services arrangements as an appropriate risk management measure. The CFTC’s misconstruction of the routing “capacity” requirement, however, nullifies the CFTC’s rationale for proposed elimination of CFTC Regulation § 37.702(b)(1) ............................................................................................ 43 3. SEFs