DEPARTMENT OFDEFENSECHEMICALANDBIOLOGICAL DEFENSEPROGRAM ANNUAL REPORTTO CONGRESS

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM

ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

February 2007 April 2007 This report was coordinated and prepared by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs in accordance with 50 USC 1523 and related requirements.

Copies of this report may be downloaded from the World Wide Web through the Special Assistant for Chemical and Biological Defense and Chemical Demilitarization Programs Web Site at http://www. acq.osd.mil/cp under the reports section as an Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) file.

Cleared for Public Release. Unlimited Distribution. April 2007 It is our responsibility to provide our Warfighters the best capability and support in the world. America remains a nation at war. The Armed Forces of the United States are engaged in a global war on terrorism while simultaneously deterring further attacks on Americans here at home. In doing so, our military faces many challenges, but one in particular—the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—is among our greatest challenges. The Department of Defense (DoD) is pursuing a comprehensive strategy to counter this threat. The purpose of this strategy is to build readiness for current and future challenges. The Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) is a critical component supporting both the national strategies and DoD strategies. The program exists to provide chemical and biological defense capabilities in support of the goals and objectives of our national military strategies, ensuring that the Department’s operations are unconstrained by chemical or biological effects. To effectively execute this program, the Department is depending upon continued congressional support in three priority areas: • Stable funding for the Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative to fully exploit the advanced science and technology innovation necessary to successfully counter future genetically engineered biological weapons. • Adequate long-term investment in the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) infrastructure to enhance our RDT&E capabilities, including the modernization and construction of laboratories and test facilities to ensure we develop advanced countermeasures against current and emerging chemical and biological threats. • Consistent resources for the overall program itself to ensure that, year after year, we are able to field the improved defensive capabilities essential to ensure our military can operate in any environment, unconstrained by chemical or biological weapons. With the support of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress, we have developed and resourced an integrated CBDP to best serve the Nation, to build readiness for current and future challenges, and to sustain our armed forces in time of war. To continue countering the existing and future threat from hostile WMD and to meet the critical operational needs of our military, the Department requires the full support of the resources requested in the program budget.

Purpose of the Report The Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) This annual report of the Department of Defense provides U.S. forces the best capability and support in Chemical and Biological Defense Program describes how the world. The CBDP is a key component of national and the Department is executing the CBDP and provides defense strategies aimed at defending the nation from the the context for a management framework that seeks to hostile use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)— identify and balance investment priorities against risks particularly chemical and biological (CB) weapons— over time. The report provides detailed information and against U.S. citizens, military forces, friends, and allies. assessments regarding: The CBDP seeks to ensure that Department of Defense (1) the overall readiness of the armed forces to fight (DoD) operations are unconstrained by chemical and/or in a CB warfare environment, along with efforts biological effects by providing CB defense capabilities to undertaken and ongoing plans to improve such build readiness for current and future challenges. (see readiness; and Figure 1.) (2) the requirements for the CBDP, including The program depends on support in three priority requirements for training, detection, protective areas: equipment, decontamination equipment, medical (1) Stable funding for the Transformational Medical prophylaxis, and treatment of casualties resulting Technolgies Initiative (TMTI); from the use of CB weapons. (2) Adequate long-term investment in the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) infrastructure, including laboratories and test facilities; and (3) Consistent, predictable, and sustained resource levels for the CBDP.

CBDP Strategic Context A Nation at War Four Challenges: Traditional, Irregular, Catastrophic, Disruptive Expanding Risks from a World in Conflict

Vision: Ensure DoD Operations Are Unconstrained by CB Effects

Mission: Provide CB Defense Capabilities in Support of the National Military Strategies

Four Overarching Program Goals

Current CB Defense Risk: Adversaries pursuing CB WMD Future CB Defense Capabilities as asymmetrical weapons to deter Capabilities & or directly attack the United States and our allies & Business Processes Business Processes

Conclusion: The CB Defense Program mitigates the risk from those hostile intentions now and in the future

Figure 1. CBDP Strategic Context

 Strategic Context • Persistent obstruction from rogue states (Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and others) determined to exercise influence on the international stage by Strategic Reality sowing physical chaos and political turmoil. We are a nation at war. For the foreseeable future, the CBDP anticipates expanding risks (see Figure 2) from Premise a world in conflict, fueled primarily by these global The United States possesses overwhelming military drivers: capabilities. In response, adversaries are pursuing • Increasing competition for limited resources, chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear (CBRN) particularly in underdeveloped regions with WMD as a comparatively cheap, easy-to- deploy, and rapidly growing populations that creates internal disproportionately influential tool to deter U.S. power displacements, refugee flows and humanitarian asymmetrically or to attack the United States directly. emergencies. With the support of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and • Expanding reach of often amorphous nonstate actors the Congress, we have developed and resourced the CBDP, an (terrorist organizations, criminal gangs, religious integrated program to best serve the nation, to build readiness fanatics, ethnic groups, etc.), all increasingly for current and future challenges, and to sustain U.S. forces in operationalized by global communications and time of war. financial resources, and all actively seeking to exploit societies weakened by ineffective governance.

Figure 2. DoD Security Environment ii Active Players complex, more interrelated with often overlapping areas of responsibility, and more closely linked to A wide spectrum of opposing and supporting actors transnational networks and private groups. The directly affect the CBDP: global scope of the CB threat necessitates effective • Antagonists. Rogue states such as North Korea multi-lateral cooperation to present an efficient, and Iran have WMD programs designed both as an unified response to proliferation and use. However, asymmetrical counter to the U.S. and as a source the cited complexity of the world stage makes of illicit revenue. Similarly, intelligence reporting it difficult for the CBDP to maximize needed consistently documents the interest of terrorist international policy integration, research and groups such as Al Qaeda in obtaining chemical, development (R&D), or financial burden-sharing, biological, and radiological materials in order to a situation which is exacerbated by opponents inflict disproportionate psychological and physical who exploit their membership in international impact on the United States and our allies. Even organizations to actively undermine multilateral nominally friendly states, such as India and Pakistan, cooperation. seek the perceived prestige offered by WMD, • Different Perspectives. Another constraint is notably nuclear weapons. While no single antagonist created by the differing priorities and perspectives offers an insurmountable obstacle, in aggregate they of various U.S. government branches and depart– constitute a daunting and ever-evolving problem set ments, which may impede effective interagency for the CBDP to manage. cooperation and burden-sharing. For example, the • Protagonists. The United States and its Western military may emphasize preventive medicine in partners, particularly North Atlantic Treaty support of military operations, while civilian planners Organization (NATO) countries, are essentially may focus on effective responses to terrorist attacks. united in opposition to the further spread of WMD As a result of these different perspectives, DoD technology and resources, despite being in occasional emphasizes pretreatments and vaccines rather than disagreement about preferred tactics and strategy. therapeutics, and may have different information International bodies, such as the United Nations architectures to support military operations rather (UN) and the European Union, are also generally than civilian life. sympathetic, if often not particularly operationally • Competing Fiscal Priorities. Through 2025, effective. Within the executive branch, there is the United States is forecast to maintain not only comprehensive presidential and departmental one of the highest population growth rates among leadership that provides detailed guidance and developed countries ranging between 0.7 and resources to pursue WMD defense in general and the 1.0 percent, but it also has an aging population, CBDP in particular. DoD’s Total Force approach to necessitating expanded long-term investment in the CBRN defense mission creates synergy between nondefense health care, social services, and R&D. Active and Reserve components. In sum, the CBDP Within DoD, the requirement to provide pensions has significant allies, but generating efficient unity and medical care for millions of retirees is imposing of effort among them is a challenge. similar financial demands. Further, DoD’s need to simultaneously transform and recapitalize U.S. forces while prosecuting conventional operations Passive Constraints in Iraq and Afghanistan and unconventional warfare Other less-obvious factors exert more indirect yet also against global terrorism also strains finite resources. significant influence: The resultant national economic competition affects funding for the CBDP and potentially dilutes its long- • International Complexity. Treaties registered term ability to promptly counter threats emerging with the UN more than tripled between 1970 and from the accelerating explosion of global scientific 1997, and the number of international institutions competency and technological innovation. increased by two-thirds from 1985 thru 1999. At the same time, those entities became more

iii - National­ Budget. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, projects 2007 Defense spending will be 3.9 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), continuing a downward trend. Defense resources have not kept pace with the growth in GDP. Between 1968 and 2005, GDP increased over 300 percent (from $3.7 to $11 trillion), while defense spending increased only 62 percent, (from $358 to $523 billion). (See Figure 3.) - Defense Budget. The buying Figure 3. DoD Outlay as a Percentage of U.S. GDP power of DoD will decline by approximately $92 billion over the next ten years, according to a U.S. defense industry consensus forecast. After adjusting for inflation, DoD’s raw spending power is expected to decline by about $80 billion over the next five years alone. Additionally, much of national defense funding is committed to sustaining people, maintaining vital infrastructure, and preparing equipment for combat deployment. As a result, annual funding for investment accounts must compete with these other equally pressing priorities. (See Figure 4.) Also, according to projections in its 2007 budget proposal, DoD plans to reduce its spending for R&D from $72.5 billion this year to $71.2 billion in 2011. After inflation is taken into account, this is a cut of 11.6 percent from 2006.

Figure 4. Investment Dollars

iv - CBDP Budget. The CBDP received $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2007 (FY07), an increase of $84 million above the initial budget request. Although this is encouraging recognition of the importance of CBD to national security, future program funding must be similarly stable and insulated from the broadly negative funding trends cited above. Continued support for the FY08 President’s Budget Request for the CBDP will be a key part of the national strategies to counter the threats from CB weapons. (See Figure 5.)

Figure 5. CBDP Budget

The Challenge • In particular, units that have been designated to be available for employment need CBD equipment Today’s environment of global conflict is not unique. The and training to be ready for immediate deployment human struggle for power and influence remains much from the U.S.’s power projection infrastructure. the same as it has been throughout history. What has Therefore, the CBDP must provide improved changed, and changed dramatically for the worse, is the defensive capabilities in support of the national expanding roster of antagonists who have access to, or military strategies and force generating base. who are actively seeking, WMD with the capacity to inflict catastrophic damage. It is this increasingly dangerous • Building capabilities to manage risk and ensure strategic context that gives the CBDP its particular U.S. forces are ready to meet current and future urgency to our nation. Of all the forms of WMD, CB WMD challenges remain paramount, requiring weapons are among the cheapest and easiest to produce stable funding for the TMTI; adequate long- quickly and to deploy with the greatest likelihood for term investment in the RDT&E infrastructure, catastrophic effect. The challenge is compounded by the including laboratories and test facilities; and ease of disseminating knowledge related to developing consistent, predictable, and sustained resource WMD, increasing the dual-use nature of technologies, levels for the CBDP. and the rapid technological advancements that continue to • Failure to invest in the right CBDP capabilities— lower the threshold for acquiring WMD, and developing by improving doctrine, training, material, leaders, novel threats through various techniques, including people, facilities, and infrastructure—will increase genetic engineering. Thus, relevant implications for the risk for our nation. The ability of the CBDP to CBDP are as follows: respond to new and emerging threats is critically • The nation will continue to be engaged in a long dependent on continued support of integration and struggle of continuous, evolving conflict against awareness of revolutionary advances in in science adversaries employing irregular, catastrophic, and and technology (S&T) such as genetic engineering disruptive strategies, including terror, asymmetric and nanotechnology. attacks, and WMD to challenge, marginalize, erode, and paralyze U.S. power. These implications combine to underscore a strategic national security imperative to place the highest priority • As a result, military forces must be prepared on sustaining and further improving DoD’s CBDP. to deal with the full spectrum of threats. More specifically, they must be able to operate in all WMD environments, unconstrained by CB effects.

 vi C o n t e n t s

Purpose of the Report ...... i Strategic Context ...... ii The Challenge ...... v

Executive Summary...... ix DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program Performance Plan...... xii CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE GOALS AND FUNDING...... xiv Chapter 1 Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program Management and Oversight...... 1 1.1 INTRODUCTION...... 1 1.2 MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS...... 1 1.3 KEY ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS, ROLES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES...... 1 1.4 COORDINATION WITH RELATED PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES...... 7 Chapter 2 Chemical and Biological Defense Requirements and Research, Development, and Acquisition Program Status...... 11 2.1 INTRODUCTION...... 11 2.2 CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE (Reconnaissance, Detection, and Identification)...... 12 2.3 BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS...... 17 2.4 INFORMATION SYSTEMS...... 18 2.5 DECONTAMINATION...... 24 2.6 PROTECTION...... 30 2.7 MEDICAL DEFENSE ...... 43 2.8 CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE HOMELAND SECURITY PROGRAMS...... 60 2.9 CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL T&E ACTIVITIES...... 62

Chapter 3 Chemical and Biological Defense Logistics Status...... 73 3.1 Introduction ...... 73 3.2 CBRN Logistics Management...... 74 3.3 lOgistics Status...... 86 3.4 Peacetime Requirements...... 86 3.5 Funding...... 87 3.6 Industrial Base ...... 87 3.7 Biological Defense Immunization Programs...... 96 Chapter 4 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Education, Training and Doctrine...... 97 4.1 INTRODUCTION...... 97 4.2 CBRN DEFENSE IN PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION...... 97 4.3 CBRN DEFENSE TRAINING...... 98 4.4 EXERCISES...... 117 4.5 CBRN DEFENSE DOCTRINE...... 122 4.6 CBRN DEFENSE TRAINING, EXERCISES, AND DOCTRINE ISSUES...... 126

vii Annex A Contamination Avoidance Programs...... A-1 Annex B Biological Defense Programs...... B-1 Annex C Information Systems...... C-1 Annex D NonMedical Protection Programs...... D-1 Annex E Decontamination Programs...... E-1 Annex F Joint Medical Chemical and Biological Defense research, Development and Acquisition Programs...... F-1 Annex G Homeland Security Programs...... G-1 Annex H CBRN Defense Logistics Readiness Data...... H-1 Annex I DoD Joint Service Chemical and Biological Defense program Funding Summary...... I-1 Annex J Statement Regarding Chemical and Biological Defense programs Involving Human Subjects...... J-1 Annex K Status of DoD Efforts to Implement the Chemical Weapons Convention...... K-1 Annex L Congressional Reporting Requirement: 50 USC 1523...... L-1 Annex M Acronyms and Abbreviations...... M-1

viii E x e c u t i v e S u m m a r y

It is our responsibility to provide our warfighters the best • Consistent resources for the overall program itself capability and support in the world. America remains a to ensure that, year after year, we are able to field nation at war. The armed forces of the United States are the improved defensive capabilities essential to engaged in a global war on terror while simultaneously ensure our military can operate in any environment, deterring further attacks on Americans here at home. unconstrained by chemical or biological weapons. In doing so, our military faces many challenges, but With the support of the President, the Secretary of one in particular—the threat posed by weapons of mass Defense, and the Congress, we have developed and destruction (WMD)—is among our greatest. resourced an integrated CBDP to best serve the nation, DoD is pursuing a comprehensive strategy to counter this to build readiness for current and future challenges, and threat. The purpose of this strategy is to build readiness to sustain our armed forces in time of war. for current and future challenges. The Chemical and To continue countering the existing and future threat from Biological Defense Program (CBDP) is a critical hostile WMD and to meet the critical operational needs component supporting both the national strategies and of our military, the department requires full support for department’s strategies. The program exists to provide the resources requested in the program budget. chemical and biological defense capabilities in support of the goals and objectives of our national military strategies, This report is provided in accordance with 50 U.S. Code ensuring that DoD operations are unconstrained by Section 1523. (The complete reporting requirement chemical or biological effects. is detailed in Annex L.) The report describes the accomplishments, initiatives, management, and oversight To effectively execute this program, the department of the CBDP, as well as strategies and plans for the depends on continued congressional support in three development and acquisition of capabilities in each of the priority areas: program commodity areas for the near term, midterm, • Stable funding for the Transformational Medical and far term; a description and assessment of RDT&E Technologies Initiative (TMTI) to fully exploit programs and infrastructure; an analysis of CB defense the advanced science and technology innovation logistics posture; and CB defense education, training, necessary to successfully counter future genetically exercises, and doctrine. engineered biological weapons. This report also demonstrates compliance with the • Adequate long-term investment in the RDT&E Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) by infrastructure to enhance our research, development, providing a performance plan, which is integrated into test and evaluation capabilities, including the the overall structure of the report. The performance plan modernization and construction of laboratories provides an assessment of the overall program for the and test facilities to ensure we develop advanced most recently completed fiscal year (FY06). countermeasures against current and emerging Since its establishment in 1994 following congressional chemical and biological (CB) threats.

ix passage of the FY94 National Defense Authorization Act An overview of the budget is provided in Annex I. This (50 U.S. Code, Section 1522), the CBDP has integrated request focuses on reducing the future challenges risk by research, development, and acquisition (RDA) funds increasing resources for the science and technology into defense-wide accounts that are overseen by a base. The CBDP seeks to ensure that DoD operations single office within the Office of the Secretary of are unconstrained by chemical and/or biological Defense. The CBDP vision is to ensure DoD effects by providing chemical and biological operations are unconstrained by chemical defense capabilities to build readiness for current and biological effects. The program’s mission and future challenges. The program depends on is to provide chemical and biological support in three priority areas: (1) stable funding defense capabilities in support of the for the TMTI; (2) adequate long-term investment national military strategies. The in the RDT&E infrastructure, including laboratories vision and mission statements guide and test facilities; and (3) consistent, predictable and the program, and its activities and are sustained resource levels for the CBDP. supported by four corporate goals: The CBDP employs multiple complementary processes Goal 1: Provide CB defense capabilities to monitor performance and provide programmatic to the warfighter to adjustments. First, the Planning, Programming, reduce near-term Budget and Execution System is employed to ensure operational risk. program performance goals and targets are imple­ mented. The CBDP annual report to Congress as well Goal 2: Reduce force management risks as assessments by the Joint Requirements Office-CBRN through enhanced joint CB defense education, Defense also play key roles. Additionally, each materiel training, and exercises. solution’s progress is measured by monitoring specific performance goals and targets in the planning years, Goal 3: Develop transformational CB defense and the results of the data analysis are compared against technologies to reduce future challenges risk performance goals, operational goals, corporate goals, to DoD operations and forces. and the overall CBDP mission. These processes support Goal 4: Reduce institutional risk by improving DoD the objective of fielding improved CB defense equipment CB defense management practices – become a to our military forces. high-performance organization. These goals reflect the CBDP’s implementation of DoD’s balanced scorecard concept, which provides a management and oversight framework to balance investment priorities against risks over time. The CBDP budget request for FY08 is $1.570 billion.

 COMPELLING NEEDS Science and Technology CB defense requires Transformation new capabilities and technologies to meet and counter novel threats, including ge- netically engineered weapons. In 2007, funding was shifted from procurement to To achieve its objectives in response to global CB threats, S&T to invest more the U.S. military must continue the transformation heavily in preparing process. The Transformation Planning Guidance of April for future threats while 2003 calls for transformational business and planning sustaining and enhanc- practices.Transformation challenges include management ing current force protection levels. The FY08 President’s of defense, speed of mass (life and mobility) and Budget reinforces this effort. The TMTI identifies multi- information, fiscal barriers, values, and attitudes. The ple scientific approaches to deliver broad-spectrum ther- principles of jointness and developing an adaptable and apeutics, genomic sequences of known threats, and rapid responsive military carry over into CB defense. response countermeasure capabilities. TMTI is a first It is extremely difficult to collect reliable intelligence critical step in S&T efforts to defend and protect against on WMD programs and activities, which are closely the dangers of future CB threats. Additional initiatives in guarded secrets. The prevalence of dual-use technologies science and technology include the Transformational and legitimate civilian applications means CB research Countermeasures Technologies Initiative (TCTI), which efforts are easy to conceal and difficult to detect and focuses on the physical (nonmedical) aspects of CB de- monitor. Based on the demonstrated ease with which fense, and the Nanotechnology Initiative, which cross- uncooperative states and nonstate actors can conceal cuts medical and physical CB defense. Together, these WMD programs and related activities, the United States, initiatives address needs for advanced technologies for its allies, and its partners must expect further intelligence detection, individual protection, information systems, gaps and surprises. Consequently, the United States must and decontamination capabilities. The new capabilities couple responses to known and validated threats with an will reduce future risks in the future by leading to capa- agressive and adaptive capability development process bilities that will defeat genetically engineered biological that anticipates potential novel and emerging threats. threats and other as yet unknown threats.

xi DoD Chemical and Biological management risk addresses investments to ensure Defense Program Performance sustainment of fielded systems and initiatives for CB defense education and training. This is represented Plan by elements of various operations and maintenance DoD’s management priorities often focus on responses accounts of the military departments, the Defense to near-term operational threats. A key purpose of the Logistics Agency, and the Defense Health Program. performance plan is to shift the emphasis to a more Resources for force management are not included anticipatory approach that incorporates other factors within the budget of the CBDP; the CBDP leadership into a comprehensive risk management framework. The coordinates with the Services and Defense Agencies balanced scorecard concept provides a risk management to ensure integration between acquisition programs framework that demonstrates compliance with the and sustainment and force management activities. Government Performance and Results Act and includes • Future challenges risk derives from issues affecting operational risks, while also addressing additional the ability to invest in new capabilities and develop challenges that defense managers must consider to balance new operational concepts needed to dissuade or investment priorities against risks over time. DoD has defeat mid- to long-term military challenges. Within tailored the balanced scorecard concept to four broad the CBDP, this includes investments in the S&T base, areas of risk management with performance management Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations, and measures, all of which support the department’s vision, related efforts to address mid- to far-term needs. mission, and goals and ensure an integrated collection This is represented by Budget Activities 1, 2, and 3. of systems and capabilities in order to reduce overall program risk. DoD pursues an investment strategy that • Institutional risk results from factors affecting the seeks to reduce overall program risk by balancing risk in ability to develop management practices, processes, each of the following areas. metrics, and controls that use resources efficiently and promote the effective operation of the defense

• Operational risk stems from factors shaping the establishment. Within the CBDP, this includes ability to achieve military objectives in a near-term investments in management activities to enhance the conflict or other contingency. Within the CBDP, this effective and efficient use of department resources, includes investments in procurement and advanced including investment in infrastructure to conduct development to address near-term needs. This is research, development, and acquisition. This is represented by Budget Activities 4, 5, and 7 and represented by Budget Activity 6. procurement accounts. As illustrated in Figure 6, reductions in risk in one area

• Force management risk results from issues may reduce total program risk. However, because of affecting the ability to recruit, retain, train, and resource constraints, investment decisions must be made equip sufficient numbers of quality personnel to make trade-offs among different accounts in a manner and sustain the readiness of the force while it that ensures balance or reduces total risk. accomplishes its many operational tasks. Force

Figure 6. Risk Management Strategy xii The increased complexity of modern warfare demands As outlined in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review that CB defense equipment be fielded in the most cost- (QDR), the Department has refined its Force Planning effective and expeditious manner possible. Furthering Construct to better reflect the nature of DoD’s mission that complexity, the evolving threat environment calls and tasks. In addition to normal force generation, for a capabilities-based approach that requires identifying sustainment and training activities, this updated wartime capabilities that U.S. military forces will need to conduct force planning construct calls for U.S. forces to be able a range of military operations. Put simply, determination to do the following: of each specific adversary’s intentions and capabilities • Defend the homeland may not be possible, underscoring the need to smartly balance overall program risk. • Prevail in the war on terror and conduct irregular operations • Conduct and win conventional campaigns VISION, MISSION OF THE CBDP In each area, the Force Planning Construct accounts for The vision statement (Figure 7) provides focus and activities that the department conducts continuously direction for CB defense RDT&E, and acquisition (steady-state) and those it conducts periodically (surge). efforts. This vision encompasses a wide range of military The CBDP’s mission (Figure 8) is to provide the environments and missions. These range from traditional capabilities needed to support military operations in battlefield force-on-force combat to homeland defense each of these areas for various durations. RDA programs and civil support operations, and include special within the DoD CBDP aim to provide U.S. forces with operations, anti-terrorism, force protection, consequence the best equipment to ensure their survivability and management, and other stability operations. Ultimately, mission accomplishment on any future battlefield where the vision is focused on outcomes. That is, an effective chemical or biological agents may be employed. CB defense capability will be one that facilitates the conduct of all DoD operations, in spite of a complex and varied CB threat, regardless of the range of operational environments.

Figure 8. CBDP Mission

Figure 7. CBDP Vision The vision is not focused on any specific chemical or biological threat. While it is focused on those CB agents that may be employed intentionally, it addresses classical threat agents as well as novel and emerging threats. The vision also encompasses various methods of delivery. Currently, CB defense capabilities impose some degree of burden on the user. The vision points forward to the development of capabilities free of such constraints and providing effective defensive capabilities that are transparent to the users.

xiii CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL by chemical and/or biological effects by providing CB DEFENSE GOALS AND FUNDING defense capabilities to build readiness for current and future challenges. The program depends on support in three priority areas: (1) stable funding for the TMTI; CBDP Corporate Goals (2) adequate long-term investment in the RDT&E infrastructure, including laboratories and test facilities; The CBDP corporate goals used in Figure 9 are a key and (3) consistent, predictable, and sustained resource element in providing a means to establish progress in levels for the CBDP. fulfilling the program’s mission.

Joint CBRN Defense Functional Concepts and Operational Capability Goals The Joint Staff Joint Requirements Office for CBRN Defense (JRO-CBRND) completed a Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) of Joint CBRN defense warfighting operational capabilities during 2005. This assessment provides a structured process that aligns programs with national security strategies and departmental strategies. In addition, it brings the process in line with the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)—the Department’s process for defining and developing system requirements. The focus of the CBA is on the passive defense portion of the Combating WMD mission, as outlined in the National Military Strategy for Combating WMD. (Similar assessments are being conducted for consequence management and radiological and nuclear defense. CBAs are updated every Figure 9. CBDP Corporate Goals three years.) Joint warfighter CBRN defense capability requirements are divided into four functional concept Corporate goals provide the broad framework needed areas—Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain, as described in by the CBDP to meet warfighter requirements for CB Figure 10. These functional areas represent an integrated defense operational capabilities. These goals provide network of capabilities to support the warfighter. Core strategic program direction for the development, capabilities for Sense include reconnaissance, detection acquisition, and fielding of CB defense equipment while and identification (contamination avoidance); Shape reducing acquisition costs and time of development. includes information systems; Shield includes individual Figure 9 defines the corporate goals (and provides a and collective protection, and medical prophylaxes and summary of the key focus areas that support these goals.) pretreatments; and Sustain includes decontamination, To implement the goals of the program, the CBDP restoration, and postexposure medical capabilities (i.e., seeks to ensure that DoD operations are unconstrained therapeutics and diagnostics).

xiv Figure 10. Joint CBRN Defense Enabling Concept and Supporting Core Capabilities

CBRN defense operational capability goals, as defined mission areas, including consequence management and in the 2005 CBA, are aligned under the four functional homeland security. Specific projects and programs within concept areas (Figure 11). Assessments are under way to advanced development and procurement are associated determine whether additional goals may be needed, or with one or more of the operational goals. if existing goals need to be tailored to support evolving

Sense Shape Shield Sustain 1. Point Detection 4. integrated Early 7. respiratory and Ocular 11. individual (Chemical, Biological, Warning Protection Decontamination and Radiological) 5. Battlespace 8. Percutaneous Protection 12. equipment 2. Stand-off Detection Management 9. expeditionary Decontamination (Chemical, Biological, 6. Battlespace Analysis Collective Protection 13. Fixed Site and Radiological) 10. medical Prophylaxes Decontamination 3. nBC Reconnaissance 14. medical Diagnostics 15. medical Therapeutics

Figure 11. CBRN Defense Operational Goals

xv CBDP Funding to ensure that DoD operations are unconstrained by chemical and/or biological effects by providing chemical As illustrated in Figure 12, the total CBDP investment for FY08 is $1.570 billion. In FY07, the department and biological defense capabilities to build readiness for restructured funds within this investment portfolio. The current and future challenges. The program depends on FY08 program continues the investment and focuses on support in three priority areas: (1) stable funding for the reducing the future challenges risk by increasing resources TMTI; (2) adequate long-term investment in the RDT&E for the S&T base. The overall program risk optimizes a infrastructure, including laboratories and test facilities; and (3) consistent, predictable, and sustained resource balance among the competing needs of the department. To implement the goals of the program, the CBDP seeks levels for the CBDP.

Sense $308.111 Shape $91.415 Shield $488.676 Sustain $101.223 Homeland Defense $86.418 Other $494.406 CB Defense Program Total $1,570.249 (Dollars in Millions)

Note: Homeland defense includes the Installation Protection Program, the Military Mail Screening Program, and the WMD–Civil Support Teams. “Other” includes: Dugway Proving Ground funds; the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Program; management support for the joint organizational offices; the Joint Test Infrastructure Working Group; laboratory infrastructure; test equipment, strategy, and support; and S&T funds that may be applicable to two or more of the functional areas.

Figure 12. FY08 President’s Budget Request for the CBDP

xvi The investment in the Shield capability area includes cost, schedule, and performance parameters. This annual the TMTI investment. Investment in the Sense area was assessment, conducted by the Joint Program Executive decreased due to a delay in the procurement of future Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO- biological standoff detection systems, and homeland CBD), incorporates the consideration of risk within the defense also decreased, due to a reduction in funding for following categories: the Installation Protection Program. • Cost • Test & Evaluation SUMMARY OF KEY • Schedule • Logistics PERFORMANCE METRICS • Performance • Production Measuring Progress Toward Operational Goals • Funding • Management (Operational Risk) • Contracts • Interoperability The investment in RDA is critical to the successful The department is making overall progress in the implementation of national security and military acquisition programs, as illustrated in Figure 13, and strategies for combating WMD, the global war on consequently, is making progress towards advancing the terrorism, and homeland security. At the end of FY06, capabilities for U.S. forces. Table 1 illustrates progress there were 38 programs of record within the CBDP. across the broad range of capabilities that provide a For FY07, 37 of these programs are projected (from comprehensive approach to managing risk. an annual perspective) to be on track to meet program

Figure 13. Summary Status of Acquisition Programs Demonstrates Overall Progress

xvii Table 1. Summary Status of Acquisition Programs Demonstrates Overall Progress

JPM Collective Protection Shipboard Collective Protection System (SCPE) G Joint Collective Protection Equipment (JCPE) G Collectively Protected Field Hospitals (CPFH) G Joint Expeditionary Collective Protection (JECP) G Chemical Biological Protective Shelter (CBPS) G JPM Guardian Analytical Laboratory System (ALS) G Unified Command Suite (UCS) G Installation Protection Program (IPP) G JPM Individual Protection Joint Service Air Crew Mask (JSAM) Y Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) Ensemble G Joint Service Mask Leakage Tester (JSMLT) G Joint Service Chemical Environment Survivability Mask (JSCESM) G Joint Protective Aircrew Ensemble (JPACE) G Joint Service General Purpose Mask (JSGPM) Y JPM NBC Contamination Avoidance Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector (JSLSCAD) R Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD) Y Stryker NBC Recon Vehicle (NBCRV) G Joint Service Light NBC Reconnaissance System (JSLNBCRS) G Joint Chemical Biological Radiological Agent Water Monitor (JCBRAWM) G M93/M93A1 NBC Recon Vehicle (FOX) G JPM Information Systems Joint Effects Model (JEM) Y Joint Operational Effects Federation (JOEF) G Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) Y JPM Chem-Bio Medical Systems Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed (AVA) G Recombinant Botulinum A/B Vaccine (rBot) G Smallpox System G Plague Vaccine G Skin Exposure Reduction Paste Against CW Agents (SERPACWA) G Joint Biological Agent Identification & Diagnostic System (JBAIDS) G Advanced Anticonvulsant System (AAS) G Improved Nerve Agent Treatment System (INATS) G pBioscavenger G Bioscavenger Increment II G JPM Decontamination Joint Service Transportable Decontamination System (JSTDS) - SS G Joint Service Personnel Decontamination System (JSPDS) G Joint Material Decontamination System (JMDS) G JPM Biological Defense Joint Biological Standoff Detection System (JBSDS) Y Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS) G

xviii The overall rating of each program is assessed by JPEO- in the short term, but will result in enhanced overall CBD and is based on a variety of factors tailored to the performance and integration. individual program. The overall assessment is based One program—Joint Service Lightweight Standoff on whether the programs are on track (green), facing Chemical Agent Detector (JSLSCAD)—faces major potential or actual problems (yellow), or have major weaknesses. While JSLSCAD represents an improvement weaknesses (red) compared to requirements defined in over currently fielded capabilities, it faced technical the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) document for limitations in its performance during testing. As a each program. result, JSLSCAD requirements are being re-evaluated The vast majority (81%) of the programs are on track to determine whether the program should continue in to meet defined and approved program requirements. support of modified requirements or whether other Only six programs are identified as having potential or options (including program cancellation) would be actual problems. However, appropriate solutions to these appropriate. The program decision will be reviewed by problems are within the Joint Program Manager’s ability the Joint Requirements Oversight Council during FY07. to solve. For example, two of these programs—the RDT&E progress within the programs is illustrated Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) and within Figure 14. The predominance of programs the Joint Effects Model (JEM)—are at risk as a result entering/completing Operational Testing or completing/ of the deliberate decision to synchronize the schedules conducting a Milestone C Decision Review in FY06 and and planned fielding of these programs with the Joint and FY07 indicates significant near-term program RDT&E Service command and control programs with which they completion and product fielding. must interface. The realignment caused schedule delays

Figure 14. Milestone Decisions

xix In FY06 and FY07, 16 new capabilities are or will be and customer focus within the programs of record are fielded to the operational forces. These capability illustrated in Figure 15. Concurrent with program- upgrades range across the spectrum of nuclear, biological, of record events and development, a wide spectrum of and chemical defense and include major detection, capability has been generated during FY06 to meet the decontamination, medical, warning and prediction, and immediate needs of operational forces. individual protection capabilities. Acquisition flexibility

1. Joint Service Chemical Environment Survivability 9. Fox Survivability upgrade Mask 10. Stryker NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle 2. Joint Service General Purpose Mask 11. Analytical Laboratory Suite (ALS) Block 1 Upgrade 3. Joint Service Decon System–Small Scale 12. Battlefield Anti-Intrusion Detection System (BAIS) 4. Joint Service Personnel Decontamination System/ AN/PRS9 (FUE 2QFY06) Reactive Skin Decontamination Lotion (RSDL) 13. Mobile Detection Assessment Response System 5. Joint Biological Agent Identification & Diagnostics (MDARS) (1QFY07) System 14. Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology 6. Joint Service Mask Leakage Tester (JSLIST) Block 2 Glove Upgrade (FY07)

7. Joint Effects Model Block I 15. Alternative Footwear System (AFS) / Integrated Footwear System (IFS) (FY07) 8. Joint Service Light Nuclear, Biological, Reconnaissance System 16. Joint Service Aircrew Mask (JSAM) (FY07)

Figure 15. CBDP Capability Fieldings (FY06 and FY07)

In addition to monitoring progress by tracking programs materiel solutions. Based on national defense policy and of record, other assessments of DoD’s current and centered on a common joint warfighting construct, the projected CBD capabilities took place. In August 2005, analyses initiate the formal development of integrated joint the Joint Requirements Office (JRO) completed the capabilities, to include the identification and justification report Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear of requirements necessary to initiate development and Defense (CBRND) Functional Needs Analysis/Functional acquisition. The requirements are derived from an Solution Analysis. This report, also referred to as the CBA, analysis of existing joint force operations and include is structured in accordance with the Chairman of the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership Joint Chief of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01D, Joint and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). The capabilities and deficiencies. 2005 CBRND CBA was coordinated with the services Table 2 provides a summary of the results of the analysis. and the Combatant Commands and was approved by This assessment provides a summary of current capability the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). levels of U.S. forces and planned capabilities at all levels The CBRND CBA contains the most comprehensive of war. The 2005 CBRND CBA did not address any and current assessment of DoD’s current and projected materiel deficiencies at the strategic or operational levels CBRN defense capabilities and is therefore used here as of war, so ratings for those levels are based solely on the basis for the assessment of CB operational risk. assessments of DOTMLPF capabilities. This assessment The JCIDS process provides a structured methodology assumes planned schedules will be achieved and threshold that defines functional tasks, capabilities to perform the key performance parameters (KPPs) will be met for all tasks, capability gaps, and potential nonmateriel and systems. Investment decisions are based on optimizing xx Table 2. JROC Capability Based Assessment of CBRN Defense

capability performance and reducing overall program While the overall ratings do not change through the far deficiencies. The assessment provides an evaluation of term, the assessments are based on current and projected CBRN defense: capabilities that will allow U.S. forces to operate against by Operational Area—Sense, Shape, Shield, and Sustain current and projected threats, respectively. Thus, even as capabilities improve, they must contend against by Level of War—Strategic National, Strategic Theater, transforming threats. Operational, and Tactical and Additionally, this table provides an aggregate summary of by Time—current, near term/midterm (FY06-11), and material and non-material activities. The CBDP supports far term (FY12-20) and directs research, development, and acquisition In qualitative terms, green, amber, and red typically of material solutions while leveraging nonmaterial indicate the following about the capabilities within each approaches. For example, inadequate doctrine or training area: may lower the rating for a task, even if material solutions exist. One example of this is found in a Shield task that “Green” indicates a full capability to perform G the task to the designated standard(s). involves protecting individuals from CBRN hazards. The “Amber” indicates a partial capability CBA notes that DoD operations increasingly involve A to perform the task to the designated U.S. and non U.S. civilians who play an important role in standard(s). supporting U.S. forces and therefore must be protected. “Red” indicates little or no capability However, military doctrine and training programs were

R to perform the task to the designated not designed to ensure that the unprecedented number standard(s). of civilians that were employed in early 2003 to support A summary of the results of the 2005 CBRN Defense operations against Iraq were adequately prepared for CBA is shown in Table 2. The overall capability in each CBRN defense. The information that follows in this operational area is rated as amber through the far term. report details the various measures being taken to address  As defined by the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), the strategic shortfalls identified in the JROC CBA. Consistent level of war is divided into two sublevels: strategic national, which resource levels, as detailed in the FY08 President’s encompasses DoD, service, and interagency tasks, and strategic theater, which encompasses combatant command tasks. Establishing Budget Request, and congressional support for the overall these sublevels provides clarity and focus for task development and program will be critical to the department’s ability to execution. At this level, a nation, often as a member of a group of field improved defensive capabilities and to ensure U.S. nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national forces can operate in any environment, unconstrained by resources to accomplish these objectives. chemical or biological weapons. At the operational level of war, campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. At the tactical level of war, battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.

xxi Table 3. JSTO-CBD Panel Assessment of CB Defense Technology Areas

Defense Technology Objective Panel Rating CB.35 Standoff Bio Aerosol Detection GREEN CB.37 CB Agent Water Monitor AMBER CB.42 Environmental Fate of Agents GREEN CB.45 Self-Detoxifying Materials AMBER CB.46 Recombinant Ricin Vaccine AMBER CB.50 Lightweight Integrated CB Detection GREEN CB.51 Low Level CW Agent Exposure GREEN CB.53 Wide-Area Aerial Reconnaissance for Chemical Agents GREEN CB.54 Therapy for Smallpox GREEN CB.55 CB Hazard Environment Prediction GREEN CB.56 Methodology for BW Agent Detection and Diagnostics Systems GREEN CB.57 Nontraditional Nerve Agent Medical Countermeasures GREEN CB.58 Western and Eastern Equine Encephalitis Vaccine GREEN CB.59 Therapeutic Strategies for Botulinum Neurotoxins AMBER CB.60 Vaccine Technologies for Filovirus Exposure GREEN CB.61 Advanced Air Purification System GREEN CB.62 Hazard Prediction with Nowcasting GREEN CB.63 Therapeutic Strategies for Filovirus Infection GREEN CB.64 Detection/Assessment of Genetically Engineered Biothreats GREEN

Logistics and Training Capabilities (Force Developing and Deploying Transformational Management Risk) Capabilities (Future Challenges Risk) Critical CB defense capabilities for the warfighter are The CBDP addresses risks from future challenges through provided through the operations and sustainment (O&S) research conducted in the S&T base. In early 2006, the accounts of the military departments, in addition to the Joint Science & Technology Office for Chemical/Biological RDA funds of the CBDP. Logistics Risks Assessments are Defense (JSTO-CBD) conducted a stakeholder’s review provided in Chapter 3 of this report. These assessments of the science and technology program and provided an provide information on capabilities in stock and available assessment of Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs). to the warfighter at the end of FY06 and planned for The results are summarized in Table 3. In particular, the future years. JSTO panel identified DTOs CB.42, CB.60, and CB.61 as excellent performance areas. Data on personnel training and During 2007, the DoD will be phasing out the use of DTOs education is provided in as the basis of science and technology base performance. Chapter 4 of this report. Two key measures will include (1) a series of expert panel Additional information on reviews and (2) a measure of the number of technologies exercises, training standards, transitioned. One of the key measures of success of and related CB defense training the science and technology base is the demonstration activities is also detailed. A key and transition of advanced capabilities to the materiel aspect of the program is the developer for eventual production and fielding. JSTO- establishment of the CBRN CBD and JPEO-CBD currently maintain over 40 Education and Training Technology Transition Agreements (TTAs) to facilitate the Integration -Directorate. exchange of information and ensure successful transition of new technologies and capabilities. Table 4 provides a summary of actual and planned technology for transition to the materiel developer.

xxii Table 4. Actual & Planned Technologies Transferred to JPEO-CBD

Core Programs Test and Evaluation FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 Detection 1 0 2 0 0 3 0 2 Information Systems 1 5 4 1 0 0 0 4 Protection 0 2 6 0 0 1 3 5 Decon 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 Threat Agent Sciences 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 Diagnostics (Systems) 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 Diagnostics (Assays) 0 8 8 8 0 0 0 0 Diagnostics (Hardware) 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 Pretreatments 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 Therapeutics 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 Totals 8 14–18 23–27 6–10 0 8 5 12

A key programmatic decision of the 2006 QDR concept to CB defense capabilities to protect fixed and (Quadrennial Defense Review) was the direction to semi-fixed facilities. Up to one-third of the physical S&T implement a $1.5 billion Transformational Medical funds will directly support technologies in this cross- Technologies Initiative (TMTI) over FY07–11 to cutting initiative. develop broad-spectrum medical countermeasures against the threat of genetically engineered bioterror Improving Management Practices agents. The TMTI focuses on broad-spectrum defenses (Institutional Risk) against intracellular bacterial pathogens and hemorrhagic Managing institutional risk deals with factors affecting fevers. The TMTI builds on efforts started in FY06 as the ability to develop management practices, processes, a result of the Enhanced Planning Process. It shifts the metrics, and controls that use resources efficiently investment balance to reduce future risks and decrease and promote effective operations. Following are key overall program risk by maintaining a balance among management activities that are being pursued to manage countermeasures against near- and far-term threats. institutional risk. Additional initiatives will include developing advanced detection and deterrent technologies and facilitating Streamlining the decision process — Chapter 1 of full-scale civil-military exercises to improve interagency this report describes the CBDP’s management and planning for complex homeland security contingencies. oversight structure. The most significant change in the management structure was the program reorganization In a parallel effort, the S&T program that was approved on April 22, 2003. This reorganization will initiate plans for the investigation streamlined the decision process by reducing the number into nanotechnology, biotechnology, of Milestone Decision Authorities (MDAs) from nine information technology, and cognitive to one. From April 22, 2003, through May 9, 2006, sciences (NBIC) in an effort to advance Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) oversight was CB defense capabilities through implemented through a tailored index of systems labeled revolutionary and innovative areas of “Sentinel Systems” that sought to measure performance research. This program has been titled of CBDP functional areas based on the criticality, “TheTransformational Countermeasures complexity, and cost of individual programs. On May 9, Technologies Initiative” or TCTI. The 2006, the DAE suspended the Office of the Secretary of intent of this program is to leverage Defense’s (OSD’s) use of the Sentinel oversight systems, NBIC developments to provide a fully delegated full MDA for all CBDP programs to the Army integrated protective ensemble to protect the future Acquisition Executive (AAE) and designated the CBDP warfighter in a highly mobile force, and to expand this

xxiii a Special Interest program in accordance with DoD President’s Budget Submission, budget needs for the T&E Instruction (DoDI) 5000.2. This MDA authority was infrastructure were integrated with the RFA programs. further delegated by the AAE to the JPEO-CBD on June 7, Based on technology needs and directions, this budget 2006. In July 2006, the CBDP implemented an alternative restructured acquisition programs, and integrated review process, which is detailed in Chapter 1. the T&E capabilities to execute these programs. The programs were time and funding sequenced so that the Program Balance — Annex I of the annual report of the CBDP provides information on RDA funding. technologies could be demonstrated and transitioned DoD annually reviews the program budget to ensure in synchronization with the T&E capabilities. Thus, the that program activities are balanced among science & program milestones were based on the availability of not technology, advanced development, and procurement only the financial resources, but also the technology and to ensure technology transitions as well as to ensure T&E resources needed to execute the programs. Figure 16 capabilities are being developed to address near-term, illustrates the significant number of test events sponsored midterm, and far-term operational needs. by the CBDP and occurring at a variety of locations for operational testing (OT), developmental testing (DT), Improving Test & Evaluation Infrastructure — Chapter 2 combined test events, and clinical testing (for medical of this annual report provides information on the DoD systems requiring Food and Drug Administration [FDA] test and evaluation (T&E) infrastructure. In the FY07 approval).

Figure 16. Major Test Events

xxiv C h a p t e r 1 1 Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense t e r

Program Management and Oversight P h a C

1.1 introDUCTION Team (OIPT)/WIPT process. The current processes, roles, and responsibilities are described in Section 1.3. In accordance with 50 USC 1522, research, development, and acquisition (RDA) of chemical and biological (CB) versight defense programs within the Department of Defense O (DoD) are overseen by a single office within the Office 1.3 KEY ORGANIZATIONAL of the Secretary of Defense(OSD). The Assistant to the RELATIONSHIPS, ROLES, AND Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and RESPONSIBILITIES Biological Defense Programs, ATSD(NCB), serves as this single office. This chapter describes the management and Key organizational relationships within the DoD CBDP oversight processes and activities related to the effective management structure are portrayed in Figure 1-1, which anagement and oversight and management of the Department’s CB illustrates processes to (1) provide policy guidance; (2) M Defense Program (CBDP), including interagency and conduct planning, programming, budgeting, and execu­ international coordination efforts. tion of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense RDA; (3) establish military require­ ments for CBRN defense; (4) test and evaluate CBRN defense programs; (5) manage CB defense science and 1.2 management technology (S&T) programs; (6) provide program analysis IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS and integration; and (7) provide program oversight. The roles and responsibilities of all departmental organizations are detailed in the “Implementation Plan for the Management of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program,” which was approved on April 22, 2003, and revised on July 10, 2006. This revision to the Implementation Plan provided detailed instructions for a new review process for the CBDP and added an Advanced Development Working Integrated Product Team (WIPT) to the Overarching Integrated Process  While the public law specifically addresses only CB defense RDA activities, DoD planning includes radiological and nuclear defense along with CB defense in its planning activities. Radiological and nuclear defense capabilities within the CBDP are limited to certain types of radiation detection equipment, modeling and simulation capabilities, and medical research on radioprotectants. Various other radiological and nuclear defense efforts, including systems for nuclear and radiation hardening, nuclear detection, medical radiological defense, and other selected programs are outside the scope of the CBDP. These efforts are discussed where they are related to or complement CBDP efforts. Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Program

  Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program Management and Oversight C h a P t e r 1 1.3.1 interagencyTechnical SupportWorking Operations and Special for Defense of Secretary Assistant the through policy making. USD(Policy) also provides interagency government U.S. ove in Department’s role the countries,foreignandpolicy, relationsforceswith DoD and guidance planning defense support activities CBDP that ensure to guidanceCBDP, and oversight providing The USD(Policy) serves as the policy advisor for the DoD was (AAE) directed onSeptember19, 2002. Executive Acquisition Army the through reports that JPEO-CBD a of establishment The 2003. 4,approved wasFebruary on JRO-CBRNDcharter The 1,2002.October on established formally was CBRND) (JRO- Defense CBRN Office Requirements Joint The organiz and individuals key of This section summarizes selected roles and responsibilities

for U nder P o L S l ow Intensit ic ecretar y, USD(P Figure 1-1.CBDP y Conflict, ASD(SO/ y a in wti te CBDP. the within tions o of l ic D y) G efense roup (TSW roup r sight for the M L anagement &

IC). G ) 1.3.2 the SecretaryofDefense. ObjectiveProgram Memorandum (POM) submission to associated the approvingCBDP, (4) the and of Reviews (2) CBDP OIPT within the Plan, OSD, (3) Strategic chairing DAE Oversight CBDP Overarching USD(AT& a vertically integrated chain of command. and Chemical for Biological Defense Officer(JPEO-CBD). This Executive structure maintains Program the Joint to responsibility MDA delegated further has who USD(AT& The USD(AT& the DAE,CBDP. the DoD As the for (DAE)Executive USD(AT& The

for U AND O nder versight Structure L L ) serves as theasservesMDA) fortheoverall program. rsosblte icue 1 apoig the approving (1) include responsibilities ) A Lo cquisition L L S ) delegates this authority to the AAE, the to authority this delegates ) sre a te ees Acquisition Defense the as serves ) g ecretar istics , USD(AT& , T y of echno D efense L

salsig a establishing ) l o gy

1.3.3 Assistant to the Secretary the principal deputy, the Special Assistant also supports of Defense for Nuclear and the USD(AT&L) in carrying out its MDA and oversight

Chemical and Biological responsibilities for the CBDP. 1 Defense Programs, ATSD(NCB) The SA(CBD&CDP) established the CBD Education and Training Integration Directorate to lead and guide The ATSD(NCB) serves as the single focal point within the integration of DoD CBRN defense educational and t e r the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) responsible training initiatives. This Directorate will synchronize P for overall oversight, coordination, and integration of capability baseline assessments by identifying successful the DoD CBDP in accordance with 50 USC 1522. The education, training and exercise initiatives and by exploring h a ATSD(NCB) serves as the permanent chair of the CBDP

ways to alleviate any training gaps, misalignments C OIPT. The objective of the OIPT is to assist the DAE with or redundancies. The integrated approach to CBRN overseeing the CBDP in accordance with the Defense defense education and training will provide warfighters, Acquisition Board (DAB) process. Members of the commanders, senior leaders, and decision makers with OIPT include the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), the critical skills to ensure appropriate strategic, tactical, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), the and/or operational awareness and understanding of

DoD General Counsel, the Under Secretary of Defense CBRN defense capabilities that maximize continuity of versight (Comptroller), the Services, and others, as listed in operations and survivability. O the Implementation Plan. On July 10, 2006, the USD (AT&L) revised sections of the Implementation Plan to The first phase of this strategy provide detailed instructions for a new review process established an Education for the CBDP and added an Advanced Development and Training Integration WIPT to the OIPT/WIPT process. The OIPT oversees Council (ETIC) with

the following WIPTs: representatives from anagement and

across the DoD. The first M • Joint Requirements—Chaired by the JRO-CBRND ETIC conference was held • Science and Technology—Chaired by the Joint Science in March 2006, with the next and Technology Office for CB Defense (JSTO-CBD) conference scheduled for March 2007. In early 2007, this office launched a web site • Advanced Development—Chaired by JPEO-CBD (https://etic.jscbis.apgea.army.mil) and database to • Test and Evaluation—Chaired by the CBDP Test and capture CBRN defense education and training across Evaluation (T&E) Executive DoD. • Education and Training Integration—Chaired by the Director for CBRN Integration within the Office of the Special Assistant for Chemical Biological 1.3.4 Joint Requirements Office Defense and Chemical Demilitarization Programs, for Chemical, Biological, OSA(CBD&CDP) Radiological, and Nuclear Additional WIPTs may be formed by the OIPT to address Defense (JRO-CBRND) specific issues. WIPTs are advisory bodies and will The JRO-CBRND began official duties on October 1, convene as required to address specific issues that need 2002. The official charter was approved on February resolution. WIPTs will not convene as part of the normal 4, 2003. The JRO-CBRND coordinates with the coordination process. Unresolved issues are elevated to combatant commands and Services to develop joint the OIPT in a timely manner. Membership in the OIPT CBRN requirements, an overarching CBRN defense and WIPTs includes all appropriate OSD, Service, Joint architecture and a joint capabilities roadmap. The JRO- Staff, and Defense Agency stakeholders. CBRND defines required system interoperabilities and Within the office of the ATSD (NCB) the SA(CBD&CDP) operational architectures and validates the development of is the principal deputy for CBDP matters and the primary Joint CBRN defense capabilities through both simulation staff action office for ATSD(NCB) responsibilities. As and technology demonstrations. These efforts will be Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Program

  Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program Management and Oversight C h a P t e r 1 1.3.5 the Military Departments within theCBDP: Departments the Military of responsibilities selected are Followingorganizations. defense CBRN other with integration and coordination fulfilling In responsibil their sustainment. and procurement and through Corps—plan research basic from programs, Marine defense CBRN execute the including Navy, and Force, Departments—Army,Air Military the of Each Plan. Implementation Six of the Section with in accordance support Executive T&E CBDP and JSTO-CBD, JPEO-CBD, with POM of the DoD CBDP the development leads JRO-CBRND consequence defense, security. homeland and protection, force passive management, for architectures and These concepts, operational joint generation. requirements, operational requirements defense CBRN of development include Staff responsibilities Joint and serve as the focal point for Service, combatant command, that and requirements operational defense CBRN joint of approval and coordination, planning, for responsible is that Staff of Chiefs DoD Joint the the of Chairman within the under office single a is JRO-CBRND The Council (JROC). Oversight RequirementsJoint the byvalidation for Plan Modernization Defense CBRN Joint a in documented • v Figure 1-2.Service evc-pnoe CR dfne capability defense CBRN Service-sponsored

ldt Jit prtoa Cnet ad develop and Concepts Operational Joint alidate M i l itar i ties, the Military Departments ensure Departments Military the ties, y D epartments R esponsibilities forJoint Program • • • • • • • •

odc CR dfne riig raies and readiness, training, defense CBRN Conduct with overseeing theCBDP. DAE the assist to ATSD(NCB), the by chaired is OIPT,CBDP Providerepresentativesthe for which defense meetingsandorganizations. CBRN appropriate all to representatives Provide CBRN defenserequirement documents. joint to annexes Service of development Support developmentduring ofthe DoDCBDPPOM. JRO-CBRND the to requirements defense CBRN respective for data fielding and acquisition Provide for potentialCBRNdefenserequirements. phase development concept the in possible as as early JRO-CBRND the of participation the Include inclusion into the Modernization Plan. doc materiel requirements are identified, Moderniz submit Defense capability CBRN Jointthe in forth guidanceset thedocumentsusing of jointprograms. the by personnel joint Service duty assignments in support assigned as JPEO Programs Joint Support Capabilities, andtheJoint Priority of the Modernization Plan, Joint Future Operational Participate in the review, development and validation sustainment. u M mentsto the JRO-CBRND and recommend for ‑ anagement withinthe JP CBD. iue 1-2 Figure lutae cret key current illustrates a in ln Wee new Where Plan. tion L EO ists. -CBD The military departments play a critical role in the While the USD(AT&L) is designated as the single execution of all phases of RDA. The military departments MDA for the CBDP, MDA status is delegated by the

provide the essential infrastructure, which includes USD(AT&L) to the AAE. Thus there are two MDAs, 1 personnel with unique scientific, technical, and though based on a single authority.) boratory and test facilities management expertise, and the la • Serve as Joint Service Material Developer to to meet the demands of developing and fielding CBRN coordinate and integrate acquisition for the CBDP t e r defense equipment. Included in Chapter 2 of this report through the JPEO-CBD. P is a detailed description and assessment of the military’s CBD T&E infrastructure and the supporting laboratory • Provide Program, Analysis and Integration functions infrastructure. These include capabilities for handling live for the CBDP. h a CB agents and conducting a variety of tests. Selected key • Provide the CBDP T&E Executive for the CBDP. C military facilities, for which more detail is provided in Chapter 2 (Section 2.9), include the following: • Serve as the Joint Combat Developer for the CBDP through the JRO-CBRND. • U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC) 1.3.6.1 Joint Program Executive Office–Chemical • U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground (DPG) and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD) versight O • U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious The JPEO-CBD reports to the AAE and serves as Diseases (USAMRIID) the CBDP Material Developer and oversees Life • U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Cycle Acquisition Management for assigned system Defense (USAMRICD) acquisition programs within the CBDP. The JPEO-CBD provides centralized program management and Joint

• U.S. Navy Medical Research Center (NMRC) Service acquisition program integration for all assigned anagement and • Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Dahlgren nonmedical and medical CBD programs. Following are M selected key responsibilities of the JPEO-CBD. • U.S. Air Force Operational Test & Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) • Serve as the CBDP MDA for all CBDP programs. • Air Force Institute of Occupational Health • Develop and approve program and acquisition (AFIOH) strategies. • Provide the planning guidance, direction, control, and support necessary to ensure systems are 1.3.6 Army as Executive Agent developed in accordance with DoD acquisition guidance. In accordance with 50 USC 1522, the Army serves as the Executive Agent for the CBDP and coordinates and • Integrate interoperability with civilian emergency integrates research, development, T&E, and acquisition response agencies in the planning, guidance, requirements of the military departments for CBRN direction, and control of newly acquired systems defense programs of the DoD. The Secretary of the whenever possible. Army serves as the Executive Agent for the CBDP, and • Oversee the development, coordination, and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, commitment to an acquisition program baseline and Logistics and Technology, ASA(ALT), serves as the AAE. ensure immediate reporting of all imminent and Following are selected key responsibilities of the Army as actual breaches of approved baselines. In addition, the Executive Agent: ensure development of a recovery plan. • Review all funding for the CBDP. • Prepare required input to the POM, the Budget Estimate Submission, the President’s Budget, • Review and recommend approval of the CBDP and other required documentation. Support POM. development of the annual RDA. Plan in coordination • Serve as the MDA for delegated programs, with with the JSTO-CBD and the Program Analysis and

authority to delegate to the JPEO-CBD. (Note: Integration Office. Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Program

  Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program Management and Oversight C h a P t e r 1 1.3.6.2 Program AnalysisandIntegrationOffice for Programs ( each milestone within approved baselines. through programs assigned guide to necessaryfunctions Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) Planning,normal perform to (PMs) Managers Program the and JPEO the supports PAIO build. POM the for (F maintains the DoD CBDP Future resourceallocation for the program years. ThePAIO and also planning, resource requirements, programs, fiscal programmatic analyze and overall CBDP.review thewill PAIOof The health and plans, published process, integrated CBDP. This analysis includesoverall the torecommendations impactsandconcerning the provides CBDP PAIOoversight the OIPT, CBDP independent analysis the for decision makers to enable of review support In under CBDP the of operatio elements other all to functions and JPEO-CBD, JRO-CBRND, office, oversight OSD the to analysisproviding by CBDP the supports PAIO The • • • • • • Y

P ad rvds upr t te JRO-CBRND the to support provides and DP) JSTO-CBD strategy. investment infrastructure T&E overall projects support to development capabilities T&E Execute protection. health force for required programs materiel DoD related with integration ensure programs, For medical programs. nonmedical and medical assigned across integration functional and technical Provide Plans (TEMP)forassignedprograms. Master Evaluation and Test approve and Develop to reduce development-cycle times. to advancedof technologies development programs Ensure interagency cooperation and timely transition toacquisition. programs S&T CB of transition for opportunities identify to JSTO-CBD with conjunction in reviews, conduct Establish Readiness Technology coordination withtheJRO-CBRND. JPEO- sustainment in cooperationand in with the Services include which to management cycle for life maintains CBD programs non-medical and Prepare the Joint n (PAIO) al direction of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff of Chief Deputythe Army of direction al G . ThePAIO provides independent analysis 8) as the Army Executive Agent. L ogistics ogistics Support Plan for medical Y ears’ Defense Program L evels (TR evels L s) and s) 1.3.6.4 JointCombatDeveloperforCBRN 1.3.6.3 CBDPT&EExecutive test standards, processes, and procedures. the establishing for responsible has also Executive T&E systems.CBDP The the for conducted is adequate T&E oversightCBDPfor of ensurethatinfrastructuretoT&E directorofOT&E. The T&EExecutive isalso responsible the byapproval require may and plans test and TEMPs at associatedthelevel.impacthighest often issuesthe Such issues related and T&E T&E major resolve CBDP to theExecutive assists WIPT This (TRMC). Center Director,the (DOT&E)and TestManagementResource Evaluation and Director, Operational Test (OTAs); the Agencies Test Operational Service JSTO-CBD, CBD; T&E Executive and principals from JRO-CBRND, Service each JPEO- from membership includes WIPT, which T&E Executive. The CBDP T&E Executive chairs the T&E Under Secretary Deputy of the the Army (DUSA), is under designated Executive,as the CBDP T&E Army The rvds yid eore sie fr BN defense CBRN leverages personnel, JCD-CBRNDexperimentation, the for suited resources myriad provides (USACM School Chemical Army U.S. the Though experimentation joint DoD process. broader the in JFCOM the with partner will JCD-CBRND the JRO-CBRND, will the by directed as respectively. and appropriate, Where Development experiments Advanced the by managed and efforts concept S&T the complement JCD-CBRND The DoD Executive Agent for Joint Experimentation. the of much larger Joint Forces that Command (JFCOM) role as the from role JCD-CBRND the differentiates on focus The CBRN defense limited-scale defense. experiments and capabilities homeland and management, consequence protection, force defense, passive CBRN of spectrum full the address initially will Experiments and Facilities (DOTM Organization, Doctrine, Training, nonmedical Materiel, and medical of by defense CBRN systematically for exploring new and Concept innovative combinations Integrating Joint the validate to used experiments multiservice execution and Joint overseeof and coordinate will JCD-CBRND U.S.Coast the and Services the by JRO-CBRND,directionthe theofUnder supported and Defense (JCD-CBRND) L eadership and Education, Personnel, L PF) capabilities. JSTO-CBD and the JPEO-CBD, the and G uard (USC uard G ), the ), L S) equipment, and facilities available through each of the and Homeland Defense. An overview of key intra- and Services and other government organizations to reduce costs, interagency and international coordination is provided

shorten timelines, and improve experimental designs. below. 1

1.3.7 Defense Threat Reduction 1.4.1 Other U.S. Government t e r

Agency (DTRA) Organizations P DTRA serves two key roles in support of the DoD Several organizations within the U.S. government CBDP—Funds Manager and Joint S&T Manager. These roles are developing CBRN defense technologies. Five h a are filled by DTRA’s CB Defense Directorate, DTRA(CB), organizations with which the CBDP currently has formal C also designated as the Joint Science and Technology Office coordination efforts include (1) DARPA, (2) the Counter­ for Chemical and Biological Defense (JSTO-CBD). The proliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC), DTRA provides funds management functions under the (3) TSWG, (4) the Department of Homeland Security oversight of the ATSD(NCB). The JSTO-CBD manages (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate, and (5) the and integrates CB defense science and technology S&T Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). base programs, which are coordinated with service S&T versight O principals. S&T management responsibilities include 1.4.1.1 DARPA Biological Warfare Defense the development and integration of S&T programs in Program response to OSD and JRO-CBRND guidance. The JSTO- CBD provides the necessary programming, planning, DARPA is charged with seeking breakthrough concepts and budgeting documentation for CB defense S&T and technologies that will impact our national security. programs. The JSTO-CBD works with the JPEO-CBD DARPA’s Biological Warfare (BW) Defense Program is to ensure effective transition of S&T efforts to advanced intended to complement the DoD CB Defense Program anagement and M development. Other JSTO-CBD responsibilities include by anticipating threats and developing novel defenses the maintenance and leveraging of a robust Service S&T against them. The DARPA program is unique in that its laboratory base to respond to DoD S&T needs, including focus is on the development of technologies with broad T&E, providing a DoD CB defense S&T liaison with applicability against classes of threats. DARPA invests various organizations (to include the Defense Advanced primarily in the early technology development phases of Research projects Agency [DARPA], Technical Support programs and the demonstration of prototype systems. Working Group (TSWG), industry, academia, and other In accordance with 50 USC 1522, the Director of DARPA government agencies), providing support for DoD CB shall seek to avoid unnecessary duplication of activities defense S&T international programs, and providing under the program with CB warfare defense activities of management and integration of CB defense Advanced the military departments and defense agencies and shall Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs). coordinate the activities under the program with those of the military departments and defense agencies. The DARPA BW Defense Program coordinates its efforts with 1.4 COORDINATION WITH RELATED over forty organizations, including the SA(CBD&CDP) PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES and JSTO-CBD and by participation in the Technology Area Review and Assessment (TARA) process. A panel DoD CBDP activities are coordinated with other U.S. of CBD experts is routinely consulted by DARPA to Government agencies and with other nations to ensure evaluate programs and to ensure that National Institutes all CB defense capabilities are integrated and coordinated of Health (NIH) efforts are not being duplicated. DARPA within the interagency community. Management of the also participates in the BW Sensors Group, which development and implementation of national security provides government coordination outside of the DoD policies related to CB defense activities by multiple and works closely with the Military Services to ensure agencies of the U.S. government are coordinated by that technologies are effectively transitioned into the the National Security Council Policy Coordination hands of the user community. In addition to coordinating

Committee for Proliferation, Counterproliferation, with external agencies, DARPA produces an internal Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Program

  Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program Management and Oversight C h a P t e r 1 1.4.1.3 Technical SupportWorking Group 1.4.1.2 CounterproliferationProgram Review Kin requirements through cooperative R&D with the United combating-terrorism the of comm needs meet high-priority to the equipment and technology develops rapidly DoD,the by the specifically(SO/ ASD Depar for requirements combating terrorism. Policy ove (R&D) development and research prioritizes, and coordinates interagency and international T delivery) andCBRNterrorism. of the means their (including CBRN counter WMD of proliferation to capabilities U.S. enhancing to related Staff of Chiefs Joint the and community intelligence the DOE, the DoD, the of programs and activities the on committees defense congressional to annually report to agencies.government other chartered also is CPRC The of needs operational the with integrated are programs (DOE) Energy of and Department that ensure and funding, program interagency facilitate establish and encourage priorities, funding efforts, uncoordinated and also directs the CPRC to identify and eliminate redundancies mandate congressional The Secretary. Executive the as serves ATSD(NCB).SA(CBD&CDP) the The by chaired is Committee CPRC.Standing the The of tions recommenda the implement and duties the perform to CPRC The Standing Secretary.Committee, esta Executive the as the ATSD(NCB) and (CJCS), Staff of Chiefs Joint the of Chairman of Secretary Energy ( the (Chair), Defense of Secretary the of executive interagency composed an committee is CPRC involvingWMD. threats The terrorist and paramilitary negate to of proliferationand the WMD stem to efforts of U.S. counterproliferation policy and efforts, including cap and technologies of deployment developmentensure and and funding optimize to CPRC (Public 1994 T intheCBwarfare programs of allitscurrent arena. Review Technologies Defense Biological and Chemical e TSW he Fiscal for Act Authorization Defense National he g o, aaa Ire, utai, n Singapore. and Australia, Israel, Canada, dom, u t ment of State, and execution oversight is provided nity, and addresses joint international operational V Committee (CPRC) (TSWG) ice Chair), the Director of Central Intelligence, G s n neaec frm ht identi that forum interagency an is L w 0-6, 100 etbihd the established §16050) 103-160, aw b lished in 1996, meets regularly r sight is provided by the a bilities in support support in bilities L IC). The TSW Y f ies, ear G ­

1.4.1.4 DepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS) n poet t mxmz lvrgn opportunities. leveraging maximize to projects and TSW and CBDP DoD The protection, detection, for decontamin solutions identifies and co CBRN interagency su CBRNC FDA.The the and DoD the from representatives by co-chaired is which subgroup, (CBRNC) Countermeasures Nuclear Chemical,the Biological,Radiological,and is subgroups TSW of more or one participating in by together work government. representatives of These levels all across organizations eighty TSW and Interoperability. Standardization Equipment for (IAB) Board Interagency and state,local agencies. federal, TSW other and elements DoD between new from deve technology benefit can agencies local and state that so and procurement initiatives. research,development, technology regarding exchanges information and reviews, science DHS in participation DHS participation in DoD technology area reviews, DoD 2006,werethere severalcooperation, of areas including related initiatives being pursued by both agencies. During and S&T the on cooperation effective ensure to (MOA) of Agreement Memorandum a developing currently are laboratories.federal and national DHS the and DoD The univers with closely work will and needs predicted and emerging meet to efforts using WMD.orga and guide will S&T DHS attacks deter and detect to means United the provide to the States in capabilities technological and scientific into tap to established was Directorate S&T DHS The one are Capitol example of the TSW in and Pentagon the throughout deployed masks escape The considerations. other and requirements regulatory,operational,legal, to equipment due warfighter the for from combating differ for may terrorism requirements equipment However, TSW The G membership includes representatives from nearly Science &Technology (S&T)Directorate G a lo a a effe an has also tion, contai l G opments and facilitate interoperability facilitate and opments -funded research. G co-chairs the co-chairs S&T Subgroup of the b m ru ide group n aig errs requirements terrorism bating G ment, mitigation, anddisposal. s 1 ugop. n o the of One subgroups. 11 ’s i is te rvt sco and sector private the ties, G oriae requirements coordinate c tive outreach program program outreach tive n ti f ies and prioritizes prioritizes and ies n ize research research ize 1.4.1.5 Department of Health and Human manufacturing development, and procurement. The Services (DHHS) degree of coordination for specific candidate products

DoD and DHHS collaborate on numerous medical CB is defined under separate subordinate interagency 1 defense initiatives in support of national and homeland agreements. security strategies. These strategies include the research, A critical aspect of interagency coordination is DoD development and procurement of safe and effective support for Project BioShield. The Project BioShield Act t e r medical countermeasures (MCMs). The DoD and the of 2004 was initiated as a result of the attacks of September P DHHS aim to cooperate to leverage MCM programs of and October of 2001. The National Defense Authorization

mutual interest and to ensure there is no redundancy. Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-136) includes provisions for h a how the DoD interacts with the DHHS with respect to The DHHS family of agencies includes the NIH, the C Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Project BioShield. The DoD’s role in BioShield allows it to and the FDA. Staff members from the NIH (specifically, leverage DHHS resources for research, development, and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, procurement activities to achieve DoD requirements for NIAID) and CDC meet regularly with staff at the MCMs, particularly when DHHS and DoD requirements USAMRIID (Fort Detrick, Maryland) and the staff overlap. of the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute The first DoD product under consideration for transition versight (AFRRI) to discuss development of drugs, vaccines, and to DHHS for advanced development under Project O diagnostic tests for military personnel. Regulatory issues BioShield is the plasma-derived bioscavenger, human are addressed with the FDA through the Joint Program butyrylcholinesterase (pBuChE). pBuChE is intended Office for Chemical Biological Medical Systems within to be an effective pretreatment against classic and the JPEO-CBD. NIAID personnel also meet periodically nontraditional chemical agents. It will be developed with DTRA and DARPA. through Phase I clinical safety trials by the DoD and

In addition to these informal avenues of collaboration, then transitioned to the DHHS for potential licensure. anagement and there are also formal agreements between the DoD More detailed information on this effort is available in M and DHHS concerning the development of MCMs. In Annex F. Another Project BioShield candidate involving accordance with the Interagency Agreement between interagency collaboration is a next-generation smallpox DoD and the DHHS for the joint development of vaccine that the DHHS is developing and DoD intends to MCMs, both Departments agree to pursue specific procure upon successful FDA licensure. MCMs of mutual interest selected by an Interagency DHHS is developing some MCMs for the Strategic Working Group (IWG). Implementation plans for each National Stockpile that have their technology basis in specific MCM are identified in sub-agreements under programs that originated in the DoD. Examples include this interagency agreement. Implementation plans are the next generation anthrax vaccine and the cell culture- developed and managed by product-specific Integrated derived smallpox vaccine. DoD and DHHS also coordinate Product Development Teams (IPDT) with oversight from regarding licensed products. The anthrax vaccine adsorbed the IWG. (AVA) and Dryvax™ (smallpox vaccine) are procured Both Departments participate in an interagency process by the DoD from Emergent BioSolutions (Bioport) and that employs IPDTs to manage the development of DHHS, respectively. More detailed information on these mutually selected MCMs. The ultimate goal for each programs is available in Annex F. MCM is licensure or approval by the FDA. Under this The DoD will continue to partner with the DHHS and its agreement, both Departments agree to share information related agencies to ensure military and civilian populations on intramural and extramural programs in basic are protected from the potentially catastrophic effects of research and early development work for MCMs. The both man-made and naturally occurring threats. Departments cooperate for coordinating translational, advanced development research designed to ensure 1.4.1.6 Other Interagency Coordination successful product transition, including advanced animal model development and MCM preclinical assessment. The CBDP participates in efforts to coordinate research, The Departments also cooperate in coordinating development, and other efforts related to CBRN defense with other organizations throughout the federal

demonstration and product validation work, including Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Program

 10 Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program Management and Oversight C h a P t e r 1 1.4.2 rgas te oeg CmaaieTsig Program, Testing Comparative RDA Foreign the Cooperative programs, International Information Program, the Exchange include These CBD. in international cooperation for framework procedural and legal the A range of international agreements and programs provide common data. and procedures test standardized multinational establish and infrastructure, technology mitigate risk in the R&D foreignprocess, and to access unique gain to programs international leverages effectively CBDP The partners. and coalition with interoperability enhance to production,and support; development, cooperative through CBD costs acquisition system defense reduce to are programs cooperative international of objectives key The these of coordination efforts: highlights some are Following government. • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

A

CB Warfare Battlespace Detection and Diagnostic Biological Surface Venezuelan Standoff Biological Detection System Development

nalytical Environmental Protection Agency ofJustice Department U.S. of Department Agriculture Council The National Security and Research Program, Development Subgroup WMD chaired Policy The and Science of Office House White Technology equipment of in support of Justice’s grant program Department Justice’s with Office of Domestic Preparedness Agreements to purchase Interagency enforcement responses to WMD terrorism lawfire, and medical,for necessary capabilities the on focused agencies local and state, federal, with Interoperability The InterAgency Board for Equipment Standardization and

I nternationa M I E ethods for the Determination of CW A nformation Systems Development quine gent Challenge (known as the IAB), is a partnership partnership a is IAB), the as (known M E onitoring ncephalitis Vaccine T able 1-1. R eagents Development l C L evels ooperation I nternational Cooperative R esearch A gents • • • • • • • eoadm f nesadn (B MU with MOU) (CBR Understanding of Memorandum Radiological CBD and Biological cooperative Chemical, international program—the premier 2006, DoD’s of September the In ones. existing strengthening and relationships new important several establishing by F In collaborativeinternational activities. extensive more support which Agreement,Program or to the development of a Memorandum of Understanding When aresynergies identified, these mayexchanges lead exist.currently 50 than more annex,which of exchange exchange of technical information through an information an defense community. play typically with an begin Partnerships efforts program essential role in integrating the CBDP into the global CB international DoD’s The inSection4.2ofthisreport.) are described which agreements, doctrine standardization in codified are training and in efforts (Cooperative efforts. cooperative foreign and assignments, sales. military and exchanges personnel our nation’s allies. with procedures and equipment of integration seamless maintain to and worldwideavailable technologies CBD best the to access ensure to critical is cooperation Such gaps. program address that capabilities global leverage and identify to continues CBDP nations.The different 20 than more nowto extends agreements and programs CBD cooperative international of network DoD’s The mass destruction. of weapons of threat geopolitically global the a on perspective with unique partner a from insight offer valuable and relationship CBD States—Australia United the bolster also will It years.twenty-five than more of expand and rejuvenate an ongoing multilateral to partnership serve will membership.addition its This to Australia add to amended Kingdom—was United the and Canada M T H Fate and Collective Protection Systems Protective Suit Development and Plague Vaccine Development oxic uman Science and Biomedical Studies C M Y I s to Chemical and Biological 06, the CBDP broadened its international reach reach international its broadened CBDP the 06, ndustrial Chemicals E fforts inCBDefense E ffect of Chemical Table1-1 lists examples of international international of examples lists A gents E valuation A gents C h a p t e r 2 2 Chemical and Biological Defense Requirements and Research, t e r

Development, and Acquisition Program Status P h a C

2.1 introDUCTION Integration and Development System (JCIDS)—the department’s process for defining and developing system This chapter describes Joint Service CB defense requirements. The focus of the CBA is on the passive (CBD) requirements and research, development, and defense portion of the combating WMD mission, as acquisition (RDA) programs and the status of these outlined in the National Military Strategy for Combating programs—from the science and technology (S&T) base WMD. (Similar assessments are being conducted for through procurement. This chapter is organized within consequence management and radiological and nuclear the framework of the seven operationally oriented commodity areas outlined in a Capabilities-Based defense. CBAs are updated every three years.) Joint

Assessment prepared by the Joint Requirements Office warfighter CBRN defense capability requirements are for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear divided into four functional concept areas—Sense, Defense (JRO-CBRND). These commodity areas (and the Shape, Shield, and Sustain, as described in Figure corresponding sections within this chapter) as follows 2-1. These functional areas represent an integrated network of capabilities to support the warfighter. Core • Contamination Avoidance (Sense) (2.2) capabilities for sense include reconnaissance, detection • Biological Defense (Sense) (2.3) and identification (contamination avoidance); shape • Individual Protection (Shield) (2.6) includes information systems; shield includes individual

and collective protection, and medical prophylaxes and esearch, Development, • Information Systems (Shape) (2.4) R pretreatments, and sustain includes decontamination, • Collective Protection (Shield) (2.6) restoration, and postexposure medical capabilities (i.e., • Decontamination (Sustain) (2.5) therapeutics and diagnostics). • Medical Systems (Shield and Sustain) (2.7) When a valid operational need has been identified, the services first examine the range of nonmateriel solutions— In addition, specific activities related to CBD defense,

doctrine, organization, training, leadership, personnel, equirements and

homeland security, and force protection are addressed R force structure—to provide the most effective capability in Section 2.8. Test and evaluation (T&E) activities for for operating in a CBRN environment. If it is determined program-specific activities are provided in each of the that none of the nonmateriel options fully meet the sections, while overall T&E infrastructure activities are required need, equipment or materiel solutions are pursued detailed in Section 2.9. through the acquisition process. The R&D modernization The Joint Staff JRO-CBRND completed a CBA of joint process identifies technological approaches that may CBRN defense warfighting operational capabilities result in a new operational capability or an upgrade to an during 2005. This assessment provides a structured existing operational capability. process that aligns programs with national security The FY08 President’s Budget Submission integrates strategies and departmental strategies. In addition, it S&T investments, acquisition programs, and the T&E brings the process in line with the Joint Capabilities Status cquisition Program capabilities to execute these programs. Schedules and A and Chemical and Biological Defense

11 2 t e r P h a C

Figure 2-1. Joint CBRN Defense Enabling Concept and Supporting Core Capabilities

resources are sequenced to synchronize technologies capabilities ensure that forces can assume the optimal demonstrations and transitions to advanced development protective posture and rapidly identify and (if possible or in concert with T&E capabilities to support a fully necessary) decontaminate affected personnel, equipment, executable program. Thus, the milestones of the and areas. Sensors for the individual warfighter, as well as esearch, Development,

R acquisition programs were based on the availability of systems capable of detecting multiple agents, character­ not only the financial resources, but also the technology izing chemical, biological, and radiological toxic and T&E resources needed to execute the programs. industrial materials (TIMs), and new warfare agents are being developed. Technological advances in the areas of CB standoff detection, early-warning detection, 2.2 CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE miniaturization, and interconnectivity are being pursued. Enhancements in detection sensitivity, interferents equirements and R (Reconnaissance, rejection, logistics supportability, and affordability are also Detection, and being addressed. The increased lethality and heightened Identification) operational tempo of future battle spaces demand early The CBRN contamination avoidance capability area responsive detection and warning capabilities to reduce develops CBRN detectors and identifiers for point, the force degradation caused by CBRN contamination. standoff, and early-warning applications for use in These capabilities are critical for force readiness and will CBRN reconnaissance, detection, and identification. continue to be emphasized by the DoD community in the For missions requiring operations in a contaminated near-and far-term. Early detection and warning are keys environment (including fixed sites), reconnaissance, to avoiding CBRN hazards. The following sections detail detection, and identification are critical to ensure the contamination avoidance S&T efforts, modernization

cquisition Program Status cquisition Program strategy, and joint service programs.

A continuation and accomplishment of the mission. These and Chemical and Biological Defense

12 Table 2-1. Detection S&T Strategy

Near (by FY08) Mid (by FY13) Far (by FY23) 2

• Signatures in the THz region of the • Lab prototype of point detector • Nanoscale detector for CB warfare electromagnetic (EM) spectrum for using GHz and THz regions of the agents

exploitation EM spectrum for the detection of CB • Room temperature materials for t e r

• Improve algorithms and sources to warfare agents optical detector elements P increase range and reduce false • Investigate new spectral ranges for • High-power excitation sources based positives signatures that increase discrimination on semiconductor materials • Materials usable in Surface Enhanced from background and reduce false h a positives • Foldable materials for high- Raman Scattering (SERS) application performance optics C for BW detection • Portable point detector for chemical contamination in potable water • Exploit existing emitter sources • Leverage GHz efforts by other (cell towers, radar, etc) for passive government agencies • Lab prototype based on SERS or signatures in GHz/THz domain Resonance Raman for the detection • Increase understanding of biological • Expendable-free detection/ variability • Lab prototype for detection of identification of BW agents • Detection of NTAs contaminants on surfaces for validation of decontamination • Identification of all threats delivered • Feasibility of single pathogen nucleic to detector acid sequencing • Lab prototype for single molecule nucleic acid sequencing • Validate feasibility for classification in biostandoff • Feasibility of inexpensive solid-state

source for deep ultraviolet

2.2.1 Detection Science and operations at ranges of at least 1 km while decreasing the Technology (S&T) Base Efforts false alarm rates to no more than one per week. Another effort, Wide-Area Aerial Reconnaissance, demonstrates Detection S&T efforts are jointly managed, and the performance envelope of the current state-of-the- support programs of both the Joint Project Manager for art hyperspectral imaging technology. Real-time data

Contamination Avoidance (described in section 2.2) and processing is used to perform phenomenology studies to esearch, Development, R the Joint Project Manager for Biological Defense (described explore the optimal trade-offs between speed, spatial and in section 2.3). The S&T efforts include standoff detection, spectral resolution for mapping chemical warfare (CW) point identification, and T&E sciences. threats in an airborne reconnaissance application. A third effort—Lightweight Integrated CB Detection—tested 2.2.1.1 Goals and Timeframes three competing technology concepts and selected from among them the Rapid Aerosol Agent Detection (RAAD) The goal of the detection technology area is to provide equirements and

concept, which uses a combination of multiwavelength R a real-time capability to detect, identify, characterize, fluorescence and laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy quantify, locate, and warn against all known or vali­ to detect and discriminate biological agents. This dated CBRN warfare agent hazards, to include TIM and technology is being considered for technology insertion nontraditional agents (NTAs) (see Table 2-1). as a spiral improvement to the aerosol trigger in the a. Near Term. To meet near term needs, a number of Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS). A sensor technologies are being optimized while alternative fourth effort, Chemical/Biological Agent Water Monitor detection technologies mature. Four major efforts will demonstrated an advanced prototype that will transition be completed in the near-term as part of this effort. to meet the biological detection requirements of One effort, StandOff Biological Aerosol Detection, Increment I of the Joint Chemical Biological Radiological develops and demonstrates technologies to detect and Agent Water Monitor, (JCBRAWM) program. cquisition Program Status cquisition Program

discriminate biological agents in both day-and night-time A and Chemical and Biological Defense

13 • Technology transition from DARPA with operations. This will enable commanders to avoid CBRN Semiconductor Ultraviolet Optical Sources (SUVOS) contamination, determine the need for and verification

2 technology to develop a low cost biological aerosol of effective reconstitution procedures, and assume the detector in collaboration between the CBDP and appropriate protective posture required to continue the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). their mission with minimal performance degradation

t e r • The developmental of new test methodologies to and casualties. CBRN detection technologies have dual- P support Developmental/Operational and Evaluation use potential in occupational environmental health requirements of the CBDP. surveillance for monitoring air pollution, noxious fumes inside enclosed areas, and municipal water supplies. h a b. MidTerm. Midterm technologies focus on C developments to improve tactical detection and iden­ 2.2.1.3 Major Technical Challenges tification capabilities for both CB warfare agents. To this end, work on a first-generation prototype based The major technical challenges are in the areas of on millimeter wave spectroscopy for biodetection is biological collection, detection, and identification, being continued along with ultraviolet (UV) Resonant including remote/early warning sensing, improved agent Raman (UVRR) spectroscopy for the detection and discrimination and quantification, sample processing, identification of biological materials. Efforts to develop interferents (i.e., false positive and negative alarms), and technologies, which will detect surface residuals for ambient biological background rejection. Among other postdecontamination, are being initiated this year. Efforts technical challenges for detection are size, weight, and are being initiated to predict passive standoff technology power reduction of detectors; power generation and response to aerosols, and in detection modalities to consumption; development of integrated biological and detect sentinel species from CB warfare materials and chemical detection systems, the fusion of sensor data processes. with mapping, imagery, and other data for near-real- time display of events; detection on surfaces; standoff c. Far Term. Far term S&T efforts focus on multiagent detection; and detection and quantification of low-level sensors for CBRN agent detection and remote/early exposures. The ability for wireless remote control and warning CBRN detection. These far-term objective to obtain near-real-time information from detectors technologies seek to integrate CB point and remote/early employed by expeditionary forces is a key challenge. warning detection modules into a single system. R&D Challenges for T&E capabilities development include the efforts seek to optimize and balance system sensitivity, following: those of realistically portraying an agent threat esearch, Development, size/weight, cost, power consumption, signature

R environment in a live-agent chamber; performing robust, suppression and false alarm rate. Ultimately, the goal is valid agent-simulant correlations; and developing the direct integration of CBRN detectors as a single system analytical methodologies and modeling and simulation into various platforms linked into command, control, required to fully characterize the detector system communication, computer, and intelligence (C4I) performance under battlefield conditions. networks. The CUGR Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) will exploit next-generation Two critical challenges to current biological agent equirements and sensor technology to demonstrate an improved CBRN detection technologies are the need for a high level of R contamination-detection capability in the current manned logistical support and limitations of standoff detection systems reconnaissance capabilities and demonstrate the military to discriminate biological agents against the background. The utility of CBRN unmanned ground reconnaissance challenge in reducing logistical support stems from systems. dependence on reagents and trade-offs among size, weight, and power requirements of the systems. Several efforts 2.2.1.2 Potential Payoffs and Transition are aimed at providing minimum reagent requirements Opportunities with higher sensitivity, better stability, and fewer support­ ing reagents, and scientific and engineering strategies to Future CBRN detection systems will provide the reduce size, weight, and power requirements, especially capability to detect, identify in real time, map, quantify, in the sample collections components. There are several

cquisition Program Status cquisition Program and track all known CBRN contamination in a theater of factors directly limiting the ability to discriminate A and Chemical and Biological Defense

14 biological agents using standoff detection technologies. systems maintained by the services through their O&M Key factors include (1) a lack of fundamental data in accounts are described in the annex.

understanding the physical and spectral properties of 2 BW and the correlation of these data with clinical and health effects, (2) range limitations due to atmospheric 2.2.3 Contamination absorption, and (3) natural background interference. Avoidance Programs t e r P Within the CBDP, service contamination avoidance needs are addressed by fully coordinated joint projects. Table

2.2.2 Contamination Avoidance h a 2-2 highlights joint programs; service-unique programs Modernization Strategy are italicized. Program descriptions are provided in C The increased lethality and heightened operational tempo Annex A. The joint programs are as follows: of future battlespaces demand responsive detection and • Automatic Chemical Agent Detection Alarm warning capabilities to reduce the force degradation (ACADA) caused by CBRN contamination. These capabilities— which encompass reconnaissance, detection, identifica­ • Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD) tion, and reporting—are critical for force readiness and • Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent will continue to be emphasized by the DoD community Detector (JSLSCAD) in the near term through the far term. Table 2-2 shows the roadmap of DoD requirements for contamination • Joint Service Light NBC Reconnaissance System avoidance and highlights capabilities being developed (JSLNBCRS) and procured in the near term, as well as developmental • Joint Chemical Biological Radiological Agent Water programs that are planned to be available in the midterm Monitor (JCBRAWM) to far term. Fielded legacy systems maintained by the services through their operations and maintenance (O&M) accounts are not indicated in this table. While the near-term requirements primarily address service- specific needs, those in the midterm to far term primarily address joint requirements.

Early detection and warning are keys to avoiding CBRN esearch, Development, hazards. As a result, the DoD is investing in RDA efforts R to provide the warfighters real-time capabilities to detect, identify, quantify, and warn against all CBRN warfare hazards. Real time detection of biological agents is currently unavailable and is unlikely in the near term to midterm, though investment efforts are focused on

reducing detection times. The near term to midterm equirements and focus is on developing stand-alone detectors and sensors, R system miniaturization, improved sensitivity and specific­ ity, agent characterization, range, decreased false alarm rate, and decreased operation and support costs. This focus will facilitate the integration of chemical detectors into personal warfighter gear (Objective Force Warrior (OFW) Program), CBRN detectors onto various air, sea, and ground platforms, and integration of detectors into automated warning and reporting networks. Table A-1  Biological detection efforts are also fully coordinated joint programs and are described in section 2.3. The separation of in Annex A provides an overview of current and planned Contamination Avoidance and Biological Defense corresponds to the

RDA efforts and service involvement. Fielded legacy JPEO organizational structure to facilitate program management Status cquisition Program and does not indicate a lack of integration. A and Chemical and Biological Defense

15 Table 2-2. Contamination Avoidance Modernization Strategy

2 Fielded Capabilities Near (FY07-08) Mid (FY09-13) Far (FY14-23)

• Surface off-gas sampling • Improved, all-agent • Increased sensitivity • Improved surface capability (ICAM) programmable automatic to detect extremely contamination monitor

t e r • Automatic point detection point detection; portable low levels of toxic • Detection of CBR monitor; miniature compounds (JCAD P of nerve and blister agents contamination in water (ACADA)/(Ship ACADA) detectors for aircraft Increment 2) (Joint Chemical Biological interiors; interior ship Radiological Agent Water • Navy-Ship based spaces; wheeled and h a Monitor, (JCBRAWM) improved automatic point tracked vehicles; and

C detection of nerve/blister individual soldiers (JCAD

Chemical Point Detection Point Chemical (IPDS) Increment 1)

• Improved CBRN • Lightweight passive • Add biological detection • Chemical Agent Standoff Reconnaissance Vehicle standoff detection for and identification Detection System detection, with remote/early chemical agent vapors capabilities (JSNBCRS ranging, and mapping of warning and data (JSLSCAD Increment I) P3I) chemical rains, vapors and fusion capabilities and • Light reconnaissance • Lightweight passive aerosols survivability upgrades vehicle (JSLNBCRS) stand-off detection for • Wide area detection (M93A1) • Integrated CBRN chemical agent vapors • Single, fully integrated

emote and Stand-off Stand-off and emote detection (point/ • Joint CBRN multifunctional NBC R standoff)/ identification/ Dismounted Recon Recon platform with NBC sampling /Stryker System (JCDRS) Unmanned Ground Vehicle NBCRV) – Spiral 1 dismounted System (UGVS) capability

Detection reconnaissance (Stryker NBCRV) capability • Future Combat System (FCS) – CBRN Manned Recon and Unattended CBRN Sensors econnaissance and CB CB and econnaissance R

• JCDRS Spiral 2 modularized, networked RN dismounted reconnaissance CB capability

• Army, Marine Corps- • Radiation detection in • Standoff radiation esearch, Development,

R AN/PDR-75, AN/VDR-2 water (JCBRAWM) detection and measurement RADIAC • Portable radiation meter • Marine Corps- IM-143 • Army-AN/PDR-77 RADIAC • Air Force-ADM-300 • Navy-Multi-function equirements and RADIAC R adiation Detection adiation R • Army -Compact, digital whole body radiation measurement (AN/UDR- 13) 1. All programs shown are joint or multiservice, unless indicated as a service-unique effort (italicized text). 2. Where applicable, systems that meet requirements are listed following the entry. cquisition Program Status cquisition Program A and Chemical and Biological Defense

16 2.2.4 T&E Infrastructure to Support • Real-time test-data collection capabilities Contamination Avoidance • Development and fielding of a synthetic test and Biological Defense environment for robust testing of CB detection 2 systems Future T&E capabilities to support contamination

avoidance will provide the ability to detect and identify t e r

agents, as well as build performance correlations P between simulated and actual warfare agents. Planned 2.3 BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE and program-aligned infrastructure and capabilities to PROGRAMS support contamination avoidance programs include the h a following: Within the CBDP, service biological detection needs C are addressed by fully coordinated joint projects. • Development of a Whole-System Live-Agent Testing Advanced development and acquisition efforts for (WSLAT) chamber to test biological point detection biological detection are managed by the Joint Project systems against actual biological agents Manager Biological Defense. Table 2-3 highlights joint • Data standardization and integration for CB programs. Service-unique programs are italicized. detection systems T&E infrastructure to support biodefense programs is included in paragraph 2.2.4 above. Program descriptions • Development of a standoff test capability for CB are provided in Annex B. The joint programs follow: detectors • Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS) • Development of high-speed meteorological and test-

environment monitoring capabilities to improve • Joint Biological Standoff Detection System (JBSDS) field simulant operational tests of CB detection • Joint Portal Shield (JPS) performance • Biological Identification System (BIDS) • Development of simulants and agent-to-simulant performance correlations for detection systems • Dry Filter Units (DFUs) • Testing of CB detection systems with NTAs

Table 2-3. Biological Defense Modernization Strategy esearch, Development, R

Fielded Capabilities Near (FY07-08) Mid (FY09-13) Far (FY14-23)

• Automatic/mobile • Field Joint Biological • Spiral Upgrade of • Build III, JBPDS will exploit biodetection to Standoff Detection JBPDS – increase interoperability of disparate warn, detect, and System to provide number of agents sensors for a detect-to- identify bioagents early warning of detected and identified warn capability. Decreased (Joint Biological Point biological threats with increased size, weight and power will Detection System (JBSDS Increment I) sensitivity, lower false- enable installation on all equirements and R [JBPDS]) • Complete Milestone positive rates; with military platforms. Plug-and- • Navy- Ship-based A, down-select increased reliability Play modules allow greater automatic point technologies, and • Automated biological density and a confirmatory detection of biological transition development remote detection identification I( D) capability agent capabilities of lightweight and and early warning to expedite countermeasures (JBPDS) portable automatic capabilities (JBSDS for high value assets • Army- Biological biological agent Increment II) • Automated biological remote Identification System detection for Joint detection and early warning Biological Detection Systems Detection Biological (BIDS)/(JBPDS) Biological Tactical at decreased size, weight, Detection System and power for unmanned • Joint Portal Shield (JBTDS) vehicle applications with Network Sensor System improved discrimination

• Dry Filter Units (DFUs) (JBSDS Increment III) Status cquisition Program A and Chemical and Biological Defense

17 2.4 inFORMATION SYSTEMS incremental development of JWARN and combined Block II and Block III into one increment and addressed The information systems area seeks to develop the

2 hardware and software integration onto service-designated capability to use automatic collection and fusion of platforms and installation at fixed sites. information from all CBRN defense assets throughout the battlespace and integrate that with other relevant An integrated warning and reporting network will t e r battlespace information and C4I, surveillance and enhance the overall approach used in the chemical P reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. It will integrate threat biological defense strategy. The JWARN effort includes information, CBRN sensor and reconnaissance data, a JWARN component interface device (JCID), which

h a protective posture data, environmental conditions, provides connectivity to CBRN sensors and detectors

C medical surveillance, and other data pertaining to the via wired and wireless communication. (A key challenge CBRN conditions in the battlespace. The end result of will be the connectivity to legacy and some development this capability is the rapid dissemination and display of systems.) Alerts from sensor systems in the operational operationally meaningful information to commanders theater become available to various command levels and units at all levels to support decision making with appropriate levels of resolution determined by the related to the CBRN defense mission, such as joint command decision needs. For example, a fixed facility force protection, restoration of operational tempo, and commander can determine the appropriate level of pro­ casualty care treatment. tective posture by monitoring the direction of an ongoing attack or the effects of weather in moving contamination Warning and reporting provides the critical link between in a postattack situation. CBRN detection and CBRN protection and provides situational awareness to the commander. Warning and Information systems also provide tools for the warfighter reporting provides the hardware and software to connect to understand a specific challenge and evaluate proposed detection systems into the overall command and control solutions. These systems provide the warfighter with a full architecture. Additionally, it provides information and spectrum of capabilities to automatically create warning analysis capabilities to enhance hazard forecasting and reports and situational awareness from sensory input, and assessment, and operational decision making. The goal of to perform hazard analyses, operational effects analyses, warning and reporting is to provide sufficient, accurate, and accurate training. Modeling and simulation (M&S) and timely information to commanders at all levels capabilities are used to provide situational awareness, to through early and direct warning capabilities so they provide hazard-warning and prediction, and for planning or can assume appropriate protective postures and develop modification of operations. In the future, M&S capabilities esearch, Development, R options to continue mission essential operations. will be used to provide operators and decision makers with The Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) will the ability to analyze courses of action immediately prior provide joint forces with a comprehensive warning and to, or in concert with, response objectives. In addition, reporting capability to collect, analyze, identify, locate, M&S aids in the assessment of joint and multi-service report and disseminate CBRN and TIM hazard information doctrine, training, materiel development and equipment to affected personnel. Providing this information to the design (i.e., simulation-based acquisition). M&S is also equirements and warfighter effectively minimizes the effects of hostile used to support warfighter training and the training of R CBRN attacks as well as accidents/incidents. JWARN battle staffs using larger conflict simulations. In the latter will integrate with Joint/Service C4ISR systems and aspect, M&S is used to perform and support analyses of networks. JWARN will be interoperable with the Joint CBRN defense operations within the context of larger Effects Model (JEM) and the Joint Operational Effects military operations. Analytic systems such as models are Federation (JOEF). also critical components of larger systems such as JWARN and command and control systems. These efforts also The JWARN Block I effort began fielding the first support simulation-based acquisition in the development version of software in FY98. The JWARN Block II effort of critical CBRN defense capabilities. commenced in FY01. The JWARN program achieved a Milestone B (MS B) decision in July 2003. Subsequent to The following sections provide a summary of the S&T MS B, a contract was awarded, and the acquisition strategy efforts, modernization strategy, and joint service programs, cquisition Program Status cquisition Program

A was revised. The new acquisition strategy eliminated the all of which support the information systems area. and Chemical and Biological Defense

18 2.4.1 Information Systems and improvements in the fidelity of the models. We will S&T Efforts integrate modules for the JEM that address high altitude

intercepts, urban, littoral, and coastal environments, and 2 The information systems S&T efforts include four interior contamination scenarios. subareas: network architectures; hazard and environmental modeling; simulation, analysis, and planning; and system c. Far Term. The far-term capabilities will include a t e r performance modeling. Information Systems technologies near-real-time operational hazard prediction capability. P are addressing battlespace management, an S&T data Integrated conflict simulation capabilities are also backbone, rapid assimilation of sensor information envisioned to meet theater and strategic simulation research, and medical surveillance systems. Efforts requirements. h a are continuing to provide advanced hazard-assessment Table 2-4 shows specific efforts supporting these goals. C methodologies, to address specific environmental flow regime issues (such as high altitude and urban transport and diffusion (T&D) methodologies), and to support first principle physics, chemistry, and meteorology efforts. Information Systems technologies are addressing operational effects and processes for fixed-site simulations as well as advances in decision support and medical effects modeling. The technology base efforts also leverage information on weapons effects, medical and larger DoD M&S communities to address source term and toxicology, interoperability, and architectural issues. 2.4.1.1 Goals and Timeframes The goals of CBRN defense information systems S&T efforts are to • support the warfighter directly through existing C4ISR networks and information systems, • support operational and National Command

Authorities with CBRN defense environment esearch, Development, R decision systems, and • support DoD-level theater and warfare simulation efforts. a. Near Term. Current modeling capabilities are designed to support warfighter efforts to conduct scenario simulations prior to engagements and to train equirements and in a realistic manner. Recent advances allow CBD plan­ R ning to be folded into larger conflict simulation and consequence management tools, including battlespace management, hazard environment prediction, effects on operations, and acquisition decision support tools. b. Midterm. The next generation transport and diffusion (T&D) methodologies will provide a multifidelity capability, which will afford the warfighter increased flexibility and more responsiveness to threat and hazard predictions. Testing operational models with cquisition Program Status cquisition Program combatant commands will allow for direct user input A and Chemical and Biological Defense

19 Table 2-4. Information Systems S&T Strategy

2 Near (by FY08) Mid (by FY13) Far (by FY23)

• Transition Common Operational • Develop and transition next • High speed data acquisition Picture (COP) to JOEF/JWARN generation technologies and net- supporting full spectrum decision

t e r • Evaluate integration of medical centric enterprise integration support for CB

P syndromic surveillance • Integrate SDF technologies into CB • Develop capability to continuously • Inauguration of Sensor Data Fusion network refine and update contamination (SDF) related technologies • Transition validated source footprint through assimilation of h a determination tool limited and disparate information • Conduct field trial for verification into meteorological and T&D models C and validation (V&V) of • Transition validated sensor developmental SDF algorithms placement tool • Capability to rapidly and accurately model T&D, at high resolution and • New/enhanced dispersion codes for • Initial high altitude modeling in a multitude of environments new environments capability in JEM • Coupled meteorological, T&D and • Improved atmospheric boundary • Comprehensive Secondary Effects CB modeling capability for hazard layer modeling Module (Agent Fate) transitioned prediction • Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) • T&D modeling uncertainty • Federate fully integrated data impact model transition to JOEF quantification backbone • Chemical, biological, and • CBR effects integrated into theater • Development of comprehensive radiological (CBR) effects integrated and campaign-level models/ medical T&E model into selected tactical maneuver simulations model • Full immersive CB virtual • Continue development and transition environment to support test and

• Integrate capabilities from of T&E models training Consequence Assessment Tool Set • Full assessment of virtual prototyping (CATS) into JOEF • Use data for experimentation, and capabilities training, T&E, model development • Evaluate epidemiological modeling • Completion of CB library for insertion into JOEF and JEM • Investigate genomic and proteomic • Gather data and populate backbone modeling within the human body to • Development of multivariate investigate agent pathology decision support tool for CB • Determine data to be collected and investment portfolio areas of future research • Perform modeling to enable predictive pharmacology and • Provide models for syndromic • Development of overarching models toxicology for therapeutic purposes for PMs surveillance, disease epidemiology, casualty estimation, and prediction esearch, Development, • Determine scope of effort, begin

R of human performance in hazard to identify CBRN data backbone environments structure • Determine method for permanently capturing/retrieving data to backbone • Transition NBC Crest/AMedP8 to JOEF equirements and • Medical automation and support R tools cquisition Program Status cquisition Program A and Chemical and Biological Defense

20 2.4.1.2 Potential Payoffs and Transition • Use of internal building models Opportunities • Models of chemical IED effects on mobile forces

Future information systems will enhance C4ISR systems 2 • Other methodologies for improving situational with a level of situational awareness with significant awareness improvements including accurate information, knowledge, and predictions of threats, the environment, operational By 2013, the military force will have significantly t e r alternatives and effects in real time, accelerated time, improved information systems technologies to support P or as required. This will enable commanders to control information sharing and situational awareness of CBRN the battle, analyze the need for CBRN defense actions, hazards in the battlespace, supporting the net-centric h a future focus of the department. verify effective deployment of CBRN defense assets C and reconstitution procedures, assume the appropriate protection required to continue operations, and sustain 2.4.1.3 Major Technical Challenges their mission with minimal performance degradation Major technical challenges for information systems and casualties. The key payoffs of improved information include the following: systems include the following: • Characterizing CBRN hazards on complex, urban • Commanders and battle staffs that are better trained terrain and fixed sites and able to analyze alternate courses of action with advanced simulations. • Characterizing human effects, small unit behaviors and low-level/long-term exposures in CB environment • less confusion and more consistent decision making as a result of using a federation of analytical and real- • Rapidly assimilating CBRN-related data to support

time CBD situational awareness tools. tactical and T&E applications • CBRN defense systems and operational concepts • Developing engineering-level models of CBRN match requirements more closely because warfighter defense equipment feedback is captured earlier in the development cycle • Developing engineering-level models of DoD defense under the tenets of simulation-based acquisition. equipment in CBRN hazard scenarios • Advanced hazard prediction and human effects • Obtaining CB warfare relevant data to facilitate modeling has dual-use potential in aiding civilian M&S and IT development that facilitates decision

responders or planners to prepare for or respond to superiority esearch, Development, terrorist attacks and industrial accidents. R • Integrating CBRN-related IT with other emerging The DoD anticipates over thirty technology transitions technology initiatives (i.e., TMTI-and TCTI-related by FY09, including improvements in real-time hazard requirements) prediction capability for JEM, improvements in CBR operational effects modeling for JOEF, and the maturation Information system technology goals identified in its of a CB “Sim Suite” for testing data fusion tools. These planned approach, combined with new threat agent data

and increased research into performance degradation equirements and changes will add the following capabilities to the JEM, R JOEF, and JWARN programs: effects of protective equipment on units, will address many of these challenges in the midterm. • Simulation of the behavior of atmospheric dispersion of liquid agents • Hazard prediction capabilities for more operational 2.4.2 Information Systems scenarios Modernization Strategy • Measurements of coastal and littoral agent The CBRN Information Systems modernization strategy dispersion is organized into two major functions: (1) warning and • CB sensor-siting around building complexes reporting systems and (2) M&S systems. Table 2-5 shows

the roadmap of DoD requirements for both warning and Status cquisition Program A and Chemical and Biological Defense

21 Table 2-5. Information Systems Modernization Strategy

Fielded 2 Near (FY07-08) Mid (FY09-13) Far (FY14-23) Capabilities • JWARN Block IF • Automatically collect and • Full Global Information Grid • Integration of new – Urgent Needs consolidate sensor information (GIG) Compliance sensors t e r Statement (UNS) • Transport sensor-derived • Wireless sensors and P information through the JWARN connectivity to C2 and C4ISR component interface device (JCID) systems network to the host C2 platform

h a • Cross-domain security • Generate hazard area plot ATP-45 solution for sensor network

C and JEM reporting and management from unclassified to classified eporting Systems eporting • Display hazard warning area on R Common Operational Picture DoD networks (COP) • Integration of new sensors. • Generate warning and de-warning (NBC) messages to affected forces

Warning and and Warning • Integration with full spectrum of command and control (C2) and C4ISR systems and interoperability across the joint battlespace • Transition Hazard • Fully integrated web-based JEM • Urban, littoral, and coastal • Waterborne hazards Prediction and that which includes the best of effects modeling • Complex structures, Assessment breed of: • High altitude missile intercept building interiors Capability a. Transition HPAC - UNS effects modeling (HPAC) • Human performance b. VLSTRACK - UNS • Weather effects above 20 km degradation • Vapor Liquid and precipitation Solid Tracking c. D2PUFF (UNS) • Contagious/infectious (VLSTRACK) - • Integrated with the JWARN • Improved transport and diseases UNS diffusion methodology • Interoperability with authoritative • Effects on aircraft at • D2PUFF - UNS DoD meteorological data systems: • Minimum 10% improvement various altitudes/ ships Virtual Natural Environment in accuracy and speed underway nalysis

A Net-Centric Services (VNE- • Estimate the source location(s) NCS), Meteorological and and source term esearch, Development, Oceanographic (METOC) R • Estimate human effects from azards azards Data Service (MDS), Integrated

H a 5,000 weapon worldwide Meteorological System (IMETS), strike Joint Weather Impact System (JWIS), etc. • Predict fatalities and incapacitation, both initial and delayed (up to 180 days), by country (metropolitan area) • Accommodate population equirements and

R moves including area evacuations or sheltering in place cquisition Program Status cquisition Program A and Chemical and Biological Defense

22 Fielded Near (FY07-08) Mid (FY09-13) Far (FY14-23) Capabilities • No current • Strategic Deliberate Planning in • Strategic deliberate planning • Full spectrum of military 2 fielded capability. a C4ISR Environment (Common in a C4ISR Environment incident response Tools exist and Operating Environment/ (stand-alone) and consequence are utilized such Command and Control Personal • Operational Deliberate management at military as STAFFS and Computer, COE/C2PC) Planning in a C4ISR installations/sites and t e r

NBC CREST, but • Operational deliberate planning Environment (Standalone) in C4ISR environments P no integrated (COE and stand-alone) nalysis in a C4ISR environment (COE /

A program • Tactical deliberate planning in C2PC) a C4ISR environment (COE/ • Full spectrum of civilian

of record h a • Operational crisis planning in a C2PC and stand-alone) incident response ffects ffects capabilities exist.

E and consequence

C4ISR environment (COE / C2PC) C • Strategic crisis planning in a management at civilian C4ISR environment (COE/ sites and in C4ISR C2PC and stand-alone) environments (COE and

perational perational • Operational crisis planning in stand-alone)

O a C4ISR environment (stand- alone) • Tactical crisis planning in a C4ISR environment (COE/ C2PC and stand-alone) • None • Warning and reporting capabilities • Warning and reporting • Warning and reporting (supports training and planning) capabilities (supports training capabilities (supports • Hazard analysis capabilities and planning) training and planning) (supports training and planning) • Hazard Aanalysis capabilities • Hazard analysis

• Operational effects analysis (supports training and capabilities (supports capabilities (supports training and planning) training and planning) planning) • Operational effects analysis • Operational effects capabilities (supports training analysis capabilities and planning) (supports training and • Optimization of placement of planning) decontamination personnel, • Sensor placement materials, and equipment to optimization. raining Simulation Systems

T speed the decontamination process, restore operational

tempo and minimize exposure esearch, Development, R of personnel to hazards reporting and M&S, and highlights capabilities being sensors. Like M&S systems, warning and reporting developed and procured and the near term and develop­ systems typically are hosted on other major hardware mental programs that are planned to be available in and software systems though they are capable of stand- the midterm to far term. Legacy systems that are still alone operation. equirements and maintained by the services are not addressed here. The CBD M&S program includes efforts from R Warning and reporting systems combine hardware with technology base through full-scale system development information systems solely as a result of the need to and demonstration. The JEM, program is based upon the create the physical means to automatically provide sensor proven technologies of existing agent hazard assessment system data to the information system and consequently models and the emerging operational requirements provide the resulting information in an effective manner document, which articulates the joint service needs. to the human operator. Therefore, warning and reporting The JEM program achieved Milestone A in May 2001 systems have evolved from platform-based (ANBACIS and Milestone B in January 2004, along with a signed and MICAD) efforts to the more generic JWARN system requirements documents and a T&E master plan. hosted on C4ISR systems with the capability of receiving The JOEF program achieved Milestone A in February data from or controlling all legacy and future CBRN Status cquisition Program

2002. JOEF is the acquisition program that addresses A and Chemical and Biological Defense

23 operational effects and planning. JOEF will use JWARN scenario. Eventually, testing will be virtual simulation and JEM to predict or analyze the nature of the hazard with or without a small actual test unit in play. The focus

2 area, but will take that information and use a federation will be on digitizing the environment and performance of of other models and simulations to meet a specific systems of systems against which to play the CBDP M&S operational commander’s or other authority’s needs. The system, with the ability to run thousands of scenarios

t e r combination of JWARN, JEM and JOEF will meet a wide quickly to identify major areas of focus and combinations

P spectrum of user needs for analytical M&S systems. of conditions best suited for actual live testing. Time- Analysis and training are the keys to being prepared for, sequenced and aligned efforts to support RDA activities in information systems include the following: h a and responding to a CBRN event. As a result, the DoD is

C concentrating RDA efforts on providing its warfighters • Development of high-speed ground-truth and test- and decision makers with analytical systems to predict or environment monitoring capabilities to improve forensically analyze events and courses of action for the operational testing and the ability to compare full spectrum of CBRN threats. In the near term, efforts model predictions to measured field-simulant cloud are focused on taking advantage of technology devel­ behavior opment in hazard assessment methodologies to provide • Development of portable testing capabilities interim accreditation for a number of analysis regimes. In addition, efforts in operational effects and simulation- • Development and implementation of improved based acquisition (SBA) will be prepared to transition data-fusion techniques to full-scale development programs. In the midterm, • Improvement of test-area data-collection capabilities first priority has been given to transitioning the most • Development of synthetic test capabilities using

mature technologies to the new-start JEM and JOEF programs. These will provide accredited, common-use operational-testing stimulators hazard information systems by 2008. Largely due to the • Development and implementation of real-time test- maturity of the technologies, requirements and the vision data collection capabilities for field testing for them, the SBA and training systems,capability (TSC) will be addressed behind those for analysis. However, both SBA and TSC are also functionally and structurally dependent upon the analytical systems so a delay in their 2.5 DECONTAMINATION start is appropriate. Table C-1 in Annex C provides an When contamination cannot be avoided, personnel esearch, Development, overview of RDA efforts and service involvement. and equipment may need to be decontam­nated to R reduce, eliminate, or neutralize hazards after CBRN The management challenge involves the coordination weapons employment. Decontamination systems pro­ and consolidation of numerous previously uncoordinated vide a force restoration capability for units that become RDA efforts across the services and agencies. This contaminated. Two commercial application systems strategy, led by the JPEO through the Joint Project (Multipurpose Decontamination System & Fixed Site Manager, Information Systems (JPMIS), established in Decontamination System) were fielded in response to April 2003, has already resulted in the initiation of the equirements and

R five applicator Operations Need Statements (ONS) above mentioned joint service RDA efforts. and one decontaminant ONS. Technology advances in sorbents, vapor, dispersion methodologies, coatings, catalysts, and physical removal will reduce logistics 2.4.3 T&E Infrastructure to burden, manpower requirements, and lost operational Support Information Systems capability associated with decontamination operations. Future T&E capabilities to support battlefield information The following sections detail CBRN decontamination systems will provide the ability to perform automated S&T efforts, modernization strategy, and joint service and integrated stimulation of systems, collection of programs. system performance data, and processing of data to evaluate M&S systems as used within operational test/ cquisition Program Status cquisition Program

A unit exercises when integrated into an overall battlefield and Chemical and Biological Defense

24 2.5.1 Decontamination S&T Efforts chemistry solutions and technologies. The desired products are liquid-based systems for a one-liter spray The S&T efforts in this area include process fundamentals,

device or a 5-gallon backpack-type unit. These products 2 solution chemistry, solid phase decontamination, and are for use in operational decontamination scenarios. alternative processes. Several approaches based on liquid chlorine dioxide-based

solutions are being studied. Other candidates for this t e r 2.5.1.1 Goals and Timeframes application are peroxide-based systems with nucleophiles. P The goal of decontamination S&T is to develop Enzymatic generation of reactive components is also being studied. In support of the HRDS, the program

technologies that remove, displace, or eliminate h a toxic materials or their effects without performance is investigating reactive nanoparticle-based reactive degradation to the contaminated object and that will sorbents and impregnated fabrics for the containment C be noncorrosive, environmentally safe, and lightweight system. (see Table 2-6). This area includes decontamination b. Midterm. This covers the FY 09–FY13 period. In light of personnel, individual equipment, tactical combat of the changing manner in which the future force will vehicles, aircraft, ships, facilities, and fixed sites. be operating, the decontamination program strategy is a. Near Term. The program has focused on technologies shifting emphasis from requirements-pull to technology- to address transition milestones for the Joint Materiel push. The program is incorporating a new vision to Decontamination System (JMDS), Joint Portable look at decontamination at the systems-of-systems Decontamination System (JPDS), and the Human level, and is looking to evolve technologies to allow Remains Decontamination System (HRDS). For JMDS personnel the capability to perform immediate, thorough

the program is focusing upon the development of a gaseous decontamination of skin and personal equipment items. system based on hydrogen peroxide with ammonia as In terms of the tactical decontamination of equipment, an additive to achieve broad-spectrum reactivity. Also, the aim is the same for both platform interiors and reactive fabric-based solvent wipes are being developed exterior surfaces. Similarly, in area decontamination we as part of the tool kit for the JMDS. For the JPDS, the plan to achieve the same results in the longer term. program is evaluating a number of approaches involving

Table 2-6. Decontamination S&T Strategy esearch, Development,

Near (by FY08) Mid (by FY13) Far (by FY23) R • Broader involvement of academic • Robust Decontamination Knowledge Base • Create a dramatic technological and industrial research − agent-surface interaction change that transforms existing doctrinal decontamination practices • Analytical and predictive − identification and selection of decontamination modeling candidate decontaminants • Improved capabilities allow for • Wide-area solutions thorough decontamination of − efficacy of candidate skin and personal equipment by • Alternative scientific process decontaminants the individual within immediate methodologies to maximize equirements and − Decontaminant effects on sensitive decontamination time requirements R efficacy and “durable” materials • Improved capabilities for thorough • Process application/dispersion • New Generation/Alternative Science decontamination of crew-served methodology(ies) to maximize Decontaminants and Decontamination systems allow for thorough decontamination efficacy Systems decontamination of equipment by the crew within operational − Demonstrated efficacy against all decontamination time requirements agents − includes the full spectrum of chemical agents, biological agents, TIM, and other novel agents and materials − environmentally benign cquisition Program Status cquisition Program

− effective on numerous surfaces A and Chemical and Biological Defense

25 Technologies under consideration include evolutionary development of decontamination T&E capabilities also lie approaches and revolutionary approaches. The program in safety of use of the simulated agent or decontaminant,

2 is looking at alternative processes based upon applicator and in correlating stimulant field performance to that of systems to achieve this goal. For liquid decontamination, the corresponding live agent. we are examining mixed formulations and novel

t e r enzymatic materials. Also under investigation are a

P number of approaches using reactive nanoparticles 2.5.2 Decontamination in a variety of matrices. Coating systems are slated to Modernization Strategy be studied possibly as early as FY08 depending on the h a outcome of current DARPA efforts in this area. The goal of the CBRN decontamination program area is to

C provide technology to remove and detoxify contaminated c. Far Term. A number of technology options can be material without damaging combat equipment, personnel, pursued, all consistent with the TCTI vision as a system or the environment. Decontamination systems provide a of systems. Planned research areas intend to push the force restoration capability for contaminated units. Exist­ edge of current technologies. A number of concepts in the ing capabilities rely upon the physical application and coatings area point to some intriguing possibilities. The rinse down of decontaminants on contaminated surfaces. most intriguing involves a “smart systems” approach. The Existing systems are effective against a wide variety of concept is to evolve technologies that can encapsulate and threat agents, yet are slow and labor intensive and present react with agents or possibly act as both sensor and active logistical, environmental, material, and safety burdens. decontaminant. Nanotubes and nanoclusters of various Existing systems are also inadequate for electronic compositions may afford this capability. equipment decontamination, deficient for large area,

port, and airfield decontamination, and rely on water or 2.5.1.2 Potential Payoffs and Transition bleach-based aqueous systems. To improve capabilities Opportunities in this functional area, the joint community has placed The payoff from enhanced decontaminants and emphasis upon new decontaminating technologies that decontamination systems will be new noncorrosive, reduce existing manpower and logistics requirements. nontoxic, nonflammable, and environmentally safe These technologies are safer on the environment, the decontamination systems suitable for timely elimination warfighter, and equipment. Table 2‑7 shows the roadmap of CBRN hazards from all materials and surfaces. This for modernizing decontamination systems in the DoD, ability will allow forces to reconstitute personnel and and highlights capabilities being developed and procured esearch, Development, R equipment more quickly to increase combat efficiency in the near term, as well as developmental programs that and lessen the logistic burdens. In the future, reactive are planned to be available in the midterm to far term. coatings may allow the continuation of combat operations Legacy systems that are still maintained by the services without the need to disengage for decontamination. are not addressed here. Potential uses for environmental remediation, especially A decontamination master plan provides a roadmap that those dealing with pesticide and TIM contamination and integrates RDA efforts with non-RDA efforts, including

equirements and implications to domestic scenarios, are being exploited. policy, doctrine, standards, and revised tactics, techniques R and procedures. R&D of noncorrosive, all-agent multi­ 2.5.1.3 Major Technical Challenges purpose decontaminants and decontaminating systems for combat equipment, aircraft, and personal gear remains a There are a range of technical challenges associated with priority. Alternative decontamination approaches, such as CB decontamination. Warfighters need decontaminants sensitive equipment decontamination methods and large- that are reactive, nonaqueous, noncorrosive, safe for use scale decontamination systems, attract interest across the on sensitive equipment, able to decontaminate a broad services. Table D-1 in Annex D provides an overview of spectrum of CB agents, environmentally safe, and pose joint service RDA efforts and service involvement. no unacceptable health hazards. Additionally, warfighters need decontamination systems that effectively clean all surfaces and materials while simultaneously reducing cquisition Program Status cquisition Program

A the manpower and logistics burden. Challenges to the and Chemical and Biological Defense

26 2 Decontaminant Decontaminant II II t e r P ircraft Decontamination) ircraft Far (FY14-23) Far A ncrement ncrement ncrement ncrement I I h a DS DS T ission-tailored decontaminants decontaminants ission-tailored arge-scale fixed location location fixed arge-scale JSPDS JSPDS decontamination interior Vehicle Navy Contamination-resistant Contamination-resistant Navy materials shipboard JS (include capability decontamination Waterless and electronics for capability avionics equipment Sensitive for system decontamination interiors aircraft use for systems decontamination Service (Joint facilities site fixed at Decontamination Stationary System) C M L • • • • • • • • ) id (FY09-13) id I M oncaustic, noncorrosive noncorrosive oncaustic, and-held portable portable and-held uto-releasing coatings; reduces reduces coatings; uto-releasing ncrement ncrement Decontaminants for fixed sites fixed for Decontaminants decontaminant for personnel and and personnel for decontaminant equipment capability caustic -Less Navy labor & hazard contact skin requirements systems applicator decontaminant operational and immediate for Portable (Joint decontamination System Decontamination I N A H

• • • • • odernization Strategy

I M ncrement ncrement I ransportable ransportable T I ear (FY07-08) ear N esearch, Development, R DS), Small Scale Scale Small DS), T oncaustic, noncorrosive, noncorrosive, oncaustic, ncrement ncrement Joint Service Personnel/Skin Personnel/Skin Service Joint Decontamination System (JSPDS) (JSPDS) System Decontamination I manufacture and store to easy decontaminants multipurpose Service Joint System Decontamination (JS Decontaminant N

• • • able 2-7. Decontamination T ) B) HTH T equirements and R quipment ypochlorite ( ypochlorite E H Fielded Capabilities Fielded est est T 291 Skin Decontaminating Kit Decontaminating Skin 291 Kit Decontaminating 295 Decontamination Sorbent 100 igh igh ndividual ndividual Supertropical Bleach (S Bleach Supertropical I System

M M H M • • • • • Bulk Bulk xpedient xpedient quipment quipment Personal Personal E E cquisition Program Status cquisition Program Decontaminants Decontaminants Delivery Systems Delivery A and Chemical and Biological Defense

27 2 t e r P Far (FY14-23) Far h a arge-scale fixed location location fixed arge-scale Vehicle interior decontamination decontamination interior Vehicle capability decontamination Waterless and electronics for capability avionics equipment Sensitive for system decontamination interiors aircraft use for systems decontamination Service (Joint facilities site fixed at Decontamination Stationary System) C

L • • • • arge arge L DS, DS, T ) I id (FY09-13) id M ncrement ncrement I onaqueous capability for for capability onaqueous apid large-scale large-scale apid decontamination capability for for capability decontamination manpower reduced sites; fixed (JS burden logistic and Scale other and avionics, electronics, equipment sensitive N R

• •

I ncrement ncrement I ransportable ransportable T ear (FY07-08) ear N esearch, Development, R DS), Small Scale Scale Small DS), T igh-pressure water wash; wash; water igh-pressure Joint Service Service Joint Decontamination System System Decontamination (JS Decontaminant decontaminant improved vehicle (increased dispenser throughput)

H • •

I 17 17 ncrement ncrement 1 Power Power 1 I M A equirements and pparatus pparatus R A 12 M ransportable ransportable T eplace eplace R ultipurpose ultipurpose ebuild ebuild M R Fielded Capabilities Fielded DS (Fixed Site) Site) (Fixed DS ightweight Decontamination Decontamination ightweight 1 Power Driven Driven Power 1 L L A DS), Small Scale Scale Small DS), T 17 17 12 17 igh-pressure water wash; wash; water igh-pressure rmy – rmy pparatus; pparatus; ightweight Decontamination Decontamination ightweight nterim fielding of a commercially commercially a of fielding nterim System System Decontamination Decontamination Driven A L System System Decontamination lightweight Commercial (interim system decontamination the for replacement/supplement M terrain perform to unit developed decontamination Service Joint System Decontamination (JS Decontaminant decontaminant improved vehicle (increased dispenser throughput A M M I H • • • • • • • Deliberate Deliberate cquisition Program Status cquisition Program Delivery Systems Delivery A 1. All programs shown are joint or multiservice, unless indicated as a service-unique unless indicated joint or multiservice, effort are All programs (italicized text). shown 1. the entry. listed following are meet requirements systems that applicable, Where 2. and Chemical and Biological Defense

28 2.5.3 Joint Service Decontamination and dioxiranes, and liquid slurries or suspensions of Programs nanoparticles in organic solvents. The Army developed the M291 Skin Decontamination In the far term, the services are seeking nonaqueous 2 Kit as a replacement for the M258A1 Decontamination decontamination systems to provide for sensitive Kit for all services and introduced the M295 for equipment decontamination at mobile and fixed sites. t e r improved personal equipment decontamination. The Additionally, there is interest and exploratory research P M295 provides the warfighter a fast and non-caustic in coatings, which can reduce or eliminate the necessity decontamination system for personal gear. An adsorbent of manual decontamination. The ultimate goal of this that is more reactive and has higher capacity for absorbing coatings effort is to develop a chemically or possibly h a electrically reactive coating to apply on equipment contamination was developed and completed to improve C the performance of the M295 kit. The M295 kit filled when operating under high CBRN threat conditions. with the new sorbent became available for requisition in This coating would then provide immediate decontam­ ination on contact with CBRN agents, thus reducing the January 2000. hazard without any actions required at that time by the Two systems and a decontaminant were fielded in response warfighter. A detailed description of the decontamination to Urgent Operational Needs. The Multi-Purpose projects is provided in Annex D. Decontamination System, a commercial system, was fielded to address M17 shortages in meeting operational 2.5.4 Other Decontamination requirements. The Fixed Site Decontamination Programs System, a modified commercial item, was fielded to The Army is using commercial-off-the-shelf technology address an urgent need to provide facility and terrain

to alleviate M17 shortages until fielding of Joint Service decontamination. The Sandia National Laboratories– Transportable Decontamination-Small Scale occurs. The developed DF-200 was fielded to address the urgent Marine Corps has modified its existing M17 Lightweight need for an environmentally friendly decontaminant. Decontamination System so it can be operated with In the near term and midterm, the DoD continues military standard fuels. The Navy has procured and is to research new multipurpose decontaminants as a fielding an M17 Lightweight Decontamination System replacement for obsolete Decontamination Solution 2 that can be operated with military standard fuels. The (DS2) and for corrosive High Test Hypochlorite (HTH) M100 Sorbent Decontamination System began fielding and Super Tropical Bleach (STB). New technologies, in February 2002. This decontamination system replaces such as reactive decontaminating systems, oxidative the M11/M13 DAP and associated DS2 used in imme­ esearch, Development, R formulations, and enhanced sorbents are being explored diate decontamination. This system consists of a nontoxic and may offer operational, logistical, cost, safety, and and noncorrosive, powder-based system that provides environmental advantages over current decontaminants. greater coverage than the M11 at 33% less weight. Present chlorine-based decontaminant solutions pose an unacceptable corrosion risk to aircraft. Current 2.5.5 T&E Infrastructure to procedures require the use of fresh water and normal aircraft detergent solutions. Support Decontamination equirements and R Ideally, new decontaminant formulations must be Future T&E capabilities for decontamination systems extremely reactive with dwell times under 15 minutes will include the ability to quantitatively assess the and be effective at a pH below 10.5 to minimize operational significance of system degradation caused by corrosion. Potential new solutions-based approaches decontamination operations. This is critical for both CB consist of organic, aqueous and mixed organic-aqueous and non-CB systems that require NBC Contamination systems, which use catalytic and oxidative chemistries. Survivability (NBCCS). The T&E capabilities will Some promising decontaminants under consideration are also be focused on providing for quantitative and organized assemblies incorporating monoethanolamine- operationally meaningful characterization of the efficacy type moieties, non-chlorine containing oxidants, of decontamination systems for hasty, operational, and thorough decontamination. A future focus is to provide such as stabilized peroxides, peroxycarboxylic acids Status cquisition Program

a wider range of simulants for agents and possibly A and Chemical and Biological Defense

29 decontaminants for use in field testing/training. Time- “Respiratory & Ocular Protection” and “Percutaneous sequenced and aligned efforts to support RDA activities Protection.” Masks and clothing are the two subareas

2 in decontamination include the following: within the individual protection thrust area. • Development of hazard-assessment models for Protective masks with reduced respiratory stress, decontamination improved protection, compatibility with weapon-

t e r sighting systems, and reduced weight and cost are

P • Expanded CW agent decontamination system being developed. Respiratory protection technology capabilities focuses primarily on air purification technologies, and materials technologies for mask lenses and face

h a • Development of capabilities to assess the effects of decontamination on battlefield performance pieces. Protective gloves are being developed that C will have greater durability, tactility, and dexterity • Development of capabilities to test decontamination and that are flame resistant. Protective footwear will procedures under battlefield-relevant conditions provide equal or increased durability while greatly including development of reactive simulants for use reducing weight and volume. Percutaneous protection in operational testing technology mainly focuses on the development of • Development of decontamination test methodologies materials such as engineered permeable materials for NTAs that include semipermeable membranes, sorbent- • Development of updated methods to assess the loaded semipermeable membranes, nanobarrier degradative effects of the decontaminating process materials, and reactive materials. on equipment and systems. • Collective protection programs develop systems

that provide shelters, buildings, and platforms (vehicles, vessels, and aircraft) with a toxic-free 2.6 PROTECTION environment to support mission continuity without impacting the operations tempo. Technologies, once Protection provides life sustainment and continued mature, are then transitioned to the JPM – Collective operational capability in the CBRN contaminated Protection for incorporation into acquisition environment. The protection capability area provides programs. The collective protection program is the capability to shield the force from harm caused by driven by capability gaps identified as “Expeditionary CBRN hazards by preventing or reducing individual and Collective Protection.” There are two subareas in esearch, Development, collective exposures and by protecting critical equipment. collective protection—air purification systems and R The protection program is aligned within three areas— shelter systems. Air purification technology seeks individual protection, collective protection, and test temporary and permanent air purification solutions methodology development. Because of the similarities of for transportable and fixed-site applications. many of the technologies, the JSTO-CBD manages the Advanced vapor separation technologies, advanced S&T program as an integrated portion of the protection aerosol/particulate separation technologies, and capability area. However, JPEO-CBD manages individual filter residual life indicators are being investigated equirements and and collective protection systems separately. to enhance the performance of both single-pass R and regenerable air purification systems. Shelter • Individual protection programs develop new ensembles worn by the individual warfighter to technology mainly focuses on the development of materials such as engineered permeable materials, provide protection against CB agents. Individual impermeable materials, and material treatments. protection taxonomy follows potential routes Supporting technologies are being investigated to of entry, including: respiratory, ocular, and advance environmental control units, motor blower percutaneous. Technologies, once mature, are then units, structural components, and test methodology. transitioned to the Joint Program Manager (JPM) Technology improvements are being pursued to – individual protection for incorporation into reduce power requirements and improve filtration acquisition programs. The primary focus of Individual capacity against current and future CBRN hazards. Protection is to address capability gaps identified in cquisition Program Status cquisition Program Technologies that reduce weight, volume, cost, A and Chemical and Biological Defense

30 and improve the deployability of shelters and air of the near-term objectives. A future individual protective purification systems are also being pursued. ensemble, tentatively titled the Joint Chemical Ensemble

• Test methodology development supports the (JCE), will drive the majority of midterm technology 2 transition of new technologies by developing and transitions. Additional technology drivers include support validating new test methods that are transitioned to Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) that into test range capabilities. Methodologies, once are outside the CBDP. MDAPs supported may include t e r mature, are transitioned from JSTO-CBD to the the Ground Soldier System (GSS), a component of the P Program Director for Test Equipment Strategy and Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) for individual

Support (PD-TESS) at the JPEO‑CBD for validation dismounted soldiers, and support for MDAP vehicles h a

of the range capability. and platforms that have specific collective-protection C requirements. 2.6.1 Protection S&T Efforts Valid and applicable methodologies are essential to User issues with current protective systems focus on support technology transition and provide a means for factors such as burden, costs, duration of performance, end-item qualification for fielding. Test methods that and effectiveness against a full range of agents. From an address individual components, subsystems and whole S&T standpoint, these operational challenges translate to systems are developed concurrently with the applicable the development of materials and systems that capture, technology. Timeframes generally reflect the timeframe block, or destroy agents more effectively than the of the specific technology. current systems without increasing material weight or a. Near term. The focus of the near term is to transition costs, while reducing burden and lessening the impact

specific technologies that support the JECP program on mission performance, S&T efforts also address the and associated MDAP vehicles and other platforms. general technology areas (themes) of air purification, Goals of these programs align with capability gaps in materials science, human performance and systems “Expeditionary Collective Protection” and “Fixed Site science. Collective Protection.” Specific goals are to (1) reduce the weight, size, and power requirements of collective 2.6.1.1 Protection Goals and Timeframes protection (CP) systems, (2) reduce the logistical Protection research projects support joint acquisition burdens associated with the maintenance of CP filters, programs as the means of getting technology to the (3) improve protection capabilities against current and emerging threat agents, including TIM, and (4) esearch, Development, warfighter. The timing and goals of the protection S&T R program are aligned with acquisition programs. See Table improve the ability of transportable shelter systems to 2-8 for the timeframes associated with the protection S&T be deployed. To achieve these goals, improvements to system components are being investigated along with strategy. The Joint Expeditionary Collective Protection improvements to the current vapor and particulate (JECP) system has near-term milestones and drives most filtration media. Regenerative vapor and particulate equirements and

Table 2-8. Protection S&T Strategy R

Near (by FY08) Mid (by FY13) Far (by FY23) • Regenerative and Reactive Air • Integrated Protective Fabric • Network-centric Protective Technologies Purification • Novel Respiratory/Ocular Protection • Embedded Sensors • Improved Single-Pass Filtration • Human Performance-based Design • Intelligent Materials • Shelter Materials, Coatings, and Studies • Reactive Hybrid Approaches Treatments • Novel sorbents • Nano-Closure Systems • Advanced Air Purification AA( P) • High-EfficiencyN anofiber filters model • Self-Detoxifying Surfaces/Materials • Alternative ColPro System • Test and Evaluation Technologies Methodologies Status cquisition Program A and Chemical and Biological Defense

31 filtration materials processes are being investigated to 5) T&E Methodologies. Complete development of eliminate the need for filter change and improve the component-and system -test methodologies to

2 capability against any battlespace CBRN hazards. Specific support JECP development timelines. Work technologies are as follows: includes the development of an integrated 1) Regenerative and Reactive Air Purification. Complete and real-time swatch test methodology, air t e r development and validation of technologies that purification component, subsystem, full-system P have emerged over the previous 3 to 10 years to test methodologies, and whole-system chamber and replace activated carbon, single-pass filtration field test methodologies. Methodology and referee equipment development will be transitioned to the h a technologies. This includes evaluation of electro- PD-TESS.

C thermal swing adsorption (ESA) technologies and fabricates a high-fidelity prototype for transition b. Midterm. The focus of midterm technology during FY08. Pressure/temperature swing transitions will support initiation of an integrated adsorption (P/TSA) regenerative air purification ensemble program of record and address the user’s and catalytic oxidation (CATOX) efforts continue desire of developing a novel approach to individual to be funded through the Chemical and Biological protection. The primary goal of individual protection Defense Initiative Fund (CBDIF). is to address capability gaps identified in “Respiratory 2) Improved Single-Pass Filtration. Develop a residual life & Ocular Protection,” and “Percutaneous Protection.” indicator (RLI) system and examine chemical vapor The burden and degradation of mission performance pulse probes to assess the remaining capacity for are the warfighters’ primary issue with currently fielded chemical agents. This technology will provide an individual protection systems. Additionally, individual on-line capability of assessing collective protection protective systems must address the inhalation, ocular filter systems. Additionally, a high-fidelity prototype and percutaneous threat of aerosolized agents, NTAs, filter will be fabricated and tested. This will and emerging threats. Physical solutions are focused culminate research in sorbent technologies and on the development of novel materials that can provide includes novel, optimized particulate and sorbent an increased level of protection while reducing the media that provides broader protection against physiological and logistical burdens associated with chemical warfare agents (CWA) and TIMs at a lower prolonged use of the items. Approaches include the encumbrance as compared to currently fielded end- development of strong, lightweight, and tactile barrier items. Both technologies are candidates for retrofits materials; agent-resistant, selective permeable materials, esearch, Development, and aerosol and vapor-resistant breathable materials. R in fielded systems. The addition of a self-detoxification component is also 3) Shelter Materials, Coatings and Treatments. Complete being pursued to enhance the protection (and lighten) work on a new lightweight barrier material that protective materials, increase service-life, and reduce is suitable as an exterior tentage material. This the secondary transfer and re-aerosolized threat during material will incorporate n-chloramines into the doffing procedures. Individual air purification physical interior face of the fabric and will be assessed against solutions are focused on the development of novel equirements and spore-forming biological agents, HD, and selected

R materials for advanced adsorbents and aerosol/particulate NTAs. Additionally, work will be completed on the filtration with the aim of reducing the size, weight, profile, assessment coatings that can rapidly prepare existing and breathing resistance of the filter while increasing structures for expedient collective protection performance across a broader range of potential threats shelters. that include TIMs. An integrated ensemble, designed to 4) Advanced Air Purification (AAP) model. Complete work reduce burden and enhance mission performance, will on a trade study tool for the sizing, optimization, become the platform for these new technologies. Burden sensitivity analysis, and assessment of advanced air and mission degradation are based on a multitude of purification systems. Initial modeling capabilities both cognitive and physiological factors. These factors will be for improved single pass, CATOX , P/TSA, and being identified and will form the bases of design and ESA. heuristics and early assessment techniques. cquisition Program Status cquisition Program A and Chemical and Biological Defense

32 Additional technology transitions will provide and effectiveness against a full range of agents. From an fundamental advances in collective protection by S&T standpoint, these operational challenges translate to

providing whole-system approaches rather than current the development of materials and systems that capture, 2 component approach. Studies are being conducted that block, or destroy agents more effectively than the build on the lessons learned from DARPA’s Immune current systems without increasing material weight or

Building program that uses a computer model called the costs, while reducing burden and lessening the impact on t e r

Immune Building Toolkit for analysis of alternate system mission performance. Specific challenges are subdivided P and technology approaches. These studies will identify below in the technology theme areas of air purification, alternate collective protection technologies that will be material science, human performance, and systems h a developed and transitioned in the midterm. engineering. C c. Far Term. As warfighters become increasingly a. Air Purification. connected to the network, protective technologies should 1) Removal of hazardous low-molecular weight chemical integrate with this emerging capability. Integrated and vapors. Chemically impregnated activated carbon automated information linkages can reduce the overall (ASZM-TEDA) has limited the service life and burden to the warfighter by automatically responding effectiveness against acid-gas agents and low- to increase protection when hazards are imminent, and molecular weight chemical TIMs. Technologies reducing protection (and burden) when hazards have are needed that increase adsorption/removal passed. Additionally, intelligent materials could report effectiveness, extend service life, and decrease size exposed personnel and initiate decontamination and/or and weight. New sorbents based on novel materials therapeutics. (e.g., nanotechnology) show the potential to have Efforts in collective protection will seek novel, low- significantly higher capacities and agent uptake cost, and scaleable approaches that allow seamless rates to reduce the pressure drop and lower filter incorporation into all building and vehicle designs and profile, and can be tailored to low-molecular weight support rapid (field) conversion of fixed facilities. System compounds. approaches will be developed that allow less dependence 2) Energy efficient non-adsorptive processes. Reactive on overpressure techniques and depend more heavily on processes such as catalytic oxidation of chemical network integration and rapid response. Technologies agents or heat destruction of biological agents that include strippable coatings, self-detoxifying surfaces, require too much power for economical use in and responsive (switchable) surfaces will be developed situations where waste energy is not available. New- esearch, Development, to support collective protection configurations that can technologies or innovative applications or current R rapidly mitigate fugitive internal contamination transfers. technologies are needed to significantly reduce the 2.6.1.2 Overview of DARPA Protection Programs power consumption and achieve the required agent This thrust focuses on destroying or neutralizing pathogens destruction. and toxins before they enter the body. Projects in the area 3) Highly efficient low resistance sub-micron particulate of decontamination and neutralization include the Self- removal. Current high-efficiency particulate equirements and

Decontaminating Surfaces program that seeks to explore, (HEPA) technologies create significant pressure R identify, and develop creative new material technologies barriers (pressure drop) to airflow and have poor for the ultimate purpose of providing a surface treatment performance for particles below 0.3 microns. that is biocidal and exhibits self-cleaning/renewal Techniques that decrease pressure drop by behavior. The initial phase will demonstrate approaches increasing surface area through pleating increase applicable to military vehicle exteriors as well as coatings the size of the filter bed. Technologies are needed to that are compatible with sensitive electronics. significantly decrease pressure drop (per unit area) and increase efficiencies for submicron particulate 2.6.1.3 Major Technical Challenges removal. Additionally, efficient (size, weight, power) technologies are needed for regenerable and/or User issues with current protective systems focus on

medialess particulate removal technologies. Status cquisition Program

factors such as burden, costs, duration of performance, A and Chemical and Biological Defense

33 4) Residual life indicators (RLIs). Protective systems such the potential to be highly effective and breathable, as filters and protective garments have finite service but issues such as robustness and manufacturability

2 lives stipulated on the label or technical manual. must be addressed before this technology becomes However, service life is often strongly dependent a viable option. on environmental factors such as temperature, 3) Ultrathin, high-strength, and flexible/tactile barrier t e r relative humidity, and environmental contaminant materials. Classical and nontraditional agents P loading. This can lead to equipment/material being penetrate many polymeric barrier materials. To discarded when significant service-life remains, or achieve the required protection levels, current remaining in service without sufficient capacity h a materials used for gloves, boots, and shelter systems remaining. Technologies are needed to continually are often thick and stiff. This results in reduced C apprise the user of the residual life of the item, tactility, degraded performance of fine-motor tasks, without taking the item out of service. RLIs must be and increased the thermal burden. New materials broad-spectrum and directly correlate to residual are needed to allow the construction of thin and capacity of the media and not be specific to targeted strong chemical agent barriers for low-weight CB contaminants or agents. shelters, and thin and tactile CB protective gloves b. Material Science. and boots. 1) Stable, selectively reactive, self-detoxifying materials. Self- 4) Lightweight/low-power or passive microclimate cooling. detoxifying materials are seen as a means of increasing CB protective ensembles significantly increase the service life and performance, while simultaneously heat burden on the warfighter. Materials are needed decreasing thermal burden. Additional benefits also that can reduce thermal burden by a combination

include reducing secondary contact hazards and re- of increasing water vapor permeation and air aerosolized hazards during the doffing process. These permeation, and reducing thermal resistance (R materials need to be safe, shelf-stable, and effective value), or by other means of exploiting natural against a broad spectrum of potential agents. cooling processes– all of which can be incorporated into protective ensembles. Active power-demand 2) High efficiency selectively permeable materials (SPMs) and technologies are desired if they accentuate passive breathable high-efficiency aerosol/particulate barriers. cooling processes and operate on 30 watts of power Selectively permeable barriers provide a means of or less, and provide 150 watts or more of cooling keeping agents (liquids, aerosols, and vapors) out effect. while allowing water vapor out and thus reducing esearch, Development, R the thermal burden. The currently (limited) fielded 5) Intelligent, controllable, switchable, and selective SPM protective ensembles have similar thermal permeation materials. As warfighters become burden characteristics to air-permeable, adsorptive increasingly connected to the network, protective protective ensembles, but provide the advantage technologies should integrate with this emerging of a lower-packed volume and weight and increase capability. Integrated and automated information the protection against finely aerosolized agents. To linkages can reduce the overall burden to the decrease the thermal burden to users, new SPMs, warfighter by automatically responding to increase equirements and R not currently available on the market, are needed protection when hazards are imminent, and reducing that increase water vapor permeability and increase protection (and burden) when hazards have passed. liquid agent barrier performance. Additionally, there Additionally, intelligent materials could report is the development of elastomeric SPMs, which are exposed personnel and initiate decontamination a new class of barrier materials that can be used and/or therapeutics. in form-fitting closures or replace impermeable 6) Human Performance. Cognitive and physiological barrier materials in certain applications. Breathable, parameters related to “comfort” and performance. high-efficiency aerosol/particle barriers can be used The burden and degradation of mission performance in conjunction with adsorptive or self-detoxifying is the warfighters’ primary issue with currently technologies to capture aerosolized agents. Potential fielded individual protection systems. Burden and

cquisition Program Status cquisition Program approaches, such as the use of nanofiber meshes, have mission degradation are based on a multitude of both A and Chemical and Biological Defense

34 the cognitive and physiological factors. Some factors enhanced compatibility with life support equipment and such as heat burden are well quantified, but others tactical systems. They will also require the capability to

such as cognitive effects of encapsulation are not. protect against NTAs and TIMs, as well as traditional 2 Multivariant analysis is needed to provide trade-off CBRN warfare agents. In the future, the focus will be models to advise and optimize design of individual on integrated respiratory protective ensembles, which

protection ensembles for cost, performance, and offer optimal compatibility with personal, tactical, and t e r

burden. crew support systems. Key technologies for future P 7) Systems engineering. Alternative protection system mask systems include a mask filter service life indicator, advanced materials, improved adsorbents, and improved studies. Currently fielded and developmental h a individual and collective protection still use a models and test technologies for protection assessment. C variation of a basic design derived shortly after Future protective clothing ensembles for U.S. forces will World War I. Whole-system analysis is needed require reductions in bulk and weight without any loss to determine the value of new and emerging of protection or durability. As an evolutionary program technologies that may allow a revolutionary systems the JSLIST intends to meet these future requirements approach to individual and collective protection by introducing evolutionary technologies such as the (CB). JSLIST Block 2 glove upgrade (JB2GU) and Alternative Footwear Solution/Integrated Footwear System (AFSs/ IFS) into JSLIST chemical protective ensemble solutions 2.6.2 Protection Modernization as those technologies mature. These technology inser­ Strategy tions, which will include enhanced performance, will be

accomplished as JSLIST RDT&E joint service projects. Forces cannot always avoid CBRN hazards. Therefore, individuals and warfighting units must be provided Collective protection equipment (CPE) development materiel to protect them from the effects of these lethal efforts are focused on CBRN protection systems at the agents. Protection must be effective against all known crew, unit, and platform level. New CPE systems will threats with minimal degradation to the performance of be smaller, lighter, less costly, and more easily supported personnel, weapons, or equipment. Protective measures logistically. New systems are required to provide allow our forces to maintain combat superiority in CBRN clean environments for critical operations (i.e., where contaminated environments. A summary of protection individual protective equipment (IPE) otherwise places an modernization capabilities is provided in Table 2-9, unacceptable burden upon the warfighter in performing esearch, Development, which highlights current and planned developmental duties) and for essential rest and relief. Modernization R programs that will provide new or enhanced capabilities efforts will concentrate on the following: in the near term through far term, as well as capabilities (1) improvements to current vapor and particulate that are being procured or are currently fielded. filtration media to extend filter life and to offer The goal of the protection RDA area is to provide improved performance against current and/or equipment that allows U.S. forces to operate in a CBRN emerging threats, contaminated environment with minimal degradation equirements and (2) advanced air purification (vapor and particulate) R of the warfighters’ performance. near-term, midterm, technologies, integrated with environmental and far-term objectives are to reduce physiological and control, to greatly reduce the logistical burden and logistical burdens while maintaining/improving current offer greatly improved performance against current protection levels. and postulated threats, Protective masks and filters will be improved to reduce (3) increased application of CP systems onto mobile breathing resistance, thus enhancing ability to perform and transportable platforms and in fixed facilities mission tasks. Mask systems will require increased within the joint services, CBRN survivability and compatibility with combat or personal equipment. Future respiratory systems, such (4) improved transportable shelter system with integrated power/environmental control/filtration, as the Joint Service Aircrew Mask (JSAM), will require Status cquisition Program A and Chemical and Biological Defense

35 (5) improvements to current collective protection the R&D potential and for possible consideration in next- systems to reduce weight, volume, and power generation suit technology.

2 requirements, and The Joint Project Manager for Individual Protection (6) standardization of filters within the joint services to (JPM IP) is pursuing an AFS designed to provide a address storage and procurement concerns. common CBRN protective footwear that will meet the t e r requirements of the joint services. CBRN protective

P Protection efforts are in place to support major weapons systems developments, such as the U.S. Army’s FCS; the footwear is a system, with legacy footwear, such as the green vinyl overboot/black vinyl overboot (GVO/BVO) Bradley, Breacher, Heavy Assault Bridge, Future Scout h a and Cavalry System, the USMC Expeditionary Fighting and chemical protective footwear covers (CPFCs),

C multipurpose overboot (MU Vehicle (EFV) (formerly the Advanced Amphibious LO), and an improved Assault vehicle), Assault Breacher Vehicle (ABv); U.S. shipboard boot the ACTON lightweight overboot (ALO) Navy Littoral Combat Ship and other advanced weapons are available in sufficient quantities. The AFS program, platforms. when fielded, will replace legacy CBRN protective footwear across the joint services. The Integrated Footwear System (IFS), formerly 2.6.3 Joint Service Protection Multipurpose Protective Sock (MPS), is part of the JSLIST Programs ensemble. The IFS will fulfill the JSLIST and Joint Service Protective Aircrew Ensemble (JPACE) requirement for a Joint programs are shown in Table 2-9; service-unique launderable CB protective sock for wear under service programs are italicized. A detailed description of joint footwear. The IFS may also be a key component of IPE and CPE programs is provided in Annex D. future JSLIST alternative footwear solutions, to include Individual Protection investigation of a CB-resistant combat boot that when worn in combination with a protective sock could provide Individual protection is composed of technologies in the required CB footwear protection for the warfighter. the following categories: Surface Protection Ensembles, Individuals who cannot complete their missions while Aviation Protection Ensembles, Surface Respiratory wearing protective vinyl overboots will wear the IFS in Protection, Aviation Respiratory Protection, and conjunction with their service foot wear. Universal “Common” Individual Protective Equipment. The JB2GU will provide hand protection against liquid, Surface Protection Ensembles. Future protective esearch, Development, vapor, and aerosol CBRN agents, semipermeable or R clothing ensembles for warfighters will require selectively permeable to prevent excessive moisture reductions in bulk and weight without any loss of buildup and improve user comfort. It will be flame protection or durability. The Joint Chemical Ensemble resistant, and its performance will not be degraded by (JCE) intends to meet these future requirements by exposure to petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POLs) or inserting revolutionary technologies into chemical field contaminants. The JB2GU system will meet all protective ensemble solutions as those technologies service requirements for NBC protective gloves for both mature. These technology insertions, which will include equirements and JSLIST and JPACE. The block 2 glove effort will improve R enhanced performance, will be accomplished as JCE upon the block 1 glove by incorporating more robust RDT&E projects. JCE is expected to replace the JSLIST testing, and it will provide a glove solution that satisfies a in 2008 as the new RDT&E protective suit effort. broader set of user requirements, i.e., JSLIST operations The JSLIST Alternative Source Qualification (JASQ) requirements document (ORD) for ground and shipboard is a congressionally mandated government-industry use and JPACE requirements for aviation use. The JB2GU partnering effort to seek additional sources for JSLIST will be designed to achieve a fully integrated interface materials. JASQ candidates that successfully complete with the sleeves of JSLIST and JPACE NBC suits and will all testing requirements will be considered for inclusion be compatible with the MOPP exchange/dirty doffing on an approved materials list (AML). In addition, two and doctrinal decontamination tactics, techniques, and Industry Initiated Demonstration Products (IIDP) using procedures used for those ensembles. cquisition Program Status cquisition Program

A semipermeable membranes are being tested to determine and Chemical and Biological Defense

36 The JSLIST chemical/biological coverall for Combat The Block I Joint Service Chemical Environment vehicle Crewmen (CVC) (JC3) will be a lightweight CB Survivability Mask (JSCESM) will provide commanders

protective garment worn in place of, or over, the current at all levels with greater options for protection, especially 2 CVC suits in a CB environment. It will resist ignition in operations other than war (OOTW). It will provide a and will provide thermal protection to allow emergency compact, lightweight, disposable, emergency mask for use

egress. Using a selectively permeable material (SPM), the in chemical warfare agent (CWA) situations confronting t e r

JC3 will not be degraded by exposure to POLs present in the warfighter while operating in low-CWA threat P the operational environment. The JC3 will be compatible conditions and for medical care providers and patients with protective masks and mask accessories, headgear, in instances when using the standard service mask is not h a gloves/mittens, footwear, and other CVC ancillary practical. It is envisioned that warfighters will use Block II equipment. JSCESM in special operations or in noncombat roles and C will carry the JSCESM during deployment when a CWA Aviation Protection Ensembles. The JPACE is a CBRN and fire resistant protective clothing ensemble in threat is possible, but unlikely. This mask is intended to development and is intended for use by all USN, USMC, be a one-size-fits-all and provide limited protection based USAF, USA, and USSOCOM fixed-wing aviators and on agent concentrations for approximately six hours. aircrew and USN, USMC, USA, and USSOCOM rotary Aviation Respiratory Protection. The JSAM will -wing aviators and aircrew. JPACE will provide aviators provide aircrew members with individual head-eye- with a modern capability that replaces the impregnated respiratory protection against CBRN warfare agents undergarment and CWU-66/77P, using proven JSLIST and, for high-performance aircraft, will provide aircrew technology. As noted above, the JC3 is being developed protection under high rates of acceleration and possible

to provide a CB protective coverall that is resistant GLOC (G-force-induced loss of consciousness). JSAM to degradation. JPACE will increase the protection will be compatible with current and planned CBRN provided over existing garments while reducing heat ensembles and existing life support equipment, provide stress and system weight. JPACE will fully integrate flame and thermal protection, and reduce heat stress with the JSAM, legacy masks, JSLIST Glove Upgrades, imposed by existing CBRN protective masks. JSAM will MULO, or the CBRN overboot. The JPACE will utilize a have two variants—one for rotary wing applications and block upgrade acquisition approach. Block 1 will provide one for fixed wing—and will replace all existing service chemical protection from all liquid, particle, vapor and aircrew CBRN respirators. aerosol CBRN agents, provide CBRN protection over The Army is fielding the M48 protective mask to replace a 16-hour mission and be flame retardant. Block 2 will esearch, Development, the M43 series masks. The M48 is for Apache pilots. It R address the Rotor-wash Protection Key Performance provides a lightweight motor blower unit, uses a standard Parameter (KPP) requirement. battery, and provides increased protective capability. In Surface Respiratory Protection. DoD is developing the near term, the Army is replacing the M43 mask for a low cost end-of-service-life indicator (ESLI) for use in the general aviator (non-Apache applications) with the CBRN protective mask filters that will indicate to the aircrew protective mask, M45. The M45 is lighter and less user that a mask filter has been contaminated and has expensive than the M43 and features CBRN protection equirements and limited, if any, remaining service life. without the aid of force-ventilated air. R The Joint Service General Purpose Mask (JSGPM) will Universal “Common” Individual Protective be a lightweight protective mask incorporating state- Equipment. The Joint Service Mask Leakage Tester of-the-art technology to protect all forces from future (JSMLT) is a portable device that will be used to perform threats. Key requirements include 24-hour CBRN preventive maintenance checks and services, and is protection, improved fit, vision requirements, lower capable of determining serviceability, proper fit, and breathing resistance, and reduced weight and bulk. The identifying defective components of current and future mask components will be designed to minimize the CBRN negative-pressure protective masks. This system impact on the wearer’s performance and maximize the will provide an expeditionary capability currently not ability to interface with future service equipment and available to the joint services that will quantitatively and

qualitatively test a protective mask for defects and fit by Status cquisition Program protective clothing. A and Chemical and Biological Defense

37 measuring the performance of the mask against known The CP EMF will integrate environmentally controlled standards. The capability will be provided at the unit-or collective protection into the Navy’s Expeditionary

2 maintenance-section level. Medical Facility Fleet Hospital configuration. Fleet hospitals are first and foremost land-based hospitals, Collective Protection medically and surgically intensive. Transportable and The services currently use the M20A1 Simplified Collective t e r designed for sustained operations of 60 days or greater,

P Protection Equipment (SCPE) to provide collective fleet hospitals are deployable in a variety of operational protection to existing structures. Environmental control scenarios. The fleet hospital can be mobilized in two is also being added to selected applications. The M20A1 primary formations–500-bed hospital or a 20-to-116 h a SCPE which provides resistance to liquid and vapor bed Expeditionary Medical Facility (EMF). The EMF C agents and allows expansion of a protection area, has been may be utilizing a new style of deployable medical unit, fielded. The new joint program, Collectively Protected the BASE-X expedition shelter and will require the Field Hospital (CPFH), was established to manage the integration of the M28 CPE. CBD activities of the services’ collectively protected, deployable field hospitals: The Chemically and Biologically Protected Shelter (CBPS) is a highly mobile, rapidly deployable shelter • Army–Chemically Protected Deployable Medical system designed to be used for Level I and II divisional System (CP DEPMEDS), and nondivisional, forward area medical treatment • Air Force–Collectively Protected Expeditionary facilities. The system is self-contained/self-sustaining. It is Medical Support (CP EMEDS), and permanently integrated with a mobile dedicated platform with a lightweight multipurpose shelter. The vehicle • Navy–Chemically Protected Expeditionary Medical

tows a trailer and generator set. The vehicle transports Facility (CP EMF). a CBRN-protected, airbeam-supported soft shelter, self- The CPFH will integrate environmentally controlled col­ contained environmental support and power generation lective protection into already fielded Army, Air Force, system, a crew of four and gear, and medical equipment. and Navy field hospitals to sustain medical operations in a The CBPS presently is in production. Using feedback from CBRN-contaminated environment for 72 hours. the warfighter, as a result of reliability concerns during Operation Iraqi Freedom, an engineering change has The CP DEPMEDS integrated chemical protection into been developed to eliminate the hydraulic subsystem and existing tent extendable modular personnel (TEMPER)- replace it with a more reliable self-powered (electrical) based medical tents and shelters through the addition esearch, Development, environment control system. Design modifications will R of M28 CPE, chemically protected heaters and air be incorporated into the current and future procurement conditioners, and alarms. The CP DEPMEDS also includes of CBPS systems. To increase the reliability and to CBRN-protected water distribution and latrine systems. maintain configuration control, the existing fleet of The CP EMEDS is an effort to insert environmentally CBPS systems will be retrofitted with the self-powered controlled collective protection into currently fielded hos­ (electrical) environment control system, replacing the pital shelters. The role of CP EMEDS, as part of the Air hydraulic sub-system. equirements and Force Theater Hospital, is to provide individual bed-down R and theater-level medical services for deployed forces or The Collective Protection Technology Readiness select population groups within the entire spectrum of Evaluation (CP TRE) was funded in FY05 and FY06. military operations. CP EMEDS are modular packages, The office of the Joint Project Manager for Collective tailored to meet theater requirements, by providing a Protection (JPM-CP) executed the TRE, which consists flexible hospitalization capability. The CP EMEDS +25 of four separate focus areas, each having unique testing has the capability to provide 24-hour sick call, 25 inpatient requirements and in most cases requiring different subject- beds, and emergency medical care to a population at risk matter experts to manage the technical assessments. of up to 6,500. The CP EMEDS provides a contamination- These focus areas included air purification processes, CB free environment where medical treatment can be barrier material and quick CP erect technologies, CP rendered to personnel without the encumbrance of IPE support equipment, and whole CP systems. The CP TRE

cquisition Program Status cquisition Program (individual protective equipment). identified mature, applicable CP technologies to the A and Chemical and Biological Defense

38 JPM-CP. The JPM-CP is, in turn, using the TRE findings operators exit the area of high contamination. A personal to transition the best CP technologies to the warfighter. ice cooling system (PICS) has been developed for use

A number of the acquisition programs that benefit from with both the ITAP and the STEPO. 2 the CP TRE include the JECP, JCPE, Marine Corps EFV, Collective Protection the Army FCS and Navy LCS.

The Navy includes the Collective Protection System t e r Other near-term to midterm CP efforts, such as the

(CPS) on selected spaces on new construction ships. P JCPE, will use the latest technologies in air purification, Currently the DDG-51, LHD-1, and LPD-17 ship classes environmental controls, and power generation to improve are being built with the CPS. The Navy also has the and/or standardize current CPE so that it is lighter, more capability to backfit CPS on ships already in service. The h a efficient, more affordable and less logistically burdensome. ship CPS Backfit program continues to backfit selected C The JECP will be the next-generation lightweight, modu­ spaces critical to amphibious ships with CPS. These spaces lar, easily transportable, self-supporting CP system that include hospital areas, command and control areas, and will provide relief from psychological and physiological rest and relief areas. stresses during sustained operations in a contaminated environment. Additionally, redesign and concept trade-off assistance regarding advanced filtration technologies, such 2.6.5 T&E Infrastructure to as pressure swing adsorption (PSA) and catalytic oxidation (CatOx) have been provided to the United States Marine Support Collective and Corps (USMC) EFV and to the U.S. Army advanced- Individual Protection vehicle efforts. The United States Air Force (USAF) is Future T&E capabilities for protection will provide the currently undergoing a major upgrade to its mobile and ability to relate data to casualty estimation by providing fixed-site CP capabilities. a wider range of threat representation in the testing and system M&S relating component to system to battlefield performance and agent to simulant. Time-sequenced and 2.6.4 Other Protection Programs aligned efforts to support RDA activities in individual Programs supporting requirements of a single service and CP programs include: are shown in Table 2-9 as italicized entries. A detailed • Improved chamber-testing capabilities to allow description of IPE and CPE projects is presented in testing with CB agents Annex D. • Expanded capability to test advanced protective esearch, Development, R Surface Protection Ensembles materials The Army has approved fielding of the Self-Contained • Development of hazard-assessment models and Toxic Environment Protective Outfit (STEPO). STEPO situational-analysis methods provides Occupational Safety and Health Administration • Development of capabilities to test next-generation (OSHA) level A protection for Army Chemical Activity/ materials for protection against TIMs that are related Depot (CA/D), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD),

to hazard estimates equirements and and Technical Escort Unit (TEU) personnel. The Army • Development of next-generation materials tests that R has also developed an Improved Toxicological Agent provide expanded threat and operational conditions Protective (ITAP) ensemble that provides level B or C and quantitative data relevant to toxicological protection for short-term operations in immediately values dangerous to life and health (IDLH) toxic chemical environments (up to one hour), emergency life-saving • Improved dynamic system simulant tests that response functions, routine chemical activity operations, provide near-real-time sampling data and a wider and initial entry and monitoring activities. The ITAP range of simulated agent challenge types ensemble incorporates improvements in materiel and design. It includes a one-hour supplied air bottle system,

which can be switched to a filtered air respirator when Status cquisition Program A and Chemical and Biological Defense

39 2 Far (FY14-23) Far t e r P h a ask for Fixed Fixed for ask ask for the the for ask M M C nsemble E ircrew ircrew ircrew ircrew A A id (FY09-13) id M xpeditionary Collective Collective xpeditionary E Joint Service Service Joint Joint Chemical Chemical Joint Joint Joint Wing Pilots Wing Service Joint Fighter Strike Joint Protection

• • • • ask M ask for for ask pgrade M U

love love eneral Purpose Purpose eneral ircrew ircrew G G A odernization Strategy ear (FY07-08) ear N M ask lternative Footwear Solutions Footwear lternative otary Wing Pilots Wing otary nvironment Survivability Survivability nvironment ntegrated Footwear System Footwear ntegrated Joint Coverall for Combat Vehicle Vehicle Combat for Coverall Joint Joint Block 2 2 Block Joint Joint Service Service Joint M Chemical Service Joint E Joint Service Service Joint R Crewmen A I

• • • • • • • esearch, Development, R able 2-9. Protection able 2-9. Protection T echnology T ester T equirements and nsemble R E pgrade U eakage eakage L Fielded Capabilities Capabilities Fielded ircrew ircrew A love love ask ask ightweight Suit Suit ightweight ask ask ask ask verboot G L M M M M M O S AT 1 Shelter* 1 A 41 P 41 40 Series Series 40 Series 42 Series 45 Series 53 20

Joint Block 1 1 Block Joint Black Vinyl Vinyl Black Joint Service Service Joint Protective Joint Service Joint Shelter* Protective Biological and Chemical Aircrew Eye Respiratory Protection Respiratory Eye Aircrew System* Medical Deployable Protected Chemically Support* Medical Expeditionary Protected Collectively Backfit* - System Protection Collective Shipboard

M M M M M M

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

E P I

Surface Surface Surface Surface viation A viation A

Protection

Common Common

Collective Collective

espiratory Protection espiratory R nsembles E Protection niversal/ U cquisition Program Status cquisition Program A 1. All programs shown are joint or multiservice. 2. Where applicable, systems that meet requirements are listed following the entry. 3. Blank cells indicate new programs pending definition pending programs new indicate cells Blank 3. entry. the following listed are requirements meet that systems applicable, Where 2. multiservice. or joint are shown programs All 1. and/or technological S&T investment. requirements identified through of new breakthrough in the near term* Continuing procurement and Chemical and Biological Defense

40 2.6.6 Supporting Sciences on militarily relevant surfaces, and (4) physiological and New Initiatives response to low-level agent exposure. TAS identifies

and addresses gaps in the understanding of CB threats, 2 The Threat Agent Sciences (TAS) capability area develops including the physical and chemical properties of agents, S&T data to support the physical S&T capability areas, environmental stability and transport, and toxicological special topics, and policy issues. TAS executes science that properties. Addressing these gaps is critical to facilitate t e r supports the other physical S&T capability areas as well as development of detection, protection, decontamination, P T&E methodologies. The data generated in this capability and information systems. It also improves warfighter area are also directly incorporated into combatant decision-support tools and provides a sound scientific h a commands’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) basis for doctrine and policy development. While there and other manuals. TAS maintains research in traditional are substantial (but not complete) data on the health C threats as well as nontraditional and emerging threats. effects of traditional CW threats and TIMs, there are TAS concentrates on defining threats in scientific terms fundamental data gaps for determining quantitative that are useful in the development of technologies that infectious/toxic levels of concern for biological agents. protect against them. The physical S&T division of JSTO- However, even with the necessary data to substantiate CBD has initiated an effort to develop revolutionary and a set of health-based criteria for minimum required integrated technologies that will be delivered to the FCS detection and decontamination levels, a lack of consensus and potentially other mission areas. This effort is called has hindered previous efforts to establish effective DoD the Transformational Countermeasures Technologies criteria. Efforts are under way to ensure new criteria are Initiative (TCTI). While this effort is in the process of approved through medical channels. Such criteria will be developing a budget and program plan, the concept is defensible, consistent, and relate to an appropriate and being initiated within the FY07 S&T program. beneficial level of operational risk reduction.

2.6.6.1. TAS Efforts 2.6.6.1.2 Goals and Timeframes The S&T efforts in this area are grouped into the four The goal of TAS is to develop technologies on the thrust areas: (1) agent characterization and stimulant scientific characterization of threats that provide the development, (2) computational chemistry and starting material for all other commodities and their predictive modeling, (3) environmental fate of agents technology development efforts (see Table 2-10). esearch, Development,

Table 2-10. TAS S&T Strategy R

Near (by FY08) Mid (by FY13) Far (by FY23) • Transition data gained in DTO CB.42, • Finish efforts in environmental fate of • Develop a systems approach for CB Environmental Fate of Traditional NTAs. defense with an integral component CWA, to JEM and JOEF. • Finish effort in physiologic response to being TAS. • Transition data gained in DTO CB.51, NTAs. • Begin developing in silico approaches Low-level CWA Exposure, to TTPs, for predicting agent characteristics,

• Continue development of in silico equirements and manuals, and appropriate models. tools for molecular modeling of physiologic response, and R • Initiate efforts on the Environmental environmental fate and physiologic environmental fate. Fate of Chemical Nontraditional response. Agents. • Continue agent-simulant correlations • Initiate efforts on the Physiologic for NTAs. Response to Low-level Chemical • Leverage computational chemistry Nontraditional Agent Exposure. techniques (molecular modeling, • Transition Aerosol Production QSAR, etc.) to enhance simulant Methodologies to the T&E community. development efforts. • Begin leveraging computational technologies to aid in simulant development, physiological response,

and environmental fate of agents. Status cquisition Program A and Chemical and Biological Defense

41 This work also directly supports key concerns and c. Far Term. Integrate TAS into a systems approach to requirements as described in the Joint Priority List and chemical-biological defense. Develop in silico-based

2 Capabilities Baseline Analysis for the four CBRN defense approaches for predicting agent fate, physiological response, operational elements outlined in the Joint CBRN Defense agent characteristics, and simulant development. Modernization Plan.

t e r a. Near Term. Identify and map the scope of effort 2.6.6.1.3 Potential Payoffs and Transition P required for characterization of new threats to include Opportunities NTA synthesis and characterization, agent fate studies for TAS has a number of near-term transition opportunities,

h a NTA and surfaces of interest, and operational toxicology including simulants to support T&E applications for

C studies for NTAs. traditional CBW agents and NTAs; definitions of • Develop agent (CWA, BWA and NTA) simulants to operational envelopes in which simulants may be used support T&E applications and define operational for DT and OT; aerosol production technology to the envelopes in which simulants may be used for CBDP T&E community; data for predictive modeling developmental testing (DT) and operational for thickened CWA; interim policy to address DoD testing (OT). “how clean is safe” issues; and Multinational Force SOPs for CBRN (including TIM) defense and consequence • Provide data for predictive modeling of thickened management to DoD. CWA. Complete interim policy to address DoD “how clean is safe” issues. 2.6.6.1.4 Major Technical Challenges • Improve JSTO S&T investment strategy by TAS faces a variety of technical challenges. For instance, developing and implementing a methodology for there are already known threats that were developed assessing risk in CBRN defense. to evade protection, detection, and medical treatment • Develop an empirically based, biological dose- capabilities; and others may emerge via natural or response for hazard assessment. technological evolution that accomplish the same end. • Establish standards for BWA characterization Little is known about their chemical, physical and standards, preparation techniques, transition of toxicological properties or their exact mechanisms of non-pathogenic simulants, sampling methods, and action within the human physiological environment. agent – simulant correlation studies. It is also extremely important, as well as extremely esearch, Development, R • Compare/contrast MNF SOP resource plans to challenging, to meet the needs of the T&E community. DoD CBRN defense programs. It is necessary to ensure that the infrastructure and methodologies provided by the S&T community are • Identify and fill potential gaps in JSTO S&T validated and verified and that appropriate simulants with program. the physicochemical properties of CB agents relevant to • leverage research in computational techniques. the specific application (e.g., testing) and interactions (e.g., environmental, material) are identified. As a equirements and b. Midterm. During this timeframe, TAS will execute R subfactor, there may not be a single simulant for an programs on the environmental fate of, and physiological individual agent or class of agents that is the “perfect response, to low-level exposure to chemical NTAs. simulant”; rather, a suite of simulants may be required. Another aim is to accurately describe CWA and NTA environmental and physiological interactions at the atomic Describing the environmental fate of agents and their and molecular level using molecular dynamics, quantum interactions with operationally relevant surfaces, chemical methods, and quantitative structure-activity equipment and materiel, as well as understanding relationship (QSAR) computational tools. The area also how agents interact within the human body to include plans to expand simulant development and correlation mechanism of action, target organ/cell/molecule, long- efforts for the evolving NTA threat. Finally, TAS plans term effects, etc.) present significant challenges. Not to leverage multidisciplinary work in nanotechnologies, the least of these is the requirement for investment in

cquisition Program Status cquisition Program costly, hazardous live-agent testing (on the lab bench, in

A information technologies and computational chemistry. and Chemical and Biological Defense

42 field tests, and in long-term animal experimentation) for ballistic protection, internal environmental controls, and extrapolating to real-world needs. Identifying alternatives full CBRN defense capabilities. To develop this system,

to such expensive and hazardous testing is both necessary the JSTO-CBD has made investments in advanced fabrics, 2 and challenging. masks, filters, gloves, boots, etc. However, the next- Exploiting advances in computational chemistry and generation protective ensemble must take advantage biology may help identify such alternatives, increase of novel materials and technologies such as nanofibers, t e r the payoff of experimental work, and enhance the nanopore filtration media, reactive chemistry, CB agent- P understanding of fundamental phenomena. Yet such sensing fibers, power generation from solar/kinetic/ thermal sources, embedded radio frequency (RF) sensing exploitation will require a significant investment to h a and transmission, and many others. The convergence of

ensure the fidelity of the tools employed prior to their C use as well as a rigorous validation postdevelopment. It these transformational technologies will provide the may be possible to decrease the cost of this investment by most-advanced protective and operational capabilities leveraging efforts from the pharmaceutical and chemical ever imagined and make the 21st Century warfighter a industry. more effective asset in all future combat environments. Finally, TAS faces the challenge of facilitating rapid, readily- This integrated system will be capable of sensing the employed dissemination of scientific data with significant presence of adverse substances of CBR origin, initiate operational impact from within the JSTO-CB RDT&E physical/medical countermeasures, and provide projects to the RDT&E community and the warfighters. battlefield awareness to the wearer as well as to the command nodes in real time. These same technological advances will directly apply to force protection and 2.6.6.2 Transformational Countermeasures

consequence management requirements for structures, Technologies Initiative (TCTI) facilities, and installations as well as critical defense In response to the OSD Program Strategy Guidance systems being developed by the major defense acquisition for the FY08–13 POM, the JSTO-CBD has proposed a programs (MDAPs). The expected transition of these new initiative that will capitalize on recent and future revolutionary technologies, based upon current planned advances in the areas of nanotechnology, biotechnology, funding, is not expected until the 2015–2020 timeframe. information technology, and cognitive sciences. The e The project’s strategy will initially focus on a significant TCTI will use the emerging field of nanotechnology, investment in basic research early in the process to biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive identify, exploit, and expand innovative NBIC research. sciences (NBIC) convergence as the cornerstone for a Applied technology projects will not be numerous esearch, Development, R new paradigm on CBD S&T planning and execution. The until 2010–2013, since there are no mature NBIC initiative reflects a goal of understanding and capitalizing technologies at this time. As the TCTI project identifies on the transformational technological changes that and nurtures basic research efforts, NBIC technologies are taking place. A revolutionary (vs. evolutionary), will be available for maturation in the latter parts of the interdisciplinary (vs. stove-piped), and science-based FY10–13 timeframe. (vs. needs-based) strategy must be developed to achieve equirements and

this goal. This initiative will require a collaborative effort R between the organizations charged with developing the 2.7 meDICAL DEFENSE tactics, requirements, S&T, and acquisition of military equipment and its employment. In a break from the current approach, S&T will lead the development of new combating WMD technologies to make a rational 2.7.1 Introduction assessment of what kinds and levels of transformation are Along with individual and CP, medical systems form the possible within the existing fiscal constrains. third area associated with the CBRN defense principle of protection. Medical systems include all pharmaceuticals, The JSTO-CBD advocates the development of an advanced biologics, and devices that preserve combat effective­ integrated combat garment for the future warfighter. ness by timely identification, diagnosis, and provision

Such a system would integrate equipment- bearing Status cquisition Program

of medical countermeasures in response to Joint A and Chemical and Biological Defense

43 Service CBRN defense requirements. Technology and injury prediction. Medical prophylaxis and treatment development advances are being pursued in the creation strategies reduce performance decrements, injuries, and

2 and manufacturing of vaccines and pharmaceuticals that deaths of military personnel in the field, thus enabling prevent the lethal or incapacitating effects of CB agents. them to accomplish their missions, reducing the need for Therapies that improve survival and facilitate return to medical resources and decreasing the probability of long-

t e r duty are being developed. Also, technologies are being term health effects.

P evaluated for the development of rapid portable diag­ Specific initiatives programmed to improve CBD medical nostics that will facilitate a quick medical response for readiness include the following: exposed warfighters. These medical countermeasures h a (MCMs) are developed while incorporating best practices • Development and implementation of a biological C from both industry and government. defense immunization policy for U.S. forces and other-than-U.S. forces. Within the CBDP, medical research, development, and acquisition (RDA) programs are organized according to • Increased focus of medical technology-based capability areas. Within the JSTO-CBD, these capabilities research toward the development of antivirals, are managed by senior managers for pretreatments, antibiotics, and toxin therapeutics. therapeutics, and diagnostics. For advanced development • Continued cooperation and consultation with the and procurement programs, the JPEO-CBD manages FDA for application of the Animal Efficacy Rule, these capabilities under the Joint Project Manager for which allows consideration of efficacy data derived Chemical Biological Medical Systems (JPM-CBMS). The from animal studies as surrogates for large-scale JPM-CBMS is composed of a headquarters and support human efficacy trials to license drugs and biological

element and two joint product management offices: products that cannot be ethically tested for efficacy the Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program (JVAP) and the in humans. Medical Identification and Treatment Systems (MITS). (Medical radiological defense research is described in • Enhanced medical diagnostic capability for diseases/ section 2.7.7 below.) Table 2-11 provides a summary injuries caused by all CB threat agents, including of the programs in the planned modernization strategy species and strain identification. through the far term, highlighting capabilities being • Studies to elucidate the toxicity and mechanism of developed and procured in the near term, as well as action of NTAs, and to determine the effectiveness developmental programs that are planned to be available of current MCMs. esearch, Development, in the midterm to far-term. R • Studies to evaluate the effects of exposure to low The medical CBD RDA program has the following levels of CWAs. goals: • Exploratory and advanced studies to develop • Provide individual level medical protection and effective preventive, assessment, and treatment prevention to preserve fighting strength. strategies to mitigate injuries from the spectrum of • Maintain technological capabilities to meet present ionization radiation energies and qualities produced equirements and

R requirements and counter future threats. by either nuclear or radiological devices. • Provide medical management of CB casualties to • Effective procedures for the use of the best available enhance survivability, and expedite and maximize MCMs under the FDA Emergency Use Authorization return to duty. authority enacted by Section 1603 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, • Sustain basic research that provides the knowledge Section 1603: Authorization for medical products upon which innovative diagnostics, prophylaxes, for use in emergencies. and therapies are developed.  21 CFR Parts 314 and 601, Food and Drug Administration, DoD medical CBD R&D programs have provided numer­ “New Drug and Biological Drug Products; Evidence Needed to Demonstrate Effectiveness of New Drugs When Human Efficacy ous products to protect and treat service members. Studies Are Not Ethical or Feasible.” Federal Register: May 31, 2002

cquisition Program Status cquisition Program Assessment methodologies enable threat evaluation and (Volume 67, Number 105), Rules and Regulations, Pages 37988– A 37998. and Chemical and Biological Defense

44 , A 2 ) and ricin and ) SP) SP) T EE (a arburg and and arburg A M t e r and W and nerve agent agent nerve CW A III continued on next page P P EEE , , ER EE h a ncrement ncrement I Far (FY14-23) Far bola) E astern, and Western equine equine Western and astern, E C arburg and and arburg lternative delivery methods for vaccines and and vaccines for methods delivery lternative agents blister for therapeutics dvanced bola) icensure of vesicant agent prophylaxis prophylaxis agent vesicant of icensure ( neurotoxins botulinum vaccines of icensure icensure of nerve agent “bioscavenger” (human “bioscavenger” (human agent nerve of icensure or antisense using therapies novel of icensure icensure of improved S improved of icensure ( vaccines filovirus of icensure ransition opportunities for ricin, filovirus, and and filovirus, ricin, for opportunities ransition M Development and licensure of filovirus vaccines vaccines filovirus of licensure and Development ( butyrylcholinesterase) pretreatment pretreatment butyrylcholinesterase) of Development pretreatment bioscavenger catalytic plague and B) E immunogens for vaccines of licensure and Development Venezuelan, (V viruses encephalitis vaccines virus encephalitis equine multiagent of licensure and Development to threats BW multiple against vaccines development. advanced strategies similar therapeutics receptor-targeted of Development (non-oxime) next-generation of Development reactivators acetylcholinesterase L L T L L L L A A • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • A V A /B) Bioscavenger Bioscavenger A II

id (FY09-13) id M odernization Strategy ncrement ncrement I M dvanced development of a monoclonal monoclonal a of development dvanced botulinum a of development dvanced icensure of advanced anticonvulsant advanced of icensure vesicant advanced of icensure for therapeutics oral two of icensure for drug antisepsis an of icensure Plague vaccine candidate in advanced advanced in candidate vaccine Plague Vesicant agent prophylaxis candidate prophylaxis agent Vesicant botulinum recombinant of Development ( vaccine neurotoxin for schedule dose reduced Potential Develop Develop development multiagent of development Continued platforms vaccine wound and therapeutics products decontamination smallpox with associated shock of treatment infection filovirus infection filovirus for antibody therapy molecule small toxin

L L L L A A • • • • • • • • • • • • /B) /B) edical CBDP A M as as esearch, Development, RNA R and as and able 2-11. Bioscavenger nerve nerve Bioscavenger T RNA II ear (FY07-08) ear N bioscavenger (pBioscavenger) (pBioscavenger) bioscavenger I S/BioShield ncrement ncrement I HH equirements and S for advanced development development advanced for S R HH dvanced development of two oral oral two of development dvanced &D of multiagent vaccine platforms. vaccine multiagent of &D icensure of intravenous therapeutic for for therapeutic intravenous of icensure ncrement ncrement nitiate development advanced in oxime mproved clinical trial; potential transition to the the to transition potential trial; clinical D effort prophylaxis agent vaccine smallpox improved of Procurement D from of development advanced Continue ( botulinum recombinant and plague vaccines neurotoxin globulin immune vaccinia of Procurement complications vaccine smallpox for for immunotherapies of Demonstration toxins and bacteria, filoviruses, si of Development filovirus against therapeutics smallpox smallpox for therapeutics I I R I L A • • • • • • • • • • •

A

CW A P ) L nthrax nthrax reatment reatment eactive eactive ER dsorbed dsorbed T R A ATNAA SD A gent gent R xposure xposure A E ) PP (Soman nerve nerve (Soman PP A ntidote ntidote V erve erve gents) utoinjector) eduction Paste against against Paste eduction NA icensed S icensed icensed icensed icensed Smallpox icensed icensed otion ( otion A A Fielded Capabilities Fielded

R (Skin (Skin Chemical Warfare Warfare Chemical A S pretreatment agent pyridostigmine) ( (Dryvax) vaccine Decontamination Skin L ( N A Vaccine Vaccine L L L L L

• • • • • •

Pretreatments herapeutics T cquisition Program Status cquisition Program A and Chemical and Biological Defense

45 s M P C M GM 2 ) syndrome, and and syndrome, ) t e r GI P h a Far (FY14-23) Far C -licensed military radiological defense defense radiological military -licensed counter to hand in therapeutics licensed D) agents in hand to mitigate hematopoietic hematopoietic mitigate to hand in agents D) DS system enhancements system DS A A dvanced development of presymptomatic presymptomatic of development dvanced esearch of noninvasive diagnostic technologies diagnostic noninvasive of esearch valuation of reagent-less diagnostics diagnostics reagent-less of valuation resequencing rapid portable of valuation icensed chemical exposure medical diagnostic diagnostic medical exposure chemical icensed MR FD ( ( gastrointestinal syndrome, FD devices signatures biomarker technologies capabilities acute from pneumonitis/fibrosis respiratory injury radiation c and development rapid integrated Fully of combination for procedures production bacterial intracellular and fever hemorrhagic diseases and development rapid integrated Fully counter and identify to procedures production emerging and threats modified genetically diseases L NG A E R E • • • • • • • • • •

A approval A ) tract from acute acute from tract )

GI id (FY09-13) id M eneration Diagnostics with a with Diagnostics eneration G eneration Diagnostics System System Diagnostics eneration ext ext G DS) licensure; others rapidly following following rapidly others licensure; N A ext ext dvanced development of candidate candidate of development dvanced integrated of development dvanced dvanced development of multiplexed multiplexed of development dvanced multiplexed of development dvanced fusion data of development dvanced medical two least at dvance FD through advanced drug one least t NG Continue assay development support support development assay Continue for FD gaining in focus N ( sample preparation module preparation sample module acid nucleic module immunoassay module biomarker presymptomatic of Validation signatures pharmacodynamic, toxicity, Complete least at of properties immunogenic and anti-inflammatory anti-apoptotic, two acute against protect that agents demonstrate and syndrome radiation injuries radiation late and early both radiological of efficacy Develop protects that agents prophylactic and system hematopoietic the both ( gastrointestinal injury radiation through countermeasures radiological FD available become funds as as following rapidly others licensure; permit funds developed technologies Platform operating standard test; under and of effectiveness place; in procedures candidates drug model of range a under system this using developed investigation A A A A A A A • • • • • • • • • • • • P R ther ther I F) and and F) O R esearch, Development, R assays X nvestigational nvestigational DS Block Block DS I AI D, and V and D, G B, B, assays to advanced advanced to assays ear (FY07-08) ear I enhancement: automated automated enhancement: D) submission stage. stage. submission D) I G N IN D90/30 survival assays of at least least at of assays survival D90/30 L equirements and R DS Block Block DS DS, Block Block DS, AI AI ne or more drugs to counter counter to drugs more or ne ew Drug ( Drug ew ssess ssess stablishment of systems evaluation evaluation systems of stablishment stablishment of rapid resequencing center resequencing rapid of stablishment least at of profile blood peripheral stimate 2 next for expression cytokine valuate ransition of eight additional candidate candidate additional eight of ransition ransition of eight additional standardized standardized additional eight of ransition JB JB development C to assays/reagents immunodiagnostics kit and system prep sample acid nucleic JB of Fielding Continued methodology matrix testbed/decision assay Cholinesterase of Validation of Validation (D factor reduction dose Complete candidates promising 6 of studies toxicity candidates promising 6 candidates promising 2 candidates promising most intracellular or viruses fever hemorrhagic the to developed bacteria N permit funds as developed candidates drug standard initiated; technologies Platform development; under procedures operating identified pathways target E T T E A E E O • • • • • • • • • • • • • • assay assay I

I gent gent A DS), Block Block DS), -approved Joint Joint -approved DS Block Block DS P) AI A R AI ematopoietic growth growth ematopoietic eagents Program Program eagents ransition of of ransition Fielded Capabilities Fielded dentification and and dentification

Biological Biological FD I Blue Prussian iodide Potassium research – (n/a Detection System System Detection (JB in anthrax detect to blood and blood cultures JB manual enhancement: sample acid nucleic kit prep immuno- standardized Critical to diagnostics R (C factors in started initiative FY06) H T

• • • • • • •

Diagnostics adiological R edical M TMTI cquisition Program Status cquisition Program A and Chemical and Biological Defense

46 Since FY01, there has been an ongoing effort to transition The results of the DTIF are currently being reviewed, medical research efforts from the DARPA program to and lessons learned will be applied to ongoing efforts

joint medical biological defense research within the CBDP to transition the most promising DARPA programs in 2 technology base for exploitation and further development. medical biological and chemical defense to the CBDP This effort was funded by an initiative called the DARPA medical S&T program. In 2005 the DTRA (JSTO-

Transition Initiative Fund (DTIF), which ended in FY05. CBD) and DARPA signed a MOA to facilitate transfer t e r

Technology base reviews of DARPA-funded programs in of promising technologies and research, and committing P biological warfare defense led to the selection of several both parties to the development of technology transfer DARPA research efforts in the Pathogen Countermeasures standards and procedures. h a Program for transition to joint medical biological defense research efforts within the CBDP technology base. The C selected programs include the following: 2.7.2 Reducing Reliance on • Research to develop broad-spectrum vaccines the Use of Animals as by molecular breeding (gene shuffling) strategies Subjects of Research focused on cross-protection against pathogenic Joint medical CB defense research efforts continue to equine encephalitis viruses. utilize alternative methods and resources intended to • A novel class of antimicrobial drugs that bind reduce, refine, or replace the use of animals in research. ribonucleic acid (RNA) targets involved in the This is consistent with DoD policy, and is required of disease process. all DoD laboratories that conduct research using animal subjects. When possible, research programs employ • High-level plant-based expression system for vaccine computerized molecular modeling, simulation-based pre­ antigens and humanized monoclonal antibodies for dictions, in vitro cell cultures, cell-free reaction systems, biological threat agents. and other in vitro models to replace the use of animals. • In vivo countermeasures against biological toxin For example, DARPA’s Rapid Vaccine Assessment threats of the superantigen family (e.g., staphylococcal Program seeks to eliminate preclinical animal testing by enterotoxin B) using a peptide or peptidomimetic creating an artificial human immune system on a chip. antagonist. Statisticians evaluate all research proposals that use ani­ mals to ensure that the minimum number of animals • Small-molecule antibiotics that target the cell-cycle required to obtain scientific validity are used. Animals

regulated methyltransferase (CcrM) deoxyribonucleic esearch, Development,

lower on the phylogenetic scale (or the least sentient R acid (DNA) methyltransferase enzyme. species) are used if the selection will permit attainment • Investigation using in silico screening methods of of the scientific objective. Additionally, a veterinarian structurally diverse small-molecule inhibitors of with expertise in laboratory-animal medicine reviews all the zinc endopeptidase of botulinum neurotoxin procedures that might cause pain or distress in laboratory serotype A. animals to determine the procedural modifications, analgesics, and/or anesthetic regimens that could be

• Development of nonspecific immunomodulatory equirements and agents using a synthetic lipid A analog (aminoalkyl incorporated to minimize pain or distress. Detailed R glucosaminide phosphate). protocols are comprehensively reviewed and approved by Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees before • Development of a broad-spectrum antibiotic against experiments are initiated. For medical CB research all Ciproflaxcin-resistant organisms. conducted at DoD laboratories, protocols that specify • Novel techniques including random homozygous the use of nonhuman primates (NHPs) undergo further knockouts to identify therapeutic targets even for scrutiny by a headquarters-level animal review office. The infections of unknown etiology. Care and Use of Laboratory Animals in DoD Programs states “A headquarters-level administrative review of all NHP • Development of a siRNA platform technology that protocols will be conducted at the appropriate DoD has preliminary efficacy against avian influenza and  Army Regulation 40–33 (SECNAVINST 3900.38C, AFMAN Status cquisition Program

hemorrhagic fever. A 40–401(I), DARPAINST 18, USUHSINST 3203. and Chemical and Biological Defense

47 component oversight office by a veterinarian trained or and host immunity. These studies will result in experienced in laboratory animal medicine and science the identification of new candidate vaccine targets

2 to ensure conformance with all applicable Federal that will be employed in development of advanced regulations and policies.” JSTO-CBD is establishing a or next-generation molecular and multiagent review process and organization that will address animal vaccines. Studies in this area currently focus upon

t e r use for activities outside of DoD laboratories. Policies bacterial, viral, and toxin pathogens.

P and procedures of the Association for the Assessment and • Vaccine Technology Development: The goal of this thrust Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care – International area is twofold. The first objective is to explore are rigorously enforced and followed. DoD policy h a technologies and validate the effectiveness of requires that animal use be conducted in full compliance

C candidate vaccine platforms, including engineered with the Animal Welfare Act and that animals are to be viruses, recombinant or fusion proteins, molecular used in research only when scientifically acceptable vaccines, and new adjuvants that will be applicable alternatives are not available. to development of next-generation multiagent biodefense vaccines. Developed under the sub- thrust area heading of “molecular vaccines”, these 2.7.3 Pretreatments S&T Efforts vaccine platforms should permit insertion of new immunogenic cassettes, facilitating rapid 2.7.3.1 Goals and Timeframes development of vaccines effective against new The goal of the pretreatments capability area is to threat agents (genetically engineered threats or conduct basic research to develop lead candidate vaccines emerging infectious diseases). The second subthrust

and chemical pretreatments and protectants that can be area is molecular immunology. The objective of this administered before exposure to provide both specific subthrust area is to understand, at the molecular and broad-spectrum protection against validated level, the events that induce and maintain rapid chemical or biological agents. Categories of threat and effective protective immunity, and to exploit agents addressed in this capability area include nerve that understanding in the rational design of the agents, viruses, bacteria, and toxins. Robust and broadly next-generation biodefense vaccines. Additionally, effective pretreatments are essential components in the results from this research may permit augmentation layered, system-of-systems approach to force health or enhancement of innate immunity, which could protection, conserving warfighter operational flexibility, provide nonspecific and broad-spectrum protection esearch, Development, against biothreat agents. R and reducing the logistical burdens of sustaining forces in chemical or biological environments. Emphasis is placed • CWA Pretreatments: This portfolio addresses the on technologies and approaches leading to the next requirement for effective pretreatments against CW generation of biodefense vaccines, including multiagent agents. One objective is to field a bioscavenger, an vaccines, molecular vaccines, new vaccine platforms and advanced pretreatment that is effective against classic adjuvants, and alternate (needle-free) delivery methods. and nontraditional agents based on physiological There are four subareas within the pretreatments scavengers such as the human butyrylcholinesterase equirements and R capability area: (HuBuChE) or carboxylesterase (CaE) enzymes. • Multiagent Vaccine Development: This subarea’s Ideally, the prophylaxis would not require any objective is the development of vaccines directed at follow-on treatment, and would have no adverse multiple pathogens. Multiagent vaccines will greatly side effects. These naturally occurring enzymes, as reduce the logistical burden and cost associated with well as acetylcholinesterase, are targets for nerve use of biodefense vaccines. agents. Through bioengineering efforts, HuBuChE and CaE have been mutated to forms that are not • Vaccine Research Support: Studies in this area use only less susceptible to inhibition by the nerve systems biology tools (proteomics, genomics, agents, but have the added capability to catalyze bioinformatics) to provide new insights into nerve agent breakdown. Both a plasma-derived pathogen genetics, virulence factors, host- cquisition Program Status cquisition Program human butyrylcholinesterase enzyme (pBuChE) A parasite interactions, pathogenic mechanisms, and Chemical and Biological Defense

48 and a recombinant butyrylcholinesterase (rBuChE) and ultimately development of a catalytic bioscavenger enzyme have passed Milestone A. The pBuChE will pretreatment that enhances efficacy by degrading

be developed through Phase I clinical trials by the multiple molecules of nerve agents in vivo. 2 DoD and transitioned to the DHHS for potential In the biological pretreatments area, near-term licensure. The rBuChE is being developed through biological pretreatments include the continued advanced MITS. The S&T emphasis in this area is on developing development of bacterial (plague) and toxin (botulinum t e r recombinant and catalytic bioscavengers that will toxins serotypes A and B) vaccines. The program will P protect against both organophosphate nerve agents also seek approval of a reduced dosing schedule for the and NTAs. current anthrax vaccine. Midterm opportunities include h a

Current prophylactic measures do not adequately address continued development of plague and Botulinum A/ C the full spectrum of CB weapon (CBW) threats. In the B vaccines as well as potential transitions to; advanced chemical pretreatments subarea, Soman Nerve Agent development of filovirus (Ebola and Marburg) vaccines, Pretreatment Pyridostigmine (SNAPP) was approved Venezuelan, Western, and Eastern Equine Encephalitis under the very first demonstration of the FDA’s Animal virus vaccines, and ricin, toxin vaccines. In the current Efficacy Rule, and a barrier skin paste, SERPACWA, POM (FY08-13), funding for the advanced development has been approved and fielded for protection against of filovirus, ricin and Equine Encephalitis virus vaccines percutaneous exposure to CW agents. In biological was eliminated. Therefore, these transition opportunities pretreatments, two licensed vaccines exist for protection may be delayed until the far term. Far-term targets include against biological warfare (BW) agents (anthrax and licensure of all near-term and midterm vaccine candidates Smallpox). In addition, a plague vaccine, a vaccine in advanced development (see Table 2-12). Additional

against botulinum toxin (subtypes A and B), and an basic research leading to new vaccine approaches for improved anthrax vaccine have transitioned to advanced the intracellular bacterial threats (Tularemia, Brucella, development. The improved anthrax vaccine is being and Burkholderia) is being funded, potentially focusing developed by the DHHS under Project Bioshield. Finally, on the critical host-pathogen interface within the cell. a number of legacy and newly developed univalent Furthermore, the program has concluded a DTO (defense vaccines are either in Investigational New Drug (IND) technology objective) evaluating several alternatives to status or ready to transition, pending decision by the hypodermic needles for administration of multiagent acquisition authority. Until approved by the FDA, use of and recombinant protein vaccines. The results of this pretreatments in IND status (as well as other products research, which will be applied to formulation of new in IND status) is limited in accordance with procedures biodefense vaccines, could greatly reduce the medical esearch, Development, R defined in Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) logistics burden and improve user compliance. Another 6200.2, Subject: Use of Investigational New Drugs for Force thrust is to identify effective adjuvants to reduce the Health Protection, dated August 1, 2000, which establishes time and vaccine dose required for the development policy and assigns responsibility for compliance with of effective protective immunity. Finally, a DTO was 10 USC 980, Executive Order 13139, and applicable approved in FY05, Multiagent (Molecular) Vaccines for FDA regulations for the use of INDs for force health Biowarfare and Genetically Engineered Agents, which equirements and

protection. will fund advanced research in this area. R In the chemical pretreatments capability area, near-term accomplishments include the transition of the nerve agent bioscavenger Increment I (plasma-derived human butyrylcholinesterase) pretreatment to the DHHS for advanced development and FDA licensure. This is a stoichiometric bioscavenger, meaning that one molecule of bioscavenger binds and neutralizes one molecule of nerve agent. Midterm opportunities include the develop­ ment of the Increment II Bioscavenger. Long-term targets

include the licensure of the Increment II Bioscavenger, Status cquisition Program A and Chemical and Biological Defense

49 Table 2-12. Pretreatments S&T Strategy

Near (by FY08) Mid (by FY13) Far (by FY23) 2 • Block I bioscavenger (pBioscavenger) • Block II nerve agent recombinant • Licensed nerve agent clinical trial; potential transition to bioscavenger candidate in advanced “bioscavenger” (human the DHHS development butyrylcholinesterase) pretreatment t e r • Block II nerve agent recombinant • Plague vaccine candidate in • Development of Block III nerve agent P bioscavenger candidate in advanced advanced development catalytic bioscavenger pretreatment development • Recombinant botulinum neurotoxin • Licensure of vaccines for botulinum • Plague vaccine candidate in vaccine (A/B) in advanced neurotoxins (A, B) and plague h a advanced development development • Development and licensure of C • Recombinant botulinum neurotoxin • Continued development of vaccines for Venezuelan, Eastern vaccine (A/B) in advanced multiagent vaccine platforms and Western, equine encephalitis development viruses (VEE, EEE, and WEE), and • Research and development of ricin multiagent vaccine platforms • Development and licensure of filovirus vaccines M( arburg and Ebola) • Transition opportunities for ricin, filovirus and equine encephalitis virus vaccines • Development and licensure of multiagent vaccines against multiple BW threats to advanced development

2.7.3.2 Potential Payoffs and Transition develop reliable methodologies that will accelerate the Opportunities S&T base necessary to achieve three-dimensional (3-D) Investment in pretreatments that provide protection tissue engineering and to define the spatial and temporal against CB agents will yield significant gains in force requirements necessary to expand its applicability. This health protection capability while preserving maximal program brings together a combination of science and operational flexibility in CB environments. Effective engineering communities to achieve its goals. The ability esearch, Development, to fabricate functional, 3-D ex vivo immune constructs is R pretreatments will dramatically reduce medical requirements by reducing the medical resources required limited by current methodologies and materials. to treat CBW casualties among populations that receive The RVA Program focuses on both engineering products these pretreatments, freeing medical assets for other and biological control of differentiating cells leading to types of battlefield casualties. Further, vaccines and a functional immune system. The program is developing chemical pretreatments currently in the pipeline and a 3-D conformal printing system with both additive and under development will provide protection against a subtractive features capable of printing cells, scaffolds, equirements and

R wider range of threat agents than is currently available. and differentiation factors; new scaffolds that control Multiagent vaccines will potentially provide protection the release of growth and trophic factors both spatially against multiple agents simultaneously. Effective medical and temporally; and a new bioreactor system and prophylaxes ultimately serve a counterproliferation instrumentation that will allow multiple-cell constructs function by denying an adversary an operational advantage to interact and communicate in an in vitro environment. in developing or employing such weapons. Specialized imaging methods will allow investigators to directly observe cellular activities in real time 2.7.3.3 Overview of DARPA Programs without disrupting the system. The biology is focused on understanding the fundamental differentiation Among the vaccine-oriented projects, efforts are under pathways needed to repeatedly produce appropriate way to develop superior protection against threat agents.

cquisition Program Status cquisition Program T and B cell responses in culture. Novel methods of

A The Rapid Vaccine Assessment (RVA) Program aims to and Chemical and Biological Defense

50 antigen presentation and controlled immune responses therapeutics are essential components in the layered, are emerging, providing greater insight into vaccinology system-of-systems approach to force health protection,

and immunity. The long-term effect will be reduced conserving warfighter the operational flexibility and 2 development times and costs with improved vaccine sustaining operational effectiveness of forces operating in efficacy directed at human infectious diseases and a a CBW environment. Emphasis is placed on technologies

dramatic reduction in reliance on the currently used and approaches leading to next-generation biodefense t e r

rodent models. In FY06, the experimentally verified therapeutics, including treatments and pharmaceuticals P utility of the system was demonstrated for the tetanus effective against specific agents and broad spectrum toxoid vaccine. In FY07, there will be a testing schedule therapeutics effective against entire classes of biological to validate all current and previously-fielded vaccines on or chemical agents. All subareas within the therapeutics h a a panel of civilian and military personnel. capability area will depend on the development of C validated animal models and surrogate indicators of 2.7.3.4 Major Technical Challenges human efficacy (necessary preconditions for FDA approval). There are six broad subareas within the Major technical challenges in the medical pretreatments therapeutics capability area: capability area include defining appropriate in vitro and in vivo model systems for investigative purposes, • Bacterial Therapeutics: Studies in this thrust area are determining mechanisms of action of the threat agents intended to elucidate the underlying genetics of, as well as their countermeasures, identifying appropriate and molecular basis for, bacterial virulence; host- immunogenic protective antigens for vaccine targets, parasite interactions; pathogenic mechanisms; and delineating pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics mechanisms of resistance, recovery and repair. These studies will result in the identification of of pretreatments for chemical agents, stimulating immune responses to small molecules, developing new new therapeutic targets to be employed in the and effective adjuvants, selecting vector systems for development of advanced or next-generation recombinant protein vaccines, evaluating preliminary treatments for bacterial infection and disease. In safety and efficacy data, determining dose and route of addition, drugs and therapeutics that are already administration, and evaluating process/scale-up potential. FDA approved for other indications are being The development of acceptable surrogate markers of evaluated for efficacy against CBW agents. effectiveness is essential to obtain FDA licensure of • Viral Therapeutics: Studies in this thrust area are medical CBD pretreatments, because challenging humans intended to elucidate the underlying genetics with CBW threat agents to establish vaccine protective of and molecular basis for viral virulence; host- esearch, Development, R efficacy is both unethical and prohibited. parasite interactions; pathogenic mechanisms; and mechanisms of resistance, recovery and repair. These studies will result in the identification of new 2.7.4 Therapeutics S&T Efforts molecular therapeutic targets that will be employed in the development of advanced or next-generation 2.7.4.1 Goals and Timeframes treatments for viral infection and disease. In

addition, drugs and therapeutics that are already equirements and The goal of the therapeutics capability area is to develop R FDA approved for other indications are being lead candidate medical treatments and pharmaceuticals evaluated for efficacy against CBW agents (bacteria, that, when administered after exposure to a chemical viruses, toxins, CW agents). or biological agent, mitigate or curtail the effects of that exposure and sustain forces operating in a CBW • Toxin Therapeutics: Studies in this thrust area are hazard area. To meet this requirement, medical CBD intended to elucidate the underlying genetics research and development is directly tied to warfighter of, and molecular basis for, virulence; toxin- capability requirements. Categories of threat agents receptor binding; biochemical activities of toxins addressed in this capability area include blister, nerve, and of events cascading from those activities; and respiratory, and blood agents, TIMs, viruses, bacteria, mechanisms of resistance, recovery and repair. These studies will result in the identification of new toxins, novel chemical threat agents, and genetically Status cquisition Program modified biological agents. Robust and broadly effective molecular therapeutic targets to be employed in the A and Chemical and Biological Defense

51 development of advanced or robust next-generation to advanced development, and will be part of the Improved treatments for intoxication by biological toxins. Nerve Agent Treatment System (INATS) being developed

2 by the JPEO-CBD. In the biological therapeutics subarea, • Chemical Agent Therapeutics: Studies in this thrust area are intended to elucidate the underlying gentamicin is being evaluated for approval as a treatment mechanisms of chemical agent–induced injury for plague. In addition, a number of therapeutic t e r (vesicants, nerve agents, NTAs); toxin, subcellular candidates are in IND status, or undergoing revision P and molecular target interactions; biochemical of labeling indications for approved use against threat activities of chemical agents and events cascading agents, pending decision of the acquisition authority. Until approved by the FDA, use of therapeutics in IND

h a from those activities; and mechanisms of resistance, recovery and repair. These studies will result in the status (as well as other products in IND status) is limited C identification of new therapeutic targets that will be in accordance with procedures defined in Department of Use of Investigational employed in the development of advanced or next- Defense Directive (DoDD) 6200.2, New Drugs for Force Health Protection generation treatments for intoxication by CWAs. , dated August 1, 2000, which establishes policy and assigns responsibility for • Low-Level CWA Exposure-Effects and Countermeasures: compliance with 10 USC 1170, Executive Order 13139, This thrust area, supporting both medical and and applicable FDA regulations for the use of INDs for physical S&T areas, is supported by both DTO and force health protection. non-DTO S&T research. The goals are to explore systemic toxicity of low-dose exposure(s) to CWAs, Midterm aims for chemical casualty treatment include with specific emphasis on biochemical, toxicological, licensure of an advanced (improved) anticonvulsant for and behavioral effects, and to determine the efficacy protection from the effects of nerve agent exposure, advanced development of vesicant agent therapeutics of extant MCMs on these effects. In addition, basic research efforts aim to identify biomarkers for (including ocular therapeutics), skin, and wound low-level CWA exposure, and to identify novel decontamination products, and next-generation oxime neurotoxic and immunological effects. candidates for treating exposure to traditional nerve agents and NTAs, with licensure projected in the midterm. Long- • Nontraditional Nerve Agents: The major goals of term objectives include receptor-targeted therapeutics this thrust are to make significant gains in our and protection from CW agent-induced brain trauma and understanding of important NTAs, and to survey exposure to low-level CW agents, and therapeutics for existing countermeasures to determine their blister agents (see Table 2-13). effectiveness against these agents. The longer- esearch, Development,

R term goal is to develop new approaches, based on Near term goals for biological casualty treatment include greater understanding of a wide variety of NTAs, transition to advanced development of the antimicrobial for creating new MCMs to the broad array of novel and antiviral compounds currently being developed threat agents (not all of which act via inhibition against validated biological threat agents; this transition of acetylcholinesterase). Approaches include will address the need to prevent casualties induced by establishment of in vitro electrophysiological biological threats. Long-term targets include licensure preparations to delineate mechanisms of action of of broad-spectrum antibacterial, antiviral, and antitoxin equirements and

R biological regulators and to suggest approaches for therapies. Development of immune modulators for pharmacologic intervention; development of 3-D biodefense against multiple threat agents, including models of NTAs-receptor binding as an aid in drug plague, anthrax, and smallpox are also far-term targets. discovery of new anticonvulsants; and development For toxin threats, therapeutics target biochemical of a toxicogenomic database for the toxic effects of intervention points in the host’s response, such as the NTAs to aid in characterization of candidate drugs recovery of botulinum-intoxicated nerve cells, or down- and in preparation of technical packages for FDA modulation of the toxic shock pathway elicited by the submission. Staphylococcal enterotoxins (see Table 2-13). Current therapeutic measures do not adequately address the full spectrum of CBW threats. In the chemical

cquisition Program Status cquisition Program therapeutics subarea, an improved oxime has transitioned A and Chemical and Biological Defense

52 Table 2-13. Therapeutics S&T Strategy

Near (by FY08) Mid (by FY13) Far (by FY23) 2 • Advanced development of oxime • Licensure of advanced • Licensure of novel therapies using candidates anticonvulsant antisense or similar strategies • Licensure of intravenous therapeutic • Licensure of oxime candidates • Development of receptor-targeted t e r for smallpox • Licensure of advanced vesicant therapeutics P • Advanced development of two oral therapeutics and wound- • Advanced therapeutics for blister therapeutics for smallpox decontamination products agents

• Licensure of two oral therapeutics for • Development of next-generation h a smallpox (non-oxime) acetylcholinesterase C • Licensure of an antisepsis drug for reactivators treatment of shock associated with filovirus infection • Advanced development of a monoclonal antibody for filovirus infection • Advanced development of a botulinum toxin small molecule therapy

2.7.4.2 Potential Payoffs and Transition structure to biological function and the definition of Opportunities reusable components of proteins leading to the equivalent The direct payoff from investment in the therapeutics area of a periodic table for proteins. In addition, the research is the mitigation of illness or injury following exposure will also involve exploiting the redundancy in amino acid to CBW agents. Coupled with diagnostic capabilities that coding and the use of artificial amino acids. Today, what unambiguously demonstrate exposure to CBW agents at is considered protein design is in reality the redesign presymptomatic time points, effective therapeutics will of an existing protein. The Protein Design Processes lead to rapid return to duty, and are critical capabilities (PDP) Program changes the paradigm by beginning with for sustaining the force in CB environments. Additionally, an understanding of the binding and chemical reaction treatment in the presymptomatic phase greatly reduces that is to be expressed; designing an active site that is compatible with the initial, transition, and final state strains on both deployed and receiving medical assets, esearch, Development, reducing the logistical support requirements for casualty chemistry; and then embedding the resulting structure R care. Finally, effective medical treatments serve a in a scaffold. To accomplish this, DARPA is investing counterproliferation function by denying an adversary an in the development of new tools in diverse areas such operational advantage in developing or employing such as topology, optimization, the calculation of ab initio weapons. Effective therapy will also depend on a rapid potentials, synthetic chemistry, and informatics leading point-of-care medical diagnostics capability to augment to the ability to design proteins to order. At the end of this program, researchers expect to be able to design a clinicians’ evaluations of etiology. equirements and new complex protein within 24 hours that will inactivate R a pathogenic organism. In addition, DARPA’s Accelerated 2.7.4.3 Overview of DARPA Programs Manufacture of Pharmaceuticals Program attempts to DARPA is pursuing several approaches to develop create an extremely rapid, flexible, and cost-effective therapeutics for BW defense. DARPA has an effort under manufacturing system with a goal to produce 3 million way to create a set of design and synthesis processes that doses of protein vaccines and protein-based therapeutics will enable the specification of a desired function, and within 12 weeks. This revolutionary manufacturing be able to rapidly synthesize a protein that performs platform promises extraordinary flexibility, allowing for the function. To achieve this goal, significant advances the manufacturing of vaccines to protect against a wide must be made in the understanding of several problems, range of viral, protozoan, fungal, bacterial, and toxin

including the relationship of sequence to physical antigens to meet the needs of the warfighter. The resulting Status cquisition Program A and Chemical and Biological Defense

53 platforms will deliver a rapid, flexible, inexpensive, and as soon as possible after exposure and ideally before highly effective MCMs capability against both established symptoms develop to allow early initiation of the

2 and emergency threats. appropriate countermeasure and rapid return to duty. This capability area evaluates both new and existing 2.7.4.4 Major Technical Challenges technologies in order to discover, identify, and monitor

t e r biomarkers of infection and/or exposure. Diagnostics Major technical challenges in the medical therapeutics P research is tied directly to warfighter requirements capability area include defining appropriate in vitro and is developed with the end-user in mind. Fielded and in vivo model systems for investigative purposes, systems should be easy to operate, inexpensive to use h a determining mechanisms of action of the threat agents and sustain, and highly specific and sensitive. Research C as well as their countermeasures, and understanding in this capability area supports diagnostic systems used in the pharmacokinetics of therapeutics for chemical the military reference laboratories, deployable medical agents, expression systems for recombinant products, facilities, and on the battlefield. and detailed modeling of agent-host interactions at the molecular level to facilitate development of small- Medical diagnostics deals with the diagnosis of infection by molecule and quick-turn therapeutics. The development or exposure to bacterial, viral, or toxin agents (biological of acceptable surrogate markers of effectiveness is diagnostics) or of exposure to nerve, vesicants, respiratory, essential to obtaining FDA licensure of medical CBW and blood agents (chemical diagnostics). Collaboration therapeutics and pretreatments, because challenging with other government agencies is encouraged. The humans with CBW threat agents to establish efficacy biological diagnostics portfolio is subdivided into four is both unethical and illegal. The DTRA is preparing subthrust areas and has two ongoing DTOs:

for an expanded role in facilitating the transition of • Technology Assessment. This subthrust area investigates effective therapeutic discoveries to advanced product promising new technologies and conducts development, meeting the expanding complexities of evaluations to determine their military usefulness. obtaining licensed indications from the FDA under the Evaluations are limited to mature technologies. animal rule. Challenges to the licensure of therapeutics Current areas of interest include DNA and protein will also include the ability to understand potential adverse microarrays, multiplexed and orthogonally complex effects in subpopulations or the genetics underlying the assays, whole genome amplification, and mass- disease and response to treatment. spectral/bioinformatic approaches. This subthrust area directly supports the JBAIDS, Block I and Next esearch, Development,

R Generation Diagnostics System (NGDS). 2.7.5 Diagnostics S&T Efforts • Assay Development. This subthrust area develops immunodiagnostic (antibody-based) and nucleic 2.7.5.1 Goals and Timeframes acid-based diagnostic assays for multiple platforms Early, sensitive, and specific diagnostic testing is an meeting specific technical requirements and for essential component in a layered, system-of-systems new and existing technologies. Current areas of equirements and approach to force health protection, conserving interest include using recombinant techniques, R warfighter operational flexibility and sustaining mass spectrometry, and proteomics to design new operational effectiveness for forces operating in a CBW assays; and developing improved sample preparation environment. Medical CB diagnostics research is focused methods. This subthrust area directly supports the on developing assays and evaluating technologies that JBAIDS Block I and NGDs. meet FDA standards for clinical testing. Specifically, the • Identification of Novel Biomarkers. This subthrust area goal is to employ FDA-approved systems to (1) identify aims to identify novel agent/host-specific markers and confirm individual exposure to BW agents and (2) that could serve as useful diagnostic targets. Areas quickly verify exposure to CW agents or to identify of emphasis include in vitro and in vivo modeling, subclinical indicators that may result from low-level identification of early, intermediate, and late chemical exposure. Identification and confirmation of

cquisition Program Status cquisition Program markers of infection/exposure in the host and the

A exposure to CBW threat agents should be accomplished and Chemical and Biological Defense

54 agent, agent biology (molecular epidemiology, • Genetically Engineered Threats. A new DTO was genomics, proteomics), and the development of approved in FY05 to support this area of research

methods supporting the identification of genetically (DTO CB.64) Rapid Detection, Threat Assessment 2 engineered threats. and Attribution of Genetically Engineered Biothreat • Test and Evaluation (T&E). This subthrust area Organisms using Microarray-Based Resequencing leverages work performed in the other subthrust Technologies. This capability will permit DoD t e r areas by employing in vivo animal model systems laboratories to unambiguously identify biothreat P for diagnostic assay validation testing and testing agents within hours, rather than days or weeks, and will cost less than 1% of traditional nucleic platforms and assays under field conditions. T&E h a acid sequencing methods. This also will permit

results are used in concept of operations (CONOPS) C development. identification of engineered modifications to naturally occurring organisms. Further, coupled • DTO CB.56 Methodology to Facilitate Development of with biogeographic databases, the genomic sequence Biological Warfare Threat Agent Detection and Medical will permit identification of the most likely origin of Diagnostic Systems. This DTO seeks to develop a the parent organism from which the biothreat agent standardized testing package for all assays and was produced. reagents produced through the biological diagnostics program. The testing package will be prepared for The chemical diagnostics area seeks to develop screening all new and previously transitioned assays. These procedures and definitive analytical methods testing packages will be used by the advanced developer to biomedical sample for individual exposure to CWAs (see pursue FDA approval. Table 2-14, below).

Table 2-14. Diagnostics S&T Strategy

Near (by FY08) Mid (by FY13) Far (by FY23) • Continuing support for JBAIDS • Evaluate and recommend • NGDS system enhancements Blocks I and NGDS transition technologies suitable for NGDS,

• Advanced development of esearch, Development,

of eight additional candidate an integrated hand-held diagnostic presymptomatic biomarker R JBAIDS, Block I assays to advanced device incorporating sample signatures development preparation, BWA, and toxin detection into one instrument • Evaluation of reagent-less • Transition of eight additional diagnostics technologies standardized immunodiagnostics • Advanced development of integrated assays/reagents to Critical Reagents sample preparation module • Research of noninvasive diagnostic technologies Program (CRP) • Advanced development of • JBAIDS Block I enhancement: multiplexed nucleic acid module • Evaluation of portable rapid automated nucleic acid sample prep resequencing capabilities equirements and • Advanced development of R system and kit multiplexed immunoassay module • Establishment of systems • Advanced development of data evaluation test bed/ decision matrix fusion module methodology. • Validation of presymptomatic • Establishment of rapid resequencing biomarker signatures center. • Validation of cholinesterase assay • Validation of GB, GD, and VX assays cquisition Program Status cquisition Program A and Chemical and Biological Defense

55 2.7.5.2 Potential Payoffs and Transition 2.7.6 Medical Radiological Defense Opportunities The mission of the Medical Radiological Defense Program 2 Deployment of these systems is critical to mitigating (MRDP) is to conduct research in the field of radiobiology illness or injury following exposure to CBW agents. and related matters essential to the support of the DoD Early and definitive diagnosis permits prompt and and the Military Services. Currently, the Armed Forces t e r effective therapy and rapid return to duty, and is a critical Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI) is the primary P component in sustaining forces in a CBW environment. repository of defense radiobiology expertise. AFRRI Coupled with effective MCMs, an enhanced diagnostic is funded through the Defense Health Program, which

h a capability deters the use of CBW by denying adversaries is overseen by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

C an operational advantage in using such weapons. Health Affairs, the ASD(HA). A comprehensive strategy and program for medical radiological defense is under 2.7.5.3 Major Technical Challenges development by ASD(HA). In FY06, the CBDP initiated a medical radiological defense S&T effort, which is Major technical challenges in the Diagnostics managed by the JSTO-CBD. Following is a description of capability include developing appropriate sample the CBDP-funded medical radiological defense efforts. processing methods for complex biological matrices, and identifying presymptomatic host responses (early biomarkers) and translating that information into 2.7.6.1 Goals and Timeframes diagnostic assays to detect chemical and biological The medical radiological defense (MRD) capability warfare (CBWA) exposure. The program continues area within the CBDP conducts and manages applied to meet the challenges of developing new and more- and advanced research to develop lead candidates for sensitive assays for threat agents and of evaluating/ MCMs against radiological and nuclear exposure, which determining the applicability of new technologies to are essential components to treat warfighters exposed diagnostics in a warfighting environment. to the damaging effects of acute radiation syndrome (see Table 2-15).

esearch, Development, Table 2-15. Medical Radiological S&T Strategy R

Near (by FY08) Mid (by FY13) Far (by FY23) • Complete dose reduction factor • Complete toxicity, pharmacodynamic • FDA-licensed MRD agents in hand (DRF) and toxicity studies of 6 and immunogenic properties of to mitigate hematopoietic syndrome, promising candidates at least two anti-apoptotic, anti- GI syndrome, and respiratory • Assess LD90/30 survival inflammatory agents that protect pneumonitis/ fibrosis from acute assays of at least 6 promising against acute radiation syndrome radiation injury equirements and and demonstrate both early and late

R candidates • Fully integrated rapid development radiation injuries • Estimate peripheral blood and Good Manufacturing Practices profile of at least two promising • Develop efficacy of radiological (cGMP) production procedures candidates prophylactic agents that protects both for combination of medical the hematopoietic system and GI tract countermeasures • Evaluate cytokine expression from acute radiation injury for next two most promising candidates • Advance at least two medical radiological countermeasures through FDA licensure; others rapidly following as funds become available cquisition Program Status cquisition Program A and Chemical and Biological Defense

56 Unlike chemical exposure where MOPP (mission- lining of gastrointestinal tract. The research effort oriented protective posture) protection and medical will be to develop a combination of treatment,

chemical antidotes can provide a sufficient level of including antiapoptotic, anti-inflammatory agents, 2 protection and reduction in morbidity, the weaponized antioxidants, steroid hormones, cytokines/growth use of ionizing radiation on the battlefield will result in factors, free-radical scavengers, somatostatin

unavoidable casualties. MOPP cannot protect against analogues, and antimicrobial agents. t e r

penetrating rays of gamma particles, some high-energy P beta, particles and neutron particles, so pre-exposure 2.7.6.2 Potential Payoffs and Transition protection will also be limited. Therefore, safe and Opportunities h a effective MCMs are necessary to prevent or minimize the

In FY06, the JSTO-CBD began a medical radiological C damaging effects of radiation to the body. They must also defense S&T effort under the CBDP with a minimal be able to be administered in a field-expedient manner. investment (less than $300,000), which was used as Because potential MCMs appear to have different seed money to screen the efficacy of four to five steroid mechanisms of action, they could very well be used in hormone, antioxidants, and free-radical scavengers in combination in the treatment of casualties following acute rodents. For FY07, after a market survey and extensive radiation exposure. They may also have useful applications literature search, the JSTO-CBD evaluated 15 medical for noncombatants who are minimally exposed to ionizing radiological countermeasures candidates for Milestone- radiation. To meet this challenge, medical radiological A designation. During FY07, the advanced developer, defense R&D is directly tied to warfighter capability the Chemical Biological Medical Systems Joint Project requirements. Categories addressed in this capability area Management Office, will evaluate these and other include three subareas: radioprotectants, postradiation

candidate compounds and initiate advanced development therapeutics, and diagnostic biodosimetry biomarkers. activities on one candidate leading to eventual FDA Emphasis is placed on three subareas within the MRD approval. capability area for technologies and approaches leading to the development of syndrome-specific radiation-induced injuries, i.e., hematopoietic, pneumonitis/respiratory 2.7.6.3 Major Technical Challenges fibrosis, and gastrointestinal syndromes. All subareas The medical treatment to respond to a radiological and within the MRD capability area will depend on the nuclear event is based upon the type of event. Some development of validated animal models and surrogate interventions are specific for the ingestion or inhalation indicators of human efficacy (necessary preconditions for of a particular radionuclide, for example, potassium esearch, Development, FDA approval): iodide for radioactive iodine or DTPA for transuranic R • Hematopoietic Syndrome: For treating approximately metals. The medical response for radiation doses in 1-6 Gy irradiation, studies in this area use cytokines, excess of approximately 2 Gy will be guided primarily growth factors, and steroid hormones to stimulate by the radiation dose, organs exposed, and the presence production of leukocytes and thrombocytes; and of combined injury and underlying medical conditions. antioxidants and free radical scavengers to reduce For this reason, the medical approach is organ- and

syndrome-related so that available countermeasures equirements and

the oxidative effects of ionizing radiation. R will be considered in context with the overall acute • Pneumonitis and Respiratory Fibrosis: This thrust area radiation syndrome (ARS) and the delayed effects of has two goals: mitigation of the onset of pneumonitis acute radiation exposure (DEAR), which can occur soon after irradiation and the long-term development months, years or decades after exposure. For doses of respiratory fibrosis by administration of combined above 2 Gy, hematopoietic syndrome leading to bone therapeutics such as anti-inflammatory agents, free marrow suppression and immunosuppression are critical. radical scavengers, antioxidants, antimicrobial For certain organs doses above ~4-8 Gy, late organ agents, and other promising MCMs. dysfunction may occur months or years later. Coupled • Gastrointestinal Syndrome: For treating approximately with other illnesses or environmental exposures over a 5-9 Gy irradiation, projects target underlying lifetime, subclinical radiation-induced injury may become clinically important so that the mitigation of subclinical Status cquisition Program mechanisms of therapeutics action on the mucosal A and Chemical and Biological Defense

57 radiation injury may be of significance to warfighters and development will significantly reduce the time to FDA veterans. For doses less than 2 Gy, the long-term effects of approval. The JSTO and the JPEO-CBD will establish

2 carcinogenesis would be the only major radiation-related a joint program manager for the TMTI (JPM TMTI) issue. Current major technical challenge in developing to exercise day-to-day management of the ongoing MCMs against radiological and nuclear threats include execution of the projects under the TMTI. The JPM will

t e r the ability to develop radioprotectants that are less toxic manage contracting and the funds to be obligated under

P because the current FDA-approved therapeutic drugs that contracts. The JPM will also develop and implement could be used in the treatment of acute radiation exposure the detailed acquisition strategies needed to transition are not practical for battlefield use, due to potential off- mature technologies to products. h a label use requirements associated with administration,

C The initial TMTI therapeutic development programs of such drugs, the intravenous mode of administration address warfighter requirements to counter hemorrhagic and the close medical monitoring required during and viruses and intracellular bacteria (see Table 2-16). following administration. Technology platforms are being developed to identify novel and genetically modified biological agents and to facilitate the preparation of therapeutic agents to 2.7.7 Transformational Medical counter these threats. In FY06, 26 multiyear contracts Technologies Initiative (TMTI) were awarded across these four thrust areas for research established within the TMTI: 2.7.7.1 Goals and Timeframes • Innate Immunity and Cytokines: Selective manipulation The mission of the TMTI is to develop broad-spectrum of the hereditary components that provide an therapeutic countermeasures to protect the warfighter immediate “first-line” of defense to continuously from conventional or genetically engineered biological ward off pathogens (innate immune response) threats, known or emergent. The use of novel technology is identified as having the potential to provide platforms and an innovative management approach effective defense. The immediacy of the innate to achieve seamless integration between discovery immune response contrasts with adaptive (or and development will accelerate countermeasure acquired) immunity that takes longer to develop. development. The Initiative will accelerate the Understanding of the consequential action of development of new medicines by establishing alliances cytokines, which mediate the immune response in a with academia and the pharmaceutical and biotechnology variety of modes, is also essential. The general goal esearch, Development,

R industries, through which applicable drug candidates in this area is to identify the best-candidate innate will be identified and incorporated into the program. immune potentiator platforms for development as Directed development through targeted solicitations broadly protective therapeutics against weaponized will be initiated to broaden the scope of therapies pathogens, thus departing the “one bug: one drug” for consideration. Additionally, the selection of drug model. Balancing near-term needs (first-generation candidates that are already in an advanced stage of compounds) with long-term success is critical. equirements and R Table 2-16. TMTI S&T Strategy

Near (by FY08) Mid (by FY13) Far (by FY23) • One or more drugs to counter • At least one drug advanced into • FDA licensed therapeutics in hand hemorrhagic fever viruses or FDA-licensure process; others to counter hemorrhagic fever and intracellular bacteria developed to rapidly following as funds permit intracellular bacterial diseases the IND submission stage. Other • Platform technologies developed • Fully integrated rapid development drug candidates developed as funds and under test; standard operating and production procedures to permit procedures in place; effectiveness of identify and counter genetically • Platform technologies initiated; a range of model drug candidates modified threats and emerging standard operating procedures developed using this system under diseases under development; target pathways investigation

cquisition Program Status cquisition Program identified A and Chemical and Biological Defense

58 • Genomics: The study of all the genes in a person quickly identifying genetically modified and/or emerging or organism and their functions, includes the diseases, the efforts of the TMTI will lead to the discovery

molecular interactions of those genes with each and production of therapeutics that will either prevent the 2 other and with the environment (for instance, warfighter from being susceptible to a biological attack in such a way as to cause disease). This area also or will assist the warfighter in maintaining an operational

seeks to understand the structure of the genome, capability following such an attack. t e r

including the mapping of genes and the sequencing P of DNA. An understanding of the genome can 2.7.7.3 Major Technical Challenges characterize host-pathogen relationships, explain the h a molecular basis for pathogenesis, provide a means of Major technical challenges include the ability to identify identifying pathogens, and enable advanced vaccine appropriate drug candidates in midstage to late-stage C development. development that are effective against the agents of interest; the ability to identify common infectivity pathways; the • Proteomics and Small Molecules: The study of the ability to find therapeutic agents that block such pathways proteome includes the complete set of proteins without toxicity to the host; assuring that such pathways, produced by an organism, their properties and once blocked, will not impair the warfighter’s ability activities: how they are produced and modified, when to operate. Additional technological challenges involve and how they are expressed, how they are involved the ability to develop procedures to rapidly identify and in metabolic pathways, and how they interact with produce countermeasures to new BW agents. one another. Analysis of pathogen proteome can lead to vaccine development, detection and diagnostic 2.7.7.4 TMTI Strategy and Issues

systems, and treatments. Small molecules can also stimulate (or block) an immune response when they The TMTI mission is to produce broad-spectrum are attached to a carrier protein. Analysis of the therapeutics that are effective against BW agents of proteome is much more difficult than the genome interest and to develop procedures for rapidly identifying because proteins are more complex relative to the and counteracting BW agents that have not as yet been nucleic acids that constitute the genome. encountered. TMTI is “transformational” in generating products and in its approach to managing R&D. These • Metabolomics: The analysis of metabolites, the small approaches will do the following: molecules (such as sugars and fats) generated in the process of metabolism. These metabolic products • Encourage the full and open exchange of information esearch, Development,

are studied as signatures of an organism’s condition. between entities performing biodefense-related R They can be markers of the progress of a disease R&D through coordination and cooperative efforts and can, for instance, be used to identify the action among the DoD and other government agencies of a pathogen and/or a treatment. Metabolites can already in biodefense including the DHHS (including also be analyzed to determine the effect of a genetic its agencies – NIH, CDC, and FDA), industry, and alteration (as in “functional genomics”) or change academia. in environment on an organism. As a less-mature • Identify and advance drug candidates that are further equirements and state of technology, metabolomics is considered a along in the development process, thereby shortening R mid-to-long range S&T investment target, where the time to FDA licensure. early success would be best achieved if coupled with proteomics and genomics. • Establish the JPM, with personnel to manage drug candidates from discovery through FDA licensure. Projects will be managed throughout their full 2.7.7.2 Potential Payoffs and Transition lifecycle by the JPM rather than undergoing the Opportunities traditional transition from the JSTO to JPEO. This The direct payoff from investment in the TMTI is a new maintains an end-to-end view of the development paradigm for developing therapeutic countermeasures process, enables dynamic portfolio management, and against BW agents. Coupled with the development enhances the coordination of performer activities to cquisition Program Status cquisition Program of new platform technologies and methodologies for ensure timely product outputs. A and Chemical and Biological Defense

59 • Establish technology platforms to identify and IPP and PM Consequence Management (CM) program counter genetically engineered or other novel offices meet these missions using a spiral acquisition

2 biological agents. strategy to expedite the procurement and fielding of emerging capabilities. At this time, efforts are focused on effectively fielding government and commercial-off-the-

t e r 2.8 CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL shelf technologies and products (GOTS/COTS) to meet

P the urgent needs of CBR response units and installation DEFENSE HOMELAND SECURITY commanders. However, the spiral nature of these efforts PROGRAMS lends itself to upgrading and improving equipment and h a This section reflects the incorporation of programs procedures on a continual basis. These programs expect C currently managed by the JPEO-CBD (specifically by the to take advantage of improvements in technology as it JPM Guardian) and the DTRA to address CBRN- defense happens within the supporting product areas. At the homeland security. Specifically, this section provides same time, improvements in analytical capabilities will descriptions of efforts and plans related to the following: impact the simulation based acquisition (SBA) tools and (1) The installation Protection Program (IPP) and the processes so that optimized use can be made of available Army Emergency First Responder Program (AEFRP) resources. and (2) The National Guard Bureau Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (NGB WMD-CST) and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) Reconnaissance and 2.8.1 CBRN Defense Homeland Decontamination Companies. Security and Force

The CBRN-defense homeland security and force Protection S&T Efforts protection area seeks to provide urgently needed The CBRN-defense homeland security area leverages protection and response capabilities to DoD S&T efforts of the other product areas. Where unmet organizations, forces, and installations responsible for requirements are identified and where S&T is required supporting the execution of critical military missions or to meet cost objectives, the CBRN-defense homeland responding to CBRN events that affect these missions security this area will work with the CBRN S&T and personnel. The programs that constitute this thrust community, the JPEO-CBD, and the associated product differ from the other CBRN defense areas in two ways: area JPM to prioritize investments and integrate (1) They address the need for integrated families of requirements. This strategy of supporting subsystem S&T esearch, Development,

R fully developed CBRN systems, and (2) they meet the will meet the vast majority of the area requirements. needs of both the military and civilian CBRN response personnel. A flexible acquisition approach is required to 2.8.1.1 Goals and Timeframes provide a comprehensive, integrated CBRN detection protection and response capabilities to 57 National Guard The goals of CBRND homeland security are to support Bureau Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support the establishment and equipping of 57 WMD-CSTs; Teams (NGB WMD-CSTs), USAR reconnaissance and fielding and equipping the 20th SUPCOM, USAR equirements and

R decontamination elements, other DoD CBR response reconnaissance and decontamination units; and providing units and to continental United States (CONUS) integrated CBRN protection, information management, and outside continental United States (OCONUS) and response capabilities to DoD installations. All installations as large as the Norfolk Naval Base and Ft. equipment for 55 teams has been purchased, certified, Hood, with disparate and unique mission requirements. and fielded. Two additional teams were authorized The CBRN capabilities provided to these organizations in 2006 and will be fielded in 2008. The IPP has been and installations provide commanders and both military reshaped based on the results of the QDR (Quadrennial and civilian first responders with an enhanced ability Defense Review) and sustained a decrement of $535M in to prepare for, rapidly respond to, make more timely procurement funds. and informed decisions about, and more effectively manage the consequences of a CBRN event. The PM cquisition Program Status cquisition Program A and Chemical and Biological Defense

60 2.8.1.2 Major Technical Challenges maintain critical missions, and effectively restore essential operations. The JPM guardian has an assigned mission to Technical challenges are based upon the production

do the following: 2 nature of the programs. Major technical challenges include the following: (1) Providing affordable real- • Provide an effective CBRN detection, identification, time biological -event identification and warning at the warning, and protection system for each installation time of the event versus relying on more costly and protection t e r P time-consuming detecting to treat, (2) Low-cost, self- • Provide a CBRN capability that will allow for rapid configuring communications for sensor networks, (3) restoration of critical installation operations Expeditious transition of emerging COTS capabilities, h a • Protect DoD civilians, contractors, and other persons and (4) Comprehensive the CBRN simulation based C analysis and decision support system. The first two working or living on U.S. military installations and challenges are high on the DoD priority lists and being facilities from a WMD event pursued by many sources. The third challenge may The program is structured using a spiral acquisition require particular attention from the JPEO-CBD and strategy to expedite procurement and fielding. Technical CBRN S&T communities to provide resources to readily risk will be reduced by focusing on mature GOTS/COTS evaluate COTS products against the Urgent Requirements technologies and products. This family-of-systems (FoS) Capabilities Document (UCRD). Lastly, Simulation package is fielded as a single, integrated system designed Based Analysis and decision Support System tools are to meet the specific needs of the installation. The design currently fragmented across multiple system areas and stresses flexibility and the capability for future technology a fully integrated Analysis and Decision Support System insertion.

will require development. The IPP is in a period of evolutionary transition. Over the past three years, the scope and resources to support 2.8.2 CBRN Defense Homeland the IPP changed significantly. Initially, the program was scoped and funded to support a complex, integrated Security Modernization family of systems consisting of CB fixed sensors, Strategy individual and CP, first responder capability, information DoD efforts for CBRN-defense homeland security and management, a robust decision support system, mass force protection rely upon the integration of capabilities notification, and medical surveillance and protection. provided by the operationally oriented commodity With the funding decrement in FY05, the program was esearch, Development, R areas previously described in this chapter. As these revised to focus on the first responder, a limited incident commodity areas complete development of emerging management system, mass notification, and a telephonic capabilities, each product or system will be evaluated notification system. In June 2006, the OSD completed for its applicability in meeting the needs of the ongoing a study validating the need to continue with the IPP CBRN-defense homeland security efforts. Thus, the program and identified both material and nonmaterial modernization strategy for this area does not rest on the gaps affecting CBRN installation protection. The study

recommended the establishment of a tiered program equirements and

development of new capabilities, but rather focuses on R the integration of existing and developing capabilities structure that enhances protection at all installations into an integrated and effective system of systems. but provides additional resources to preserve mission capability at priority bases. The IPP consists of a tiered FoS that includes detection, 2.8.3 Installation Protection identification, warning, incident management, Program (IPP) individual and CP, medical surveillance, protection, response, and initial recovery. The baseline tier consists The IPP is designed to fill a critical gap in an installation’s of nonmaterial solutions to include training materials, ability to react to a CBRN incident. This program provides military and civilian CONOPS and mission area analysis DoD prioritized installations with an integrated CBRN (MAA) templates, and exercise plans and scenarios. protection and response capability to reduce casualties, Status cquisition Program Tier 1 adds to the baseline tier by providing material A and Chemical and Biological Defense

61 solutions to include enhanced first responder capability Teams (OIPTs). At the operational level, coordination is to include individual protection and chemical, biological accomplished by a near-continuous dialog between the

2 and radiological portable handheld detection and program management and the services and installations. identification systems; mass notification and telephonic Joint, service, and federal agency IPTs have also been alerting systems and an incident management system. established for key functions within the IPP. Coordination

t e r Tier 2 consists of the baseline and Tier 1 capabilities, has included the following Programs and initiatives

P and adds collective protection, fixed chemical and within DoD: Immune Building Program (DARPA), biological point detection systems, and a more robust Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Defense (UNWD) decision support system. This FoS package is fielded Program (DTRA/DOE), BioNet (DoD/DHS), the h a as a single integrated system designed to meet the CBDP S&T Program (DTRA), CASPOD ACTD (DTRA), C specific needs of the installation. This approach is and The Defense of Cities Study (DOE). flexible enough to accommodate the needs of specific installations and accommodate technology insertion while standardizing major system elements to provide 2.9 CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL cost-effective solutions. T&E ACTIVITIES In addition to the IPP, the PM IPP also manages the Army’s Emergency First Responder Program (AEFRP) which This section provides a description of T&E activities, complements the IPP support to the Army. The AEFRP including infrastructure and related capabilities that provides enhanced emergency-response capability to select support multiple efforts throughout the CBDP. This Army installations. This program provided upgraded first section provides a summary of execution plans for the $444 million that was budgeted and programmed for

responder capability to 20 Army installations in FY05 and an additional 15 installations in FY06. For FY07, 16 Army FY06–11 period. CONUS installations, 6 OCONUS installations and 10 The development of CBD equipment and MCMs requires USARG installations are in progress. Capabilities include adequate T&E facilities. This annex provides an analysis of improved personnel protection, CBR detection and survey the existing and planned non-medical T&E infrastructure systems, individual decontamination as well as improved to meet the requirements of current and future CBD R&D CONOPS and tactics, techniques, and procedures. This programs. This document also identifies facilities that program is executed in concert with the IPP ensuring support animal testing for CBDP T&E requirements. system interoperability and compatibility across Army

esearch, Development, installations. R The JPEO-CBD/JPM Guardian IPP constitutes the 2.9.1 Overview DoD’s effort to field a full spectrum of NBC installation Current T&E facilities are not adequate in terms of either protection capabilities designed as a FoS to military capacity or capability to meet the T&E needs of the CBDP installations and DoD-owned or leased facilities. The Program. The dynamic nature of the expanding CB threat JPM Guardian procures GOTS/COTS systems designed has exceeded the capability of our current infrastructure, to meet the operational requirements as identified in the

equirements and which has a limited ability to test and evaluate equipment R URCD, October 14, 2003, and revalidated August 19, against evolving threats.Additionally, state-of-the-art tech­ 2005. nology and analytical methods are lacking or inadequate in some areas. Critical improvements to threat represen­ tation of current and projected threats began in FY06. 2.8.4 Coordination with related In FY04, the CBDP aligned the T&E requirements with CBRN Defense Homeland the appropriate S&T and/or acquisition development Security and Force programs. This alignment formed the basis of the Protection Programs Enhanced Planning Process (EPP), which was approved in the first quarter of FY05. The approved EPP resulted At the highest levels, these programs are coordinated in an overall increase of $444 million, to the total T&E by participation of the services, joint staff, and OSD cquisition Program Status cquisition Program infrastructure (over the already existing $322 million) A staff elements in the Overarching Integrated Product and Chemical and Biological Defense

62 beginning in FY06 and continuing through FY11. Of the a. Medical research facilities. These facilities primarily total T&E infrastructure budget, approximately $256 provide research data, including animal testing with CB

million was planned to be available for improvements agents to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of medical 2 in T&E capabilities. An amount of $350 million within products. the T&E infrastructure budget will be used to support i. U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases the CBDP Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB) (USAMRIID): The USAMRIID investigates infectious t e r operations and sustainment in accordance with Public diseases that require special containment and P Law 107-314, Section 232. provides a critical capability to infectious disease

The JPEO-CBD established the Product Director, research as the only DoD laboratory equipped to h a

Test Equipment, Strategy, and Support (PD TESS) in study highly hazardous viruses at Biosafety Level C the second quarter of FY05 to support the CBDP T&E 4 (BSL-4). The institute also operates a reference Executive in matters of test infrastructure development. laboratory for definitive identification of biological The PD TESS is chartered to execute the $256 million threat agents and diagnosis of the diseases they allocated to 6.4 (Advanced Component Development produce. and Prototype) and 6.5 (System Development and ii. U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense Demonstration) efforts. The PD TESS is also chartered (USAMRICD): The USAMRICD provides extensive, to coordinate efforts with the $100 million allocated world-renowned research capabilities to support to the JSTO-CBD for the execution of 6.3 (Advanced the identification, development, and fielding of Technology Development) test methodology efforts. This overall increase in the T&E infrastructure will MCMs against chemical and toxin agents. support the expansion of existing capabilities as well as iii. Navy Medical Research Center (NMRC): The Biological development of new capabilities for the execution of 6.3 Defense Directorate at the NMRC provides test methodology efforts. rapid and confirmatory diagnosis of infectious In FY05, PD TESS and the CBDP T&E Executive diseases through analysis of a wide variety of hosted the Test Capability Requirements Meeting with clinical materials. The directorate explores basic participation from the Joint Project Managers, JPEO- and applied microbiological, immunological, and CBD, the capability area program officers, the Joint related scientific research methodologies for the Requirements Office, Service combat developers, development of medical diagnostics. Research operational test agencies, developmental testers, and personnel have designed, developed, and tested a

broad variety of methodologies that have allowed esearch, Development, evaluators. This meeting resulted in a consolidated list R of T&E requirements that were then distributed to all for swift and accurate disease diagnosis essential participants and the T&E community. The consolidated for substantive medical protection and readiness. list formed the baseline for relating T&E capability to In addition, researchers have been instrumental in requirements. A data call was then conducted by PD TESS the advancement and refinement of confirmatory to determine current service T&E capabilities to establish diagnostic methods utilizing polymerase chain test capability needs based on material test requirements. reaction (PCR) methodologies in tandem with

innovative, state-of-the-art biosensor technologies. equirements and This effort forms the basis of the FY06–FY11 T&E R infrastructure investment strategy. The strategy focuses iv. Air Force Institute for Operational Health (AFIOH): The on incremental improvements in T&E capabilities over AFIOH protects health through operational and the POM, based on multiyear development programs environmental surveillance, analytic laboratories, phased to support acquisition program timelines. ongoing risk analysis, and supporting consultation. Partnerships with domestic and international civilian and governmental entities enhance AFIOH 2.9.2 Description of existing capabilities. A new function under the AFIOH, T&E Facilities the Applied Technology Center (ATC), provides continual and rapid (< 1 yr) evaluation, validation Following is a description of existing facilities for

and transition assistance of new off-the-shelf Status cquisition Program research, development, and T&E. A and Chemical and Biological Defense

63 technologies, and identifies emerging technologies b. Nonmedical R&D and T&E Facilities. (“technology discovery”) to fill critical gaps in force i. U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC):

2 protection, rapid diagnostics, epidemiology, and ECBC facilities consist of BSL-3 and live-chemical- preventive medicine, including CBRN identification, agent and simulant-aerosol-particulate bench to meet both Air Force and Joint Community chambers; CB protective filter and mask testing t e r requirements. The ATC has over 10,000 square feet with live agents and simulants; small animal live P of dedicated molecular testing laboratories including agent testing; limited field simulant and interferent an ultraclean lab space with high-throughput testing; two hazardous material explosion facilities nucleic acid sequencing, mammalian cell culture, h a (16,000 cubic feet) for testing military unique protein purification and characterization and a

C chemical material and industrial material, which can CDC-certified BSL-3 suite. The ATC also performs use one pound of explosives when combined with analytical, in-lab assessment of fielded technologies chemical material, and five pounds of explosives such as PCR-based (JBAIDS) testing and immuno- without chemical material; aerosol simulant magnetic electrochemiluminescence (EC L), among chambers and the Aerodynamic Research Labora­ others. tory, comprising approximately 11,000 square feet v. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI): of experimental aerodynamic facilities that include AFRRI conducts research in the field of radiobiology four wind tunnels for component and materials and related matters essential to the operational tests; and 5 mph Breeze Tunnel, which primarily and medical support of the DoD and the Military supports early R&D phases (research on acute and Services. AFRRI is a joint entity of the military subacute toxicity effects of chemical warfare agent

departments and is subject to the authority and surety materials, terrestrial environmental fate and direction of the president of the Uniformed Services effects, and effects of chemicals of military interest University of the Health Sciences (USUHS), under on varying species of the aquatic ecosystem). the Assistant Secretary Of Defense for Health Affairs ii. U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground (DPG): The DPG is and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel DoD’s Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB) NIH Strategic Plan and Readiness. As stated in the range for providing CBD, both developmental and and Research Agenda for Medical Countermeasures operational testing to support milestone, system Against Radiological and Nuclear Threats , June 2005, production, and fielding decisions. DPG facilities the current cadre of investigators conducting consist of the Combined Chemical Test Facility esearch, Development, research into MCMs for radiological injury is R (CCTF) (35,000 square feet) with 35 test suites small, the infrastructure to support such research supporting live-chemical-agent liquid, vapor, is inadequate, and only a few small training and aerosol testing; the Life Sciences Test Facility programs in the radiological health sciences exist. (LSTF) with multiple live-biological-agent test Moreover, the physical infrastructure and other chambers at the BSL-3 level with aerosolization support (e.g., biostatistical services good laboratory capability, comprising 32,000 square feet of which practices ( GLP)-certified facilities) are limited for 3,500 square feet is BSL-3 lab space; Materiel equirements and R high-quality basic and translational research and Test Facility (MTF) with three environmentally are particularly lacking for the development and controlled, vehicle-size live-chemical-agent licensure of experimental dosimetry and radiological chambers, the largest of which is 30 x 50 x 50 feet; countermeasures. test grids, and instrumentation for CB simulant vi. Other government and extramural facilities that exist field and chamber tests; the Ambient Breeze outside of the Department, but which are leveraged Tunnel for biological stimulant system tests. The by the CBDP, to include the National Institute of DPG has a limited capability for transportable Allergies and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) and the instrumentation to support simulant tests and CDC. Medical testing is conducted in compliance operational tests in off-site environments. with the rules, regulations, and requirements iii. Air Force Operational Test & Evaluation Center (AFOTEC):

cquisition Program Status cquisition Program established by the FDA (21 CFR).

A The AFOTEC utilizes the BSL-1 lab for simulants and Chemical and Biological Defense

64 at Eglin Air Force Base (AFB). Eglin AFB facilities 2.9.2.1 Analysis of T&E Facilities’ Capacity consist of simulant vapor challenge test chambers, The test facilities possessed by and accessible to the CBDP

several test ranges, and an outdoor decontamina­ 2 are not currently adequate in terms of capacity, given the tion pad for use with chemical simulants. Air Force expanding requirements to test whole systems; and are Research Laboratory (AFRL) facilities consist of a not adequate to fully test and evaluate CBDP material

BSL-3 lab and chemical simulant test chambers. t e r development products. However, the coordinated efforts iv. Naval SurfaceWarfare Center (NSWC), Dahlgren: Provides in submitting the FY06 CBDP budget have resulted in P CB test center for ship systems, with capabilities establishing the funding to provide for these resources,

including BSL-3, TIM, biotoxin and chemical agent with improvements expected during FY08 and each h a

simulant test capabilities; materials T&E laboratory year beyond. Component and simulant capabilities exist. C for small-scale component, small and large Current T&E shortfalls lie in the full systems and platform coupon test samples—fully equipped for dynamic test chambers and supporting instrumentation and mechanical materials test methodology; corrosion fixtures. These test fixtures must be able to introduce and laboratory; large coupon dynamic environmental adequately control live CB agent challenges and provide test chambers; ship wash-down decontamination a range of environmental and challenge conditions to test facility with simulant; small-weapons post- simulate evolving threats, while performing end-to-end decontamination functionality testing range; small- systems operations of CBD equipment. Shortfalls in scale component and material decontamination instrumentation and methodology to support multiple tests using simulants; CP development systems for and diverse concurrent natural environmental, full development and simulant testing of airlocks and systems operational tests also exist. Specifically, tests

filter assemblies. for full systems decontamination capabilities, moving v. U.S. Navy Operational Test & Evaluation Force and the platform biological and chemical long-range detectors, Marine Corps Operational Test & Evaluation Agency: and full-scale battlefield hazard mitigation of protective These facilities provide limited capability to support ensembles do not currently exist. CBDP field tests. Requirements for CBDP-related T&E capabilities for vi. Other government/international and extramural which funding has not been programmed have been facilities that exist outside of the CBDP that are frequently identified over the past decade, resulting leveraged to the fullest extent possible on a case- by- in a rolling backlog of unimproved or unavailable test facilities, thus resulting in limited capabilities. Funding case basis, including the Nevada Test Site (outdoor esearch, Development, simulant field tests), the Defense Research and in FY06 is in place to begin addressing this. To address R Development Center (DRDC) in Suffield, Canada, the most serious deficiencies, DOT&E, through the and Porton Down in the United Kingdom (chamber Central T&E Investment Program (CTEIP), has initiated and field tests). Battelle Memorial Institute, and funded the Contamination Avoidance Detector Test Geomet, Southern Research Institute, Arvin/ Suite (CADTS). This multiyear project, scheduled to Calspan, Environmental Technologies Group, ITT complete in FY08, provides the most immediate needs

Research Institute, Midwest Research Institute, and for testing contamination avoidance equipment. Among equirements and Truetech also have small-scale agent and simulant the capabilities included in the test suite are the Joint R test capabilities. Other R&D facilities include Los Ambient Breeze Tunnel (JABT) completed in FY06, Alamos National Laboratory (research on biological Active Standoff Facility (ASC) scheduled to complete and radiological defensive systems), MIT Lincoln in FY07, and a near real-time PCR referee system Labs (laser technology research for defensive completed in FY06. biological systems), and Research Triangle Institute The T&E infrastructure in terms of intellectual capital/ (R&D of CBD systems). personnel resources required to support the CBDP is currently not adequate. However, beginning in FY06, the coordinated efforts in preparing the CBDP budget have resulted in establishing the funding to provide cquisition Program Status cquisition Program

for these resources. As required by Public Law 103- A and Chemical and Biological Defense

65 160, Section 1703, all CBDP T&E funds are provided • comprehensive M&S to establish T&E parameters through a defensewide account, thus the services may and expand systems analyses,

2 not independently support the T&E infrastructure • live-CB-agent full system test chambers, through service research, development, T&E (RDT&E) accounts. Other than the individual direct test programs, • expanded simulant range capabilities,

t e r much of the current Operational Test Agency (OTA) • T&E capabilities to address decontamination efficacy

P infrastructure that supports the CBDP has limited or no and systems performance postdecontamination funding from each Service, thus hampering the ability to operations, perform early T&E methodology planning and continu­ h a ous evaluation. The OTA intellectual infrastructure is • T&E capabilities for advanced battlespace C critical for the advanced planning and development of management (Shape) information systems, and versatile test capabilities that are adequate to address • T&E capabilities to address individual protection the diversity of threat and scenario types expected to be requirements. encountered.

2.9.2.2 Analysis of Versatility 2.9.3 Integrated Approach CBDP T&E capabilities are not sufficiently versatile to to Plan for T&E provide full decision support to address current threats Infrastructure Planning with operational realism, nor to address evolving threats. However, it should be noted that the T&E Infrastructure Funding has been identified to develop and sustain test Investment Strategy is designed with funding in place to infrastructure and methodology to support identified

address this over the POM, with improvements planned community shortfalls. This funding will allow the for FY08 and beyond. following CBDP T&E objectives to be met: For the DoD T&E facilities that support the CBDP, • Establish a single integrated approach to planning there has not been an integrated approach to ensure joint service T&E capability and methodology documentation, validation, and repeatability of test needs. procedures in many cases; no basis or mechanism to • Establish a fully integrated T&E investment strategy. standardize procedures among labs; and no advanced planning nor investment for evolving threats and testing • Establish a common set of test processes and standards esearch, Development, for conducting joint T&E activities.

R of diverse battlespace conditions and missions. This has resulted in specific compartmentalized test capabilities • Identify T&E capability gaps and intellectual and a lack of versatility. Additionally, correlations of infrastructure required for CB defense needs. agents and simulants required to support the assessment • Develop new test procedures and capabilities to of system performance against live agents based on testing with simulants have not been established. increase the breadth, depth, and capacity of the CBDP T&E infrastructure to address evolutionary

equirements and In the past, acquisition program offices have sponsored threats and expanded operational environments. R expedited test capabilities (either in government or the commercial facilities) to meet immediate urgent needs. The T&E infrastructure requirements have been This has often resulted in test systems with limited synchronized with technology transition and acquisition versatility that were only suitable for very specific testing programs’ T&E requirements. A key focus is to develop applications, as well divergent, nonstandardized and models and analytical methods necessary to provide nonsustainable tests. commanders guidance for effective CBD operations and equipment use. A critical element of the developmental Beginning in FY06, investments were initiated to obtain: T&E work required across all functional areas is the • advanced T&E capabilities to test CBD equipment correlation of agents’ and simulants’ performance against NTAs and new collective and individual tailored to each type of CBD technology. Work to increase critical operational test capabilities (outdoor

cquisition Program Status cquisition Program protection technologies,

A simulant testing) is planned as well. and Chemical and Biological Defense

66 2.9.4 Integrated Approach chamber is required to provide data sufficient for system for T&E Processes evaluation. Efforts in FY06 included initiatives to further

characterize and relate component performance among 2 In addition to the synchronization of the S&T, agents and various types of simulants, to validate additional acquisition, and T&E infrastructure budget planning, simulants, and to establish an M&S whole system analysis process improvements have been made to establish process. Based on currently planned funding, the WSLAT t e r integrated T&E approaches. In FY06, among OSD T&E test is scheduled to be completed in FY07. P oversight programs, JBAIDS and JSLNBCRS conducted multiservice operational test evaluation, and JCAD

2.9.5.2 Field Trials h a conducted an Operational Assessment. These were truly joint tests including the Air Force, the Army, the Navy More than thirty years have passed since outdoor live- C and the Marines. Other programs, including the JSGPM, agent chemical tests were banned in the United States. also conducted tests using joint test teams. The lead OTAs and the last outdoor test with live chemical agent was coordinate producing single evaluation reports reflecting performed, so much of the infrastructure for the field the results of all services’ evaluations. These efforts testing of chemical detectors no longer exists or is by AFOTEC, the U.S. Navy Operational T&E Force seriously outdated. The currently budgeted improvements (OPTEVFOR), the Army Test & Evaluation Command in the T&E infrastructure will greatly enhance both (ATEC), and the Marine Corps Operations T&E Activity the developmental and operational field testing of full (MCOTEA) reflect the spirit of the joint integrated T&E systems, with better simulated representation of threats infrastructure approach and indicate a sound direction in and characterization of system response. establishing a common set of processes and procedures for joint CBDP T&E. 2.9.5.3 Live-Agent T&E Capability A test chamber and validated methods adequate to perform live CB agent testing of active standoff CB 2.9.5 Specific T&E Requirements detectors is a critical need of the CBDP program. Work Planned T&E capabilities improvements include with actual agents is necessary for both development advanced ground-truth sampling systems, threat- and testing to establish the library of algorithms for the representative CB challenge dissemination and system to detect CB agents, and to test the efficiency of characterization, aerosol-and-surface-sampling methods, detection. An active system test chamber for chemical

and hazard analysis models relating test data to actual agents is currently being defined and will be timed to esearch, Development, toxicological data. The following is a description of support standoff acquisition programs along with a R activities and capabilities to be developed starting in military construction project in FY11–12. There are FY06 to address the full scope of T&E requirements. technical risks associated with the safe implementation of a large-scale live-agent capability for standoff detection 2.9.5.1 Whole System Live Agent Testing that could delay testing and limit the ability for full system testing. The CBDP T&E Executive and the DOT&E have equirements and identified the requirement to conduct Whole System R Live Agent Testing (WSLAT) of biological agent point 2.9.5.4 Emerging Threats detection systems with live biological agent aerosols. For all functional areas, test methods are required to Currently, active agent testing is conducted only at the address emerging threats, including NTAs, TIMs, and subcomponent level, due to size constraints associated dusty agents. The CBDP will fund a dedicated NTA with existing aerosol containment chambers. Whole chamber, along with the studies needed to provide data system testing is currently conducted solely with a to safely operate it, and specific test fixtures tailored to single biological agent simulant. Simulants have not been each type of test. The CBDP will develop and validate validated for many types of biological agents. While the advanced technology tests to address TIM effects on current approaches have met minimal requirements protective materials and systems.

to test and field detectors, establishment of a WSLAT Status cquisition Program A and Chemical and Biological Defense

67 2.9.5.5 Decontamination Testing and to understand the interactions among variables that affect protection to link all the tests in an analysis and The testing of decontaminants and decontamination

2 model to predict hazard levels in order to optimize CB systems is hampered by the lack of any acceptable ensemble design and deployment. Correlation between simulants for field testing and training and lack of agent- simulant penetration and leakage and that of either simulant correlations. Due to the unique qualities of

t e r chemical or biological agents and direct relation of chemicals and biologics, even within the same family,

P penetration and leakage data to toxicological data are no two chemicals or biologics act the same when key tenets in the strategy to evaluate IP and CP systems. exposed to the same decontaminant or environment. For both individual and collective protection equipment h a Decontamination is a physical process that will always be testing, fixtures used to test swatches of material for

C dependent upon the exact chemical or biologic present. leakage against chemical agents are outdated and were Testing is currently conducted with small components not designed to represent field-wear conditions. or panels of hardware in test chambers. The CBDP will provide updated decontamination-system test methods that address decontamination system efficacy, as well as 2.9.5.8 Collective Protection T&E Investment system degradation from decontamination processes. Strategy The decontamination pad used at DPG was contaminated In pursuing force protection for warfighters, Collective in the 1980s with C8 Emulsion decontaminant. The Protection against CBRN threats is critical to sustaining area is a solid waste management unit regulated under battlefield momentum. T&E infrastructure and capability RCRA. This limits the type and quantity of testing that to support timely acquisition of systems designed to can be done there. This pad has been replaced with an sustain the fight is a critical requirement. Current gaps

environmentally sound system that will collect all run- have been identified that impact safety and battlefield off. In order to provide test data regarding operator protection for individual platforms, crews, and units. use of the decontamination systems, families of reactive Aligning technology development and system acquisition simulants are needed. programs is the framework within which the T&E methodologies and capabilities will be developed to 2.9.5.6 Simulants and Agent Characteristics meet the T&E needs. The T&E investment strategy for CP (currently unfunded) will focus on upgrading test fixtures Agent/simulant correlations are a cross-commodity and instrumentation and standardize test procedures to testing need in the CBDP. Also in this category are evaluate COLPRO systems and components to include

esearch, Development, analysis procedures and agent-simulation correlation

R air purification systems and novel closures. Upgraded methods for NTAs, aerosol chemical agents, and TIM. test facilities are required to test advanced technologies, which require different test setups, instrumentation, 2.9.5.7 Individual Protection T&E Investment measurement of different parameters, and new analysis Strategy methods. Improvements would include several sites Fixtures containing new sample cells that will more (ECBC, Eglin, Dahlgren, DPG). The test procedures accurately sample the air behind the protective material, across facilities will be standardized to allow for equirements and

R provide dynamic subsystem tests, and enable tests comparability of the data. to characterize the effects of high winds on system protection are technologically feasible and have been 2.9.5.9 Information Systems T&E Investment designed, but require funding to develop and validate. Strategy A critical requirement exists for a whole-system live- Automatic collection and fusion of information from agent CB ensemble test supported by modeling to allow all CBRN battlefield assets and integration with other integration of toxicological data into valid estimates of relevant information is critical. Gaps exist in our ability casualty predictions. Whole ensemble testing is currently to test the integration of threat information, CBRN conducted with one simulant that has been determined to sensor and reconnaissance data, protective posture data, be safe for human use. Methodology studies are needed to environmental conditions, medical surveillance, and

cquisition Program Status cquisition Program characterize the physical properties affecting protection collection of other data pertaining to CBRN conditions. A and Chemical and Biological Defense

68 The T&E investment strategy for Information Systems will (b) The T&E strategy will also upgrade the DPG ASC & focus on acquiring test grid and safari Instrumentation, JABT simulant standoff chambers. It will procure test

simulant/simulator development, real time data instrumentation and fully characterize simulant cloud 2 standardization, integration, fusion, visualization, and characteristics in the ASC and JABT standoff chambers. test area data network. Develop standardized Test Operation Procedures. This

Spectroradiometer. Test equipment purchase (for use as T&E capability is critical to allow full system evaluation t e r a referee system) to fully characterize simulant cloud of all CB standoff detection systems and point detection P releases in a field environment for standoff and point systems, by allowing testing of production representative systems in realistic threat conditions. detection systems at DPG. Linked to accepted Edgewood h a

Chemical Biological Center (ECBC) S&T proposal. C 2.9.5.11 Chemical Standoff Detection T&E Simulators & Stimulators. Design and build detection Investment system simulants and stimulators to facilitate hardware- in-the-loop in a field environment. Validate simulators For operations against a threat with chemical weapons, and stimulators. These T&E capabilities are critical to capability detection and identification are critical to insure support operational testing of Shape and Sense systems that forces can assume the optimal protective posture so in a wide range of environments. These capabilities will that they can continue to sustain operations and rapidly allow activation and emulation of detection systems to decontaminate affected areas, equipment, and personnel. simulate threat scenarios without simulant dissemination, The T&E investment strategy for chemical standoff and will provide simulated detector inputs to fully systems will focus on acquiring: Spectroradiometer, characterize detector network systems in unit level tests. ASC/JABT, Synthetic Test Environment, Test Grid These capabilities support detector network tests, testing and Safari Instrumentation, NTA facility, CB standoff during operational exercises, and tests of Battlespace chamber Test Facility, and CB Field Simulant Challenge Management/Information and Reconnaissance Systems. Test Capability. The T&E investment strategy for chemical point systems 2.9.5.10 Biological Standoff Detection T&E will focus on acquiring: Synthetic Test Environment, Test Investment Grid and Safari Instrumentation, Dynamic Test Chamber, For operations against a threat with biological weapons, NTA facility, and improved and expanded CB Field capability detection and identification are critical to Simulant Challenge Test Capability. ensure that forces can assume the optimal protective esearch, Development, R posture so that they can continue to sustain operations 2.9.5.12 Updating T&E Infrastructure and rapidly decontaminate affected areas, equipment, and Test infrastructure for other CBDP systems in personnel. The T&E investment strategy for biological development meets minimal testing requirements, but in standoff systems will focus on the following: most cases is either outdated, incapable of a high degree of (a) Designing and building a live-agent biological reproducibility or precision, underfunded, or otherwise detection standoff capability at the DPG. Test techniques, inadequate to meet schedule or quality requirements equirements and methodologies, dissemination hardware, and referee for operational evaluations or commanders’ guidance. R instrumentation will be developed and validated during Most testing currently performed is not operationally this effort. Developing standardized Test Operation relevant, nor is it based on realistic threat scenarios that Procedures. Gap addressed: This T&E capability is warfighters require. critical to allow system evaluation of all biological stand- The development of all CBDP materiel—from detectors, off detection systems in realistic threat conditions. to individual protective gear, to decontaminants—requires Standoff detection test facilities have space, line-of-sight, test validation against actual CWAs in systems validated and hardware differences from point detection facilities with animal models. Inhalation exposures are the most that will tend to drive higher the cost per test. However, likely exposure route for volatile CWAs and a likely route this does not necessarily preclude point detectors from for weaponized agents. Such exposures, to either vapor testing in the same facility. or aerosol forms of CWAs, require specialized equipment Status cquisition Program A and Chemical and Biological Defense

69 found in few areas of the world and also expert personnel investment of the CBDP. As a result of T&E capabilities to supervise and run the exposure trials. At a minimum, development efforts over all commodities, repeatable

2 expertise is required in inhalation toxicology, analytical procedures must be demonstrated, validated, and chemistry, and respiratory physiology. An inhalation documented. These will be published for standardized agent testing capability has been firmly established at use in test operating procedures (TOPs) required to

t e r ECBC in accordance with all DoD safety, surety, security meet evaluator data requirements for lab CB agent testing

P and Association for Assessment and Accreditation of and outdoor simulant testing in multiple environments. Laboratory Animal Care (AAALAC) requirements and Validation trials will be conducted on initial general in compliance with GLP (Good Laboratory Practices) in capabilities to support finalization of the TOPs. h a the new state-of-the-art Life Sciences Research facility.

C T&E needs are organized according to the Joint Enabling This current state-of-the-art research facility is under- Concept/functional area they support, that is, Sense, funded in terms of its maintenance, routine replacement, Shape, Shield, and Sustain. The following sections list and capacity to meet current increased needs. Lack of specific T&E needs. continued maintenance funds could deteriorate these capabilities. As with the overall T&E infrastructure, 2.9.6.1 SHIELD: Individual/Collective Protective sustainment and instrumentation costs have been passed Equipment (IPE/CPE) to CBDP research programs that are not adequately • Next-generation materials agent tests to provide budgeted for these expenses. toxicologically relevant data under wide variety of Animal Test Research that supports the CBDP requires threat conditions and types of materials. work with chemical surety materials and will require an

• Tests to address NTA, TIM, and dusty agents. increase in scope to support specific hazard definition and protective ensemble performance. Simulant research • Development of modeling and analysis methods cannot accurately predict biomedical outcomes of to characterize system protection in terms of chemical warfare agents. By federal law chemical surety toxicological hazard levels to give commanders materials, including dilute agents, must be under DoD/ guidance for effective CB ensemble use. Department of the Army control. The animal research • Whole system live agent testing of CB protective test facilities at the U.S. Army ECBC and USAMRIID ensembles. must be augmented to meet these requirements. • A next-generation Man-in-Simulant Test (MIST), esearch, Development, For CBD MCMs, Annex F provides a detailed description R which would provide near-real-time sampling of technical barriers for the various prophylaxes, technology for material and system tests to therapeutics, and diagnostics, and outlines T&E needs better characterize CB performance and provide to be overcome to ensure development of FDA-licensed operationally useful information regarding the effects medical products. of changing battlefield conditions and warfighter movement. The current test capacity and challenge types for system testing of CB ensembles needs to equirements and

R 2.9.6 Actions Needed to Meet be improved to meet the rising test demands of new Testing Requirements RDA plan systems, including liquid challenges and This section supplements Section 2.9.4 above. The expanded processing capability. Increase the test following is a list of specific T&E capabilities that were aerosol CB simulant challenges beyond the present initiated in FY06. These shortfalls primarily comprised capability of 1–2 subjects per trial. Current IPE needs for tests that do not presently exist, but also systems being tested require a larger chamber and include tests that require improvement to provide data increased test capacity. Also, a larger and more adequate for evaluator, decision maker, and combatant- controlled range of particle sizes will be available to commander information needs. In addition, continued better simulate a range of dusty CB agents. identification and development of CBDP T&E intellectual • Obtain CB ensemble subsystem tests with live agents

cquisition Program Status cquisition Program and capabilities infrastructure is required as a significant (CB gloves, footwear, and masks) to include testing A and Chemical and Biological Defense

70 of CB masks with biological challenges and with a simulant performance with additional detectors, wider range of helmets and respiratory conditions. decontaminants, and protective materials that

establish ground truth data comparing agent and 2 2.9.6.2 SENSE: CB Standoff Detection. simulant under comparable conditions. • Implementation of the National Academy of • Full characterization of the chemical agents of varying Science (NAS) test requirements that state that grade or quality, interferent, and development and t e r environmental modeling be used to augment live- documentation of more effective test methods for P agent testing, as outlined in Review of Testing NTAs. and Evaluation Methodology for Biological Point • Improved and accelerated development of referee h a

Detectors, Final Report, The National Academies systems, sampling and analysis, validation testing, C Press, Washington, D.C., 2004. Additional study by and TOPs. Final studies on the uniform dissemination the NAS to determine the feasibility of a biological and reproducibility of dusty challenge materials also standoff chamber and levels of agents or agent-like will be accelerated and completed. organisms (ALO) that can be tested in a large scale chamber safely. • Building upgrades (test fixture mechanical systems, safety systems, controls, and data systems) need • Better characterized threats for realistic threat to be funded, which will result in shorter and less scenarios for developmental and operational tests. expensive tests and more efficient test operations at This needs to include the ability to establish the reduced direct cost to customers. relationship between lab agent performance and field simulant performance.

2.9.6.4 SENSE: Biological Point Detection • Provide additional ground truth instrumentation, • Purchase equipment for modular BSL-3 laboratory including augmenting the ability to exploit future space to support WSLAT. advances in imaging spectrometer and Raman light detection and ranging (LIDAR) technologies. • Design and build WSLAT chamber; validate with multiple BWAs. • Provide for improved data collection, archiving, • Projects that validate and expand current PCR and automated processing of trial results to enable technologies, characterize interferent challenges, test schedules to proceed and for test conditions develop improved chamber bioaerosol dissemination to be adjusted as necessary to account for previous

methods, develop encapsulated simulants, and esearch, Development, trial data. This significantly improves the ability develop robust simulants. R to characterize system performance over a wider and better-defined set of operational conditions 2.9.6.5 SUSTAIN: Decontamination and greatly lessens lost data and the necessity for repeated trials. • Support full-system, end-to-end decontamination procedure development and demonstration, • Award NAS feasibility study for biological standoff including a means to determine success

live agent testing. of decontamination, characterization of equirements and R decontamination chemistry and mechanisms, and 2.9.6.3 SENSE: Chemical Point Detection agent-simulant correlation for use in field testing and training and to support NBC contamination • Provide technological improvements that reduce survivability testing of critical non-NBC systems. cost, improve test schedules and efficiency, and • Develop fixtures and instrumentation to increase minimize test performance impacts. the size of materiel to be decontaminated from • Relocate detector test fixtures from the current exposure to CWA. Materiel Test Facility (MTF) chamber, which is • Accepted methods for measuring chemical-agent required to test new systems. vapor and contact hazards, and determining the decontaminability of RDA systems exposed to

• Correlate chamber agent performance with field Status cquisition Program

agents of biological origin. A and Chemical and Biological Defense

71 • Tests, models, and standard methods to reliably expanded environmental and agent challenge conditions characterize the degradation of system function as a for individual protection materials and systems. Simulant

2 result of decontamination processes. development is a key area of the S&T effort: developing families of simulants that can be used to predict system 2.9.6.6 Sustainment of Existing Infrastructure agent performance and that can be safely be used by

t e r operators in outdoor environments. Test technology • Prepare sustainment plans and finance sustainment for P will also provide agent (lab) and simulant (lab and existing CBDP laboratories, test facilities, chambers field) challenge generation and control, agent-simulant and outdoor test grids. This includes sustainment correlations, and near-real-time measurements of CBD h a plans and funding for new test capabilities developed systems’ responses. Provide mobile, deployable test C under the CTEIP or modernization programs. capabilities to perform field simulant testing in multiple • Fund all direct test support requirements at the natural environments to ensure that CBD systems are DPG effective, suitable, and survivable across the range of 2.9.6.7 New T&E Technologies environments in which they will be deployed. Much of the T&E technology efforts are targeted to Capabilities to enable testers to provide evaluators and provide scientific source data, especially for M&S, that unit commanders specific information about how to has not previously been available or has been limited or properly use the CBD systems tested to mitigate risks not representative of current threat environments of in the CB environment, and also to provide system concern. Examples of requirements and test conditions developers the information required to adequately for which test technology and data must be developed develop and mature the systems. Test infrastructure will

and validated include unique agent challenge profiles, be adequate to ensure that data are available to certify jet aircraft flight conditions, and simulated effective that critical CBD systems are ready for operational tests respiratory rates in CB mask protection agent tests; and and to identify any potential vulnerabilities. esearch, Development, R equirements and R cquisition Program Status cquisition Program A and Chemical and Biological Defense

72 C h a p t e r 3 3 Chemical and Biological Defense Logistics Status t e r P h a C

3.1 introduction the DoD Strategic Planning Guidance emphasized the need to continue building on capability-based planning The Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) and management efforts. Joint capability portfolio continues to make progress towards a common goal of management provides an approach to manage groups Joint Logistics. This report describes current initiatives of related capabilities across the enterprise to improve plus the progress and the challenges. Joint logistics interoperability, minimize capability redundancies focuses on ensuring the overall availability of chemical and gaps, and maximize capability effectiveness. Joint and biological (CB) defense equipment for the Total capability portfolios will allow the Department to shift Force—or its logistical readiness—as one measure of to an output-focused model that enables progress to be overall readiness. Logistical readiness does not address measured from strategy to outcomes. Delivering needed operational readiness directly. Operational readiness is capabilities to the joint warfighter more rapidly and highly dependent on the training and equipping of specific efficiently is the ultimate criterion for success in this units and the nature of the specific operation. Generally, effort. such information is time dependent and classified. The JPEO-CBD continues to improve the logistical As the Materiel Developer for the Chemical and Biological readiness status of the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) Defense Program (CBDP), the Joint Program Executive CB defense equipment in three ways: Officer, Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD) and the Joint Project Managers (JPMs) are responsible (1) Continue and improve upon several Business for Total Life Cycle Systems Management (TLCSM). The Process Improvements and institutionalize these JPMs execute TLCSM and are supported by agencies improvements across the JPEO-CBD. such as the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Tank- (2) Enhance the JPEO-CBD’s decision support tools Automotive Armaments Command (TACOM), and many and communications through logistics information industry partners. These partnerships are central to the technology solutions. effective management of a variety of complex system

(3) Increase visibility of the CBD industrial base status ogistics Status with various sustainment strategies. TLCSM integrates L in support of DoD requirements, and improve planning, resourcing, and execution along with logistics, understanding of the Homeland Defense/ Homeland training, industrial base, and readiness improvements. Security requirements and the risks to the industrial The JPEO‑CBD maintains cooperative engagement base from a CB attack on the homeland. with the services to ensure integration between the Title 50 responsibilities of the CBDP and the Title 10 responsibilities of the Military Services to train and equip the forces. The CBDP is preparing for the transition to an end state where the total program is managed as a “Joint Capability Portfolio.” The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Chemical and Biological Defense

73 3.2 CBRN Logistics Management • Increase availability, reliability, and maintainability to the warfighter The Services, the Joint Requirements Office-CBRN 3 Defense (JRO-CBRND), the Defense Logistics Agency • Avoid duplication of efforts, potential excess, and (DLA), and the JPEO-CBD coordinate and integrate joint unbalanced capacity for depot/contractor logistics CBRN defense logistics. Stakeholders share information support (CLS) t e r to maximize the distribution and use of limited resources, P • Maintain configuration control and address to gain total visibility of CBD materiel, and to ensure a supportability issues, including diminishing common understanding of requirements for fielding and manufacturing sources and material suppliers h a sustaining equipment for all operational environments, (DMSMS)

C including battlefield operations and homeland defense. Unique commodity characteristics, such as the • Maximize economies of scale differences between pharmaceutical products, textile • Reduce life cycle costs products, and complex chemical or biological detection • Maintain asset visibility devices, require a decision-making model that accounts for a diverse range of factors. The JPEO-CBD is addressing the challenges of TLCSM 3.2.1 CBRN Business Process through the Joint Logistics Advisory Council for Chemical Improvements and Biological Defense (JLAC-CBD), which is composed of senior logisticians from the JPEO-CBD, Services, The Services, the DLA, and the JPEO-CBD continue DLA, and other supporting activities (see Figure 3-1). to improve business processes using a number of The main purpose of the JLAC-CBD is to recommend organizational, procedural, and information system Service-wide Business Process Improvements that address initiatives. Some efforts are unique to CBD, while others best practices for TLCSM. The JLAC-CBD focuses on capitalize on business process improvements occurring joint sustainment processes that do the following: elsewhere in the DoD. ogistics Status L

Figure 3-1. Joint Logistics Board, Joint Service Executive, and Joint Logistics Advisory Council for CBRN Defense Logistics and Sustainment Initiatives Chemical and Biological Defense

74 3.2.1.1. Joint Logistic Board TLCSM Executive The JSS-CBD is intended to address common Joint Council CBD sustainment challenges by providing the JPEO-

During 2006, the JPEO-CBD made progress toward CBD a formal process through which joint sustainment 3 establishing a TLCSM Executive Council under the initiatives are properly vetted and staffed through the authority of the Joint Logistics Board. This initiative is Joint Services. This group will examine and provide a step towards the implementation of cutting-edge Joint formal Service feedback on all JLCAC-CBD initiatives t e r Service logistics management processes. This initiative before they are introduced for consideration or P also is examining the establishment of the Joint Service implementation to the Joint Services. The process is depicted in Figure 3-1. Sustainment Chemical and Biological Defense Working h a

Group (JSS-CBD). C 3.2.1.2 Joint Logistics Advisory Council for The JSS-CBD is under development and is intended to Chemical and Biological Defense (JLAC- serve as the centralized focal point for CBDP logistics CBD) planning, policy, guidance, and sustainment initiatives. The group will review or develop recommendations to The JLAC-CBD is an integrated process team (IPT) DoD policy and procedures to do the following: tasked to advise and make recommendations to the JPEO-CBD on all CBDP TLCSM issues that are within • Increase readiness the JPEO-CBD’s authority. The JLAC-CBD is made up • Reduce total life cycle costs of empowered logisticians within the CBDP (see Table 3-1) who represent their respective agency/service on • Mitigate logistics and supportability risks proposed CBD supportability and sustainment issues. • Preserve the industrial base The JLAC-CBD Chairperson oversees the management of the council and advises on the recommendations and • Improve TLCSM of DoD CBD systems/ decisions that go to the JPEO-CBD. Figure 3-2 shows equipment the JLAC-CBD process.

Table 3-1. JLAC-CBD Membership

• JPEO-CBD Chief of Logistics • TACOM (RIA-ILSC) • JPM Information Systems • JPM Chemical Biological Medical Systems • JPM Individual Protection • JPM Decontamination • JPM NBC Contamination Avoidance • JPM Guardian • JPM Collective Protection • JPM Biological Defense • United States Air Force • United States Army • United States Marine Corps • United States Navy • United States Special Operations Command • U.S. Army Medical Research & Materiel Command • Edgewood Chemical Biological Center • Joint Equipment Assessment Program

• Defense Logistics Agency ogistics Status L Chemical and Biological Defense

75 3 t e r P h a C

Figure 3-2. JLAC-CBD Process

The JLAC-CBD also includes various working groups • Consolidated internet information and response that identify, define, develop, staff, and propose centers into one centrally managed response center recommendations to the JPEO-CBD on their respective on the Joint Acquisition CBRN Knowledge System. TLCSM focus areas. During FY06, JLAC-CBD working groups activities included the following: 3.2.1.3. Joint Equipment Assessment Program • Compiled the Operations and Sustainment (O&S) (JEAP) costs for FY06. The Joint Equipment Assessment Program (JEAP) is the • Standardized New Equipment Training (NET) single point of contact for surveillance of CBRN defense questions to give the JPEO-CBD a broader sense of equipment throughout the DoD. Chartered by the JPEO- the effectiveness of the CBD equipment being fielded. CBD in April 2006, the JEAP establishes Joint Service standards for surveillance, assessment and reuse of fielded

CBD equipment (see Figure 3-3). ogistics Status L

Figure 3-3. JEAP Charter Chemical and Biological Defense

76 The JEAP performs critical functions in support of the study on the Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit JPM’s TLCSM responsibilities throughout the systems Technology (JSLIST), the M40 Mask, and the Joint Service

acquisition process. It is particularly involved in the General Purpose Mask (JSGPM). This study is scheduled 3 Operations and Support phase of the equipment’s life to be completed in FY07. The study will conduct an cycle. The JEAP’s operating environment required to accelerated aging study on JSLIST Suits to determine achieve its mission are affected by several factors, such the maximum storage temperature that will permit t e r as the Service’s Title X responsibilities, the JPMs TLCSM a full shelf-life storage term without compromising P responsibilities, and the Primary Inventory Control serviceability. Additionally, it will identify the potential Activities management responsibilities. failure modes, exposing samples to extreme, but realistic h a conditions, and extrapolating the data for shelf-life

The JEAP operates in three functional areas, as depicted C prediction. in Figure 3-4. The JEAP shelf-life and surveillance activities prolong the service life of CBD equipment. These activities, minus the JEAP’s operating costs, 3.2.1.4. Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and resulted in $16.8 million in cost avoidance to the DoD Material Shortages (DMSMS) in FY06. JEAP has also established a Memorandum of DMSMS is the loss or impending loss of manufacturing Agreement (MOA) with the Defense Reutilization and or production sources, or suppliers of components, end Marketing Service (DRMS) to segregate CBRN items items, and/or raw materials. The JPEO-CBD tasked turned in to Defense Reutilization and Marketing the Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC) to Offices (DRMO) suitable for issue as “Training Only.” establish, coordinate and implement a joint DMSMS The JEAP indelibly marks them and fills requests for Program to identify and mitigate obsolescence issues training items submitted by various authorized DoD on CBRN defense systems. This is being accomplished agencies, presenting additional cost savings. through the DMSMS Joint Services Working Group During the July 26, 2006, Joint Quarterly Readiness (JSWG) within the JLAC-CBD. The DMSMS JSWG Review (JQRR) meeting, the JPEO-CBD requested a mission is to develop strategic policies and solutions proposal from the JEAP to conduct an accelerated aging to address parts obsolescence problems and reduce ogistics Status L

Figure 3-4 JEAP Functional Areas. Chemical and Biological Defense

77 the impact of DMSMS on CBRN programs. The goal the suit needed to be identified. The resulting review of the DMSMS JSWG is to provide a comprehensive and study discovered alternates for the cut-and-sew

3 and coordinated program that supports efficient and shops and liner material. The NOMEX fiber is solely effective resolutions of obsolescence/nonavailability/ produced by DuPont. While there are other fabrics, single-source issues thereby addressing the guidance they do not meet the CB challenge requirement.

t e r directed by Department of Defense Regulation DoD An industrial base study is being conducted, which

P 4140.1R, Supply Chain Material Management, dated 23 has application for other individual protective May, 2003. The DMSMS JSWG is chartered to develop equipment items that use some of the same materials team relationships with the JPEO-CBD and its JPMs as and manufacturers. h a well as organizations and agencies that participate in the

C The DMSMS program objectives for FY07 are as TLCSM of CBD items. The DMSMS JSWG will serve as follows: an advisory group for the DoD Components and develop • Perform DMSMS Awareness Training for Joint Project close relationships with their DMSMS working groups, Managers. Advisory Board Members, the Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP), and Industry Liaisons. • Increase visibility and participation in JSWG meetings; coordinate with participating organizations Quarterly Significant DMSMS Issues/Projects: JSWG Meetings. • ASZM-TEDA Carbon. The number of potential • Implement a complete DMSMS infrastructure and suppliers of activated charcoal is currently process for tracking DMSMS cases and industrial base issues. restricted. Activated charcoal is obtained solely from a single vendor, which meets the current • Become the DMSMS Center of Excellence for military specification (MIL-DTL-32101). The integrating, maturing, and all emerging technologies for CB defense acquisition programs. supply of ASZM-TEDA Carbon will be restricted to the current validated product from a single vendor until additional standards can be defined, which 3.2.1.5. CBRN Joint Training Working Group would allow the acquisition of carbon to be fully The CBRN Joint Training Working Group (JTWG) has competitive. been formed to facilitate discussions and recommend • Diagnostic Test Set (DTS) Connector. The DTS is a solutions to identified gaps in Joint training and the test set used for detection systems. The connector training development process within the CBRN Defense portion of the DTS is a single-source item with Community equipment and systems. The CBRN- minimum purchase quantity of 1,500, which is JTWG is co-chaired by the JPEO-CBD and the Joint in excess of required quantities. The Joint Project Requirement Office CBRN Defense (JRO-CBRND). Manager is coordinating with other organizations Members include representatives from each Service, that use the DTS to purchase the minimum number JPM Offices (JPMOs) under the JPEO-CBD, U.S. Army of connectors or utilize a different configuration. Chemical School (USACMLS), and other supporting agencies for the CBDP. • M256A1 Chemical Agent Detection Kits. The ogistics Status

L M256A1 Chemical Agent Detection Kit includes test The goals for the CBRN-JTWG include the following: spots made of standard laboratory filter paper. The • Facilitate improvements within the training filter paper has experienced several DMSMS issues, acquisition process including a single-source manufacturer for the filter • Identify duplicative efforts by reviewing Joint paper solution. The system review and study resulted Training Plans in the identification of an alternate manufacturer, a review of the current supply support structure, and • Identify and exploit synergies within programs a business case analysis for this system. that will provide for integrated training solutions, especially System of Systems (SoS)/Family of • Joint Protective Aircrew Ensemble (JPACE). Systems (FoS) Alternate manufacturers for the cut-and-sew shops, active carbon, liner material, and NOMEX fiber for • Facilitate the enhancement of training capabilities Chemical and Biological Defense

78 for new CBD systems. acquisition process—staffing of the training IPT, provision The CBRN-JTWG improved the method of receiving of a standard guideline about the content of the overall customer feedback from the warfighter through the strategic training plan for a system, and identification 3 development and use of surveys. One change included of joint guidelines for the training developed to ensure standardization of the initial questions and rating scale completeness without redundancy of the training on all New Equipment Training (NET) and Fielding packages provided to the services. Another improvement t e r surveys to provide a common basis for the analysis of accomplished for training has been the emplacement of P customer satisfaction. This change has led to the ability the training documents for JPEO-CBD products on the military accessible JPEO-CBD web site, to allow access to compare the surveys across JPMOs, allowing the h a to any military member wishing to review the training to

JPEO-CBD to receive feedback from the warfighter C quickly. A second change was an upgrade in survey update their knowledge on CBRN systems. The training support through automated survey development, data documents have been transitioned to the Joint Acquisition collection, analysis, and reporting. Tools to allow this CBRN Knowledge System (JACKS) to allow easier access automation are to be made available to the JPMOs over and streaming of large files for easier viewing. the next year, providing them the ability to use both web- and paper-scanned surveys with their NET and Fielding 3.2.1.6. Individual Protective Equipment Events. Automation will allow for faster and easier use Strategic Inventory Management (IPE of surveys and provide more complete feedback from SIM) the customer—the warfighter. Figure 3-5 provides an The JPM Office for Individual Protection (JPMO-IP) is example of survey user response. sponsoring the Individual Protective Equipment Strategic The CBRN-JTWG presented three specific initiatives Inventory Management (SIM) project, in coordination to the JLAC-CBD intended to improve the training with the Centrally Managed IPE Working Group within ogistics Status L

Figure 3-5. Example of NET and Fielding Survey (Responses to JBAIDS Survey Shown) Chemical and Biological Defense

79 the JLAC-CBD. This project is exploring methods industrial base—through inventory consolidation and concepts designed to improve the management of and centralized management of requirements and

3 Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) inventories within priorities the DoD (see Figure 3-6). Equipment consists of Class • Enable improved inventory and asset management to II (individual equipment) and Class IX (repair parts) improve the readiness and life cycle management

t e r expendable items, which are sustained by two entities—

P the DLA and TACOM—in support of four Service The IPE SIM project is intended to provide numerous processes. The objective is to facilitate a more effective positive outcomes, including the following: approach to joint TLCSM while addressing Government h a • Improve readiness by providing greater accountability Accounting Office (GAO) recommendations made in the

C and utilization report U.S. Ability to Meet Protective Suit Inventory Requirements Faces Risk, GAO-03-889C, 1 September 2003. • Increase operational flexibility The objectives of this project are as follows: • Stabilize industrial base demand • Capitalize on efficiencies and cost avoidance • Reduce number of requisitions associated with centralized management and • Reduce competing requisition priorities streamlined integrated supply chains • Improve asset visibility • Standardize IPE inventory management across the services • Improve requirements projections • Mitigate risks associated with IPE management • Reduce IPE requirements and associated costs challenges—reduced inventories, tenuous • Reduce storage locations and inventory and

DLA TACOM

JSLIST Coats

Protective Gloves and M295 Individual M291 Skin Liners Equipment Decontamination Kit Decontamination Kit

JSLIST Trousers

ogistics Status M256A1 Chemical L Chemical Protective M8 Chemical Agent Agent Detector Kit Helmet Cover Detector Paper

Chemical Protective Overshoes M9 Chemical C2A1 Mask Filters Detection Paper

Figure 3-6. Individual Protective Equipment Portfolio Chemical and Biological Defense

80 associated management 3.2.1.7. Joint Materiel Release Pilot Program • Reduce number of automated information systems In an effort to develop a standardized Joint Materiel 3 The IPE SIM Project capitalizes on improvements in Release (JMR)/Fielding process, the JPEO-CBD recently information systems, communications, storage and initiated a JMR Pilot Program using seven pilot programs. In November 2006, the JPEO-CBD was delegated JMR distribution practices throughout the DoD. It further t e r authority for the pilot programs (see Figure 3-7). capitalizes on successful DoD centralized management P initiatives associated with other commodities including fuel, ammunition and medical supplies. Additionally, it will leverage on-going service initiatives to centralize h a IPE storage and management. C By establishing an IPE inventory manager (IPE IM) for the strategic inventory, there will be increased stability in the industrial base and improved support for operational needs. This new IPE management paradigm is expected to avoid the erratic production patterns that were common in the past and are detrimental to maintaining industrial base capacity. The IPE IM will also enhance readiness and operational sustainment through improved visibility and oversight of DoD IPE stocks. For a detailed description Figure 3-7. Materiel Release Approval of current business practices in this area, see Section Authority Designation for the JPEO-CBD 3.2.3, War Reserve Requirements and Planning (below), and for more on the challenges of maintaining a “warm” industrial base see paragraph 3.6.1, also below. The initial Joint Materiel Release Pilot Program feasibility study and business case analysis to determine This Pilot Program is intended to integrate the separate the preferred management alternative was completed Service fielding processes into a single JMR process, in March 2006. Actions are ongoing to define the next eliminate redundancy, and streamline acquisition efforts, phase, which will include detailed implementation plans while ensuring that all Forces continue to receive safe, and funding strategies. effective, suitable, and supportable materiel. This single JMR process involves three phases (see Table 3-2).

Table 3-2. Phases of the JMR Pilot Program ogistics Status L Phase I – Implement a JMR Pilot Phase II – Refine the Process Phase III – Implement the JMR Program • Designate a variety of programs to • Document JILA reports and get • MDA designated as MRA participate stakeholder feedback • Continue to update and improve the • Designate Joint Independent • Continuously refine the process as it process Logistics Assessment (JILA) teams evolves (with Service Representation) • Continue to keep senior leadership • Develop a JMR concept/process and affected agencies informed on (checklist, Standing Operating the program status Procedures (SOPs)) • Update JILA checklist and SOP • Request milestone decision authority (MDA) as MRA for Joint Programs Chemical and Biological Defense

81 3.2.1.8. Joint Maintenance Integrated Product JPEO-CBD products Team (IPT) • Multi-Service and governmental coordination with 3 The Joint Maintenance IPT was formed to transition manufacturers from multiservice maintenance activities to joint-service • Coordination with Joint Project Managers and the maintenance activities for all CBD Programs to more

t e r JPEO staff on matters concerning the material effectively utilize government resources. In order to

P release of CB equipment affected by Metrology and achieve this long-range goal, the IPT has established Calibration analysis and recommendations short-term goals that provide an incremental approach.

h a This incremental approach began by focusing on JPM • Interface with other DoD agencies and offices to

C contamination avoidance issues to include the Improved provide metrology science–related support of CB Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM) and the M22 Alarm, detection equipment including the National Institute Chemical Agent Detection Automatic (ACADA). This has of Standards and Technology (NIST) and industry been followed by efforts to define the sustainment for all CBD equipment (both new and legacy systems), in both 3.2.1.10 Unique Identification (UID)/Radio wartime and peacetime scenarios. To move forward in Frequency Identification (RFID) Working these goals, the IPT must examine the means of working Group with different maintenance policies, understand services’ The JPEO-CBD has established a guidance for maintenance processes, and develop a Joint process for implementation of DoD unique item identifiers (UIDs) all levels of maintenance. and radio frequency identification (RFID) policy and In May 2006, the team successfully moved forward in standards in response to the requirements of the Acting identifying a Joint Maintenance Facility for the ICAM. Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and A business case analysis (BCA) was conducted with a Logistics, USD (AT&L), Memorandum: Policy for Unique recommendation for the Joint Services to establish the Identification of Tangible Items – New Equipment, Major Oregon National Guard (ORARNG) as the dedicated Modifications, and Reprocurements of Equipment and central repair facility for the ICAM, providing the Spares, dated 29 Jul 03 and Radio Frequency Identification services with direct support level maintenance. To date (RFID) Policy, dated 30 Jul 04. This Guidance for the Army and Navy have started to utilize the ORARNG Implementation outlines the JPEO-CBD approach and for ICAM repair. The Air Force is finalizing details to provides guidance along with measurable objectives to utilize this maintenance facility for repair actions on their assist the Chemical and Biological Defense Equipment ICAMs. The Marine Corps will not immediately establish (CBDE) Joint Project Management Offices (JPMOs) in the ORARNG as their maintenance facility because of complying with the aforementioned DoD policies and a previous contract agreement to repair their ICAMs milestones. Additionally, it provides the overarching before the BCA recommendation was finalized. the JPEO-CBD guidance in accordance with the DoD Program Manager’s Roadmap for Implementation 3.2.1.9. Joint Metrology and Calibration of UID, the DoD Business Rules for Implementation (JMETCAL) Working Group of RFID, and the DoD RFID Supplier’s Passive RFID ogistics Status L Information Guide. A comprehensive and coordinated end-to-end “Metrology” Legacy program-specific plans submitted by the respective program supports the TLCSM within the CBDP. The JPMOs are included as annexes to this guidance. JPEO- JLAC-CBD principals recommended and approved the CBD UID/RFID implementation will be accomplished establishment of the JEAP, Joint Chemical and Biological through centralized JPEO-level management, with Defense Metrology Support Group to support the Joint decentralized JPMO level execution and reporting. The Project Managers in the systems acquisition process. JPEO-CBD has established a UID/RFID working group The Chairperson of the CBD Metrology Support Group within the JLAC-CBD to coordinate related activities. will provide the Director, Joint Equipment Assessment The JPEO-CBD has assigned a UID/RFID Focal Point, Program (JEAP), with the following: and each JPMO has identified representatives responsible • A single focal point of contact for metrology-related for coordinated and comprehensive implementation. Chemical and Biological Defense

82 The cost, schedule, and performance of UID/RFID are FDA Shelf-life Extension Program (SLEP), and various reported to the JPEO-CBD as each JPMO executes Service specific inventory management programs.

the strategy. This wide-ranging strategy also calls for The GAO report 04‑33, Chemical and Biological Defense: 3 incorporation of UID/RFID requirements into solicitations the DoD Needs to Reduce Protective Ensemble Operational and contracts, identification of items requiring marking Risk” recommended: “...implement a joint, integrated and tagging, engineering determinations, technical inventory management system that will allow the Department t e r documentation, the marking efforts, registration of to develop better data, including the number, location, and P identifying information, and utilization determinations. serviceability of ensemble components.” DoD concurred with the recommendation and directed the JPEO-CBD h a 3.2.1.11 Operations and Sustainment (O&S) to implement a solution, resulting in the JPEO-CBD C Working Group developing and implementing JTAVRW. In 2005, the JPEO-CBD issued its first O&S report to the services to aid in the Program Objective Memorandum 3.2.2.1 Joint Acquisition CBRN Knowledge System (JACKS) (POM) process. In February 2006, the O&S Working Group was established to improve data reporting. This JACKS is the web-based DoD knowledge management year, data calls were sent to each of the JPMs, and O&S system for information related to the acquisition costs were estimated for one system for one year. Costs and support of nonmedical CBRN defense products. were analyzed by the JPEO-CBD Logistics Team and a JACKS was established by the JPEO-CBD to serve the report was drafted for signature by the JPEO-CBD. Each warfighting and Homeland Security communities as an report was tailored to the services and included effective and powerful resource in quickly accessing O&S costs for one system for one year. The CBRN defense product acquisition and support Military Services, along with the Program information. Analysis and Integration Office (PAIO) JACKS provides an all-service single entry and U.S. SOCOM will be receiving an point to CBRN defense equipment O&S report to aid in their upcoming characteristics, capabilities, and POMs. The J LAC-CBD working group acquisition information, minus Class will continue to revise and improve the VIII (medical) assets. JACKS is not O&S reporting procedures to ensure that a database system but rather a accurate information is reported to the services. “portal” to access reliable and timely data harvested from other official logistics and capabilities systems. 3.2.2 Decision Support and Information Tools JACKS provides authorized users access to CBRN equipment advisory messages, training links, and The ability to understand the issues and provide solutions contact information. It allows the user to search and for Joint CBD requirements depends on the availability display information about CBRN equipment including of key information at specific points in the program’s ogistics Status

name, part number, and/or category, national stock L life cycle. Collecting, analyzing, and acting upon this number (NSN)/national item identification number information is critical to the implementation of the (NIIN), description, cage locations, and service specific Business Process Improvements discussed earlier in this management instructions as well as packaging, freight, chapter. The JPEO-CBD is taking significant steps in and other critical logistics details. JACKS does not this critical area that will be discussed in detail in this contain medical shelf-life information, however, as the section. FDA imposes its own stringent requirements on medical Major information technology initiatives already materiel management. Medical shelf-life data is obtained established include JACKS, JACKS Reporting Warehouse through the SLEP system. (JACKS-RW) (formerly called the Joint Total Asset Visibility Reporting Warehouse (JTAVRW)), the DoD/ Chemical and Biological Defense

83 3.2.2.2 Joint Acquisition CBRN Knowledge to be included in the JACKS-RW. Regardless of the System Reporting Warehouse (JACKS-RW) number of CBD items reported to the JACKS-RW by the

3 JACKS-RW, formerly known as the JTAVRW, was services, the services will still be able to maintain their established as the central repository for CBD equipment own independent CBD inventory and tracking systems. inventory data. As of September 30, 2006, all services The result of sharing CBD asset information on the t e r and the DLA are reporting the quantities of 11 IPE items JACKS-RW will not only improve fielding but will also P into the JACKS-RW. Improvements in 2007 will include improve the sustainment of CBD items in an operational the expansion of the inventory items reported by the environment.

h a services based on the memo from the Special Assistant for 3.2.2.3 CBRN Information Response Center C Chemical and Biological Defense and Chemical Demilitar­ ization Programs (SA(CBD&CDP)) dated October 2006 (CBRN-IRC) (see Figure 3-8). The SA(CBD&CDP) will work with The JPEO-CBD is implementing an initiative designed the JLAC-CBD to identify additional critical CBD items to build upon the JACKS portal as the single point of CBD materiel information for the warfighter. The CBRN-IRC seamlessly integrates and provides responsive, relevant, and reliable CBRN information in support of warfighters’ mission and the joint project managers as total life cycle systems managers for the chem bio defense community. The IRC’s Mission: In Coordination with the JPEO- CBD’s Joint Project Managers and Directors, JACKS-IRC will consolidate all CB hotlines, operate on a 24/7 basis, and serve as the single entry point for all information related to CBRN defense equipment (see Figure 3-9). The consolidation of the various “hotlines” will simplify Figure 3-8. Memorandum for Expansion of the warfighters search for information and ensure the Inventory Items Reported by the Services information received is current and reliable. ogistics Status L

Figure 3-9. JACKS CBRN Information Response Center Environment – The One Stop Shop for CBRN Defense Information Chemical and Biological Defense

84 3.2.2.4 Industrial Base Decision Support Tool peacetime and surge capabilities. Work is under way and will continue throughout 2007 to transition the system The Chemical Biological Industrial Base Decision Support

from a prototype into a production system. Of primary 3 Tool (CB IBDST) provides capabilities to assess the importance in this transition are the automated data Industrial Base for CBRN defense equipment. A contract feeds, but inclusion of functional capabilities from other was awarded in September 2005 to develop the tool, and Industrial Base information systems is also planned. t e r in May 2006, a prototype web-based information system was delivered to the JPEO-CBD. The process ultimately P identifies supply chain chokepoints and the ability of the

Industrial Base to address the shortages. 3.2.3 War Reserve Requirements h a

and Planning C The system is currently populated with data for 200 CBRN defense items. In addition to existing data from Increased requirements for CBRN defense equipment in the annual Equipment Data Call to the services, data from wartime have mandated a greater emphasis on the need several information systems will feed IBDST periodic to plan for sustainment stocks while relying on industry updates. Work is ongoing to establish automated data to surge production to meet required stockage levels. As feeds from the JACKS, the Federal Logistics Information currently planned, (see Figure 3-10) the Services (except System, the CBRN Shelf-Life Information System, and for the Navy) retain “starter stocks” of CBRN defense the CBRN Industrial Base Information System (IBIS). equipment to support immediate deployments and initial Institutionalization of these data sources will also operations. Service doctrine determines sustainment provide greater breadth and depth of item and supplier duration for these stocks. Air Force units deploy with 30 information in the system. days of CBRN defense consumables. Army divisions use a planning factor of 45 days. The Marine Corps Marine The CB IBDST is hosted by Edgewood Chemical Biological Expeditionary Units (MEUs) use a planning factor of 15 Center at Rock Island and can be accessed via the Internet days, while the Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) use by authenticated users. Output reports are available on 60 days. Navy shore units use 60 days as the basis for their a variety of areas in both text and graphical formats. plans. Navy ships stock CBRN material to Allowance This includes information on monthly and cumulative Equipage Lists (AELs) that are 115% or 215% of the production capacities, monthly item asset profiles, and ship’s manning level, depending on the equipment type. ogistics Status L

Figure 3-10. War Reserve Requirements and Planning Chemical and Biological Defense

85 For CBRN defense materiel, and particularly in the case Chemical and Biological Defense Expendable Equipment of IPE, the days of supply represent a minimum stockage Combat Consumption (E2C2) study and the impact of

3 position based on current investment guidelines for such the QDR on the force planning construct will permit materiel. In most cases, the Services (except for the the Services and the DLA to more accurately assess their Navy) will first redistribute any available uncommitted readiness and sustainment status. The E2C2 Study is

t e r assets to provide sustainment before sourcing elsewhere. currently modeling the consumption rates of consumable

P Once these starter stocks are depleted, the military CB defense assets on the battlefield. The results will force (except for the Navy) turns to the DoD CBRN provide a foundation for the definition of requirements defense item managers for “swing stocks,” also known for a set of critical consumable items, which will aid in h a as “sustainment stocks.” The industrial base is also relied readiness assessment and planning. C upon to surge production for sustainment. In general, this assumption is valid; however, certain items may have long-lead-time components. 3.3 logistics Status The DLA and the Army Materiel Command (AMC) are the item managers, or National Inventory Control During collection of FY06 data, information on the Points (NICP), for the vast majority of CBRN defense inventory status of more than 150 CBRN defense items in all four Services. They are responsible for equipment items was compiled. The quantities discussed industrial base development, and storage of wholesale here and provided in Annex H should be viewed as peacetime and sustainment wartime stocks. They buy a snapshot of inventory as of September 30, 2006. (process procurement actions) and, if requested, store Inventory data are also complicated because once certain CBRN defense materiel (swing stocks) for the Services. equipment items are issued, although in possession of a However, the Services must provide funding to DLA and deployed warfighter, they are considered expended and the AMC for the procurements. are not counted as on-hand inventory. The AMC and HQDA G4 are responsible for managing all CBRN defense items such as spare parts and aspects of the Army’s War Reserve and APS requirements. subcomponents were considered a subset of the primary They are responsible for industrial base development, item, and were not reviewed separately. Batteries for and storage of wholesale peacetime and sustainment critical systems are listed for informational purposes. wartime Army stocks. They buy (process procurement Inventory tracking for batteries is difficult because of a actions) and, if requested, store Army CBRN defense lack of visibility and because they typically have other material (swing stocks). applications. Training systems were not included, since they do not reflect wartime service requirements. DLA and AMC depots primarily store Army-owned Characteristics and capabilities of selected CBRN sustainment stocks, although the Air Force, Marine defense items are discussed in detail in Annexes A–G of Corps, and Navy may provide funds to store their sustain­ this report. ment stocks. All Services are responsible for individually programming and funding sustainment stocks to provide the required support to their force structure. Because of a ogistics Status L lack of visibility of CBRN defense items, unclear wartime 3.4 Peacetime Requirements requirements, scarce O&S funds, and low priorities In peacetime, quantities of CBRN defense equipment given to CBRN defense stocks, the current quantity of are necessary to train personnel in CBRN defense and DLA and AMC CBRN defense war reserves have been to build confidence among our warfighters that their reduced and may not support sustainment requirements equipment will provide the necessary protection when for the entire DoD force. These numbers are reflected in used correctly. The two most critical areas of peacetime the tables of Annex H. stocks are IPE and medical chemical defense materiel. The Joint Materiel Prioritization Allocation Board The Services have indicated that adequate CBRN defense (JMPAB) CB Defense Subgroup will resolve critical equipment is on-hand to conduct training. issues related to joint logistical and sustainment issues Generally, items used in peacetime for training are drawn for the CBDP. The completion of the analysis of the Joint from retail stocks, requiring units to maintain both Chemical and Biological Defense

86 training and contingency stocks. For selected items, such the government. Some procurement, however, suffer as protective clothing, contingency utility is lost when significant delays in delivery because of the time required

the item is used (or consumed) for training. Because to accumulate sufficient requisitions to produce economic 3 peacetime training requirements are met in this manner, buy quantities. This situation occurs when item managers major commands are inconsistent in their accountability try to plan purchases of consumable items that have a low and tracking of training equipment and in their estimates peacetime consumption but high wartime consumption t e r of on-hand assets. (such as decontamination kits, large collective protection P Requirements or applicability for use in homeland filters, and M256A1 detector kits). The result is a low purchasing history with a small industry-production security have not been determined or validated, with h a capability, which in turn causes a very low war reserve the exception of several special purpose units, such C as the WMD Civil Support Teams. These specialized status with minimal industry surge capability. units represent a small fraction of the overall potential requirement, however. Currently, each of the services has a mixed approach to the use of CBRN defense 3.6 industrial Base equipment intended for warfighters during peacetime. The CB defense industrial base is characterized as Until such time as requirements are defined these types small niche defense centric sectors embedded in larger of assets will not be a part of the logistics status report. commercially dominant industries such as materials, textiles, pharmaceuticals, and electronic equipment. This industrial base was robust during the Cold War era 3.5 Funding and supported a large number of producers. After the In accordance with statutory requirements (50 end of the Cold War, excess inventory of CB defense USC 1522), funding of RDT&E and procurement is items coupled with evolving and ill-defined threats and centralized in a DoD defensewide account. O&S funding declining budgets led to lower demand for products from for CB defense materiel is not consolidated at the DoD the CB industrial base. Mergers and acquisitions further level. Therefore, for secondary items (e.g., consumables reduced the number of firms participating in defense such as decontamination kits, detection kits, and filters), production. each Service continues to separately fund replenishment Over the past decade, demand has grown intermittently and sustainment of CB defense equipment. Depot for CB defense products. The increased demand is maintenance and contractor logistics support for some a function of ongoing operations such as Operation low-density major items are also O&S funded. These Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the appropriations are not included in the joint CBDP. terrorist threat at home and abroad, and DoD’s increased Funding of CB defense items categorized as war reserves emphasis on homeland defense for DoD installations and secondary items (WRSIs) remains a significant issue. The units. Another factor driving up demand is the shelf-life Services are responsible for developing the requirements expiration of inventories built up during the 1980s, such as and funding items in war reserve stocks. (As noted in chemical suits and masks. The decreased number of firms in the sector has reduced competition, but the remaining ogistics Status section 3.2.3, Navy Afloat Forces do not maintain WRSI). L Funding of WRSI comes from congressional appropri­ firms appear to have stabilized. While the current sector is ations made into the Working Capital Fund from the stable, vulnerabilities still exist, particularly where sources transfer of Services’ O&S funds. of component materials are limited (see Figure 3-11). Under current acquisition procedures and DoD guidance to minimize wholesale stockpiles, procurements are based only on funded Service requisitions. The Services remain responsible for program funding to replace CB defense equipment wartime stocks. Procurement is usually based on economic buy quantities (a consolidation of all Service requisitions) to provide the best value to Chemical and Biological Defense

87 3 t e r P h a C

Figure 3-11. Chemical and Biological Defense Industrial Base Assessment

The current global political climate, coupled with the the testing community to validate commercial product threat to homeland security, is affecting the CB industrial performance so that fielding decisions can be based on base. Some firms with only commercial experience in high-confidence government test data rather than on producing related products are now attempting to enter manufacturer-provided data. Many of the firms in sub- the military market. Other firms with a long history of sectors other than detection and individual protection producing CB defense items for the DoD are marketing are still dependent on Service demands and sales for products to local and state governments, foreign military, their financial survival. the DHS, as well as to the commercial sector. The potential Strategies in the medical sector work to circumvent these markets for DoD, foreign military, the DHS, state and trends. The Chemical Biological Medical Systems (CBMS) local governments, and direct sales to concerned citizens Joint Project Management Office (JPMO) acquisition have attracted many firms. With the lure of increased strategy for chemical-biological defense vaccines, demand, some firms without any history or expertise are ogistics Status therapeutics, and diagnostics is to buy commercially L making inquiries into how they can enter this market. available FDA-licensed medical products. The CBMS The result is an industrial base in transition. develops products for the DoD or co-develops medical The industrial base currently ranges from small to products with allied nations or other government large firms set in small subsectors of larger commercial agencies. Medical chemical-biological development industries, but is adjusting to new buyers and increased efforts are conducted through contracts with the medical demand. The subsectors of detection and individual industrial base. Developmental programs for drugs and protection (IP) should benefit in the long term from medical devices have also received multiple responses a more robust industrial base as new firms enter the to requests for information and proposals that indicate market and older firms expand sales to civil agencies. a sufficient industrial base exists to support the CBMS These two subsectors are aligned with new demands from mission. The major issue in the pharmaceutical industry is the new markets. The challenge to DoD is to work with concerns of legal liability over possible future side effects Chemical and Biological Defense

88 of the current generation of vaccines and medicines. even if there is not a current demand for the items. Legal issues and limited profitability keep many major Maintenance contracts may also fund the sustainment of

pharmaceutical companies from producing for the a manufacturing infrastructure to ensure the viability of 3 defense market. a production line. Past examples are the IBMCs to help a Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi sole-source production facility achieve FDA certification Freedom are testing the capacity of the CBRN industrial and maintain production of nerve agent antidote injectors, t e r base. The limitations of the industrial base are due in part and to maintain production of chemical protective P to lowered DoD procurements in the 10 years leading gloves. IBMCs can help maintain the minimum sustaining rates that a manufacturer is willing to allow to keep a up to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and Operation h a production line warm, thereby avoiding ramp up time and

Enduring Freedom. The limited procurements are due C to low peacetime demand and budget restrictions. Also costly start up charges associated with a cold industrial contributing to this problem is the inability of DoD base. The utility of this approach was demonstrated this agencies to commit to long-term contracts with CBRN year as the warm base for butyl gloves was maintained defense firms. such that a recent study has concluded that the current demand is now above the minimum sustaining rate levels for the industry. 3.6.1 Maintenance Of A Warm Eliminating Constraints to Surge: Quantities of critical Industrial Base items (raw material) may be bought in advance of an anticipated demand to reduce the surge burden on the Commercial industries, and particularly small businesses, industrial base and to meet contingency requirements have difficulty handling the fluctuations in production in a more timely fashion. A related effective strategy is necessitated by wartime demands when peacetime the purchase of long-lead-time components, for instance demand is low or nonexistent. Once industry surges long-lead-time subcomponents for the ATNAA dual- production to support a period of high demand, the chamber autoinjector, and chemical protective suit liner DoD is challenged to maintain the industrial capability material essential to JSLIST suit production. Another after DoD requirements drop to typical low peacetime typical industrial measure is to provide equipment that levels. Industrial production surge capability may also increases throughput capacity. An industrial base analysis be limited by the supply of critical components with of the JSLIST supply chain is currently being conducted long lead times. Intervention is sometimes required that will assess the effectiveness of these measures or to maintain an active production capability, or warm identify the need for further measures. industrial base. CB defense items for which peacetime demand is often inadequate to maintain the industrial Warstoppers has demonstrated effectiveness in the base include chemical protective suits and gloves, and CB defense sector by preserving production of nerve- nerve agent antidote auto-injectors. agent antidotes, protective suits, and gloves. However, the Warstoppers program also supports industrial base The DLA’s Warstoppers program, mandated by law (HR maintenance measures in other defense sectors; therefore, 102-311), recognizes that preparedness measures must be CB defense efforts must compete for funds by seeking ogistics Status taken for certain supply items, and that critical industrial out and implementing best industrial practices that have L capability must be preserved to support DoD’s readiness a positive return on investment and better support the and sustainment requirements. The Warstoppers program warfighter. supports the Services’ go-to-war estimated requirements Recent Program Strategy Guidance instructions have and maintains sole source of supply for the go-to-war surge. included a policy that the CBDP will procure 30 percent Among the industrial preparedness measures leveraged by of the requirement for new consumable items (includes Warstoppers to maintain critical industry capabilities are suits, boots, gloves, skin decontamination kits, etc.), and the following: there is concern that this policy may adversely affect the Industrial Base Maintenance Contracts (IBMCs): IBMCs ability to maintain a warm industrial base for these items. preserve an essential manufacturing capability for the The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) future by continuing to fund production of such items directed that a study be performed to assess the impact Chemical and Biological Defense

89 of this policy and to recommend a “best method” for capability areas to address both chemical and biological consumables procurement. The study is currently under threats: detection; protection (individual and collective);

3 way, and results are expected in FY07. decontamination; M&S; and threat agent science. Additionally, specific program areas include CB defense medical technologies that address pretreatments,

t e r 3.6.2 Industrial Base therapeutics, and diagnostics. P Outreach Efforts The DTRA, Chemical and Biological Defense Directorate, Industrial Base outreach efforts are a way to expand or provides technical and programmatic oversight to SBIR h a obtain new subject-matter, latest technologies, and CB topic generation in addition to proposal evaluation and

C equipment across the commercial sector. The CBDP relies selection. The Army Research Office-Washington (ARO- on multiple methods and venues to leverage industry to W) administers the day-to-day administrative activities of meet program requirements. These include, but are not the CBD SBIR program and is responsible for the operation limited to, the following: of the CBD SBIR Program Management Office. • Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) CBD-related SBIR opportunities are posted on various web sites, including: • Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) • DoD SBIR (http://www.acq.osd.mil/sadbu/sbir/) • Broad Agency Announcements (BAAs) • DARPA SBIR (http://www.darpa.mil/sbir/) • Sources Sought Announcements • Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) SBIR • Requests for Quotations (RFQs) (http://www.afrl.af.mil/bc_sbir.asp) • Request for Information (RFI) • Requests for Proposals (RFPs) 3.6.4 Broad Agency Announcements (BAAs) • Technology Transfer (to include Cooperative Research and Development Agreements A BAA is intended to solicit research ideas, and is issued [CRADAs]) under the provisions of the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-369), as implemented in • Conferences, Symposia, Events, and Working the Federal Acquisition Regulations. Research proposals Groups. are sought from educational institutions, nonprofit The Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps) organizations, and private industry. BAAs are general in web site http://www.fedbizopps.gov/ is the single nature and identify areas of research interest, including government source for government procurement criteria for selecting proposals, and soliciting the opportunities over $25,000. Current listings for many participation of all offerers capable of satisfying the CBDP opportunities may be found on this web site. government’s needs. The following sections provide descriptions of selected Selected CBD-related BAA opportunities are posted on a mechanisms to leverage the industrial base. ogistics Status number of web sites, to include the following: L • United States Army Medical Research and Material 3.6.3 Small Business Innovative Command (USAMRMC) BAA (http://www.usamraa.army.mil/pages/) Research (SBIR) • Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) BAA The CBD SBIR program is used to elicit innovative (http://www.tswg.gov/tswg/baa/baainfo.htm) solutions from the small business community that address CB defense technology gaps confronting the • Army Research Laboratory (ARL) BAA DoD and to include technologies that will also have (http://www.arl.army.mil/main/main/default. high commercialization potential in the private sector. cfm?Action=6&Page=8) SBIR topics are developed in each of the following Chemical and Biological Defense

90 3.6.5 Technology Transfer strategy that will pursue best value for those events that have common interest and are of primary importance to The Secretary of Defense issued a policy memorandum

our mission. 3 in June 1995 on technology transfer that outlined the scope of DoD technology transfer activities. In DoD, Examples of conferences, symposia, and advance planning technology transfer activities encompass the following: briefing for industry (APBI)s that are representative of the major CB defense program commodity areas include t e r

• Spin-off activities that demonstrate nondefense P the following: technologies, e.g., commercial viability of technologies already developed or presently • Environmental Sampling for Biothreat Agents h a being developed for national security purposes.

• T&E Conference C The primary purpose of these activities, which encompasses much of what has been traditionally • JPEO-CBD Advance Planning Briefing for Industry called "technology transfer," is to promote and make (APBI) available existing DoD-owned or DoD-developed • CBDP T&E Executive Capabilities and Process technologies and technical infrastructure to a broad Review spectrum of nondefense applications. • CP (Collective Protection) Conference and • Dual-use science and technology activities that Exhibits develop technologies having both defense and nondefense applications. • AUSA Annual Meeting & Exposition • Spin-off promotion activities that demonstrate the • Chemical Biological Information Systems (CBIS) national security utility of technologies developed Conference outside the DoD. • Joint Service Scientific Conference on Chemical & A key web site for CBD-related technology transfer Biological Defense Research opportunities is the DoD Technology Transfer Office • lincoln Laboratory Bio-Chem Defense Systems (http://www.dtic.mil/techtransit/). Workshop • Annual Combatant Commander (COCOM) CBRN Defense Conference 3.6.6 Conferences, Symposia, Events, and Working Groups • United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) CBRN Conference & Exhibition Conferences, seminars, symposia, trade shows, and exhibits play a significant role in providing information • Decontamination Conference on the latest technologies and policies and education in • Joint Conference on Standoff Detection for CB the CB defense community. They keep the community Defense prepared to meet the daily challenges of managing and • AUSA Winter Symposium executing programs. An Advanced Planning Briefing to ogistics Status Industry include details on the Joint Service mid-and • IP (Individual Protection) Conference L long-range research, development, test, and evaluation • Special Forces Operations APBI (RDT&E) plans and programs, future production projections, and emerging military doctrine. • Joint CBRN Conference & Exhibition In the past year, organizations across the CB defense • AUSA Medical Symposium community hosted and attended various conferences and • Modern Day Marine Exposition symposia in support of furthering the latest thinking, Details of selected APBI and Working Group efforts are technologies, and policies shaping the community. Each as follows: year, the joint CB defense representatives, including the JPEO-CBD, JRO-CBRND, JSTO-CB, and T&E • The APBI The CBDP APBI is hosted by the National Executive, are encouraged to build a unified conference Defense Industry Association (NDIA) (http://www. Chemical and Biological Defense

91 ndia.org) and provides a forum for industry to receive periodic command inspections to ensure that proper briefings on business opportunities, upcoming maintenance of contingency IPE, and Army training

3 acquisitions, and information on existing technology requirements include an annual evaluation of each pursuits. soldier to ensure proper fit and employment of the • The NBC Industry Group (http://www. protective ensemble components. t e r nbcindustrygroup.com/index.html) is an association FP2 and above and supporting units - Army P established to provide information on nuclear, authorizes follow-on deployer units to draw IPE biological, and chemical (NBC) civil and military requirements from contingency stocks maintained

h a matters to the U.S. Armed Forces, other appropriate at Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD) through the

C government agencies of the United States, and automated Army Electronic Product Support the general public; improve understanding of the (AEPS) network. Units determine requirements, importance of NBC defense and its contribution to to include sizing tariff, and submit them via secure the ability of the United States to carry out its global email to the AEPS web site. Submitted requirements responsibilities; and advance NBC information, are validated and approved by the parent major technology, and materiel for any purposes proper command (MACOM), item manager, and the Agile and lawful for the association. Group meetings serve Development Center (ADC) G-4, and then release as a means to exchange information on current by BGAD to the requesting unit. events in the area and discuss emerging trends and Sustainment stocks for all units are maintained in requirements. Meetings typically include invited prepositioned accounts at various theater-specific speakers from key congressional committees, the support locations. Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, or other agencies who have a role in NBC b. Inventory Management. Protective masks are unit defense. property and receive Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS) inspection as prescribed by In addition to CB defense conferences attended by the the appropriate item technical manual. Industrial Base, it is important to have knowledge of OCONUS events across the CB defense community. The Army’s Natick Test Activity routinely tests, OCONUS events can be a vital part of the sustainment effort by lot number, each of the expendable ensemble of CB programs and a source of COTS technologies. components to validate shelf-life. Deficient lots are identified to the appropriate item manager and the Army ADC G-4 for publication to Army units via 3.6.7 Individual Protection appropriate notification message. Effective protection must be provided for all deploying Army regulation and periodic technical bulletins warfighters. The Services must have mechanisms in place direct owning units to survey on-hand stocks to ensure that all warfighters are issued complete and annually, unless sooner notified, of potential shelf-life functional protective ensembles when deployed. The problems by the Army ADC G-4. Upon identification Services have the following processes in place: ogistics Status of expiring shelf-life for specific commodity lots, L ARMY deficient stocks are issued as training items, and a. Issuance. The Army policy varies regarding replacement stocks are appropriately requisitioned. authorization of contingency stocks to various c. Preparation for Deployment. During in-processing units: at the unit, each soldier is evaluated by the unit Force Package 1 (FP1) and supporting CBRN defense staff for proper size and fit of each units. Army authorizes these early deployer protective ensemble item. The unit CBRN staff units to maintain two complete sets on hand per records the information for each individual in the individual authorized on the unit Modified Table of unit battle book. Organization & Equipment (MTO&E), plus a small When in receipt of deployment orders, each soldier overage to accommodate sizing. These units conduct Chemical and Biological Defense

92 is inspected by unit supervisors for possession of Force Emergency Management (EM) Program all required IPE. All shortages (FP2+ units) are Planning and Operations establishes basis of issue

immediately requisitioned from BGAD via AEPS for (BOI) standards for Air Force members stationed in 3 issue upon receipt prior to deployment from home or deployable to chemical, biological, radiological, station or at the port of embarkation. nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) medium

d. Medical Chemical, Biological, Radiological and and high threat areas. The current BOI consists t e r Nuclear Defense Materiel (MCDM) Program. of four operational suits (to provide 96 hours of P MCDM is used for pretreatment and posttreatment protection) and one training suit per individual.

of CBRN injuries to individual soldiers and consists b. Threat Areas h a

of the following items: three Antidote Treatment - C Low Threat Areas (LTA). Within LTAs, only Nerve Agent Antidote (ATNAA), which is replacing military or emergency-essential personnel when the existing inventory of Mark I Kits on a one-for- tasked for deployment to areas outside of the LTA one basis, one Convulsant Antidote Nerve Agent are authorized to be issued a C-1 bag. One half of (CANA) autoinjector, 15 days of supply (30 tablets) the BOI (C-1) authorizations will be stored and of an antibiotic (Ciprofloxacin or Doxycycline), and hand carried by the individual upon deployment or a users guide that explains how and when to use prepositioned in the area of responsibility (AOR). these items. The U.S. Army Office of the Surgeon Sustainment assets for CONUS units (C-Bags) are General (OTSG) centrally manages MCDM in stored at the Consolidated Mobility Bag Control deployable force packages, stored in strategic Center according to AFI 23-226. For OCONUS locations throughout the world, and approves all units, sustainment assets will be stored using releases of centrally managed MCDM to deploying MAJCOM guidance. units. MCDM is issued to all deploying soldiers, and the OTSG continues to sustain this initial issue Medium Threat Areas (MTAs). Within MTAs, all inventory of consumable MCDM for all forward military and emergency-essential civilian personnel deployed forces. Additionally, this program procures are authorized a C-1 bag. Only personnel assigned Pyridostigmine Bromide (PB) for pretreatment to mobility positions are authorized sustainment against nerve agent (Soman) exposure; Skin equipment. Both C-1 and sustainment equipment Exposure Reduction Paste Against CW Agents are stored and deployed using MAJCOM guidance. (SERPACWA), which, in conjunction with mission- High Threat Areas (HTAs). Within HTAs, all oriented protective posture (MOPP), enhances military and emergency-essential civilians are soldier protection from chemical warfare agents; authorized the full issue of both C-1 and sustainment and six potency and dated items for the unit Medical assets. Storage, issue, and deployment of these assets Equipment Set (MES), Chemical Agent Patient will be according to MAJCOM guidance. Treatment. OTSG began centralized management of MCDM in 1994. c. Inventory Management. Some individual units (normally Special Operation Forces, Battlefield MCDM provides the individual soldier with the

Airmen or Security Forces), maintain a portion of ogistics Status capability to give self-aid or buddy aid to treat their IPE, i.e., protective masks (minus operational L injuries resulting from CBRN warfare agents. Each filters), protective vests, etc., and are responsible MES, Chemical Agent Patient Treatment, provides for maintenance and inspection in accordance with medical personnel with the capability to treat 30 tech manuals. Most IPE is centrally stored at Base chemical casualties. This program has successfully Logistics Readiness, and all required inspections and supported and continues to support all deployments inventories take place there. Management of assets for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation is accomplished through the Mobility Inventory Enduring Freedom. Control and Accountability System (MICAS). HQ AIR FORCE Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency (AFCESA) and HQ Air Force Installations & Logistics monitor a. Issuance. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-2501, Air IPE issues such as shelf-life expiration or extension Chemical and Biological Defense

93 and lot testing. Upon any changes in regard to Visibility Management System (TAVMS) and JACKS stocked items, they send equipment advisories to to provide automated shelf-life data updates to all

3 each MAJCOM for distribution to their respective units via the Internet throughout the equipment’s units. life cycle. Outdated material is discarded or reserved d. Preparation for Deployment. Squadron or group for training, and replacement material is ordered t e r commanders identify deployable Air Force members using unit operation funds. Relevant shelf-life data P and emergency-essential civilians at the unit-level. will also be posted to the CBRD Information Web Upon receipt of deployment orders, each individual site.

h a is issued IPEs and sized for a protective mask. The c. Preparation for Deployment. On a monthly basis

C quantitative fit test is conducted to ensure that each or whenever mission readiness changes, each ship mask will provide its wearer optimum respiratory reports its operational readiness through the chain protection. IPE shortages are reported in Status of of command via the SORTS reporting system. Resources and Training System-Chemical (SORTS- Any projected deficiencies in readiness that are C) and worked through MAJCOM to overcome. noted in predeployment workups are reported NAVY to the Immediate Superior in Command and Type Commander. If material shortfalls, such a. Issuance. All deployable Navy units have established as a deficiency of IPE, cannot be remedied by allowances for IPE. The basic allowance document requisitioning needed material from the supply is the Allowance Equipage List (AEL) crafted for system, the Type Commander takes action to fill the each ship class and deployable unit type. The AEL shortfall using assets from the NAVSEA Joint Storage identifies a numeric allowance for each element of Facility to fulfill requirements. It is important to IPE, and if the item, say, for example, a protective note that the delivery of a fully equipped, mission- suit or NBC protective mask, is issued in multiple capable unit to the operational commander is a Type sizes, then the size distribution oriented to the Commander responsibility. population of the unit in question is provided. The basis of issue for all clothing items is 2.15 per person MARINE CORPS for amphibious and mine warfare ships and 1.15 per a. Issuance. Each command has a designated table of person for the other surface ships; the basis of issue equipment that lays out the asset requirements for for the expeditionary warfare forces for all clothing that unit. The Commands’ equipment is stored, items is 2.5 per person and 1.05 for naval installation maintained, and issued by Consolidated Storage commands; masks are issued at a rate of 1.05 masks Facilities (CSFs). When the onhand inventory does per person. The excess quantities generated cover not support issuing to a Commands’ full table training needs, size anomalies, and surge assignments of equipment, the Marine Expeditionary Force that may exist at the unit level. Each ship currently (MEF) Commander will determine which units maintains this material centrally under control of are given priority and the quantities to be issued. the Damage Control Assistant. Those units having Redistribution of CBRND equipment between CSFs ogistics Status completed the Readiness Improvement Program may be required to resolve localized deficiencies. L (RIP) have all CBR-D IPE bar-coded and stored in a Redistribution between CSFs is coordinated between bag, and a bar-coded etched mask sized and fitted and the MEFs, the NBC Defense Systems Program issued to each individual crewmember separately. Manager, the Proponent for Readiness (Deputy The material will be returned to the ship’s custody Commandant for Plans Policies and Readiness), prior to transfer of the individual. Aviation IPE is and approved by the Proponent for NBC defense issued to the aviator and ground support personnel (Deputy Commandant for Combat Development). to the aviator squadron directly prior to overseas b. Inventory Management. The Marine Corps has movement for Expeditionary Air Squadrons. initiated the Strategic Logistics Asset Management b. Inventory Management. As stated above, the Navy Project (SLAM). The SLAM geographically will utilize a combination of CBRD Total Asset centralizes the Marine Corps’ CBRN equipment Chemical and Biological Defense

94 in CSFs using contract logistics support. The a complete protective ensemble, an alternative risk equipment held in the CSFs is managed by the NBC calculation has been provided in past reports that

Defense Systems Program Manager (PM) who has compared the aggregate quantities of all available 3 total asset visibility through a web-based system. The fielded items that fulfill a particular protective Deputy Commandant for Combat Development is function with the sum of their requirements. The

responsible for determining the capabilities required overall risk is then determined by the component in t e r

and establishing the Tables of Equipment. The PM is shortest supply. Until the requirements are updated, P responsible for the replenishment of equipment held Table 3-3 presents aggregate totals only based on in the CSFs. Unit commanders are not responsible information as of publication of this report. h a for providing operations and maintenance (O&M)

The true readiness posture for individual protection C funds to sustain their equipment. has reflected a more accurate picture when the c. Preparation for Deployment. Units preparing for entire protective ensemble (suits, gloves, boots, deployment will notify their MEF Headquarters and etc.) is assessed rather than only tracking the sum of the CSF of their intent to draw CBRN equipment. its individual components within each Service. The Commands are required to inspect the equipment accelerated procurement of all JSLIST components held in the CSF to ensure it is ready for deployment. over the past three years has significantly improved All SORTS reporting commands are required to readiness in this area and toward the overall goal include CBD equipment readiness in their SORTS to not allow one overlooked line item to degrade report. individual protection. Continued full funding of all Recognizing that the risk to individual protection protective ensemble component shortfalls for both of the warfighter is contingent on the availability of the Services and the JPM-IP is critical to maintain the upward momentum. Table 3-3. Protective Ensemble Inventory Summary

ARMY AIR FORCE Component FY06 On-Hand FY07 (projected) Component FY06 On-Hand FY07 (projected)* Suits 907,622 1,057,134 Suits 890,933 890,933 Masks 944,897 997,485 Masks 385,313 385,313 Filters 535,105 2,535,105 Filters 1,889,931 2,322,604 Gloves 1,768,701 2,074,200 Gloves 1,881,257 2,395,137 Boots 823,568 1,100,226 Boots 867,931 965,206 Hoods 597,998 597,998 Hoods 1,262,072 1,262,072 NAVY MARINE CORPS Component FY06 On-Hand FY07 (projected)* Component FY06 On-Hand FY07 (projected)* Suits 443,445 443,445 Suits 617,807 617,807 Masks 130,975 130,975 Masks 189,653 283,685

Filters 527,238 527,238 Filters 578,545 578,545 ogistics Status L Gloves 217,434 217,434 Gloves 847,943 847,943 Boots 317,183 317,183 Boots 859,094 1,116,139 Hoods 1,790 1,790 Hoods 0 0 COMBINED SERVICES Component FY06 On-Hand FY07 (projected)* Suits 2,859,807 3,009,319 Masks 1,650,838 1,797,458 Filters 3,530,819 5,963,492 Gloves 4,714,885 5,534,264 Boots 2,867,776 3,498,754 Hoods 1,861,860 1,861,860 * Partial data at time of publication Chemical and Biological Defense

95 3.7 Biological Defense anthrax vaccine to be licensed for the prevention of Immunization Programs anthrax, regardless of route of exposure. The Emergency

3 Use Authorization (EUA) expired on January 14, 2006. The CBMS JPMO, via the Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program (JVAP), continues to ensure a constant supply On December 19, 2005, the FDA issued a new final of anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA) and Dryvax™ order reaffirming its determination that anthrax vaccine t e r is safe and effective for the prevention of anthrax disease,

P (smallpox vaccine) to meet the needs of the Military Vaccine Agency’s (MILVAX) immunization programs. including inhalation anthrax. This action set the stage for JVAP procures licensed AVA from the sole-manufacturer, further legal proceedings to clarify the legal status of the h a BioPort Corporation. In FY05, BioPort let a contract vaccine and for DoD decisions concerning the future

C with the Department of Health and Human Services course of the AVIP. (DHHS); however, maintenance of the industrial base for this sole-source product remains a concern due to low demand outside the DoD. JVAP procures 3.7.2 Smallpox Vaccination DryVax™, through an Interagency Agreement with the Program (SVP) DHHS. DryVax™ is a legacy product no longer actively The SVP web site provides a detailed account on the manufactured and there is a finite supply of the product nature of the threat from smallpox (variola virus), available. The DHHS is developing a next-generation smallpox vaccine that the DoD intends to procure after description of the vaccine, explanation of U.S. DoD FDA licensure. policies regarding biological defense vaccines, U.S. DoD policies regarding the smallpox vaccine, immunization schedule, information on adverse event reporting, and 3.7.1 Anthrax Vaccine Immunization other information related to the SVP. The SVP web site Program (AVIP) may be found on the Internet at http://www.smallpox. mil/. The AVIP web site provides a detailed account on the nature of the threat from anthrax (Bacillus anthracis), As of January 3, 2007, 1,233,693 DoD personnel were description of the vaccine, explanation of U.S. DoD screened, and 1,137,045 personnel were vaccinated policies regarding biological-defense vaccines, U.S. DoD against smallpox disease. policies regarding the anthrax vaccine, immunization In addition to the Smallpox Vaccination Program, the DoD schedule, information on adverse event reporting, and issued version 3.1 of the DoD Smallpox Response Plan other information related to the AVIP. The AVIP web site (www.smallpox.mil/resource/SMAplan/SMAplan.asp) may be found on the Internet at http://www.anthrax. on September 29, 2002. This document consists of a base mil/. plan plus 10 detailed annexes. The plan describes the As of December 31, 2006, 5,806,172 doses of the vaccine DoD’s global duties on military installations or during had been administered to 1,492,366 persons. Also as of contingency operations, as well as military support to this date, 244,781 service members had received six or civil authorities. The plan helps DoD prepare for, and

ogistics Status more doses.

L respond to, smallpox outbreak, regardless of magnitude The FDA completed its administrative action on or location. The plan allows for either ring-vaccination or December 19, 2005 by issuing a Final Order, again finding wide-area vaccination as a means of outbreak control. Chemical and Biological Defense

96 C h a p t e r 4 4 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) t e r

Defense Education, Training and Doctrine P h a C

4.1 introDUCTION Team. The WIPT will oversee the congressional study, HR5122, “Joint Training and Certification for Nuclear, This chapter highlights DoD education, training, Chemical, and Biological Defense” and follow up on exercises, and doctrine for CBRN defense. The Services, study recommendations. Concurrently, the Council will the Joint Requirements Office for CBRN Defense (JRO- develop a strategic plan for CBRN defense education, CBRND), and the CBRN Defense Education and Training training, and doctrine integration. Integration Directorate (under the ATSD (NCB)) all play major roles in developing or integrating CBRN defense education, training and doctrine. This partnership has raining and Doctrine expanded to include, but is not limited to, the Under 4.2 CBRN DEFENSE IN T Secretary of Defense (Policy), the Under Secretary PROFESSIONAL MILITARY of Defense (Personnel & Readiness), and critical DoD EDUCATION CBRN defense education and training providers, Currently the Professional Military Education (PME) ducation, including the National Defense University (NDU), the E Defense Threat Reduction University (DTRU), and the provides only limited CBRN defense considerations U.S. Army Chemical School. and does not adequately address the CBRN threat or U.S. response capability in their curricula, associated During 2006, the OSD CBRN Defense Education and wargames, or workshops. The incorporation of combating ) Defense Training Integration Directorate began to integrate

weapons of mass destruction (CbtWMD) learning areas RN CBRN defense education and training throughout the in the CJCSI 1800.01C Officer Professional Military DoD. The directorate is currently developing a web site Education Policy (OPMEP) as well as the CJCSI 1805.01 (https://etic.jscbis.apgea.army.mil) and database that Enlisted Professional Military Education Policy (EPMEP)

will be a resource for all CBRN defense stakeholders. shows the increasing priority of this area. It is essential uclear (CB The CBRN Defense Education and Training Integration that personnel of all services understand the CBRN N Directorate hosted a conference for all major threat, are familiar with U.S. capabilities to detect and stakeholders in March 2006. A significant outcome was mitigate the threat, and comprehend their staff roles and the establishment of a CBRN Defense Education and responsibilities in handling CBRN issues. Training Integration Council (ETIC), which includes The JRO-CBRND is continuing an initiative to support participation by all key stakeholders within DoD. This

the services and joint PME systems. In general, the JRO- adiological and initial conference provided an overview of CBRN defense CBRND provides subject-matter experts (SMEs) to R education and training efforts and current standards, ensure various aspects of CBRN defense are addressed identified challenges, and discussed potential solutions. in PME and related activities. Activities may include The Council continues to evolve with the Strategic reviewing and developing course curricula; reviewing Working Group, established under the Council, currently wargame scenarios; providing SMEs as guest speakers for performing as a Working Group Integrated Process Team classes, workshops, and conferences; providing awareness (WIPT) of the CBDP Overarching Integrated Process training for faculty; and participating in various meetings Chemical, Biological,

97 to stimulate synergy among various institutions. During three service academies interested in integrating FY06, the JRO-CBRND provided the following specific CBRN issues into their curricula.

4 support: Throughout 2006, the USAF Counterproliferation • Coordinated and facilitated the JRO-CBRND defense Center (CPC) provided specialized weapons of mass Guest Speaker Program at joint and service PME destruction (WMD) expertise to PME institutions at t e r institutions. This support involved 15 SME lectures Air University (AU), Maxwell AFB, AL, as well as the P at Senior and Intermediate Service Colleges, and DoD community at large. With a mission to “counter joint colleges as well as related activities, addressing weapons of mass destruction through education and

h a in excess of 500 officers and senior civilians. research,” CPC personnel developed and delivered

C • Assisted with the development, execution, and WMD-related electives and also lectured at Air Force assessment of wargaming events at Joint and Service (AF) PME schools. In academic year 2006, the CPC PME institutions. The JRO-CBRND provided sponsored a first ever, “Combating WMD Day” at the Air assistance to the Army War College's Strategic War College, emphasizing the criticality of this threat Crisis Exercise, the Marine Corps Command and to combat air forces. Through a program aptly named Staff College’s National Response Exercise, the Air “Johnny Appleseed,” the CPC conducted intensive one- War College's Solo Challenge, and the Joint, Land, day courses to “educate the educators,” equipping faculty Aerospace and Sea Simulation (JLASS) exercise from across the AF and DoD with the tools to properly conducted by the Air Force Wargaming Institute for develop and present WMD curricula within their all senior-level colleges. The JRO-CBRND’s efforts respective institutions. The CPC was also instrumental have resulted in CbtWMD exercise objectives being in the Air Force’s Counter-CBRN Education, Training, and Exercise (ETE) initiative, providing subject-matter raining and Doctrine added to this premier venue. This support affected T over 500 officers and ensured that the appropriate and PME expertise to the ETE team. Finally, the CPC levels and types of CBRN defense events were published a number of WMD-related monographs and inserted into these wargames. The Army War books, taking full advantage of the rich operational experience of resident PME faculty and students, as well ducation, College’s Strategic Crisis Exercise is being renamed E to the Strategic Decision Making Exercise with the as the myriad WMD experts associated with the center. JRO-CBRND assisting in the redevelopment effort of that capstone event.

) Defense • Coordinated and provided CBRN defense SME

RN technical assistance at joint and service PME institutions to review and improve existing core and elective curriculum. For example, the JRO-CBRND developed and executed a two-day course for the uclear (CB Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) entitled N “Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.” The JRO- CBRND also reviewed and provided recommended CBRN defense-related improvements to both the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and at five senior service and two joint colleges participating in the JLASS exercise. adiological and R • Co-sponsored the “Johnny Apple Seed II” conference with the United States Air Force (USAF) Counterproliferation Center. This two- day conference provided CbtWMD subject-matter expertise to curriculum developers and educators at eight joint and service intermediate and senior Figure 4-1. Chemical Defense Training level colleges, four senior enlisted academies, and Facility (CDTF) Chemical, Biological,

98 4.3 CBRN DEFENSE TRAINING 4.3.1.1 Individual Training All services conduct CBRN defense specialist The Army’s policy is to train all soldiers on individual professional training at the same location in accordance CBRN warrior tasks to ensure their survival and mission 4 with congressional statute (P.L. 103-160, Section 1702). continuation. CBRN training is integrated into all phases Currently, all service training, except for medical of their professional development from initial entry CBRN courses, is co-located at the United States Army training through the advanced education that the Army’s t e r P Chemical School (USACMLS), Fort Leonard Wood, leaders receive. The Army’s goal is to survive and win Missouri. Each service conducts training with service under any conditions. instructors and establishes standards of proficiency for h a

CBRN defense training, including live chemical agent 4.3.1.2 Medical Training C training at the Chemical Defense Training Facility (CDTF), shown in Figure 4-1. The following sections The Army and the Defense Health Program fund describe each service’s activities for CBRN defense medical CBRN defense training in support of casualty training, and training initiatives that support service and care, leader development and medical force health joint organizations. protection. Casualty care training provides medical professionals with the clinical skills necessary to diagnose and treat individuals exposed to CBRN agents. Leader 4.3.1 Army CBRN Defense Training development prepares Army medical leaders to plan for and manage CBRN threats in any environment. Force In addition to conducting traditional CBRN defense health protection training provides preventive medicine specialist training, the USACMLS is currently overseeing personnel with the skills necessary to support Force raining and Doctrine the training portion of the Army Emergency CBRN Health Protection programs across the full spectrum of T Responder Program, a major component of the CBRNE military operations. Training is conducted at the following Installation Preparedness Program. Required training organizations: is completed in accordance with 29 CFR 1910.120,

Hazardous waste operations and emergency response, and • U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School ducation, E consists of new equipment training and new organization (AMEDDC&S) training. The training is divided into individual segments • U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical covering Installation CBRN Awareness, Operations, and Defense (USAMRICD)

Technician Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT), Emergency ) Defense • U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious

Medical Services, Healthcare CBRN Provider and RN Diseases (USAMRIID) Incident Command. The USACMLS broke ground for the 1LT Terry CBRN Responder Facility in June 2005, shown • Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute in Figure 4-2. This state-of-the-art training facility and (AFRRI) ranges will be used to train both Army and multiservice • U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and uclear (CB N CBRN specialists beginning in FY07. Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM) • Defense Medical Readiness Training Institute (DMRTI) Training modalities include in-residence training, training conducted at the requesting unit’s site (on-site training), adiological and

and distance learning programs. Each training modality R offers unique advantages. In-residence training enables students to use laboratory and field training facilities while maximizing student-instructor interaction. On- site training at military installations worldwide minimizes Figure 4-2. 1LT Terry CBRN Responder Facility student travel costs while preserving direct student- instructor interaction. Distance learning programs Chemical, Biological,

99 Table 4-1. Summary of Army Medical CBRN Training in FY06

4 Type of Training Total Number Trained Army Trained AMEDDC&S Leader Development (CBRNE) 19,215 19,215 Army Training Support Center (See also Table 4-3) t e r Emergency Medical Preparedness & Response Course (EMPRC) 23,209 23,209 P AFRRI Medical Effects of Ionizing Radiation (MEIR) 574 68 h a USAMRICD/USAMRIID

C Medical Management of Chemical and Biological Casualties Course (MCBC) 305 152 in residence Field Management of Chemical and Biological Casualties Course (FCBC) in 361 162 residence Hospital Management of CBRNE Incidents (HM-CBRNE) 259 198 On-site to active military 394 240 On-site training – Non military 281 0 MCBC Offsite 191 165 MCBC Computer based Training/Video 4 4 raining and Doctrine

T Table 4-2. Summary of Contact Hours Awarded to USAMRIID/USAMRICD (Course Attendees in FY06)

EMT/ Type of Physician EMTs /

ducation, Physicians Nurses Nurse Hours Paramedic

E Training Hours Paramedic Hours MCBC in 102 4,628.25 41 2,300.10 NA NA residence MCBC Offsite 20 410.50 29 652.10 NA NA

) Defense FCBC in NA NA NA NA 112 4,569.60 residence RN HM-CBRNE in 51 1,541.25 62 2,116.30 19 583.40 residence HM-CBRNE 9 108.75 18 341.30 2 31.50 Offsite uclear (CB N adiological and R Chemical, Biological,

100 Table 4-3. Detailed Summary of Army Medical EMPRC Trained Emergency Medical Preparedness & Response Course (EMPRC) 4 EMPRC – Army Total Completed % Complete Military Personnel

Enlisted Medical Personnel/Corpsmen 10,513 8,385 79.8% t e r

Non-Medical Personnel (Enlisted & Officer) 1,493 1,234 82.7% P Independent Duty Special Forces Medics 3 2 66.7% Medical Corps 2,869 1,560 54.4% Dental Corps 740 649 87.7% h a

Veterinary Corps 351 304 86.6% C Nurse Corps 2,126 1,507 70.9% Medical Service Corps - Administration 1,242 953 76.7% USA – Medical Specialist Corps 444 356 80.2% Physician Assistant 113 51 45.1% Total Active Duty Personnel 19,894 15,001 75.4% DoD Personnel (Civil Service) Technicians/Medical Assistants 6,496 5,199 80.0% Medical Providers 792 580 73.2% Dentists 58 39 67.2% Veterinarians 3 2 66.7% Nurses 4,153 2,773 66.8%

Healthcare Administration 2,038 1,754 86.1% raining and Doctrine T Med SP Corps Equiv/ Biomedical Specialists/ 78.6% 973 765 Technologists Physician Assistants 280 168 60.0% Nonmedical/NonSecurity 7,157 5,757 80.4% ducation,

Security 215 116 54.0% E Total DoD Civilian Personnel 22,165 17,153 77.4% TOTALS 42,059 32,154 76.5% ) Defense minimize training costs and support increased audience receive training in chemical, biological, and radiological RN size, but do not afford direct student-instructor agents, plus HAZMAT characteristics, smoke and interactions. A summary of Army-sponsored medical decontamination operations, chemical and radiological CBRN training is provided in Table 4-1 and Table 4-2. survey procedures, HAZMAT awareness operations, uclear (CB

A summary of Army medical personnel who have and individual protective clothing and equipment. N completed the Emergency Medical Preparedness & This program provides 10 weeks of intensive training, Response Course (EMPRC) Training is at Table 4-3. culminating in live/toxic agent training in the CDTF. Toxic agent training is an integral, mandatory component 4.3.1.3 Army CBRN Specialists Training of all Chemical Corps CBRN specialist initial entry and professional courses. There are two types of toxic agent U.S. Army CBRN specialist professional training takes

training. Basic toxic agent training provides students adiological and place at the USACMLS, Fort Leonard Wood, with R with personal confidence in protective, detection and the exception of the Technical Escort Course, which decontamination equipment, while advanced toxic is conducted at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. Training agent training, added in FY05, provides Chemical Corps consists of three enlisted/noncommissioned officer Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC), Captain Career, Civil courses, two officer courses, and one reclassification Support Skills, and Air Force students the opportunity to course (Reserve Component only). At initial entry level practice planning, monitoring, and sampling skills in a (see Table 4‑4), enlisted CBRN specialists, and officers toxic environment. Chemical, Biological,

101 Table 4-4. U.S. Army Professional and Initial Entry Training (FY06) at the USACMLS

1

4 Type of Training Training Method Number of Graduates Chemical Officer Basic Initial Entry – Resident 102 Chemical Captain’s Career Course Initial Entry – Resident 55

t e r Chemical OfficerA dvanced -RC Resident 38

P Chemical Operations Specialist (AIT) Initial Entry – Resident 1856 Chemical Basic NCO Course Resident 136 Chemical Advanced NCO Course Resident 104 h a 1 Graduates included from all services and foreign military. C

4.3.1.4 Army CBRN Training to engage the enemy in close combat. The CBRN soldier of the 21st Century is well trained, well-equipped, and The CBRN specialist remains the centerpiece of our organized to meet the ever-changing challenges of our CBRN defense systems and formations and is embedded new and complex operational environment. Maintaining in virtually every Army organization from company to unit that high degree of technical competence requires an of employment—indispensable to the joint team. Training adaptive institutional training model that includes the and leadership development for the CBRN specialist will most effective up-to-date facilities, comprehensive include instruction, both resident and nonresident, on CBRN instruction and practice, and a commitment to raining and Doctrine all manmade environmental hazards including CBRN T evolve training to meet changing tactical and domestic and HAZMAT. Our instruction is designed to equip the CBRN threats. soldier to operate within the full spectrum of hazards and instantaneously provide detection, identification, and Specialized functional training is conducted in stand- ducation, response expertise to the commander. CBRN specialists alone courses attended by DoD, allied, and international E are disciplined, physically and mentally tough; trained students, as shown in Table 4-5. All courses use a resident and proficient in warrior task and drills; and prepared training method and are conducted at USACMLS. ) Defense

RN Table 4-5. U.S. Army Specialized Professional Training (FY06)

Type of Training Training Duration Number of Graduates1 Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Reconnaissance 6 weeks 97 uclear (CB

N Master Fox Scout 3 weeks 0 Biological Integrated Detection SYS (BIDS) P3I 4 weeks, 1 day 77 Biological Integrated Detection SYS (BIDS) JBPDS 2 weeks, 3 days 69 Decontamination Procedures (Non-US) 1 week 205 Radiological Safety (Installation Level) 3 weeks 39 Operational Radiation Safety 1 week 85 Analytical Laboratory System Course 5 weeks 20 adiological and

R Unified Command Suite 3 weeks 18 Civil Support Skills Course 8 weeks, 172 Chemical Pre-Command & Div/Corps 1 week 19 Technical Escort 3 weeks, 3 days 405 CBRN Responders Course 2 weeks 19 CBRN Mass Casualty Decontamination Course 1 week 3 days 0 1 Graduates included from all services and foreign military. Chemical, Biological,

102 4.3.1.5 USACMLS Weapons of Mass Destruction In FY06, 23 students completed the training. In addition, – Civil Support Team (WMD-CST) 14 of the Army’s NMSOs, Health Physics Technicians,

Program Environmental Science Officers, and Chemical Officers 4 The USACMLSWMD-Civil Support Team (CST) completed an intensive one-week field Response to program has been fully engaged in FY06. The National Radiologic Incidents Course at the Idaho National Guard Bureau (NGB) activated the remaining 11 WMD- Environmental and Engineering Laboratory. This course t e r CST teams creating a total of 55 teams. This provides is designed to give junior preventive medicine personnel P each state (50) and territory (4) with one team, with an skills in responding to either accidents or terrorist events involving radiological materials. This year, the attendance additional team in California. Initial individual training h a selection was heavily weighted to favor officers in units

for the team members will be provided at the USACMLS C using the Civil Support Skills Course (CSSC). The CSSC scheduled to deploy during FY07. classes are composed of officer and enlisted members Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, from the Army and Air National Guard. Additional CSSC & High Explosive (CBRNE) Sciences Branch classes were added in FY05 to accommodate the number Joint Civilian CBRN Training Initiative. The of soldiers and airmen to be trained in order to meet AMEDDC&S continued to support the U.S. Border congressional mandated timelines for the new teams. Patrol and Joint Task Force 8 for the purpose of The Incident Response Training Detachment (IRTD) developing a well-trained civilian Emergency Medical of the 3d Chemical Training Brigade, Fort Leonard Technician corps to meet surges in health care demands Wood (FLW), trained 172 students through the CSSC resulting from catastrophic events. The purpose of this in FY06. USACMLS continually analyzes CST training initiative is to further develop the CBRNE medical and equipment requirements to adjust the program of recognition in our homeland’s first line of defense. raining and Doctrine instruction (POI) and lesson plans for the CSSC. There are T currently three additional sustainment training courses CBRNE Sciences Branch Oversight Training in various stages of development for this program. They Initiative. The Army Medical Command’s advanced are the Unified Command Suite (UCS), the Analytical training in management of chemical and biological

(CB) threat agent incidents is conducted through two ducation,

Laboratory System (ALS) and the CST Operations E Course. There are also numerous other civilian course subordinate commands of the Medical Research and requirements that are coordinated through the NGB. Materiel Command, USAMRICD and USAMRIID. Together, USAMRICD and USAMRIID conduct the

4.3.1.6 Army Medical Initiatives Medical Management of Chemical and Biological ) Defense

Casualties (MCBC) and the Field Management of RN CBRN Defense Training. The Principles of Military Chemical and Biological Casualties (FCBC) courses. Preventive Medicine Course prepares future preventive These courses train all members of the health care medicine officers to support medical force health team, including emergency responders and public health

protection programs in CBRNE environments. In FY06, 86 officers, in the medical preparation for, and treatment of uclear (CB students completed the Principles of Military Preventive chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents. Although N Medicine Course. This course was revised to incorporate they have a military focus, these courses have become low-level radiological (LLR) training. LLR training was increasingly important in the national and international expanded in the Health Physics Specialists’ Course and in antiterrorism effort. training provided to the Nuclear Medical Science Officers (NMSOs) during Officers Basic Courses, Captain’s Career USAMRIID and USAMRICD also cooperated this past year to produce a six-part satellite program on advanced courses, and Principles of Military Preventive Medicine adiological and courses. LLR training enables NMSOs and health physics topics in the medical management of CBW agents. R specialists, with the support of Preventive Medicine The program was explicitly constructed to meet both Specialists, to provide medical force health protection to deployed military and homeland defense needs. Table deployed forces supporting incidents involving potential 4-2 clearly demonstrated the utility of the program radiation exposure, including radiological dispersal device and also demonstrate the outreach capability of this (RDD) attacks or releases of radiological materials from educational medium. nuclear facilities. Chemical, Biological,

103 In addition, USAMRICD is actively engaged in support the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear of homeland defense. The Institute established a course Response course. The pilot course was held in July 2006

4 to prepare international partners to respond effectively and training will begin in the second quarter, FY07. to incidents involving WMD, and the Public Health This course will provide HAZMAT technician-level Service included the MCBC as required training for its training to Army Reserve soldiers, along with other

t e r Emergency Management Teams (EMATs). necessary training. The Fort Dix Joint Interagency Civil P In short, USAMRICD is actively engaged with both military Support Training Center continued to train soldiers on and civilian medical and first-responder communities so mass casualty decontamination. Over 800 soldiers have been trained on this topic so far. To transition the Mass h a that they are fully equipped and confident in their ability Casualty Decontamination training over to the US Army

C to medically manage chemical agent incidents. Chemical School, the school will pilot a Mass Casualty Support to U.S. Army Medical Command Decontamination course in the third quarter, FY07, and (MEDCOM) Homeland Security Initiatives. begin training in the fourth quarter, FY07. AMEDDC&S provides subject-matter expertise in support of the Joint Services CBRNE Defense Training 4.3.3 Air Force CBRNE Defense Training Program. This program is evolving in collaboration with the DMRTI and the services. It is a two-phase program Air Force policy is to provide initial CBRNE defense consisting of distance learning and on-site evaluations. training to military personnel and emergency-essential Phase I consists of up to eleven modules, depending on civilians in, or deployable to, medium- and high-threat duty position, distributed through the Army Distance CBRNE areas (Table 4‑6), to provide recurring training Learning System and the DMRTI. every 20 months. CBRNE defense course instructors at

raining and Doctrine base level receive professional training through Air Force T 4.3.2 Army Reserve Initiative Training apprentice, and advanced courses at the Air Force Civil Engineer Readiness School, Fort Leonard Wood. Selected As part of the ongoing Domestic Response command, control, and response personnel receive Decontamination and Reconnaissance initiative (begun ducation, additional home station and/or in-residence training to E in 1999), U.S. Army Reserve soldiers have been trained meet the requirements for HAZMAT emergency response, through the U.S. Army Technical Escort Course (J5), WMD emergency response, or exercise evaluation team the Pennsylvania State Fire Academy, and at the US duty. The designation of CBRNE threat areas is used for Army Reserve’s Joint Interagency Civil Support Training both deliberate and execution level planning. Airbases ) Defense Center. To date, 620 U.S. Army Reserve chemical within these geographical locations are categorized as RN soldiers have received HAZMAT training through the CBRNE high, medium, or low threat areas. Assessments Pennsylvania State Fire Academy in Lewistown, PA, use open source publications, major command and theater and at Fort Leonard Wood. Of this number, 200 were guidance; and unclassified intelligence information. This trained at these locations in 2006. To assist the Army information is updated annually or as needed. uclear (CB

N Reserve, the U.S. Army Chemical School prepared adiological and R Chemical, Biological,

104 Table 4-6. CBRN Threat Areas

CBRNE Threat Geographical Location 4 Bahrain, Balkans Region, Diego Garcia, Egypt, Greece, India, Israel, Jordan, Kingdom High Threat Area* of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar, Republic of China (Taiwan), Republic of Korea, Somalia, Singapore, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates t e r Medium Threat Area** Germany, Italy, Japan, and Yemen P Low Threat Area*** All locations not listed as a High or Medium Threat Area * CBRN High Threat Area (HTA). Friendly forces in these areas are at high risk for attack with CBRNE weapons by states and nonstate actors, such as terrorists and criminals also known as transnationals. Potential adversaries within the region either possess, or are likely h a to possess, a substantial stockpile of CBRNE weapons and weapon systems and may have special operations forces capable of conducting sustained attacks on airbases. Actual or potential transnational threats exist during peacetime or wartime. Forces are within immediate C strike range of adversary theater missiles, and CBRNE strikes using these weapons are assumed to be likely to occur. Air Force personnel and units in or deployed to these locations will be organized, trained, exercised, and equipped to survive CBRNE attacks and conduct sustained combat operations in CBRNE evironments. (Definition taken from AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management Program Planning and Operations) ** CBRNE Medium Threat Area (MTA). Friendly forces in these areas are at medium risk for attack with CBRNE weapons by states and nonstate actors, such as terrorists and criminals also known as transnationals. Potential adversaries within the region, either possess, or are likely to possess, CBRNE weapons and weapon systems and may have special operations forces capable of conducting limited attacks on airbases. Actual or potential transnational threats exist during peacetime or wartime. Forces may be within the extended range of adversary theater missiles, but it is assessed that CBRNE strikes using these weapons are less likely to occur. Air Force personnel and units in or deployed to these locations will be organized, trained, exercised, and equipped to survive CBRNE attacks and conduct limited combat operations in CBRNE. (Definition taken from AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management Program Planning and Operations) *** CBRNE Low Threat Area (LTA). Friendly forces in these areas are at risk for attack with CBRNE weapons by transnationals. Actual or potential transnational threats exist during peacetime or wartime. Select personnel identified in AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management Program Planning and Operations, and other personnel identified in the installation Comprehensive Emergency Management

Plan (CEMP) 10-2, are organized, trained, and equipped to continue critical missions and restore the primary mission. All other personnel raining and Doctrine in these locations are trained to survive attacks. (Definition taken from AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management Program Planning T and Operations) 4.3.3.1 Individual and Team (Collective) Training To keep skills current and to introduce new or changed procedures and equipment, all initially trained mobility At the individual level, the Air Force uses a multilevel ducation, members and those in threat areas are required to E approach to CBRNE defense-related training. All new attend recurring training 20 months after initial training enlisted inductees (approximately 45,000 annually) and every 20 months thereafter. For both initial and receive initial CBRNE defense training during basic recurring training, the Air Force is transitioning to a

training at Lackland AFB, TX. Instruction includes basic ) Defense individual defense measures and wear of protective blended learning concept to train all Airmen to prepare RN equipment; alarm signals; mission oriented protective for, respond to, and recover from the full spectrum of postures; CBRNE characteristics, identification, physical threats. Distance learning technologies will be detection, reporting, and decontamination; and a mask used to deliver standardized knowledge-based materials, confidence exercise. CBRNE training combines with which will allow for academic self-paced learning and provide the student the ability to access the materials uclear (CB other combat skills training over the course of a full N week, culminating in a full-scale ability to survive and 24/7. Upon successful completion of knowledge-based operate exercise. training objectives, Air Force Civil Engineer Readiness Flight instructors will evaluate students while they Additionally, in conjunction with their Air Force accomplish demonstration-performance objectives Specialty Code awarding courses, enlisted medical in a classroom environment focusing on key tactics, personnel receive initial readiness training through the techniques, and procedures. After receiving hands-on adiological and

Expeditionary Medical Readiness Course at Sheppard instruction and meeting demonstration performance R AFB or at Basic Expeditionary Medical Readiness Training objectives, members must complete functional task at Brooks City Base. All other members, including qualification training (TQT), normally at their respective emergency essential civilians and contractor personnel, that are in, or deployable to, chemical threat areas who  Instructors from Civil Engineer readiness flights are the Air have not completed training during their inception Force’s CBRN Defense instructors. These instructors receive their professional training through Air Force apprentice, craftsman and into the Air Force receive eight hours of initial CBRNE advanced courses at the Air Force Civil Engineer Readiness School, defense training at respective installations. Fort Leonard Wood, MO. Chemical, Biological,

105 duty location. During TQT, members perform individual in CBRN environments. Beyond the standard CBRNE wartime duties while wearing appropriate chemical defense-related training, as described above, selected

4 defensive equipment. Additionly, aircrews are required command, and response personnel (Table 4-7) receive to conduct TQT flights while wearing chemical defensive additional home-station and/or in-residence training equipment. and participate in exercises to respond to HAZMAT

t e r Finally, each individual’s education and training are further emergencies including terrorist use of WMD. Specialized P team members and personnel in senior or key leadership refined during mandatory readiness exercises (see Table positions also receive additional information to help them 4-16 and Table 4-17 later in this chapter) conducted to make appropriate risk management decisions and better h a hone individual skills and unit capabilities and to identify lead their personnel while ensuring air base operability.

C shortfalls in the unit’s overall capability while operating

Table 4-7. Major Accident and CBRNE Response Education and Training Requirements

and who is If the person is whose rank is assigned to then, complete local training and - Commander and Staff Radiological Accident Response (CASRAR) Workshop or Radiological Accident Command, Control, and Coordination (RAC3) Course - Air Force Incident Management Course (Formerly OSC MAJCOM or Response Task Course) Installation General Force (RTF) - FEMA IS-100, Introduction to the Incident Command Commander System raining and Doctrine

T - FEMA IS-700, National Incident Management System - FEMA IS-800, National Response Plan (NRP), An Introduction Emergency Major thru

ducation, Operations Colonel or Initial Response

E -Air Force Incident Management Course Center (EOC) equivalent Base (IRB) or Director and throughColonel EOC - FEMA IS-100, -700, and -800 Alternates and equivalent

Any SNCO or -Air Force Incident Management Course

) Defense EOC Manager IRB or EOC Officer - FEMA IS-100, -700, and -800

RN Technical Sergeant (TSgt) - CASRAR or RAC3 Course Officer, Civilian, RTF or NCO through Colonel - FEMA IS-100, -700, and -800 or equivalent EOD, CE - AF Incident Management Course uclear (CB readiness or

N - Radiological Emergency Teams Operations (RETOPS) bioenvironmental Any Rank IRB personnel - FEMA IS-100, -700, -800 Senior Fire - AF Incident Management Course Officers Any Rank IRB TSgt thru Security Forces Colonel or IRB - AF Incident Management Course equivalent

adiological and EOC Member Any Rank EOC - FEMA IS-100, -700, and -800 R Exercise Major accident - Air Force Incident Management Course Evaluation Team Any Rank response EET Chief or IG evaluation duties - FEMA IS-100, -700, and -800 Evaluator Key: DNWS - Defense Nuclear Weapons School, Kirtland AFB, NM; AU – Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, EOC- Emergency Operations Center, IRB- Initial Response Base, EET- Exercise Evaluation Team, RTF- Response Task Force, TSgt- Technical Sergeant, OSC- On Scene Commander, CE - Civil Engineer, EOD- Explosive Ordnance Disposal, IG- Inspector General Chemical, Biological,

106 During 2006, Air Force Medical Service personnel Additionally, the Air Force conducted its fifth annual completed a DoD-directed CBRNE defense web-based USAF Medical CBRNE Defense Seminar. This seminar,

training requirement. Table 4-8 provides a summary which began in 2002 for bioenvironmental engineers, was 4 of active duty medic completion, as of October 2006. expanded to include wing-level public health, laboratory, In accordance with Assistant Secretary of Defense for and casualty management officers. It included plenary

Health Affairs Memo, Subject: Chemical, Biological, sessions, didactic presentations by CBRNE SMEs, and an t e r

Radiological, Nuclear, and (High Yield) Explosives interactive table top exercise (TTX), Caduceus Endeavor, P Training for Military Medical Personnel, dated January 9, for 400 personnel. The next seminar is scheduled for 2004, Health Affairs requires 75% of active duty Medical June 2007 with a similar format. h a Corps and 50% of all active duty medical personnel to complete the training. C

Table 4-8. Active Duty Medic Completion

Personnel Assigned Personnel Completed % Completed Enlisted Medics 15,091 12,405 82% Med Techs/IDMT* 6,269 5,569 89% Medical Corps 2,931 2,810 96% Dental Corps 916 916 100% Nurse Corps 4,015 4,015 100% raining and Doctrine

Medical Service Corps 1,223 1,223 100% T Biomed Sciences Corps 2,034 1,716 84% Physician Asst 322 291 90% Total Active Duty 32,801 28,945 88%

* IDMT – Independent Duty Medical Technician ducation, E

4.3.3.2 Contagious Casualty Management acquire 20 units during FY07 through FY09 and stage

(CCM) them at Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) and U.S. Air Forces ) Defense

During FY04–05, the United States Air Force (USAF), Europe (USAFE) locations. A Concept of Employment RN through the leadership of Headquarters, Air Combat has been developed. Air Force tactics, techniques, and Command (ACC) and Headquarters, Air Mobility procedures (AFTTP) for aeromedical evacuation of index Command (AMC), began developing its newest cases by AE crews and Critical Care Air Transport Teams (CCATTs), including PPE requirements and procedures, uclear (CB deployable capability for treatment-in-place of biologically N contagious casualties, and the aeromedical evacuation of will be developed as part of the fielding process. EMEDS, joint index contagious casualties. For treatment-in-place, CCAT, and Flight Nurse Technician training courses will the concept of employment, personnel requirements, be modified to include contagious casualty management and allowance standard and field testing for a 25- concepts as these new capabilities are fielded. bed increment to supplement Expeditionary Medical 4.3.3.3 Air Force CBRNE Defense Specialist

Support (EMEDS) facilities has been accomplished. adiological and The aeromedical evacuation capability to transport Training R and treat enroute limited numbers of index contagious The 366th Training Squadron, Detachment 7, Civil casualties will be provided via a patient isolation unit Engineer Readiness School at Fort Leonard Wood offers (PIU). An effort led and coordinated by AMC, with Joint six in-residence courses designed to enhance the CBRNE involvement, is currently under way to acquire a limited defense proficiency of primary-duty Air Force Civil number of individual PIUs for aeromedical evacuation Engineer Readiness Flight personnel (Table 4-9). (AE) of contagious casualties. Current plans are to Chemical, Biological,

107 Table 4-9. Air Force Professional Training

4 Course Duration Number of Attendees Civil Engineer (CE) Readiness Craftsman Course 67 days 235 CE Advanced Readiness Course 5 days 34 CE Readiness Flight Officer Course 20 days 21 t e r CE Cell (Resident) Course 5 days 80 P

h a These courses fulfill the differing needs of the total programs and processes. The C-CW CONOPS Eagle

C force, including active duty, Air National Guard, Air Look review is primarily focused on how well the Air Force Reserve, and international students. The Readiness Force has institutionalized and validated the training Craftsman Course has been expanded from 53 to 67 and procedures identified in the C-CW CONOPS. The academic days, effective January 2006, to include more review also seeks to identify gaps and recommend actions detailed CBRNE defense training and additional emphasis to improve enterprise-wide implementation. Final results on automated warning and reporting. will be published in early calendar year 2007. The Counter–Biological Warfare (C–BW) Element 4.3.3.4 Air Force C-CBRN Concept of Operation of the C–CBRN CONOPS. The goal of the Air Force’s C- (CONOPS) Documents BW CONOPS development effort is to leverage existing Because of the potential need to operate in a CBRN materiel and nonmateriel solutions, while also developing environment, the Air Force has focused a great deal of procedural workarounds to overcome both technical and raining and Doctrine

T effort to develop and codify preparatory, response and procedural capability gaps, to give Air Force commanders command and control actions in C-CBRN CONOPS what their installations need to survive, fight, and prevail documents for use across the service. Additionally, against BW-armed adversaries. in recognition of differences in CBRN and high-yield The Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) signed the ducation, explosive environments, the USAF C-CBRN Council E Counter–Biological Warfare Concept of Operations and the USAF Force Protection Steering Group (FPSG) (C-BW CONOPS) on August 18, 2006. The document agreed to transfer High-Yield Explosive responsibility to outlines the Air Force approach for countering the FPSG. biological attacks and naturally occurring disease ) Defense The Counter–Chemical Warfare (C–CW) outbreaks. Its overarching goal is to limit casualties RN Element of the C–CBRN CONOPS. The Air Force and sustain mission capability at Air Force installations achieved initial operational capability in December 2003. before, during, and after a biological event. The C-BW Additional research continues to identify and characterize CONOPS is centered on four main elements: layered chemical warfare threat vectors, including toxic industrial biological defense, trigger events, disease containment, uclear (CB

N chemicals and toxic industrial materials (TICs/TIMs). and operational risk management. The AMC is working on global airlift requirements in a The Air Force staff developed an implementation plan contaminated environment. A major challenge for unit to deploy the new C-BW CONOPS across the service. C-CW capabilities is maintaining the previously high A comprehensive CONOPS implementation plan is in levels of C-CW capabilities at the base level. The high development, and approval is expected by early 2007. operations tempo and recurring deployments limit the The implementation plan outlines Air Staff, MAJCOM, adiological and frequency and extent of C-CW CONOPS training at the

R and installation responsibilities and lays out a two-year individual and unit levels. plan to fully integrate the precepts of the CONOPS into The Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA) is currently Air Force operations. Specific focus areas of the plan performing an “Eagle Look” review of the Air Force include development and publication of the following: C-CW CONOPS. Requested by senior Air Force • New Air Force C-BW guidance and updates to leadership, Eagle Look reviews are independent and existing guidance objective management reviews of key Air Force–wide Chemical, Biological,

108 • Educational materials for the general Air Force operationally focused, science-based report the Air population, medical experts, and key installation Force used to develop guidance for commanders to

leadership deter, prevent, and respond to radiological attacks and 4 • C-BW Exercise requirements to recover operational capability in an RW environment, while limiting risks to personnel and resources. The Air

• Installation planning requirements Force followed the C-RW Concept Study with R&D of t e r

• gaps in C-BW resource requirements five baseline studies in 2005. The five studies provided P an overview of existing C-RW capabilities across the Air • C-BW operational standards and inspection criteria Force and identified a number of capability shortfalls. In h a An important element of the C-BW CONOPS addition to the five baseline studies, six major commands implementation process will be AFI 10-2604, Disease (MAJCOMS) and 20 installations participated in a C-RW C Containment Planning Guidance, scheduled for publication survey designed to gather information on installation- in 2007. This document will provide policy and guidance level C-RW preparedness and response capabilities. for disease containment planning, outline roles and The C-CBRN Council approved the formation of a C- responsibilities, and discuss planning considerations. It RW Tiger Team. In early 2006, the C-RW Tiger Team, will also direct all Air Force installations to develop a which included C-RW subject-matter experts, convened comprehensive disease containment plan and supporting to assess current C-RW capabilities. The baseline studies checklists to prepare for, and respond to, a biological event. and MAJCOM survey were reviewed by the team as When released across the Air Force, the new instruction part of their assessment. In all, the Tiger Team developed will be accompanied by a sample Disease Containment 62 recommendations for improving Air Force C-RW Plan to aid installations in the development of their own capabilities. These recommendations were included raining and Doctrine plans. in the C-RW Tiger Team Report, and will serve as T Other important guidance includes AFI 10-2603, Emergency the foundation for creating a C-RW CONOPS and an Health Powers on Air Force Installations (published in December effective C-RW capability. 2005), and AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management The USAF C-CBRNE Master Plan. The U.S. Air ducation, Program Planning and Operations (revision scheduled for Force published a C-CBRNE master plan with four E release in the spring of 2007). Further, guidance is being implementation roadmaps. This plan coordinates Air Force refined as the result of Air Force involvement with the efforts over a five-year period (2004–2009) to establish, WMD Installation Training and Exercise Program and the

maintain, improve, and evaluate its readiness to accomplish ) Defense Installation Protection Program (IPP). the full suite of Combating WMD missions and to operate RN The Counter–Radiological Warfare (C–RW), in a WMD environment. The master plan outlines the Element of the C–CBRN CONOPS. The Air Force operational capabilities the Air Force needs to counter continued work to create a C-RW element of the C- the WMD threat, outlines a methodology and approach

CBRN CONOPS: for developing and enhancing those capabilities, and uclear (CB

organizes these efforts into four sub-plans or “roadmaps.” N The primary objectives of this initiative are as follows: The roadmaps are a comprehensive set of overarching • Determine the operational impact of RW on critical tasks that support the master plan and are designed to missions cover a period of two years. Three of the roadmaps parallel the service’s Title X responsibilities to organize, train, • Assess requirements for sustaining mission capability and equip; and the fourth covers fundamental research in a radiological environment and definition of the problem and potential solutions. adiological and • Assess, augment, and develop C-RW policy The Air Force is currently completing subtasks from the R • Institutionalize the ability to operate through a second iteration of roadmaps; the FY06–07 roadmaps. radiological attack while minimizing personnel Development of the third and final iteration, the FY08– exposure. 09 roadmaps, will begin in early FY07. Work on the C-RW initiative began with the C- RW Concept Study in 2004. That study provided an Chemical, Biological,

109 4.3.3.5 Air Force C-CBRN Air Force Training designed to train installation leadership on terrorist- Initiatives: Air Force C-CBRN Education, generated chemical and/or biological agent attacks.

4 Training and Exercise (ETE) Initiative Code Silver TTX requirements are being incorporated The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Air, Space & into WMD IRT and AFI 10-2501, currently in revision Information Operations, Plans & Requirements (AF/ and expected to be published in 2007. See section 4.4.2 t e r A3/A5), established the Air Force C-CBRN Education, for more information on the Code Silver TTX. With the P Training and Exercise (ETE) Initiative in December Code Silver program completed, the newest program is 2003 to institutionalize a cross-functional, end-to-end MeRET (Medical Readiness and Training). The first pilot base was completed in January 2007. h a (accession to separation/retirement) approach to achieve

C an Air Force-wide C-CBRN operational capability. The AF C-CBRN Council chartered an ETE Working Group co-chaired by Deputy Director for Counterproliferation 4.3.4 Navy CBRN Defense Training (AF/A3SC) and HQ Air Education and Training The Navy continued training based on prior guidance Command Strategic Plans (HQ AETC/A8PX). and established training courses. During FY06, the Navy The goal of AF C-CBRN ETE is to give individuals the developed the Navy Training Systems Plan (NTSP) for appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to new and in-service chemical, biological, and radiological conduct air and space operations in a CBRN environment. defense (CBR-D) systems in an effort to establish CBR-D The current focus is on individual airmen and senior systems as formal programs of record in the Navy training leaders. Future efforts will address civilians, contractors, community. and dependents. The ETE Working Group utilizes a four- Within the Navy, CBR-D training is conducted in raining and Doctrine part methodology to realize USAF master plan objectives: two phases: individual and unit/installation training. T (1) determine which KSAs are required, (2) investigate Individual training consists of attendance at formal school what institutional baseline currently exists, (3) identify courses, web-based instructions, and completion of basic and assess the gaps, and (4) develop an implementation and advanced CBRN defense personnel qualification

ducation, plan to make the necessary changes. standard (PQS) training. At the unit/installation-level, E Navy personnel conduct periodic CBRN defense training In 2006, the Air Force made significant strides in and predeployment unit training exercises. reaching goals of the ETE initiative. The Air Force A3/5 has approved competencies for the first four of five Air Table 4-10 lists all CBRN-D related courses offered

) Defense Force doctrinal pillars: proliferation prevention, active by the Navy, or via joint schools. Some are discussed in

RN defense, counterforce, and passive defense. Air Force the paragraphs that follow under individual, unit, and education and training stakeholders compared those installation training. competencies with existing curricula and lesson plans to determine a baseline and worked with AETC to identify 4.3.4.1 Navy Individual Training uclear (CB the gaps. Currently, the stakeholders are assessing these N In support of an on-going Navy Knowledge Online gaps to identify potential solutions. (NKO) initiative and DoDINST 1322.26 “Development, WMD Incident Response Training (WMD IRT). Management and Delivery of Distributed Learning” of The Air Force conducts WMD IRT to strengthen June 2006, the Navy is working to develop Shareable capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of Content Objective Reference Model/Integrated terrorist use of a CBRNE device. The CJCSI 3125.01 Learning Environment (SCORM/ILE) compliant adiological and further delineates the requirements, and DoDI 2000.18 courses that will further enhance CBR-D training in R places the requirements squarely on the services and the areas of operation and maintenance. At the present, installations to prepare for, train, organize, and equip to an ILE product is being developed that addresses IPE, respond to CBRNE WMD use by terrorists. decontamination equipment, and detection kits. In FY06 and FY07, respectively, ILE products for the CP system Code Silver Tabletop Exercise (TTX). The Air Force and in-service Navy CBD detectors were completed and conducted Code Silver TTXs at 51 air bases (active and delivered to the Center for Naval Engineering (CNE) for Air National Guard bases) in FY05. The exercises were incorporation into CBR-D training. Chemical, Biological,

110 Table 4-10. U.S. Navy CBR-D Courses

Course Name Course Location 4 Shipboard CBR-D Specialist Course, #CIN A-495-2062 Fort Leonard Wood, MO Disaster Preparedness Operations Specialist Course, #CIN Fort Leonard Wood, MO A-494-0006 t e r Recruit Training CBR-D Naval Training Center Great Lakes, IL P Basic Engineering Core Course (BECC), #A-651-0125 Naval Training Center Great Lakes, IL Hospital Corpsman “A” School, #CIN B-300-0019 Naval Training Center Great Lakes, IL

Naval School of Health Sciences San Diego, CA and h a Independent Duty Corpsman Naval School of Health Sciences Portsmouth, VA C Preventive Medicine Technician “C” School Naval School of Health Sciences, San Diego, CA ConfirmatoryL ab Operator Naval Medical Research Center, Silver Spring, MD U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Management of Chemical Casualties Defense, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute Bethesda, Medical Effects of Ionizing Radiation MD Radiation Health Indoctrination, #CIN B-5A-1050 Naval Undersea Medical Institute Groton, CT Radiation Health Officer, INC B-6H-0020 CBR-D Command Center Naval Construction Training Center Gulfport, MS and CBR-D Personnel Protection Naval Construction Training Center Port Hueneme, CA Naval Construction Training Center Gulfport, MS and CBR-D Team Training Naval Construction Training Center Port Hueneme, CA

MSC CBR-D Course Military Sealift Command Training Center Earle, NJ raining and Doctrine T Fleet Training Center San Diego, CA Norfolk, VA; Repair Party Leader, #CIN K-495-0040 Mayport, FL Ingleside, TX Pearl Harbor HI; Yokosuka, Japan Senior Enlisted Damage Control & Damage Control Fleet Training Center San Diego, CA Assistant (SEDC DCA) Course, CIN A-4G-1111 ducation, E Damage Control Assistant (DCA) Department Head, #CIN A-4H-0107 Surface Warfare Officer School Command,N ewport, RI (Prospective) Executive Officer, #CIN A-4H-0112 (Prospective) Commanding Officer, #CIN A-4H-0111 ) Defense RN In the fourth quarter of FY05, the effort to outfit all of hours in the classroom, one hour in the lab) focused on the Navy CBR-D schoolhouses with technical training the use of personal protection equipment and survival equipment (TTE) was completed. This effort also included skills, including an exercise designed to increase uclear (CB

briefing the schoolhouses on the use of the TTE and individual confidence in the protective equipment. At N verifying that they have the level of support needed from officer candidate school, officers receive two hours of the Navy material developer. This effort will continue as class time focused on personal protection equipment and needed to ensure that the Navy schoolhouses are receiving survival skills. adequate support. The following sections are divided into initial training and advanced-level CBR-D training for 4.3.4.3 Navy Individual Training – Professional

shipboard, ashore, and medical training. Level adiological and R Officer and enlisted personnel assigned to ship and shore 4.3.4.2 Navy Recruit/Accession Level Training billets requiring specialized CBR-D expertise attend the The Navy provides initial entry-level CBR-D training Disaster Preparedness Specialist Course (DPSC), a 20- to all junior officers and junior enlisted personnel in day course, and the CBR-D Shipboard Operations and accession programs. At the recruit training center, all Training Specialist Course (10 days) conducted by US enlisted personnel receive three hours of training (two Navy personnel located at the USACMLS, Fort Leonard Chemical, Biological,

111 Table 4-11. Navy Professional CBRN Defense Training Status Conducted at Joint School

**

4 2006 Accomplishments 2007 Goals DPSC* CBR-D Ops Total DPSC* CBR-D Ops Total Officers 1,062 97 1,159 700 13 713

t e r Enlisted 45,047 1,203 46,250 5,990 224 6,214

P Total 46,109 1,300 47,409 6,690 237 6,927 * DPSC – Disaster Preparedness Specialist Course ** 2007 goals have been established for total numbers trained. Commands have the authority and option to send either officers or senior h a enlisted personnel to courses (in the past that were designated only for commissioned officers) to earn the position of Officer in Charge. As

C a comparison, 219 personnel graduated from the schools in FY 2004.

Wood. The Center for SeaBees and Facilities Engineering • Medical Effects of Ionizing Radiation Field Course (CSFE) at USACMLS supervises the program for the – AFRRI Navy and offers two courses of instruction for Navy • Radiation Health Indoctrination - Naval Undersea CBR-D specialists. The courses are open to Navy, Coast Medical Institute Groton, CT Guard, Military Sealift Command, and select foreign military personnel, E-5 and above. Courses are designed • Radiation Health Officer - Naval Undersea Medical to provide both afloat and ashore commands with Institute Groton, CT personnel who can successfully perform their duties • Biological Warfare Detection Course (BWDC) – in a CBR-contaminated environment. In addition, the Biological Detection Research Department (BDRD) training enables CBR-D specialists to act as the primary raining and Doctrine – This course is for advanced lab technicians (NEC T CBR-D trainers for their respective commands. Table 8506) and preventive medicine technicians (NEC 4-11 displays the student throughput numbers. 8532), microbiologists, and biochemists. The Navy is currently reviewing options to disestablish Presently, Navy clinicians attend the MCBC at

ducation, the Disaster Preparedness Course and create two new

E USAMRICD, USAMRIID, or AFRRI. Further, three courses: a new Emergency Manager Course for Navy Medical Service Corps officers are selected annually installation personnel and a new expeditionary CBR to complete a one-year fellowship at the U.S. Army specialist course for personnel assigned to shore-based Research, Development and Engineering Command, expeditionary forces. ) Defense Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. Advanced training in

RN the entire medical defense spectrum against CBR agents, 4.3.4.4 Navy Medical Training including environmental contaminates encountered Navy Medicine CBRNE training includes standardized, during deployment, is provided. There is a specific focus formal courses, and the tri-service CBRNE electronic emphasized on the planning and execution of military uclear (CB training program, Emergency Medical Preparedness and response and support to CBRNE-related events, both N Response Course (EMPRC). Information on the status of domestically and during conflict. Additionally, Advanced FY06 Navy CBRNE defense medical training is provided Lab Technicians and Preventive Medicine Technicians in Tables 4-12 and 4-13. receive Biological Warfare detection training provided by the Navy Medical Research Center (NMRC). CBRNE specific training courses include the following: In 2003, the Navy Surgeon General mandated that all • Medical Management of Chemical and Biological adiological and Navy medical personnel complete their EMPRC training

R Casualties Course (MCBC) – USAMRICD by 30 September 2006. Table 4-12 provides the status • Field Management of Chemical and Biological of FY06 Navy CBRNE defense medical training. Table Casualties Course (FCBC) – USAMRICD 4-13 reflects compliance data as of October 2006 for all • Hospital Management of Chemical, Biological, members of BSO-18. Radiological/Nuclear, and Explosive Incidents Course (HM-CBRNE) - USAMRICID Chemical, Biological,

112 Table 4-12. Navy Medical CBRN Defense Training Status (2006)

Clinicians Nonclinicians 4 Trained Total % Trained Trained Total % Trained Officers 6,052 6,966 86.9% 764 1,123 68% Enlisted 64 86 74.4% 12,761 14,003 91.1% t e r Total 6,086 7,052 86.3% 13,525 15,126 89.4% P

Table 4-13. Navy EMPRC Training Status (2006) h a C Clinicians by Corps Trained Total Inventory % Trained Medical Corps 2,417 2,912 83.0% Dental Corps 916 1,135 80.7% Nurse Corps 2,490 2,670 93.3% Physicians Assistant 229 249 92% Hospital Corpsman (HM) 12,825 14,089 91% Total 18,877 21,055 89.6 %

4.3.4.5 Unit Training Naval expeditionary air units receive IPE fit testing and training in donning and doffing CB protective equipment Navy units conduct basic, intermediate, and advanced (mask and JLIST suit). A total of 10 naval expeditionary training exercises as part of the interdeployment training

air squadrons and their associated 6,000 personnel raining and Doctrine cycle. During the basic training phase, CBR-D training T received CBR-D training prior to their deployments exercises may involve additional unit training by CBR-D overseas. Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) in specialists from an afloat training group (ATG) or Naval coordination with the Commander Naval Air Forces Construction Training Center.

(CNAF) forwarded a proposal to add aviation-related ducation, After reporting to designated units, Navy personnel ratings to be included as part of the source ratings to E are required to complete basic and advanced CBR-D attend the CBR-D Operations and Training specialist Personal Qualification Skills (PQS) training. The PQS are course to establish an organic CBR-D training capability a compilation of the minimum knowledge and skills that within naval expeditionary air squadrons. ) Defense an individual must demonstrate to stand watch or perform Information on basic unit qualification CBR-D training RN other specific duties necessary for the safety, security, or tasks is provided in Table 4-14. proper operation of a ship, aircraft, or support system.

Table 4-14. Navy Basic CBR-D Unit Training Tasks uclear (CB N

• Locate and transit Decontamination station/ CCA stations • Locate Casualty Collection stations and Deep Shelter Stations • Don and doff Chemical Protective Ensemble • Change protective mask canister • Use the M-291 skin decontamination kit adiological and

• Demonstrate self and buddy aid for nerve agent exposure R • Identify CBR markers • Use M8 and M9 paper • Pass through CPS air lock/pressure lock • Decontaminate internal and external areas • Satisfactorily perform or simulate immediate actions for the following emergencies: nuclear attack, chemical attack, biological attack, nuclear radiation exposure, chemical agent exposure, and biological agent exposure. Chemical, Biological,

113 4.3.4.6 Installation Training Phase 1 procurement included the following items: personal protective gear (Level C suits, Air Purifying The OPNAV Instruction 3440.17, Navy Installation

4 Respirators (APRs), Power APRs (PAPRs) gloves, boots), Emergency Management Program (EMP), was signed July mass casualty decontamination equipment, handheld 7, 2005. EMP is a contingency plan for preparing for, interoperable radio communications, and pharmaceutical mitigating the potential effects of, responding to, and t e r countermeasures for first responder/receivers. Phase 2 recovering from all man-made and natural emergencies, P procurement will expand the procurement to more MTFs including CBRN-D events. It is applicable to all Navy across the Navy medical enterprise as well as incorporate installations in the United States and overseas, including those initiatives from the Assistant Secretary of Defense h a active and reserve components, Navy civilians, Navy for Health Affairs (ASD/HA) regarding avian/pandemic

C families, and Navy and non-Navy tenants on Navy influenza. installations. The Chief of Naval Installations assumes overall responsibility for the Navy Installation EMP. The EMP uses a three “tiered approach” to training depending on installation size and criticality. Annually, 4.3.5 Marine Corps CBRN all installations will be required to conduct a simulated Defense Training CBRN TTX event. Larger bases are required to conduct The Marine Corps trains its personnel to accomplish their the TTX and an all-hands field training exercise. wartime mission in any battlespace condition and in every environment. Anytime CBRN defense is separated from 4.3.4.7 Navy Medicine Emergency Management other training events, as it conditions Marines to regard Program CBRN defense operations as a separate form of warfare.

raining and Doctrine Complete integration of CBRN defense training ensures T In 2006, the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED), Navy Medicine Office of Homeland Security (NMOHLS) that all Marines possess a thorough understanding of transitioned the Disaster Preparedness Vulnerability CBRN defense operations and procedures. All personnel Analysis Training and Exercise Program (DVATEX) are trained to recognize CBRN attacks, don the field

ducation, protective mask and protective clothing quickly, perform

E into the “all-hazards” EMP. This program provides the health service support for installation emergency assigned missions wearing protective clothing, and survive management as directed by OPNAV3400.17 and serves and continue to operate for extended periods in a CBRN as the Echelon 2 complementing EMP to CNIC3440.17. environment. All Marine Corps organizations must continually integrate nuclear, biological, and chemical ) Defense The Navy Medicine EMP is being implemented in a defense (NBCD) training to develop unit integrity, RN phased approach over the midterm. The EMP provides policy guidance, tiered capabilities, standardized and cohesion, and CBRN defense operational expertise. centralized equipment procurement, training and exercises, integration with the Joint Program Executive 4.3.5.1 Individual Training uclear (CB Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-

N Annually, individual survival standards (ISSs) training CBD) and Commander, Navy Installations Command is conducted for all Marines using the standards of (CNIC) programs/projects, life cycle sustainment and proficiency outlined in MCO 3400.3F, Nuclear, Biological, National Response Plan (NRP) and National Incident and Chemical (NBC) Defense Training, dated March 1, 2004. Management System (NIMS) compliance. In conjunction with ISS training, all Marines complete an Phase 1 (FY06) of the EMP involved final draft completion IPE confidence exercise once per calendar year.

adiological and of BUMEDINST 3440.11; finalization of the CBR-D R standardized equipment list, military treatment facility 4.3.5.2 Unit Training (MTF) tier assignments, basis of allocation tables (BoAs) Units are required to perform to the basic operating and the Authorized Medical Allowance List (AMAL) standards of proficiency and CBRN defense team development; and initial procurement to supplement the operations when conducting missions under CBRN Joint Project Manager Guardian Installation Protection conditions. These standards are outlined in MCO Program (JPMG-IPP). 3400.3F. Chemical, Biological,

114 Table 4-15. USMC CBRN Defense Operating Force Training

Training Command Type of Training Training Duration 4 USMC CBRN Defense School CBRN Defense Specialist Basic Course 12 weeks USMC CBRN Defense School CBRN Defense Officer Basic Course 7 weeks USACMLS Chemical Captains Career Course 26 weeks t e r Nuclear, Biological, Chemical 6 weeks USACMLS P Reconnaissance USACMLS Master Fox Scout 3 weeks

USACMLS Radiological Safety (Installation Level) 3 weeks h a USACMLS Operational Radiation Safety 1 week C USA Red Stone Technical Escort 3 weeks, 3 days Radiological Emergency Team Operations DNWS 9 days Course

4.3.5.3 CBRN Defense Specialist Training material solution and/or tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) from this ATD may transition into Completion of the required initial basic instruction and the Joint Biological Tactical Detection System (JBTDS) sustainment of proficiency are considered paramount to program. the ability of the unit CBRN defense officer and CBRN defense specialist in accomplishing the mission of CBRN raining and Doctrine defense in respective units. The minimum training T requirements for initial instruction and sustainment of 4.3.6 Armed Forces Radiobiology proficiency are located in MCO 3500.70, NBC Defense Research Institute Training and Readiness Manual. Table 4-15 provides a (AFRRI) Training ducation, complete list of schools available for CBRN officers/ AFRRI is a DoD organization that develops, organizes, E specialists. and conducts the postgraduate level-Medical Effects of Ionizing Radiation (MEIR) Course for medical 4.3.5.4 Marine Corps CBRN Defense Initiatives professionals and ancillary health care providers. The ) Defense The Marine Corps’ focal point for all CBRN defense course is partially supported by the U.S. Army Office of RN issues related to the CBDP resides under the Deputy the Surgeon General in coordination with the Defense Commandant for Combat Development and Integration Health Program. The MEIR Course is designed to (DC CD&I). The DC CD&I is also the Commanding improve the operational capabilities of the military services by providing medical and operational personnel

General of the Marine Corps Combat Development uclear (CB

Command (MCCDC). Operating force CBRN defense with up-to-date information concerning the biomedical N initiatives are tailored to support MCO 3400.3F, Nuclear, consequences of radiation exposure, how the effects can Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense Training and may be be reduced, and how to medically manage casualties. adjusted as required to focus on supporting and winning The training, formerly known as the Medical Effects the current fight. Operating force training conducted in of Nuclear Weapons Course, was expanded to include FY06 is shown in Table 4-15. During FY05, the Marine nuclear or radiological incidents that can occur on or

Corps initiated the Expeditionary Biological Detection off the battlefield and that go beyond nuclear weapons adiological and R (EBD) Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD). The events. EBD ATD will determine if available GOTS and COTS The MEIR Course generally travels to host installations biological agent detectors can be employed in a manner worldwide and is always tailored to meet the needs of that will provide the Marine Corps an operationally the specific audience. Four variations of the course are suitable tactical family of biological detectors that can available, all sharing a common core but with differing be employed down to the small unit level. Any resulting lengths to accommodate greater breadth and depth Chemical, Biological,

115 of coverage as needed. The variations include the 4.3.7 Defense Threat Reduction following: Agency (DTRA) Training 4 • Mini-MEIR–A one-day course that focuses primarily DTRA is designated as the DoD Executive Agent for on the medical/health and psychological effects of nuclear weapons training. As part of DTRA, the Defense radiation. Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS) is the only DoD t e r

P • MEIR – The standard 2.5-day course taught regularly school with advanced joint and multiservice training in the Washington, DC area and at other locations by courseware on the national nuclear weapons stockpile request. This course is most frequently requested, and the nation’s nuclear weapons program. DNWS h a and covering thoroughly the four key subjects uses a blend of in-residence classroom, field training, C of health physics, biological effects of radiation, mobile training team, and distance-learning courseware medical/health effects, and psychological effects. for students from the noncommissioned officer ranks through general/flag officers. DNWS also provides • MEIR Scientific Update–A four-day course taught training to the larger combating weapons of mass once a year in residence at AFRRI. This course destruction (CbtWMD) community in nuclear weapons incorporates everything in the standard MEIR orientation, nuclear weapons accident response, and course plus lectures by leading scientists on the general CbtWMD staff training. To ensure the full range latest developments in radiobiological research. It is of individual and collective training opportunities, the most academic of the four course offerings. DNWS manages the DoD’s only radioactive field training • MEIR Field Course–This one-week course is the sites and has recently obtained approval for this capability longest version of the four and is taught once or to be a persistent site within the Joint National Training

raining and Doctrine twice a year only at Kirtland AFB, where the unique Capability (JNTC). This linkage to the JNTC will make T facilities needed are located. It includes everything the DNWS field training sites available to a wider set of from the standard MEIR plus preparation for, U.S. military customers throughout the world. DNWS and conduct of, actual field exercises. The course also makes use of DoD’s only classified nuclear weapons

ducation, culminates with a day in the field during which display area (WDA). The DNWS trains students from all E students, dressed in full protective gear, rescue role- levels of DoD, federal, and state agencies, and selected playing victims at a real air crash site on the base in allied countries. an area of low-level radiological contamination. This In FY07 the DTRA will continue to develop a Defense is the least academic and the most applied hands-on ) Defense Threat Reduction University (DTRU) with a coordinated version of the course. RN CBRNE education, training, and research capability Continuing education credits are granted for successful operating at the international, federal, state, and local completion of the MEIR course and the Uniformed levels. The agency is working closely with the OSA Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS) is (CBD & CDP), the U.S. Army Chemical School, U.S. uclear (CB the certifying authority. The USUHS grants Continuing Joint Forces Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. N Nursing Education (CNE) credits as an institution of the Strategic Command’s (USSTRATCOM’s) Center for American Nurses Credentialing Center’s Commission Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC), and on Accreditation. Accreditation refers to recognition of the joint staff on this initiative. DTRU has published its continuing nursing education activities only and does first catalog of all of the individual and collective training not imply Commission on Accreditation approval or courses conducted by all of DTRA. The DTRU is also endorsement of any commercial product. The USUHS in the process of establishing qualification standards for adiological and

R grants Continuing Medical Education (CME) credits as DoD nuclear and radiological instructors. The DTRU has an accredited institution of the Accreditation Council also recently accepted responsibility for the management for Continuing Medical Education (ACCME) to provide of the Defense Threat Reduction Information Analysis continuing medical education for physicians. This activity Center (DTRIAC) which maintains a specialized nuclear has been approved for American Medical Association knowledge library, the WDA, and an associated research (AMA), Category 1, Physician’s Recognition Award capability. DTRA estimates an Initial Operational (PRA) credit. Capability for the DTRU of FY08. Chemical, Biological,

116 4.3.8 Joint CBRN Defense Training MTF commanders are encouraged to conduct their MTF exercises in conjunction with those of the installations on The JRO-CBRND assists the combatant commands to

which they are located. Fifty-four USAMEDCOM MTFs 4 reduce CBRN defense-related training gaps by working have been supplied with decontamination equipment within the JointTraining System (JTS).This is accomplished and train in patient decontamination regularly. by providing CBRN defense familiarization training to USAMEDCOM is also developing a Pandemic Influenza t e r staffs, subject-matter expert support to exercises from Preparation and Response Plan and conducting a series P concept development through lessons learned, and other of exercises to test the plan through FY07. related exercise execution support. Part of this JRO-

CBRND initiative is the Joint Senior Leaders Course h a

(JSLC). The JSLC is sponsored by the JRO-CBRND and C conducted at the USACMLS in Ft Leonard Wood three 4.4.2 Air Force Exercises times per year. This course is designed to offer critical All AF installations are required to develop scenarios elements of CBRN defense subject-matter expertise, with and conduct exercises based on AFI 10-2501, Air an operational to strategic-level focus, to senior leaders Force Emergency Management Program Planning and who wish to augment their understanding of current Operations, the installation’s Comprehensive Emergency CBRN issues. The highlight of JSLC continues to be the Management Plan (CEMP) Plan 10-2 and other opportunity to conduct toxic agent training at the CDTF. emergency plans. Table 4-16 and Table 4-17 summarize This training allows senior leaders to experience actual the types and frequencies of exercises that installations conditions in a contaminated environment. JSLC also must conduct. provides a forum for senior leaders to exchange ideas and In FY2004-05 the Air Force Medical Service conducted gain a familiarization with current CBRN defense issues. raining and Doctrine

a medically centric TTX (Code Silver) that included T wing and civilian community CBRNE responders. TTX Code Silver provided the medical treatment facilities, 4.4 exerCISES installation, and civilian responders the opportunity

to envision a CBRNE event that would generate 300 ducation, During 2006, the services and joint organizations planned E casualties in the first 24–72 hours. Responders from and developed scenarios and conducted exercises that civil engineering, public pffairs, the medical group, and integrated CBRN considerations to varying degrees. the wing leadership were among some of the participants Some exercises were specifically designed to respond to

who responded to a decision-based scenario, cues, ) Defense CBRN-related events while others added CBRN defense

player input, and focused questions to deal with the RN considerations into the master scenario events, list as consequences of an event. This team-building exercise a condition of the battlefield. The following sections permitted installation personnel to identify shortfalls highlight service and joint organization exercise activities in planning through cross communication and senior that dealt with CBRN events in exercises. leadership involvement. uclear (CB N 4.4.1 Army Exercises 4.4.3 Navy Exercises 4.4.1.1 U.S. Army Medical Command (USAMEDCOM) CBRN Defense Exercise In accordance with the updated Navy instruction for Program Initiatives installation protection, all Navy installations are required

to conduct annual simulated TTX CBRN events. The adiological and USAMEDCOM complies with the Joint Commission on larger bases are required to conduct tabletop and all- R Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO) hands field training exercises every three years. recommended external emergency/mass casualty exercises twice a year at all Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs); one of these semi-annual exercises includes reaction to a CBRNE incident in accordance with MEDCOM Regulation 525-4, Emergency Preparedness. Chemical, Biological,

117 Table 4-16. Air Force CBRNE Defense Exercise Requirements

4 CBRNE Minimum Exercise Requirements Threat Area * Annually

t e r Low - Must reflect the most stringent CBRN threats in-place or that assigned expeditionary forces could

P face. Semiannually - Scenario should exercise all functional operations in a CBRNE threat environment and include a h a minimum of one persistent agent attack. Medium C - ANG units require only the minimum number of participants to meet exercise objectives (for example, key players). - ANG is authorized two tabletop exercises annually, with key player involvement. Quarterly - Scenario should exercise all functional operations in a CBRNE threat environment and include a minimum of one persistent agent attack. High - Air National Guard (ANG) units require only the minimum number of participants to meet exercise objectives (for example, key players). - ANG is authorized two tabletop exercises annually, with key player involvement. * Air Force installations within these geographical locations are categorized as CBRNE high, medium or low threat areas based on threats posed by enemy ranges of theater ballistic missiles (TBMs). However, bases also face threats other than missile-delivered weapons, to including infiltrators, witting or unwitting human vectors infected with any contagious BW agent, off-base dispensing of an agent from ground sources, and aerial dispersal from aircraft that remain outside the base perimeter. raining and Doctrine T

Table 4-17. AF Emergency Management Program Exercise Requirements – Installation Exercises ducation, E Type of Category * Remarks Exercise Frequency Munitions Annually Applies only to the munitions at the installation. Radioactive material Annually

) Defense Nuclear weapons Annually** - May not be accomplished by tabletop.

RN - MAJCOMS will determine their installations’ participation requirements. Major Off-base response Annually Exercise should be written with host nation or Accidents local community to allow its participation when possible. uclear (CB

N Mass casualties Annually Exercise must overwhelm the installation’s medical capabilities. Air Show Response As applicable*** HAZMAT Team Annually Exercise HAZMAT substance located on the installation. Terrorist Use CBRNE Incident Two Annually Two CBRNE exercises annually, one of which of CBRNE must be a biological incident. * adiological and Exercise frequency requirements are minimal, and may be increased by the EET chief. R ** CONUS MAJCOM RTF and the OSC exercise at least every other year. The theater commander determines RTF exercise frequency in OCONUS areas. *** CONUS MAJCOM RTF and the OSC exercise at least every other year. The theater commander determines RTF exercise frequency in OCONUS areas. Chemical, Biological,

118 4.4.4 Marine Corps Exercises NBC scenario development, and execution with the combined forces. The following CBRN defense exercises were conducted by Marine Forces Command (MARFORCOM). • The 31st MEU E-NBC Team conducted sensitive 4 site exploitation (SSE) in support of an amphibious • From October through December 2006. CBIRF boat raid in Guam during the Marine Expeditionary

conducted consequence management support in t e r Unit Exercise (MEUEX) 06-1. They also conducted

Exercise Ardent Sentry. P SSE in support of an airfield seizure on Ie Shima • During May 2006, the Chemical, Biological Island, Okinawa, and conducted SSE in support of

Incident Response Force (CBIRF) participated in a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) h a capabilities exercise at Camp LeJeune, NC. operations during MEUEX 06-2. C • 2nd Marine Logistics Group participated in a • Exercise Ryukyu Warrior. The 1st Marine Wing Camp LeJeune–base CBRN antiterrorism/force validated Counter-Chemical Warfare (C-CW) TTP protection exercise during August 2006. during their counter-CBRN defense initiative. The • During August/September 2006, II MEF participated exercise included warning the airfield/base of a in exercise Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) providing the possible chemical attack; and performing CBRN II MEF Combat Operations Center (COC) with a reconnaissance, decontamination operations, zone CBRN Operations Cell. establishment with security personnel, and medical operations in a contaminated environment (casualty • From January through December 2006, the CBIRF movement to medical treatment facility). supported Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) with two CBRN Reconnaissance Teams. raining and Doctrine T • On May 23, 2006, the CBIRF conducted a joint/ 4.4.5 Joint Exercises interagency chemical response exercise at the Pax The United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) River National Academy of Science. and the DTRA have partnered in creating and staffing

the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) CBRNE Support ducation, • On July 13, 2006, the CBIRF Conducted IRF TTX, E a Chemical Explosive Event at Mallinkrodtchem Cell. This cell is tasked to support every combatant Facility, St. Louis,MO. commander (COCOM) exercise in the Chairman’s Exercise Program that has Combating Weapons of Mass The following CBRN defense exercises were conducted

Destruction (CWMD)/CBRNE events included in the ) Defense by Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC): exercise. Historically, this has been two exercises per year RN • Exercise Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and for NORTHCOM and STRATCOM and one exercise per Integration (RSO&I) (March 2006). MARFORPAC year for the remaining COCOMs. Additionally, the cell units participated in this annual U.S. forces/Korea supports mission rehearsal exercises (MRXs), as well as

(USFK) exercise conducting NBCD CBRN planning NATO, the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Proliferation uclear (CB and execution, while exercising the NBC Warning Security Initiative (PSI), and other multinational N and Reporting System using the JWARN software exercises. This support includes creating and refining suite, coupled with the Command and Control training objectives and subtasks for the training Personal Computer (C2PC) software program. audience; developing and refining scenario CBRNE themes; providing CBRNE modeling and simulation • Exercise Ulchi Focus Lens (August 2006). (M&S) products; creating the CBRNE portion of the MARFORPAC units participated in this USFK- ground truth document; creating Joint Master Scenario adiological and R sponsored exercise, including exercising the NBC Event List (JMSEL) injects to support the scenario; and Warning and Reporting Network System using the manning the CBRNE cell in the Joint Exercise Control Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) Group (JECG) during execution. software suite, coupled with the C2PC software program. Within the construct of the exercise Finally, the cell provides CWMD/CBRNE expertise and capabilities of various software, U. S. Marine relating to the Joint Enabling Capability Elimination, Corps units actively engaged in CBRN scenarios, CWMD/CBRNE doctrine, CWMD Joint Innovation Chemical, Biological,

119 and Experimentation, DTRA M&S integration, the experienced an in-flight emergency resulting in Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, Exercise the aircraft crashing short of the runway while on

4 Conference (I/ITSEC), and the OSD CBRNE Education final approach. There was also limited play by local, and Training Integration Council. county, and state officials and first responders. An Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) During 2006, the Joint CBRN Defense Capabilities

t e r for the State of Arizona filled the role of defense Improvement Initiative Team (JCBRN CIIT) continued to

P coordinating officer (DCO). integrate new JCBRN processes and developments into the Joint National Training Capability and Joint Training • ARDENT SENTRY 06: The CIIT supported this

h a System to provide and improve CBRN defense capability exercise with personnel at (1) Michigan with

C to the warfighter. This organization codified a formal JTF-CS and Michigan State White Cell and at (2) working relationship between the JRO-CBRND and the USNORTHCOM HQ. The purpose was to provide Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to improve the current CBRN/CM expertise and input to the respective and emerging joint force warfighting and supporting exercise summary reports. capability in a CBRN environment. Under the JRO- • ARDENT SENTRY/NORTHERN EDGE 07: The CBRND lead, the JCBRN CIIT assisted COCOMs with CBRNE Support Cell supported the Initial Planning CBRN-related tasks/missions in each of the four phases of Conference (IPC), the MDC, and the MPC for this the JTS–Requirements, Plans, Execution and Assessment. exercise. This support included developing and The JCBRN CIIT provided support to three COCOMs: refining scenario CBRNE themes, providing CBRNE the United States Pacific Command (PACOM), United M&S products, creating the CBRNE portion of the States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), and the ground truth document, and creating JMSEL injects United States European Command (EUCOM). raining and Doctrine to support the scenario. T 4.4.5.1 Northern Command (NORTHCOM) 4.4.5.2 Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) • Exercise Vigilant Shield 2007 (VS07) Nuclear Exercise Support Weapons Accident (NUWAX) venue. The CBRNE ducation,

E Support Cell supported the MSEL Development Sudden Response 2006 (SR-06). SR 06 was conducted Conference (MDC), Mid Planning Conference August 14–18, 2006, and was a local JTF-CS exercise (MPC), and Final Planning Conference (FPC) for designed to deploy and employ the Command this exercise. This support included developing and Assessment Element (CAE), validate deployable ) Defense refining scenario CBRNE themes, providing CBRNE communications from the CAE to JTF-CS Main;

RN M&S products; creating the CBRNE portion of the complete a Commander’s Assessment, and complete ground-truth document, and creating JMSEL injects an Operational Order (OPORD) with briefing. The to support the scenario. The CBRNE Support Cell JRO-CBRND observer/trainer team participated in manned the JECG during the execution of this this exercise by providing concept development, MSEL uclear (CB exercise, providing CBRNE expertise that included development, collection plan design, and observer/ N dynamic scripting of scenario and JMSEL injects trainer support. The scenario was a pneumonic plague based upon blue player actions and resolving outbreak in Las Vegas and environs. white cell issues so the impact on blue players was minimal. The JRO-CBRND/CIIT also provided 4.4.5.3 USSTRATCOM WMD Interdiction SME and analytical support to NORTHCOM, the Tabletop Event DTRA, and the Air Combat Command (ACC) adiological and The CIIT provided support to both the USJFCOM and R for this exercise. The NUWAX was led by DTRA the USSTRATCOM during the development of this short and ACC, and was conducted at Davis-Monthan notice event. Within 30 days, the CIIT developed the AFB (DMAFB). The VS07 NUWAX was the first scenario, prepared facilitator questions, built the tabletop time NORTHCOM took operational control of, books, and executed the tabletop. As a result of the employed, and redeployed the ACC Response Task tabletop, USSTRATCOM determined the need to more Force (RTF). The NUWAX scenario involved a actively engage COCOMs to develop a USSTRATCOM Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) that training policy on the issue of combating WMD. Chemical, Biological,

120 4.4.5.4 USJFCOM J9 URBAN RESOLVE 2015 Support Cell manned the JECG during the execution of this exercise, providing CBRNE expertise that included Between February and September 2006, the CIIT

dynamic scripting of scenario and JMSEL injects based 4 provided the only CBRNE consequence management upon blue player actions and resolving white cell issues subject-matter expertise for the nine different iterations so the impact on blue players was minimal. of this experiment to test the integration of subject- matter experts and emerging CBRN tools into JTFs. GLOBAL THUNDER 07: The CBRNE Support Cell t e r Two JRO-CBRND personnel were integrated into the supported the TOW, CDC, and IPC for this exercise. This P experimental JTFs as the only CBRN planners. support included creating and refining training objectives

and sub tasks for the training audience and developing h a

4.4.5.5 Pacific Command (PACOM) initial scenario CBRNE themes. C TERMINAL FURY 07: The CBRNE Support Cell GLOBAL LIGHTNING 08: The CBRNE Support Cell supported the MDC, MPC, and FPC for this exercise. supported the Concept Development Conference (CDC) This support included developing and refining scenario for this exercise. This support included developing the CBRNE themes, providing CBRNE M&S products initial scenario CBRNE themes. creating the CBRNE portion of the ground truth document, and creating Joint Master Scenario Event List 4.4.5.9 Central Command (CENTCOM) (JMSEL) injects to support the scenario. INTERNAL LOOK 07: The CBRNE Support Cell supported the MSEL Development Conference (MDC) 4.4.5.6 European Command (EUCOM) and Final Planning Conference (FPC) for this exercise. This support included refining scenario CBRNE themes, FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 08: The CBRNE Support Cell raining and Doctrine T supported the Concept Development Conference (CDC) providing CBRNE M&S products, creating the CBRNE for this exercise. This support included developing initial portion of the ground truth document, and creating -scenario CBRNE themes. JMSEL injects to support the scenario. The CBRNE Support Cell manned the JECG during the execution of ducation,

this exercise, providing CBRNE expertise that included E 4.4.5.7 Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) dynamic scripting of scenario and JMSEL injects based Fuertes Defensas/PANAMAX 06: The CBRNE Support upon blue player actions and resolving white cell issues Cell manned the JECG during the execution of this so the impact on blue players was minimal. exercise, providing CBRNE expertise that included ) Defense

UNIFIED ENDEAVOR 07-2 Mission Rehearsal Exercise RN dynamic scripting of scenario and JMSEL injects based (MRX): The CBRNE Support Cell supported the upon blue player actions and resolving white cell issues Training Objective Workshop (TOW) for this exercise. so the impact on blue players was minimal. This support included creating and refining training

objectives and subtasks for the training audience. uclear (CB

4.4.5.8 Strategic Command (STRATCOM) N GLOBAL LIGHTNING 07: The CBRNE Support Cell 4.4.5.10 Special Operations Command supported the Training Objective Workshop (TOW), (SOCOM) Concept Development Conference (CDC), Initial ABLE WARRIOR 07-1 and 07-2: The CBRNE support Planning Conference (IPC), MSEL Development Cell supported the MPC for this exercise. This support Conference (MDC), Mid Planning Conference (MPC),

included refining scenario CBRNE themes. adiological and

and Final Planning Conference (FPC) for this exercise. R This support included creating and refining training objectives and subtasks for the training audience, 4.4.5.11 NATO, Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) developing and refining scenario CBRNE themes, Exercises providing CBRNE M&S products, creating the CBRNE portion of the ground truth document; and creating REGIONAL COOPERATION 06: The CBRNE Support JMSEL injects to support the scenario. The CBRNE Cell provided scenario development and modeling support for this exercise. Chemical, Biological,

121 SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE SIMULATION (SEESIM) was last reviewed on January 25, 2006. 06: The CBRNE Support Cell provided scenario • STANAG 2476–Medical Planning Guide for the 4 development and modeling support for this exercise. Estimation of NBC Battle Casualties, (AMedP-8), (Biological), Volume II. AMedP-8 provides the estimates of casualties and remaining operational t e r 4.5 CBRN DEFENSE DOCTRINE strength after a CBRN event in a military (Brigade- P sized) unit during an out-of-area contingency CBRN Defense doctrine exists at the Allied, joint, multi- operation. The estimates consist of the numbers, service and service levels. Initiatives continued through h a injury type, and injury severity of patients in several 2006 that supported efforts to make CBRN defense

C brigade scenarios. Edition 2 Addendum, Ratification doctrine more integrated, relevant, and current. Each Draft 1, was produced by the custodian (U.S.) and service (including National Guard bureau and reserve distributed to the NATO nations for ratification components) has CBRN defense doctrine that supports, in the fall of 2005. Ratification status is currently or is integrated into, the multiservice doctrine/TTP pending. manuals developed by the four Services. The core joint and multiservice, and service-unique CBRN defense doctrine • STANAG 2873–Concept of Operations for Medical publications are listed in Table 4‑18. Support in CBRN Environments, Allied Medical Publications-7, (AMedP-7). AMedP-7 provides guidance for planning CBRN medical operations. 4.5.1 Joint/Coalition Medical This document supports medical planning for Doctrine Initiatives CBRN environments to sustain the force and to raining and Doctrine ensure mission success. It proposes an approach to T The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense delegates CBRN medical defense that places greater emphasis the U.S. Army as the lead agent for the United States on pre-event preparation than postevent response. and serves as the Department of Defense focal point for Ratification Draft 1 of Edition 4, was produced by ducation, the NATO medical, and medical chemical, biological, the custodian (US) and distributed to the NATO E radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) actions. The Office of nations in October 2006 for ratification. the Surgeon General (DASG-HCO) is the lead executive agent for international CBRN activities. The office of the • AMedP-8–Medical Planning Guide for the Estimation Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, designates the OTSG CBRN of NBC Battle Casualties, consisting of three volumes, ) Defense Staff Officer as the U.S. Head of Delegation (HOD) to STANAG 2475, Volume I; STANAG 2476, Volume RN the NATO CBRN Medical Working (CBRN Med WG) II; and STANAG 2477, Volume III; The way-a- and its subgroups and panels. The HOD is responsible head on AMedP-8 has lead to the revision and the for coordinating and developing U.S. positions within proposal to consolidate the three volumes into one the medical CBRN functional area in accordance with document. Study Draft 1 of the revision has been uclear (CB produced and is projected to be circulated to the N the policies and directives established by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and the Assistant nations for review and comment by January 2007. Secretary of Defense for Policy. The U.S. recommended ratification for two NATO The United States achieved significant milestones in its CBRN Medical STANAGs. They include the following: commitment to the continued development of Medical • STANAG 2463 – NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects CBRN Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) and of Defensive Operations, AMedP-6(C), (Chemical, adiological and

R allied publications (APs). They include; Volume III) • STANAG 2242–Policy for the Chemoprophylaxis and • STANAG 2476–Medical Planning Guide for the Immunotherapy of NATO Personnel Against Biological Estimation of NBC Battle Casualties, AMedP-8(B), Warfare Agents. This STANAG developed a unified Volume II approach in NATO doctrine and policy in the use of The following STANAGs / APs were promulgated by the chemoprophylaxis by NATO personnel against BW NATO Standardization Agency during FY06: agents that cause infectious disease. STANAG 2242 Chemical, Biological,

122 Table 4-18. Core CBRN Defense Doctrine

Comment Marine 4 Publication Army Air Force Navy (Status) Corps Joint Publication 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Joint Doctrine • • • • Environments, July 2000 t e r

Joint Publication 3-26, Joint Doctrine for P Joint Doctrine • • • • Homeland Security, August 2005 Joint Publication 4-02, Doctrine for Health

Joint Doctrine • • • • h a Service Support, October 2006

Joint Publication 3-40, Joint Doctrine for C Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, July Joint Doctrine • • • • 2004 Joint Publication 3-41, CBRNE Consequence Joint Doctrine • • • • Management, October 2006 Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Multiservice FM AFTTP NTTP MCWP (MTTP) for NBC Defense of Theater Fixed Sites, Doctrine 3-11.34 (I)3-2.33 3-11.23 3-37.5 Ports and Airfields MTTP for CBRN Contamination Avoidance, Multiservice FM AFTTP NTTP 3- MCRP February 2006 Doctrine 3-11.3 3-2.56 11.25 3-37.2A Multiservice Part of Doctrine Part of Part of 3- MCRP Nuclear Contamination Avoidance AFTTP (FM 3-11.3 3-11.3 11.25 3-37.2B 3-2.56 under revision) raining and Doctrine

MTTP for NBC Aspects of Consequence Multiservice FM AFTTP NTTP MCRP T Management Doctrine 3-11.21 (I)3-2.37 3-11.24 3-37.2C Multiservice FM AFTTYP(I) NWP MCWP MTTP for NBC Defense Operations Doctrine 3-11 3-2.42 3-11 3-37.1

Multiservice FM AFTTP (I) NWP 3- MCWP ducation, MTTP for CBRN Decontamination, April 2006 Doctrine 3-11.5 3-2.60 11.26 3-37.3 E Multiservice FM AFTTP (I) NWP MCWP MTTP for NBC Protection, June 2003 Doctrine 3-11.4 3-2.46 3-11.27 3-37.2 Field Behavior of NBC Agents (including smoke Multiservice AFM FMFM FM 3-6

and incendiaries), November 1986 Doctrine 105- 7 7-11-H ) Defense NBC Field Handbook Army Doctrine FM 3-7 RN Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Multi-Service FM 3- AFTTP(I) NTRP MCRP Compounds, January 2005 Doctrine 11.9 3-22.55 3-11.32 3-37.1B Flame, Riot Control Agent, and Herbicide Multiservice FM MCRP Operations, August 1996 w/ ch1 March 2003 Doctrine 3-11.11 3-3.7.2

MTTP for NBC Vulnerability Assessment, Multiservice FM AFTTP (I) NTTP MCRP uclear (CB December 2004 Doctrine 3-11.14 3-2.54 3-11.28 3-37.1A N Multi-Service FM AFTTP (I) NTTP MCWP MTTP for NBC Reconnaissance Doctrine 3-11.19 3-2.44 3-11.29 3-37.4 Multiservice MTTP for NBC Aspects of Consequence FM AFTTP NTTP MCRP Doctrine (under Management, December 2001 3-11.21 (I)3-2.37 3-11.24 3-37.2C revision) Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team FM

Army Doctrine adiological and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, June 2003 3-11.22 R Multiservice FM AFTTP(I) NTTP MCRP MTTP for Biological Surveillance Doctrine 3-11.86 3-2.52 3-11.31 3-37.1C Army Doctrine FM CBRN Responder Operations Handbook (New Publication) 3-11. 23 CBRN Handbook: SSE and Environmental Recon Army Doctrine FM Operations (New Publication) 3-11.24 Chemical, Biological,

123 Comment Marine Publication Army Air Force Navy (Status) Corps Multi-service 4 MTTP for NBC Defense of Theater Fixed Sites, FM AFTTP (I) NTTP MCWP Doctrine (under Ports and Airfields, September 2000 3-11.34 3-2.33 3-11.23 3.37.5 revision) Multi-Service FM AFTTP(I) NTTP MCWP MTTP for Biological Surveillance, October 2004 t e r Doctrine 3-11.86 3-2.52 3-11.31 3-37.1C

P FM AFTTP Multi-Service NTTP Force Health Protection in CBRN Environment, 4-02.7 3-42.3 MCRP Doctrine 4-02.7 October 2000 (FM 8- AFTTP 4-02.1E (under revision) (Draft) h a 10-7) 3-47.3

C FM AFMAN Treatment of Nuclear and Radiological Multi-Service NTRP MCRP 4- 44-161 Casualties, December 2001 Doctrine 4-02.21 4-11.1B 02.283 (I) AFMAN Treatment of Biological Warfare Agent Casualties, Multi-Service FM 8- NTRP MCRP (I) 44- July 2000 Doctrine 284 4-02.23 4-11.1C 156 Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties Multi-Service FM 8- AFJMAN NAVMED FMFM and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries, Doctrine 285 44-149 P-5041 11-11 December 1995 (under revision) NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Multi-Service AFJMAN NAVMED Defensive Operations (AMedP-6[B]), February FM 8-9 Doctrine 44-151 P-5059 1996 Navy/Marine MTTPs for Recovery Operations in a Chemical Corps Dual NTTP MCWP

raining and Doctrine Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Environment Designated 3-02.1.1 3-37.6 T Doctrine Chemical and Biological Defense NATOPS NAVAIR Navy and Marine (Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures 00-80T- Corps Doctrine Standardization) 121

ducation, NTTP 3- E Surface Ship Survivability Navy Doctrine 20.31 Chapter 470 Shipboard BW/CW Defense and Navy Doctrine NTRP 3- Countermeasures (Under revision) 20.31.470 Guide to Biological Warfare Defense and TM 3-

) Defense Navy Doctrine Bioterrorism – Afloat andA shore 11.1.02

RN Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) NBC Marine Corps MCWP Defense Operations Doctrine 3-37 Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Air Force AFDD Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive Operations Doctrine 2-1.8 Air Force AFPD uclear (CB Emergency Management Doctrine 10-25 N Emergency Management Program Planning and Air Force AFI 10- Operations Doctrine 2501 Air Force AFMAN Emergency Management Program Guidance Doctrine (Draft 10-2502 development) Air Force Emergency Management Program Tactics, AFMAN Doctrine (Draft adiological and Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) 10-2517

R development) Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Conventional Air Force AFMAN Defense Operations and Standards Doctrine 10-2602 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Air Force AFMAN Operations and Standards Doctrine 10-2602 Air Force AFMAN Airman’s Manual Doctrine 10-100 Chemical, Biological,

124 • STANAG 2478–Medical Support Planning for NBC 4.5.3 Marine Corps Environment, Edition 1, February 10, 2006 The Marine Corps participates in the development and • STANAG 2954–Training of Medical Personnel for NBC revision of the doctrinal publications listed in Table 4- 4 Operations, Edition 2, May 12, 2006 18. The Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-37 is the Marine Corps capstone doctrinal publication

The DASG-HCO also oversees doctrine development t e r for Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) NBC Defense to support CBRNE hazards in domestic applications P for the support of the Federal Response Plan and the Operations. National Response Plan. The Army Medical Department Center and School (AMEDDC&S) leads in doctrine and h a development for military medical support for Defense/ 4.5.4 Air Force Doctrine C Military Support to Civilian Authorities (DSCA/ During 2006, the AF Doctrine Center finalized AF Doctrine MSCA). The AMEDD focus is on medical support of Document (AFDD) 2-1.8, Counter-Chemical, Biological, Homeland Defense and Homeland Security consequence Radiological, and Nuclear Operations. This document has management in a CBRNE environment. substantially revised the former AFDD 2-1.8, Counter- Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Operations, dated August 2000. The new document discusses the five AF pillars of 4.5.2 Navy Doctrine proliferation prevention, active defense, counterforce, passive defense, and consequence management. The During FY06, the Navy participated in all multiservice document also introduces the relationship between the doctrine working groups to produce and update the joint Air Force pillars with the three pillars in the National and multiservice CBRN defense doctrinal publications raining and Doctrine

Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction T listed in Table 4-18 above. The Navy was also represented (CbtWMD) (nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and at all FY06 meetings and reviews associated with the consequence management) and the eight mission areas ongoing development of improved NATO STANAGS defined in the National Military Strategy for CbtWMD. and AP. For example, Allied Tactical Publication 3.8.1, AFDD 2-1.8 discusses Air Force capabilities and tenets ducation, Volume 1, Allied Joint Tactical Doctrine for CBRN Defense E supporting each doctrinal pillar. is currently under development by a NATO CBRN doctrine and terminology panel that includes U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives.

4.5.5 Defense Threat Reduction ) Defense The Navy has continued their work in tandem with Agency (DTRA) Doctrine RN the Marine Corps to update existing and produce new doctrine focused on the unique maritime-related As a member of the joint doctrine development requirements of Navy and Marine Corps warfighters. community, DTRA fully participates in the development and/or revision of joint doctrine for CBRN defense. As of October 2005, the Navy updated the CBR- uclear (CB

DTRA voices their views and influences the development N D Navy Mission Essential Task Lists (NMETLs) and of joint doctrine at biannual conferences attended by Personnel Qualification Standards (PQSs) (NAVEDTRA joint staff, combatant commands, all services, as well as 43119-I-Change-2) for Damage Control. The Navy multiservice doctrinal schools and organizations. During Tactical Task List and Surface Forces Training Manual FY06, the DTRA brought its technical capabilities and (SURFORTRANMAN) are in the process of being updated to reflect current PQSs for damage control and practical experience to bear into all joint-doctrine

working groups involved in the development of CBRN adiological and

CBR-D training requirements. R joint doctrine and served as the technical review authority As part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acquisition for the development of JP 3-41, CBRNE Consequence requirements process, and in response to the Global War Management and JP 3-28, Civil Support. The DTRA on Terrorism (GWOT), the Navy is developing doctrine conducted and led a doctrine workshop that served as and acquisition requirements for CBRN at-sea maritime a forum for JS J-5 (WMD), USSTRATCOM, DTRA, interdiction operations. Results will be reported in next USSTRATCOM’s Center for Combating WMD (SCC), year’s report to Congress. Headquarters, Department of the Army, and various Chemical, Biological,

125 offices of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to lay In January 2004, the ASD (HA) directed the services the groundwork for the revision of JP 3-40 Combating to implement initial and sustainment levels of the

4 Weapons of Mass Destruction. Additionally, the DTRA Tri-Service CBRNE training program, incorporating actively participated in the development of JP 3-27 CBRNE Standards of Proficiency. Upon completion Homeland Defense and revision of JP 3-11 Operations of the training, personnel should have the knowledge

t e r in NBC Environments. DTRA also materially influenced and/or training to enable them to perform critical tasks

P the revision of the key doctrine policy document CJCSI needed to meet real-world requirements. The Services 5120.02 Joint Doctrine Development System and selected an on-line, distance-learning strategy utilizing worked with Air, Land, and Sea Applications (ALSA) in the Emergency Medical Preparedness/Response Course h a the development of the multiservice tactics, techniques, (EMPRC) to meet this requirement. As of September 30, C and procedures (MTTPs) for civil support publication. 2006, the services had reported that 85,611 personnel (81% compliance) completed the training. Personnel who did not complete the training during the implementation 4.6 CBRN DEFENSE TRAINING, period ending September 30, 2006 must complete the training before the end of FY07. Personnel who EXERCISES, AND DOCTRINE completed the training will begin sustainment training in ISSUES FY08, completing the training every three years. ISSUE: Need for C-CBRN Education, Training, Program Review: In September 2006, the Tri-Service and Exercises (ETE) focused on airlift and air CBRNE Medical Training Program’s training levels were refueling operations for Air Mobility Command revised based on the lessons learned during the imple­ (AMC) and the Air Force. mentation phase of the program. The original training raining and Doctrine T SOLUTION: The AMC is currently incorporating concept and levels created a distinct division between C-CBRN instruction in Air Mobility Warfare Center education and training. After the review of the program, (AMWC) courses to address the challenges and limitations it was determined that the Standards of Proficiency initial and sustainment training levels should be consolidated into ducation, to air mobility operations in a CBRN-contaminated E environment. Currently, the command teaches seven one level. The revised training program consists of two courses (29 classes per year) and reaches a diverse levels—core knowledge and advanced knowledge—that audience from airmen to general officers. Each block utilize education and training to meet the requirements of instruction is tailored to the specific audience and is of both levels. The concept of the two levels is provided ) Defense designed to foster a better understanding of the effects of below. RN a CBRN event on airlift and aerial refueling operations. (1) Core Knowledge: The core knowledge level provides AMC is also incorporating C-CBRNE education and the necessary education and training to enhance training into courses of instruction throughout the the proficiency of individual and unit/platform

uclear (CB command in 27 other training courses (separate from the skills. This is a level of subject-and-task knowledge N AMWC). AMC is seeking to expand the instruction to a applicable to all DoD medical personnel. This broader USAF audience and to incorporate air mobility– level can be completed through various education specific C-CBRNE events in USAF-level exercises to and training courses, from awareness training to foster a better understanding of the effects of CBRNE sustainment education and training. attack on air mobility operations. (2) Advanced Knowledge: This level is specific training ISSUE: Need for Tri-Service CBRN Defense designed for a service-specific target audience of adiological and R Medical Readiness and Training personnel who require expert-level knowledge SOLUTION: Background: In April 2002, the Defense and abilities. This level can be completed through Medical Readiness Training Institute (DMRTI) was various education and training courses that enable tasked by the Joint Staff and the Assistant Secretary of personnel to perform specific skills/tasks, and Defense for Health Affairs (ASD [HA]) to review the results in specific capabilities at the unit/MTF and/ services’ current CBRNE medical training and develop a or installation. standardized Tri-Service CBRNE training program. Chemical, Biological,

126 Core Knowledge Level: Tri-Service CBRNE Medical to meet identified requirements (e.g., for specific Training Program Standards of Proficiency–Core targeted audiences, disciplines or capabilities). The

Knowledge and answers the question “What do we recommendations generated by this review will be 4 need to do to prevent, protect against, respond to, and staffed to the services using JSAP for concurrence recover from a CBRNE incident?” The standards were prior to submission to the Deputy Assistant Secretary developed based on the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) of Defense/Force Health Protection and Readiness t e r and influenced by the Department of Homeland Security (DASD/FHP&R) via the Force Health Protection P (DHS) Universal Task List (UTL) in consultation with the Council for approval. Currently, requirements for three Toxic Chemical Training Course (TCTC) and 43 Subject disciplines are under review, emergency operations h a Matter Experts (SMEs) throughout the DoD. planners, public health emergency officers, and first C The standards encompass six capabilities and 148 receivers with the goal of submitting recommendations standards targeting all levels and disciplines from to the DASD/FHP&R by the end of FY07. nonmedical, nonsecurity, nonmilitary personnel to ISSUE: Need for an Integrated Process Team (IPT) military medical/health care professionals (physicians, to discuss issues and solutions that will improve nurses, etc.) assigned to the Military Healthcare System the effectiveness of CBRN Defense training and (MHS). The six capabilities include are as follows: education. • Assess Threat Information SOLUTION: The CBD Education and Training • Conduct Extraction & Evacuation Directorate established the Education and Training Integration Council (ETIC) which will allow for • Manage Incident improved communication and a more positive functioning

• Provide Medical Care CBRN Defense Education and Training program across raining and Doctrine T • React to a Hazard the Department. The first ETIC conference took place March 2006 with the next one scheduled for April 2007. • Respond to a Hazard The ETIC is now part of the CBDP OIPT and is now

functioning as the Education and Training Special WIPT, ducation,

Personnel who did not complete the training during the E implementation period ending September 30 , 2006 must under the CBDP OIPT. complete the training before the end of FY07. Personnel ISSUE: Lack of a consistent and standardized who completed the training will begin sustainment system within DoD to educate, train, and training in FY08 and will be required to complete the exercise CBRN Defense. ) Defense sustainment training every three years. RN SOLUTION: The ETIC is in the process of conducting Advanced Knowledge Level: The emphasis for this a congressionally mandated study, HR5122, to address component is on developing plans, guidelines, processes, this issue. Recommendations are due to Congress by and/or procedures to enhance preparedness and respond

October 1, 2007. uclear (CB

effectively to a CBRNE incident. This level requires in- N depth performance-based or application-orientated ISSUE: CBRN Defense Education and Training training for positions or personnel identified by their does not have a central information source. services as requiring specialized knowledge, skills, or SOLUTION: The CBRN Defense Education and abilities to ensure adequate CBRNE medical response Training Directorate created a web site at https://etic. capability. The identified personnel will play a critical jscbis/apgea.army.mil that will provide streamlined role in the response to a CBRNE incident. information for CBRN Defense related issues. This web adiological and R The JRO-CBRND/DMRTI Integrated Concept site will increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the Team (ICT) will identify positions and/or teams that program across the Department. The web site initial require advanced training. Joint staff action processing operation is planned for completion by March 2007. (JSAP) procedures will be used to generate tasking for the services to identify SMEs to participate on a committee that establishes standards of proficiency Chemical, Biological,

127 4 t e r P h a C raining and Doctrine T ducation, E ) Defense RN uclear (CB N adiological and R Chemical, Biological,

128 A n n e x A A ANNEX Contamination Avoidance Programs

Table A-1. Contamination Avoidance Research, Development, & Acquisition (RDA) Efforts

Category Nomenclature Status USA USAF USMC USN - M22 Automatic Chemical Agent Production Joint Joint Joint Rqmt Detector Alarm (ACADA) - Improved Point Detection System (IPDS) Production Rqmt - Improved CAM (ICAM) Production Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt - Joint Chemical Biological Agent Water RDTE Joint* Joint* Joint* Interest Automatic Detectors Monitor (JCBAWM) and Monitors - Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD) RDTE Joint* Joint* Joint* Joint* - CB.37 Chemical/Biological Agent DTO Water Monitor - CB.50 Lightweight Integrated CB DTO Detection - Joint Service Lightweight Stand-off RDTE Joint Joint Joint Joint Stand-Off Detection Chemical Agent and Remote/ Detector (JSLSCAD) Early Warning - CB.73 Threat Agent Cloud Tactical DTO Intercept and Countermeasure (DARPA) - Joint NBC Reconnaissance System RDTE (JNBCRS) --NBCRS/CB Mass spectrometer * Rqmt Rqmt --Joint Service Light NBC * Rqmt Interest Joint Interest NBC Reconnaissance System (JSLNBCRS) - NBC Recon Vehicle (NBCRV) RDTE Rqmt Reconnaissance - JA.40 Chemical Unmanned Ground DTO Reconnaissance (CUGR) ACTD

- AN/UDR-13 Pocket RADIAC Production Rqmt Interest Interest Radiation Detection (Multi-Service - AN/PDR-75 RADIAC Production Rqmt Fielded RADIACs) - AN/PDR-77 RADIAC Production Rqmt Interest - AN/VDR-2 RADIAC Production Rqmt Fielded Joint = Joint Service requirement Joint* = Draft Joint Service requirement Rqmt = Service requirement Interest = Service interest (Requirement may be pending) Rqmt Interest = requirement or interest in sub-product * = Sub-product(s) of a Joint project DTO = Defense Technology Objective (Science & Technology Base Program) RDTE = Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (Advanced Development program)

A-1 AUTOMATIC DETECTORS AND MONITORS

ANNEX A ANNEX FIELDED AND PRODUCTION ITEMS

Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) and Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM) The CAM is a hand held instrument that provides a relative indication of G- and V-type nerve and H- type blister agent concentrations. The CAM uses ion mobility spectrometry (IMS) to detect and identify agents within one minute of agent exposure. A radioactive source ionizes air drawn into the system, and the CAM then identifies chemical threat agents based on the agent’s characteristic ion mobility in the monitor’s drift tube (i.e. cell modules). The ICAM has the same chemical agent detection capability as the CAM but is 300% more reliable, starts up 10 times faster, and its modular design is much less expensive to repair. The ICAM has the additional features of an RS-232 data communications interface, and the ability to be programmed for new/different threat agents. The four pound, 15” long ICAM can be powered either by an internal battery or by an external source through the ICAM’s combination power/fault diagnosis/RS-232 plug. The ICAM may be used for a variety of missions, to include area reconnaissance and area surveillance, monitoring of decontamination operations, and medical triage operations. The ICAM significantly reduces the level and frequency of maintenance vs. CAM without affecting performance. The ICAM sieve pack has double the capacity of two CAM sieve packs, which results in twice the operational life of the ICAM over the CAM. The ICAM significantly reduces operating and sustainment costs associated with the CAM.

M256A1 Chemical Agent Detector Kit The M256A1 kit can detect and identify field concentrations of nerve agents (sarin, tabun, soman, GF, and VX), blister agents (mustard, phosgene oxime, mustard-lewisite, and lewis­ ite), and blood agents (hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride) in both vapor and liquid form in about 15–20 minutes. The kit consists of a carrying case containing twelve Sampler- Detector tickets individually sealed in a plastic lam­nated foil envelope, a book of M8 chem­cal agent detector paper, and a set of instructions. Each detector ticket has pretreated test spots and glass ampoules containing chemical reagents. In use, the operator crushes the glass ampoules to re­ lease reagents, which run down pre-formed channels to the appropriate test spots. The

A-2 presence or absence of chemical agents is indicated through specific color changes on the test spots. The kit may be used to determine when it is safe to unmask, to locate and identify chemical hazards (reconnaissance), and to monitor decontamination effectiveness. In FY05, three major improvements to the unit were delivered. First, the heater was improved to allow for more consistent and reliable test results in all environmental conditions. Secondly, a new A ANNEX commercial source for the blister spot paper was identified and validated to broaden the industrial base for the manufacture of the kits. The third, and perhaps the most significant improvement, was the addition of the Low Volatility Hazard (LVH) Kit, which expands the detection capabilities of the M256A1 to include low volatility liquids and granular-solids. The LVH capability meets an Urgent Need and is currently undergoing further development/ testing to field the LVH as a standard item.

ABC-M8 VGH, and M9 Chemical Agent Detector Paper M8 and M9 paper are dye impregnated papers that change color when exposed to liquid chemical agents or aerosols. 1 These papers cannot detect chemical agents in vapor form. M8 paper comes in 4” x 2 /2” booklets. Each booklet contains 25 sheets of detector paper that are capable of detecting G series nerve agents (GA, GB, GD, and GF), V type nerve agents, and H (mustard) type blister agents. M8 paper can identify agents through distinctive color changes from its original off-white: yellow-orange for G, blue-green for V, and red for H. M8 paper is typically used to identify unknown liquid droplets during chemical reconnaissance/surveillance missions. M9 (SR119) detector paper is rolled into 2-inch wide by 30-feet long rolls on a 1.25-inch diameter core. M9 paper can detect G and V nerve agents, H agents, and L agents but it cannot distinguish the identity of agents. It turns pink or a shade of red when in contact with liquid chemical nerve and blister agents. M9 paper is typically placed on the BDO, equipment, and vehicle exteriors to warn personnel of the presence of a liquid chemical agent.

M18A3 Chemical Agent Detector Kit The M18A3 is manually operated kit that can detect and identify dangerous concentrations of nerve agents (sarin, tabun, soman, GF, and VX), blister agents (mustards, phosgene oxime, mustard-lewisite mixture, phenyl dichloroarsine (PD), ethyl dichloroarsine (ED), and methyl dichloroarsine (MD)), blood agents (hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride), and choking agents (phosgene) in about 1–4 minutes. The kit is also used to confirm results of the M256A1 kit. The M18A3 kit contains a manually operated squeeze bulb and enough colormetric detector tubes, detector tickets, and chemical reagents needed to conduct 25 tests for each agent vapor. The kit also contains a booklet of M8 chemical agent detector paper to detect liquid agents. Agent vapor detection is indicated by the production of a specific color change in the detector tubes. The M18A3 kit is only used by special teams such as surety teams or technical escort personnel.

M272 Water Test Kit The M272 kit is manually operated and can detect and identify hazardous levels of nerve, blister, and blood agents in treated or untreated water resources in about 20 minutes. The kit contains enough detector tubes, detector tickets, a test bottle, and pre-packed, pre-measured test reagents to conduct 25 tests for each agent. The kit also contains simulants used for training. Agent detection in water is indicated by the production of a specific color change in the detector tubes or in the ticket. The M272 was fielded in 1984 and does not meet current lower level detection requirements.

M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm (ACAA) The M8A1 ACAA is a system that continuously samples the air to detect the presence of dangerous concentrations of G and V type nerve agent vapors by employing IMS. This system is being replaced by the ACADA. In the Army, displaced M8A1 systems are being cascaded to lower priority units. The M8A1 ACAA may be employed in a number

A-3 of configurations, but all configurations are built around the M43A1 detector unit and the M42 alarm unit. The config­ urations differ primarily in their mountings and power supplies: ground mounted and battery operated, or mounted 1 1 on a vehicle and powered by the vehicle’s electrical system. The M43A1 detector unit measures 7 /2” x 5 /2” x 11”.

ANNEX A ANNEX 3 Using the battery in ground mounted operations adds another 7 /4” to the height. The M43A1 detector unit will alarm within about 1–2 minutes from exposure to agent. The M42 alarm unit is a remote visual and audible alarm 1 that measures 7” x 4” x 2 /3”. The M42 alarm unit may be placed up to 400 meters from the M43A1 detector unit (connected by wire) to give users warning of an approaching agent cloud.

M90 Automatic Mustard Agent Detector (AMAD) The AMAD is an automatic nerve and mustard agent detector that detects agents in vapor form. This system was purchased in limited quantities in 1993 to meet an urgent need for an automatic mustard agent point detector. It is currently in use by the Air Force. The M90 is similar in size and form to the M8A1.

Chemical Agent Point Detection System (CAPDS), MK 21, MOD1 CAPDS is a fixed system capable of detecting nerve agents in vapor form, using a simple baffle tube ionization spectrometer. Installed in a ship’s upper superstructure level, CAPDS obtains a sample of external air, ionizes airborne vapor molecules, and collects them on a charged plate after eliminating lighter molecules via the baffle structure. When a sufficient mass of ions is collected, a pre-set potential is achieved, and an alarm signal is generated and sent to both Damage Control Central and the bridge. The CAPDS system is being replaced by the MK 26 Mod 0 Improved (Chemical Agent) Point Detection System

Improved (Chemical Agent) Point Detection System (IPDS) The IPDS is a shipboard point detector and alarm that replaces the existing shipboard CAPDS. IPDS uses special elongated ion mobility cells to achieve the resolution necessary to counter false alarms caused by interfering vapors. IPDS can detect nerve and blister agent vapors at low levels, and automatically provide an alarm to the ship. The unit is built to survive the harsh sea environment and the extreme electromagnetic effects found on Navy ships.

M22 Automatic Chemical Agent Detection Alarm (ACADA) The M22 ACADA is a man-portable, point sampling alarm system that provides significant improvement over the capabilities of the M43A1 Detector; it detects and identifies GA, GB, GD, and VX as G-type nerve agents and will detect HD and L as blister agents. The M22 employs IMS to provide concurrent nerve and blister agent detection, improved sensitivity and response time, agent identification capability, improved interferents rejection, exten­ sive built-in test, a data communications interface, and the capability to be programmed for new threat agents. It replaces the M8A1 Alarm as an automatic point detector and augments the CAM as a survey instrument. The ACADA consists of an off- the-shelf non-developmental item (NDI)—the GID‑3 chemical agent alarm. In FY04, enhancements were made to the ACADA to decrease maintenance and increase life expectancy of systems that are operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The ACADA 24/7 version was fielded within the Joint Service Installation Pilot Program in FY03 and early FY04. Additional improvements allow the ACADA 24/7 to detect and identify Toxic Industrial Chemicals that pose a threat to DOD Installations. This variant of the ACADA was fielded in FY04 in support of JPM Guardian programs.

A-4 AUTOMATIC DETECTORS AND MONITORS

RDTE ITEMS A ANNEX

Agent Water Monitors The Joint Chemical Biological Radiological Agent Water Monitor (JCBRAWM) is a cooperative RDTE effort, chartered to develop a detection system that will detect chemical and biological agents in water. The detector will feature multi-agent capabilities, and operate automatically, improving both ease and response time of existing system. The project will accommodate the four services’ requirements. Key Requirements: • Detect, identify, and quantify chemical agents and agents of biological origin in water • Perform monitoring automatically with continuous and batch sampling capabilities • Easy to operate and support in forward areas, austere environments, and limited lighting Description: The Agent Water system will improve current water monitoring and purifying capabilities. It will detect CBR agents at or below harmful levels in water and not false alarm to common interferents. The system will be compact, man- portable and easy to use, and be decontaminated to a negligible risk level.

A-5 Defense Technology Objective (DTO) CB. 37 Chemical/Biological Agent Water Monitor Objectives. This effort will develop system concepts and technologies to meet the service requirement for a Joint Chemical/Biological Radiological Agent Water Monitor (JCBRAWM). The desired capability is for the detection ANNEX A ANNEX and identification of hazardous chemical, biological, and radiological agents in potable water. The system will be capable of processing source (pretreatment, ponds, lakes, rivers, etc.,) and product waters (post treatment verification and distribution quality assurance). It is unlikely that a single technology will be able meet this objective; therefore, the system will most likely consist of two or more integrated technologies that have been optimized to meet a specific challenge. Payoffs. This DTO address Joint Future Operational Capability of Contamination Avoidance: Medical and Environmental Surveillance. The only system currently fielded for the detection of agents in water is the M272 Water Test Kit. This kit has several drawbacks, including an inability to detect biological or radiological agents and a relatively long response time for chemical agents. This kit is difficult to use when in a protective posture and is incapable of autonomous operation, requiring a user to interpret the results. The water monitor developed in this effort will be capable of detecting chemical, biological, and radiological agents. In addition, it will be capable of real-time, autonomous operation, which will allow the system to be used as a true water monitor. In FY01, development of standardized test evaluation protocols was completed and the testing of technologies was initiated. Transition criteria were established based on the JCBRAWM Operational Requirements Document (ORD). A first-generation design for a water monitor system was completed and the breadboard build was initiated. In FY02, the breadboard was completed and surety testing was initiated. In FY03, receiver operator curves (ROC) were established on the breadboard to predict technology performance. In FY04, Milestone A was completed for the biological detection portion of the program. Challenges. The challenges for the system will include a requirement to operate under a variety of environmental conditions, ranging from extremely turbid source water to chemically treated ”clean” water. Experience shows that this will pose a challenge in terms of both agent sensitivity and specificity. The system will also be required to operate in near real time. Research conducted in FY03 based on ROC curve analysis predicts chemical agents will be more difficult than previously assumed. Sensitivity requirements also pose a significant challenge. The requirement is in the parts-per-trillion to parts-per-billion range for chemical agents. Chemical agents undergo chemical changes in water much more quickly than in air. Factor such as hydrolysis will be significant. Biological agents could undergo changes as well, making the detection problem somewhat dynamic. Milestones/Metrics. FY2006: Complete Milestone A for chemical detection portion of program. Conduct utility assessment.

A-6 Integrated CB Detection Capability DTO CB. 50 Lightweight Integrated CB Detection Objectives. This DTO will develop technology to meet the requirements of the Joint Biological Tactical Detection System (JBTDS). The critical path is to demonstrate an overall size of 2 cubic ft and weight of 35 lb, with A ANNEX biological sensitivity of 15 agent containing particles per liter of air (ACPLA) and chemical identification equal to that of the Joint Chemical Agent Detector. This will demonstrate the potential to meet the JMCBD operational requirements. Metrics. This DTO is to demonstrate a capability to detect both biological and chemical aerosols in a 2 cu ft size and 35 lb weight. The biological sensitivity is 15 ACPLA. The chemical identification capability to be equivalent to that of the Joint Chemical Agent Detector. Payoffs. This effort addresses the Joint Future Operational Capabilities for Contamination Avoidance in Biological Early Warning Detection/Discrimination, Chemical Early Warning Identification, and Chemical Detection and Identification. This effort will provide the next generation of smaller, lighter CB detection capabilities, and will be the first to provide an integrated system for chemical and biological capabilities. This DTO addresses the overarching need to reduce the total number of systems out in the battlefield for better logistics. In FY04, tradeoff analysis was completed to identify the best three approaches. In FY06, the project assessed the abilityed of technology to meet JMCBDS requirements. A brassboard was designed and fabrication of brassboards was intiated with fabrication to completed, tested, and evaluated in FY07. Challenges. The major technological challenges are in the biological detection and discrimination to reduce the overall size, weight, and power requirements; integration of chemical and biological capabilities; and integration of the next generation of aerosol collection/sampling technology. The primary focus will be a cost-benefit analysis on the level of discriminate for biological detection and the size and weight of the overall system. The current philosophy is that the higher level of biological discrimination will require a bigger and heavier system. Integration of chemical and biological capabilities will be a challenge due to the fundamental differences in the nature of the materials. Integration of aerosol collection/sampling will be dependent on the availability of technology.

Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD) The JCAD is a fully cooperative joint RDTE effort, chartered to develop a chemical agent detector for a variety of mission requirements and service platforms. The detector will provide warfighters near-real time information on the presence of chemical agents so that miosis or more severe effects can be avoided and not subvert the mission. The project will accommodate the four services’ requirements. Key Requirements: • Small, lightweight detector capable of detecting presence of chemical agent vapors • Capable of de-warning, allowing for rapid reduction of protective postures (Increment 2) • Detect, identify, quantify, and warn of presence of even low levels of nerve, blister, and blood agents in vapor form in aircraft and shipboard interiors (Increment 2) • Capable of being modified to detect future agents

A-7 Description: JCAD will provide a detector or a network of detectors capable of automatically detecting, identifying, and quantifying chemical agents (nerve, blister, and blood) inside aircraft and ANNEX A ANNEX shipboard interiors. The device must be sufficiently sensitive to warn aircrews before accumulation, over the entire mission, of levels of agent that may cause miosis or more severe effects. JCAD will also provide hand-held monitoring capabilities, protecting the individual soldier, sailor, airman, and marine through the use of pocket-sized detection and alarm. The requirements are for the detector to be considerably smaller (within 40 cubic inches) and lighter (2 lbs. or less) than the ACADA and to be configurable for a variety of applications, such as individual soldier detectors, post-attack monitoring, shipboard chemical agent monitoring, special operations forces applications, and aircraft interior detection. JCAD Increment 1 will be fielded beginning in December 2007.

STAND-OFF DETECTION AND REMOTE/EARLY WARNING

FIELDED AND PRODUCTION ITEMS

AN/KAS-1/1A Chemical Warfare Directional Detector (CWDD) This is a semi-portable system designed to detect nerve agent vapor clouds at ranges up to five kilometers. The AN/ KAS-1/1A must be removed from its stowage case and set up on a pre-installed ped­stal for operation. A trained, diligent oper­tor must manually aim the detector at the suspect cloud and interpret its infrared images to determine whether or not the cloud contains nerve agent vapors. The AN/KAS-1A provides a remote video display, an enhanced capability for vapor cloud analysis, and a remote relative bearing indicator useful for avoiding the agent cloud or other surface target with a thermal signature.

M21 Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL) The M21 RSCAAL is an automatic scanning, passive infrared sensor that detects nerve (GA, GB, and GD) and blister (H and L) agent vapor clouds based on changes on the infrared spectrum caused by the agent cloud. It is effective at line-of-sight distances of up to five kilometers. The alarm is used for surveillance and reconnaissance missions in both vehicle-mounted and tripod-mounted modes. The M21 is no longer in production.

STAND-OFF DETECTION AND REMOTE/EARLY WARNING

RDTE ITEMS

Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector (JSLSCAD) Key Requirements: • Automatically detect nerve, blister, and blood agents at standoff distances up to 500 meters

A-8 • Lightweight and employed from manned and unmanned systems • Capable of being data-linked with centralized hazard information data collection center

• Capable of remote operations; aerial and on-the-move operation A ANNEX Description: The JSLSCAD requirement is to be capable of scanning 360° x 60°, and automatically detecting nerve or blister agents at a distance up to 500 m. The system will be light, compact and operate from a stationary position or on-the-move. The JSLSCAD Michelson interferometer em­ ploys a passive infrared system that will detect presence of chem­cal agents by completing a spectral analysis of target vapor agent chemical clouds. JSLSCAD is envisioned for employment on various platforms and in various roles, including fixed site defense, unmanned aerial vehicles, tanks and other vehicles, and on board ships. Among the vehicle platforms will be the STRYKER NBCRV and JSLNBCRS.

CB.73 Threat Agent Cloud Tactical Intercept and Countermeasure Objectives. This DTO will develop and demonstrate technologies to achieve high confidence standoff detection of chemical and biological agent clouds and use that information to locate the cloud and remove it from the air in real time. The integration of the detection and countermeasure technologies into the Threat Agent Cloud Tactical Intercept and Countermeasure (TACTIC) system will enable active response to the attack by agents of chemical or biological warfare. The TACTIC system will protect military forces downwind from the threat cloud, the agents’ lethal effects, and minimize or eliminate the need to decontaminate vehicles and equipment. Payoffs. Enabling military personnel to respond actively and in real time to the presence of threat agents will greatly reduce the effectiveness of such attacks. The system will enable the maintenance of high tempo military operations even in the presence of chemical or biological warfare agent clouds. The ultimate payoff, upon development of a highly efficient system, is the removal of the chemical and biological threat from the battlefield. Challenges. Development of the technologies for assured identification of aerosolized agent in a one minute timeframe at standoff distances of 10km and the countermeasure of an entire 105 m3 cloud at levels >104 in 5 minutes. Development of an accurate system model that can predict the applicability of the system to open-air challenges against CWAs and BWAs. Integration of the detection and countermeasure components into a prototype that demonstrates accurate detection and efficient countermeasure. Integration of these subsystems with a delivery platform with minimal logistics burden to produce a prototype operational system. Milestones/Metrics. FY2006: Demonstrate high efficiency countermeasure of chemical and biological agent simulants in static aerosol test chambers. Demonstrate accurate correlation between system model and aerosol chamber test results. FY2007: Demonstrate integration of detection and countermeasure subsystems into a prototype system. Demonstrate the joint detection and countermeasure of chemical and biological agent simulants in flowing-air test chambers with the prototype system.

A-9 NBC RECONNAISSANCE

ANNEX A ANNEX FIELDED AND PRODUCTION ITEMS

M93 NBC Reconnaissance System (NBCRS) The M93 NBC Reconnaissance System, known as the FOX, is a high mobility armored vehicle capable of performing NBC reconnaissance on primary, secondary, and cross country routes throughout the battlefield. The NBCRS was procured as a Non-Developmental Item and is capable of detection, warning and sampling the effects of NBC weapons and is used as a reconnaissance vehicle to locate, identify and mark chemical and nuclear contamination on the battlefield. The M93 FOX usually accompanies the scouts or motorized reconnaissance forces when performing its NBC mission. The NBCRS has an overpressure filtration system that permits the crew to operate the system in a shirt sleeve environment, which is fully protected from the effects of NBC agents and contamination. It utilizes a secure communications system to warn follow-on forces. Samples gathered are forwarded to the Theater Area Medical Laboratory for further analysis and verification. The mobility platform is a six wheeled all wheel drive, armored combat vehicle capable of cross-country operation at speeds up to 65 MPH. The Fox System is fully amphibious and is capable of swimming speeds up to 6 MPH. Sixteen M93 NBCRS are fielded with Army and Marine Corps forces.

M93A1 – FOX NBC Reconnaissance System (NBCRS) The Block I Modification M93A1 NBCRS contains an enhanced and fully integrated NBC sensor suite consisting of the M21 RSCAAL, MM1 Mobile Mass Spectrometer, CAM/ICAM, AN/VDR-2, and M22 ACADA. The NBC sensor suite has been digitally linked with the communications and nav­ igation subsystems by a dual-purpose central pro­ cessor system known as MICAD. The MICAD processor fully automates NBC Warning and Reporting functions and provides the crew com­ mander full situational awareness of the Fox’s NBC sensors, navigation, and communications systems. The M93A1 FOX is also equipped with an advanced position navigation system (GPS & ANAV) that enables the system to accurately locate and report agent contamination. The NDI mobility platform is a six wheeled, all wheel drive armored vehicle capable of cross-country operation at speeds up to 65 MPH. The Fox System is also fully amphibious and is capable of swimming at speeds up to 6 MPH. It is used as a reconnaissance vehicle to locate, identify, and mark chemical agent and nuclear contamination on the battlefield. The FOX usually accompanies the scouts or motorized reconnaissance forces when performing its NBC mission. The M93A1 FOX NBCRS is fielded worldwide with U.S. Army and Marine Corps forces. In 2006, 17 M93A1 were outfitted with improved armor and weaponry for use in current conflicts. These vehicles are used for convoy escort as well as the normal NBC reconnaissance mission.

A-10 NBC RECONNAISSANCE

RDTE ITEMS A ANNEX

Stryker NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV) The Stryker NBCRV will incorporate enhanced chemical and biological detectors that will allow on-the-move standoff chemical agent vapor detection (i.e., JSLSCAD). The NBCRV integrates a biological agent detector with detection, identification and sampling capabilities equivalent to or greater than the JBPDS. CB agent detection capability is added through the Chemical Biological Mass Spectrometer (CBMS), which improves the detection and identification of liquid agents. Integration of common NBC technical architecture will facil­ itate low-cost expansion/upgrading of on-board computers. Stryker NBCRVs Program with enhanced CB Sensor Suites will be used to equip the Army’s future Brigade Combat Teams. Initial NBCRV platforms began fielding in 2006 to Army Brigade Combat Teams to complete testing and evaluation.

Joint Service Light NBC Reconnaissance System (JSLNBCRS) Key Requirements: • Stand-off and point detection from vehicle mounted or dismounted operations • Chemical standoff detection • Detection while on-the-move capability from speeds of 0–45 kph • Biological point detection and identification • A dismountable, handheld, self-contained chemical point detection capability • Radiological detection capability (vehicle mounted or dismounted operations) • Collective protection • Environmental Conditioning Unit capable of providing climate conditioning for the crew and equipment • Overpressure protection from all known agents Description:

The JSLNBCRS will provide a premiere vehicle for accurate, rapid NBC combat hazard information by ver­fying the absence of, finding, mapping, and marking radiological, biological, and chemical hazards. Two variants, the HMMWV and the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) are planned and will house the same equipment. Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) and Air Force CBRN defense forces will receive the LAV variant, while U.S. Army Light Contingency Forces and Air Force CBRN defense forces will operate the HMMV variant. In addition, dismounted reconnaissance capability will be fielded. This will include modularized, networked and wireless sensors that enhance full spectrum reconnaissance, including Toxic Industrial Chemicals.

A-11 DTO JA.40 CBRN Unmanned Ground Reconnaissance (CUGR) ACTD Objectives. The CUGR ACTD will exploit Next Generation Sensor (NGS) technology to demonstrate an improved CBRN contamination detection capability in the current manned reconnaissance capabilities and demonstrate the ANNEX A ANNEX military utility of CBRN unmanned ground reconnaissance systems. These capabilities will improve the speed of traditional zone, area, and route reconnaissance, as well as provide unmanned and restricted terrain reconnaissance. CUGR ACTD technologies will permit future NBC Reconnaissance assets to keep pace with maneuver forces on the battlefield, extend protection for both the mounted and dismounted forces and permit rapid maneuver to exploit our superior technology. The ACTD will develop supporting Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) for employment of the technology applications (Manned and Unmanned Ground Reconnaissance). The CUGR ACTD addresses the JRO-CBRND Joint Future Operational Capabilities (JFOCS) of NBC Reconnaissance, Chemical/Biological Standoff Detection and Point Detection. Payoffs. The end-goal of the CUGR ACTD is to provide an advanced sensor suite for near rear-time CBRN detection, sampling, and identification for manned and unmanned platforms. These new CBRN reconnaissance systems will increase the pace of operations and maneuver. In addition, the ACTD will introduce Raman technology with the Joint Contaminated Surface Detector (JCSD) in the manned reconnaissance vehicles. The JCSD can detect Chemical Warfare Agents (CWAs), Toxic Industrial Chemicals/Toxic Industrial Material (TICs/TIMs) and Non- Traditional Agents (NTAs). This system will not degrade existing CBRN sensors on the JSLNBCRS. CUGR ACTD technologies will provide detection capability to investigate urban terrain and integrate NBC detection while keeping crews/systems out of the contamination and minimizing the exposure to hostile direct fire weapons. Challenges. Significant progress has been made in both the biological and chemical standoff detection arenas. Despite this, significant challenges remain in terms of developing a cost-effective approach for accurate surface contamination detection and identification, and real-time detection algorithms. The CBRN Unmanned Ground Vehicle (CUGV) challenge includes the aforementioned plus integration of select CBRN/TIM sensors onto small robotic platforms. Milestones/Metrics. Conducted JCSD technical and operational demonstrations on CBRN Recon Platforms; conducted CUGV prototype integration with CBRN sensors and completed technical and operational demonstrations; developed draft Concept of Operations (CONOPS); Developed Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) and Training Support Packages (TSPs) for the JSCD and CUGV and operational demonstration. FY2007: Initiate residual Support phase with 2 CUGV to the 95th Chemical Company. Continue JCSD software and hardware hardening and CUGV sensor integration; conduct technical and operational demonstrations; continue CUGV sensor integration; continue refinement of CONOPs, TTPs, and TSPs. FY2008: Complete Military Utility Assessment; finalize CONOPs, TTPs, TSPs; complete Transition Readiness Level assessment; complete ACTD residual phase; support milestone decisions, document lessons learned and publish ACTD closeout report.

A-12 RADIATION DETECTION

FIELDED AND PRODUCTION ITEMS A ANNEX

AN/VDR-2 The AN/VDR-2 measures gamma dose rates from 0.01 µGy/hr (micro- gray per hour) to 100 Gy/hr (gray per hour) and beta dose rates from 0.01 µGy/hr to 5 cGy/hr. The unit functions simultaneously as a dose rate meter and dose meter with independent adjustable alarms that can be set at any level over the entire range. Dosage data is independently stored in non- destructive memory for display on command and may be retained when the unit is turned off. The unit is powered by three 9 volt batteries.

AN/PDR-75 Radiation Detection, Indication and Computation (RADIAC) Set The AN/PDR-75 measures dose from 0 to 999 cGy. The RADIAC Set consists of a dosimeter and a reader. It provides the capability to monitor and record the exposure of individual personnel to gamma and neutron radi­tion. Each individual will be issued a DT‑236/dosimeter. This device, worn on the wrist, contains a neutron diode and a phosphate glass gamma detector. When a determination of exposure is required, the dosimeter is inserted into a CP‑696/PDR-75 reader, which then displays the cumulative neutron and gamma dose. The reader is issued at the company level and the dosimeters are issued to all combat, combat support, and combat service support personnel. The reader can be powered by a BA-5590 lithium battery, vehicle battery, or external power supply via adapter cables provided.

AN/PDR-77 RADIAC Set The AN/PDR-77 RADIAC Set is a set of portable radiation detection equipment for detecting alpha, beta, gamma, and x-ray radiation. The set consists of a radiacmeter to which one of three radiation probes can be attached for measuring particular types of radiation. The probes are part of the set. An extension kit, commonly referred to as the Radiation Safety Officer kit, is available for the AN/PDR-77 that includes a beta-gamma pancake probe and a low- level gamma (or micro-R) probe. The set includes accessories and basic test and repair parts for unit maintenance including a carrying pouch with shoulder straps capable of holding the radiacmeter, alpha probe, and beta/gamma probe for field use. The entire set is contained in a carrying case (large briefcase) for easy portability and storage.

AN/UDR-13 Pocket RADIAC The AN/UDR-13 Pocket RADIAC is a compact, hand-held, tactical device capable of measuring the gamma dose-rate and gamma and neutron cumulative dose in a battlefield environment. Its pocket size permits convenient use by troops on foot. Alarm pre-sets are provided for both the dose-rate and total dose modes. A push-button pad enables mode selection and functional control. Data readout is by liquid crystal display. It replaces the obsolete IM-93 quartz fiber dosimeter and the PP-1578 Dosimeter Charger.

A-13 AN/PDQ-1 Multi-Function RADIAC /RADIAC Detector Group OA-9449 The AN/PDQ-1 RADIAC Set (MFR) consists of an IM-265/PDQ RADIAC Meter, an operator’s manual, headset, carrying strap, spare batteries and the CY- ANNEX A ANNEX 8716/PDQ carrying case. The OA-9449/PDQ RADIAC Group consists of DT- 680/PDQ Gamma-Beta Probe, connecting cable assembly and CY-8717/PDQ carrying case. As a stand-alone instrument, the IM-265/PDQ measures gamma radiation using an internal gamma probe. When connected to ancillary probe DT-680/PDQ it will measure beta and gamma radiation.

IM-270/PD Self-Indicating Casualty Dosimeter The Self Indicating Casualty Dosimeter (SICD) IM-270/PD is an electronic dosimeter designed to replace the DT- 60/PD Casualty Dosimeter and the accompanying CP-95/PD Reader for use during a nuclear event for forces afloat personnel. It provides real-time measurement and indication of personnel dose and does not require a separate reader to evaluate the dose. It measures radiation dose from exposure to x-rays and gamma rays both pulsed and continuous. The total dose is instantly displayed on a LCD screen. The dynamic range of the dosimeter is from 10 – 1000 cGy in increments of 5 cGy. Any dose less than 10 cGy will be displayed as zero. The dosimeter is designed in a wristwatch style with a Velcro wristband of adjustable length to accommodate different wrist sizes (with over garments). Battery life of the IM-270/PD is approximately 10 years.

Electronic Personal Dosimeter The Electronic Personal Dosimeter (EPD) is a commercial off-the-shelf dosimeter for individual wear. It replaces the IM-9/PD, IM-135/PD, IM-143/PD, and DT- 60/PD at Navy shore facilities. The Navy and Air Force use the EPD for first responders, such as firefighters and emergency medical personnel. The EPD can provide real-time beta and gamma radiation exposure and dose rate information over a broad range (0.01 mSv (millisievent) to 16 Sv (sievent) and 0.01 mSv/hr to 4 Sv/hr dose rate). These dosimeters have adjustable audible and visible alarms for dose and dose rate, and hardware and software for tracking and collecting exposure data. The Air Force personnel monitoring program is certified by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accredited Program.

ADM-300A Multifunction Survey Meter The ADM-300A is a battery-operated, self-diagnostic, multi-function instrument. It is used alone to locate and measure low and high intensity radioactivity in the form of gamma rays or beta particles. It is used with external probes to locate and measure alpha, beta, gamma, and x-rays, and neutron radiation.

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Contractor Logistics Logistics worldwide.Contractor sites T S , the X the , and PACand ervice ervice T he acquis he 31E2 B DS S n D he JP he M ervices, and pr (interrogating and broadly cat n su evelopmentaland S sor suite detects and presumptivelyide and detects suite sor 31A1 B 31A1 ) (see separate description below), the Force XX Force the below), description separate (see ) ystems to the 375th Chemical Company began in June 2003 and was completed in completed was and 2003 June in Companybegan Chemical 375th the to ystems m M ables. I S nstallation Pilot Project (J Project Pilot nstallation IDS has been deployed to a total of ten sites in Northeast Asia and 12 sites in the in sites 12 and Asia Northeast in sites ten of total a to deployed been has 96 Portable, the X Portable,the 96 OM i IDS T tion stra tion s IDS he system successfullyattainedsystem he have been fielded to various Chemical Companies since 2006. As of sible fiel sible T theaters of operation to mai to operation of theaters DS Company, 13th Chemical (P3 S he JP he n ervice bi ervice to the 7th Chemical Company,Chemical 7th the to Ft.in Polk, Louisiana, in wascompleted sors sors to increase probability of detecting a biological wa M collector, Biological Aerosol Warning M o viding greater logistic su viding greater logistic ass 31E2 B t S S collection egy allows for signi for allows egy T system consists of a variable number of bi of variablenumber a of consists system ervice designated platforms.designated ervice d O S he sensor is modular in design and can detect and presu and detect can and design in modular is sensor he S ing of these systems to meet urgent requir urgent meet to systems these of ing tryker and J and tryker S DS pe perational testing has been completed.been has testing perational o upport and managed byJPE managed and upport logical logical detection system used to protect high value fixed assets. c VDR IDS . tro n T M (capturing sa (capturing tains several tec IDS he previously deployed fleet was upgraded worldwide in worldwide upgraded was fleet deployed previously he m 97 . tocontinuethrough FY13. Fieldingisscheduled 2), which provides an integrated chemical, biological and eter (CB eter ( e m S gorizing gorizing the contents of the aerosol), M SI helter,X the mand post computer (CPC). S 31E2). PP) sites for a one year pilot test. pilot year one a for sites PP) LNBC warning I S n addition the system has a chemical sensor inter f upport pe upport icant economies throughout the throughout economies icant MS n m p T RS MSIII tain and sustain equipment.sustain and tain n I ), h ples of the suspect aerosol for systems and systems for aerosol suspect the of ples (pr por his B his ), began fielding at Ft. Hood, tifies ten BW agents simultaneously in less in simultaneously agents BW ten tifies nol ). M M t T o ini-FlowCytometer, Biological the and o ability in joint ope and systems weresystems and provided support to vi IDS he system may be operated locally or locally operated be may system he 98 T gies, including the Ultr r d so he detection suite is common across common is suite detection he ing visual and audible alert to local to alert audible and visual ing O S model utilizes the Joint Biological JointBiological the utilizes model n hipboard, and the X the and hipboard, nel are on-site at these deployed these at on-site are nel -CB i.e. I M S Battle Command, Brigade and Brigade Command, Battle ensor (BAWensor 31A1 B 31A1 , JP , D . S S and B and ystem consumables wereconsumables ystem T o T logical sensors forming forming sensors logical he upgrades enable JP enable upgrades he he CPC communicates IDS e ments, as well as the as well as ments, r ations. was the expedited the was S IDS ide ) U ) r I fare attack while I n FY03 the JP the FY03 n n FY03/04 JP FY03/04 n n a P31), is more is P31), M RD V T violet Aerosol tification M T exas and was 31E2 JBP trigger, and he modular 102 A process, A m O T ptively ctober (pro railer DS S S S ­ ­

end of FY06, over 200 JBP Companies.Chemical provide monitoring. forBW attack in FY07. identific fle T o date over1700 date o x ibi l ity needed to improve the system co a tion, inform D FUs have been fielded to units, sites (including six J six (including sites units, to fielded havebeen FUs a T tion pr he Navy is also currently installing and operating JBP operating and installing currently also is Navy he DS o systems have been fielded to the ce s dniid fe te ovninl n atrx errs atcs n 2001. in attacks development was terrorist originally funded through the anthrax and conventional the after identified JBP as such systems detection robust more for need or role the replace not does and to flexible.extremely and inexpensive,factor, is concentration Chain Polymerase and/or external ambient air samples for subsequent analysis using Hand Held Assays (HHA) T Dry FilterUnit(DFU) Urgent Need Urgent ( Commander’s needs in support of support in Commander’sneeds sing, sciences. andengineering D he E R D F). ry ry Filter Unit is a stand-alone collector that can be used to collect internal and DS , JP , I n n FY 2003 it was further procured and fielded based on an Umbrella an on based fielded and procured further was it 2003 FY n ti n­ S S and B and ously with the latest advances in the bi tatement by the Joint the by tatement IDS . T R he system was developed in response to critical needs critical to response in developed was system he eaction (PC eaction S ervices and ervices over 70 additional systems will be fielded O peration R I 35 of Fielding opnn o the of component JBP November in 2003. completed was and 2003 Capability was the and 375 Equipped Unit produced. and developed jointly confi trailer commercial T on operational fully R JBP eight of network a of part deployedas was Homeland the O equirement ntegrated ntegrated SI R hese H hese go o Nvme 2, 01 n was and 2001 28, November on egion ne modular design variant, referred to as to variant,referred design modular ne ) assays.) PP sites), ships, and select U. select and ships,sites), PP DS DS DS s urnl big ile a a as fielded being currently is Capital National the in systems I T D systems on surface ships.the surface of on At systems raqi Freedom and other initiatives.other and Freedom raqi DTR e hle cniuain f the of configuration shelter he efense Emergency D I t is simple, has an exceptional an has simple, is t etection O o systems were deployed in a in deployed were systems logical detection,logical collection, ffice to support Combatant support to ffice D M efense 12 JBP 31E2 M S th 12 B 31E2 D I ystems began in June Chemical Company. t is complementary complementary is t I cme 3 2001. 3, ecember nitial g T ur alr (H railer R a DS in ht was that tion IDS esponse Fund O Biological Biological S perational to Army to . cities to cities . T he First First he S DTR ystem ), B-3

ANNEX B B-4 ANNEX B Joint BiologicalTactical DetectionSystem(JBTDS) RDTE ITEMS MONITORS AND AUTOMATICDETECTORS DOD BiologicalSamplingKit Concurrently, baseactivitiesare beingmonitored tech toleverage detectiontechnologies. and/oraccelerate critical a and FY05 wereforces.in initiatedactivities foot-mobile byPre-milestone and JB process. detection-to-alarm the in intervention manual for permit to or automatically warn to flexibility the have requirements. application. remote and site fixed in flexibility providemaximum to interfaces wireless hardwireand both include networkwill disabling the detectors on the network and tracking information generated within the network. resetting,remotelyand of enabling consist will network.capability the Control within generated information track and detectors the control to able being while more) or (three detectors arrayed the from data receiving of capable of acting in two modes: agent detector mode and/or a command module. a biological war of probability the increase capabilities. isolation sample and T Description: Key Requirements: • • • he JB he TDS

Be field upgradeable to detect new and/or additional biological threat todetectnewBe fieldupgradeable agents and/oradditionalbiological network andreporting Capable intowarning ofbeingintegrated Lightweight detectionsystem biological will be employed remotely or in an unattended configuration, on platforms to include vehicles, aircraft, vehicles, include to platforms on configuration, unattended an in or remotely employed be will TDS will be developed to provide warfighters a lightweight sensor with biological agent detection, warning warning detection, agent biological with sensor lightweight a warfighters provide to developed be will T he required throughput of the system will be consistent with the alert data exchange and archiving archiving and exchange data alert the with consistent be will system the of throughput required he T he sample isolation feature will collect and preserve a sample for evacuation and analysis. JB stored at 4ºC, hasaone-timeuseonly capability, andisnotfordiagnosticuse. interactive,multimediaC training card.instruction swabs,tipped cotton and buffersolution basic of a bottle and a containing tube capped high fairly in released been has agent concentrations. BW a suspected is it where areas indoor for with the manufacture or delivery of BW agents; or as a contamination identification kit associated be might that materials weapons or laboratory terrorist suspect screening screening envelopes or packages that display suspicious liquids, powders or suspensions; scree field identification capability for BW agents in environmental samples and are employed for: T n he ing personnel and reduce the probability of false alarm. Each JB Each alarm. false of probability the reduce and personnel ing T DOD he detector will be networked to provide a cooperative detection capability to capability detection cooperative a provide to networked be will detector he n Biological Biological ing suspect munitions or munitions fragments for presence of BW agents; BW of presence for fragments munitions or munitions suspect ing T T he raining DOD S ampling Kit, with its associated HHAs, provides a presumptive a providesHHAs, associated its with Kit, ampling DOD Biological Biological Biological Biological D - ROM S ampling Kit contains a panel of 8 HHAs,blue-8 a of panel a contains Kit ampling . S T ampling Kitsare also available as well asan he DOD M ilestone A is scheduled for FY07.for ilestone scheduled is A Biological Biological T he command modulewillbe T S ampling Kit mustKit be ampling TDS he capabilities of the will be capablebe will TDS will Joint BiologicalStandoffDetectionSystem(JBSDS) Biological Remote/Early Warning RDTE ITEMS REMOTE/EARLYWARNING AND DETECTION STAND-OFF FY11. MOT requirements, andsize. Description: Key Requirements: • • •

O D D &E will be complete in FY07 and with a FUE in 4QFY07. A iscriminate biological clouds from non-biological cloudsat 1km cloudsfrom non-biological biological iscriminate aerosol cloudsoutto5km etect andtrack perationally eye andskinsafe T people willhave totakepost-attack medicaltreatments. they become exposed to the biological warfare agents. This means that fewer people will become casualties, faster,attackbiologicalmuch a and to react fewer pr take to thereby personnel manyallowingmore a significantly decisioncycle shortened r program(JBSDS) JointSystem inten The Detection is BiologicalStandoff e JB he SDS

I ncrement II il nrae estvt, ag, n rlaiiy wie euig egt power weight, reducing while reliability, and range, sensitivity, increase will e garding biological attacks; that is, the commander will see and be able to T Y3 A FY03. Qualification I ttoay mode. stationary infcn conce significant iciiae (1 discriminate oe n wl b fedd o l four all to fielded be will and move on-the- operating while scanning degree 360 provide opera I U.the to fielded be demand urgent an Jointa in identified to response in developed being ncrement 1 JB 1 ncrement ncrement 1 JB he JB he MS t n fo fxd ie o mbl pla mobile or sites fixed from ing SDS B for the next generation system is planned for M uses an uses lsoe ws opee i FY04. in completed was C ilestone d ed to give the warfightinggivethe commander to ed T s drn F0 ad a and FY03 during est SDS SDS

m arsl lus t operationally at clouds aerosol km) n trations. T provides scanning while 120 degree underwent a combined Production combined a underwent S S IR e et eeain ytm will system generation next he . U.the Armyand taff /U S V tatement of Urgency and will and tatementUrgency of o tective measures beforetectivemeasures T laser to detect (5 detect to laser he I ceet JB 1 ncrement S . Force.Air M S lsoe in B ilestone ervices. t om i a in forms

km) and km) SDS T T T is he he he B-5

ANNEX B B-6 ANNEX B DTO CB. 35StandoffBiologicalAerosolDetection the feasibility of the demonstrated technology to meet chemical standoffdetectionrequirements. tomeetchemical the feasibilityofdemonstrated technology FY2006: Milestones. existwithrespect tosensitivity,challenges specificity, rates, false alarm anddaytime operations. detection. biological to respect Challenges. initiated. testing. detection biological for initiated I S downselect. support wereto maturity,dataconcerns,generated operational platform,conducted. was Experimental cost and logistics, performance, including criteria weighted on based technologies candidate of downselection and users, S T used on various platforms for the purpose of air or ground biological reconnaissance and contamination avoidance. detection, discrimination, and location of biological aerosol clouds. Payoffs. nighttime operations toincludedaytime operations. onlyfrom system the of usability the expand to and km 1 1000 of of range sensitivity ACPLAa ata weekfor per Metrics. concentrations. detection capability biological to both aerosoldetect and biological discriminate clouds at operationally significant Objectives. Warning nduced Fluorescence.nduced cattering/ tandoff echnology developed under this effort is intended to address operational requirements of the Joint Biological Biological Joint the of requirements operational address to intended is effort this under developed echnology

D

D T D

T etection etection/ his D emonstrate the optimized system performance to detect and discriminate biological agents.Evaluate biological discriminate and detect to performance system optimized the emonstrate he system enhancements for standoff biological aerosol detection is to reduce the false alarm rate to one D

ifferential Absorption Lidar,LWPassive ifferential Absorption

T S ownselected technologies include long-wave and mid-wave infrared (LW DTO his ignificant progress has been made recently in both active and passive standoff detection arenas with DTO S drse Jit Future Joint addresses D ystem. iscrimination iscrimination and I n FY03, modifications and laboratory characterization of seven breadboard systems weresystems breadboardseven of characterization laboratory and FY03,modifications n will develop and demonstrate technology by the end of FY05 for an advanced standoff advanced an for FY05 of end the by technology demonstrate and develop will I n FY02, system performance parameters weren FY02, parameters establishedsystem performance through coordinationwith D espite this, significant challenges remain. this,challenges espite significant I dentification. I F0, il evrnet aa olcin n h bedors was breadboards the on collection data environment field FY04, n O eainl aaiiy otmnto viac: ilgcl Early Biological Avoidance: Contamination Capability perational IR T he development of this technology would permit the rapid

S pectroscopy,and T his technology would also be capable of being I S n addition to size,to addition weight,n power,and pectral R IR esolution Ultraviolet Laser Ultraviolet esolution and M W IR ), D ifferential CB.70 FemtosecondAdaptiveSpectroscopyTechniques forRemote AgentDetection FY2006: Milestones/Metrics. standoff rangeof3km. a at retroreflectors without detection agent remote of demonstration a to leading technologies the of maturationthe and km 3 of range standoff a at retroreflectors using range test outdoor instrumented an on experiment an pulse.4) the of intensity sequence,and D high-fidelity pulse shaping to deliver the pulse shape at the target through a dispersive and scattering atmosphere. 3) spores.fromanthrax signal detect to ability the on 2) properties physicalchemical and size,similar similar components,with of molecules atmospheric molecules and common of evaluatingimpact the Challenges. of Protect Basesof andanincrease attacks in response time. andchemical of biological warning weapons. biological Payoffs. and provide toadapt thesystemtonew agents. amechanism information contained in the backscattered signal will be exploited. temporal coherenceeffects,and with spectral the both lasers pulse signal. short using return By the thatoptimize coherent nonlinear optical spectroscopy, laser pulse shaping techniques, and adaptive optics coupled with strategies demonstrate the capability to detect biological agents at standoff distances. Objectives. RO adaptive coherent antistokes raman spectroscopy and multiphoton excitation fluorescence.excitation multiphoton and spectroscopy raman antistokes coherent adaptive emonstrating optimization of the backscattered C curve for the detection of anthrax spores for a variety of nonlinear spectroscopies including femtosecond including spectroscopies nonlinear of variety a for spores anthrax of detection the for curve C

U. D emonstrate FA S

Challenges for this program include: 1) Establishing in the laboratory setting the signal to clutter and ad olto fre fc a ucran prtn evrnet n hc opnns a employ may opponents which in environment operating uncertain an face forces coalition and . T he Femtosecond Adaptive Femtosecond he O T peration including Biological peration includingBiological he ability to detect biological agents at a standoff distance range of 3 km will provide earlyprovide will km 3 of range distance standoff a at agents biological detect to ability he STR EA D technique fordipicolinicacid( technique T ransitioning the capabilities developed in the laboratory and conducting and laboratory the in developed capabilities the ransitioning S pectroscopy S /N by adapting spectral content of the pulses, timing of the pulse D efense, Chemical T echniques for echniques D T PA) distances. at experimental laboratory his will enable identification of specific agents D efense, andCombating R T emote Agent emote his will be accomplished by performing T his directly supports the Q his directly supports D D evelopingfor techniques etections program will program etections T his will be done by done be will his T errorism. DR goals B-7

ANNEX B B-8 ANNEX B CB.72 BiologicalWarfare DefenseSensors ( and enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay.immunosorbent enzyme-linked and that replace today’s laboratory silver standards such as polymerase chain reaction (PC ranges.standoff useful at agent biological a of localization and providedetection can sensors proposed program addresses the urgent need for BWAfor sensors.detect-to-protectneed urgent the addresses program FY2007: data collectiontoenable Phase conducting all three assays. FY2006: Milestones/Metrics. have beenthemainChallenges. Challenges. aerosolaccurate threat detectionofabiological from astandoffposition. device.hand-held portable a using toxin or virus bacteria, Payoffs. forBWAs. anddetect-to-protection sensors detect-to-warn standards. performance beyond laboratory or at device handheld a using toxins and bacteria,viruses, of spectrum biological sensors. fielded currently to relative rate alarm false in reductionmagnitude of order one atleast with and minute one than less of responsetimes with sensors detection with sensors trigger fast response times and very low false rates.alarm handheld portable detect-to-protect sensor. stand-alone detection without consumables, and readily the other will be semi-portable interfaced with the H sensors. trigger detect-to-warn T standoff, stand-alone, and sensors detect-to-protect portable hand-held using Objectives. SS he BA) programs are developing fieldable systems that will detect biological weapons agent (BWA) on the battlefield SS BA detect-to-warn trigger sensors will be developed for two biosensing areas; the first will be capable of capable be will first areas;the biosensing two for developed be will sensors trigger detect-to-warn BA H Complete field testing and algorithm optimization with extended false alarm testing. optimization withextendedfalse alarm Completefieldtestingandalgorithm H T ISSS ISSS he development of these sensors will support the support will sensors these of development he

H T he Handheld he : : ISSS D D evelop detection technologies that will enable accurate detection of a biological, specifically a specifically biological, a of detection accurate enable will that technologies detection evelop esign for a single flow-through sensor validated in the flow-through testbed that is capable of capable is that testbed flow-through the in validated sensor flow-through single a for esign : D uring the Phase the uring SS I sothermal sothermal BA: III SS testing. S BA: ensor prototype must demonstrate at least 1 week of continuous operation and D S ue totheearly stageinPhase II ilver flow-through assay development, molecular adhesion and assay speed assay and adhesion molecular development,assay flow-through T T he goal of the program is to enable battlefield detection for the full the for detection battlefield enable to is program the of goal he he S SS tandard BA program addresses the urgent need for BWA detect-to-warn T S ensor (H ensor he SS SS BA: BA program will also evaluate whether any of the of any whether evaluate also will program BA DTO D ISSS evelop detection technologies that will enable will that technologies evelopdetection ’s biological defense operation through the through operation defense biological ’s II T ) and the and ) , have nochallenges yet beenidentified. he goal of this program is to develop point T hey are based on isothermal techniques techniques isothermal on based are hey S pectral R ), reverse transcriptase PC S ensing of Bio-Aerosols of ensing T he H he ISSS ISSS R ,

Expeditionary BiologicalDetection(EBD)–AdvancedTechnology Demonstration(ATD) Biological Biological stated in the CB the in stated existing compare to conducted was (FEA) AnalysisEnd Front A M D S Agent Biological Joint the with compatible be must collect samples to confirm their presence and identify them. T systems against U their applicability to the JB agents.BW classical of A conventionallyclouds to disseminated limited initially strategy.acquisition and R FY2008: T FY2007: FY2006: Milestones/Metrics. Challenges. andsamplers. detectors biological andnextgeneration utilityofcurrent manportable the military Joint Biological the for requirements refine and Clarify 2) samplers; and detectors aerosol biological automated portable, Payoffs. provided theoverallinformation whendetermining systemeffectiveness incasualtyreduction. M Expeditionary Biological ( ment sensors. tactical for space trade the reflect accurately that objectives and thresholds A the from learned lessons and analysis, considered. system must be affordable. I 12 hours. Additionally, use of power from military vehicles, aircraft, gene Jointwithin and system networks. achieved.be can burdens vs. logistics gains performance if sampling system weighing less than 37 lbs. However, modular capabilities or a family of systems will be considered existing within use by employable and deployable be must Objectives. ms b pcae a cro o tasot n -3, H5, H6, CC LA LCAC, UH-60, CH-53, C-130, in transport for cargo as packaged be must t tatement of Need without modification or further development.tatement ofNeedwithoutmodification orfurther op Exercises, ConductField he candidate system candidate he eport, conduct vlpet Cmltd the Completed evelopment, arket UA will consider detection, collection, and identification systems in conjunction with the medical response to the M R Complete Conduct developed Analysis, End Front Conducted

UA) is intended to support an FY09 decision to satisfy the 2005 the satisfy to decision FY09 an support to intended UA)is T esearch,the Completed T D he EB he actical T etectors.

T he developmentJB of a

T he EB he most significant challenge identified is that selected systems may not fully meet requirements meet fully not may systems selected that is identified challenge significant most he R T D SM N D ransition T A echnical Evaluations,and Conduct echnical etection M S D C tactical biological detection needs and to review lessons fromlearned past experimentation. TD M ensors for Unmanned Applications for ensors

A A selected must be able to automatically detect a cloud of suspected biological agents and agents biological suspected of cloud a detect automatically to able be must selected ilitary Utility Assessment and C and Utility Assessment ilitary GT T TD serves three purposes: 1) purposes: three serves D he ability to discri to ability he TDS etector and/or identify to technologies transition to JB O F logistics and manpower constraints.manpower and logistics F R is designed to the support Joint Bi S nly systems with an estimated full-rate production unit cost of $50,000 or less will be eadiness Evaluation, andexecute ystem (JB D program, and the A T emonstrations, andcomplete echnology echnology D T emonstration Agreement,the Completed and he system must be operable with standard military batteries for a minimuma of for batteries mustoperablesystem military be he standard with TDS TDS M Capabilities TD arine Expeditionary Forces. Expeditionary arine m S ) to be used to define capabilities for a JB will ensure an operationally significant capability with appropriate appropriate with capability significant operationally an ensure will lcin ln Cmltd h Concept the Completed Plan, election inate,objective. threatsidentify primary the or is classify TD D evelop Concepts of Employment (C Employment of Concepts evelop I schedule will be bounded by the JB D dentification and dentification D O I evelopment tgae Assmn Plan, Assessment ntegrated evelopthe N I nitial Capability nitial T O T he candidate must be able to operate as a stand-alone a as operate to able be must candidate he P T he candidate sampling and agent identification system o T S ransition Plandevelopment. logical logical ransition Plan.

D ocument, I D deally, this will be met by a single detection/ single a by met be will deally,this M D o D T ocument (C odeling and odeling T actical biological agent detection/ identification detection/ agent biological r D he candidate system must be suitable for suitable be must system candidate he ators, or worldwide mains is an objective. M iagnostic D arine Corps Corps arine D ocument ( ocument D evelop TD etection TDS T DD S echnology echnology candidates will be selected for selected be will candidates S imulation Plan,Conduct imulation TDS V ystem (JBA ystem T ) based on experimentation,based on ) , AA , T I as an interim capability. O echnical / Lessons Learned Learned Lessons / echnical nitiated I he C f S S TDS C D ystem (JB tatement of Need for an for Need of tatement O O V M DD ) or the or ) eain, Conducted perations, E) for the use of man of use the for E) n H and ilitary Utility Assess Utility ilitary acquisition timeline. S ource ; and 3) M IDS ngmn Plan anagement TDS MM M ). S arine Corps Corps arine T election for election T D W ) program he system he he A etermine etermine V s. TD T able T T he he is ­ B-9

ANNEX B B-10 ANNEX B * = C x Inf e n n A DTO Fielded =Capability( R Joint= Joint Operational qmt= Simulation Reporting Category Warning Hazards Training Analysis Analysis S Effects = ub-product(s) ofaJoint project and D orm S efense ervice requirement ervice S ervice requirement ervice T echnology echnology - Training Simulation Capability (TSC) - Virtual Emergency Response Training System (VERTS) - WMDJA.28 Combat Assessment - Joint Medical NBC Decision Support Tool - Joint Operational Effects Federation (JOEF) - Simulation Training and Analysis For Fixed Sites - CB.51 Low-level CW Agent Exposure: Effects and - CB.55 Chemical and Biological Hazard Environment - CB.62 Hazard Prediction with Nowcasting - CB.42 Environmental Fate of Agents - Joint Effects Model (JEM) - Hazard Prediction and Analysis Capability (HPAC) - CB Warfare Computational Fluid Effects (CBW-CFX) - MESO - Chemical Warfare Naval Simulation (CWNAVSIM) - Vapor, Liquid and Solid Tracking (VLSTRACK) - Multipurpose Integrated Chemical Agent Detector - Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) a (JMNBCDST) (STAFFS) Countermeasures Prediction (MICAD) tio O

bjective ( S n ustained by

Sy

S cience & st Table InformationSystemsRDA Efforts C-1. S Nomenclature ervices) e T ms echnology BaseProgram) echnology rdt Rqmt Interest Rqmt Joint*= =sub-product requirement orinterest E = D R raft Joint esearch, =requirement orinterest insub-product S D ervice requirement ervice evelopment, RDTE Fielded RDTE/ Fielded* RDTE RDTE RDTE DTO RDTE RDTE RDTE DTO DTO DTO DTO RDTE Fielded RDTE RDTE Status T est &Evaluation (Advanced Joint* Rqmt Joint Joint* Joint* Joint* Joint* Joint* Joint* Joint* Joint* Joint* USA Joint* Joint Joint* Joint* Joint* Joint* Rqmt Joint* Joint* Joint* Joint* USAF D Joint* Joint Joint* Joint* Fielded evelopment program) USMC Rqmt Joint* Rqmt Joint Joint* Joint* Joint* Joint* Joint* Joint* Joint* Joint* Joint* USN C-1

ANNEX C C-2 ANNEX C Joint ServiceWarning andReporting Network(JWARN) BlockI(FUEFY99) FIELDED AND PRODUCTION ITEMS REPORTING AND WARNING reports, and access to specific NBC information to i ech lowest the to warnings desi Key Requirements: Pre-Planned Product M tools sothat sensordata automatically system. feedstheinformation future and existing C4 on segment a be will it that so centers Control and Command into capability this integrate to Description: Key Requirements: • • • • • • • ultipurpose ultipurpose

ISR g Capable ofvehicle (Fox, anddataCapable ofautomatic transmissionofNBCalarm Capable ofgenerating NBCreports commandandcontrol systems Capable ofinteroperability withallservice andsensors Capable ofinterfacing withallNBCdetectors anddataCapable ofautomatic transmissionofNBCalarm Capable ofgenerating NBCreports n a systems, and to integrate the sensor outputs directly and automatically with the NBC warning and reporting reporting and warning NBC the automaticallywith directlyand outputs sensor the integrate to systems,and ted personnel.ted I ntegrated Chemical Agent ntegrated I mprovement (P3 I t allows operators to provideto co allows operators t e lons on the battl the on lons M 93A1) operation in Block ha and threat NBC disseminate and report locate, cap incidents. JWA and response capability to predict the hazards of hostile NBC attacks or accidents/ nication,Computers, Jointthe into sensors and detectors NBC I JWA in the digitized battlefield.JWA digitized the in nformation nformation S I a ervice-specific annexes and employed by NBC defense specialists and other and specialists defense NBC employedby and annexes ervice-specific ) bility to employ NBC warning tec R I D N Block Block N is located in command and control centers at the appr etector ( etector e field. S ystem. JWAystem. m R I I N Block N Block prove the efficiency of NBC pe MI s n uoae Ncer Booia, n Ceia (NBC) Chemical and Biological, Nuclear, automated an is t provides additional data pr data additional provides t m CA manders with analyzed data for decisions for di for decisions for analyzeddata with manders I nfo D ) Embedded Common Embedded ) I will also pr r R m N Block Block N a tion and tion R N Block 1 provides the Joint Force an analysis Forcean Jointprovides the 1 Block N I o is essential for integrating the data from data the integrating for essential is h vide the Joint Forces with the operational I no ntell S l ogy that will collect, analyze, identify, ervice Command, Control, ervice Commu i gence (C gence o r cessing, production of plans and plans of production cessing, sonnel assets. Block T echnical Architecture (EC Architecture echnical z r ifrain JWA information. ard 4 I 2 ) systems and networksand systems ) o priate priate level defined II s se is planned m in a ting T R A) N ­ Joint ServiceWarning andReporting Network(JWARN) BlockII(FUE FY08) RDT&E ITEMS REPORTING AND WARNING used by the Army for Fox vehicles, the of NBC reports, and access to specific NBC information toi of NBCreports, andaccesstospecificNBCinformation se S C4 host the within functionality NA of generation automatic and to the actual detector/sensor/ network nodes and pr desi other in defined level appropriate the at systems and hazard information. JWA to employ evolving thattechnology warning will collect, analyze, identify, locate, and report disseminate NBC threat development to replace legacy anal Joint Force a co war generates CB the from directly data takes that applications sensor stationary, dispersed vehicular,and mobile JWA Description: Key Requirements: Description: ystems ( • • • • m

in R Capable of automatic transmission of NBC alarm anddataCapable ofautomatic transmissionofNBCalarm Capable ofgenerating NBCreports commandandcontrol systems Capable ofinteroperability withallservice andsensors Capable ofinterfacing withallNBCdetectors a N Block Block N ting warnings to the lowestthe to ech warnings ting T g B n a M ted personnel. ted n C m ing and reporting information directly to the host C4 host the to directly information reporting and ing II S will meet the JWAthe meet will pr ) usedby the Air Force. e he n sive analysis capability with the use of the Joint Effects TO T R he JWAhe N will be located in co

S ISR tandard warning reports using JWAusing reports warning tandard y sis tools. JWA system. R R G e N N system will transfer data automatically via hard wire or other means from means other or wire hard automaticallyvia data transfer will system N lons on the battlefield.the on lons CC ORD S S - I ervice-specific annexes and employed by NBC defense specialists and specialists defense NBC by employed and annexes ervice-specific M nitial target C4 target nitial requirements for a fully automated CB automated fully a for requirements system used on Navy ships, and the R N will also provide the Joint Forces with the operational cap m aad rdcin n Aayi Cpblt (PC, and (HPAC), Capability Analysis and Prediction Hazard the as tools such legacy using analysis initiated operator connections, wire hard direct, through performed is which sensors NBC info reporting and warning generate to sensors shelters and ships where data is taken directly from the CB CB automated fully a EC the hazards associated with any CB such, the EC the Joint Force a legacy analysis and response capabi directly to and on the host C4 mand and control centers and hosted as a segment mand on and C4 control centers o T vide co MI A completelyJWAA the meets m ISR CA prove ofNBCpe theefficiency I t will provide additional data pr dataprovide will additional t systems are the are systems D m system deployed on the Army’sdeployedon system Fox vehicles. As V manders with analyzedmanders data for decisions for dis T pr Liquid apor A will take ISR R N Block 1 software, and embed the control the embed software,and 1 Block N system. JWAsystem. M R N odel (JE MI S M I T nfo olid CA aneuver Control aneuver heater Battle ISR r D R mation T M R sy functions such as control of N Block Block N R akn ( racking R N ), which is currently under N N event. EC s tem. EC I r ORD nformation nformation sonnel assets. S o se fr vehicles, for ystem cessing,production M II V requirements for will provide the provide will anagement Core L R T STR S A pr N sensors and sensors N l ystem ( ystem T ity to predict A is a P3 S C) and ACK) o ystem for ystem vides the r m a M bility a tion C ISR R I to S N ) ­

C-3

ANNEX C C-4 ANNEX C Hazard Prediction andAssessmentCapability(HPAC) Vapor, LiquidandSolidTracking (VLSTRACK) FIELDED AND PRODUCTION ANALYSIS HAZARDS Joint Effects program.acquisition active an as supported longer no is but fielded and gene requirementsstudies, and program doctrine,acquisition assessment h developer, U the the by conducted program development HPACgeneration. requirements and studies, program acquisition doctrine, assessment hazard planning, contingency operational decisions, operational NBC against defense active for by accredited HPACpublication.is journal peer-reviewed including validation and verification independent W against defense passive and facilities.storage and production HPAC activevalidatedoffense,for dataand against verified been has active defense (W destruction mass of weapons enemy against strikes weapon conventional from resulting effects collateral (NBC populations. military and civilian on impact its and atmosphere the into releases material hazardous of effects the predict to means HPACthe provides the by accredited D model only the is and weapons chemical and biological against defense passive concerning data attack.weapons biological or chemical a from hazards resulting V unclassified networks inanoperational environment. andbecertified and classified among data sensor (CB) chemical/biological move to way automated and affordable an fixedfor used when protection;site softwareand falsesensor point alarms reduceto algorithms fusion chemical and developing CB ( JWA the strategy development its of part As O T DTR echnical Publication (A 45 echnical L epar beramergau. STR R A) to focus on enhanced capabilities.enhanced on focus to A) t ment of ACK is a chemical and biological agent hazard assessment model that predicts the behavior of agents and the and agents behaviorof the predicts that model assessment hazard agent biological and chemical ACKa is ) weapons, nuclear reactor accidents, M R T odel (JE D NE sensors and CB his technology isbeing transitionedtotheJointhis technology Effects S efense for this purpose. Am Chemical Army M ) Acquisition Program. T P) MD R S tandard,accreditedand by U facilities, approved as the as approvedfacilities, R weapons, production facilities and storage structures. storage and facilities production weapons, NE sensor capability that is plug-and-play and hardware independent; information S chool, V I t models incidents involving nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological radiological and chemical biological, nuclear, involving incidents models t ersion 4.04 is currently available and fielded directly from the from directly fielded and available currently is 4.04 ersion I D t supports operational decisions,t supports operational conti efense T T DTR hese include software-defined sensors, architecture and approaches to approaches and architecture sensors, software-defined include hese oxic R N program is teamed with the with teamed is program N T A’s Nuclear Weapons Nuclear A’s I ndustrial ndustrial Chemicals, hreat R eduction Agency ( eduction Agency S HAPE NBC HAPE SSTR T his model has been verified and validated against validated and verified been has model his A T C M T OM T S oxic r odel (JE ho, n te NA the and chool, his technology is being transitioned to the to transitioned being is technology his R ation.

for its NBC its for M DTR I ndustrial ndustrial odeling Capability and NA and Capability odeling V D M L A). efense STR ) Acquisition Program. T raining is also availablefrom also is raining ACK M R T aterials aterials and high explosive planning. HPAC supports hreat I n t has well documented well has t V TO gency planning,gency hazard ersion 3.1 is availableis 3.1 ersion / R S eduction Agency Agency eduction HAPE T echnology echnology TO S ho at chool Allied DOD MD )

Chemical andBiologicalWarfare ComputationalFluidEffects(CBW-CFX) MESO (3Dmesoscalemeteorologicalmodel) CWNAVSIM (ChemicalWarfare NavalSimulation) RDTE ITEMS ANALYSIS HAZARDS with the ship surfaces using potential flow equations. Unit Key Requirements: physical processes relevantin modelingimportant tohazardassessment. D puff methodology but does not require the time and computer resources of a full Navier- M Description: Key Requirements: the ship and transported throughout by the ship’s H cloud) of the contaminant from the ship’s external surfaces. Naval a on Chemical Attack a of devices.detection of placement the specifically systems, defensive CWNA Description: Key Requirements: CFX Computational Fluid the from Army’s developedprimarily was AU without input from the model.zonal a using compartment each in dosages and concentrations of track • • • • • • • ynamics (CF ynamics E

SO buildings T Address physical standardmodelsforCB processes andhazardassessmentcapabilitiesofcurrent layer boundary oftheplanetary Advance incharacterization thestate-of-the-art anddiffusion( transport particle Advance inuseofLagrangian thestate-of-the-art agentdetectionsystemeffectivenessPredict shipboardchemical Predict attack Predict resulting from shipsystemdegradation achemical R ak het rm ao, iud ad oi C aet aon o wti cmlx tutrs eg, hp and e.g., ships structures, complex within or around agents CB solid and liquid, vapor, from threat rack esiliency esiliency Analysis (NU is developed to provide a provide to developed is VSIM M was developed to address specific Naval acquisition program decisions regarding chemical weapons chemical regarding decisions program acquisition Naval specific address to developed was D ission ) code.) O riented Protectiveriented Posture ( D T he development effort for the for developmenteffort he AWN module. NU D ynamic (CF R A). T V he CWNA he T D essel ( essel & T AWN simulates D actics, capability that is more accurate and more theoretically sound than sound theoretically more and accurate more is that capability D D ) code. AWN), T VSIM R cnqe ad rcdrs ( Procedures and echniques A provides casualty assessments and ship’s mission degradation. NU R A code.the CurrentlyA model is comprised of threemodules:of comprised is model S V MO hip Chemical hip Warfare G AC system. T he aussian puff vapor and liquid clouds (primary cloud) interacting PP) resultingattack from achemical D D epartment of epartment AWN module allows deposition and off gassing (secondary T he primary and secondary clouds are then entrained into V EN M traces the vapor movement internally keeping D D AWN module is being replaced with CBW-with replaced AWNbeing is module M efense is also intended to provideto advancesintended also is efense TT V E entilation SO ) edd o eed h si ad the and ship the defend to needed P) iscurrently notindistribution. V EN M M can simulate attack scenarios scenarios attack simulate can T odel ( odel S & D tokes Computational Fluid D eposition and eposition Weathering ) V EN M ) and the Naval the and ) D G aussian R A C-5

ANNEX C C-6 ANNEX C Agent Fate,ModelValidation, andSourceCharacterizationDatabases Key Requirements: other models, researchers.by use agents.for CBW-CFX biological intended and is subroutines that can be used within the code. CBW-CFX adds methodology for physical processes unique to chem 3- around and in agents biological CF CBW-CFXuses Description: Defense Technology Objective(DTO) CB. 42EnvironmentalFateofAgents and outdoor environments. Complete agent (H document residual contactmeasurements. experiments;validationtest conduct field experiments.makeoutdoor predictionsand of and Complete grass and FY2006: Milestones/Metrics. andcontactmodel. an agentpersistence concrete and asphalt. Challenges. V Chemical Hazard Estimation validated.and D Effects Joint the as such tools decision numerous hazards.agent chemical to due disruptions of face the in mission the battlespace. CB the in decisions critical with faced when commanders operational to risk decrease models,will environment threatagents. biological and novelfuture for chemical analysis persistence addressing -for keycomponent a as surfaces, on serves relevantagents environment of fateto persistence. and fate agent threat chemical predicting for uncertainty reduce to trials field and tests, tunnel wind studies, laboratory against validated - produced be will surfaces.on warfareagents chemical physics of and science-based evaporationsurface chemistry A module the of understanding a develops methodology,and analytical consistent and datasets validated on based environments Planning.and Payoffs. environment anditsevolution intime. fate agent an model. via scenarios operational in concentration agent residual and persistence their predict to order in Objectives. • • • • •

L uring FY04, lab scale wind tunnels for measuring the surface evaporation of chemical agents were developedwere agents chemical of evaporation surface the measuring for tunnels wind scale lab FY04, uring STR T T T Evaluate parameters thevalidity ofsourcecharacterization and fate model T Provide theJoint echnology Business echnology Area (BA) he databases willinitially theJoint directly Effects support he databases will be used to validate to used be will databases he he spreadsheets will contain information needed to develop or validate any open terrain contaminant transport ACK were updated withthemostrecent agentfate data. S uch data will uch with be CB incorporated environment of models the to CB enhance Battlespacedescription Complete surface evaporation testing of H

T his S

e.g. T uch decisions have impact not only on the survivability of the warfighter,the of have decisions survivability onlyuch the not on impact of integrity the on butalso

T D DTO T his his he evaporation of H evaporationof he ispersing and measuring the surface evaporation of thickened agents on complex matrices such as such matrices complex on agents evaporation thickened surface of the measuring and ispersing , V DTO D DTO L addresses the Jointthe Futureaddresses code to model the transport, diffusion, deposition, and surface evaporation of chemical and chemical of evaporation surface and deposition,diffusion, transport, the model to code STR S S ervice with field trial data assembled withfieldtrial withindatabases inspreadsheet format ervice caling agent evaporation measurements from lab-size wind tunnels to outdoor conditions in will measure and understand the physicochemical processes of chemical agents on surfaces establishes challenge levels and protection factors necessary for multi-service operating multi-service for necessary factors protection and levels challenge establishes ACK andthe M ethod & D structures. CFX is a comme a is CFX structures. D on glass and the dissemination of thickened agents wereaccomplished.agents thickened of dissemination the and glass on V entilation R isk Assessment M & S O D tools developed under the under developed tools , perational Capability of Battleof Capability perational M GD M odel ( D odel (JE odel , , V GD D X) secondary evaporation model for concrete, asphalt, soil T ata developed by this effort, when incorporated with CB with incorporated when effort,developed atabythis ool (CHE V , and EN M S c a oue we adesn pyia processes physical addressing when module, a uch ) and Joint and ) M V M r ). X on concrete, asphalt, soil, in and both grass lab cial code, which allows licensed users to develop to users licensed allows code,which cial odel (JE MR T o extend its utility it has been interfaced with interfaced been has it utility its extend o R esults of this program will directly support directlywill support program this of esults A T ) and the surface evaporation module of O M M perational Effects Federation(J Effects perational ) program & M S CA and the and CA anagement:Battlespace Analysis I nformation nformation S O ystems EF). T he i cal reports contain data for contaminant releases in open areas that can be used for model validation.model for used be can that areas open in releases contaminant for data contain reports data. trial field against validated further experimentation orinvestigation. experimentation further estimatepending used an more valid,the as identified is be will indicatorwhich clear no thereparameters is and the them, a community accepted value would be determined. parameters. When there is no consensus in the validity models.of the or parameters the methods experimental used to obtain diffusion and transport by needed CA called tool program. A of part deliveryas systems S missile interceptcapabilitiesofJE high altitudes. of representative conditions under agents biological or chemical of behavior the characterizing data collect to and Further literature searches will be done to locate reports containing data reports.on of the set flow original the of as fashioncontaminants same around the in buildings database validation the to added and reports these from extracted an and the files used for collected model validation.fromreports the field trial All relevant will be put into information M neededtomeetassociated requirements.of materiel be used to develop decontamination and restoration of operationsand training doctrine and influence the acquisition hazards.vapor and contact resulting the accuratelypredict and agent liquid deposited onto materials sufficiently well that computer models can be developed to simulate the behavior D agents. chemical persistent of presence the to due expected degradation performance operational for planning general the specifications,and performance recoveryplanning,equipment developingnew hazards.liquid and vaporresulting the and surfaces various onto Agent Fate Description: ource Characterization Characterization ource atabase is to translate detailed laboratory and field acquired data to improve the behavior characterization of chemical odel O racle database. Additional literature search of search literature database.Additional racle V alidation D atabase T his additional data will be added to the validation database for use in validating the complex flow and D atabase : Currently CB D atabase : Each of the three the of Each : M RR & E S tools available to the operational CB community and in direct support to the HPACthe availableto tools directcommunityin support operationalCB and the to M : M T has been developed to estimate a delivery system’s initial source, in parameters parameters in source,system’s initial delivery a estimate to developed been has T e ore em, eerlgcl odtos ad otmnto lvl wl be will levels contamination and conditions, meteorological terms, source he Blocks 2and3. Blocks M he overall objective is to develop a source characterization database of CB agent CB of database overallhe developcharacterization to objectivesource is a & S capabilities do not adequately address the fate agents deposited of chemical S bet atr xet wl eaut te aiiy f hs estimated these of validity the evaluate will experts matter ubject DOD DTI standard models ( models standard C and C I n cases where there is a significant disagreement in a value T R echnical Libraries will be performed for field trial trial field for performed be will Libraries echnical T esults from modeling studies and analyses can then can analyses and studies modeling from esults he ability to assess these risks is key to post attack attack post keyto is risks these assess to ability he V L STR ACK, HPAC,ACK,and T he goal of the Agent Fate Agent the of goal he D T 2PC) has been has 2PC) he data will be will data he C-7

ANNEX C C-8 ANNEX C DTO CB.62 HazardPrediction withNowcasting and mesoscaledata assimilation systemscoupledwithreal-time nowcast oftheJE update insupport FY2007: for hazardprediction. FY2006: Milestones/Metrics. tactics, techniques, andprocedures.operations, of concepts of development and support, capability,exercise the of the evaluation for and required test is operational effort Considerable validate. to effort significant require will dust, and fog,smoke, as such altitude and near-surface atmospheric physics and agent behavior, especially in environments containing interferents Challenges. manner. turbulent fluctuations, and will be coupled to atmospheric models in a physically Payoffs.realistic (thermally and dynamically) that willbedoneunderthis mesoscale nowcasts effort constitutesthetechnical (6.1) for direct applications to the capabilities. current etc.),than altitudes, high at terrain, complex in time,(night conditions atmospheric of range wider stable,a under dispersion moreaccurately to models describe all the fate of chemical and biological agents, smoke, toxic industrial materials, and other agents in the environment for Objectives. Effects should be tied to real-time observational nowcast and battlefield management systems such as JWAas nowcast such systems real-timebattlefieldobservational management to and tied be should in development) for executing and managing prudent operations in the battlespace.the in operations prudent managing and executing for development) in system that describes and forecasts/nowcastsand environmentbattlespace (B describes that system DOD M applications; and incorporate these B these incorporate applications;and

Enhance near-surface environmental characterization and demonstrate improvements using the Joint the using improvements demonstrate and characterization environmental near-surface Enhance CB dispersion models will be improved by investigating methodologies that more accurately represent accurately more that methodologies investigatingimprovedby be will models dispersion CB D odel. emonstrate transitionable telescoping environmental prediction capability using a combination of global

T As time-critical decisions are necessitated, the forecast capability to support dispersion modeling dispersion support to capability forecast the necessitated, are decisions time-critical As he overall objective is to develop a high–resolution local, regional, and global atmospheric prediction D evelop data assimilation to techniques improve forecasts of important near-surface characteristics S ervice ervice (6.4) users. S E parameters into improved chemical/biological (CB) dispersion dispersion (CB) improvedchemical/biological into parameters E T he work necessary to integrate the Joint Effects T his S DTO E) parameters to support prediction of prediction support to parameters E) DTO matures emerging basic research research basic emerging matures . I mproved modeling of high- of mprovedmodeling R M N (currentlyN . M odel with Joint EffectsModel(JEM)(FUEFY08) Key Requirements: DTO CB.55 ChemicalandBiologicalHazardEnvironmentPrediction program. FY2006: Milestones/Metrics. DTO foreseeable future. New methodology on agent persistence, surface evaporation, reaerosolization (produced under the for issue ongoing an be availablethatexecuteon will codes faster for need platforms affordablecomputer and that analysis dynamics fluid computational full requires a greater computing resources. to Computer code implementation also comparedrepresents a continuing challenge.inaccurate very be will results the but analysis, rapid for environment urban an in diffusion and transport to applied be might terrain) flat for (designed model fast-running range.thata outside Forunsuitableexample may be but conditions of range overspecific a adsorption, surface surface desorption, evaporation,deposition, decay and diffusion,biological is addressed through mathematical calculations that aretransport, valid of processes modeled the of Each addressed. be must that kilometers). Challenges. likewise improve theresults by oftheoperational analyses J performed will predictions those make to capabilities the in improvementspredictions, environment hazard biological and associatedrisks.their and action battlefield. the on weapons Payoffs. theJoint Effects supports under developed methodology new incorporate decay,evaporation,deposition,will biological and reaerosolization and theyafter agents have biological environment.releasedthe been into environment.the in agents biological Objectives. • •

toxic industrial materials toxic industrial Predict hazard areas and contamination effects from nuclear, chemical or biological agent releases and releases of Predict hazardareas andcontamination effectsfrom nuclear, attack orbiological chemical CB.42) intothisbroader modelingframework willneedtobeintegrated ofhazardprediction tools. DTO

T T his capability will allow the warfighter to assess potential hazards from the use or of biological chemical asto te ope tran n fo aon srcue mdln cpblte t JE to capabilities modeling structures around flow and terrain complex the ransition CB.42 (Environmental Fate of Agents) that describes agent fate and persistence. and fate agent describes that of Agents) Fate(Environmental CB.42 T

T

T here are a wide range of interacting processes involved and a variety of operational environments operational of variety a and involvedprocesses interacting of range wide a are here he objective of this effort is to develop an improved capability to predict the behavior of chemical and he primary challenge to developing this capability is the scale of the problem domain (meters to many M odel (JE T his information is an important consideration when evaluating possible courses of courses possible evaluating when consideration important an is information his S ince the Jointthe ince M I ) t will address the physical and biological processes that effect chemical and chemical effect thatprocesses biological physicaland the address will t ORD . O perational Effects FederationperationalEffects (J T hese processestransport,diffusion,hese include O EF. O EF) makes use of the chemical chemical the of makesuse EF) T his DTO M Block Block G directly aussian T he III

C-9

ANNEX C C-10 ANNEX C Research CWAgentExposure thrust:Low-Level focus on enhanced capabilities. tec used analytically, JE C4 those co with interface effects data forJE circulations. vortex data. pressuresolverand field wind developbuilding-scale to a model developurban overthe to time;enhancements and through urban areas at ranges between 10m and 10km with visualization of 3 contaminants toxic of dispersion the predict to model dispersion area urban data;large a meteorological and sensor CB available on based release (CB) Chemical/Biological a for location source the estimate to warfighter the allow predictions;interior),hazard accuraterequiredarethat and for that tools (exterior buildings and usage terrain,land As part of its development strategy the JE homeland defensethrough useby Civil Authorities and Allies. Description: ( VV • • • • • • •

h &A) in accordance with the applicablethe with accordance in &A) nology,development materiel and proposals, structuring.force and JE and behavioral effectsinduced by repeated low level warfare agentsinguineapigs. exposure to chemical nerve Evaluated the efficacy of the F dose forrepeated warfare agenttoxicity. chemical agentexposures andonotherindicesofchemical I following of low-dose exposures forvarying durations andtheirpotentialimpactonhumanoperational readiness. effects neuropathological and physiological, behavioral, short-term Assessed I deficitsfollowing agentexposures.Examined thepotentialforimmunological nerve Continued studiesofneurotoxic effectsoflow agentexposure. dosechemical I T nitiated studies on the effects of current prophylactic and therapeutic treatments on the maximum tolerated maximum the on treatments therapeutic and prophylactic current of effects the on studies nitiated forlowdentified potentialmedicalcountermeasures level warfare agentandH chemical nerve dentified biomarker(s) toindicate low level exposure. chemical he wind solver will lead to improvements in near-source dispersion around buildings, such as channeling and channeling as buildings, around such dispersion improvementsnear-source to in lead solverwill wind he I systems will use JE use will systems m M mand,control, communications,(C4 intelligence computers,and M . I will assist n addition, results from results addition, n M T to predictareasprovideto hazard and U.to warning DOD hese include development of high-quality and reliable environmental data, including D A-approved oxime treatment, pralidoxime chloride (2-PA components to train jointly, develop doctrine and tactics, and assess warfighting, M program is teamed with the DOD DTO

VV CB.42 – Environment Fate of Agents will provide secondary secondary provide will Agents of Fate Environment – CB.42 &A directives.&A operationally,used When JE JE and M NBC against defense included be JE 1. will Block of release following capabilities these of some degradation; performance human and interiors, building environments, NBC altitude urban releases, high passive incidents, or counterforce, accident defense, including: scenarios ha modeling of capable JE model. prediction hazard NBC O of transition the science and technology capabilities JE nce fielded, JE fielded, nce aterial aterial ( M M D V will be verified, validated, and accredited and validated,verified, be will will that program acquisition the is efense L STR M D (unclassified version) may also support mayversion) (unclassified support also concentration and dosage fields as they TIM C, PC and HPAC,ACK, T hreat S ) weapons, devices, and incidents. .areas.those within forces When I ) systems.) War M R V will be the standard the be will eduction Agency ( nre gn i rodents in agent nerve X M z rs n vrey of variety a in ards ), against biochemical M will reside on and resideon will T D D n oxic M 2PC/ ing systems on systems ing exposure. will support support will M DTR I D il be will ndustrial ndustrial 2PUFF. DOD A) to

conducted withcoordination between communities. themedicalandnon-medicalresearch T DTO CB. CWAgentExposure:EffectsandCountermeasures 51Low-Level he following FY2007: varying durations, andassesspotentialimpacts onhumanoperational readiness insubsequentdeployments. delayedand CWAof effects behavioron physiologyagents and low-dosefollowing of range nerve exposuresa for rodents that refine operational assessments.human health risk Complete and deliver assessments of the long-term FY2006: Milestones/Metrics. will require novel totraditionaltreatments approaches ofscientificdata. unified a into results all of effects.Collation health degrading reduce the difficulty dataof extending such to human optimal exposuresdetection of performance- and to permit studies. integration of series a in some agents. Cross-validation of inhalation, parenteral and dermal routes of exposure conditions must be addressed Challenges. strategies. prophylaxis or protection novelmedical for need a maysuggest settings exposure less-than-lethal these in effects personal protective gear, and decontamination activities. Finally, the characteristics and magnitude of adverse health operations. military to relevant concentrations and times exposure from decrements performance long-term or short- potential and estimates of toxicity and will provide a consistent and basis uniform for extrapolating information on health effects various in embedded currently error the reduce significantly will program this by generated data defendable and in changes obvious less low-levelsat but exposures. of performance operational Consistent effect’,significantlydegrade more could function mental noticeable ‘first a such as serve could (miosis) effects pupil agent-induced nerve of description quantitative a example,Foractions. response determining for use to endpoint appropriate CWAstraditional ( for relationship dose-response been have time agent,studied best in overlythe be for shownconservativeto out exposures of prediction the extend to used assumptions lethality, historical as endpoint deploymentof range settings.acrossa maypersonnel encounteredby be For military toxicological evena clear as Payoffs. useful formilitary predictions assessment risk health in error the reducing for basis a as serve to data validscientifically generate to studies execute and readiness;operationaldesign subsequent mayand problemsthatimpact health post-exposure refinement of risk assessment tools. (CWAs).Warfare Chemical Agents of concentrations Objectives.

T D D his eliver inhalation dataset to define longer time, lower level operational effects for eliver inhalation data settodefinelongertime, lower level operational effectsforH DTO

T DTO S his ignificant technical hurdles must be addressed to create and maintain stable exposure conditions for is a key in addressing the issues effort of Low-Level CW Agent Exposures. O DTO addresses deficiencies in the current understanding of the consequences of CWA exposure that I perational n addition, these data will be essential in creating requirements criteria for detector design,detector for criteria requirementscreating in essential be will data addition,these n will deliver data sets on operationally relevant health effects of exposures to sub-lethal to exposures of effects health relevant operationally on sets data deliver will R isk S S election of appropriate animal model systems must be carefully designed to designed carefully be must systems model animal appropriate of election M pecific objectives are to extrapolate relevant experimental effects to determine anagement ( G ORM -series, T ) decisions. ee aa es il i tr, upr dvlpet and development support turn, in will, sets data hese V G -series and H and -series B. O T perational he major goal of this effort is to understand the understand to is effort this of goal major he D R ) with an object to identify the most the identify to object an with ) isk M anagement ( anagement V X in swine and T his research his is research being D ORM inswine. ) framework) GD in C-11

ANNEX C C-12 ANNEX C Joint OperationalEffectsFederation(JOEF)(FUE FY09) Simulation Training andAnalysisforFixedSites(STAFFS) RDTE ITEMS ANALYSIS EFFECTS OPERATIONAL Key Requirements: currently available. resolution. of level desired any to adaptable is that approach task-network a using modeled are tasks availability.operational of levelsBasic and capabilities equipment different cycles. work-rest as such procedures doctrinal and encumbrance, induced equipment effects, thermal induced equipment deco gear, protective including ST user/system interface whileanalysis applications typically processing. utilizefilebasebatch interfacesareuser provided application.the to specific simulation/analysis cases (a case matrix) often involving parametric represe different many of examination involvethe typicallyperformed. applications Analysisbe may simulations and games ST environments, and of (2) operationalsupport and requirements analysis. Wargame applications inte run (1) areas: functional major two operations. combat hamper and throughput logistical effects.their weaponsand CB encounter to likelytargets most the of one thus and forces aggressor to targets priority expected high be to be can facilities rear-area these operation, of theater the in forces to roles support combat essential and within wa biological and chemical air bases, of debarkationports aerial (AP ST Description: Key Requirements: • • • • • • •

AFF AFF AFF I into uniteffectiveness. parameters Aggregates individualperformance Assesses individual Warfighter missionessentialtasks. ability toperform characteristics. equipmentbasedonmaterial ofparticular Evaluates theperformance overallthe system. within elements various of effects and interrelation the through doctrine and issues operational Analyzes I D ntegrates existing transport/diffusion modelsforCBagent hazards. existing transport/diffusion ntegrates nterfaces withkey NBCmodels, simulations, anddatabases S S S etermines operational effectsofCBwarfareetermines environment fixed onmilitary siteoperations DOD T utilizes spatial and temporal CB challenge data calculated by other standard CB hazard assessment models assessment hazard CB standard other by calculated data challenge CB temporal and spatial utilizes system. a as running applications model other to output providing and input accepting as such facilities fixed-site large of operations the represents which model simulation general-purpose a is hese effects are represented by engineering level sub-models, which can be easily changed to represent to changed easily be can which sub-models, level engineering by represented are effects hese V L STR to assess the operational impact of CBW attacks on critical fixed-site ta T hese sites may be particularly susceptible to repeated CBW attacks, which could significantly degrade significantlydegrade could attacks,repeatedCBW which susceptibleto mayparticularly sites be hese ACKHPAC.detectors,and include resolution high representedin effects agent and equipment CB n aiain txc n ifcie gn efcs cletv poeto, eia treatment, medical protection, collective effects, agent infective and toxic tamination, r fare (CBW) attacks and their effects on operations. No other capability currently exists currently capability operations.other on No effects their and attacks (CBW) fare

support of wargaming and operational exercises including distributed interactive distributed including exercises operational and wargaming of support OD s) and seaports s) of and debarkationseaports ( ST ST AFF AFF S S wargaming applications utilize an interactive graphic wargaminginteractive applicationsan utilize graphic is currently in use and being further developed in developed further being and use in currently is ST AFF S is developed by AF by developed is n S tation of unknown system data. P OD s), with the capability to represent r gets. D ue to their fixed location R L. Limited training is training Limited L. M an-in-the-loop r actively with D ifferent Joint MedicalNBCDecisionSupportTool and to estimate NBC casualties. NBC estimate to and analyze the NBC battlefield both to identify S planning, threat assessmentdoctrine, studies, acquisitionprogram andrequirements generation. contingency decisions,operationaloperational Levels 3-5.atrequirements supports bed it such,hospital As for and requirements evacuation medical requirements, personnel medical requirements, materiel medical determine: to T Description: Key Requirements: infectious diseasesandtoxic operational chemicals; effects. andmodelingofradiological capabilities. enhanced on focus to As of part its development strategy the J suitable formodelingmulti-warfare scenarios. warfaremodels,data, entity frameworka in tools certified simulation appropriate relatedand services, support user analysis.and execution, planning, of support in of in high support level concept assessments and system effectiveness studies and (3) Joint exercises and experiments evaluation;plan (2) and assessment action of course of support in makers decision and ners CB and operational analyst to make rapid course of action analysis effects- based operational decisions, logistics decisions, degr personnel chemical nuclear,radiological, processes,environments.defense all battlespaceforces, and biological and simulate will bases, data specific to married when that, capabilities simulation relative to any nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological event. J operationalenvironment required predictto immediately or operationalfor information respondneed effects the to T Description: upport upport • • e Joint he J he

D Command and Control systems, medical informatics including the database, and Joint Warning and I foroperational missions,medical support bothonthebattlefield andinurbanenvironments. Provide the capability to deliberatesupport planning, crisis action planning, exercises/training, and execution of asset location decisions, and develop nterface with current and co-developmental medical planning tools such as the as such tools planning medical co-developmental and current with nterface O F il rvd te prtoa cmuiy ih h fdrtd oes n smltos pcfc o their to specific simulations and models federated the with community operational the provide will EF T ool (NBC C (NBC ool M dcl NBC edical a dation and medical processes and resources.and processes medical J and dation R E ST D ecision ) that provides calculations of casualty rates related to initial and secondary exposure to exposure secondary and initial to related rates casualty of providescalculations that ) I t will also relate treatment protocols (time, task, treater files) to these casualties these to files) treater task,(time, protocols treatment relate also will t S T upport upport ee nld te ula Booia Ceia Casualty Chemical Biological Nuclear the include hese R eporting Network (JWAeporting O TT EF program is teamed with the S T Ps for CB ervice/Joint Forceervice/Joint agent exposures on and military civilian populations o wl eal the enable will ool T he J he D O operations. EF vision is of a set of validated low-to-medium resolution low-to-medium validated of set a of is vision EF O R EF will be used by both the operational commander operational the byboth used be will EF N) for discretionary transmissionofdata.N) fordiscretionary S O T riemdcl lne/prtr o oe and model to planner/operator ervice/medical EF will include both fixed site and mobile forces he J D I O efense n addition, the federation will address both address will federationaddition, the n D EF will be utilized by: (1) operational plan efense M edical T hreat M S edical Analysis R urveillance urveillance eduction Agency (

the analysis communityanalysis the R suc Estimation esource S ystem ( T ool ( ool DTR DMSS M A T A) ), ) ­ C-13

ANNEX C C-14 ANNEX C Virtual EmergencyResponse Training System(VERTS) RDTE ITEMS SYSTEMS SIMULATION TRAINING Key Requirements: DTO JA.28WMDCombatAssessment* FY2009: FY2008: FY2007: collection system. FY2006: Milestones/Metrics. developing compatible taggantmaterial withU. U. existing into technology integrating systems;deployable militarily for systems sensor packaging and miniaturizing materials; corrosive and by-products,explosive dust, sand, as such interferents post-strike containing plumes in agents radiological and biological, chemical, of identification time fromchemical,agent-related biological,targets; radiological and real-and collection developingpoint for sensors Challenges. capability forreal-time bombimpactassessment/bombdamageassessmentforthe W enemyon W Payoffs. and forensic analysis ofcollectedmaterial. potential of warning advanced (and downwindsystems detection W remote for cueing provide to as action targets combat from of released result plumes a effluent tag to materials of weaponization and development include also may capability. reporting near-real-time or real-time with collector-identifiers, and collectors unmanned as post-strike.or pre- either such emplaced are that sensors systems expendable with or deployablevehicles on mounted sensors by conducted be may assessment Combat targets. of release atmospheric of resultingfromU. (e.g., assessment materials) agents, chemicals,radiological biological or consequences adverse of severity and magnitude the of indication Objectives. * mass destruction (W destruction mass targets.nuclear-related and biological, chemical, enemy on conducted strikes • • •

T his D theC and theirequipmentwithwhich M M V isually immersive training environment for specialized missions of the U the of missions specialized for environment training immersive isually etailed visual and structural databases required city/site.etailed visualandstructural foreach ust represent not only the deploying military units’ personnel and equipment, but also the civil first responders ass DTO

D S T S S S P 2: piral 1 ( piral 2( P 1: his effort will provide the warfighter with the capability to rapidly assess the results of planned strikes strikes planned of results the assess rapidly to capability the with warfighter providethe will effort his estruction Civil estruction isfundedby MD

T MD Challenges include standoff detection of W detection standoff include Challenges his D D targets, providing forces,friendly to hazards indicationof population centers, etc., wellas the as emonstrate prototype airborne BCA emonstrate prototype airborne emonstrate prototype airborne BCA emonstrate prototype airborne contamination). DTO S S P 1): P 2): MD will develop and demonstrate the capability to perform combat assessment of counterforce I DTR I nitiate development of prototype airborne Biological Combat Assessment ) combat assessment are intended to provide the Combatant Commander with timely with Commander Combatant the provide to intended are assessment combat ) nitiate development BCA ofprototype airborne S upport upport A (underPE0603160B S T ensor systems/host vehicles may a targetarea also egress to facilitate recovery eams—W ST s willwork. MD S ./Coalition weapons sensors. andtactical/strategic C S R ST S collectionandidentification system. collectionsystem. ) incoordination withtheCB . MD agents and tracking of post-strike plumes/clouds post-strike of tracking and agents S ./coalition combat action against combataction ./coalition W S S collectionandidentification system. ./Coalition C4 ./Coalition S S Army National Army ystems that perform weapons of weapons perform that ystems S ensors may consist of material material of mayconsist ensors D MD P targetset. T ISR echnological solutions echnological architectures; and architectures; G uard Weaponsof S ystem (BCA MD S )

Training SimulationCapability(TSC) M training.collective training and si and training simulations.live, constructive under and effects virtual, environmentsand NBC S review(AA action exercises. and training for trainers upthrough largeunitbattle stafftrainingcapabilities.trainers Computers, Communications, T Description: Key Requirements: modules that will serve as DOD distances.travellong to having without together observed by adversaries, criminals and terrorists.being of threat the without so do to and buildings actual in cities, actual in navigate to learn to teams these allows V environment.training live a in recreate to impossible not if difficult are that proceduresagents, NBC dangerous to procedures.and equipment of variety a master to required protection,NBC for equipment response.commercial medical and and detection tasks.collective and individual for demands T Description: related to NBC threats and scenarios.threatsand NBC related to fullyfielded,When the T S forces. will operate in conjunction with the Joint Warning and imulation ( imulation ystems, andthe other • • • • he he he E edical

RTS TS V TS federation. simulationa using rehearsals mission dataperform Providemission to and models effects NBC use to capability action review Provide ability to gather and store lessons and learned identified failure/error incidents in order to provide after NBC a in operations I for prepare to warfighters for tool training environment consistent and integrated an Provide ntegration with and have access to current and planned individual service C4 withandhaventegration andplannedindividualservice accesstocurrent response elements and first responders as well.as responders first and elements response E C will be used at all levels of NBC defense decision-making to train for and simulate NBC attacks against friendly I also allows mission rehearsals in actual and realistic urban settings. urban realistic and actual in rehearsals mission allows also RTS wl poie h aiiy o iuae B atcs sn NC ees ast ad omn, Control, Command, and assets defense NBC using attacks NBC simulate to ability the provide will C t will provide for the training and use of simulation capability by all NBC defense personnel and commanders S tation, Network is being developed to enhance the training of training the W enhance to developed being is T E m S ul ) gear, and simulators for training and exercises. and training for simulators gear,and ) a R V tions in both Command Post Exercise (CPX) and Field Postand Command (CPX) Exerciseboth in tions ). E RTS I t will provide the capability to use or simulate the use of NBC sensors, NBC of use the simulate or use to capability providethe will t M odeling and S supports training in all tasks for the C the for tasks all in training supports S urvey urvey erver erver I t will allow for exercise planning, execution, and capturing lessons learned for after for learned lessons capturing and execution, planning, exercise for allow will t I T S ntelligence, eam tation, AA S imulation capabilitiesdevelopedNBCdefenserequirements. tosupport S tations ( S R oldiers and airmen must be proficient on a wide array of government of array wide a on proficient be must airmen and oldiers

I S nformation, D tation, and V O esk- E nce validated for C for validated nce RTS T T R op), a Chief , by being distributable over a network, allows teams to train he simulation system will consist of a network of PC-based of network a of consist will system simulation he eporting Networkeporting (JWA D T MD TS R ata Logger he eco C will provide capabilities from individual and team provideand will individual fromC capabilities C V ST n E T ST T nai RTS rainer/Battlemaster . he s. W I ST s t allows training on procedures for response for procedures on training allows t ac, and sance, TS is required to support both individual and individual both support to required is S s, tation. C will provide the capability to simulate to capability the provide will C MD T V raining Exercise (F Exercise raining T E raining in the virtual cities of cities virtual the in raining response requires significant training significant requires response RTS R I T t will provide the capability to use to capability providethe will t I N), future Joint NBC offers the promise to train other train to promise the offers 2 he W RS S relac (C urveillance systems MD S tation, C ST T T X) environments.X) actical Engagement actical I s,particular,in are mmersive 4 I 2 RS I nformation nformation systems ) S V tation, E RTS I t

C-15

ANNEX C C-16 ANNEX C D x No e n n A Specialty Suits Ensembles Protection Surface Aviation/ Equi Protective Individual Co Universal Category n m p mon - ment Me di - Suit Contamination Avoidance Liquid Protective - Joint Firefighter Integrated Response Ensemble - Improved Toxicological Agent Protective (ITAP) - EOD Ensemble - STEPO - CB.45 Self-Detoxifying Materials for Chemical/ Joint Protective Aircrew Ensemble (JPACE) -Battledress Overgarment (BDO) - JSLIST CB Coverall for CVC (JC3) - JSLIST Block 2 Glove Upgrade (JB2GU) - Integrated Footwear System (IFS) - Alternative Footwear Solutions (AFS) -- Boots (MULO) -- Overgarment - Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit - CMU-34P and CMU-35P (USN modified CPU) - Modified CPU (mCPU) - Joint Service Mask Leakage Tester (JSMLT) - Voice Communication Adapter - Protection Assessment Test System (PATS) - Joint Service Chemical Environment Survivability - Joint Service General Purpose Mask (JSGPM) - Joint Service Aircrew Mask (JSAM) - MCU-2A/P/MCU-2P - M40A1/M42A2 - M45 Land Warrior Mask - M45 Aircrew Protective Mask (ACPM) Nomenclature cal (SCALP) (JFIRE) Biological Protective Clothing Technology (JSLIST) Mask (JSCESM) Prot ec Table Protection RDA D-1. Efforts tio n Progr a ms RDTE Fielded Fielded Fielded Fielded Status Fielded Fielded Production Production Fielding DTO Production Fielded RDT&E Production RDT&E RDT&E Prod.* Prod.* RDTE Production Production Fielded Fielded Production Production Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt USA Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Interest Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Interest Rqmt Rqmt Interest Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt USAF Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Fielded USMC Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Fielded Fielded Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt USN Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt D -1 ANNEX D D ANNEX D -2 I R MCU-2/P andMCU-2A/P Protective Mask ITEMS PRODUCTION AND FIELDED RESPIRATORYSURFACE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT PROTECTION INDIVIDUAL I nterest =Product nt-N qmt =Product requirement COLLECTIVE PROTECTION Generic Filters Systems Filtrations Generic CP Systems Fixed CP Systems Mobile CP (CP) Systems Protection Collective Transportable Category IR =Product

I I nterest nterest, No - CB Protective Shelter (CBPS) (Medical) - M28 CP Equipment (CPE) - M20A1 Simplified CP Equipment (SCPE) Nomenclature - M48/M48A1 (100 cfm) Gas-Particulate Filter - M98 (200 cfm) Gas-Particulate Filter Set - CB.61 Advanced Air Purification System Model - Joint Collective Protection Equipment (JCPE) - Modular Collective Protection System (MCPE) - Fixed Installation Filters - M13A1 GPFU - M8A3 Gas-Particulate Filter Unit (GPFU) - Shipboard Collective Protection System (CPS) - CP Deployable Medical System (CP DEPMEDS) - CP Expeditionary Medical Shelter System (CP

(Medical) EMEDS) (Medical)

I mminent R equirement dto to the sta the to attachment for tube drinking relativemasks,a earlier includes to and visor.quality filter canister, is mounted on either which side of a wide-view optical pa tion from all chemical and biological (CB) agents as well as radi T improvedcomm of the Air Force ground crews and the shore-based support units. support shore-based Air Force Aero- * - Rqmt, Interest he r S ti ub-Product(s) ofaConsolidated Joint = M c lt material. ulate CU-2/P and D efense n dard canteen, and electronic voicemitter connections for connections voicemitter electronic and canteen, dard = T T echnology echnology S he mask pr mask he ub-Product requirement or M u nications. edical personnel Fielded Fielded DTO RDTE Fielded Fielded Fielded Fielded Production Production Production Production Fielded Fielded Status M T CU-2A/P provides eye and respiratory protec O e ak ss replac a uses mask he bjective ( o T vides improved fit, comfort, and vi improvedand fit,vides comfort, T he he S Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Interest Rqmt Interest Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt USA cience & M M S ervice Project ervice CU-2A/P is also currently used by used currently also is CU-2A/P CU-2A/P designed to meet needs meet to designed CU-2A/P I nterest M T echnology BaseProgram) echnology CU-2/P Navy Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Interest Rqmt Interest Rqmt Rqmt USAF e be sta able, Rqmt Interest Interest Rqmt USMC S n hipboard and ad NA dard Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Interest Interest Rqmt Rqmt Interest Rqmt Rqmt USN o s ibility active TO ­

XM50/51 JointServiceGeneralPurposeMask (JSGPM) Universal SecondSkin Voice CommunicationAdapter M40/42 SeriesProtective Mask and U. is fieldingarelated secondskinfornaval oftheprotective variants masks. T battlefield.Nuclear,contaminated the (NBC) Chemical Biological, T T costsavings.significant operational andsupport T pr sy lens rigid designed for combat vehicle cre series series mask. is a Jointa U.is parts permits the permits parts mo of savings.Use cost support and operation significant a in resulted has which part, spare a made been has J with patible he he Universal he he he o tection for the masks. V V M oice Communication Adapter ( CA provides effective voice communication between masked personnel enhancing Command and Control on Control and Command enhancing personnel betweenmaskedcommunication voiceprovides effective CA S 0 eis ( series 40 . Army. S s T tem. . Army/U. S he Universal second skin provides liquid agent protection for the mask faceblank material. S L econd IST T left M he facepiece is covered with a chlorobutyl/ EP covered chlorobutyl/ is a facepiece with he and 40 series facepiece to be used in both the both in used be to facepiece series 40 i dsge fr h idvda di individual the for designed is ) S kin is one of the components of a Pre-planneda of Productcomponents the of one is kin S S . I aratoga ovearatoga t accommodates NA M arine Corps effort. Corps arine w men. V r CA) is a low risk program providing additional capability to the garments, and ballistic/laser protective eye lens outserts. lens eyeprotective ballistic/laser and garments, R ecent improv T are, n acsois noprtn saeo-h-r tec U. state-of-the-art protect incorporating accessories and carrier, T TIM fallout particles, and radioactive agents, CB from protection above-the-neck wearer co-deve and current S with interface to ability to the and maximize performance wearer’s the on impact the minimize to designed rie qimn ad rtcie clothing. protective and equipment ervice he J he he J TO s). T SG SG he the for skin second Forcea Air fielding is standard canisters, which can be worn on either cheek of the mask. P P M M S e is a lightweight protective mask system consisting of mask, of consisting system mask protective lightweight a is was designed for use by all four fre fo al niiae CB anticipated all from forces . ments include a universal second skin, making the mask com s T one gon wrir wie the while warrior, ground mounted oxic I ndustrial ndustrial Chemical/ M DM T 40 and 40 he second skin to pr to skin second V in-turned in-turned peripheral face seal and binocular si a of sists radioactive fal wa CB from eye-re provide T

CA is a joint program between the U betweenthe program joint a is CA he M 42 confi 42 I M mprovement(P3 04 sre poetv masks protective series 40/42 T l­ oxic cone rubber face piece with an with piece face rubber cone g S l uration. out particles. Each mask con ervices coveringervices a multitude r o s R I ae gns txn and toxins agents, fare T vide opt vide pi ndustrial ndustrial E threats. NE e J he r­ oy ae pr face tory M M SG T CU 2A/P.CU T I 2 eis ( series 42 his has resulted in resulted has his ) in the in ) i he mask facepiece mask he P mum liquid agent liquid mum M M M aterials aterials ( rvds the provides T T 40/42 mask. his program h e ak is mask he M no l T o 40/ o p he Navyhe l right g to ogy te mental TI d­ c SM M tion Cs/ is ) lar 42 C ­ ­ D -3 ANNEX D D ANNEX D -4 M45 Protective Mask ITEMS PRODUCTION AND FIELDED RESPIRATORY PROTECTION AVIATION ITEMS R&D RESPIRATORYSURFACE PROTECTION Joint ServiceChemicalEnvironmentSurvivabilityMask(JSCESM) the filters. J the while filters, screw-in of use the require standards CB to response for responders first civilian and military by approvalNational the frompursuing is manager 300%. by resistance material increasing and 37% by resistance breathing lowering150%, by M of environments and missions, and the mask has to work in variety of ground, shipboard and combat vehicle operations. shelter filtration system fails or emergency evacuation of a shelter is required when contamination is present. J airport. civilian Additionally,J the for exist missions other CB provides ofprotection from 2hours aerosol. ask designers have achieved several significant milestones with the J the with milestones severalhavesignificant achieved designers ask R N threat is po threatis N s sible, but unlikely, such as while in-transit to a deployment or when operating an aerial port at a at port sible,aerial an operatingunlikely, butwhen deployment or a to in-transit while as such T operations personnel and other U other and practical. personnel not operations is mask service standard the using when instances certain CB low egress mask emergency for use in situations confronting the U O in especiallyprotection, for options greater with levels all at he J he ther S CE T R han War( N threat conditions and military medical care providers and patients in patients and providers care medical military and conditions threat N SM is a lightweight complement to the J the to lightweightcomplement a is M and ut and facepiece with an in-turned peripheral seal, a detac ACP co when burden logistical ai and cost weight, systems,reduced has and devices; vision optical night and displays helicopter with compatibility provides I Army helicopter pilots and crews (except for the Apache hel ACP Protective Crew Air the and program Warrior T I t does not require power or forced air to provide CB prote provideCB to air forced powerrequireor not does t nstitute for nstitute he 43 ( 43 MOOT M M M i T a coe itn eeess one i a sil a in mounted eyelenses fitting close has ( lizes the standard NA standard the lizes 5 Protective 45 ype SG shown S R P W). CE II N incidents.N Currently, N M O ) and the and ) i seily eind o et h requir the meet to designed specially is ) utilizes a bayonet-style locking mechanism to attach attach to mechanism locking bayonet-style a utilizes ccupational SM T he J he such as use in collective protection shelters if the if shelters protectioncollective in use as such S S SG forces can discreetly carry J carry discreetly can forces CE M M P s spot rqieet fr h Land the for requirements supports ask SM M 24 avi 24 m S afety and Health (N Health and afety , including increasing overallprotectionincreasing ,including ae t the to pared TO provides a one-size-fits-all,disposable,providesa canister. a tor’s mask.tor’s SG IOS P M H testing and certification certification and testing H T . M he I t pr t 3 eis f mask. of series 43 T T M he IOS S he J he M o M 45 will replace the replace will 45 forces operating in vides commanders commanders vides h M ilitary ilitary ask (ACP ask able hood system, H) to enable use enable to H) S SG 45 fits a higher a fits 45 CE i P cone rubber rubber cone SM M O e program program perations et of ments i when a when M co c S S tion;it CE ). pecial p r craft ter). T T SM he he

M48 P M48 P22P-14( anti-drown features. air forhoodventilation, andfiltered airforoxygen forbreathing. filteredprovide to switch selector flight ground with cross-overmanifold a and filter,supply CB air/oxygen a dual compatibility isrequiredastheLand foruniqueequipmentsuch Warrior system. being used for some hard-to-fit personnel. an get not do who adequatepersonnel face seal for in the mask a as used is and population, extra-large and extra-small the of percentage rotective V )2 L O X, A/P22P-14( T Apache Apache Joint the until aviator Apache the for mask only the is and mask Aircrew Eye/Respiratory Protection (AERP) flightoperations.during T hose assembly, a web belt, the mask carrier, facepiece carrier, eyelens cushions, and facepiece. M M he he motor blower is aircraft mounted with a quick disconnect bracket on the pilot’s seatpilot’s the on bracket disconnect quick a with mounted aircraft is blower motor he 40 or T are provided in the followingconfigurations:the provided arein A/P22P-14( members.aircrewfixed-wing and deployedrotary-wing forward T CB Respiratory Assemblies(A/P22P-14(V) 1,2,3,&4)NDI mounted insidetheaircraft. de-misting.provides M chemical-biological a in operations mission environment. conduct to aircrews enables that mask M ask he AE he he CB he BU-12/P mask, an intercom for ground communication, and a blowerthat assemblya communication,and ground for intercom an mask, BU-12/P 48 is the third generation third the is 48 V V M ariant is produced. is ariant )3 CU-2A/P masks. R O R P, B espiratory Assembly is a self-contained protective ensemble designed for all for designed ensemble protective self-contained a is Assembly espiratory OGS M T U1/ (elcs the (replaces BU-19/P T he he AE he , and A/P22P-14( M 45 is also used for specific ground force applic T R he blower is stowed during flight operations on a bracket that is that bracket a on operations flight during stowedblower is he P system includes a protective hood assembly with a standard a with assembly hood protective a includes system P I t will be used to phase out the extra-small T he M M 43 series masks. series 43 48 mask consists of a lightweight motor blower,new motor lightweighta a of consists mask 48 V )4 Panel T he systemprovides enhanced protection and offer M U1/ sse fr ices i a protective a is aircrews) for system BU-13/P M ounted T he M R 48 mask replaced the replaced mask 48 egulator. V )1 Helo (self contained),(self Helo )1 A/ S T ervice Aircrew ervice he design incorporates a R tions where close eye M espirator assemblies espirator 17 masks currently M 43 M T ask – ask ype I

D -5 ANNEX D D ANNEX D -6 Joint ServiceMaskLeakageTester M41 Protection AssessmentTest System FIELDED AND PRODUCTION ITEMS EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE INDIVIDUAL COMMON UNIVERSAL Joint ServiceAircrewMask(JSAM) AVIATION RESPIRATORY PROTECTION R&DITEMS to 24months. provides a visual display of the fit achieved by the individual.mask when worn bythe the individual and of requires calibration everyface 18 the to mask a of fit individual to ensure the highest protective value. D anti-drown features andsomeversionswillbecapable ofbeingdonnedinflight. and demist demist/emergency feet, 60,000 to protection hypoxia provideprotection, thermal and flame provide Air Force, Navy, and T Description: include a protective hood assembly,hood protective a filter,include CB communication. blower ground assembly,for intercom an and aircraft. J the in he J he uring the issuing process for Protective for process issuing the uring S Rotary Rotary Wing Type 1 A DOD M S family lightweighta be will masks of protectiveCB thatprotectionmask wornCB be as will all for Army, A M inventory that can provide anti- provide can that inventory T will be compatible with CB ensembles, ensembles and existing aircrew equipment.life support he M M 41 PA arine rotary arine and fixed-wing aircrew members. TS hasbeenacquired by the Air Force, and Apache Variant Type 1a T expanded capability compared to the provides capability for an overall mask servic overallmask an for providescapability wellcomponents.levelas added system with mask as testing the of testing capable of testing the serviceability of a pr a of serviceability the testing of capable of protective masksinthe field. e Joint he M I t tests all current military and several commercial masks. commercial several and military current all tests t asks it is absolutely essential that the mask be properly fitted to the to fitted properly be mask the that essential absolutely is it asks G protection, up to 9 a 9 to up protection, T he S ervice ervice M 41 Protection Assessment M s Leakage ask Fixed Wing Type 2 I M G t will be the and first only CB protective mask ( arines. T T se (J ester ype 2), for aircrew in high performance performance high in aircrew for 2), ype M 41 PA T est SM o te TS e S L abi ystem (PA c T by allowing component level tive mask in the field. the in mask tive i a por a is ) l ity and fit factor validationfactor fit and ity TS t ) validates proper be et system test able T he system he I I I t will t t will t has t I t CWU-66/P AircrewEnsemble Battle DressOvergarment(BDO) ITEMS PRODUCTION AND FIELDED ENSEMBLE PROTECTIVE SURFACE SCOT Tester MQ1A MaskTester I andisthe cylinders Air Force replacement forthe offers a reduced thermal loadburden andiscompatible areduced thermal equipment. withallcurrentlyoffers fieldedaircrew lifesupport T wear. LikeJ the (extendable). T particles. radi and toxins), include (to agents biological droplets, liquid impre activatedcharcoal uniform. duty the over T T T garment, which is launderable.is which garment, fabric. liner the in immobilized adsorbers carbon activated spherical, uses M system provides a visual display of the fit achieved by the mask when worn by the individual. is currently inuseby the Air Force the at unitssupporting t uses spherical, activated carbon adsorbers immobilized in the liner fabric and is less bulky than prior ensembles. bulkyprior less than is and fabric liner spherical,the uses in t immobilized activated adsorbers carbon he CWU-66/P, a one-piece flightsuit configuration, provides 16-hour pr 16-hour providesconfiguration,CWU-66/P, flightsuit he one-piece a B he B he he he BU-5/P and BU-5/P M S C DO DO Q1A mask tester also validates proper fit of a mask to the face of the individual.the of face the to mask a of fit propervalidates also tester mask Q1A OT T S provides 24 hours of chemical agent protection once contaminated and has a field durability of 22 days 22 of durability field a has and contaminated once protection agent chemical of hours 24 provides is a camouflage patterned (desert or woodland), two-piece,air-per woodland), or (desert patterned camouflage a is L he B mask tester performs the same functions as the as functions same the performs tester mask IST DO ,the M BU-12/P aviator masks and the and masks aviator BU-12/P is issued in a sealed vapor-barrier bag that protects the garment from rain, moisture, and sunlight. S A R T g A he overgarment material co material overgarment he natedpolyurethane foam. TOG T A CP A he S aratoga pr aratoga S uit is an air-permeable,an is uit overgarment. patterned camouflage piay amn oe udrer eedn uo te niomn and mission. environment the upon depending underwear over garment primary a skins. second design with hood an compatibleintegrated with respe previous in garments. technology foam carbon activated bulky the replacing technology, bead launde 6 wearand of T Overgarment Joint ServiceLightweightIntegratedSuitTechnology (JSLIST) Chemical Protective (CP)Suit,Saratoga(USMC) removed from itsvacuum packaging. he J he S L o IST vides a 24-hour protection period and has a durability of 45 daysof 45 of durability a has and period protection 24-hour a vides M

M T O Q1A. I he B he BU-13/P and BU-13/P n vergarment provides 24-hour pr 24-hour provides vergarment t will be worn as an ove an as worn be will t sists of an outer layer of nylon cotton, and an inner layer of layer inner an and cotton, nylon of layer outer an of sists DO T M he J r BU-5/P, ings for a period of up to 120 days after the garment is garment the daysafter 120 to up of period a for ings M provides protection against chemical agent vapors and vapors agent provides chemical protectionagainst Q1A. However,Q1A. the S o L active alpha and (all but the most energetic) beta energetic) most the but (all and alpha active IST M

M O BU-19/P aviator NBC protective masks.protective NBC aviator BU-19/P BU-12/P, ve r o garment garment is a two-piece jacket and trouser T T te he linerisbaseduponactivated carbon his system allows for a lighter,cooler a for allows system his c r tion against standard NA standard against tion ga m­ r M able overgarment typically worn typically overgarment able ment for the duty uniform or as or uniform duty the for ment BU-13/P and S C o OT tection with up to 45 days 45 to up with tection I t tests currently fielded currently AF tests t is not reliant on oxygen on reliant not is T c tive he M S M T QA1 ervice masks and ervice he BU-19/P. S A TO M R ask A threats. TOG T ester T he A I t D -7 ANNEX D D ANNEX D -8 Joint ServiceLightweightIntegratedSuitTechnology (JSLIST) RDTE ITEMS ENSEMBLES PROTECTIVE SURFACE Chemical Protective Undergarment(CPU) uniform, theCPUprovides ofbothvapor andliquidprotection 12hours andisdurable for15days. activated carbon. When worn under a combat vehicle crewman coverall, battle dress uniform, or aviation battle dress T be authorized as additional JSLIST material sources. asadditionalJSLISTmaterial be authorized wellas, may and list products qualified consideredJSLIST be fora on will placement garment JSLIST current the than better or to and materials JSLIST conduct field of wear tests and sources laboratory chemical tests additional on commercial JSLIST qualify suit candidates. to initiated was The JASQ (JASQ) candidates that performQualification as Source Additional JSLIST The ORD. JSLIST the in found requirements the meet to sock/liner) (overboots and program, items (IFS) footwear System field will which and OperationalEnsemble(ORD)) CrewFootwear Documents AlternativeAir Requirements Integrated (AFS) Footwear Solution Protective Joint and JSLIST the both in (found requirements Service Joint meet to glove protective chemical a field to intended meet U.S.SOCOM to glove protective a chemical GloveUpgrade) 2 BlockGloveUpgrade),glove programprotective(JSLIST 1 Block field chemical follow-on (JSLIST requirementsa to intended programs includes RDT&E JSLIST Current (MULO). Overboot Multi-purpose and Overgarment JSLIST the fielding began and classified type program JSLIST 1997,the April In these sixJSLISTcomponents. 2) generallybe launderable.will and and lightweightburdenheat components:item clothing JSLIST six areThere overgarment, 1) needs and tested to Joint Service standards. The JSLIST will provide enhanced CB protective ensembles with reduced physiological protective clothing for all Services. The program will yield a family of garments and ensembles developed for Joint Service mission CB new field and develop to chartered effort Procurement and cooperativeRDT&E fully JointService a program is JSLIST The he CPU is a one-time launderable two-piece lightweight undergarment made of a non-woven fabric containing fabric non-woven a of made undergarment lightweight two-piece launderable one-time a is CPU he

lightweight garment, 3)

undergarment, 4) socks, 5) boots, and 6) gloves. Each of the Services’ requirements are incorporated by fixed wingaviators withbelow-the-neck pr as a tec Joint Aircrew the as such masks, co-developmental and systems mask aviation legacy enviro CB in JPACEsystem.improv with aviatorsprovides unde and Navy the replaces that ensemble protective CB a JPACEis Joint Protective AircrewEnsemble(JPACE) r garment and the and Army garment AviationBattl h nical insertion nical to insertion the Army Air Warrior program. JPACE will pr M ask (J ask n ments, extended wear, and service life.wear, extended ments, service and S A M ). T his ensemble will be jointly tested with J with jointlytested be ensemble will his e o dress Uniform (AB Uniform dress te e c ments in protection, reduced heat stress heat protection,reduced in ments tion againstCBthreats. I n addition, it is co is it addition, n D U)-B S M A arine Corps Corps arine M DO and will be used be will and o vide rotary and m and/or CPU and/or patible with patible S ervice ervice M K-1 Modified Chemical Protective Undergarment(mCPU) and fieldingofJPACE. the AB with worn mCPU tubing.unit cooling microclimate for pass-through a include to developed being is (mCPU) CPU modified A DTO CB.45 Self-DetoxifyingMaterialsforChemical/BiologicalProtective Clothing Conduct fieldtestingandassessments. nanoparticles.reactive containing materials and textiles,N-halamine-treated membranes, self-detoxifying electrospun scaled-up of cost-effectivenessoverall and FY2007: plan. durability.assess to garments Weaponworn CWAon user live (CWA)testing and Agent simulant Collect systems.Chemical reactivity. Conduct of persistence fabric and durability self-detoxifying for ensemble biocidal-treated test chemically Field assessments. of field-testing Conduct garments. of breakthrough FY2006: Milestones/Metrics. more universalintheiractivity. against agents.nerve effective be to shown been havecatalysts other example,while for mustard, against effective are that developed additional benefit is increased protection. Agent reactive catalysts are specific in their behavior. Catalysts have been clothing is burdensome to wear, any extra weight must result in garments.additional the benefit to to additivesthe warfighter.of weight extra the and capability self-detoxifying new the between balance Challenges. have beenshown towork forantimicrobially treated electrospun fibers. polyurethanecoatings.polyesters,fabrics,nylon/cotton and to kill” mechanisms applied and Aerosolbeen “catch Undergarments have been treated with chloramines to kill biological warfare agents, and N-halamine chemistry has near protective fabric surfaces. the effectiveness of reactive compounds by concentrating reactive nanoparticles and other decontaminating catalysts gas wellcontaminatedof disposing as clothing. and membranes, resulting in increased protection and a substantially reduced hazard when donning and doffing, as coatings,fibers, into incorporated be will agents warfare(CW/BW) chemical/biological neutralize that biocides clothing protective CB through the to added capability of self-detoxification.protection of level increased an provide and decontamination personal simplify will Percutaneous)byskin, probabilityof reducingthe eye, hazards.agent NBC with respiratorycontact or Payoffs. their capabilitytoself-detoxify agentsinacost-effective clothingsystemwillbedemonstrated. Objectives. V X simulant and mustard. Hyperbranched compounds that float to surfaces have been synthesized to increase to havesynthesized surfaces been to float that compounds mustard. and Hyperbranched simulant X Fabricate prototype garments.

T O his tmz gret ein ad auatr otmzd rttp garments. prototype optimized manufacture and designs garment ptimize Agent reactive catalysts and biocides will be directly incorporated into CB protective clothing and clothing protective CB into incorporated directly be will biocides and catalysts reactive Agent

T DTO he addition of agent reactive catalysts and biocides to advanced CB clothing systems must strike a strike must systems clothing CB advanced to biocides and catalystsreactive agent of addition he addresses the Joint Future Joint the addresses I t is not practical at this time to expect universal agent neutralization. D U will be used as interim chemical protection for Army aviators until the development the until aviatorsfor Army protection chemical interim as used be will U S urface enrichment urfaceof hyperbranched enrichment materials has been demonstrated in coatings. D D ownselect candidates. emonstrate activity of treated fabric systems. R eactive nanoparticles in fibers have fibers in eactiveshownbeen nanoparticles breakto down nerve O M perational Capability of Capability perational T easure chemical/aerosol breakthrough of optimized garments. optimized of breakthrough chemical/aerosol easure he most efficient and cost-effective agent reactive catalysts and T ransition toJ I ndividual Protection ( Protection ndividual S L IST upgrade. M easure chemical/aerosol D I n general, biocides are mntae durability emonstrate D evelop transition evelop R I espiratory and espiratory n this case, the T S his effort effort his ince CB ince T he D -9 ANNEX D D ANNEX D -10 Multipurpose Overboot(MULO) Green VinylOverboots/BlackOverboots(GVO/BVO) Disposable FootwearCover Chemical Protective Sock FIELDED AND PRODUCTION ITEMS ACCESSORIES PROTECTIVE and a butyl rubber securing strap for each set of buttons. of set each for strap securing rubber butyl a and released from either side of the overboot.the of side either from released sealed.completely and vulcanized are seams decontaminability, over andhasbetterdonningdoffingcharacteristics standardfootwear. provides more durability, improved traction, resistance to Petroleum, pr and boot wet pr is T andare durable agentsfor24hours forupto60days.chemical pr vapor moisture and/or T the shelterandaircraft. over-bootsPlastic overwornare flyer’sthe boot. heat-seal closure. wide inch 1/8 with tubing extruded flat wide inch 8 and thick long,mils 4 roll,inch per 21 each 500 at size one in T folded inavacuum plasticbag. packed he he generation first the is Crew Air Chemical sock his o M GVO duced by injection molding.byinjection duced UL O /B is a joint program service under the auspices of the J VO are fitted vinyl overshoes that are worn over the combat boots to provide agent protection chemical o T vides 24 hours of protection from chemical agents with a wear-life of up to 60 days.60 to up of wear-life a with agents chemical from protection of hours 24 vides his sock istobeworn overhis sock theregular sock. overboot designed to provide a minimum of 24 hours protection from chemical agents in agents liquid and chemical vapor form. from protection hours 24 of minimum a provide to designed overboot agents. chemical to exposure against ensemble. AL CB the with interchangeable is and CPFC the to equivalent functionally and operational Footwear Cover (CPFC) - is which no longer available through the supply system. T AirBoss LightweightOverboot(ALO) he AL o T te hey comeinonesizeandare removed theaircraftorshelter. before entering c O tion during wet weather.wet during tion is being procured and issued as the interim replacement for the Chemical Protective I t is designed for wearfor overdesigned is cold/ boot,combatt boot,the jungle intermediate and O (JSLIST Boots) s are worn over the standard issue shoes or work boots and provide protection O nce contaminated, the AL T he AL T T he AL he overboot has an anti-slip, ridged tread pattern, is anti-static, and all T O hey protect the user from chemical contamination en-route fromen-routecontamination chemical from user heythe protect D is issued in four sizes.four in issued is O efense Equipment.efense is approximately 13 inches high and has three sets of buttons of sets three has and high inches approximately13 is T he impermeable impermeable he T T he adjustable securing strap is symmetric and can be can and symmetric is strap securing adjustable he he AL he S L O IST canbedecontaminated andreissued. O O program. is a lightweight compounded butyl rubber rubber butyl compounded lightweight a is il, (P and Lubricants I t is plastic and disposable.and plastic is t T GVO he overboots are packaged in pairs and pairs in packaged overbootsare he I t is made of an elastomer blend and /B VO provides protection against protection provides O Ls), flame protection, T he sock comes sock he T T he he AL M UL R O - is O D

Joint ServiceLightweightIntegratedSuitTechnology (JSLIST)Block2GloveUpgrade(JB2GU) Chemical Protective (CP)Gloves Alternative FootwearSolutions(AFS)/IntegratedSystem(IFS) with aremovable protective linerfor sweat management. protective liner. chemical inner resistant(F flame requirements.aviation and shipboard, ground, of spectrum broader J the upon improve wear.of days 30 to up for agents known all of concentrations T least 24 hours. he JB2 he

AFS G

U is a hand wear item that will provide 24 hours of chemical biological (CB) protection from battlefield from protection (CB) biological chemical of hours 24 provide will that item wear hand a is U T he 7 mil glove set should be replaced within 6 hours of exposure to a chemical agent. R ) and non-flame resistant(nF non-flame and ) S L IST T (U a CB protective system sock/liner that meets aviation and U. meet the requirements for ground, aviation and shipboard mission areas. areas.AF mission similar for durability and protection chemical of terms in footwear protection. footwear and (CB) chemical biological in gain incremental an achieve will that program development evolutionary e lentv Footwear Alternative he of the glove(s) it replaces. functionality the and protection agent chemical both provide together that liner and shell glovenew a of wear,combination hand a existing or of place in worn be will thatglove a T J days.14 contaminatedenvironmenta protection in gloveof durable to is up and hours 24 offer will providewill tactility,enhanced climates.dexterity, all in worn be can and comfort and glove. current the to equal or than better hazards (CB) Chemical/Biological aerosol and increased tactility and durability. T Joint Block1GloveUpgradeProgram (JB1GU) mask. block 1 block SSO S he JB1 he JB1 he L IST C T OM requirements document and will serve as an evolutionary approach to the JB2 the to approach evolutionary an as serve will and document requirements he nF he G G T U supports the U U supports U may be either a liner intended to be worn under existing U.existing under worn be to intended liner a mayeither U be G he JB1 he ) missionarea requirements. love Upgrade (JB1 Upgrade love R variant is a molded glove made from compounded butyl rubber and comes and gloverubber butylmolded compounded froma made is variant G U is a system that will achieve most of the requirements outlined in the in outlined requirements the of most achieve will that system a is U T and heavyandlabor. by personnel who require a durable glove to perform close combat tasks necessary and stress to the glove is not too harsh. personnel such as aviators and mechanics, in cases when good tacti repair,electronicequipment aircrews.and high degree of ta mil.25 14,and7, forperspiration absorption. CPouter gloves come inthree thicknesses: gloveinnerglovecottonmil a (25only)andagents chemical from tion he CP butyl glove set consists of a butyl-rubber outer glove for pr R ). S I T t will be used with the J ltos (AF olutions SSO he F he G C R T U) effort by offering greater durability that will satisfy a satisfy will that durability greater offering by effort U) OM he JB1 variant combines an outer Nomex/leathergloveouter an combines variant an with T c T he goals of AF of goals he ti urgent requirement to provide glovean interim with he 14 and 25 mil glovemilprovide 25sets and protection at14 for he I T l t is a component of the J the of component a is t ity, such as medical personnel, personnel engaged in G S he 7 mil glove is used by personnel who requirea who personnelby used gloveis mil 7 he and ) U will provide hand protection from liquid, vapor, T he JB2 he I tgae Footwear ntegrated S L S G IST / I U will be available in two variants: two in available be will U F ensemble and protectivechemical S are to field common protective common field to are S . S pecial T he 14 mil glove is used by used gloveis mil 14 he S L T IST O he 25 mil glove is used perations Command T S ensemble and will and ensemble he se ( ystem S . military gloves,. military I F S will provide I F S i an is ) S l o will ity is G T tec U. he I ­ t D -11

ANNEX D D ANNEX D -12 Suit ContaminationAvoidance LiquidProtection (SCALP) SUITS SPECIALTY Aircrewman Cape Chemical Protective HelmetCover Glove Inserts polyethylene-coated contamination. liquid gross T and othernational standards. stageofanattack.liquid dispersal contamination. liquid against protection T opening by elasticwebbing enclosedinthehem. contamination. biological and T absorption.perspiration T primarily for wartime environments. wartime for primarily (NFPA),N Protection Fire P a CB environment, (4) providing resistance to water and all standard fire fighting chemicals (foam, C (foam, chemicals fighting fire standard all and water to resistance providing (4) environment, CB a O he provideadditional to body entire overthe worn in) 23 x in (74 bag plastic all fits size one a is cape disposable his chemical from protection with helmet standard anyprovide to intended Coveris Helmet Protective Chemical he gloves. rubber butyl (CP) protective chemical the under worn are inserts cotton gauntlet hese L), and (5) S AP a b wr oe sadr ceia poetv gret t poie one provide to garments protective chemical standard over worn be can CALP

is capable of being donned in 8 minutes. A limitation of the ensemble is that it does not meet National meets several key requirements, including (1) providing 24 hours of CB agent protection against 10 protection agent CB of hours 24 providing (1) including requirements, key several meets CB and fire both gloves.proximity standard JF under for worn be glovesto CB for used need the replaced has protection be can that glove off-the-shelf commercial A protection. respiratory provideapparatus breathing contained self and kit warfare chemical with mask air filtered/supplied pr envi CB a in operations firefighting fir military protect will that ensemble an developed has JF Joint FirefighterIntegrated Response Ensemble(JFIRE) FIELDED AND PRODUCTION ITEMS fighting/rescue operation, (3) operation, fighting/rescue IR o

g/m te T E is a joint effort between the Air Force (lead agency) and the Army. the and agency) (lead Force Air the between effort joint a is E c yvek™ material. impermeable tion, to be worn under aluminized proximitytion,aluminized firefightingunder outergear.worn be to Additionally,switchablea 2 T iud gn, (2) agent, liquid hey canbeworn ineitherhandandare available inthree sizes(small, mediumandlarge). IOS T he I H or H t is a one-piece configuration made of butyl coated nylon cloth and gathered at the at gathered and cloth nylon coated butyl of made configuration one-piece a is t S CALP, which consists of a jacket with hood, trouser and booties, is made from a from made is booties, and trouser hood, with jacket a of CALP,consists which I f worn, thecapeisremoved theaircraft. before entering OS T he U he HA standards. HA T he cape will be worn if aircrews have to leave a covered area during the during areacovered a leave to haveaircrews if worn be will cape he

rvdn frfgtr C pr CB firefighters providing S AF is currently modernizing the JF the modernizing currently is AF

allowing firefighters to use mission essential tools and equipment in equipment and tools essential mission use to firefighters allowing T he covers comeinonesizeandare ofolive color. green r o n T ment. JF ment. he ensemble is designed as military unique and is designed is and unique military as designed is ensemble he IR E leverages the J the leverages E o e eto i bt srcua ad rs fire crash and structural both in tection fighters providing CB protection during during protection CB providing fighters IR E with the goal of meeting NFPAmeeting of goal the with E S L IST overgarment for chemical chemical for overgarment

or f rtcin from protection of hour T e JF he T IR e provide hey O E Program Program E 2 , aircraft , IR E Improved Toxicological AgentProtective (ITAP) Ensemble ToxicSelf-Contained EnvironmentProtective Outfit (STEPO) use (1 use range of0 T charge sufficient to set off munitions and explosives in accordance with current Explosive T decontaminated andheldfordisposal. he fabric is light in color to reduce operator solar heat load and is capable of being stored within the temperature the within stored being of capable is and load heat solar operator reduce to color in light is fabric he he IT

hour at hour AP fabric is self-extinguishing meeting NFPA 1991.NFPA meeting self-extinguishing is fabric AP ° to120 ID LH), after vapor and particulate contamination. After liquid contamination, the contamination, contamination.liquid After particulate and vapor after LH), ° F. T he common, modular components with the Personal breat tether/emergency a and configurations) CA/ T (N Health eotmntd o rue p o tms fe ceia vpr e vapor chemical after times 5 to up reuse for decontaminated T tection against CB agents, missile/rocket fuels, P (E ST reducing costs. pr IT oxic e nebe noprts w tps f National of types two incorporates ensemble he o OD EP AP hasaminimum shelflifeof5years. eto fr ry hmcl Activity/ Chemical Army for tection D o O ) and , oia Aet rtcie ( Protective Agent logical T ( shown left EU and E and EU I ce Cooling IOS T echnical Escort echnical Unit Escort ( ) prvd self-co approved H) arecapable decontaminatedbeing of minimum a reuses,for 5 of 2 L agent challenge for 1 for challenge agent L 0 requir system a as worn when agent liquid IT ST mo and entry Che routineresponse, saving life gency to Life and Health ( IT S peacetime and wartime for short term peacetime operations and term for in wartime short wearer. nraig pe increasing ystem (P ystem ° P rvds pah n vpr rtcin gis pote against protection vapor and splash provides AP the replaces AP to 100 EP ) provides OD O S ystem (P andJF . IT T ° I he F when used with the cooling system. P lo rvds kn n respi and skin provides also AP C S ST O n r ) and is functional as a system where temperatures range from range temperatureswhere system a as functional is and ) IR oa poeto ad euig h teml bu thermal the reducing and protection sonal ito ccupational EP I E ensembles, si C r M ing. S O ID T T ), a hands-free communications system, and standard T 3 P bos n gloves. and boots AP) n EU) personnel. is a totally encapsulating protective ensemble for pro for ensemble protective encapsulating totally a is LH) toxic che he fabric is also static dissipative and does not hold a hold not does and dissipative static also is fabric he and rahn sses oe or n fu hour four and hour (one systems breathing tained T IT AP ensemble.AP

hour. AP shares common, modular components with the with components common,modular shares AP IT S D AP and JF afety and Health Administration ( pt (CA/ epot I t provides an optional Personal optional an provides t m h O plifying logistics andreducing costs.plifying logistics n aprts pin a atr powered battery a option, apparatus ing m L, and T ical environments (up to 1 hour), emer IR I he IT siue for nstitute E ensembles simplifying logistics and m AP e AP ST D ical Activity operations and in and operations Activity ical TI , Explosive ), EP r Cs for periods up to four hours. e n atory protection both during during both protection atory T et: 10g/m ments: hances existing capabilities by capabilities existing hances O e ut s aal o being of capable is suit he T is currently being fielded to S he afety Board requirements. x O posures. I IT mm ccupational AP suit and overhood O e d n r IT d i il exp tial ately 2 nance AP suit will be will suit AP H OS ST r D EP e o the on den I HA) level A ce Cooling ce D S ,

hours per hours ft and afety O V angerous o D ue to sure X, shares isposal G i M tial B, 3 ­ ­ D -13

ANNEX D D ANNEX D -14 M28 CPE M20/M20A1 SimplifiedCollective Protection Equipment(SCPE) FIELDED AND PRODUCTION ITEMS TRANSPORTABLE CPSYSTEMS SYSTEMS PROTECTION COLLECTIVE liner and the protectiveand liner e S S interfaceenvironmental with control units. an tents,capability,interconnections,and resistancefor agent liners capability,protectiveliquid providea also they an electronically powered blower. design, resulted in the improved CPE with respect to exit/entry procedures therefore, meeting the mission requirement as outlined in the CPE Letter in outlined as requirement mission the meeting therefore, procedures exit/entry to respect with CPE R equirement by allowing 150ormore peopletoenterandexitthe shelterover a24hourperiod. n trance;kit, ducting,contains support a and which lighting, and repairand sealing material M 20A1 existing structure into an NBC co ster, kit.and support is a room liner for existing shelters.existing for liner room a is area; a herme a area; e allows that entrance protective collapsible, a resistant polyethylene liner that pr and communicationand (C garment. wea without missions assigned perform can overpressure,positive a protecollectiveinto NBC T he T and the protective e herme e allows that entrance protective pr that liner T eln ad ear aeil n a eetoial pwrd lwr pre- blower.(P improvementA powered product planned electronically an and material repair and sealing (C NBC co NBC M he S E 20/ CPE and the 3 M ), medical treatment, and treatment, medical ), M T PE T hese improvedremovealso models the on imposed therestriction M 28 CPE is a low cost method of tran of method cost low a is CPE 28 t he i R c l 20A1 le ally sealed fi tent. M t c i c tive protection shelter for command,for co shelter tiveprotection 20 ally sealed filter canister, which pr canister, filter which sealed ally o ie a rtce ae i a eitn srcue a co a structure; existing an in area protected a vides S S M M CPE is used to convert an interior room of an exis CPE system co T 28 CPE components include a CB vapor resistant polyethylene 28 CPE models which, in addition to a vapor agent resistance he 3 n ),treamedical trance; and a support kit, which contains ducting, lighting, l S ter canister, provideswhich filtered air to both the liner CPE is a low cost method of tran l

le o soldier relief functions. relief soldier n vides a protected area in an existing structure; c sists of a liner, protective entrance, filter cani T tive protection shelter for command, co he t 3 ment,and n I ) program building upon the upon building program ) r t/xt rm h poetd ra a area; protected the from to/exit try M 20A1 components include a CB vapor CB a include components 20A1 r ing the prote the ing s n for

try to/exit from the protected the from to/exit try soldier reliefsoldier functions. c o tion she tion m vides filtered air to both the both to air filtered vides ing existing tentage into an into tentage existing ing n trol and communicationand trol M s l c ter where individuals where ter for tive mask and over and mask tive 28 is a liner for the for liner a is 28 m ing a room in an t ing structure M 20 l la M p S 20A1 sible, n M M CPE trol 20 20 ­ ­ Collectively Protected forExpeditionaryMedicalSupport(CPEMEDS) Chemically Protected DeployableMedicalSystem(CPDEPMEDS) equipment. environment AF where medical the treatment can to be rendered to impact personnel without the minimizing encumbrance of individual while protective environments services.dental, ancillary limited and medicine, aerospace coordination, evacuation aeromedical care, primary and urgent, surgery,critical, orthopedic select or forces deployed for services medical theater-level and bed-down individual provide ho fielded currently T currently available. Acquisition Authorized Army the or a full-up 248 bed Combat CP deployment developed.incrementally to been protect havea 44 bed systems Early Entry distribution Hospital, wateran 84 Bed and Hospital Company, latrines protected a 164 bed increment kit. CB a of addition the through protected chemically Army the and conditioning seals with those that are CB protected. ho the passagewayswithin systems. alarms and latrines, pr he Air Force’s CP E Force’sCP Air he o vided through the i s pi n M t t al she al e E gration gration of DS s pital. program is an effort to insert env insert to effort an is program S S l ters. ae etr rvds B rtcie etn. oh niomna cnrl nt are units control environmental Both heating. protective CB provides Heater pace upport Hospital.upport CP M 8 P poie pr provides CPE 28 D O T EP M bjective (AA bjective he role of CP E CP of role he T M 28 CPE, chemically protected air cond T he CP E CP he E he Field DS

ISO M D shelters are protected through the replacement of existing shelter existing of replacement the through protected are shelters O E eployable Environmental Control Unit provides CB protective air DS ) is 23 systems. A total of 14 systems were fielded, and 12 are 12 and fielded, were systems 14 of total systems.A 23 is ) D M T v medical oper fielded ho env T EP i o is used in a CB threat area and permits operation in CB activeCB operationin threatpermits CB areaand a in used is mission. H he Army’sCP he ro E te DS i M T n ro c o sustain approximately 500 patients and staff, che staff, and patients 500 approximately sustain o ment. Enviroment. in o existing to tion E n , as part of the Air Forcethe Air of part as , DS alrd o et hae rqieet, y provi by requirements, theater meet to tailored W and +25, flexible hospitalization capability.hospitalization flexible rua euctto ad tblzto, eea and general stabilization, and resuscitation medicine,trauma preventive control, and command medical 6,500.to up beds, & emergency medical care to a population at risk of has the capability to provide 24-hour sick call, 25 inpatient Aeromedical E CP operations. population groups within the entire of spectrum military mentally controlled co controlled mentally s achieved release full material in pi i t a ro al she T tions for 72 hours in a chemical conta in a chemical tions for 72 hours e P E CP he n D mentally controlled co controlled mentally EP n l ters. mentally controlled collective pr collective controlled mentally T DS R M he followinghe available:arealso capabilities T apid ofgrtos ae oua packages, modular are configurations. E E i T M tioners, heaters, water di DS M M he requirement is to be able to sustain E D PE E program is a Joint effort to insert insert to effort Joint a is program DS R EP DS sos ( esponse R l pr le M et adAak setr, and shelters, Alaska and tents

T c S heater Hospital (AF Hospital heater E tive protection into currently into protection tive mall Portable Expeditionary Expeditionary Portable mall o DS ie a otmnto free contamination a vides r cniue t allow to configured are S l le PEA T c S he CP E CP he tive protection into protection tive eptember 2003 and RR , ai, +10, Basic, ), s tr m M i bution and o T in E te H), is to is H), DS a c m ted en d tion is tion +25 n a ing ically ­ D -15

ANNEX D D ANNEX D -16 M13A1 GPFU M8A3 GasParticulate FilterUnit(GPFU) Shipboard CollectiveProtection System FIELDED AND PRODUCTION ITEMS SYSTEMS CP MOBILE Chemical BiologicalProtected Shelter(CBPS) and procure an additional 174 CBP from an un-armored High ele and tioned by a hydraulically powered environmental support system, which provides filtered air, hea pr is transport. L the in transported is e T T T pressurefans, airlocks, pressure controlvalves, low-pre cubic feet per minute (CF ove an at air filtered with ship the on S the vehicleforCBP platforms and the new design systems. Fielding will continue through FY11. Beginning in FY 2010 the Army will begin procuring dedicated mobile platforms andU dedicated mobileplatforms the S r hipboard CP tryker vehicles, andothervehicles. he 20 CF 20 he CF 12 he hese systemsare beinginstalledthrough bothnew shipco ator M o vided by the EC bythe vided 1A1/A2 Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting tanks,1A1/A2 Bradley Abrams S c et. tri T c T M M al power.al he CBP he he EC system provides air to armored vehicle crew member ventilatedfacemasks,crewmember vehicle armored to providesair system system provides air to armored vehicle crew member ventilated facemasks,ventilated member crewvehicle armored to providesair system S is an of part integral the H V S and L is oper is T V he CBP he engine or with the 10kw generator for limited power.limited for generator 10kw the with or engine MS M M MS or on the trailer.the on or ) a obility tional within 20 minutes with a crewfour.a of with minutes 20 within tional poweroperationsAll support requiredto M tran S S . program is currentlyis reviewing program CBP existing convertthe to options design 98 s SM G S ports a ports crew of four and their gear. All medical equipment required for the shelter M - as-Particulate as-Particulate Filter Unit ( M ultipurpose ultipurpose Wheeled C AA r pressure of 2.0 inches water gauge.CP water inches 2.0 of pressure 3 electric version systems. V V AC systems on new ships.construction CP P7A1 amphibiousvehicle. T V he CB shelter is rolled and carried on the rear of the L the of rear the on carried and rolled is shelter CB he ehicles, s High ai foot square purpose Cap Expanded the replaces trea Level for used be to designed CBP sure alarm system, pe sureand alarm M V ultiple Launch Launch ultiple n ehicle to an up-armored t S et faci ment stru M is a highly mobile, rapidly deployable shelter system shelter deployable rapidly mobile, highly a is G obility c PFU) S T tion andtheCP etr (L helter here are contracts in place for the retrofit systems M r T l­ S beam supported CB protected shelter, and a shelter,and protected CB supported beam 51. a railer with a towed 10kw is n frad ugcl em. CBP teams. surgical forward and ties et. CP city R T MS ocket ocket he CBP he V S hce (EC ehicle T S mutd no h vhce a 300 a vehicle, the onto mounted ) includes filters, filter hou is modular and is based on the 200 the on based is and modular is he system is envirois system he S S Backfit program. Backfit r ystem ( ystem so M S consists of a de a of consists S n edium I provides each pr nel deco nel and V i.e. M i.e. , Ligh a ), T II L , actical , fo RS M t M n ing, air conditioning, T 42A1/A2. Used on 42A1/A2.Used taminationstations. r ), tank transporter,),tank 42A1/A2. Used in 42A1/A2.Used ward area medical area ward actical Quiet n V mentallycondi t d­ ehicle platform weight cated o tected zone s MS ings, high- S systems during during M M S G 1113 also ulti en ­ ­ ­ Joint ExpeditionaryCollectiveProtection (JECP) Joint CollectiveProtection Equipment(JCPE) RDTE ITEMS SYSTEMS PROTECTION COLLECTIVE Nuclear (CB Nuclear Biological, Chemical, potential during (JEF) Forces Expeditionary Joint the sustain and shield to structures. solutions include a stand-alone shelter system and/or materiel Possiblemissions/operations.kit(s) expeditionary for of use support with in selected functions portable shelters medical or and Control,within and permanent Command JECP is a new start Acquisition Category (ACA S base. industrial the Key Requirements: ervices by providingervices state-of-the-art, off-the-shelfsolutionsforcurrently fieldedequipmentdeficiencies. • • • •

S I I R mproved shipboardsystems forcommand/control,ncreased numberofshelters medical, andrest/relief areas tandardization of equipment apid insertion of technology improvements oftechnology apid insertion toexistingequipment R N)/ T T oxic akenindividuallyboth collectively,and improvewill tasks these readinessdefense NBC Jointfor I ndustrial ndustrial M aterials ( aterials T TIM ) III ) attacks. JECP is intended to provide CP for the for provideCP to intended is attacks.JECP ) program.

JECP will provide a collective protection (CP) capability no cu into components across Joint across components costs. improvedpe mai and operate equipment. to easy lightweight, e techno collectivepr sa i needed provides JCPE Description: will reduce logistics burden while maintaining while burden logistics reduce will n v v n sadriain o cu to standardization ing i ro n l­ S me r adriain f niiul system individual of tandardization ety ile sses il eut in result will systems fielded rently gies in filtration,in materials,and shelter gies n a cnrl t pr to controls tal o r I for tection systems bysystems tection latestthe using srig i nserting m ance with reduced operating reduced with ance m m S provements and cost and provements ervice mission areas mission ervice proved technology technology proved o R R ie affordable, vide r adiological and adiological ety fielded rently est and est R n elief, tain D -17

ANNEX D D ANNEX D -18 Modular CollectiveProtection Equipment(MCPE)(100,200,400,600CFMSystems) GENERIC NBCCPFILTRATION SYSTEMS M98 Gas-Particulate FilterSet M48/M48A1 Gas-Particulate Filter FIELDED AND PRODUCTION ITEMS FILTRATIONSYSTEMS PROTECTION COLLECTIVE AND FILTERS NBC GENERIC Particulate Filter Particulate vans. and shelters mobile of connections to and the accessories greatest extent possible. systems.individual of demands unique M Naval applications. T T numerous vehicles, vans, mobileshelters, andfixed sites. applications. of variety wide a on installed currently are the from vapors and aerosols systems. protection Chemical collective to and supplied air particulates Biological and Nuclear remove to used are filters NBC he 200 CF 200 he he 100CF CPE consists of a family of related end items from which modules can be chosen and combined to meet the meet to combined and chosen be can modules which from items end related of family a of consists CPE M M filterisusedinthe filter is used as the basic filter set in the in set filter basic the as used is filter S et intheothers. I t can be stacked toobtainfiltrationt canbestacked ofhigherairflow rates. I t uses the uses t M 1A1/A2 Abrams tank, T hese end items employ common parts and mountings and interchangeable interchangeable and mountings and parts common employ items end hese M 48A1 G eneric, high volume airflow NBC filters, and CP filtration systems filtration CP and filters, NBC airflow volume high eneric, G as-Particulate Filter in the 100 CF 100 the in Filter as-Particulate M T M odular Collective Protective Equipment ( Equipment Protective Collective odular M hese CP systems are modular and have been applied to applied been have and modular are systems CP hese 93 CPE provides collective overpressure to a wide variety G PFU, CBP S , andPaladin M system and the and system S elf Propelled Howitzer. M CPE) and in and CPE) M 98 G as- DTO CB.61 AdvancedAirPurificationSystemModel validation of Advanced Air Purification version Advanced Hybrid Air Purification FY2008: the of Advancedvalidation Purification Air FY2007: FY2006: Milestones/Metrics. significant challenge. evaluationmethodology.and test standard appropriate of development be will size,minimizing weight, burden.challenge energy, considerable logistics while A and protection chemical/biological maximizes that system a develop to approaches these of each and time scrubbers.acid-gas of requireconsumable catalytic systems periods extended for gas purge the in agent of levels toxic produce systems filtration regenerative Challenges. system optimizedtomeetuserneed(threat protection, size, weight, power requirements, etc.). D the by gaps technological of identification for and systems Purification Advanced Air requirements.user meet to configuration system possible best the ensure to etc.) cost, cycle life cost, unit rapid, confident, tradeoff of competing (weight,characteristics volume, power, consumables, threat, performance, conditioning, aerosol/particulate, removal and chemical processes) for the application. employed as a tool by developmentthe platform community to configure an optimized air system purification (air requirements. logistical and power reduced with systems (CB nuclear and radiological, S Payoffs. Enhanced protection capabilitieswillresult aswell asimprovements inweight, cube, andcost. logistics systems Purification that can address wide application requirements by providing the optimal mix of technologies. compared to current single pass filter technology. burdenas threatreducedlogistical moreuniversally2) thatis adaptableand biological and chemical expanding an against protection broader providing:1) of purpose the for technologies mature and emerging incorporate that Objectives. S design and system integration data (characterize unit processes). that need to be overcome. For example, single-pass filters cannot effectively remove some of the of some remove effectively cannot filters single-pass example, Forovercome. be to need that CB removing of capable are systems alone threats. that most optimally meets the needs of the application. the of needs the meets optimally most that Collective Protection Equipment ( [e.g.,Assault Amphibious Advanced ite Collective Protection. Advanced Air Purification systems for improved protection against chemical, biological, ystem eployable T M

Configure laboratory-scale systems; define test and evaluation methodology, and measure the required the methodology,evaluationmeasure and and test define systems; laboratory-scale Configure

he goal of is this to effort identify the air purification or technology combination (hybrid) of technologies M T D odel. his evelop several potential system configuration designs. Fabricate system demonstrators. odify Advanced Air Purification M

T Currently, all protectionagainst universal near that offers knownno there is technologies of system edical DTO he effort will he developeffort a model, database, and design concepts for Advanced Air Purification systems M easure data designandapplication laboratory-scale toevaluate integration theseconfigurations. addresses three Joint Future Joint three addresses S ystem ( ystem S ystems R D N) agents and toxic industrial materials ( materials industrial toxic and agents N) EP I S M ncorporating all of the parameters into a single, validated model will also be a be also will single,model validateda into parameters the of all ncorporating CPE) Program], and for fixed sites. Benefit to the warfighter is an air purification M E V odel will also be useful to the procurement community to assess proposed assess to community procurement the to useful be also will odel DS ehicle (AAA ehicle S ystem ), and Chemical Biologically Protected Biologically Chemical and ), S R ystem S S ystem N agents and agents N ystem M T odel. M his will be accomplished by developing a model for Advanced Air V O M M odel andtransition. ), C-17 transport, Future Combat Future transport, C-17 ), perational Capabilities for Capabilities perational odel as dictated by test and validation results. Complete final odel, then optimize for design concepts. Complete test and test concepts.Complete design for optimize odel,then T M TIM he objective of this effort is to utilize the advantagesof the utilize to is effort this objectiveof he T S he Advanced Air Purification Purification Advancedhe Air any of these technologies when considered as stand as considered when technologies these of any & s. However, each technology may have limitations havemay However,s. technology each T D community to focus to community evelop initial version of Advanced Air Purification TIM ) will providesmaller,will ) weightlighter T ransportable, S helter (CBP helter R T S & he model will permit the he model will permit ystems (FC ystems D S ystems . Applications include . Applications S M ), mobile systems mobile ), obile, and Fixed and obile, I nitiate test and M S odel will be will odel TI ), and ), C vapors, C S T hip he D -19

ANNEX D D ANNEX D -20 ** I R x Dec e n n A I nterest =Product nt-N Aircraft Vehicles, and Equipment, Combat Personnel qmt =Product T Category his AC IR =Product o TD n support more thanthedecontamination functional area, support but isplacedin only oneannextoprevent redundancy. R t equirement I I nterest nterest, No - M12A1 Power Driven Decontamination - CB.71 Self-Decontaminating Surfaces - Joint Service Transportable Decontamination - Joint Service Transportable Decontamination - Joint Portable Decontamination System (JPDS) Platform-Joint Interior Decontamination System - Joint Service Sensitive Equipment - M17 MCHF Lightweight Decontamination - M17A2/A3 Lightweight Decontamination - M295 Individual Equipment Decontamination - M100 Sorbent Decontamination System - Joint Service Personnel/Skin Decontamination - M291 Skin Decontamination Kit a Apparatus System-Large Scale (JSTDS-LS) System-Small Scale (JSTDS-SS) (JPID) Decontamination (JSSED) System (LDS) System (LDS) Kit System (JSPDS) mi

na

I mminent tio Nomenclature R equirement n Table DecontaminationRDA E-1. Efforts Progr

a E ms * =sub-Product(s) ofaConsolidated Joint D Rqmt, Interest efense T echnology echnology Production Production RDTE Production Fielded DTO RDTE RDTE RDTE RDTE RDTE Production Production Status = S ub-Product O bjective ( Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt USA S R cience & equirement or Rqmt Interest Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt T echnology BaseProgram) echnology S USAF ervice Project ervice I nterest Fielded Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Fielded Fielded USMC Rqmt Interest Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt Rqmt USN E-1

ANNEX E E-2 ANNEX E M100 SorbentDecontaminationSystem M295 IndividualEquipmentDecontaminationKit M291 SkinDecontaminationKit FIELDED AND PRODUCTION ITEMS PERSONNEL tamination to remove, neutra equipment. l ize, or destroy CB warfare agents and toxins on contaminated personal and load bearing from usedadsorbents. agents of off-gassing the by created hazard potential the eliminates adsorbed;this being agents chemical the with reacts that component needs. storage special reduced and and handling life shelf improved through burden logistics of equipment. and efficient system to decontaminate small and individual issue items T he reactive sorbent decontamination system provides a simple, rapid, eto ceia ad ilgcl afr aet on battlefield protective suits. agents warfare skin. biological contaminated and chemical destroy T T side. re one sorptive and reactive a on contains handle strap attached an with pa pouch co he e i eals wa enables kit he I c t is effective in all environments and pr bac no a deco mitts.wip Each T fighter to perform immediate and operational fighter decon to perform powder.sorbent inating deco the by and pad polyesternon-woven the sor through non-woven plished the through material. pad freelypolyester flow to allowed ket contains a folded non-wovenappl folded fiber a contains ket he M n k -woven pol 9 cnit o a altlk feil carr flexible wallet-like a of consists 291 ing. M n n tai 295 kit consists of four ind four of consists kit 295 ta m I n ue sor use, n ing six individually sealed foil packets. Each in a ting so y T e ester material and a polyethy T r down mitt in the kit is co is kit the in downmitt he ihes o eoe neutra remove, to fighters he kit is carried in a pocket of the of pocket a in carried is kit he p r b M in f otmnto b both by contamination of tion bent powder co n pwe fo te it is mitt the from powder ent 0 sse ue a catalytic a uses system 100 T D he cnaiain s accom is econtamination M s 295 enables the war the enables 295 in polymer mi polymer in i v i e n d sents a lowered tained within a u al wipedown al m i cator pad cator prised of prised T l l ene film z, and ize, e pad he x n ture. tam y ing ­ ­ ­ ­ M12A1 Power DrivenDecontamination Apparatus(PDDA); Skid-Mounted FIELDED AND PRODUCTION ITEMS AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT, COMBAT VEHICLES, Joint ServicePersonnel/Skin DecontaminationSystem(JSPDS) RDT&E ITEMS PERSONNEL and effective intheoperational environment. forFY2007. A production decisionisscheduled RSD product selectedtomeettheserequirements. equipment. individual limited decontaminate to the than better level a to skin T four-man crew,four-man using operated be can and the of required as procedures decontamination thorough and engine-driven engine-driven pump and multifuel-fired water heating system. D he J he econtamination Apparatus. L hasbeen approved by theF S P DS will provide the warfighter with a Food and Food a with warfighter providethe will T M17 A2/A3SeriesLightweightDecontaminationSystem(LDS) T M17 MCHFLightweightDecontaminationSystem (LDS) and deli and colla hoses,showerwith spray wands,kit personnel hardware. accessory and deco thorough and compact engine dri he he M p M M 291 sible water bladder. D 17 series Ligh series 17 17 A andhasrecentlytesting toensure undergoneadditional that theproduct issafe v ering it at mo at it ering S a rpae the replaced has mobility, but can be dismounted to facilitate air transport. air facilitate to dismounted be mobility,can but shower25 heads. tion per mi d ping and transport, and pe system that can be used as for such de-icing,purposes fire figh unit, and a 600 gallon per hour liquid fuel water heater. T M kin e he arine Corps Heavy Fuel ( Fuel Heavy Corps arine co M n D M tamination. 12A1 consists of three main comp econtaminating Kit. econtaminating Additionally,J the ilitary ilitary v n en pump and water heating system. tamination. n t R weight ute through both of its hoses. d eactive S erate pre erate tandard Fuels (diesel fuel,(diesel JP-8,Fuels tandard T T he D D he M rug Administration approved capability to decontaminate to approvedrug capability Administration S eco M kin T M 21 P 12A1 T s he L he 12A1 is typically mounted on a 5 ton truck for tactical for typicallytruck is ton 12A1 5 a on mounted sure and co and sure n he system is capable of performing the same operational 12A1 can pump 50 gallons of deco of gallons 50 pump can 12A1 M tamination r D so 17 series L series 17 econtamination Lotion ( Lotion econtamination M DS n CHF) L CHF) nel showering in addition to equi is capable of drawing water from any source any from water drawing of capable is DD wt the with A n S trolled te trolled DS DS y s o T tem (L tem . All components can be moved by a bymoved be can components . All is a portable, lightweight, compact,lightweight, portable, a is nents: a pump unit, a 500 gallon tank he integral shower assembly provides T S he sy P m etc DS DS pe .) ) is a por a is ) M will provide the capability the provide will s r­ tem is used for operational I RSD 17 t can decontaminate both decontaminate can t tures. T he L) is the commercial the is L) M M T CHF T t n able, ligh able, he he system has an has system he 12A1 is a fle t I ta ing, water pum t also includes a includes also t p m M ment and area

in arine Corps Corps arine Lightweight a ting solu ting t weight, x ible ­ ­ E-3

ANNEX E E-4 ANNEX E Joint MaterielDecontaminationSystem(JMDS) RDTE ITEMS AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT, COMBAT VEHICLES, means without degradation or destruction oftheequipment. ordestruction means withoutdegradation * of sensitive equipmentandplatforms. chemical and biological hazards without degradation of the decontaminated equipment function allowing reutilization Joint the called umbrella management single a under combined were programs T Description: Key Requirements: poweran external sourceandincoordination withawater tankornatural water resource. sides of a vehicle or aircraft simultaneously, and can decontaminate personnel, equipment, and other materiel without of chemical and biological agents for both sensitive equipment* and platform interiors. platform and equipment* sensitive both for agents biological and chemical of (J S • • • • • he Joint MDS

ensitive equipment refers small, high value or critical equipment that cannot be decontaminated using existing using decontaminated be cannot that equipment critical or value high small, refers equipment ensitive Provide at fixed (vehicle/aircraft/ship) sitesand decontamination interiors systemsforplatform “on-the-move” D Capable ofbeingusedinbothmobileandfixed-sites Non-aqueous baseddecontamination systemsforsensitive equipmentandvehicle interiors M econtaminated equipmentwillretain tacticalmissioncapabilityfollowing decontamination ) program in FY06. eet two distinctoperational decontamination. needs: interiors small sensitive equipmentandplatforms S ervice ervice S ensitive Equipment T he J MDS program will use a vaporous decontaminant technology for the decontamination D econtamination (J SS E D ) and Joint Platform M I ateriel ateriel nterior nterior T D he J he D econtamination econtamination (JP MDS will neutralize will S ystem ID ) Joint ServiceTransportable DecontaminationSystem–SmallScale(JSTDS-SS) Joint Portable DecontaminationSystem(JPDS) reduce themanpower intensive decontamination processes. material handling equipment and can be mounted on general vehicles.purpose manually through the use of mops and brushes. M decontamination only), (operational shipboard surfaces, and limited aircraft facilities and terrain. small weapons, crew-served vehicles, tactical decontaminate to capability) T Description: Key Requirements: systemsusedfortheseoperations.portable equipment. non-sensitive large on areas operations. decontamination T Description: • • • • he J JP he CHF L

Provide non-hazardousandenvironmentally safeCB Be able toapply decontaminantandhotsoapy water Not require adedicated vehicle and/ortrailer D STDS econtaminate agentstobelow tacticaldetectorlevels DS DS il oss o a eotmnn() n a apiao fr s piaiy n meit ad operational and immediate in primarily use for applicator an and decontaminant(s) a of consist will

S and provides the added capability to apply the decontaminant ( mall S cale system will consist of a decontaminant, applicator module and accessories (including a shower T he target items for decontamination will be small non-sensitive equipment and key and equipment non-sensitive small be will decontamination for items target he T he JP he T • • • Key Requirements: biological decontaminants biological

he J DS rvd nnhzros n evrnetly ae hmcl and chemical safe environmentally and non-hazardous Provide Provide restoration capabilityat fixed siteandmobilelocations R equire no more than one person totransport,equire operate nomore andrefill thanoneperson STDS will decontaminate threat agents to lower levels than current current than levels lower to agents threat decontaminate will R is not man-portable, but can be repositioned using available T N decontaminants his system will replace the D F200 foam) with the system rather than T he J STDS M 17

S mall S eries L eries S cale applicator will DS and the M 17 E-5

ANNEX E E-6 ANNEX E Joint ServiceTransportable DecontaminationSystem–LargeScale(JSTDS-LS) intensive decontamination processes. D (AP debarkation ( of debarkation ports of aerial and seaports terrain, facilities, aircraft, fixed), or (mobile equipment non-sensitive large to T Description: Key Requirements: • • • • • his mobile (tactical) system provides the capability to conduct operational and thorough decontamination of medium econtamination Apparatus.

Provide non-hazardousandenvironmentally safeCB D Be able toapply decontaminantandhotsoapy water Provide fordecontamination “on themove” D econtaminate largenon-sensitive equipment, aslargevehicles, such aircraftandfacilities econtaminate agentstobelow tacticaldetectorlevels T he J STDS OD Large s). T he J he S cale applicator can apply STDS Large R N decontaminants S cale system will replace the replace will system cale D F 200 foam and will reduce the manpower M 12A1 Power- 12A1 S D P OD riven s) Re F x Joi e n n A options forradioprotectants andpost-radiation exposure medicalcountermeasures. and development Advanced defense. biological and chemical ExecutiveJoint the by medical managed efforts acquisition of rubric the within addressed are areas CB the within structure organizational the and defense. radiological threats, medical and emerging D Biological this does information not correspond directly to the management structure of organizations within the Chemical and President’sBudget the supplement to intended T in two sectionsofthisannex: research,defense biological developmentand Joint( chemical acquisition medical and Project R T FY06, the Health Affairs, A • • • he organization of this annex is intended to correspond to the organization of budget documents, as this report is report this documents,as budget of organization the to correspond to intended is annex this of organization he he primary repository of medical radiological defense expertise and facility resides in the Armed Forces esearch esearch fne (J efense

s n medical radiological defense( medical radiological defense( medical biological defense( medical chemical ea t t M I anager for Chemical and Biological anager forChemicalandBiological D r D nstitute (AF nstitute Me STO o efense Program (CB Program efense ch D CB -CB SD di , D (HA), funds AF D cal De P initiated a medical radiological defense effort, which initially focuses on science and technology adess eia rsac i cpblt aes petetet, hrpuis diagnostics, therapeutics, pre-treatments, areas: capability in research medical addresses ) RRI v ). C el T he he S o S D ection F.1), ection F.2), D RRI S P).Notably, Joint the p efense Health Program, administered by the Assistant the by administered Program, Health efense ection F.3). mi m ’s operations and infrastructure as well as some research activities. Beginning in cal en t t M D

edical an an P S ubmission in accordance with 50 U 50 with accordance in ubmission M O I edical n order to facilitate cross-walk between the budget documents budgetbetween cross-walkfacilitatethe to order n d Bio d d d A ffice for Chemical and Biological Biological and Chemical for ffice S ystem (JP S cience and cience S cqu & T l program in this annex, each of these four capability four these of annex,each this in program M ogi -CB isitio T echnology echnology MS cal ) are also described inthesesections.) are alsodescribed n

Defen Progr O ffice for Chemical and Biological Biological and Chemical for ffice RD S C 1523. C D A) programs are addressed programs A) efense (JPE efense S ecretary of ecretary s e a T

ms he organization of organization he O R -CB D adiobiology efense for efense D ), Joint), F-1 ANNEX F F-2 ANNEX F RDT DTO R Joint= Joint Emerging Threats Diagnostics Pretreatments Therapeutics Capability Area qmt= E = = R D R equirement efense esearch, S ervice requirement ervice T echnology echnology D evelopment,

A D - Antidote Treatment – Nerve Agent Autoinjector (ATNAA) Nomenclature - Critical Reagents Program (CRP) - CB.64 Rapid Detection, Threat Assessment and Attribution - Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System - CB.56 Methodology to Facilitate Development of Biological -CB.65 Multi-agent (molecular) vaccines for bio-warfare and - CB.60 Vaccine Technologies for Protection Against Filovirus - CB.58 Western and Eastern Equine Encephalitis (WEE/ EEE) - CB.46 Recombinant Ricin Vaccine - Ebola/Marburg Vaccine - Tularemia Live Vaccine (NIAID) - Improved Plague Vaccine - Botulinum Vaccine - Smallpox vaccine (Dryvax vaccine (1:1)) - Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed (BioThraxTM) - Chemical Agent Prophylaxes (Bioscavenger) - Skin Exposure Reduction Paste Against Chemical Warfare - Soman Nerve Agent Pretreatment Pyridostigmine -Vaccinia Immune Globulin Intravenous - CB.67 Therapeutics for Ebola and Marburg Virus Infections - Improved Nerve Agent Treatment System (INATS) - Medical Aerosolized Nerve Agent Antidote (MANAA) - Advanced Anticonvulsant System (AAS) - Convulsant Antidote for Nerve Agents (CANA) = Microarray-Based Resequencing Technologies of Genetically Engineered Biothreat Organisms Using Block 1 Systems Warfare Threat Agent Detection and Medical Diagnostic genetically engineered agents (Marburg and Ebola viruses) Exposure Vaccine Vaccine Constructs for a Combined Equine Encephalitis Agents (SERPACWA) (follow-on to CB.63) (approved for FY07) Table F-1. MedicalChemicalandBiologicalDefenseRDA Efforts I n Advanced O bjective (a

Joint*= T est &Evaluation (Advanced D D S evelopment cience and raft Joint S T ervice requirement ervice echnology BaseProgram) echnology D evelopment program) DTO RDTE AD AD AD Fielded Fielded AD Fielded Fielded Fielded DTO RDTE Fielded AD Fielded Fielded Status Fielded RDTE/ DTO Fielded DTO DTO DTO DTO Joint Joint* Joint Joint* Rqmt Joint Joint* Joint Joint Joint Joint USA Joint Joint Joint Joint* Joint Joint* Joint Joint* Joint Joint Joint Joint USAF Joint Joint Joint Joint Joint Joint* Joint Joint* Joint Joint* Joint Joint Joint Joint USMC Joint Joint Joint Joint* Joint Joint* Joint Joint* Joint Joint Joint Joint USN F.1.1 F.1 diagnosis of anthrax. JBA anthrax. of diagnosis reusable,approvedbeen has and by U.the technology,commercial JBA on Based infection. or exposure agent biological of confirmation JBA fluorimeter. real-time and thermocycler culture, or direct culture. Materiel: Pharmaceuticals: and guidance(withinitialfieldingdate shown). Following are fielded medical chemical defense items, including pharm to bedetermined. Point JointBiological likethe systems emerging or laboratories commercial standard gold at use in those as (such systems equipment. laboratory field other with deployable be will system the that ensure and requirements logistics current meet to modification limited require assays reagent freeze-dried integrated fully a is T for futureoperational effe enhancementofmilitary havehuman performance provided a significant increase in military effe the spectrum of conflict and in the full breadth and depth of the battlefield. materiel solutions) provide the foundation that ensures the fielding of a flexible, sustainable, operate. force modernized across and deploy effectively to ability the requires strategy, which nation’s military the global supporting and forces our of strength fighting the conserving through effectiveness unit ( development and research medical in Advances capability with 103 JBA 103 with capability for an on-time completion of JBA office delivered the final twelve Block systems) and in 1st quarter FY08 for the for FY08 quarter 1st in and systems) • • • • • • • • • he Joint Biological Agent Biological Joint he r t s s m s Antidote Convulsant Antidote forNerve Agent (CANA), 1991 Nerve Agent Antidote Kit( M kin Exposure oman Nerve Agent Pretreatment ( Pyridostigmine kin est D

esuscitation edical Aerosolized Nerve Agent Antidote ( etection E M FIELDED PRODUCTS PRODUCTS FIELDED D DI econtamination Kit( ate® ChE(Cholinesterase)Kit, 1997 T CAL CHE CAL reatment Nerve Agent Autoinjector (A S ystem) to provide a comprehensive identification and diagnostic capability.diagnostic and identification comprehensive a provide to ystem) D R in vitro in evice, eduction Paste Against Chemical Warfare Agents ( IDS IDS T I he JBA

diagnostic system composed of the JBA the of composed system diagnostic ndividual, Chemical, 1990 I systems. Fielding events are scheduled to begin in 3rd quarter FY07 for the Army (86 the Army for FY07 quarter 3rd in begin to scheduled are events systems.Fielding and sample preparation protocols for isolating target isolating for protocols preparation sample and dentification and dentification will be used both fixed and field military medical facilities, system components will components system facilities, medical military field and fixed both used be will MI M M IDS IDS ark 291), 1990 CAL CAL

T instrument, using Polymerase Chain I I otal Package Fielding to the Air Force. ), 1983 systems to Air Force units at Kelly U I t will augment and integrate with existing medical biological identification biological medical existing with integrate and augment will t M S .Food and D arine Corps (11 systems). Fielding events for the Navy (49 systems) are systems) Navy(49 the eventsfor systems).Fielding (11 Corps arine EFEN D IDS iagnostic M R s n nertd ytm o rpd dniiain n diagnostic and identification rapid for system integrated an is c ANAA), 1994 & tiveness. D T D ) significantly improve the warfighting mission by sustaining by mission warfighting the improvesignificantly ) S NAA), 2003 rug rug Administration(F S E E NAPP), 2003 S ystem R E S

(JBA EA IDS a IDS c S instrument with laptop computer,laptop with software, instrument R ce M tiveness in the past and present the potential E O u R CH ) Block Block ) edical ti R PACWA), 2003 vercoming medical threats and extending S c eaction (PC A, T als, materiel, and technical information D he Air Force is now at full operational A) for use as an aid in the laboratory laboratory the in aid an as use for A) S R an Antonio, I & began fielding in 2006. JBA 2006. in fielding began D D NA from whole blood, blood blood, whole from NA products (materiel and non- and (materiel products R ) technology, is a portable T T X in IDS he JBA he is man-portable, is D ecember 2006, IDS program program IDS

F-3 ANNEX F F-4 ANNEX F F.1.2 U. the by accomplishments M threats andconventional from chemical battlefield munitions by: ontheintegrated combined of face the in effectivenesscombat sustain and preserve to also but preventlethality to only not designed procedures,medical or materiel training,for concepts and doctrine, organization.and strategies Countermeasure to the classical and novel threats include pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, specialized therapies are based. new,diagno improved innovative,which and upon knowledge the to contributes turn, in dependent upon the co capabi technological of level high a maintaining upon on exp dose low adversaries may develop novel threat agents. Additionally, the potential for transient (H or sustained systemic toxicity from T defensestrategy areas: chemical T Technical InformationandGuidance: oday’s chemical threat is not restricted to commonly accepted classical agents, such as vesicants [sulfur mustard [sulfur vesicants as such agents, classical accepted commonly to restricted not is threat oday’s chemical • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • e eia ceia defense chemical medical he dcl hmcl ees rsac ws aae b te J the by managed was research defense chemical edical m d

S D S . Army ervice members. ervice )], nerve agents (soman, sarin, tabun, and Chemical casualtycare Prevention agents( oftheeffects ofchemical R Chemical Warfare Agent Defense Vesicant Agent Defense Nerve Agent Defense Medical Management ofChemicalCasualtiesHandbook Compact Cholinesterase Inhibitors, Sarin, Soman, GF, andCyanide T Field Management ofChemicalCasualtiesHandbook Field Joint Biological Agent Computer-Based Performance Assessment Battery, 1993 Chemical Warfare (CW)Protective Patient Wrap (N echnical Bulletin ( Bulletin echnical

apid diagnosis of chemical agentexposure.apid diagnosisofchemical econtaminable Patient Litter(N edical Planning MEDICAL CHEMICAL DEFENSE R&D ACCOMPLISHMENTS R&D DEFENSE CHEMICAL MEDICAL M M anual (F o edical D sure(s) to chemical warfare agents must be thoroughly investigated to determine the potential effect potential the determine investigatedto thoroughly be must agents warfare chemical to sure(s) isk - R M R esearch and esearch T n G ) 8-285, ead- he ability to provide timely and effective medical countermeasures to new threats depends threats new to countermeasures medical effective and timely provide to ability he tinued support of a robust program investigating basic pathophysiological mechanisms which, uide ofNBCBattle CasualtiesChemical, A T DOD B) I O dentification and nly M Treatment ofChemical Agent CasualtiesandConventional MilitaryChemicalInjuries edical ( edical aoaois odcig eerh n h CB the in research conducting laboratories R M & M emory (C emory D ateriel Command (U Command ateriel ehia brir ad copihet ae rue b te ao medical major the by grouped are accomplishments and barriers technical S M N 6530-01-380-7309), 1991 E D ) 296, 1996: 296, ) D V D - X), respiratory agents (phosgene), or blood agents (cyanide). Potential iagnostic ROM e.g. , , prophylaxes orpretreatment). S ) on “ econd Edition, July 2000. l , ity. . T S S hird Edition, July 2000. ystem (JBA S N 8415-01-311-7711), 1991 M Assay Techniques for Detection of Exposure to Sulfur Mustard, Sulfur to Exposure of Detection Assay Techniquesfor S A ustaining and enhancing this technological capability is capability technological this enhancing and ustaining anagement ofChemical Warfare MRM STO C) laboratories participating in the J the in participating laboratories C) -CB M IDS edP-8(A), D in FY06. Following are FY06 technical technical FY06 are Following FY06. in ) Block ) Block D V P I ol. , 2006 S & III T , M eia porm n FY06. in program medical R edical countermeasures are countermeasures edical atification s tics, pretreatments, and pretreatments,tics, I njuries,” 1996. D raft. STO , 1995. -CB D ’s Pre-treatment CapabilityArea Research Category: NerveAgentDefense U. Contributing Navywere Contributing laboratories Naval the R Research thrust: in fiscalyear 2006. portfolio research defense chemical medical the of portion this areas that comprised thrust research areasmajor and defense.agent nerve on development investmentsresearch in technology T Accomplishments: Technical Barriers: Countermeasures: agentdefenseare outlinedbelow.nerve T information required by theadvancedtechnical developerthepreparation ofan tosupport with consistent are and base technology the of out transition for requirements meet efforts D elevationfor to maturity of point the nearing research to disciplines associatedscientific and countermeasures agent Overarching Research Objective areas. (N U. the are program research CB medical and treatments) against chemical warfare nerve agents. S Pathology (AF is organized by threat area with subsequent arrangement of specific research thrusts into the J the into thrusts research specific of arrangement subsequent with area threat by organized is chool of Aerospace chool • • • • • • • e eald copihet ta flo ae rw fo te ai rsac, ple rsac, n advanced and research, applied research, basic the from drawn are follow that accomplishments detailed he he countermeasures,and accomplishments barriers, in the defense technical category medical research of chemical esearch esearch (W efense

S MR . Army I I Potential decrements withpretreatments performance andtreatments. andtheireffects. properties chemical unique their of mechanism the understand to agents threat all of models molecular detailed of Lack in humans, asrequired by F the on Lack of appropriate experimental use animal model systems to predict pretreatment and or treatment efficacy and safety carry to easy lasting, long acting, quick battlefield. are that antidotes and/or pretreatments of Lack pretreatments, andbiological Pharmaceutical treatments, andantidotes. and non-traditionalagents. agents nerve of effect incapacitating and action rapid against protectthat Pretreatmenttreatmentregimens and ncrement nitiated preparation of technical data package for transition of recombinant butyrylcholinesterase (Bioscavenger C). T echnology echnology T M he contributing Air Force laboratories were the Air Force the Air were laboratories Force Air contributing he R edical I A P), a joint II IR ) out of the technology base.) outofthetechnology ). nerve agent bioscavenger (chemical warfare agent prophylactic): R T O M esearch esearch hese laboratories were the principle science and technology base performer for the J bjective ( bjective edicine 311th Human 311th edicine DOD : Explore the development of medical countermeasures (i.e., prophylaxes/pretreatments I nstitute of Chemical of nstitute research institute, also conducts research for the medical DTO D A’s rule. animalefficacy ) status.) S . Army S DTO ystems (U Wing R esearch Laboratory (N Laboratory esearch M research efforts are designed so that data generated from these from generated data that so designed are efforts research D edical R efense (U efense esearch esearch studies range from basic and applied research in nerve R esearch esearch S S AF A MRI S A I I nvestigational New nstitute for nstitute M C R R /311 H /311 D esearch Laboratory (AF Laboratory esearch L) and the Navalthe and L) T ), and the and Walter), hey are organized under J under organized arehey S W). I nfectious T he Armed Forceshe Armed S D & M rug ( rug T R D edical program. eed Army iseases (U iseases STO I N R D L) and the U the and L) R -CB ) application. esearch Center esearch STO T D S he research I I STO nstitute of nstitute nstitute of nstitute A capability capability MRIID -CB S AF D ), . F-5 ANNEX F F-6 ANNEX F Research thrust: neuroprotectants thrust: Research Therapeutics CapabilityArea • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • t i t i i r d d i (e.g.,EE Continued testing Food and Food testing Continued outcomplexbehavior afterrecovery inability tocarry for change agenttoxicity. from nerve Performed safetytestinganddoserangestudiesfornew model. compoundsinanon-humanprimate ofnewand efficacy therapeuticagents. Evaluated the neurobehavioral effects of agents nerve in non-human primates and rodents to investigate the role evaluationsCompleted andcompileddata forpharmacokinetic ofmostpromising neuroprotectants. and lethality. vivomodels. in using seizures agent-induced nerve against compounds anticonvulsant novel of efficacy the Evaluated inhibitors, andantioxidants. racemase serine agonists, receptor serotonin neurosteroids,anti-epileptics, anticonvulsants, including classes, by agents. different nerve non-human and human with howAChEinteract oximesdifferent reactivationoximeinhibited understand of to ( relationship activity structure and modeling molecular to novel approaches and current Utilized neurobehavioral, physiological, andneuroanatomical measures. for therapy gene of concept the validate to combinations bioscavengers. vector/gene of testing feasibility Completed Continued pretreatment studiesofvectors todeliver intervention bioscavenger genes. Completed evaluation ofhumanprotein recombinant bioscavenger agentcountermeasure. asanerve recombinant of amounts sufficient produce enzyme scavengers forclinicaltrials. can that models animal transgenic of development Completed (Bioscavenger Continued to evaluate purification protocols for large scale isolation of human plasma-derived butyrylcholinesterase dentified andtestedseveral potentialneuroprotective compoundsinbothrat andguineapigseizure models. nitiated PKevaluations ofselectedneuroprotectants. nvestigated role ofnovel system(CN agentsincentralnervous injury,organophosphate animal against using protect to measures pharmacologic for nvestigatednoveltargets ested putative neuroprotectants in animal models.animal in neuroprotectants putative ested ested intracellular calcium modulators aspotentialneuroprotectants.ested intracellularcalcium modulators efined animalmodelsandvalidated smallandlargeanimalneurobehavioral testbatteries. etermined the etermined efficacy of midazolam, compounds and/or against anticholinergic agent-induced nerve seizures drug of number a within candidates therapeutic down-select to protocols screening refined and eveloped G power oximetry,spectrum,pulse neuroimaging). development ofanimproved neuroprotectant toprotect from exposure tonerve agents I erlgc hrpui dvlpet icuig dacd niovlat ad improved and anticonvulsants advanced including development, therapeutic neurologic ncrement I ). D rug (F rug Administration I D nvestigated potential markers for neuroprotectant effects neuroprotectant for markers potential nvestigated A)-approved drugs shown to be neuroprotective in both in neuroprotective be to shown A)-approveddrugs D evelopedneurobehavioralvalidateda and model S ) protection. S A R ) studies ) Research thrust: Emerging ThreatsCapabilityArea traditional agents. T • • • • • e following he t t i d studies. pig model. Continued to assess potential neuroprotectant treatments for agent-induced nerve brain pathology in the guinea anatomic andbehavioral studies. dentified andtestedseveral potentialneuroprotective compoundsinrat andguineapigseizure models. ested Food and Food ested ested putative neuroprotectants inanimalmodels. eveloped toolstoevaluate overt andsubtleneurobehavioral agents. impactsofnerve DTO medical countermeasures for non-traditional agents ae e efrs n drsig h ise o mdcl counte medical of issues the addressing in efforts key are s D rug (F rug D A)-approved drugs shown to be neuroprotective in both anatomic and behavioral and anatomic both in neuroprotective be to shown drugs A)-approved : r esrs o epsr t non- to exposure for measures F-7 ANNEX F F-8 ANNEX F DTO CB. 57Non-Traditional Nerve AgentMedicalCountermeasures Effective countermeasures for N and Food the by licensure eventual and development future their enabling N effectivelycountering for potential havethe that products medical identifying for N on base knowledge the increase to be will research this of outcome induction of neurochemical changes and conduct studies of N for future nonclinicaldevelopment andF current medical for doctrine N countering N of developer,developmentadvanced for the with concert vivo the to comparison for improvedof countermeasures medical candidate pharmacokinetics Evaluatedthe FY2006: Milestones/Metrics. animals toman. conventional nerve agents, and develop non-human primate models to extrapolate efficacy test results from vivo vivo Challenges. forces tosustainoperational tempo. of injury among exposed joint members,service deter their use as chemical warfare agents and enable joint facilitate research for countermeasures to N N against effective are that countermeasures medical candidate new N against efficacy their for countermeasures medical current evaluate to agents, these of N the of action of mechanism the toxicity.acute their against countermeasures medical forces and it is critically to important determine the toxicity of these agents and the effectiveness of current N increased. significantly Payoffs. N laboratory and animal models that demonstrate the ability to prevent, interrupt, the or action terminate of Objectives. protection against known N nerve agent (N agent nerve T As. persistence of N of persistence N of persistence N of time-course Completed evaluation of efficacy of human serum butyrylcholinesterase as a bioscavenger for bioscavenger a as butyrylcholinesterase serum human of efficacy of evaluation Completed T he number and type of chemical warfare agents (CWAs), beyond the conventional CWAs,conventional(CWAs), has the agents beyondwarfare chemical of type and number he M T his T ajor technical challenges include: determine the mechanism of action, determine the determine action, of mechanism the determine include: challenges technical ajor A) intoxication by identifying and characterizing compounds or medical strategies using strategies medical or compounds characterizing and identifying by intoxication A) DTO T T As. As, develop a therapy that works effectively for all non-traditional nerve agents and agents nerve non-traditional all workseffectivelythatfor therapy As, develop a T As to ensure the duration of action of medical countermeasures exceeds the exceeds countermeasures medical of action of duration the ensure to As will enable the development of medical countermeasures against non-traditional against countermeasures medical of development the enable will T I nformation generated by this research will be used to (1) develop a strategy,developa (1) to used in be will research this bygenerated nformation As have the potential of being used as chemical weapons against U. against weapons chemical as used being of potential the have As T As in non-human primates. Compare N T A exposure would substantially reduce the number of casualties or degree T As and any differences in the absorption, distribution, and metabolism and distribution,absorption, the in differences any and As D T A licensure ofleadcandidate. T A exposure and (3) to produce a developmenttechnology plan As, and to candidatecharacterize countermeasures. T he research efforts will be conducted to identify to conducted be will efforts research he T T As on vascular performance and contractility. A medical Countermeasures; (2) influence (2) Countermeasures; medical A T As and conventional nerve agents for T T As, to develop animal models that models animal develop to As, As and provide the scientific basis scientific the provide and As D rug Administration (F Administration rug T A exposure,A thereby T As, to identify to As, S T . military military . he major D A). in in in Research Category: Vesicant AgentDefense Research thrust: medical countermeasures forcutaneousandocularexposure Research thrust: medicalcountermeasures in fiscalyear 2006. portfolio research defense chemical medical the of portion this areas that comprised thrust research areasmajor and technology development investments in research on vesicant agent defense. T Accomplishments: Technical Barriers: Countermeasures: outlined below. T advanced developerthepreparation ofan tosupport required by information the technical with areconsistent and base technology the of requirementsout transition for maturity of point the to nearing elevation research for to disciplines scientific associated and countermeasures agent vesicant in Objective Research Overarching treatments) against chemical warfare vesicant (blister) agents. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • e eald copihet ta flo ae rw fo te ai rsac, ple rsac, n advanced and research, applied research, basic the from drawn are follow that accomplishments detailed he he countermeasures, and barriers, technical accomplishments in the research category of vesicant agent defense are o m Evaluated a wide array of commercially available wound healing products for their efficacy in promoting improved Considered novel decontaminating wound products that canbeappliedbefore orafterexposure. Evaluated theeffectiveness ofnew toagentchallenge. commercialskindecontamination formulations to evaluateAssessed instrumentation thedepthofcutaneousvesicant injury, foruseasaprognostic indicator. sulfurmustard injuries.of superficialdermal availablewound products,healing investigationalpromotingand improvedin efficacy their productsfor healing commercially evaluate to models these used and models injury animal advanced of development Completed death) (cell apoptotic and metabolism, energy pathways.cellular on agent mustard sulfur of effects vitro in Analyzed exposures. ocular, pulmonary percutaneous, and include to therapeutics,vesicant of strategies pharmacological Explored therapeutic interventions. Need for identification of specific molecular mechanisms of injury by vesicant agents to develop broadly effective O pretreatmentfor systems model experimental appropriate of treatmentand humans. in safety and efficacy Lack andlong-lastingpretreatments,Need forquick-acting treatments andantidotesthat are deployable. Establish astoolsforscreening potentialtherapeuticinterventions. modelsofocular injury (CWAs). Focus ofintervention. isonfunctionalmechanisms Products that moderate orimprove healingofvesicant injury. cular injury models are a particular challenge indevelopment challenge oftherapeutics. modelsare aparticular cular injury dosesanddelivery toreduce tissueinjury.ptimize drug edical countermeasures to minimize lethality, morbidity, and incapacitation caused by chemical warfare agents DTO status. Epoe h dvlpet f eia cutresrs ie, rtetet and pretreatments (i.e., countermeasures medical of development the Explore : DTO research efforts are designed so that data generated from these efforts meet efforts these from generated data that so designed are efforts research I N D application. R esearch esearch studies range from basic and applied research T hey are organized under J STO capability F-9 ANNEX F F-10 ANNEX F Therapeutics CapabilityArea Research Category: ChemicalWarfare Agent(CWA) Defense Research thrust: in fiscal year 2006.portfolio research defense chemical medical the of portion this comprised that areas thrust research major and CWAon defense.research development investmentsin technology T Accomplishments: Technical Barriers: Countermeasures: CWA defenseare outlinedbelow. T an required by information areadvancedthe and base technical with consistent preparationthe developer of support to are designed so that data meet requirementsefforts generated from for transition out of the these technology efforts elevationfor to maturity of point the nearing research to disciplines scientific associated casualties. agent warfare chemical of management clinical the in aid to strategies clinical practical treatments;and products;pharmaceutical exp dose low sustained or treatments) against CWAs, to include investigating the potential for transient or sustained toxicity of single, Objective repeated, Research Overarching • • • • • • • • • • • e eald copihet ta flo ae rw fo te ai rsac, ple rsac, n advanced and research, applied research, basic the from drawn are follow that accomplishments detailed he he countermeasures,and accomplishments barriers, in the defense technical category medical research of chemical

i d s m I N Established exposure/effects models to identify common injury responses which maybroadfor as targets responses which serve injury Establishedcommon identify exposure/effectsto models therapeutic modalitiesinto suitable candidate therapiesinhumans. therapeutic intervention. ofsimpleandsensitivediagnosticassaysLack field-portable forCWA exposure. properties. oftheiruniquechemical theorigin Need fordetailedmolecularmodelsofagentstounderstand model systemsfortreatment andsafetyinhumans. efficacy experimental ofappropriate Lack andlong-lastingpretreatments,Need forquick-acting treatments andantidotesthat are deployable. antidotes. Pharmaceutical/biological M evaluateto studies efficacy Conducted usingavalidated sulfurmustard injuries weanlinghealing ofsuperficialdermal pigmodel. D vsiae ad eeoe tcnlge ta my e sd o nert etbihd n eegn toxicant emerging and established integrate to used be may that technologies developed and nvestigated pecific casualty management techniques toimprovepecific casualtymanagementtechniques andminimizelostdutytime. survival iagnostics fortheeffectsofexposure agents, torapidly actingnerve vesicants, and non-traditional agents. edical countermeasures tominimizelethality,edical countermeasures morbidity, andincapacitation causedCWAs. 291 and/or SD K againstnon-traditionalagents(N I nvestigational respiratory andsystemictherapeutics R sac suis ag fo bsc n apid eerh n W cutresrs and countermeasures CWA in research applied and basic from range studies esearch o Epoe h dvlpet f eia cutresrs ie, rtetet and pretreatments (i.e., countermeasures medical of development the Explore : sure(s). D evice Exemption ( D vlp fetv, il-elybe igotc qimn; decontamination equipment; diagnostic field-deployable effective, evelop R eactive T A) compared to nodecontamination. ID S E) application. kin D econtaminant Lotion ( Lotion econtaminant T hey are organized under J under organized are hey RSD L), DTO S kin decontamination kit decontamination kin status. STO capability areas capability DTO research research Diagnostics CapabilityArea Research thrust: • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

d s r r Continued basic research experiments aimed at developing detection methods in clinical samples for metabolites, potential strategies for incorporation of internal standard to fluoride reactivation standardtofluoride assay. ofinternal forincorporation potential strategies detect to assayreactivation flouride the of validation vivo in with Proceeded agents.nerve Workedfor Centers with mustard exposure. methodsto various Walter fromdatatesting;throughput test high standardized/converted and and analyzedautomationmarker studies to Expanded studies adapting the (CWA) agent samples warfare chemical clinical from in resultingexposure. biomarkers methods relevant detection other and/or transitioning adducts metabolites, at for aimed experiments research advanced Continued quantitation studiesforassay development agents. foradditionalselectedchemical Established baseline studies, prepared standard curves, established linearity and limits of detection and performed population withnoknown exposure forknown andatypical testmarker marker inhibitors phenotypes. the Using related stabilityandsensitivity. assessing the suitability of different to fibers extract agent nerve metabolites from synthetic and urine their time warfare(CWA); agents chemical to exposure verify to method screeningstudies quick and performed simple a developedas solid phase micro-extractionsuch sample collection/extraction Further as technology(s) alternate skin exposure before theonsetofvesication. mustard sulfur detecting stripping tape skin using noninvasivetest immunodiagnostica of assessment Finalized adducts and/orrelevant warfare resulting biomarkers from chemical exposure. Continued applied research experiments aimed at improving detection methods in clinical samples for metabolites, sulfur mustard exposure. proteins. adducts and/orrelevant warfare resulting biomarkers from chemical agent(CWA) exposure. countermeasures. therapeutic of evaluation and agents warfare chemical to exposure inhalation of study the including research, tudied the dose response and time course for skin protein (laminin-5 and integrin) degradation resultingfrom degradation integrin) and protein(laminin-5 skin for course time responseand dose the tudied pre o te oeta fr eetn slu msad xoue y laae dut fre wt blood with formed adducts cleavage by exposure mustard sulfur detecting for potential the on eported defense chemical medical to applicability for models tissue human evaluated commercially eviewed emonstrated the utility of a sulfur mustard plasma/blood protein assay in an inhalational model for sulfur for model inhalational an in assay protein plasma/blood mustard sulfur a of utility the emonstrated D o D develop chemicaldiagnostic technologies developed whole blood cholinesterase assay for organophosphate exposure, assessed a healthy a exposure,assessed organophosphate for assay cholinesterase blood whole developed D R isease Control (C Control isease eed Army D o D -developed assay whole blood cholinesterase for organophosphate exposure I nstitute of D C) to validate a method to assay urinary hydrolysis for productsassay urinary to method validatea to C) R esearch (W esearch R A IR ) units. V X nerve agent and investigated and agent nerve X F-11

ANNEX F F-12 ANNEX F F.1.3 protective andtherapeuticsystems. (2-PAoxime fielded currently the of replacement a be attack.agent nerve of risk is there where operations military performing agents. nerve of broadspectrum a against enzymatic activity.restore normal inhibition.agent-induced AChE nerve against tran routine the disrupting (AchE), acetylcholinesterase enzyme, of component the (PB), bromide pyridostigmine of I Product: Improved Nerve Agent Treatment System(INATS) I schedule.Bioscavengeron proceeding currently workis and phases these conduct awardedto was contract FY05,a Bioscavenger butyrylcholinesterase (HuBChE), a protein that can bind organ (e.g.,sarin, soman,agents nerve organophosphorus by caused death and be to exposure after 2-pralidoxime and sulfate effective. atropine of administration requires and pretreatment a as hours ( poisoning.agent nerve against Currently,prophylaxis no is there Product: Chemical Agent Prophylaxes (Bioscavenger) D diazepam.than quickly moreseizures AA than diazepam (for quicker into absorption the blood stream) and, in animal models, agent-induced nerve terminates diazepam. uses that (CANA) ConvulsantNerve Agent fielded Antidote currently 2-PA and atropine with treatment survivors. in damage neurological permanent after produce will convulsionsthese even convulsions lasting long produce to may Exposure agents damage. neurologic nerve subsequent and seizures induced agent nerve against treatment for midazolam, F and development After Product: Advanced Anticonvulsant System(AAS) developers. CB I transitioned to the atproduct single a to selecting efficacy to meet the requirements of the F the of requirements the meet to efficacy viable, reproducible, and scalable manufacturing process. I NA ncrement F obtain to is goal development,advancedthe n n FY04,n a S uring FY06,uring NAPP) is the current F current the is NAPP) I D NA TS , through the Joint Project

s n nacd ramn rgmn gis te eattn efcs f ev aet osnn. Components poisoning. agent nerve of effects devastating the against regimen treatment enhanced an is TS are a new oxime to replace the currently fielded oxime (2 oxime fielded currently the replace to oxime new a are T ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTS PRODUCTS DEVELOPMENT ADVANCED II M he bioscavenger system is a prophylactic regimen that will protect the warfighter from incapacitation from warfighter the protect will that regimen prophylactic a is system bioscavenger he M achieved a ilestone approvedwasBioscavenger decision for A I ncrement edical chemical defenseproducts nowedical chemical intheadvanced development phaseare thefollowing: I N D D application was submittedandPhase epartment epartment of Health and Human M I . Bioscavenger D D ilestone A decisioninFY06. A approvedA poisoning.pretreatmentsoman for A approval,A the AA M M ilestone B.ilestone anager for Chemical and Biological T T he goal of he goal he oxime candidate ( I ncrement program S I will not eliminate the need for other protective and therapeutic systems.therapeutic protectiveand other for need the eliminate not will NA D I A’s animal efficacy rule, and to conduct Phase conduct to and rule, efficacy A’sanimal ncrement TS O I S NA is intended to provide an intr an provide to intended is ximes are compounds that reactivate nerve agent-inhibited reactivatethat compounds arenerve ximes AChEto will be licensed byF licensed the be will D TS S A approval/licensure of drugs, vaccines, and devices.vaccines,and drugs, approval/licensure of A NAPP, against additional nerve agents. Nerve agents inhibit the inhibit agents Nerve agents. nerve NAPP,additional against istodeveloptreatment a protection optimal systemthat offers S ervices; increment I M will be developed through a Phase 1 clinical study and then studyand clinical 1 developedPhase be a throughwill I T clinical trials initiated. clinicaltrials MM ) in the A in ) he current goals of the research are to demonstrate animal II is pursuing two technologies as a risk reduction, down- o B4) transitionedtoadvanced development inFY05. pho I ncrement S oman Nerve Agent Pretreatment Pyridostigmine Pyridostigmine Pretreatment Nerve Agent oman s s T phorus phorus nerve agents, is the current candidate for iso o msae. B rtcs oe f the of some protects PB messages. of mission M NAA. ‑ edical pralidoxime chloride or 2-PA or chloride pralidoxime II T D V S will be developed through F he new oxime component of component oximenew he I A and will be issued to service members members service to issued be will and A NAPP must be administered everyadministeredeight be must NAPP I X). , and in FY05, the program developeda FY05,program in the , and t will not eliminate the need for other for need the eliminate not will t T S a ystems (JP he AA muscular administration of the drug, the of administration muscular T he plasma-derived form of human of form plasma-derived he M idazolam is more water-soluble more is idazolam S will be a replacement for the for replacement a be will M -CB I human safety trials. safety human MS ) are the materiel M M D Untreated, . ) and use of use and ) A approval. T I NA he JPE he TS will O I n - F.2.1 F.2 spe found the provide solutions) Vaccines and Antisera: name Bio effectiv operational military of enhancement future for havehuman performance provided a significant increase in military effectiveness in the past and present the potential effectivelyope to deployand ability the requires strategy, which military nation’sglobal the supporting and forces our of strength fighting the conserving Advances in licensed and and of baseline stockpiles. moving vaccine candidates from the technology base through advanced develo Acquis by the Foodbythe and • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • r v v v

v v t

v s

c m S trum of conflict and in the full breadth and depth of the battlefield.the of depth and breadth full the in and conflict of trum Western EquineEncephalitis Eastern EquineEncephalitis Eastern N Q Fever Botulism Antitoxin Heptavalent Equine, Botulism Equine Heptavalent F(ab’)2Botulinum Antitoxin ( Botulinum Botulinum Pentavalent Anthrax ection F.2.3. provides a description of medical biological defense advanced development activities.Currently developmentadvanced defense biological medical of F.2.3.description ection a provides mallpox enezuelan EquineEncephalitis enezuelan EquineEncephalitis

accinia accinia accinia accinia he ecombinant Botulinum D i tion Program (J Program tion C (National T S BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PRODUCTS DEFENSE BIOLOGICAL alk hrax E DOD I DI V V N I I I I I mmune mmune mmune mmune V I accine, Formalininactivated, C accine Adsorbed (licensed) (soldunderthecommercialnameBio nstitute ( mmune  D T accine (limited stockpile oflicensedvaccine,accine (limitedstockpile D CAL B CAL ype F vaccines/biologicals for use in medical biological defense foruseinmedicalbiological vaccines/biologicals and the smallpox vaccine ( medical rug rug Administr D S G G G G rug Company) ( rug T ection F.2.2 provides a description of biological defense science and technology base activities, G V TSI oxoid lobulin, lobulin, lobulin, lobulin (licensed2005) AP) component of the Chemical and Biological Biological and Chemical the of component AP) lobulin, Human( IO R ) smallpox T & oxoid a T V tion that ensures the fielding of a flexible, sustainable, modernized force across the across force modernized sustainable,flexible, a of fielding the ensures that tion D oxin accine ( L significantly impact the warfighting mission by sustaining unit effectiveness through a I I I V ntravenous ( ntravenous ( ntramuscular ( OGI tion (F tion V irus irus V irus irus V accine Adsorbed ( V V accine V irus irus irus irus V S I accine ( V r N accine ( alk) L D CAL CAL ate in all environments.all in ate accine ( D A) and availableand A) use—Anthrax for V V I N #5077) accine (inactivated), C-84( accine (attenuated), S D T erotypes A and B(BB- D VS M I I ypes A, B, C, ryvax N N #1332) V I Extract, I

D D N D accinia I T N N ularemia #10351,emergency useprotocol) #10351,emergency #9141) D D D EFEN #266) TM #8429) #2013) I ). A Prime N e T V ness. ypes A, B, C, D G irus, CellCulture-derived) ( #3723) amma V D accine ( S D , E, F, and O E E ryvax nly two biological defense vaccines are fullylicensed vaccinesare defense nlytwo biological T M S R C-83 ( I rradiated (Henzerling rradiated ystems Contract, the which supports Joint edical I E N I TM N D S D D I #11756) , E, F, and EA N I G ) #157) O N R D ( M D vercoming medical threats and extending and threats medical vercoming & I p #914) R N edical R #142) ment to F V D & D accine trade Adsorbed,the under sold products (materiel and non-materiel non-materiel and (materiel products CH D #7451) T includethefollowing: hrax G S ystems office, is responsible for responsible is office, ystems ) ( I  D I N N A licensure and procurement ) D S D train) ( #4984) #3703) I N D #3516) V accine F-13

ANNEX F F-14 ANNEX F ACCOMPLISHMENTS F.2.2 in pretreatments (molecular vaccines and multiagent vaccines) actually cross some of these broad groupings. For groupings. conveniencebroad molecular vaccines are discussed under viral vaccines, and multiagent vaccines: vaccinesthese under bacterial of some cross actually vaccines) multiagent and vaccines (molecular pretreatments areas in thrust some that Note agents. warfare biological against areas thrust defense medical overarching following T and formulations. the and manner in which infection,the immune system is and engaged by and exposureresponds to biological agents and signal to various vaccine platforms that biomarkers interactions, host-pathogen common and specific disease, cause that mechanisms biology,pathogenic agent threat understanding include research agent biological for Areas to investigations basic more contribute also to the knowledge but base upon fielding, which new and or improved development biological agent countermeasures advancedwill be developed. for countermeasures candidate develop properties. unexpected and novel with toxins and pathogens engineered genetically as well as diseases emerging unknownpreviously with U.weaponized,the havebeen to known are which of pathogens,some occurring naturally these to anthrax, smallpox, plague, feverencephalitis viruses, hemorrhagic viruses, and plant toxins.and bacterial agents lists published by toxins.and viruses, bacteria, include agents threat Biological Technical InformationandGuidance: • • • • • • • • • • • • e ilgcl ees rsac ad eeomn tcncl ares n accomplis and barriers technical development and research defense biological he sig r t v r

Cidofovir smallpox therapeutic, Cidofovir smallpox therapeutic, D agentcountermeasures Bacterial NA C Medical Management ofBiological CasualtiesHandbook oxin Agent countermeasures

iral agentcountermeasures ecombinant Plague ecombinant Plague D iagnostic technologies TO - A-246 smallpox therapeutic, ROM BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH DEFENSE BIOLOGICAL Handbook “ − − − − − − on “ T T V V therapeutics Bacterial vaccines Bacterial oxin therapeutics oxin vaccines iral therapeutics iral vaccines M anagement of Biological anagement ofBiological Warfare Casualties,” 1999. T M DOD he medical he V V edical Aspects ofNBC accine –Bivalent (BB- accine –Fusion(BB- , HH S , and the O I S O ntravenous & ral ral (Fast T research program goals include not only the applied research needed to needed research applied the only not include goals program research I ntelligence Community are well for the most part known, and include I T N D I rack status) rack N D efensive D #12031) #11378) , edition, fourth 2001. February O perations, A T he agents identified on the various biological threat biological various the on identified agents he M edP-6(B), Part h et ae rue b the by grouped are ments II (Biological),” 1998. S . may be faced be may. I n addition Pre-treatments CapabilityArea Bacterial AgentCountermeasures application. an of technical preparation the with support consistent to developeradvanced the are by required and information base technology the of out transition for requirements meet efforts these from elevationto applied research in bacterial vaccines and associated scientific disciplines to research nearing the point of maturity for Objective Research Overarching Bacterial Vaccines Technical Barriers: Countermeasures outlined below. T and Joint W U.the M and focusesonemerging, novel, threats, orbioengineered andbiological. bothchemical T and the intracellular bacterial pathogens (i.e.,pathogens bacterial intracellular the and agents.threat research thrusts intoJ thrusts research • • • • • • • • • he countermeasures, technical barriers, and accomplishments in the Bacterial Agent Countermeasures area are area Countermeasures Agent Bacterial the in accomplishments and barriers, technical countermeasures, he Emerging he edical biological defense research was managed by the J the by managed was research defense biological edical

R A out ehooy ae o efr rsac nee t dvlp onemaue fr e, mrig and emerging, new, for countermeasures develop to needed threats.genetically bacterial engineered research perform to base technology robust sufficiently a provide and threats bacterial known the assess to capabilities maintain and establish to Necessity agentsofinterest. bacterial Necessity to enhance the otherwise limited data on which to base rational drug design and antibody therapies for D D of efficacy evaluate to trials clinical medical products.human perform to which in situations epidemiological suitable of Lack D D agents. T V IR accines thatthreat conferimmunity agents. againstbacterial S herapeutics for treatment of diseases and pathologies caused by exposure to and infection by bacterial threat bacterial by infection and to exposure by caused pathologies and diseases of treatment for herapeutics ifficulty in defining appropriate surrogate markers ofprotection.ifficulty indefiningappropriatesurrogatemarkers ifficulty infieldtestingrapididentification/diagnostic kitsundernatural conditions. eveloping animalmodelsystemsforinvestigation appropriate threats andcountermeasures. ofsomebacterial eveloping forallknown threat accurate andcompletegeneticinformation agents. bacterial . Army ), and the contributing laboratories from the Navy (N S ervice ervice D T efense T : M he principal bacterial threat agents addressed in this research area during FY05 are anthrax, plague,anthrax,are FY05 during area research this in addressed agents threat bacterial principal he hreats Capability Area cuts across Pretreatment,across cuts Capability hreatsArea edical I nstitutions (AF T STO echnology echnology R esearch and esearch -CB Epoe h dvlpet f addt vcie aant atra booia warfare biological bacterial against vaccines candidate of development the Explore : D capabilityareas. I O P). bjective ( bjective T M he research is organized by threat area with subsequent arrangement of specific ateriel Command (U Command ateriel DTO T ularemia, Burkholderia, etc.)ularemia, Burkholderia, ) status.) DTO STO S R A L, N MRM research efforts are designed so that data generated data that so designed are efforts research -CB T herapeutic, and herapeutic, MR D C) laboratories (U laboratories C) . Following are technical accomplishments by accomplishments technical are Following. C), Air Force (AF R esearch studies range from basic and basic from range studies esearch I D nvestigational Newnvestigational iagnostic Capability Area lines,Capability Area iagnostic S R A L, U MRIID S AF ,U S A S A M MRI D /311 H rug ( rug C D I ,and S N W) D ) F-15

ANNEX F F-16 ANNEX F Therapeutics CapabilityArea Basic and Applied Research Accomplishments: forelevation thepointof maturity nearing to pseudomallei (anthrax), predicted or presumed battlefield doses of aerosolized warfare biological bacterial agents, to include and animal models. Overarching Research Objective Bacterial Therapeutics Basic and Applied Research Accomplishments: • • • • • • • • • • • m i i nacd eoilg cpblte ad nml oe dvlpet o aiiae atra therapeutics developmentPursued ofamousemodeltostudy anthraxtoxin function. bacterial facilitate to development therapeutics. profiles ofbacterial pharmacodynamic and model pharmacokinetic characterize to models animal animal and capabilities aerobiology enhanced Utilized and research. capabilities aerobiology Enhanced threat agents. Continued to perform animal studies which clinical support trials of selected vaccine candidates against bacterial vaccine resistance. Evaluated therole ofcapsuleinthedevelopment ofageneration-after-next anthraxvaccine. plague F1- Continued technology base studies in support of the development and eventual F Continued toevaluate additionalorenhancedvaccine candidates againstplague. of new medicalcountermeasures. discovery support to agents threat (Brucella/ bacterial selected of products gene and genes novel virulence Characterized pathogens bacterial intracellular of study the in Burkeholderia/ efforts research consolidated and Facilitated nvestigated anthrax spore interactions with host cells and characterization of diverse B. anthracis strains for strains anthracis B. diverse of characterization and cells host with interactions spore anthrax nvestigated nitiated project todevelop Bacillusvaccine, ageneric includingidentification oftargetantigens. ultiagent vaccines: − − − − − − − esna pestis Yersinia (melioidosis). I Began studiesinanthrax/plaguemolecularvaccine development andevaluation. antigens. Explored genomics/proteomics-based high throughput approaches for identifying potential vaccine target Established newmodels. animalefficacy I vaccines are bycontinuing.bacterial protein engineering D I nitiated Bacillus generic molecularvaccinenitiated construction. Bacillusgeneric onanthrax-plaguecombinedvaccine development.nitiated effort multiagent vaccinedentified bacterial targetantigens. esigned development of cloned and expressed chimeric vaccine constructs for multivalent toxin and toxin multivalent for constructs vaccine chimeric expressed and cloned of development esigned V vaccine candidates. D : T emonstrate their capability for reducing mortality or incapacitation in animal models exposed to ularemia) toinclude identification ofpotentialintracellularpathogen targetantigens. (plague), R : esearch esearch studies range from basic and applied research in bacterial therapeutics to research I dentify and characterize candidate antibiotics and biologics using appropriate laboratory rniel tularensis Francisella D efense T (tularemia), echnology echnology O bjective ( ukodra mallei Burkholderia DTO ) status. D A licensure of the recombinant gadr) and (glanders), Bacillus anthracis Burkholderia Burkholderia

Pre-treatments CapabilityArea T ( requiredinformation technical by the advanced developer the to preparationsupport of an data generated from these meet efforts requirements for transition out of the technology base and are consistent with to elevation for maturity agents. threat biological toxin aerosolized of doses battlefield presumed or predicted to exposed animals in morbidity and using appropriate laboratory and animal models, and demo Overarching Research Objective: Toxin Vaccines Technical Barrier Countermeasures: below. T o I • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • he countermeasures, technical barriers, and accomplishments in the N g i r i d t d v s m d x D in emerging toxin threats.emerging Necessity to establish and maintain capabilities to assess toxin threats and provide for new countermeasures and toxin agentsofinterest. Necessity to enhance the otherwise limited data on which to base rational drug design and antibody therapies for clinical efficacy. at theagent’s ofentry. port threat againstmultiple agentsinNHPs. bacterial Assessed selectcompoundsforsafetyandefficacy therapeutics. tobeusedinconjunctionwithbacterial immunomodulators Cp Evaluated therapeuticcandidates.cytokine-based T ) application. nsertion ofstable geneticalteration targetstoproduce oftoxin toxin-resistantnsertion targets. biological biological investigationfor developmenthuman dentificationmodels and of animal endpoints appropriate surrogate of of creened novel and currently available antibiotic technologies against anthrax, plague, and burkholderia infections. cnlge icue ml mlcls atmcoil etds mncoa antibodies, monoclonal peptides, antimicrobial molecules, small include echnologies accines that produce long-term protectiveaccines that produce long-term immunity againsttoxin agents. herapeutics fortreatment ofdiseases/symptomscausedby toxin agents. etention oftoxin forvaccine antigenicitywithouttoxic candidates. properties eneric (broad-spectrum) protection from (broad-spectrum) families oftoxinseneric withsubtlealterations intoxic modesofaction. evelopment inflammation inanimalmodels. ofpulmonary ofmarkers totoxin that canbeadministered exposure prior toprotectrugs againsttoxic effectsoftheagent. evelopment modelsystemsthat ofappropriate emulate humanaerosol exposure andintoxication. ethods for induction of respiratory and mucosal immune responses that produce long term protective immunity A R esearch studies range from basic and applied research in toxin vaccines to research nearing the point of point the nearing research to vaccines toxin in research applied and basic from range studies esearch gent s: C ountermeasures G ois n ha sok rti 7 (H 70 protein shock heat and motifs D efense D evelop candidate prophylactic medical countermeasures (vaccines and pre-treatments), T echnology echnology O bjective ( bjective n DTO strate their capability for preventing or reducing mortality S ) status. ) 7) siuaos f h imn rsos) as response) immune the of (stimulators P70) T oxin Agent Countermeasures area are outlined DTO research efforts are designed so that so designed are efforts research I nvestigational New R A niios and inhibitors, NA D rug rug F-17

ANNEX F F-18 ANNEX F R Vaccine Defense Technology Objective (DTO) Research Accomplishments: R Basic and Applied Research Accomplishments: esearch esearch • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • esearch esearch d i i i t d t d i Completed efficacy studiesand pathology inhigher animalspecieswiththeleadvaccineCompleted efficacy candidate. toxicity andpathology studiesinrodents. comprehensivea Completed review resultsof candidate,lead with potency,including efficacy, adjuvant studies, commercial vaccine base. delivery foralternate outofthetechnology of technology transition support to recommendations prepared and studies research preclinical Completed Evaluated stabilityandimmunogenicity of immunogens asvaccine candidates toprotect againstmultiple enterotoxinstaphylococcal generation ( next A of testing Continued and expression ofgenesfornovel multivalent vaccine candidates. holotoxins inanimalmodels. candidate. candidate. candidates viaadjuvants and/ormethodof delivery. Accelerated studies to increase immunogenicity of existing recombinant BoN immunity inanimal models. (BoN neurotoxins botulinum of domains functional of ability the on studies Continued toxin ricin (r A-chain Conducted computational studies chemistry to develop next generation botulinum neurotoxin and recombinant as potentialimmunogens toprotect againstmultiple nitiated studies on multivalent vaccine candidates to protect against multiple BoN nitiated evaluation of inactivated BoN developmentthe of eventualand support in studies base F nitiatedtechnology enterotoxinstaphylococcal( new B dentified enterotoxinA/staphylococcal ested novel vaccine adjuvants candidate. withleadricin ( enterotoxin staphylococcal of stability ested emonstrated proof-of-concept for lead alternate vaccineemonstrated proof-of-concept delivery forleadalternate system(s). eveloped vaccine adjuvant forhigheranimalspeciesinricin studies. surrogateendpointsofclinicalefficacy eveloped in-process andrelease assays forrecombinant BoN T T oward Alternative oward the D evelopment ofa RT D A) vaccines. elivery M R ethods for ecombinant T light chain vaccine candidates as well as large-scale truncations of BoN S EB toxin vaccine in support ofclinicaltrial. EB toxin vaccine insupport R ecombinant Protein S R ) acn cniae n rcmiat ii vcie (r vaccine ricin recombinant and candidate vaccine E) icin S E serotypes. V accine (CB.46) T S E serotypes invivo. Hcvaccine candidates. V S T accines ( EA)/ staphylococcal enterotoxin B ( B enterotoxinstaphylococcal EA)/ his DTO T S EA/ DTO heavy chains (Hc) subunit vaccine D concludedinFY05. A licensure of the ricin vaccine licensurericin A the of T S serotypes, including cloning CB.32) EB) structural determinants determinants structural EB) T ) to elicit protective elicit to ) RT S EB) A) T

DTO CB. 46Recombinant RicinVaccine FY2006: Milestones/Metrics. meet current not did that process manufacturing and vial, the in (e.g.,toxinaggregation activity),natural enzymatic the from Challenges. weapon asabiological toU.ricin aerosolizedthreat toxin.of the eliminate virtually ricin and protectionforce enhance vaccinewill ricin licensed A Payoffs. toxicity.against ricin polypeptidesproduced by evaluatedbe recombinantexpressionwill vectors immunogenscapableas protecting of exposures.battlefield hypothetical Novel ricin to levelsA-chain comparable at toxin ricin aerosolized to exposed exposure to ricin toxin. A goal is demonstration of 80% (threshold, objective is 90%) survival of vaccinated animals Objectives. studies totheadvanced developer intoan forincorporation Complete pathologyComplete model.the NHP in studies Provide data from vaccinecompleted technical research No licensed vaccine, antidote, or other medical therapy is available to protect availableto is therapy medical other vaccine,antidote,or licensed No D T G he objective of this of objective he eveloping vaccine candidates that do not retain the undesirableof vaccinescharacteristics produced ood M anufacturing Practices(c anufacturing S . forces. DTO is to develop a safe and effective vaccine for protection against aerosol against protection for vaccine effective and safe a develop to is GM P) standards. I nvestigational New D rug ( rug I N S D ervice members against members ervice ) application. F-19

ANNEX F F-20 ANNEX F Therapeutics CapabilityArea performance performance of the therapeutic agent obtained in appropriate animal models of aerosol intoxication. target Efforts the respiratory tract and other of portals entry, and identification of defining parameters the efficacious neurotoxins,stap botulinum include agents,to threat toxin biological aerosolized of doses battlefield presumed or predicted to exposed animals in morbidity and mortality reducing or immunotherapies),models,animal Objectiveand cap demonstratelaboratory their and appropriate using Research Overarching Toxin Therapeutics: DTO CB.65 andgeneticallyengineeredagents Multi-agent(molecular)vaccinesforbio-warfare a number of smallpox structural proteins. structural smallpox of number a as past the and in Ebola include efficacy vaccines demonstrated have which targets Possible platform. vaccine the from expression community. (ii) research casualties. mass through terror maximum induce to calculated place plague has already been undertaken in this area both at the Naval the at both area this in undertaken been already has FY2009: FY2008: underlyingimmune response the Characterize elements. plague and anthrax the with combination in and alone models animal in FY2007: delivery systemsthat stimulate protective immunity following minimaldosing. FY2006: Milestones/Metrics. plague, andhave beendeveloped orare beingdeveloped fortheothermajorthreat agents. system.relevantmodel a animal in ultimatelychallenge aerosol purpose.this (iii) Challenges. strains.engineered has approach the potential to be extended to include additional bio-threats, those posed particularly by genetically in a single formulation would result in substantial savings in terms of cost and time. footprint. wouldthreeand agents Combining cost and logistics time the of minimize considerable saving terms in enemy.the defeating on energies their focus to commanders enable would and footprint medical the reducing by efficiency Payoffs. following possible period minimaldosing.the shortest or smallpox as such agent bio-threat other one and plague anthrax, against protection simultaneous vaccines.licensed new of devoteddevelopmentbeing currentlythe is to considerableeffort such as and bio-threatagents prime considered agents.bio-threatare multiple plague against and fighter Anthrax war the protecting of capable countermeasures medical develop to us compels events such of nature unpredictable the systems, detection time real integrated Objectives. D

xrs te eet i-het gn tre fo ti pafr sse ad ses t immunogenicity its assess and system platform this from target agent bio-threat select the Express T NA vaccine platform.vaccine NA D D D he ability to remove the threat posed by bio-weapons from the battle space would enhance operational wouldenhance space battle the bio-weaponsbyfromremove posed threat to the ability he T evelop the optimal backbone anthrax/plague vaccine platform. Particular focus will be on etermine protective against aerosol challenge etermine efficacy agent. protective against injectedliveforeach etermine efficacy agentchallenge he development of a vaccine capable of protecting against three bio-threat agents would represent a representwould agents bio-threat three against protecting of capable vaccine a of development he (i) T his O D ptimization of anthrax/plague of ptimization DTO emonstrate protective efficacy of individual and combined vaccine targets against injected and injected against vaccinetargets combined and individual emonstrateprotectiveof efficacy il ou o te eeomn o a rvln vcie ae o a rttp anthrax/ prototype a on based vaccine trivalent a of development the on focus will I R dentification of the third bio-threat agent vaccine target/targets and their subsequent their and target/targets vaccine agent bio-threat third the of dentification esearch will focus on developing a trivalent vaccine prototype capable of conferring conferring of capable prototype vaccine trivalent a developing on focus will esearch M : arburg glycoproteins, arburg T he nature of a bio-attack is such that an aggressor is likely to strike at a time and time a at strike likelyto is aggressor an that such is bio-attack a of nature he D vlp addt teaetc onemaue (hrpui dus and drugs (therapeutic countermeasures therapeutic candidate evelop I t is envisaged that the platform developed at stage at developed platform the that envisaged is t D NA platform and immunization schedule. Considerable workConsiderable schedule. immunization and platform NA V enezuelan equine encephalitis virus structural protein, and protein, structural virus encephalitis equine enezuelan M edical M odel systems already exist for both anthrax and anthrax both for alreadyexist systems odel R h esearch Center, esearch U ylococcal enterotoxins ( enterotoxins ylococcal I n the absence of specific intelligence and intelligence specific of absence the n I n addition, once developed this S A MRIID a S bility for preventingfor bility E), and ricin toxin. ricin E),and I will be used for used be will , and the larger the and , R esearch esearch studies F.tulerensis D NA vector D NA in Th R Basic and Applied Research Accomplishments: DTO range from for elevationthe point in of basic toxinmaturity and applied research nearing therapeutics to research to • • • • • • • • • • • • • • esearch towardesearch thedevelopment of r d d d t d d erapeutics into suitable candidate therapiesinhumans, specifically asacomplementtofuture vaccination strategies Evaluated potentialdelivery systemsfortheleadpeptideinhibitors. surrogate endpointsofhumanclinicalefficacy. BoN lead with studies of-concept Completed in-vitro testing of combinations of monoclonal antibodies against multiple BoN in-vivo. (botulinum neurotoxin (BoN showncompounds lead with models animal in studies Conducted haveto toxinstarget of inhibitors as potential eventual fortoxins. trials humanclinicalefficacy systems. natural products andmonoclonal antibodies. ( Evaluated novel and currently available anti-toxin against toxin,ricin technologies toxin analysis andBoN Performed ofricin structural (BoN Conducted delineatestudies to of the further action mechanism of, and host response to, botulinum neurotoxin toxin therapeuticdevelopment. aerosol modelsofdiseasetosupport Characterized status. S se efcc o cmiain o mncoa atbde aant utpe BoN multiple against antibodies monoclonal of combinations of efficacy ested efined and demonstrated technologies that integrate established and emerging toxin therapeutic modalities therapeutic toxin emerging and established integrate that technologies demonstrated and efined eveloped fornonclinicalstudiesofoptimum therapeuticcandidates/treatment atechnology modalities. eveloped astrategy fordevelopment ofBoN efined the key (peptide binding linking design,technologies candidate delivery systems) that have relevance to efined andvalidatedagainstselectedtoxins. oftherapeuticefficacy essentialindicators eveloped lead mixtures of human antibodies against Botulinum Neurotoxin (BoN EB) and Botulinum Neuro T ). D efense T ec T T oxin (BoN h ), ricin, staphylococcal enterotoxin B(

nology T herapeutic T active-site inhibitors and/or receptor antagonists in-vivo using qualified using in-vivo antagonists receptor and/or inhibitors active-site T ) in-vitro and in-vivo. O S b T trategies forBotulinumNeurotoxinstrategies ( j therapeuticcandidates. ective T serotypes. (DTO) R T echnologies include small echnologies molecules, peptides, esearc S EB)) h A T ) as passive immunotherapeutics ccomplis S taphylococcal Enterotoxin B T DTO eoye i cell-based in serotypes T CB.59) serotypes and proof- h ments : F-21

ANNEX F F-22 ANNEX F V T Technical Barriers: Countermeasures: below. DTO CB. 59TherapeuticStrategiesforBotulinumNeurotoxins iral a technology developmenta technology planfornonclinicalstudiesofoptimum therapeuticcandidates/treatment modalities. concert with the advanced developer, for development of BoN efficacy.clinical human of endpoints of-concept studies with lead BoN multipleagainst vitrocombinationsantibodies BoN in of monoclonal Completed testing of FY2006: Milestones/Metrics. data andextrapolating from efficacy animalmodelstohumans.purposes investigationalfor systems model appropriate developing therapies,and post-exposure for systems delivery drug development of countermeasures for BoN Challenges. todutyandrestorationflexibility ofjointforcesandfacilitate ofoperations. return meet joint requirements.service to Effective quantity therapeutic countermeasures against sufficient BoN in available not are ventilation) mechanical with support and antitoxins (i.e., intoxication Payoffs. R BoN of effects biochemical pathophysiologicaland the thatcounteract compounds and drugs characterizing and (BoN neurotoxin botulinum of threat (BW) warfare biological validated the against therapeutics Objectives. currently no F treatment for subsequent strategies nonclinical and preclinical studies required to obtain F BoN of effects the counteract that compounds of characterization BoN to • • • • • • • he countermeasures, technical barriers, and accomplishments in the i d d v esearch willfocusonpretreatment,esearch treatment, delivery strategies. andneuronal drug Animal F eventual for models animal characterize fully and develop to Necessity countermeasures. antibodies). laboratories. Limited infrastructure supporting work with live viral agents in high- and maximum-containment (BL3 and BL4) fortreatment ofviraldisease.Antibodies andantiviraldrugs sfiin o icmltl udrto aia mdl ytm fr netgto o vrl het and threats viral of investigation for systems model animal understood incompletely or nsufficient accines that conferimmunity againstviralthreat agents. evelopment identification technology. ofrapidvirus and (vaccines products recombinant for vectors expression different comparing and optimizing in ifficulty A T gent

delivered as a BW agent would have severe consequences on mission effectiveness. mission on consequences severehave would agent BW a as delivered BoN D R vlpd ed itrs f ua atbde aant BoN against antibodies human of mixtures lead eveloped ule. ah eoye f BoN of serotype Each T T D C his is a potent toxin that is lethal by aerosol exposure.byaerosol lethal is thattoxin potent a is A-licensed drugs against this toxin threat, and the standard post-exposure treatments for botulinum ountermeasures DTO will enable the future development of Food and Food of development future the enable will T active site inhibitors and receptor antagonists (in vivo) using qualified surrogate T I nformation generated by this research will be used to develop a strategy,developa to used be in will research this bygenerated nformation s iey o eur a alrd hrpui srtg. mhss il e on be will Emphasis strategy. therapeutic tailored a require to likely is T serotypes A, B, E, and F. T therapeutic candidates, and will be used to develop T will enable the selection of lead candidates or candidates lead of selection the enable will D V O eliberate exposure of joint service members members service joint of exposureeliberate iral Agent areaCountermeasures are outlined ther challenges are developing safe neuronal T s asv imnteaetc i vivo. in immunotherapeutics passive as D rug Administration (F Administration rug D A licensure of vaccines under the under vaccines of licensure A T will enhance the operational D T A licensure. serotypes proof-and I dentification and dentification T ) by identifying by ) D A)-licensed T here are T . Pre-treatment CapabilityArea Basic and Applied Research Accomplishments: application. an of preparation the support advanceddeveloperto the byrequired information technical with consistent are and base technology the of out transition for requirements meet efforts these from generated data that so designed elevationfor maturity of point the to nearing research to disciplines scientific immunology, and pathogenesis. virology,applied and molecular on (Ebola Focus encephalitis). filoviruses (equine alphaviruses include and (smallpox) to agents,orthopoxviruses viruses), threat BW viral aerosolized of doses battlefield presumed or models, and demonstrate their capability to protect or significantly reduce morbidity in animals exposed to predicted Objective Research Overarching Viral Vaccines: • • • • • • • • • • • • m t d d d Evaluated poxvirus virus WEE or EEE against species animal higher in challenge. candidates vaccine EEE/WEE promising Evaluated Completed studiesoncorrelatesofimmunity that protect againstdiseasefrom filoviruses andalphaviruses. against filoviruses. Expanded development ofanimalmodelsaerosol infectionwithfiloviruses. Began investigating therole ofcytotoxic and genetically hazardousviruses. engineered Necessity to establish and maintain capabilities to assess threats and provide countermeasures for new, emerging, viral agentsofinterest. Necessity to enhance the otherwise limited data on which to base rational drug design and antibody therapies for viral agents. ested promising vaccine inhigheranimalspeciesforabilitytoprotect againstfiloviruses. strategies etermined the use of virus-like particles ( particles virus-like of use the etermined ofprotection.ifficulty indefiningsurrogatemarkers unrelatedof array an against protect to compatibleplatforms vaccinemultivalentand evelopment vaccines of olecular − − − − − − Began evaluation ofa Evaluated theuseof T towardapproach rapidvaccine development. genomics/proteomics-based a for technologies sequencing and expression gene throughput high Used Evaluated Explored useof ested oligonucleotideCp V accines: D NA-based immunization againstviralthreat agents. D NA vaccine. V : LP formultiagent vaccine development. I dentify and characterize candidate vaccines, using appr using vaccines,candidate characterize and dentify R V V esearch esearch studies range from basic and applied research in viral vaccines and associated LP asantigenforvaccines forfiloviruses. EE replicon-based G asanadjuvant withlive attenuated alphavirus vaccine candidates. T cellsinthehigheranimalmodeloffilovirus infection. V LP) and adenoviruses as antigen delivery platforms for vaccines for platforms delivery antigen as adenoviruses and LP) M arburg virus vaccinearburg candidate. virus DTO status. o priate laboratory and animal and laboratory priate DTO research efforts are efforts research M arburg I N D

F-23

ANNEX F F-24 ANNEX F V a CombinedEquineEncephalitis R R Vaccine Defense Technology Objective (DTO) Research Accomplishments: • • • • • • iruses) Exposure ( iruses) sac twr the toward esearch towardthe esearch i t i Continued to analyze mutants with various engineered attenuating mutations to determine their suitability for suitability their determine to mutationsattenuating engineered various with mutants analyze to Continued variation in viral challenge strain). variation inviralchallenge testing.studies andconcurrent candidate, Continued testing candidates in available animal models for EEE vaccine. and WEE viruses). model. efficacy non-humanprimate equineencephalitis(EEE)virus Enhanced studiestoestablish aneastern use asvaccine platforms. ncorporated ncorporated antigen targets from earlier studies to improve vaccine candidates as determined from characterization nitiated applied research to define correlates of immunity that protect against disease from alphaviruses (EEE alphaviruses from disease against protect that immunity of correlates define to research applied nitiated ested leading vaccine candidates in animals (viral challenge dose, route, pre-existing vector immunity,and vector pre-existing route,dose, challenge (viral animals in candidates vaccine leading ested V 3526, inanimals. andvaccine platforms DTO D D evelopmentof (WEE/EEE) Encephalitis Equine Western Eastern and vlpet of evelopment CB.60) V accine ( V accine DTO CB.58) T cnlge fr rtcinAant ioiu ( Filovirus Against Protection for echnologies D etermined etermined the compatibility of vaccine V accine Constructs for Constructs accine M rug n Ebola and arburg Encephalitis Vaccine DTO CB. 58Western andEasternEquineEncephalitisVaccine ConstructsforaCombinedEquine xrpltn efcc dt fo aia mdl t humans. to models animal from data efficacy extrapolating FY2008: formulations. andtrivalent constructs FY2007: replicon-based vaccine platforms. FY2006: Milestones/Metrics. for thisproject. cross- as such mechanisms immune reacting specificantibody. or Competition for limited in-house animal interferon resources must also be considered as a resource challenge such mediators nonspecific through interference Challenges. to obtainprotection from from three thepathogenic toone. equineencephalitisviruses combined effective protection.An force V and mobility strategic enhance and BW of threat the decrease would therapy. supportive to viruses limited encephalitis is equine infection post-exposurethe against Effectivevaccines for treatment and viruses encephalitis equine the by imposed threat BW the against protection pretreatment for freeze-dried. when stability and infectivity warfareaerosol of biological because threats (BW) important arehowever, humans;they and horses, birds, to viruses these transmit normally mental confusion, sleepiness, and sometimes seizures and other neurological signs and symptoms. Payoffs. to appropriate be would alreadythatthe transitioned vaccinewith single a into combine constructs vaccine EEE and WEE characterizing and identifying by vaccine EEE Objectives. follow-on nonclinicalstudiesofcombined V transitioned already and under this enablingthis under vaccines and the in made candidates vaccine EE/WEE/EEE vaccine would add important logistical advantages by reducing the number of vaccines requiredvaccines of number the advantagesreducingby logistical important wouldvaccineadd EE/WEE/EEE EE/WEE/EEE vaccine components into a single vaccine, a technology development plan will be prepared for prepared be will plan development technology vaccine,a single a into components vaccine EE/WEE/EEE

Complete analyses of duration studies. Upon demonstration of preliminary proof-of-concept for combining with construct(s) combination vaccine in WEE models animal in approaches vaccine EEE newEvaluate Clinical illness associated with associated illness Clinical I nitiate duration of immunity studies with lead candidates for each platform, comparing the individual the comparing platform, each for candidates lead with studies immunity of duration nitiate D T Enable the development of a Food and Food a developmentof the Enable echnical challenges include developing appropriate model systems for investigational purposes and investigational for purposes systems model developing appropriate include challenges echnical NA vaccines. DTO V include live-attenuatedinclude vaccines, attenuatingmutations, engineered with replicon-based EE vaccine candidate vaccine EE D NA- or replicon-based vaccine platforms. Leading technologies being evaluatedbeing technologies platforms.Leading vaccine replicon-based or NA- V EE, EEE, and WEE includes headache, fever, chills, nausea, vomiting,nausea, fever, headache,chills, includes and WEE EEE, EE, V EE/WEE/EEE vaccine formulations. V 3526 or alternate alternate or 3526 D rug (F rug Administration V EE vaccinecandidateEE O hr oeta tcncl ares nld vaccine include barriers technical potential ther V EE vaccine candidates made in the in made candidates vaccine EE D T here are no F no are here A) licensed combined licensed A) V 3526,alternative with or D A-licensed vaccines A-licensed M osquito vectors V EE/WEE/ D NA- or NA- V EE F-25

ANNEX F F-26 ANNEX F Therapeutics CapabilityArea Basic and Applied Research Accomplishments: to elevationfor maturity of point the nearing research to disciplines scientific associated and vaccines viral in research to agents, threat warfare biological include filoviruses (Ebola and viral aerosolized against doses battlefield presumed or predicted to exposed vitro Objective Research Overarching Viral Therapeutics Exposure DTO CB. 60Vaccine Technologies forProtection AgainstFilovirus(MarburgandEbolaViruses) nonclinical studiesofoptimum vaccine candidates. FY2006: Milestones/Metrics. developing in use for filovirus vaccine candidates. immunogens appropriate of identification the and purposes, investigational for markers Challenges. development. lead vaccine strategies for future nonclinical studies designed to the bring optimum vaccine candidates forward for S mobility. strategic enhance and agents, (BW) warfare biological as filoviruses of threat the decrease forces, joint M offensiveprogram.its BW of weaponizationfor part as former the exist, onlycurrentlythe availablecareis supportive treatment. weaponizationtheir evidenceof clear not Although does weaponization. and dissemination aerosol for potential the have they since ( filoviruses the including Payoffs. predicted orpresumed battlefield dosesoffiloviruses. to exposed animals in morbidity and mortality reduce to capability their demonstrating and models, animal and ( filoviruses Objectives. I models. • • • • nformation generated by these research efforts will be used to developto used be developmentwill technology a generated futurefor plan by efforts nformation research these s v o cientific and technical information developed during the course of this research will enable the identification of identification the enable will research this of course the developedduring information technical and cientific DTO arburg and Ebola viruses. Effective vaccines against the filoviruses would provide pre-exposure protection to protection pre-exposure provide would filoviruses the against vaccines Effective viruses. Ebola and arburg laboratory and animal models, and demonstrate their capability to reduce mortality and morbidity in animals in morbidity and mortality reduce to capability their demonstrate and models, animal and laboratory threat agents in-vitro. interfering small animalmodels.appropriate Enhanced aerobiology capabilitiesandanimalmodeldevelopment tofacilitate viraltherapeuticsresearch. creened novel and currently available antiviral technologies, including interferons,including availablenovelcurrentlytechnologies,creened and antiviral ldtd oeta mdaos f hc ad oei ascae wt hmrhgc ee vrs neto in infection virus fever hemorrhagic with associated toxemia and shock of mediators potential alidated ptimized drug discoveryptimized drug assays with application to identifyingandtestingantiviralsagainstthreat agents. status. D vlae acn promne eurmns vcie oe rue nme o dss ec, i animal in etc.,) doses, of number route, dose, (vaccine requirements performance vaccine Evaluate V etermine if etermine putative surrogate markers of protection reliably predict mitigation or prevention of disease. iral hemorrhagic fevers are a diverse group of illnesses caused bycaused illnesses of group diverse a feversare hemorrhagic iral M T nbe h dvlpet f od and Food of development the Enable arburg and Ebola) by identifying and characterizing vaccine technologies using technologies vaccine characterizing and identifying by Ebola) and arburg : cncl hlegs nld dvlpet f prpit aia mdl ytm ad surrogate and systems model animal appropriate of development include challenges echnical S oviet Union is alleged to have had an effort to produce to effort an had have to alleged is Union oviet R NA (si NA M : arburg and Ebola).and arburg M R I dentify and characterize candidate therapeutics/ treatments, using appropriate appropriate using treatments, therapeutics/ candidate characterize and dentify NA), small compounds, artificial nucleases and monoclonal antibodies, against viral antibodies,against monoclonal and nucleases compounds,artificial NA),small arburg viruses) and orthopox viruses. and orthopox arburg viruses) M arburg and Ebola viruses are of concern as potential BW threats BW potential as concern of are viruses Ebola and arburg D T u diitain (F Administration rug here are no F hereareno R D esearch studies range from basic esearch and applied A-licensed vaccines for protectionagainst vaccinesfor A-licensed M R T NA viruses from four viral families,viral four from viruses NA arburg virus in quantities sufficient quantities in virus arburg hey are highly lethal and intensive and lethal highly are hey D ) iesd acns gis the against vaccines licensed A) V irus Like Particles ( Particles Like irus in vitro in laboratory laboratory V LP), in CB.54) R Vaccine Defense Technology Objective (DTO) Research Accomplishments: I R nfection ( • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • sac twr the toward esearch sac twr the toward esearch d d i t d in support oftheF in support Completed analysis of studies performed to characterize the pathogenesis of to milestoneapproval andtransition. filoviruses. Performed efficacy studies in NHP models that provide the best model for evaluation of the potential for treating guinea pigsmodels. fever innonhumanprimates. Evaluated the utility of recombinant nematode anticoagulant protein c2 (rNAPc2) against on cellularpathways possibly commontomany viruses. Expanded of characterization the role of neutrophils in innate and adaptive immunity to protein-protein interactions. for targets protein of discovery from shift Began testing. F for primates nonhuman in testing appropriate Performed and pharmacokinetics, route, pharmacodynamics. dose, as such requirements therapeutic viral sufficient and minimal Evaluated Evaluated efficacy. oralcidofovir againstmonkeypox drug prodrug modeltodetermine inprimate for Centers the at model Prevention. primate variola lesion pock in evaluation initial Conducted forleadcompoundseffective studiesinprimates Performed againstviralthreat doseranging agents. Evaluated leadantiviralcandidates usingin-vivo models. efficacy drug asatherapeuticforsmallpox undertheF drug ( transition. and approval milestone to up leading candidate, ocue suis o eet anti- select to studies Concluded Efficacy nitiated development forsevere ofatreatment algorithm Ebolainfectionstudies. I ested the intravenous formulation of cidofovir in non-human primates (NHPs) F to support N eveloped and executed initial steps in plan for licensure and manufacturing with lead compounds, leading up compounds,leading lead with manufacturing and licensure for plan in steps initial executed evelopedand the etermined effect of treatment on viral pathogenesis in the mouse Ebola model virus and vlpd n eeue iiil tp i pa fr iesr ad auatrn o oa cdfvr therapeutic cidofovir oral of manufacturing and licensure for plan in steps initial executed and eveloped D ) status forthesmallpox indication. DTO R ule. CB.63) D D D vlpet of evelopment vlpet f a of evelopment A two rule. animalefficacy M T herapeutic arburg monoclonal antibodies for molecular reengineering and primate primate and reengineering molecular for antibodies monoclonal arburg T eay for herapy D S A Animal Efficacy rtge for trategies S M alo and mallpox arburg virus therapy to testing of compounds to inhibit to compounds of testing to therapy virus arburg D O A licensure consideration under the F the under consideration licensure A T ral cidofovir achieved investigational new drug drug new investigational achieved cidofovir ral etn Flvrs ( Filovirus reating O R ule. hr Pathogenic ther M arburg virus in nonhuman primates M rug n Ebola and arburg O M rthopox rthopox M arburg virus, focusing D arburg hemorrhagic arburg hemorrhagic sae oto and Control isease D M A licensure of the arburg mice and V rss ( iruses D A Animal V iruses) iruses) DTO

F-27

ANNEX F F-28 ANNEX F DTO CB.54 TherapyforSmallpoxandotherPathogenic Orthopoxviruses licensure foruseasanoralsmallpox therapeutic. for candidate drug the of consideration support to partner commercial the to provide to data technical Compile FY2007: efficacy. drug initial studiestodetermine Evaluatedcidofoviroral window therapeutic prodrug monkeypoxagainst models. primate in variola and Conduct FY2006: Milestones/Metrics. R provide correlation to the animal models. Animal Efficacy efficacy.vaccine and drug demonstrate to utilized been has monkeys cynomolgous in monkeypox orthopoxvirus related closely the using however,virus; variola authentic monkeyswith completed.been not development has model excellent An (F Administration Foodand the using by trial clinical efficacy human a for substituted be made,can be it can demonstration a Challenges. vaccination tosmallpox iscounter-indicated release. prior after a release of genetically modified smallpox, as well as protecting the large number of troops for whom vaccinia monkeypox in the entire population. could be An administeredoral drug post exposure to large number of troops or smallpox engineered genetically or individuals unvaccinated in smallpox unmodified an either against defense that viral the inhibits drug virus.showstype wild pathogenicitythan greater virus modified the expressing gene cytokine mouse inserted an contains that (mousepox), ectromelia modified vacciniavaccination, quarantine, treatment cases.infected of drug antiviral and of combination a by countered unless epidemic worldwide a in result would smallpox of release and contagious Payoffs. modified pathogenic orthopoxviruses. be to performed develop a therapeutic antiviral to drug treat smallpox and other naturally or occurring genetically Objectives. orthopoxviruses, focusing on intravenous ( intravenous on focusing orthopoxviruses, build on the systems developed for and data obtained from the from obtained data and developedfor systems the on build product.final the as cidofovir of prodrug activeorally an improvementproductto epublic oftheCongo, and studiescouldprovide theneededinformation. Complete studies to evaluate drug efficacy in primate models that the support F Conducted initial evaluation in variola primate model at the Centers for S mallpox is highly infectious by the aerosol route and causes severe disease with high mortality. D T eveloping appropriate model systems that emulate human aerosol exposure and infection; if such such if infection; and exposure aerosol human emulate that systems model appropriate eveloping he objectives of this of objectives he R ule, it would be highly desirable to obtain a clinical of description human monkeypox in order to D ) nml fiay rule. efficacy animal A) D I t will be necessary to correlate this model with the variola model. Under the F the Under model. variola the with model this correlate to necessary be will t NA polymeraseNA of line replicationviral inhibit still should first a constitute might and DTO T are to develop medical countermeasures against countermeasures medical develop to are he disease areasis endemic of in certain Africa, as the such IV I ) cidofovir ( cidofovir ) nitial results show that disease can be produced in cynomolgous cynomolgous in produced be can disease that show results nitial V istide.) as the initial lead candidate but with planned with but candidate lead initial the as istide.) IV cidofovir evaluation.cidofovir T herapy (pre- and post-exposure) based on a herapyon post-exposure)based (pre-and R ecent publicationsecent geneticallyon D isease Control and Prevention. T he orally active prodrug will prodrug activeorally he D S pecifically,will research A Animal Efficacy S mallpox and other and mallpox I L-4, indicate that indicate L-4, D I emocratic t is highly R D ule. rug rug D A DTO CB.63 TherapeuticStrategiesforTreating Filovirus(MarburgandEbolaViruses) will beusedtodevelop development atechnology planfornonclinicalstudiesofleadingtherapeuticcandidates. lead antiviral drugs/therapeutic antibodies in nonhuman primates. FY2006: Milestones/Metrics. protein interactions, are required which foraproductive infection. and viral-viral protein life cycle interactions and viral-host of the virus and an incomplete understanding purposes Challenges. theoptimum therapeutic/treatmentstudies designedtobring candidates forward fordevelopment. of this will enableresearch course the identification of lead antivirals or treatment for futurestrategies nonclinical mobility of joint forces, and facilitate return to duty and restoration of operations. post-exposureor treatments filoviruseswouldthe against decreasethreat BW the filoviruses,of strategic enhance drugs or treatments for program.offensiveBW its of weaponizationpart for as sufficient former the exist, not does weaponization treatment is limited to intensive caresupportive for the most severely ill patients. Although clear evidence of their weaponization.and dissemination aerosol for potential havethe they since threats BW ( filoviruses the including Payoffs. and to reduce and mortality morbidity in animals exposed to predicted or presumed battlefield doses filoviruses (Ebola using therapeutics/treatmentscandidate Objectives. therapeutic drugs and treatments against the filoviruses ( filoviruses the against treatments and drugs therapeutic M arburg viruses). Established an assay to screen drugs that inhibit protein-protein interactions in filovirus infection.filovirusprotein-protein in thatinhibit interactions assayEstablished an screendrugs to V iral hemorrhagic fevers are a diverse group of illnesses caused bycaused illnesses of group diverse a feversare hemorrhagic iral T T echnical challenges include development of appropriate animal model systems for investigational for systems model animal appropriate of development include challenges echnical his DTO M will enable the development of Food and Food of development the enable will arburg and Ebola virus infection, and none currently in human testing. Effective therapeutics M arburg and Ebola viruses). Ebola and arburg in vitro in S oviet Union is alleged to have produced have to alleged is Union oviet laboratory and animal models and demonstrating their capability their demonstrating and models animal and laboratory M M arburg and Ebola viruses are of concern as potential as concern of are viruses Ebola and arburg arburg and Ebola) by identifying and characterizing characterizing and identifying by Ebola) and arburg T I here are no F no arehere nformation nformation generated by these research efforts D rug Administration (F Administrationrug R NA viruses from four viral families,viral four from viruses NA I D nformation nformation developed during the A-licensed antiviral therapeutic antiviral A-licensed M T arburg virus in quantities in virus arburg hey are highly lethal and lethal highly are hey D A)-licensed antiviral A)-licensed T ested F-29

ANNEX F F-30 ANNEX F Diagnostic CapabilityArea Countermeasures DTO CB.67 TherapeuticsforEbolaandMarburgVirusInfections strategies. FY2010: overall from rodents efficacy tononhuman primates. FY2009: combining of possibility toenhanceoverallthe promising inrodent technologies models. efficacy explore to begin technologies, individual these of each of evaluation separate a to FY2008: molecular pathogenesis studiestoimprove andoptimizeinterventions. needed. as partners industry in vitro FY2007: Milestones/Metrics. F the to submissions human of validitythe the to ensure to faithful and are disease they that confidence provide to models animal of characterization and development timely and sufficient on placed be to need may emphasis some interactions, and novel these evaluate to Ebola efforts with of models primate nonhuman stringent the in technology Challenges. threatsnew whetherofnatural emerging orunnatural introduction. and Ebola beyond far ranging utility clinical example, development and validation of an operative and effective delivery system for si agents.For threat biological multiple toward applicability broad-spectrum with targets or platforms noveltherapeutic authenticate and/or identify may research this of scientific course Also,infection. the of during developedspread information the technical control and and mortality and morbidity member service reduce will that filoviruses,the including Payoffs. development. development group to better anticipate the practical aspects of moving the forwardbest technologies for advanced Efficacy of strain one Objectives. advanced development. FY09. in optimization further for technologies five the of two or one downselect to studies all from and Ebola of models primate nonhuman in technologies recent outbreak of a isolatevirulent particularly of strains and/orspeciesofEbolaand availabletreatment.only the currently is weaponization.and dissemination aerosol for potential their • •

Field laboratory capability to identify biological threat agents. capability toidentifybiological Field laboratory Portable threats. commondiagnosticsystemsforabroad rangeofbiological and in animal models of Ebola and R Complete pivotal studies to optimize treatment regimens of selected technologies and/or multicomponent possible for selected technologies candidate the twoof or one of regimens treatment optimize to Begin intervention novel five of potential and utility the compare to studies pivotal complete and Perform Further develop, characterize and compare the utility and potential of five novel intervention technologies V ule. Work performed under this iral hemorrhagic fevers are a diverse group of illnesses caused bycaused illnesses of group diverse a feversare hemorrhagic iral T : T M e rmr tcncl hleg wl b t dmntae h sft ad fiay f therapeutic a of efficacy and safety the demonstrate to be will challenge technical primary he his arburg virus and provide supporting data to facilitate licensure by the F the by licensure facilitate to data supporting provide and virus arburg DTO T will develop antiviral therapeutics and treatments against one strain of Ebola virus and virus Ebola of strain one against treatments and therapeutics antiviral develop will ransition studies to explore the possibility of combining promising technologies to enhance M arburgEbola.and I n tandem with evaluation of interventions, improve animal models and continue and models animal improve interventions, of evaluation with tandem n M arburg viruses arising during the term ofthe theterm during arising arburg viruses T DTO M his effort will provide therapeutics against Ebola and Ebola against therapeutics provide will effort his arburg hemorrhagic fevers.arburg hemorrhagic Establish collaborative with arrangements M T hey are of concern as possible biological warfare possibleas threatsbiological heyof because are concern of arburg viruses; and could then be exploited for rapid response to response rapid for exploited be then could and viruses; arburg will be aligned with the M arburg in virus Angola may newbring as such challenges new M D arburg hemorrhagic fevers.data evaluate and hemorrhagic Analyze arburg A under the Animal Efficacy Efficacy Animal the under A T hey are highly lethal and intensive supportive care supportive intensive and lethal highly are hey D M efense rug eorai fever. hemorrhagic arburg R NA viruses from four viral families,viral four from viruses NA T hreat DTO R R . eduction Agency product NAs may have significant R D ule. As an example, a example, an ule.As A under the Animal the under A M arburg viruses viruses arburg I I n addition n tandem n I Basic and Applied Research Accomplishments: health threatssystem thatandrapidly canbeusedby toidentifyandconfirm diagnosedisease. medicalpersonnel F portable,integrated a of fielding developmentand advanceddeveloperfor the to simultaneously.agents different from biomarkers they cause. that system diagnostic and identification diseases of diagnosis state-of-the-art the and warfareagents biological potential of identification the for deployablemethods multiple integrates a into inclusion for devices) and protocols Objective Research Overarching Diagnostic Technologies: Technical Barriers mproved thesensitivityandspecificityofexistingnucleicacidimmunodiagnostic assays. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • d i r v d i r d r d Program Program Evaluated newly developed assays targeting thepresence ofactive toxin inaclinicalsample. animal studies. Continued to test asmicroarraysAssessed novel such forsuitabilityasanextgeneration diagnostic device. technologies samples. sample processing. JBA the address to techniques sampling/extraction alternate of development Accelerated extraction methods. commercial offtheshelf(C Advanced study todevelop analytic signatures ofbiothreat agents. forthe identification ofBWA. new chemistries Pursued (BWA). agents warfare biological against vaccinated individuals in immunity of biomarkers identify to study Continued ofavailableLack usedfordiagnosticdevelopment. tomarkers data pertaining ongeneticvariability including wholeblood, sputum, swabs, feces, andtissues. disease diagnosis. nitiated multicenter study comparing the recommended C origin. geographic nability totypeorganismsspecifically anddetermine erified hostresponse correlatingwithviralinfections. markers erified ecommended a block improvement to the Joint Biological Agent devices. methodstoportable eduction oflaboratory threat identification agents. ofbiological eference laboratoryforconfirmatory esigned multiplexed nucleic acid assays for the detection and identification of validated threat agents in clinical esigned new nucleicacidandimmunodiagnostic assays toaugmentpathogen detection. specimens, clinical possible of array broad a with used be can that methods processing rapid of evelopment evelopment of identification technologies and reagents of sufficient sensitivity and specificity to support early support to specificity and sensitivity sufficient reagentsof and evelopmentidentificationtechnologies of T he aim is to develop and integrate technologies so they will be capable of identifying multiple independent O : ffice which was to replace the current current the replace to was which ffice D o D developed assays, reagents and sample preparation in and field platforms techniques and Prom eerh edn t te eeomn o tcnlg cniae (reagents, candidates technology of development the to leading research Perform : OTS ) kit; recommendation was accepted. T he goal is to transition these technologies out of technology base technology of out technologies these transition to is goal he D NA extraction kit in the Block Block the in kit extraction NA OTS Block I dentification and I

D NA extraction kit to automated D A-approved medical diagnostic A-approvedmedical D I iagnostic deployment pallet with a with pallet deployment IDS S , Block Block , ystem (JBA I gap in gap D IDS NA ) F-31

ANNEX F F-32 ANNEX F D Using R D R iagnostic • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • esearch esearch esearch etection and s d d d i i d m

Expandedbiothreat agentstraincollection. Continued toelevate previously transitionedassays uptoestablished test andevaluation standards. standardized transitiondata packages.. with comprehensive standardizedtransitiondata packages. use.for military adaptation explored and components their and technologies diagnostic generation next of assessment Pursued Continued toapply proteomics tothedevelopment assays ofimmunologic forpathogen detection. strains. bacterial engineered organisms. Advanced the to transition to prior studies animal BWAspotential with of diagnosis the for platforms assays,and reagentsof studies field augment to Continued , 1assays Block upcomingforFood and Provided test and evaluation support for the Joint Biological Agent threats, becomeavailable. asgenomicdata andtechniques diagnosticsystems.integrated future of components Assessed BWAdetection. for assays immunologic design to data proteomics Utilized threat for profile analytic agents.an establish to microarray proteomics a develop to techniques developed Further bacterial engineered genetically identifying of capable strains. potentially system detection pathogen range broad Continued to build a pathogen database for a Expanded evaluation fortheidentification ofBWAs ofnew chemistries methods. tolatest state-of-the-art application JBA foranimalandfieldstudies, withemphasisonbettercharacterizing Further applied approaches for newprocessingFurther technological clinical samples to complex matrices and different nitiated evaluation of a broad range pathogen detection system capable of potentially identifying genetically identifying potentially of capable system detection pathogen range broad a of evaluation nitiated nvested in improving the sensitivity and specificity of existing assays, developing assays for new targets and new equenced multiple B. genomes andrelease data anthracisgroup toother relevant M eveloped samplecollectionprocedures. elivered four antigen detection assays and/or supporting reagents to the advanced developer with comprehensive developeradvanced the to reagents supporting and/or assays detection/diagnostic acid nucleic four elivered eveloped additionalmultiplexed nucleicacidassays, viruses. focusingontheorthopox atured recombinant icroarray-Based T T oward oward the oward M T edical ec R apid h D nologies D D evelopment of evelopment R iagnostic etection, esequencing D NA technologies formassimmunodiagnostic reagent production.NA technologies T S D ystems ( hreat Assessment and Attribution of efense T M echnologies ( echnologies ethodology to Facilitate to ethodology DTO D T rug rug Administration (F ec D CB.56) efense Advanced h DTO nology D CB.64 ) eveloper. O D b R evelopment of Biological Biological Warfareof evelopment D j esearch esearch Projects Agency ( ective I D A) approval. dentification and G eveloped a more coordinated and relevant and coordinated more a eveloped enetically Engineered Biothreat A ccomplis DOD IDS D iagnostic Block Block projects. h D ments A R I S assays. PA) transitioned ystem (JBA T hreatAgent : O rganisms IDS ) Diagnostic Systems DTO CB.56 MethodologytoFacilitateDevelopmentofBW ThreatAgentDetectionandMedical elevate previously transitionedassays uptotestandevaluation year. thefirst standardsestablished during developer. FY2007: Milestones/Metrics. forassay formats andreagentpackage hand-offtotheadvanced developer. data technical acceptable mutually of establishment the and reagents, and assays diagnostic/detection similar of Challenges. needs andrequirements. better in resulting development, advanced performance, detection to sensitivity, transitioned and specificity agent of fielded systems and facilitating a alreadyrapid response operational to changing BW reagents and of assays refinement diagnostic include medical and will effort this developer.Additionally, advanced the by devices Foodfielding,deploymentand obtaining and enabling thus to prior validation and testing appropriate receive assays diagnostics that ensure will research this applications, operation.of theaters in assets Formedical diagnostic medical service joint assaysdetection capablesupporting of Payoffs. detection systems. and diagnostic agent biological of fielding and development enable to reagents supporting associated Objectives. • • d resequencing platforms. (Affymetrix,systems, microarray high-density twoEvaluated eveloped andimplementdata analysis pipeline

D A principal payoff of this research effort is reliable and timely fielding of medical diagnostic and agent and diagnostic medical of fielding timely and reliable is effort research this of payoff principal A D eliver additional four nucleic acid detection/diagnostic assays and supporting reagents to the advancedreagentsthe to assaysdetection/diagnostic eliveracid nucleic four additional supporting and eliver four antigen detection assays and supporting reagents to the advanced developer.advanced the to to reagents Continue supporting assaysand detection antigen four eliver T Key include the developmentchallenges technical of reagent and protocol standards for comparison his DTO will identify,will characterize, test, evaluateassaysand detection antigen and acid nucleic and D rug rug (F Administration I nc. and Nimblegen and nc. D A) approvalmedical A) these of S ystems), as whole-genome as ystems), F-33

ANNEX F F-34 ANNEX F C R T Biothreat OrganismsUsingMicroarray-Based Resequencing Technologies DTO CB.64 Rapid Detection,ThreatAssessmentandAttributionofGeneticallyEngineered ritical throughput microarray-based resequencing. to other relevant other to and development. projects. Y.pestis FY2009 most relevant towarfighters. microarray Evaluate feature further improvements ontwo microarray platforms. pestis FY2008: increased densityontwo platforms. FY2007: Milestones/Metrics. systems. microarray improve further to technologies sequencing emerging incorporating platform deployable a develop to needed is effort decision-making.Considerable and analysis inference, bioinformatics sites, other to transfer effort. labor-intensive R process; while some collections exist, additional systematic sampling to encompass population diversity is necessary. Challenges. platforms. surveillance and detection bio-defense next-generation of basis the likelybe will technologies resequencing rapid agents. arising biothreat newly and engineered genetically of attribution and assessment threat identification, rapid the allowing Payoffs. lower-cost, requirements. withminimalspaceandpersonnel whole-genomesequencinginsinglelaboratories that will be based on rapid systems next-generation enabling while systems, biodetection current for targets validated provide will project strains.naturally-occurring, newlyor arising engineering genetic of characteristic signatures genetic identify definitive identification of the organism, is informative for to efforts determine the attribution of an agent, and will and surveillance systems. biothreat agent’s genome sequence provides fundamental for information nucleic acid-based bio-defense detection of biothreat agent genomes, whether naturally occurring, newly arising, or genetically engineered. Knowledge of a Objectives. • he Critical he Critical ationale: s efining and increasing the throughput of existing microarray-based resequencing technologies is also a time- and increasingtime- and a efining also is throughput the microarray-basedexisting of resequencing technologies Federal Agency’s, andNA upports requirements of all requirementsof upports group genomes, relevantgroup other releasingdatato group genomes, or equivalent numbers of biothreatgenomes,genomes,of agent group relevantequivalent other or numbers releasingdatato :

D D D T D R eliver high-throughput, microarray-based resequencing system for consideration of his effort will provide a rapid, low cost, high-throughput microarray-based resequencing technology,resequencing microarray-based high-throughput cost,low rapid, a provide will effort his emonstrate 3-fold scale up protocolsof experimental and systems. R emonstrate 3-fold scale up of experimental protocols and systems.and protocols experimental of up scale 3-fold emonstrate emonstrate >3-fold scale up of high-throughput experimental protocols and systems for rapid high- rapid for systems and protocols experimental high-throughput of up scale >3-fold emonstrate eagents eagents Program isoutlinedbelow.eagents Program T Assembling large, diverse collections of biothreat agents and close relatives is a time-consuming a is relatives close and agents biothreat of collections diverse large, Assembling his G DOD DTO enetic data generated will provide verified targets to speed assay development, and low-cost,development,assayand speed to targets verified provide will generated data enetic I t will be important but challenging to create systems for automating data production and production data automating for systems create to challenging but important be will t projects. Expand biothreat agent collection. Evaluate microarray feature size reduction/ size feature microarray Evaluatecollection. agent biothreat projects.Expand will provide for rapid, inexpensive, high-throughput, microarray-based P R rogram D apid, inexpensive genomic resequencing of biothreat agent genomes enables immediate, NA sequence of determination genomes. We aim to develop the capability to perform TO countries’. S ervices, as well as biological detection programs of programs detection wellbiological as as ervices, (CRP) R esequence 10 DOD projects. collection,strain agents Expand on focusing B. anthracis and 10 Y. pestis R R esequence 30 esequence 90 esequence group genomes; release data DOD first responders,other first B. anthracis DOD D B.anthracis NA resequencing procurement and 30 and 90 and DOD T his Y.

F.2.3.1 F.2.3.3 F.2.3.2 fielded the development of environmental and diagnostic molecular reagents for the JBA Kits) and developmental systems (JBP to detect 10 BW threat agents from the PC technologies. and reagentsavailable emer and current both against use for available are reagents developed by theJoint programs to expedite materiel solutions for validated defense biological capabilities. T F.2.3 older stocks. development ofreagents threats toidentifynewthe procurementemerging and and ofimproved reagents toreplace detection systems and products.medical biological S T D Key mln Kt, hc ae rtcl o h scesu dvlpet ts, n oeain of operation and test, development, successful the to critical are which Kits, ampling • • • • • • • • he JPE C he escription: d t

R R A,HHA,and to engage in the advanced development of B vaccines. vaccine). Produce HHAsand reagents,Ensure andsurgecapabilityofcritical adequate security ECLAs, HHAsandPC Ensure bestqualityreagents andimmunoassays are available intimeandadequate quantities. systems. Assays(HHAs),and Electrochemilluminescense primers), Assays(ECLAs), Polymerase Chain Provide N dueto removal terminated Program offunding.

sig f oec ad te caatrsis cnius o lgc EEE, legacy for continues characteristics, other and potency of esting equirements: R j

ynPort I A DOD A C ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT ACCOMPLIS P ensuresquality,the P availability, reagents,BW of security and ECLAs, PC O VAP P ID ontingency dvanced -CB willcontinuevaccine development through BW detection systems (B systems detection BW T V D tl ie Cycle Life otal accine Company continued to expand their operations, finding appropriate commercial subcontractors rime is a DOD DOD D S V accine (J Acquisition Program evelopment ystems Biological Biological DOD DOD agency to chartered provide intensive centralized manag S tockpile Biological Biological Biological Biological M ngmn fr h ciia raet (niois atgn, n gn poe and probes gene and antigens, (antibodies, reagents critical the for anagement C S ontract T ampling Kit develoKit ampling DS he C he IDS IT ), as well as other Federal Agencies and NA

of of S F-6A threat list. S ampling Kits that are critical toall ampling Kitsthat are critical R N ampling Kits necessary to the operation of all of operation the to necessary Kits ampling B P consolidates all consolidates P

t DI iological h and P3 and D e vaccines (recombinant botulinum vaccine and recombinant plague T T ularemia he program he maintains program an V AP), an ACA I p I H ,X N ments and requir and ments T MENTS D he C M application submission. D -99 Joint PortalJoint -99 g DOD ing threats and to include analysis of commercially of analysis include to and threats ing efense R P provides required reagents and HHAs to support V accine T antibody, antigen, gene probe/primer,antibody,ECLA,gene antigen,

II program underJPE program (BD) V e ments. DOD R S R hield,and & V IDS eaction Assays(PC accines D EE,WEE, e TO R T effort to ensure the effort best possible ment of medical and non-medical biological detectionprograms. biological . V As,HHAs, and he C he O accine products will be fu allies. utlying years will focus on the R DOD DOD P has reagents and HHAs and reagents has P DOD O T T R lrma n Q-Fever and ularemia he near future requires -CB As. biological detection biological Biological Biological ilgcl warfare biological D R . DOD As),Held Hand Biological Biological S ampling r ther F-35

ANNEX F F-36 ANNEX F F.2.3.8 F.2.3.9 F.2.3.7 F.2.3.6 F.2.3.5 F.2.3.4 • • • • • • • • • • • • r d t i dod

the P Finalized manufacturing scale-upandinitiated processFinalized manufacturing validation forserotypes A andB. 2005. G Bioport hasdelivered overBioport 9.3millionF Continued Phase1clinicaltrial. Finalized andsubmitted duetoreallocation offundingto terminated Program that willbejointly developed through anevent drivendown select, plannedfor2008 Achieved producer,an alternate CangeneCorporation. F the with report annual an Filed smallpox vaccine system with the U.the with vaccinesystem smallpox in both the U.the both in CB the under (PA) Arrangement Project bilateral a (CANUKU Canada and UK, the the reactions.adverse Project fordevelopmentArrangement of theUKplaguevaccine was signedby theU. nitiated Phase

he new Chemical Biological and eceived Fast- lobulin ( ynPort A I A A A A D nternational nt dvanced dvanced dvanced dvanced S epartment epartment of Health and Human smallpox vaccine development duetoremoval terminated offunding T C was unable to find a new manufacturer to perform the technology transfer. he current manufacturer (under subcontract to the P the to subcontract (under manufacturer current he h V M accine Company achieved licensure for the new ra VIG ilestone B in FY06 for plague vaccine program which consists of two vaccine candidates (U x V S T ). II . and Canada of a smallpox vaccine and a and vaccinesmallpox a of Canada .and rack designation byrack theF Clinical trials inFY06. Clinicaltrials D D D D accine T evelopment evelopment evelopment evelopment he smallpox vaccine portion of the PA is currently under review by both nations in light of light in nations reviewboth byunder PA currently the is of portion vaccine smallpox he C I N ooperative A D . dsorbed V S accination of cohorts resulted in no serious adverse resulted events. innoserious accination ofcohorts R ) was signed and impl and signed was ) D adiological adiological R V A under A S of of . as the lead nation.lead .the as ene S ecombinant ervices ( ervices D

t t D (AVA) (B A-released dosesofBio h h R A. z e e uelan esearc P S I N M mallpo lague D D emorandum of Understanding (CB HH #9141 to insure continued availability of availability continued insure to #9141 io Eq R S TMTI h ) efforts to develop a smallpox vaccine.

Th MO B V e VIG and V uine me T accine x V accinia otulinum ra he PAhe developmentlicensureobjectivesinclude and . U on 27 on U n product for intravenous administration in February S accine ted on 1 June 2000. June 1 on ted C) has ceased all plasma-derived processing,and plasma-derived all ceased has C) D x E  evelopment T ncep I mmune hrax ) [P M

rocurement  arch 2003 to co-operatively develop a develop co-operatively to 2003 arch h T tothe alitis o G x lobulin ( lobulin in DOD V V VIGIV T accine R accine he U. he VIG S

MO ., UK, andCanada. asof will be procured from ] ) to treat rare cases of cases raretreat to ) S U) between the U. . and Canada signed Canada and . O

I ctober 2006. V n April 2005, the accine S and UK) I mmune S ., M F.3.2 F.3.1 F.3 Countermeasure Countermeasure Approaches: outlined below. the in accomplishments and barriers, technical approaches, Countermeasure transition totheadvanced developer. However,1 on D T iscurrently hasthusshiftedtoatherapeutictack, undergoing. andaPhase1clinicaltrial effort irradiation. following shortly doses serial in therapeutically administered when model radi a as administered when model mouse the in than effective the preparationfor in model (NHP) primate nonhuman a in However,model.studies rodent expanded a in radioprotectant a as efficacy partner,good showed (5-AE I microfluora. infections whilenotaffectingbeneficialintestinalnormal injuries,radiological but they must be appropriately selected to effectively treat exogenous and endogenous systemic operations.battlefield the in casualties of numbers Ant label on a case-by-case basis by a physician, but regulatory restrictions for such use make it impractical force.for treating large fighting fit a in use its prohibit effects side toxic degrading therapy, radiationperformance or its butchemotherapy amif compound, aminothiol environments.An operational Currently, there are no licensed non-toxic agents pharmaceutical or diagnostic capabi a traumatic casualty. warfighter’s is greatlyperformance de affect the warfighting mission by sustaining unit effectiveness the and fighting conserving strength of warfighters. D the within threats nuclear and radiological against countermeasure medical no is there present, At n addressing the issue of currently limited medical countermeasure alternatives, a novel compound, 5-androstenediol • • • he following ofthe isasummary AF edical ue to a new efense stockpile. As such, appropriately applied, advances in medical radiological countermeasures will significantly

hraooi aet ta nurlz hgl ratv oye seis ht r gnrtd n ise uo the upon tissues in generated are that deposition ofionizingradiation andthat are amajorcauseoftissuedamage. species oxygen reactive highly neutralize that agents Pharmacologic major fatal syndromes: sepsisanduncontrolled bleeding andofacuteradiation syndromes Cytokine-based therapeutic, probiotics, anti-oxidants, and anti-apoptotic agents applications to mitigate the two Antimicrobials directed at M D

O ), developed at the ForcesArmed ther pharmac E M M R DI edical edical adiological S & CAL CAL D T ecember 2006, per request of JP of request per 2006, ecember program at J o logic logic agents, such as hematopoietic cytokines for treating bone marrow injury, may be used off- R R R A adiological adiological DIO STO G C ram-negative aerobes andfacultative ountermeasures L -CB T OGI RRI c he milestone-A decision is scheduled 2QFY07. he milestone-Adecisionisscheduled r e D mented by radiation injury and illness is significantly more likely to become

R that began FY06 with one project, no significant development at this time. S adiobiology & CAL CAL T I nvestigationalNew efforts for medical radiological defense: formedicalradiological efforts D D efense efense MO D i biotics are commonly used to treat the infectious sequelae of sequelae infectious treatthe to commonly areused biotics EFEN R -CB esearch esearch Th MS o tn, s F is stine, rust R & D A D & R P , fifteen , S o I roducts D nstitute (AF E protectant but yielded good efficacy in the NHP the in efficacy good yielded but protectant rug ( rug A G rea D MR ram-positive bacteria. I N apoe fr s i ptet receiving patients in use for approved A ccomplishments D C candidates were selected for possible for selected were candidates C ) application proved the drug is far less far is proved application ) drug the RRI M ) in collaboration with a corporate dcl onemaue ae are area Countermeasures edical l ities suitable for use in military T herefore, the focus of this of focus the herefore, D epartment of epartment T he F-37

ANNEX F F-38 ANNEX F Accomplishments: Technical Barriers: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • i i i i d i m i i m r r s s mitigate radiation-induced pneumonitisandlungfibrosis. exposure. protect lethalhamatopoietic andgastrointestinal radiation syndromes. predictions acceptablehuman efficacy totheF andrepair meansofup-regulating mechanisms. cellulardamagesurveillance pharmacologic Engineering Formulating slow-release delivery preparations drug that extendbioavailability andenhanceefficacy. rational development ofprophylactic andtherapeuticdrugs. radi of mechanisms molecular and sub-cellular, cellular, of knowledge Advancing prevention injury. ofradiological exposure. sources. andinternal external cells. thrombocytes. and leukocytes polymorphonuclear circulating restore myelosuppression,and reverse help to cells progenitor across damagedintestinalepithelium. translocate that microorganisms enteric by caused infections systemic treateffectively to agents Antimicrobial celldeath.and that leadto programmed lethal mutations intodaughtercells. becomeincorporated correct to time mechanisms repair and surveillance cell’snatural a allow to division cell nitiated studies on efficacy, toxicity and safety of combined agents – genistein, captopril and tranilast – to – tranilast and captopril genistein, – agents combined of safety and efficacy,toxicity on studies nitiated radiation of effects late and acute against phenylbutyrate of safety and toxicity efficacy, on studies nitiated ( nitiated studiestomitigate usinggamma-tocotrienol radiation-injury that receptor toll-like of action of mechanisms the efficacy,toxicity,and pharmacology,on studies nitiated stabilityinordertoimprovencreasing drug bioavailability andenhancetherapeuticprophylactic efficacy. mproved delivery systemsthat provide drug of radiation the entire protection period during non-encumbering mproved todetectandremove techniques depositedsourcesofradioactivity. internally mall molecular weight synthetic molecules that inhibit apoptotic pathways that are activated by ionizing radiation byreversibly checkpoints regulatoryarresting cycle weightcell modulatethat molecular agents mall synthetic ecombinant keratinocyte growth factor that stimulates the regeneration of epithelial cells from basal progenitor marrow bone of maturation and replication the stimulate that factors growth hematopoietic ecombinant eveloping appropriate animal models and bridging endpoints for extrapolating data from animal studies to studies animal from data extrapolating for endpoints bridging and models animal appropriate eveloping inimizing the performance-degrading effects of prophylactic drugs that otherwise have good efficacy for the for efficacy havegood otherwise that drugs prophylactic of effects performance-degrading the inimizing edical treatment strategies to mitigate injuries induced by protracted/delayed exposure to radiation from both D A for licensure of drugs underthenew rule. efficacy A forlicensure ofdrugs GGT ) asaradioprotectant. o oia ijr t improve to injury logical D NA damage before damage NA I R N D CBRN G x Hom e n n A I nterest =Product nt-N in 2008. achieved the certification required by law and in accordance with W 57 authorized has Congress requirement. Army Rationale: authorized in 2005 authorized have been fielded and certified. teams were authorized in 2003 and have been fielded and have achieved their certification. havetheir achievedand fielded havebeen and 2003 in wereauthorized teams Protection Installation Programs Security Homeland CBRN Defense Category qmt =Product ational •

IR T electronicallythat information through themeansofUnifiedCommand =Product he UC elan efense R G S equirement I (shown) provides a full range of communications (secure and non-secure data) necessary to support the I nterest nterest, No - Installation Protection Program - United States Army Reserve Domestic - National Guard Weapons of Mass Nomenclature uard Reconnaissance Mission Response Decontamination and CSTs) Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD- d d

Secu

H W I mminent eapons omeland rit R Table HomelandSecurityRDA Efforts G-1. equirement

of y M Progr ( Warfare (Chemical agents, agents (CW) potential or unknown of analysis presumptive • Key Requirements: TI

T d S ass he Analytical Laboratory Laboratory Analytical he C) and Biological Warfare (BW) agents) at an incident site and transmit and site incident an at agents) Biological Warfare(BW) and C) ecurity D * =sub-Product(s) ofaConsolidated Joint Rqmt, Interest estruction efense T wo additional teams were in 2006 authorized and will be fielded MD a T oxic T ms echnology echnology P -C Fielded* RDTE/Prod Status Fielded* Prod/ = ST rograms I S ndustrial ndustrial ub-Product s. T O D C bjective ( e is 3 tas uhrzd hog 20 have 2001 through authorized teams 32 first he epartment of epartment ivil S se (AL ystem R Rqmt USA Joint M equirement or S S aterials ( aterials cience & upport D T S S echnology BaseProgram) echnology S efense criterion. uite (UC TIM (hw) aal o conducting of capable (shown) ) Interest USAF Joint ervice Project ervice I nterest T ), eams T oxic S T ). he 11 additional teams additional 11 he Interest USMC Joint (WMD-CST I ndustrial Chemicals ndustrial T welve additional Interest USN Joint s ) G -1 ANNEX G G ANNEX G -2 Mission United StatesArmyReserve DomesticResponse CasualtyDecontaminationandReconnaissance D Lead the of support in Federal and C and foreignand crisis domestic for Agency operations military of support in casualties NBC of decontamination patient conduct around industrial chemicals and non-standard chemical agents. Army response. domestic support to recon NBC dismounted extraction.Perform and search casualty with assistance sampling,and NBC-contaminated in (C evacuation casualty Consequence and and crisis foreign and domestic in Federal reconnaissance Lead Agency the of support in environments area (NBC) Chemical and Biological, Nuclear, Description: Key Requirements: missions. D Rationale: to helpmake assessmentsoftherequirements forfollow-on forces. capability to other experts.reach-back technical a provide to equipped and trained specially survey,been haveand medical,who administration/logistics, made up of 22 full-time National priority response priority unit civil supporting authorities in responding to a weapon of mass destruction situation. resources.additional facilitate to support state for requests appropriate with assisting and R • • • eserve (U eserve econtamination and efense

M ) operations. Provide CB sets of Chemical four All sets of 23 All contamination. survey equipment, and response equipment) support that directly protects individuals from the effects of CB R T response. as acommandandcontrol hub to provide a commonoperational picture for planning andexecuting an incident C he Commercial he eserve eserve Chemical Companies with CB ST R mission. T eform eform his Hazardous his S D D D A omestic omestic econtamination Chemical Companies in the Army in Companies Chemical econtamination R ) train and equip and train ) I nitiative I t is the primary means of reach back comm back reach of means primary the is t R R R S esponse esponse Casualty econnaissance elementsmean improved toCombatant Commanders. support R mall Program Acquisition (C- Program Acquisition mall econnaissance Companies in the Army in Companies econnaissance M D R aterials (HAZ aterials irective Number 25, which created the W created which 25, Number irective N reconnaissance support operations to include contamination surveys, agent/material R G econnaissance Equipment. D uard members. econtamination and econtamination T he team is formed specificallyhe team is formed to provide advice to the D M econtamination Equipment. R N life-support equipment (individual protection clothing, detection and A current and current CB T Description: T he W ) training enhances unit capabilities to detect and operate in-and- operate and detect to capabilities unit enhances training ) R I N incident site by identifying CB byidentifying site incident N t consists of six sections: command, operations, communications, M MD S operations. PA) program provides the C the providesPA) program -C R

projected co projected econnaissance Elements to support support to Elements econnaissance ST mission is to support civil authorities at a domestic a at authorities civil support to is mission u nications for the for AL nications R R eserve are authorized to train with three platoon three with train to authorized are eserve eserve are authorized to train with three platoon three with train to authorized are eserve T R he enhanced capabilities of the U the of capabilities enhanced he eserve eserve smoke and decontamination companies n MD s e quences, advising on response measures, response on advising quences, -C ST s also directed that the U the that directed also s ST R S N agents/substances,N assessing for the for W s and the United the and s T he W I ncident Commander D MD MD omestic -C -C S A ST M ST S R tates Army anagement T s, and acts s,and Chemical is a high- a is R he unit is esponse S Army R N I I the Urgent Commercial- and installations military to needs of specific installations and accommodate technology insertion while standardizing major system elements to elements system major standardizing while insertion technology accommodate and installations specific of needs installation.the of needs specific the meet to designed system system. support decision robust more a and systems detection and baseline the of consists 2 system. management incident an and systems alerting telephonic and notification mass systems; identification capability to include: individual protection and chemical, and biological handheld portable radiological detection and plans and scenarios. C civilian and military materials, training include medical surveillance, protection, response and initial recovery. (Fo reduc T CB of spectrum full a field to effort first T Description: Key Requirements: nstallation nstallation • • • • • he program is structure is program he he JPE

S ) that includes detection, identification, warning, incident management, individual and collective protection, collective and individual management, incident warning, identification, detection, includes that ) Provide an effective CB effective an Provide facilities from a W Protect Provide aCB protection. minimizing impact. personnel and operations, essential resuming rapidly missions, critical of disruption preventing of Capable installations CB improved Provides ed by focusing on mature O -CB R equirements Capabilities DOD O D ff- Joint Project P T R iiin, otatr, n ohr esn wrig r iig n U. on living or working persons other and contractors, civilians, he- T N capabilitythat willallow missions. forrapidrestoration ofcritical rotection P ier 1 adds to the Baseline S MD rotection helf ( helf d using a spiral acquisition strategy to expedite procurement and fielding.and procurement expedite to strategy acquisition spiral a using d event. DOD R R GOTS M T N detection, identification, protection and response capability to critical military military critical to capability response and protection identification, detection, N N detection, identification, warning, protection and response system for installation for system response and protection warning,identification, detection, N GOTS ier 1 capabilities and adds collective protection, fixed chemical and biological point biological and chemical fixedprotection, collective adds and capabilities 1 ier anager (JP -owned or leased facilities.leased or -owned P /C rogram /C OTS D OTS R ocument (U N installation protection capabilities designed as a family-of-systemsa as designed installationprotectioncapabilities N M ) systems designed to meet the operational requirements as identified in identified as requirements operational the meet to designed systems ) ) technologies and products. T G ier by providing material solutions to include enhanced first responder uardian (IPP) O N R O C P I D nstall S ), 14 and mission area analysis ( analysis area mission and T a T T tion Protection Program ( O he JP he he Baseline his approach is flexible enough to accommodate the accommodate to enough flexible is approach his T ctober 2003andre-validated 19 August 2005. his F his M

o G T S uardian plans to procure to plans uardian he T package is fielded as a single, integrated integrated single, a as fielded is package eue aulis mai casualties, reduce pr CB incident. insta an prioritized install prioritized mission to: operations.JP essential restore effectively and missions, he T o I ier consists of non-material solutions to PP consists of a tiered Family of R te I N dete N PP is designed to fill a critical gap in gap critical a fill to designed is PP c in n rsos cap response and tion l lation’sCB a to react to ability T M i porm provides program his c tion, identi tion, AA) templates, and exercise templates,and AA) S M I mltr isaltos and installations military . PP) constitutes the

G a tions with an integrated integrated an with tions uardian has an assigned an has uardian f ication, warning, ication, G T overnment and overnment n echnical risk is risk echnical an cri tain a bi S l DOD ystems t to ity

DOD (Fo T t R ical ier S N ’s )

G -3 ANNEX G G ANNEX G -4 a disciplined approach to meeting mission-based requirements and secures orderly change as we transition to the future force. to transition we as change orderly secures and requirements mission-based meeting to approach disciplined a mitigates risk by extending the useful life of current systems within fiscal constraints. means. employment robust a conducting of W use that adversary the to demonstrate CB effective an Having superiority.conventional overwhelming neutralize to advantage military adversary an providing of capable threat asymmetric Among the significant to changes the future strategic environment, proliferation of W interoperability andcompatibility across Army installations. procedures. and techniques tactics, and operations of concept improved as well as decontamination individual systems, survey and National additional 15 installations in FY06. For FY07, 16 Army C Army installations. T provide costeffective solutions. he Army Emergency First G uard installations are in progress. Capabilities include improved personnel protection, CB protection, personnel improved include Capabilities progress. in are installations uard T i porm s xctd n ocr wt the with concert in executed is program his T his program provided upgraded first responder capability to 20 Army installations in FY05 and an S R & cptlzn ad anann te urn fre s eesr t eal tasomto and transformation enable to necessary is force current the maintaining and ecapitalizing T effort is critical to preventing technological surprise from new CB agents or different or agents CB new from surprise technological preventing to critical is effort R esponder Program (AEF R dfne s ncsay opnn o ay ees srtg ta ses to seeks that strategy defense any of component necessary a is defense N MD will not gain the advantage sought. advantage the gain not will R P) provides enhanced emergency response capability to select O NU S installations, 6 I salto Poeto Porm nuig system ensuring Program Protection nstallation O C O T MD NU his modernization plan assures M odernizing the force while force the odernizing is recognized as a principal S installations and 10 Army R detection AND PLANNED ACQUISITIONS ACQUISITIONS PLANNED AND H.1 H x CB e n n A on the results of the Combating W the of results the on tables. on and consumables, S 30 of (as quantities on-hand stocks W “ the within contained are procurements requirements.Actual of estimates command major on sustai wartime buy to expiration),and shelf-life and use training include (to “P as depicted quantities Finally,FY07.the in included are items requisitioned the received not has but FY06, in order physicallyitems a which “on-hand”.for Quantities system). supply (this the in visiblemembers longer no service is and individual dispensed considered to is materiel issued been has that consumable medical any minus reserve) war and stores peacetime both depots/facilities, in stored stocks and system supply the in stocks troops, with positioned (stocks “ I and validated, requirements notspecifically numerical identifiedby the modeled being are requirementsconstruct. consumable new1-1-1 While the with consistent not are and outdated co planning D O T te als CB tables, the n TOT STO ervices and the and ervices ables H-1 through H-5 display CB display H-5 through H-1 ables efense Expendable Equipment Combat Consumption (E2C2) study to meet the operational needs of the 1-1-1 force & MD S R

RO funds. CK AL N N T EPPstudy unlessotherwisespecifiedby the he JEC S S BREAKOUT OF SERVICE WAR REQUIREMENTS, STOCKS ON-HAND, ON-HAND, STOCKS REQUIREMENTS, WAR SERVICE OF BREAKOUT

Defen O E S n RVI will ervices develop new consumables requirements from the results of the Joint Chemical and Biological T R N-HAN struct. Until the E2C2 study is complete, requirements developed from previous models havebecome models complete,previous developedfrom requirementsis study E2C2 the Until struct. E equirements for jointly funded items that were specified by an individual an by werespecified that items funded jointly for equirements D CE

D R D efense Logistics Agency ( Agency Logistics efense N defense items listed under “N under listed items defense N UE- R D EQU s S ” represents the total of all CB serviceable ervice recommendations for legacy end items and other consu other and items end legacy for recommendations ervice e I N” are qua areN” Logisti IR E M EN n R TS MD tities the tities S N defense equipment defense N eptember 2006), and FY07–13 planned procurements for each of the four the of each for procurements planned FY07–13 and 2006), eptember ” and “1-1-1 and ” Enhanced Planning Process (EPP) study for jointly funded end items and items end funded jointly for study (EPP) Process Planning Enhanced c s s D S Rea LA). ervices plan to buy to replace consumption of CB of consumption replace to buy to plan ervices S S ervice or agency has su has agency or ervice T R ervice. OM otal di EQU ENCLA ne S IR ervice ervice T otal E ss ss M R EN T S N defense materiel avai R ervice ervice U Da equirements and 1-1-1 and equirements TS R ” r crety ile i the in fielded currently are E” ” are based on the results of the Combating the of results the on based are ” S t ervices willnotbelistedinthisannex.ervices R a equir b n mitted a funded requisition or purchase purchase or requisition funded a mitted ment stocks.ment e T ments, 1-1-1 ments, his number repr number his m S l ervice are identified in the in identified are ervice able in each of the ables bought with bought ables T R hese numbers are based are numbers hese equirements are based are equirements R O equirements,FY06 R n-Hand Column. n-Hand e N defense assets defense N sents only those only sents S ervices. S S ervices ervices ervice ervice T he H-1

ANNEX H H-2 ANNEX H

Table H-1a. Army Logistics Readiness Data – Non-Consumables

FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 (as of 30 Sept 06)

INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION CB MASK MASK, CB, M40/ 4240-01-258-0061-63 795,348 39,841 629,490 M40A1 4240-01-370-3821/3/4 18,428 MASK, M42A2, TANK 4240-01-413-4100-02 50,674 11,050 4240-01-258-0064-66 29,262 4240-01-370-2622 545 MASK, M43, APACHE 4240-01-208-6966-69 1,808 4240-01-265-2679 1,457 4240-01-414-4034- MASK, M45, AVIATOR 19,999 2 35/-4051-52 MASK, M45, LAND 4240-01-447-6987-9, 9,084 1,695 WARRIOR 8967 4240-01-386-0198/- MASK, M48, APACHE 18,292 4686/-0201/-0207 MASK, M49 4240-01-413-4095-99 909 JSAM FIXED WING NOT ASSIGNED 187 187 JSAM ROTARY WING NOT ASSIGNED 25246 25246 4240-01-512- JSGPM 1,238,801 508,024 0 63,546 51,500 60,502 57,845 57,872 59,628 65,455 4429/31/34-7

MISC PROTECTION PATS, M41 4240-01-365-8241 6,727 10

CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE NUCLEAR DETECTION EQUIPMENT AN/PDR-75 6665-01-211-4217 3,823 42 AN/PDR-77 6665-01-347-6100 1,343 929 AN/UDR-13 6665-01-407-1237 71,152 50,568 23,695 76 AN/VDR-2 6665-01-222-1425 44,733 30,446 80 FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 (as of 30 Sept 06) 6665-01-241-3844 IM-9 6665-00-243-8199 64 6665-00-705-6068 6665-01-330-7520 IM-93 15,331 6665-00-752-7759 IM-147 6665-00-542-0729 82 PP-1578 6665-00-542-1177 6,368 BIOLOGICAL DETECTION EQUIPMENT BIDS, M31A1 6665-01-436-2309 BIDS, M31E2 6665-01-500-4040 930 777 119 56 JBPDS INC I 6665-01-452-8643 28 MANPORT JBPDS INC I RECON 311 0 29 14 13 8 15 22 39 JBPDS INC I SHLT VEH 6665-01-453-5385 1,200 545 0 56 28 28 28 21 35 28 JBSDS INC I NOT ASSIGNED 6 0 JBSDS INC II NOT ASSIGNED 1,263 545 0 JBAIDS - Backpack 6665-01-523-4902 126 91 5 86 JBAIDS Analyzer - 6665-01-523-5629 126 91 JBAIDS Computer - 6665-01-524-2745 126 91

CHEMICAL DETECTION EQUIPMENT ACADA, M22 6665-01-438-6963 46,527 33,103 19,601 3,094 1,500 ALARM, CAA, M8A1 6665-01-105-5623 14,795 609 ALARM, M42 1,952 4,494 CAM/ICAM 6665-01-357-8502 27,190 19,966 15,818 1,500 1,000 1,000 6665-01-199-4153 2,560 20 JCAD NOT ASSIGNED 97,994 80,273 JWARN BLOCK 1E NOT ASSIGNED 23 MICAD NOT ASSIGNED 36 M21 RSCAAL 6665-01-324-6637 75 NBCRS, M93A1 6665-01-372-1303 40 21 JNBCRS NOT ASSIGNED 214 170 HMMWVNBCRS H-3

ANNEX H H-4 ANNEX H

FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 (as of 30 Sept 06) JNBCRS (NBCRV 2320-01-481-8579 353 311 STRYKER) JNBCRS (SSE) NOT ASSIGNED 263 6665-01-475-6658/ JSLSCAD RECON 1,263 311 6787/6795/6802/6799 CBMS 6665-01-533-0140 13 10

DECONTAMINATION DECON APPAR, 4230-00-926-9488 404 PDDA, M12A1 L/WT DEC SYS, M17 4230-01-251-8702 514 L/WT DEC SYS, 4230-01-303-5225 79 M17A1 L/WT DEC SYS, 4230-01-150-8660 66 M17A2 L/WT DEC SYS, 4230-01-346-3122 6,388 6,388 669 M17A3 KARCHER DECON NOT ASSIGNED 14 SYS

COLLECTIVE PROTECTION CHATH, AIR 4240-01-423-0915 HANDLER 5410-01-479- CP DEPMEDS 23 12 12 9727/9730 5410-01-523-0255 / CP DEPMEDS-MRI 0257 SHELTER, CB 5410-01-441-8054 1,259 1,035 172 PROTECT 4240-01-166- SHELTER, CP, M20/ 2254/4240-01-330- 3,000 232 426 213 353 286 285 285 M20A1 7806 Table H-1b. Army Logistics Readiness Data – Consumables

FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 (as of 30 Sept 06)

INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION OVERGARMENTS CHEM PROT UNDERGARMENT TOP 8415-01-363-8692-00 328 0 0 CP UNDERSHIRT 8415-01-488-5715/7 0 ‡ 0 0 MCP UNDERSHIRT 8415-01-497-7963/84 50,450 49,538 10,260 CPU DRAWERS 8415-01-363-8683-91 35,711 81,297 10,020 8415-01-488-5719/22 3,558 1,547 240 JPACE AC NOT ASSIGNED JPACE CVC NOT ASSIGNED 203,329 117,479 JSLIST OVERGARMENTS * 5,195,302 1,305,461 Woodland Coat SEE TABLE H-5 444,248 75,210 34,104 Woodland Trousers SEE TABLE H-5 309,756 76,111 34,104 Desert Coat SEE TABLE H-5 512,805 86,232 83,496 Desert Trousers SEE TABLE H-5 527,287 58,919 83,496 SCALP (TAN) 8415-01-333-0987-89 SCALP (GREEN) 8415-01-364-3320-22 3,629 SUIT, CP CAMO (BDOs) WOOD 8415-01-137-1700-07 78,342 SUIT, CP CAMO (BDOs) DESERT 8415-01-327-5346/53 3,090 OVERBOOTS/GLOVES JLIST MULO 8430-01-464-9453-84 1,372 BLK/GRN VINYL O/BOOTS 8430-01-317-3374-85 782,034 259,185 61,491 8430-01-450-0357-60 34,505 16,470 1,500 8340-01-496-0668 1,155 1,003 8 8430-01-049-0878-87 4,452 CP FOOT COVERS 8430-01-021-5978 50 AFS 8430-01-536-5413-19 11,323,827 1,305,461 CP GLOVES 7 MIL 8415-01-138-2501-04 74,249 39,340 3,151 CP GLOVES 14 MIL 8415-01-138-2497-00 246,120 90,498 12,601 8415-01-033-3517-20 821,570 152,456 47,425 CP GLOVES 25 MIL 8415-01-144-1862 626,762 23,205 518 H-5

ANNEX H H-6 ANNEX H

FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 (as of 30 Sept 06) 8415-01-494-2854, CP GLOVE INSERTS 135,076 64,916 15,750 -2868 JB2GU NOT ASSIGNED 11,323,827 1,305,461 MISC PROTECTION 2D SKIN, M40 SERIES 4240-01-413-1540-43 204,046 80,080 31,500 BATTERY, BA-5800 (PRO MASK) 6135-01-440-7774 2,052 CP HELMET COVER 8415-01-111-9028 873,776 266,308 63,000 FILTER CAN, C2 4240-01-119-2315 22,189 FILTER CAN, C2A1 4240-01-361-1319 512,916 2,000,000 600,000 HOOD, M40A1 (QUICK DOFF) 4240-01-376-3152 557,689 0 0 HOOD, M40 (ONE PIECE) 4240-01-260-8723 15,004 HOOD, M45, LAND WARRIOR 4240-01-441-0553 25,305 0 0 JSCESM NOT ASSIGNED 54,274 49,306

CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE CHEMICAL DETECTION EQUIPMENT BATTERY, ACADA BA-5590 6135-01-036-3495 1,965 1,000 1,000 BATTERY, BA-3517 6135-00-450-3528 203 BATTERY, ICAM BA-5800 6665-99-760-9742 2,109 BATTERY, M42 BA-3030 6135-00-835-7210 4,425 DET KIT, M256A1 (Boxes of 10 tickets) 6665-01-133-4964 126,610 14,239 0 DET PAPER, M8 (Indiv. Books) 6665-00-050-8529 768,794 1,584,447 575,000 DET PAPER, M9 (Indiv. Rolls) 6665-01-226-5589 1,959,177 158,000 234,000 MAINT KIT, M312 5180-01-462-7469 4,150 MAINT KIT, M293 5180-01-379-6409 31 MAINT KIT, M273 5180-01-108-1729 46 NBC MARK SET, M274 9905-12-124-5955 4,141 9905-01-346-4716 2,899 0 0 WATER TEST KIT, M272 6665-01-134-0885 1,555 1,745 1,632 BIOLOGICAL DETECTION EQUIPMENT HAND HELD ASSAY 6665-01-504-8534 3,999 360 360

DECONTAMINATION DECON KIT, M291 (Box of 20) 6850-01-276-1905 139,256 14,000 25,300 DECON KIT, M295 (Box of 20) 6850-01-357-8456 171,013 13,000 19,500 FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 (as of 30 Sept 06) JS PERS/SKIN DECON SYS NOT ASSIGNED 2,558,788 2,572,788 SORBENT DECON SYSTEM 4230-01-466-9095 283,127 26,515 STB, 50 LB 6850-00-297-6653 324

COLLECTIVE PROTECTION FILTER, CP, M12A2 (M14 GPFU) 4240-01-365-0981 2,534 0 0 FILTER, CP, M13 SERIES (M14 GPFU) 4240-00-368-6291 896 1,655 242 FILTER, CP, M18A1 (M13 GPFU0 4240-01-365-0982 8,781 2,955 5,478 FILTER, CP, M18 4240-00-828-3952 0 0 FILTER, CP, M19 4240-00-866-1825 939 698 1,267 FILTER, GP, M48A1 4240-01-363-1311 4,516 0 0 M98 FILTER SET (M59, M56, SHIPBOARD) 4240-01-369-6533 3,307 6,799 2,142 M28 Liner, End Section 4240-01-330-8882 75 62 0 M28 Liner, End Section, Type II 4240-01-461-5983 3 0 0 M28 Liner, Center Section 4240-01-330-8884 100 117 5 M28 Liner, Center Section, Type II 4240-01-460-9058 33 0 0 M28 Liner, Vestibule 4240-01-330-8891 0 61 13 M28 Liner, Vestibule, Type II 4240-01-460-9059 18 0 57 M28 Liner, ISO Adapter 4240-01-330-8890 23 42 6 M28 Liner, ISO Adapter, Type II 4240-01-460-9056 0 10 10

MEDICAL DEFENSE ANTID TREATMENT KIT CYANIDE 6505-01-143-4641 102 6505-01-457-8901 3,814 SODIUM NITRITE INJECTION USP 300MG 10ML 6505-01-206-6009 411 AMPUL 5 / PACKAGE SODIUM NITRITE INJECTION USP 30MG/ML 10ML 6505-01-533-4408 7,905 VIAL 2S SODIUM THIOSULFATE INJECTION USP 25% 50ML 6505-01-533-4417 kits 9,309 SINGLE DOSE VIAL ANTIDOTE TREATMENT KIT NERVE AGENT (MARK 1) 6505-01-174-9919 668,107 ANTID TREAT NERVE AGENT AUTO DUAL-CHAMBER 6505-01-362-7427 815,824 (ATNAA) ATROPINE INJECTION AQUEOUS TYPE 0.7ML 6505-00-926-9083 1,791,645 SYRINGE W / NEEDLE H-7

ANNEX H H-8 ANNEX H

FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 (as of 30 Sept 06) 2-PAM CHLORIDE INJ 300MG/ML 2ML AUTOMATIC 6505-01-125-3248 0 INJECTOR ATROPINE SULFATE INHALATION AEROSOL 6/PKG 6505-01-332-1281 2,909 (MANAA) ATROPINE SULFATE INJECT USP 1ML VIAL 25 VIALS / 6505-00-957-8089 vials 2,525 PACKAGE CIPROFLOXACIN TABLETS USP 500MG 50 TABLETS 6505-01-272-2385 505 / BOTTLE CIPROFLOXACIN TABLETS USP 500MG I.S. 100 TABS 6505-01-273-8650 11,417 / PACKAGE CIPROFLOXACIN TABLETS USP 500MG I.S. 30 TABS 6505-01-491-2834 tablets 9,242,420 / PACKAGE DIAZEPAM INJ USP 5MG/ML 2ML SYRINGE-NEEDLE 6505-01-274-0951 doses 1,054,325 UNIT (CANA) DOXYCYCLINE HYCLATE CAPS USP 100MG I.S. 100 6505-00-009-5060 capsules 9,353,600 CAPS / PKG DOXYCYCLINE HYCLATE TABS USP 100MG 20/BT 6505-01-511-7393 tablets 107,629,210 PATIENT WRAPS 6530-01-383-6260 3,300

POTASSIUM IODIDE TABLETS 130MG 14S 6505-01-496-4916 18,614 PRUSSIAN BLUE CAPSULES 500 MG 30 TABLETS / 6505-01-517-5214 3,588 BOTTLE PYRIDOSTIG BROMIDE TABS USP 30MG I.S. 210 6505-01-178-7903 128,333 TABS/PKG (SNAPP) SKIN EXP REDUC PASTE AGAINST CHEM WAR 6505-01-483-7162 397,754 AGENT (SERPACWA)

* Requirements are for all protective overgarments ‡ On-hand data from JACKS as of 6 Nov 2006 Table H-2a. Air Force Logistics Readiness Data - Non-Consumables

FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 (as of 30 Sept 06) INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION CB MASK MASK, M45, LAND 4240-01-447- 2644 WARRIOR 6988/6989 4240-01-415- MASK, MCU-2/P, 4239-41 4240-01-284- MASK, MCU-2A/P 3615-17 MASK, MCU-2A/P 4240-01-327- (WR) USAF 3299-01 JSAM FIXED WING NOT ASSIGNED 35497 35497 JSAM ROTARY WING NOT ASSIGNED 0 1857 JSGPM NOT ASSIGNED 416,357 419,223 MISC PROTECTION PATS, M41 4240-01-365-8241 517 JSMLT NOT ASSIGNED 1,312 741 CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE NUCLEAR DETECTION EQUIPMENT 6665-01-363- ADM 300 - A KIT 145 6213NW 6665-01-342- - B KIT 883 7747NW 6665-01-320- - C KIT 962 4712NW 6665-01-426- - E KIT 301 5071NW BIOLOGICAL DETECTION EQUIPMENT JPS 6665-NSN 314 0 0 JBPDS INC I - MAN 6665-01-452-8643 734 342 PORT JBPDS INC I - RECON 6665-01-453-5385 77 H-9

ANNEX H H-10 ANNEX H

FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 (as of 30 Sept 06) JBPDS INC I - SHLT 93 77 VHCL JBPDS INC I - TRAILER 114 JBSDS INC I NOT ASSIGNED 12 JBSDS INC II NOT ASSIGNED 407 246 CHEMICAL DETECTION EQUIPMENT ACADA, M22 6665-01-438-6963 3,521 1,914 JCAD NOT ASSIGNED 1,006 JCBAWM NOT ASSIGNED 350 CAM/ICAM 6665-01-357-8502 1,960 1,436 JSLNBCRS LAV NOT ASSIGNED 0 0 6 JSLNBCRS HMMW NOT ASSIGNED 93 88 7

DECONTAMINATION L/WT DEC SYS, 4230-01-349-1778 324 M17A2

COLLECTIVE PROTECTION 5410-01-479-9727 CP DEPMEDS 21 16 / 9730 J EXPED CP SHELTER 4240-01-346-2564 6,339 4,645 MEDICAL DEFENSE JBAIDS - Backpack 6665-01-523-4902 332 103 44 69 JBAIDS Analyzer - 6665-01-523-5629 332 103 44 69 JBAIDS Computer - 6665-01-524-2745 332 103 44 69 Table H-2b. Air Force Logistics Readiness Data - Consumables

FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 (as of 30 Sept 06)

INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION OVERGARMENTS AIRCREWMAN CAPE 8415-01-040-9018 JSLIST OVERGARMENTS 1,444,001 1,555,510 Woodland Coat SEE TABLE H-5 672,872 466,193‡ 102,074 Woodland Trousers SEE TABLE H-5 678,899 462,422‡ 96,740 Desert Coat SEE TABLE H-5 673,167 333,759‡ 142,384 Desert Trousers SEE TABLE H-5 501,242 ‡ SUIT, AIRCREW, CWU-66/77P 8475-01-328-3434-57 SUIT, CP CAMO (BDO) WOOD 8415-01-137-1700-07 118,350 ‡ SUIT, CP CAMO-DESERT 3 clr 8415-00-327-5347-53 2,979 ‡ OVERBOOTS/GLOVES JLIST MULO 8430-01-464-9453-84 BLK/GRN VINYL O/BOOTS BVO 8430-01-317-3374-85 1,445,453 771,396‡ 220,336 8430-01-450-0357-60 96,535 ‡ CP FOOTWEAR COVERS 8430-01-118-8172 8430-01-021-5978 AFS NOT ASSIGNED 1,444,001 1,555,510 CP GLOVES 7 MIL 8415-01-138-2501-04 149,956 53,078‡ 6,527 22,677 CP GLOVES 14 MIL 8415-01-138-2497-00 2,608,366 1,828,179‡ 446,553 JB2GU NOT ASSIGNED 0 1,555,510 GLOVE INSERTS 8415-00-782-2809 (S) 2,608,186 2,081,736 716 117 MISC PROTECTION FILTER CAN, C2/C2A1 4240-01-119-2315 1,607,675 824,378‡ 355,298 208,227 4240-01-361-1319 585,164 ‡ HOOD, MCU-2/P 4240-01-189-9423 797,379 1,262,072 9,173 SECOND SKIN, MCU-2 4242-00-151-3342/2617 186,294 253,385 38,236 JSCESM NOT ASSIGNED 373,700 373,700 H-11

ANNEX H H-12 ANNEX H

FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 (as of 30 Sept 06)

CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE CHEMICAL DETECTION DET PAPER, M8 6665-00-050-8529 591,642 1,153,670‡ 2 481 DET PAPER, M9 6665-01-049-8982 338,284 397,815 70,210 63,747 6665-01-226-5589 453,705 ‡ DECONTAMINATION DECON KIT, M291 (Box of 20) 6850-01-276-1905 648,030 610,453‡ DECON KIT, M295 (Box of 20) 6850-01-357-8456 687,689 ‡ JS PERS/SKIN DECON SYS NOT ASSIGNED 741,141 550,070

MEDICAL DEFENSE ANTIDOTE TREATMENT KIT CYANIDE 6505-01-457-8901 kits 251 ANTIDOTE TREATMENT KIT NERVE AGENT (MARK 1) 6505-01-174-9919 256 ANTIDOTE TREATMENT NERVE AGENT 6505-01-362-7427 907,175 AUTOINJECTOR DUAL-CHAMBER (ATNAA) ATROPINE INJECTION AQUEOUS TYPE 0.7ML 6505-00-926-9083 1,178,770 SYRINGE WITH NEEDLE PRALIDOXIME CHLORIDE FOR INJ 300MG/ML 2ML 6505-01-125-3248 649,944 AUTOMATIC INJECTOR (2-PAM CHLORIDE) ATROPINE SULFATE INJECTION USP 1ML VIAL 25 6505-00-957-8089 vials 2,035,690 VIALS PER PACKAGE CIPROFLOXACIN TABLETS USP 500MG I.S. 30 6505-01-491-2834 tablets 71,050,640 TABLETS PER PACKAGE DIAZEPAM INJECTION USP 5MG/ML 2 ML UNIT 10 6505-01-505-3476 PER PACKAGE DIAZEPAM INJECTION USP 5MG/ML 2ML SYRINGE- 6505-01-274-0951 doses 637,622 NEEDLE UNIT (CANA) DOXYCYCLINE HYCLATE CAPSULES USP 100MG I.S. 6505-00-009-5060 capsules 211,600 100 CAPSULES/PACKAGE DOXYCYCLINE HYCLATE TABS USP 100MG 20/BT 6505-01-511-7393 tablets 34,243,780 DO NOT RQN REPACKAGE OSELTAMIVIR PHOSPHATE CAPSULES 75 MG 10S 6505-01-522-6420 4,359 (TAMIFLU) PATIENT WRAPS 6530-01-383-6260 0 FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 (as of 30 Sept 06) POTASSIUM IODIDE TABLETS 130MG 14 TABLETS 6505-01-116-8198 PER BOTTLE POTASSIUM IODIDE TABLETS 130MG 14S 6505-01-496-4916 157 PYRIDOSTIGMINE BROMIDE TABLETS USP 30MG I.S. 6505-01-178-7903 79,462 210 TABS/PACKAGE (SNAPP) ‡ On-hand data from JACKS as of 6 Nov 2006 H-13

ANNEX H H-14 ANNEX H

Table H-3a. Navy Logistics Readiness Data - Non-Consumables

FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 (as of 30 Sept 06)

INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION CB MASK MASK, A/P 22P-14(V) NOT ASSIGNED 3,149 4240-01-370-3821- MASK, CB, M40A1 26,400 35,368 23 MASK, M45, LAND 4240-01-447- 335 WARRIOR 6987/89 4240-01-414-4034- MASK, M45, AVIATOR 210 35/-4051-52 4240-01-175-3443- 45 4240-01-497-7467 19,069 (S) 17,462 MASK, MCU-2/P 4240-01-497-7783 33,276 (M) 13,310 4240-01-498-1189 (L) 4240-01-284-3615- MASK, MCU-2A/P 8,675 17 MASK, MCU-2A/P 4240-01-415- 121 USN 4239/41 JSAM FIXED WING NOT ASSIGNED 2207 3824 JSAM ROTOARY NOT ASSIGNED 3970 2334 WING JSGPM NOT ASSIGNED 426,500 219,368 MISC PROTECTION TDA-99M 6665-01-450-3022 0 0 355 JSMLT NOT ASSIGNED 268 97 2

CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE NUCLEAR DETECTION EQUIPMENT EPD 6665-01-544-5580 2,000 0 2,000 IM-270 6665-01-526-1889 200,000 0 60,000 140,000 FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 (as of 30 Sept 06) AN/PDR-65 6665-01-279-7516 386 386 CP-95 6665-00-526-8645 993 993 PP-4276 6665-00-489-3106 1,156 1,156 IM-143 6665-00-764-6395 13,883 13,883 DT-60 6665-00-978-9637 155,533 155,533 AN/PDQ-1 MFR 6665-01-435-0127 2,147 2,147 OA-9449/PDQ 6665-01-435-0131 2,147 2,147 EPD 6665-01-544-5580 2000 0 2000 IM-270 6665-01-526-1889 200000 0 60000 140000 BIOLOGICAL DETECTION EQUIPMENT DFU 1000 6665-01-523-3927 417 2300 38 38 DFU 2000 6665-01-523-3926 2300 32 32 DRY FILTER UNIT 6665-01-523-3927 417 683 JBPDS INC I - RECON 22 JBPDS INC I - SHIP 6665-01-452-9645 116 121 13 11 11 JBSDS INC I NOT ASSIGNED JBSDS INC II NOT ASSIGNED 190 66 CHEMICAL DETECTION EQUIPMENT ACADA, M22 6665-01-438-6963 450 154 450 10 ACADA, SHIPBOARD 6665-01-484-7823 0 0 ALARM, CAA, M8A1 6665-01-105-5623 0 6 ALARM, M42 0 CAPDS 6665-01-294-2556 7 CAM/ICAM 6665-01-199-4153 1,009 364 1,266 CWDD, AN/KAS-1A 5855-01-352-7033 130 703 IMP POINT 6665-LL-HAL-5532 488 285 234 20 DETECTION SYSTEM JCAD NOT ASSIGNED 2,743 2,743 0 0 1,075 0 1,668 0 0 0 JWARN BLOCK I NOT ASSIGNED MICAD NOT ASSIGNED M21 RSCAAL 6665-01-324-6637 JSLSCAD RECON 6665-01-475-6658/ H-15

ANNEX H H-16 ANNEX H

FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 (as of 30 Sept 06)

DECONTAMINATION L/WT DEC SYS 4230-01-346-3122 412 8 M17A3 DIESEL L/WT DEC SYS 4230-01-346-1778 M17A3

COLLECTIVE PROTECTION SHELTER, CP, M20/ 4240-01-166-2254 0 M20A1 SHIP CPS BACKFIT NOT ASSIGNED SHIP CPS NEW NOT ASSIGNED CONSTRUCTION JOINT EXPEDITION­ 4240-01-346-2564 2,952 377 ARY CP SHELTER

MEDICAL DEFENSE JBAIDS - Backpack 6665-01-523-4902 71 54 5 49 JBAIDS Analyzer - 6665-01-523-5629 71 54 5 49 JBAIDS Computer - 6665-01-524-2745 71 54 5 49 Table H-3b. Navy Logistics Readiness Data - Consumables

FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 (as of 30 Sept 06)

INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION OVERGARMENTS APRON, TAP M-2 8415-00-281-7813-16 76 JSLIST OVERGARMENTS * 1,139,000 523,770 Woodland Coat SEE TABLE H-5 177,353 Woodland Trousers SEE TABLE H-5 163,117 Desert Coat SEE TABLE H-5 299,958 Desert Trousers SEE TABLE H-5 279,218 SUIT, CP, OG MK3 8415-01-214-8289-92 802 SUIT, CP, SARATOGA 8415-01-333-7573-76 308 SUIT, CP SARATOGA-DESERT 8415-01-333-7577-80 UNDERGARMENTS CMU-34 UNDERSHIRTS 8415-01-490-1900/17 29,575 CMU-35 DRAWERS 8415-01-490-4368/71/72/74/76-84 31,503 OVERBOOTS/GLOVES JSLIST MULO 8430-01-464-9453-84 IFS NOT ASSIGNED 32,871 33,660 AIRBOSS LTWEIGHT OVERBOOT 8430-99-869-0395/9 225,647 BLK/GRN VINYL O/BOOTS BVO 8430-01-317-3374-85 23,985 8430-01-450-0357-60 553 8340-01-496-0668 GVO 8430-01-049-0878-87 33 CP FOOTWEAR COVERS 8430-01-118-8172 8430-01-021-5978 56,416 AFS 8430-01-536-5413-19 1,139,000 523,770 CP GLOVES 7 MIL 8415-01-138-2501-04 1,117 CP GLOVES 14 MIL 8415-01-138-2497-00 49,298 CP GLOVES 25 MIL 8415-01-033-3517-20 148,000 8415-01-144-1862 0 ‡ H-17

ANNEX H H-18 ANNEX H

FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 (as of 30 Sept 06) JB1GU NOT ASSIGNED JB2GU NOT ASSIGNED 1,139,000 523,770 AIRBOSS GLOVE 8415-21-921-2167/72 19,019 CP SOCKS 8415-01-040-3169 65,107 DISP FOOTWEAR COVER 8430-00-580-1205-06 7,687 8430-00-591-1359 2,862 GLOVE INSERTS 8415-00-782-2809 255,005 CP GLOVE INSERTS 8415-01-138-2494-96 48,856 MISC PROTECTION 2D SKIN, M40 SERIES 4240-01-413-1540 -43 35,368 CP HELMET COVER 8415-01-111-9028 0 ‡ FILTER CAN, C2/C2A1 4240-01-119-2315 95,676 4240-01-361-1319 429,781 4240-01-871-7842 1,781 HOOD, MCU-2/P 4240-01-189-9423 866 HOOD, M45, LAND WARRIOR 4240-01-441-0553 901 HOOD, M40/42 (ONE-PIECE) 4240-01-260-8723 HOOD, M40A1 (QUICK DOFF) 4240-01-376-3152 23 SECOND SKIN, MCU-2 NOT ASSIGNED 530,250 190,983 200,000 JSCESM NOT ASSIGNED

CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE CHEMICAL DETECTION EQUIPMENT DET KIT, M256A1 6665-01-133-4964 5,295 DET PAPER, M8 6665-00-050-8529 46,131 DET PAPER, M9 6665-01-226-5589 20,107 NBC MARK SET, M274 9905-12-124-5955 14 TUBE PHOSGENE 6665-01-010-7965 228 WATER TEST KIT, M272 6665-01-134-0885 18 BIOLOGICAL DETECTION EQUIPMENT HAND HELD ASSAYS 6665-01-504-8534 2,000 20,000 CARRIER BOX ASSEMBLY 6665-01-525-7009 39 360 480 JBPDS HHA FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 (as of 30 Sept 06) LIQUID CONSUMABLE MISSION PACK 6665-01-512-4430 516 630 840 - JBPDS DRY COLLECTION KIT 6665-01-520-7072 138 180 240 JBPDS BOTTLES, SAMPLE STERILE, JBPDS 6850-01-512-4433 368 225 300 TUBE, BIO CUL (SAMPLE VIALS), JBPDS 6640-01-512-4432 14 27 36

DECONTAMINATION CALCIUM HYPOCHLORITE (6 oz) 6810-00-255-0471 2,082 CALCIUM HYPOCHLORITE (100 lb) 6810-12-255-0472 114 CALCIUM HYPOCHLORITE (45 lb) 6840-00-242-4770 DECON FOAM-200 (DF-200), 2 X 55-GAL 6850-01-501-2891 DRUMS DETERGENT, GENERAL PURPOSE, LIQUID, 7930-00-985-6911 5-GAL CAN ANTISETTING COMPOUND (STB DECON SLURRY ANTI-CAKING), 12.5 LB IN GAL 6850-00-656-0926 CAN SORBENT DECONTAMINATION SYSTEM (SDS), M100, (SQUADBOX, 2 KITS PER 4230-01-466-9095 BOX) DECON KIT, M291 (Box of 20) 6850-01-276-1905 149,064 DECON KIT, M295 (Box of 20) 6850-01-357-8456 82,307 JS PERS/SKIN DECON SYS NOT ASSIGNED 472,599 122,767 SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE 6810-00-598-7316 147 STB, 50 LB 6850-00-297-6653

COLLECTIVE PROTECTION FILTER, GP, M48A1 4240-01-363-1311 87 112 FILTER SET, SHIPBOARD (M98) 4240-01-369-6533 3,650 3,928 PRE-FILTER, BAG (3 DEEP NO CCT) 4240-01-474-8855 215 516 PRE-FILTER, BAG (3 DEEP CCT) 4130-01-474-8851 666 288 PRE FILTER, BAG (2 DEEP) 4130-01-531-0898 2 0 H-19

ANNEX H H-20 ANNEX H

FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 (as of 30 Sept 06) PRE FILTER, BAG (5 DEEP) 4130-01-531-0891 0 0 PRE FILTER, BAG (1 DEEP) NOT ASSIGNED 4 0 GASKET, O-RING (LARGE) 5330-01-340-5099 941 373 GASKET, O-RING (SMALL) 5330-01-339-0967 941 373 LP FILTER, 1000 CFM 4240-01-347-6190 362 112

MEDICAL DEFENSE ANTID TREATMENT KIT CYANIDE 6505-01-143-4641 6505-01-457-8901 kits 26 ANTIDOTE TREATMENT KIT NERVE AGENT 6505-01-174-9919 5,034 (MARK 1) ANTID TREAT NERVE AGENT AUTO DUAL- 6505-01-362-7427 186 CHAMBER (ATNAA) ATROPINE INJECTION AQUEOUS TYPE 6505-00-926-9083 555,031 0.7ML SYRINGE W / NEEDLE 2-PAM CHLORIDE INJ 300MG/ML 2ML 6505-01-125-3248 606,555 AUTOMATIC INJECTOR ATROPINE SULFATE INJECTION USP 1ML 6505-00-957-8089 vials 2,927,775 VIAL 25 VIALS / PACKAGE CIPROFLOXACIN TABLETS USP 500MG I.S. 6505-01-491-2834 tablets 3,038,120 30 TABLETS / PACKAGE DIAZEPAM INJ USP 5MG/ML 2ML 6505-01-274-0951 doses 167,998 SYRINGE-NEEDLE UNIT (CANA) DOXYCYCLINE HYCLATE CAPS USP 6505-00-009-5060 capsules 8,876,500 100MG I.S. 100 CAPS / PKG DOXYCYCLINE HYCLATE TABS USP 6505-01-511-7393 tablets 624,240 100MG 20/BT OSELTAMIVIR PHOSPHATE CAPSULES 75 6505-01-522-6420 2505 MG 10S (TAMIFLU) POTASSIUM IODIDE TABLETS 130MG 14S 6505-01-496-4916 80,592 PYRIDOSTIG BROMIDE TABS USP 30MG 6505-01-178-7903 29,537 I.S. 210 TABS/PKG (SNAPP) * Requirements are for all protective overgarments ‡ On-hand data from JACKS as of 6 Nov 2006 Table H-4a. Marine Corps Logistics Readiness Data – Non-Consumables

FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 (as of 30 Sept 06)

INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION CB MASK MASK, CB, M40/ 4240-01-258-0061-63 149,512 189,653 94,032 M40A1 4240-01-370-3821-23 JSAM FIXED WING NOT ASSIGNED 1,575 1,417 JSAM ROTARY WING NOT ASSIGNED 3,666 3,300 JSGPM NOT ASSIGNED 257,785 198,297 MISC PROTECTION MASK COMM 5996-01-381-9012 25,362 AMPLIFIER M7 PATS, M41 4240-01-365-8241 371 JSMLT NOT ASSIGNED 293 158 0 128

CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE NUCLEAR DETECTION EQUIPMENT AN/PDR-56 6665-00-086-8060 0 AN/PDR-56D 6665-00-053-3391 22 AN/PDR-56E 6665-00-211-6895 1 AN/PDR-56G 6665-01-016-8267 7 AN/PDR-56H 6665-01-161-5407 26 AN/PDR-75 6665-01-211-4217 1,074 AN/PDR-77 6665-01-347-6100 16,500 0 AN/UDR-13 NOT ASSIGNED 16,500 16,520 565 3,205 3,000 3,000 AN/VDR-2 6665-01-222-1425 16,500 2,074 VEHICLE MOUNT TBD AN/VDR-2 IM-143 6665-00-764-6395 15 6665-00-540-9004 762 6665-01-134-9714 6,366 H-21

ANNEX H H-22 ANNEX H

FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 (as of 30 Sept 06) CHARGER PP4276A/ 6665-00-104-7246 24 PD CHARGER PP4276B/ 6665-00-110-5081 1 PD CHARGER PP4276C/ 6665-00-489-3106 377 PD CHARGER PP4276/ 6665-00-788-5779 316 PD CHARGER PP4276D/ 6665-01-281-9637 7 PD CHARGER PP 8444A/ 6130-01-443-0970 97 U DT-236 173,328 BIOLOGICAL DETECTION EQUIPMENT JBPDS INC I - SHLT 6665-01-453-5385 113 22 VEH CHEMICAL DETECTION EQUIPMENT ACADA, M22 6665-01-438-6963 622 622 760 ACADA, M22 (TIM) NOT ASSIGNED CAM 1.5 6665-01-359-9006 38 CAM 2.0 6665-99-725-9996 2,582 JCAD NOT ASSIGNED 15,485 14,000

M21 RSCAAL 6665-01-382-1968 8 NBC RECON SYS, 6665-01-372-1303 2 M93 NBC RECON SYS, 6665-01-372-2582 8 M93A1 JSLNBCRS LAV 6665-07-000-0776 22 22 JSLNBCRS HMMWV NOT ASSIGNED 37 37 6665-01-475-6658/ JSLSCAD RECON 229 22 6787/6795/6802/6799

DECONTAMINATION L/WT DEC SYS, 4230-01-303-5225 0 M17A1 FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 (as of 30 Sept 06) L/WT DEC SYS, M17 4230-01-470-5826 82 MCHF HEAVY FUEL DECON 4230-01-492-1540 1,570 828 L/WT DEC SYS, 4230-01-346-3122 0 M17A3

MEDICAL DEFENSE JBAIDS - Backpack 6665-01-523-4902 98 16 5 11 JBAIDS Analyzer - 6665-01-523-5629 98 16 5 11 JBAIDS Computer - 6665-01-524-2745 98 16 5 11 H-23

ANNEX H H-24 ANNEX H

Table H-4b. Marine Corps Logistics Readiness Data - Consumables

FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 (as of 30 Sept 06)

INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION OVERGARMENTS JSLIST OVERGARMENTS * 867,586 641,246 Woodland Coat SEE TABLE H-5 236,323 Woodland Trousers SEE TABLE H-5 201,832 Desert Coat SEE TABLE H-5 210,771 Desert Trousers SEE TABLE H-5 209,645 M-2 APRON 8415-00-281-7812-16 32,127 SUIT, CP, SARATOGA 8415-01-333-7573-76 197,135 SUIT, CP SARATOGA-DESERT 8415-01-333-7577-80 9,195 JPACE AC NOT ASSIGNED JPACE CVC NOT ASSIGNED 25,950 21,774 OVERBOOTS/GLOVES JLIST MULO 8430-01-464-9453-84 325,389 BLK/GRN VINYL O/BOOTS BVO 8430-01-317-3374-85 229,631 8340-01-450-0357-60 196,739 8340-01-496-0668 12,190 GVO 8430-01-049-0878-87 4,053 CP FOOT COVERS 8430-01-021-5978 21 AFS 8430-01-536-5413-19 872,374 641,246 91,071 257,045 CP GLOVES 7 MIL 8415-01-138-2501-04 579 CP GLOVES 25 MIL 8415-01-033-3517-20 342,258 JB1GU GROUND 8415-01-033-3517-20 467,923 JB1GU SUMMER FLIER 8415-21-921-2165,67, 70,72 36,733 JB2GU NOT ASSIGNED 854,051 641,246 MISC PROTECTION 2D SKIN, M40 SERIES 4240-01-413-1540-43 408,233 FILTER CAN, C2/C2A1 4240-01-119-2315 92,197 4240-01-361-1319 486,348 HOOD, M40 4240-01-376-3152 0 WP BAG, M1A1 4240-00-377-9401 49,238 FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 (as of 30 Sept 06) 4240-00-803-5839 1,905

CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE CHEMICAL DETECTION EQUIPMENT BATTERY, ICAM BA-5800 6665-99-760-9742 4,698 BATTERY, ACADA BA-5590 6135-01-036-3495 431 BATTERY, ACADA BA-5590 B/U 6135-01-438-9450 53,224 DET KIT, M256A1 6665-01-133-4964 8,214 DET PAPER, M8 6665-00-050-8529 345,336 6665-01-226-5589 118,879 NBC MARK SET, M274 9905-12-346-4716 3,186 WATER TEST KIT, M272 6665-01-134-0885 1,532

DECONTAMINATION DECON KIT, M291 6850-01-276-1905 32,287 DECON KIT, M295 6850-01-357-8456 22 JSPDS NOT ASSIGNED 696,488 494,750 SORBENT DECON SYSTEM 4230-01-466-9095 150,543 STB, 50LB 6850-00-297-6653 928

MEDICAL DEFENSE ATROPINE INJECTION AQUEOUS TYPE 6505-00-926-9083 74,558 0.7ML SYRINGE WITH NEEDLE PRALIDOXIME CHLORIDE FOR INJ 300MG/ML 2ML AUTOMATIC INJECTOR 6505-01-125-3248 83,585 (2-PAM CHLORIDE) CIPROFLOXACIN TABLETS USP 500MG I.S. 6505-01-491-2834 tablets 17,800 30 TABLETS PER PACKAGE DIAZEPAM INJECTION USP 5MG/ML 2ML 6505-01-274-0951 doses 50,360 SYRINGE-NEEDLE UNIT (CANA) POTASSIUM IODIDE TABLETS 130MG 14 6505-01-116-8198 TABLETS PER BOTTLE POTASSIUM IODIDE TABLETS 130MG 14S 6505-01-496-4916 651 H-25

ANNEX H H-26 ANNEX H

FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN TOTAL SERVICE 1-1-1 STOCKS NOMENCLATURE NSN REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT ON HAND FY07 FY08 (as of 30 Sept 06) PRUSSIAN BLUE CAPSULES 500 MG 30 6505-01-517-5214 0 TABLETS PER BOTTLE PYRIDOSTIGMINE BROMIDE TABLETS USP 6505-01-178-7903 3,117 30MG I.S. 210 TABS/PACKAGE (SNAPP) * Requirements are for all protective overgarments Table H-5. Defense Logistics Agency Logistics Readiness Data - Consumables

FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN STOCKS ON NOMENCLATURE NSN FY07 FY08 HAND (as of 30 Sept 06) INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION OVERGARMENTS CAPE, AIRCREWMAN 8415-01-040-9018 177,992 CHEM PROT UNDERGARMENT TOP 8415-01-363-8692-00 23,336 CPU DRAWERS 8415-01-363-8683-91 12,594 64,000 64,000 JSLIST OVERGARMENTS * Woodland Coat 8415-01-444-1163/-1169/-1200/38/49/65/70 296,527 215,000 215,000 Woodland Trousers 8415-01-444-1435/39/-1613-/2308/10/25/38 307,711 215000 215,000 Desert Coat 8415-01-444-5902/05/13/26/-6116/31/38 117,301 415,000 415,000 Desert Trousers 8415-01-444-5417/5504/06/-5892/93/98/-5900 107,138 415,000 415,000 SUIT, AIRCREW, CWU-66/77P 8475-01-328-3434-57 3,327 16,000 16,000 OVERBOOTS/GLOVES BLK/GRN VINYL O/BOOTS 8430-01-450-0357-60 28,289 1,092,482 642,504 CP GLOVES 7 MIL 8415-01-138-2501-04 63,347 64,000 64,000 CP GLOVES 14 MIL 8415-01-138-2497-00 18,237 950,000 845,000 CP GLOVES 25 MIL 8415-01-033-3517-20 206,767 50,000 250,000 GLOVE INSERTS 8415-00-782-2809 163,725 440,000 372,000 CP GLOVE INSERTS 8415-01-138-2494-96 40,534 600,000 300,000 CP SOCKS 8415-01-040-3169 90,957 0 0 DISP FOOTWEAR COVER 8430-00-580-1205-06 10,099 22,400 27,864 MISC PROTECTION CP HELMET COVER 8415-01-111-9028 5,005 800,000 500,000 CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE BATTERY, ACADA BA5590 6135-01-438-9450 BATTERY, BA3517 6135-00-450-3528 MAINTENANCE KIT, M293 5180-01-379-6409 TUBE, DET, PHOSGENE GAS 6665-01-010-7965 249 665 665 DECONTAMINATION CALCIUM HYPOCHLORITE (6 oz) 6810-00-255-0471 13,218 287,988 240,312 STB, 50 LB 6850-00-297-6653 376,400 0 0 COLLECTIVE PROTECTION H-27

ANNEX H H-28 ANNEX H

FY06 PROJECTED DUE IN STOCKS ON NOMENCLATURE NSN FY07 FY08 HAND (as of 30 Sept 06) PRE-FILTER, SHIPBOARD CPE 4130-01-474-8855, -8851 (each) 1,046 2,241 2,252 MEDICAL DEFENSE 2-PAM CHLORIDE, AUTOINJ 6505-01-125-3248 550,000 550,000 550,000 ATROPINE AUTOINJ 6505-00-926-9083 298,000 700,000 700,000 CANA AUTOINJ 6505-01-274-0951 834,000 600,000 600,000 NAAK, MKI 6505-01-174-9919 1,796,000 800,000 800,000 PYRIDOSTIGMINE TABLETS 6505-01-178-7903 36,000 36,000 36,000 ANTIDOTE TREAT KIT, CYANIDE 6505-01-143-4641 0 5,000 5,000 6505-01-457-8901 CIPROFLOXACIN 500 MG TAB 100s IS+ 6505-01-273-8650 2,063 500 MG TAB 100s BTL+ 6505-01-333-4154 35,720 DOXYCYCLINE CAPS, 500s + 6505-00-009-5063 3,024 DOXYCYCLINE TABS, 100 MG, 500s + 6505-01-153-4335 7,812 H.2.1 H.2 contains the JBP biological agent assay, that were fielded to support will receive the Joint the receive will T (within a carrier box assembly) upon the detection of possible agents.possible of detection the assembly)upon box carrier a (within However,origin. biological JBP of the agents for the analysis.Like further for samples liquid collects and warns,identifies, T HHAs. currentlyis available Common a as scene.incident suspected a from samples air collect to used be may or releases covert detect to sampling “ laborato confirmatory and HHAs with used be to designed system sampling air environmental an S limited quantities of numbers.the Joint significant Portal in deployed be to beginning are detectors stand-off and detectors point agent Unit ( T Detection Biological version older of number large a has T /NuclearDetection Radiological to beinitially low ininventory, but theirquantitieswillimprove withcontinuedprocurement incomingyears. to other commodity areas. contamination avoidance programs, this area has an unusually high number of developmental programs, as compared identification. and detection, Contamination avoidance programs generally include equipment that is used to conduct CB (5) Avoidance,(2) For the of purposes this section, CB is seeking a replacement for the shipboard,mast-mounted the for AN/P replacement a seeking is the AN/P with system.depot 2, AN/U T operational requirement in the post-Cold War environment for a replacement device. repair parts are not available. Current stocks will be exhausted by FY09. detection of a nuclear blast and has been in for service over 40 years. suitable toitsneeds. AN/ D tandoff he he NavyArmyand JBP arecurrentlyfielding he number of biological detection devices, to include the Biological Force Air and Army he he etect to etect M M M VDR

edical. D arine Corps’ current capability consists of a limited number of number limited a of consists capability Corps’ current arine arine Corps is also considering deleting the deleting considering also is AN/P Corps arine

F FU), and Joint Portal D DR I C -2s, but lacks an Alpha detection capability, and needs to replace its outdated capability,its an replacedetection to Alpha lacks -2s,butneeds and etection EL T ontamination reat” capability for U for capability reat” -13 and AN/P -13 T I D D he Navyhe nformation nformation DS Q-1 ( Q-1 E system for Biological S D ystems (JB O S CB verall, M ervice Lightweight NBC Lightweight ervice R ulti-Function A R M DR DI A S R any programs will complete their fielding beyond FY06. ystems (3) ystems S DI R D ACrequirements.meets Program hield has historically been low as measured against requir N N -77. New -77.AN/ SDS A ue to recent type-classification of several programs that are intended to modernize modernize to intended are that programs several of type-classification recent to ue AC programs are expected to meet requirements. meet to expected are programs AC DI S D Naval forces ashore and afloat. and ashore forces Naval T ) in FY 08 followed by Joint Biological Point R ACs represent risk, amoderate logistics especiallycontingencies. during S ableof Allowances(C A N defense systems are categorized into five functional areas: (1) Contamination hield biological ne R EFEN A R voidance DI I A D ndividual Protection and Collective Protection,(4) Collective and Protection ndividual DI etection as of part its reconnaissance platform. ACs. AC) and AC) VDR DS S E E T R systems. DS hese are being replaced by newer variants such as the AN/ as such variants newer by replaced being are hese O

IT -2 systems are being procured and will be available through the throughavailable be will and procured being are systems -2 S peration automatically collects a liquid sample and inoculates the HHA the inoculates and sample liquid a collects automatically ystem in the Light Armor Armor Light the in ystem O E t worked A-9449/P DR MS T T A) item and can be requisitionedwith be fromalong can depots and item A) his system is a point detector thatautomaticallydetector point detects,a is system his -75 and -75 I - - raqi Freedom ( S R ISS DR ensor D eplacement of the of eplacement AN/P I T t may be employed for periodic environmental periodic for employed be may t Q ( Q DT -65. I he AN/P ntegrated ntegrated D UE T T S -236 from the inventoryfromoperationallythe -236 not as FUs and Hand Held Hand and FUs Assays(HHA), of type a G he JBP he he Navy is working on an updated, definitive ystems and will be receiving Joint Biological T amma Beta Probe) is complete. is Probe) Beta amma his S D AN OI FU,JBP R DR DS D F). D V A ehicle (LA ehicle etection DI etection automatically reads the HHA and HHA the readsautomatically -65 is no longer manufactured and D I n FY08-FY09, the T AC is used for over-the-horizonfor used ACis T T C hus several systems may appear DS he Army National Army he he e IM ments. Automatic bi monitors the environment the monitors O M T S S R he Navy fielded the -143 Pocket-143 arine arine Corps has sufficient ystems (JBP DR ystem (B V NCE N agent reconnaissance, ) configuration, which which configuration, ) D -27 and -27 AN/P econtamination,and r R ies, to provide a provide to ies, IDS T N M he U he DS D ), arine arine Corps S G osimeters. D ) in FY09. T T uard still uard he Navy he ry ry Filter he S o DR AF has AF logical logical VDR D D FU, -43 FU - H-29

ANNEX H H-30 ANNEX H H.2.2 O deployment rates. lines are maintaining the ability to surge in order to provide coverage of any contingency for meeting future expected year,past requirements. meet areunderway. downramp planned efforts to 2003 monthlythe While April productionrates have in decreased, production beginning month per overgarments 128,000 than agreement more produced bilateral However, through month. per overgarments 120,000 about to up took management of J clauses. overgarments older the with providing life. system until readinessthe end of stocks their service a as viewed be should overgarments protective the such, overgarments.As Garments. Ground ProtectionEnsembles Joint and EnsemblesProtection Aviation/ EnsemblesProtection T six different masks. and some duplication in capability resulting in the procurement of six different chemical protective overgarments and ( I T Reconnaissance review. Agent T Chemical Detection ofspoilage. shelflifeitemsandtoreduce risk better track Fahrenheit. degrees 40 at stored if years three Fahrenheit,or samples.aerosol process to HHAs and identified.Both agent specific the with warfighter the to provideswarning (NBC in H system along with stand-off chemical vapor detection. requir wartime meet to quantities sufficient availablein usually are with theJoint Agent (J R the to upgrades the with FY06 in capabilities T S ndividual protection equipment is designed to protect against CB warfare threat agents,threatwarfare CB against protect to designed is equipment protection ndividual TI rie, u oeal hr i ltl risk. little is there overall but ervices, raditional consumables in this commodity area ( he Joint Project he he combined total of chemical agent detection systems will improve significantly when the emote S n 24 n L Cs), and MM IST M I RV ndividual Protection equipmentthrough theseteamshasbeguntoresolve challenges. many oftheseformer 93A1 NBC D D O

) overgarments as a replacement for the Battle the for replacement a as overgarments ) D etector (JCA W etection Alarm (ACAetection Alarm O ) fitted with anti- with fitted ) ct 06, the Joint Program Executive Program Joint 06,the ct I efense ndividual perated Weapons V T

s and APCs, thus adding a supplemental capability. T oxic he S ervice Lightweight ervice S M RS I S upply Center Philadelphia ( Philadelphia upplyCenter ndustrial ndustrial rie ae otnig custo o te Joint the of acquisition continuing are ervices anager for T is currently fielded according to schedule. his has caused difficulties in meeting current needs and exacerbated logistics planning. needsandexacerbatedhis hascauseddifficultiesinmeetingcurrent logistics D S ), which begins fielding in FY08. L IST R P M in FY98. P S I tation (C G aterials aterials ( ndividual Protection (JP rotection D Armor,additional A) and A) S tandoff Chemical Agent D TIM RO T M LA/ he HHAs have a shelf life of approximately one year if stored at 70 degrees degrees 70 at stored if yearapproximately one of life shelf havea HHAs he 8A1 AutomaticChe W S s). Past ef ie ocrs a cag ti poeto; hs ra ean under remains area this projection; this change may concerns life helf DS S O ). DS CP has surge clauses in current contracts that would bring production ffice for Chemical and Biological Biological and Chemical for ffice M M CP), whose solicitations include the surge option as a requir a as option surge the CP),include solicitations whose 93A1 Fox Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Nuclear,Biological, Fox 93A1 S I 8 and mprovisedExplosive ervice-unique requirementservice-unique led to M S everal units continue to use trained reconnaissance personnel S - D M tandoff chemical detection will begin to be available in FY08 I P) has organized the Program ress 9 detection paper, T T D est Equipment. Fielding and continued developmentof continued and Equipment.Fielding est he initial J T m T etector (J T his system adds improved mass spe O ical Agent Alarm are replaced by the Joint Chemical Joint the by replaced ical are Agent Alarm he Navy is currently using bar-coding capabilities to capabilities bar-coding using currently is Navy he he Joint vergarment (B vergarment S e rie Lightweight ervice ments. S S S D L L ervices ervices began increasing the reconnaissance IST S evice ( evice CA D S M contracts did not include surge option FU and JBP and FU ome shortages may exist in individual in exist may shortages ome D 256A1 kits and DO ). I D E efense (JPE efense D ) and other chemical protective chemical other and ) ) protection, and the Common protection,the ) and S O ervice-specific procurementservice-specific ffice into two teams: I DS T ntegrated ntegrated oxic M D use liquid consumables liquid use R 22 Automatic Chemical LA/ econnaissance O M I ndustrial Chemicals ndustrial -CB c 272 water test kits) DS tr o S CP contractors contractors CP D meter sampling uit ) directed the directed ) T echnology echnology O G ver the ver V e round ment, ehicle

use. glove madefrom andaremovable compoundedbutyl rubber Coolmax/Lycra/ Non-Flame a protectiveand CB liner gloveleatherinner an and base with the industrial tosustain manufacturers both current “War of the systems. T masks. M solution until the J the until solution rtcie oter ih rdcd oue ht et sibad trg constraints. storage shipboard meets that volume reduced a with footwear protective units. shore for shortfall the current and replaced with the Black/ crew, tank crew, Respiratory FY04 during and FY05. Footwear the Alternative of fielding pending ships construction new for and fishtail, the for replacements requiring ships on Lightweight (Airboss overbootlightweight commercial a identified has Navy protective footwear volume is too large and the Chemical Protective Footwear Cover is no longer in production, the Footwear. ensemble. for frommilitary personnel battlefield concentrations of all known C/B agents when worn of as a part CB protective followedJ be the bywill and replacements for the current butyl rubber gloves and will reduce reliance on them. only.equipment the maintain Gloves. fieldinginFY08. and aircrew andwillbegin personnel T the developed Combat andanticipated needs. allcurrent with known are sufficient tosupport acceptable performance J all recallof protective mask were developed to meet the requirements of different mil different of requirements the meet to developed were mask protective AF bag. standard under M S T manages J manages S T implement improved quality assurance procedures for all J eptember 30, 2006, the 2006, 30, eptember ervice concerns, mitigate anymitigateconcerns,impacts,readiness through and ervice he he Jointhe Protective AircrewEnsemble (JPACE) replacepresentprotectiveto C ensemblesboth for scheduled is his precautionary recall is due to sewing and assembly irregularities found in some in found irregularities assembly and sewing to due is recall precautionary his e JPE he 25-series 25-series masks, respectively. For the arine arine Corps. S alsohasimproved andshipboardenvironments. tractionforground T DOD M he vacuum sealed bag will enhance recovery rate of issued footwear with reduced weight and packaged volume. S CU-2/P and CU-2/P S ervices on-hand ervices inventories has allowed GVO V ome Navy shore activitiesandNavy Expeditionary Air squadrons are also usingthe

T O T ehicle Crewmen (C Crewmen ehicle o protect armor crewmeno protect armor from liquid contamination gross when they exit their vehicles, the S he surveillance tests are validating the protective qualities of the existing butyl rubber glove stocks. S T CB olution (AF olution L Chemical Protective Footwear Covers, also known as the “fishtail”, have been removed from the inventory he JB2 he S IST S s. L : ervices ervices are expected to have adequate stocks of 14 and 25-mil chemical protective gloves for contingency T D S T IST S T uit Contamination( Protectionuit AvoidanceLiquid production, is not issuing remaining issuing not is production, he a te J the as , he etc. ervice combat footwear. ervice AF he U he G chemical protective producedbysuits chemical S I S ). For the Army, the ntegrated ntegrated Footwear L U has twovariants:has U Flame A M ervices IST SM CU-2A/P masks are designed to meet the needs of the Air Force ground crews, and Navy and crews, ground Force Air the of needs the meet to designed are masks CU-2A/P S ). Accordingly,of pairs 175,000 LightweightAirboss I n FY06, Alternative Footwear footwear solution has been completely fielded.completely been has solution footwear C and the Navy are the only services reporting a shortage of footwear,of but shortage a reporting services only the are Navy the and C S S L

ervices reported an inventory of approximately 170,000 approximately of inventory an reported ervices IST continue G S T V T L reen he J he C) and aircrews require special protective ensembles to integrate with their weapontheir with integrate to ensemblesprotective special requireaircrews and C) he J he IST ie Cycle Life RO Block 2 Block V S L inyl

IST modernizing their field protective mask inventories.mask protective field their modernizing -CB M S M olution will begin fielding in FY07. O Block 1 Block arine arine Corps, the 40 (for use) generic and R verboot (B N G S M is a Butyl rubber CB protectiveCB rubber Butyl a is overboot vacuuma in sealed packaged love Upgrade (JB2 love Upgrade ngr i wrig ih the with working is anager, D D efense has validated a U. a validated has efense LA to pursue an R G esistant (F esistant love Upgrade (JB1 loveUpgrade VO S S olutions (AF EK / S S M GVO outheastern Kentucky outheastern L RI 40A1 mask has replaced the IST R stocks and stocks D ) variant that has a combination of an outer Nomex/ outer an of combination a has that variant ) ), is which the protectivechemical interim footwear manufacturers. Production and inventory of J R G LA and the and LA S I esistant (nF esistant ndustrial ndustrial Base U) in FY07.JB2 in U) CALP), which is available in sufficient quantities.sufficient availablein is which CALP), M S S 42 (for C topper” funding. ) fielding began with 538,000 to pairs the U. G U) candidates #508 and #513 are interim interim are #513 and #508 candidates U) T S S he Air Force has plans to continue use of use continue to plans has Forcehe Air . Navy urgent requirement for chemical chemical for requirement urgent Navy . EK S I D O F rie o pas o eov individual resolve to plans on ervices i R V tary occupational specialties ( specialties occupational tary efense Contract efense O S V RI verbootwere U.the to fielded ) variant, which consists of a molded a of consists variant, ) which are a CB protective sock/liner worn C) series C) masks series replace the iscose protective liner. verboot) and has authorized its use its authorized has and verboot) M no longer produces J produces longer no T R aintenance Co G he JB1 ehabilitation U will provide hand protection providehand will U T S S he purpose ofthe he purpose EK EK M G 42, RI D M RI U began fielding in FY06 S ince existing chemical chemical existing ince iffe 40 series masks.40 series suits. produced suits. As of suits.As produced M M r I n 17, and anagement Agency, ndustries ( ndustries ent versions of the of versions ent tract ( T he S D ervices haveervices S I M B L D I LA can fill can LA B T M IST 25-series 25-series LA, who LA, M M he status S C) with e.g. EK 17 and C isto S suits. S .Nay L , air , RI IST V S C ). .

H-31

ANNEX H H-32 ANNEX H masks on hand usuallyhand on masks requirement.the exceeds their replaced aviationgeneral the for mask Armyaircrew (except Apache). I toreplace scheduled Army, Navy, and Aviation Respiratory Protection: Respiratory Aviation aircraft. the entering before removed be must and aircraft the and shelter body.the over worn bag come in three sizes: medium, large, and extra large. en route between the shelter and the aircraft. D S 35/P drawers (formerly known as Navy Protective Chemical Aircrew ProtectiveChemical the Undercoverall,is nowis obsolete. which For U the minimumrequir Garments/Footwear: Aviation Aviation Protection Ensembles/Test Equipment enclosed inthehem. I Other: availableCoverbeen quantities.Helmet sufficient also in has the for hood for the agents, protective hoods and helmet covers are required of the as individual part protective ensemble. I tooperational stocks. andreturned be marked asserviceable 2007. February in completion for will scheduled is re-certification,filters lots After these suspect all of certification re- 100% and retested being are involved canisters the forces.deployed/deployingAll all for replaced been have number,lot of 2005,regardless July and 2003 agents.February betweenproduced canisters, particulate All against non-conforming filters meet standards for protection against gaseous agents, but do not meet standards for protection Navyreadinessof increasingthe CB T availablereadily more the in forces expeditionary shore-based Navy transition to made was decision missions. support shore-based and shipboard replace the canisters. conforming one-million every with commingled were canisters non-conforming 106 approximately production and fielding. pe complete more ensure which skins, problemnow. for shortage the stabilized Additionally,U the demands.replacement meet to requirement Navy 2003 and July 2005 continues. 2005 July and 2003 T of U t is being replaced by the by replaced being is t t is a one-piece configuration made of butyl coated nylon cloth and gathered at the opening by elastic webbing elastic by opening the at gathered and cloth nylon coated butyl of made configuration one-piece a is t n order to provide complete protection to our forces on the contaminated battlefield, particularly from liquid chemical ummer Coverall foradequate protection. his decision allowed the Navy to redistribute its inventory of inventory its redistribute to Navy allowedthe decision his he recall, re-certification, and replacement of 4.5 million suspect C2A1 canisters (filters) produced between February isposable Footwearisposableoverflyer’s worn the Coversare boots. S AF unitsuntiltheJ R eadiness M T he Chemical Protective Helmet Cover is intended to provide Chem/Bio protection for the standard helmet. CU-2/P and CU-2/P M M 40/ M 40 is usually rated as low risk. e I 43-series masks. All of these masks are seen as low risk, as the combined numbers of all aviator all of numbers combined the as risk, low as seen are masks these of masks.All 43-series mprovement Program ( Program mprovement ments,requirementstotal smaller aircrewsthe for given (relative troops). ground to exce An M 42 series andthe 42 series M T SG his is significant since the CU-2A/P have been developed and issued in FY04. Historically, the Chemical ProtectiveHistorically,FY04. Chemical in the issued and developed been have CU-2A/P T M he cape protects the aircrew member from liquid contamination en route between the between route en contamination liquid from member aircrew the protects cape he P 48 (Apache) series mask. series (Apache) 48 M S isfielded. uit. U uit. D ue to flaws in the automated production process controls at the manufacturer,the at controls process production automated the in flaws to ue R

S M N S M rie uuly ae ufcet ubr o arrw vramns o meet to overgarments aircrew of numbers sufficient have usually ervices N and U and N CU-2/P series ofprotective fieldinginFY07. CU-2/P series maskasitbegins T M D r arine aircrewarine ensembles forbothfixed wingaircrew androtary personnel. sonal protection, are currently in First Article Article First in currently are protection, sonal he RI efense assets afloat.assets efense Additionally,of testing odified Chemical Protective Undergarment) in conjunction with the flyer’s P) has generated failure rates of up to 30%, increasing the production the increasing 30%, to up of rates failure generated has P) M T T T I he hey must be removed before entering the aircraft. n FY01, due to the inability of production to keep with demand, the demand, with keep to production of inability the to due FY01, n he addition of new produ new of addition he 43- SM T M T he U he M C aircrews are now using the C the using now are aircrews C ype CU-2/P hood also typically has abundant inventory. T CU-2/P and he Aircrew Cape is a large, clear, disposable, 4-mil polyethylene T S I N & U & N he mask was designed to be used by Apache equipped units. equipped byApache used be to designed was mask M S T AF has some shor some has AF T T 45 will replace the replace will 45 he Jointhe his modernization effort is ongoing;is haveunits all not effort modernization his hey protect the aircrew member from contamination from aircrewmember the protecthey SM M M CU-2/P masks from shore facilities to ships, thus ships, to facilities shore from masks CU-2/P C aircrewC are currently the using A/P22P-14( CU-2A/P masks will continue to be the mainstay S ervice ervice c tion lines for lines tion S I t is available in one size. one in available is t AF,replacedbyCWU-66/77P is the it t G ages in masks.in ages eneral Purpose Purpose eneral M M 24 and the and 24 M U-34/P undershirt and C and undershirt U-34/P CU-2/P M CU-2/P at the vendor has vendor the at CU-2/P T esting in preparation for preparation in esting M M T M CU-2-series second CU-2-series M 43 he footwear covers asks as part of the of part as asks ask (J ask T ype T M T he protective S he JPACEis he 40A1 mask. 40A1 SG econd skins II masks as masks P M ) will ) p M tion T V U- he 1- H.2.3 and requires calibration every 18to24months. also beingfieldedfortheNavy’s and Air Force’s AF T O CB T masks.commercial T the industrial capabilitytoproduce them. the industrial theisrisk primarily due to the level of funding rather than technical shortfalls. inventories even aided by industrial surge capability.current outpacedhave filters carbon-basedAs largea result,forrequirements near-term muchrequirements, theofshelter thistactical sectorand may be assessed as high risk, though Protection T quantities. (CP systemsprotection collective useof filtered air under positive pressure to avariety of facilities, vans, vehicles, and ships. Filters for these integrated collective protection equipment is component equipment designed to provide protection against CB agents throughT the the wearing personnel T command andcontrol ontheNBCcontaminated battlefield. Key Component Consumables for Respiratory Protection. the Air Force theaforementioned masks. at unitssupporting providessystem displayvisual a achieved fit bywornthe bywhen of individual.mask the the fit. mask validate to used be also serviceability,will but will continue Corps to use the cases. value.protective highest the ensure to individual the to fitted properly be mask Respiratory TestEquipment fieldinginFY08.it begins environment. contaminated a in missions conduct to aircraft performance high of pilots enable to speciallydesigned mask another most with oxygenconnections.aircraft N the as known also 4), T used withthe warfighter.protectionrequiredthe to bi and chemical with react otherwise and absorb that requirements due to a continuallyrequirementsa CPtoincreasingwith shipsdue numberof est eAr oc hs xrse itrs i a rae cletv poetv setr aaiiy hog ter Collective their through capability shelter protective collective greater a in interest expressed has Force Air he systems.integrated and shelters stand-aloneprotection: collective of categories general two are here he Joint he he he perational Capability(F R M M M S S N BU-5/P and ystem (PAystem econd T ask Communicator Amplifier, Q1A mask tester also validates proper fit of a mask to the face of the individual.the of face the to mask a of fit validatesproper also tester mask Q1A D

he Army will continue to use the use to continue will Armyhe efense C S S ervice ervice S ollective ervices’ weapons systems’ optics and sights. and optics systems’weapons ervices’ S mall kin was a pre-planned product improvement that provides supplementary liquid agent protection for protection agent liquid supplementary providesimprovement that product pre-planned a was kin T M he Joint TS 40, S chool receiving 6 systems on 29 Jun 06 as the First Unit Equipped. Unit First the as 06 Jun 29 on systems 6 receiving chool M ) validates) proper the faceto mask individual.of athe fit of M S T helter M ask Leakage ask BU-12/P aviator masks and the he system provides a visual display of the fit achieved by the mask when worn by the individual bythe worn when mask achievedbythe fit display providesthe visual system of a he 42, M S ervice ervice Aircrew DI 40-series protective mask.protective 40-series O M S C) inFY10.

se. obnd ih h Nv’ icesn shi increasing Navy’s the with Combined ystem. 43, P T R hese masks providemasks hese increasedprotection, improved compatibilityand comfort, and fit espirator, which is a common man-mounted system with variants to address Naval address to variants with system man-mounted common a is espirator,which M rotection M : T 41 PA S ester (J ester D 45, ) are usually in short supply due to low peacetime demand and low productionlow and demand peacetime low to due supply short in usually are ) M uring the issuing process for Protective for process issuing the uring 7 provides effective voice communication between masked personnel enhancing T M TS he C2/C2A1 canister is the principal filter in the military inventoryis it and military the in filter principal the is canister C2/C2A1 he M 48, A/P22P-14( to conduct fit testing; the J SM ask (J M 41 PA 41 L T ) supplements the supplements ) S I M t iscurrently inuseby the Army, Air Force and A CU-2A/P. M TS I ) is to scheduled replace all existing aircrew protective masks as M t is a butyl rubber blend that is very durable.very is that A blend rubber butyl a is t and the Navy and Air Force will use the J the use will Force Air and Navy the and o BU-13/P and log T V T he J he i 1-4), and cal agents to provide the essential respiratory and ocular and respiratory essential the provide to agents cal he Aircrew Eye/ he Aircrew SM L M T Filters and canisters provide the active ingredients M began fielding in FY06 with the with FY06 in fielding began 41 PA41 SM M S CU-2/P series masks.CU-2/P series ,theand Army’sint BU-19/P aviator NBC protective masks. L T TS will be used primarily for checking mask will be for used checking primarily R M in some cases and replaces it in other in it replaces and cases some in espiratory Protection (AE Protection espiratory M I asks, it is absolutely essential that the that essential absolutely is it asks, t tests all current military and severaland military current tests all t ostof the filter manufacturers p or cletv poeto filter protection collective board T he T M I he J he t tests the currently-fielded the tests t 41 Protection Assessment Protection 41 e grated vehiculargrated systems SM I t is currently in use byuse currentlyin is t L M T SM arines. will achieve Full achieve will L S T M econd . R arine Corps Corps arine T P) mask is mask P) he I ntegrated M S retain kin is kin arine arine T he H-33

ANNEX H H-34 ANNEX H H.2.4 (L by both the Army and the Air Force. S for purchase beginning in2003. beginning for purchase beyondcontinue 2005.to anticipated is and 2002 in fielding Army Workingwerequantities funded availableCapital M Basic soldier skills for decontamination of vehicle and crew-served weapons rely on the previously employed decontaminants, yet are highly effective against allCBagents. T item since the class of supply was changed from class Echelon T CP (inclu co shipboard providing in collective hybrid protection or systems,full collective protectionair sy filtered either have development in vehicles armored and vehicles armored modern ships.All hospitals. M Urgent CP ongoing.of are quantities components Limited chemically protected heaters and air conditioners was initiated in FY99. Procur heaters, water distribution and latrine and alarm systems. through the integration of the T Both and Army environmentallyhavewith Forcehospitals Air field collectiveintegrated controlledprotection. been Freedom/ Enduring CBP of quantities Limited unserviceable.as havecoded been T T systems, CB she env inserting by shortfall the fill support kit and NBC Filter canister.Filter NBC and kit support Protection Army Workinglevels,Funds.funding Capital Current however, ForcePackage meet onlywill the Army developed the M T M PackageForce some are ystem ( e on Porm s tepig o id niomnal sf dcnaiat ta ae es ao itnie than intensive labor less are that decontaminants safe environmentally find to attempting is Program Joint he he Protected Chemically Army’s he he he he 13 F2K. arine Corps isusingthePCP Corps arine 20 shelters. DS S l ters. capabilities. M M S M D via deliveredwater soapy contamination.Hot gross eliminate to ) d ervices have continued to improve integrated collective protection systems in armored vehicles, vans, and vans, vehicles, armored in systems protection collective integrated improve to continued have ervices 20/20A1 51 shelter has been replaced by the Chemical and Pr Biological AP, arewhich being eliminated from all inventories within the U. arine Corps has Portable Collective Prote Collective Portable has Corps arine ing amphibious ships, gunfire support combatants, and new logistics support ships) will contain significant contain will ships) support logistics new and combatants, support gunfire ships, amphibious ing T

M SDS I he Collective Protection aspects of arethe program well underway and are into being existing incorporated I

and T D ateriel ateriel n FY00, production was initiated for remaining for initiated was production FY00, n he Collective Protection for Expeditionary Expeditionary for CollectiveProtection he S econtamination ystem (CP ystem ), as well as pressurized water dissemination systems like the ISO M II forward areatreatment medical facilities. 20A1 S

R S implified CPEs are used to provide a contamination-free, environmentally controlled workspace for elease for helter O peration S S CPE procurement was initiated inFY03andproduction isongoing. M ) for the for ) II S S eals andLow Pressure Alarms. l units designated for deployments into high threat regions that will not be equipped with equipped be not will that regions threat high into deployments for designated units edical le were U.to fielded O c M tive protection. By the year 2007, most Naval ships that have close-in support roles support close-in have that ships Naval most 2007, year the By protection. tive peration Enduring Freedom/ S I 28 fortrainingpurposes. raqi Freedom. Currently 191oftherequired 1035CBP i R ro M T eengineering eengineering S n he CBP he implified Collective Protection Equipment, chemically protected air conditioner, T odular D mentally controlled co controlled mentally T he eployable hey are fielded to fielded are hey SDS S G received replaces the eneral Purpose Purpose eneral S . Urgent an of support Armyin units I nitiative or M c s edical tion D VII tems designed into their chassis. Notable progress has been made EP M M to a class M S ilestone C approval and is presently in full rate production.rate full presentlyin approvalis C and ilestone T edical helters (PCP helters T S M S E he ses (CP ystems he O M trategic Logistics Asset Logistics trategic l DS 11 le MRI M T peration 28 CPE, CB protected water distribution and latrine latrine and distribution water protected CB CPE, 28 c M ent were fielded to U to werefielded tive protection into currently fielded ho fielded currently into protection tive D S 28 20/ II helter configuration to replace the econtamination Apparatus, Portable ( secondary major end item and as such is funded by S S implified CPE is in produ ystem ( ystem M o te I 20A1 S S raqi Freedom. As a result of Lessons Learned, S ) that are being replaced by the Collective the by replaced being are that ) c M D ystem (CP E (CP ystem . Army and tive M EP 17(s) is used for aircraft decontamination aircraft for used is 17(s) 17 Lightweight MG S e M S implified CPE is no longer a freea issue longer no is CPE implified ment and production of CP helter (CBP E P DS TS S Army hospitals in support of an of support in hospitals Army ahee cletv prote collective achieves ) M ). M M M M anagement ( anagement T 100 arine Corps.arine ateriel ateriel E his is a modified a is his S DS systemshave beenfielded. S S D ). All Army ) program is an effort to effort an is program ) orbent c econtamination M tion and production of R I requirements. elease for elease ission Force 2000 or S D T LA econtamination he D M M M s AP) and the pi D ) sites. ) 51 shelters 51 shelters M O 100 began t EP al Alaska 28 liner,28 peration S M ystem T c E here tion T DS he

H.2.5 the Jointthe Program T sorbent.alumina-silica an contains 2000,it January the for procurement of personnel/skin decontamination capability based on benefits and costs. T T isreplacing their Corps now at a low risk. M terrain. of areas large and equipment crew-servedvehicles, decontaminate to used equipment of pieces Packages ( Packages forces deployedforward and deployers early for locations strategic in the Army for materiel this D T below. are described orconcern risk defense material indicate that sufficient quantities should be on hand through the far-term; however areas of potential throughpre-andpost-exposuretreatment,agents nuclear or vaccines.and chemical medical projectionsfor Current M funding foritsprocurement would maintain thelow risk. T T in product, (J the of producer sole the been the throughoutresin availability assurethe of military inventory. Past availability problems have been resolved with the sole provider, T isrecommended. monitoring refined. Continued further be will scenario,and construct 1-1-1 the in capabilities decontamination for need the to base,industrial commerciallyavailableusing the alternatives. by up made be can concentration) 5%-6% at bleach” (“household hypochlorite sodium and chlorite I the development oftheJointthrough and term, near the in systems shelf the off commercial of purchase the though mitigated being is risk 1990.since funding of lack bya caused severalsystems hundred additional decontamination. equipment upgrading all of their L in many battalion-level (smoke/ companies. decontamination) units and dual-purpose chemical T n the Army,n the ruetech, ruetech, his skin decon kit would be fielded as the Joint he projected of stockage he he he projected stockage of the he he S efense 12A1 has gone thru a modernization upgrade with a conversion to diesel fuel and improvements of the controls. edical CB defense items include those that are used to counteract the effects of exposure to chemical, biological,chemical, to exposure of effects the counteract to used are that those include items defense CB edical M P M DS M O M arch 2007. arch M 291 ffice of the of ffice 17A3 Lightweight 291 295 ) program may ) program fieldanew skindecon kit toreplace the

M R M S D M I eactive ateriel since 1994.U since ateriel S K nc. is the main producer of this item, with Pine Bluff Arsenal available for surge capability.surge for available Arsenal Bluff Pine with item, this of producer main the is nc. D FP), which will support various sized groups of personnel, based on location and mission. and location on based personnel, of groups sized various support will which FP), edical kin 17A3s to satisfy shortages.satisfy to 17A3s D econtamin and D M S T econtaminating Kit is the only personal decontamination kit approved for use on skin in the U.the in skin on use approvedfor kit decontamination personal only the is Kit econtaminating S O urgeon 12A1 Power-12A1 he use of commercial off-the-shelf technologies he will use help of lessen of commercial the shortages.off-the-shelf risk technologies kin RSD ffice for ffice DS D a M L. tion Kit used to contain the same resin mix as the as mix resin same the contain to used Kit tion D econ Lotion ( Lotion econ S to the diesel engine. 12A1 P ST ervice ervice G R econtamination eneral of the of eneral the funded and centrallyArmy has programmed Army’s esults of this analysis will be available for the B has been considered a category high-risk in the past. D M M T econtamination is conducting a Business Case Business econtaminationa conducting is paththe forward Analysisdetermine to 295 he Air Force is deleting stocks of A/E32-U systems by attrition and procuring procuring and attrition by systems A/E32-U of stocks deleting is Force Air he S 291 D T Army DD ransportable ransportable riven I ndividual Equipment D As withthe econtaminating Kit. econtaminating Block RSD T M D he edical econtamination(P Apparatus S L), an F L),an M ystem (L M T 17 is assessed as having some risk, due in part to a delay in rebuildingdelay in a to part in due risk,havingsome as assessed is 17 T S he Air Force employs the D 291 lifecycle.291 ervice ervice Personnel/ hese increased requirincreased hese M M econtamination ateriel Agency (U ateriel Agency 17A3 L D T DS A approvedA Class he sorbent is much cheaper than XE-555 and readilyavailable.and XE-555 than cheaper much is sorbent he ) isused to provide oper D DS econtamination Kit typically puts it in a low risk category. S . ince M T 291 in2007. S I he of the Jointthe of S ystem – kin O S M e ctober 1996,Bluff ctober Pine Arsenal, Arkansas,has A ments come as a result of increased attentionincreased of result a as come ments VIII 17 is no longer in production.in longer no is 17 D DD MM M M econtamination 17A3 at the squadron level for operational item controlled bycontrolled item A) and the and A) ilestone C Full S A) has procured, stored and mai and procured,stored has A) mall M T S 291 he replacement couldbe a Canadian ervice Personal/skin ervice a S tional equipment decontamination cale (J S D light shortages in light calcium shortages hypo econtaminating Kit, but since but Kit, econtaminating M R ohm & Haas, committing to 17A3 L 17A3 STDS S ystem (J R T his analysis is comparing ate Production - M T SS DS he edical CB edical ). M D S are the primary primary the are P M edical Chemical edical eployableForce DS D M arine Corps is Corps arine econ ). Currently T 17 program program 17 T he T he I D D ncreased he Army n M M S efense. ecision tained ystem arine arine arine arine I t is S ­ . H-35

ANNEX H H-36 ANNEX H re-mark the materiel at its centralized storage locations.storage centralized its at materiel the re-mark I test, and then a final potency test.test, potency final a then and the for life.shelf 10-year a Program ( Program deployingthe for units.it maintains and deployingunits. testing.for exte subsequent and acti to materiel the destroy or re-mark and period is assigned. (J Board med military of conservation overthe concern Congressional to T contract forthemanufacture of user. life. shelf 10-year original its beyond T NAAK over thenext5-7years. a multi-chambered injector that began procurement in FY03. A M R F the by extended and the cost has it everydestroyed$1.00 for havingbe from to repurchased materiel and replaced. be not and date expiration number,new Lot F the with relabeled be must material extended changes.All ink and pen be ( War in materiel Program. U. availableis from autoinjectors the drug.for this (CANA) for diazepam source and Pralidoximedomestic no is there T address thetreatment needsofpotentialBWexposures, treatment where such ismedically indicated. hand on be should quantities sufficient of thatfar-term.Quantities the through indicate material defense chemical medical for projections Current Joint the of release the improvedwith been has assets on-hand of redeployment. the centralized locations whenever a has Corps consolidated its medical defense materiel into five centralized locations. therapeutics,the Nerve Agent (CANA) will probably remain at low risk because of continued purchases. ofJ (medical) portion Kits (NAAK),Kits and 2-PAAtropineand PB as B M D he F he he sole supplier to supplier sole he epository, which is the Class the is epository, which M edical S A Project number, covering only the original expiration date, before it may be issued. be may it beforedate, expiration original the number,only coveringProject A C . sources. C. O DM D T D ffice of the Assistant of ffice ablets) will probably remain at low risk because of continued purchases. Quantities of Nerve Nerve of Agent purchases.Quantities continued of Antidote because lowrisk probablyat remain will ablets) efense M S A approvedA T R ervices and interfaces with the F the with interfaces and ervices ) Programs.) eridian eridian is a U. echnologies, T CAB) and the and CAB) S T LEP) system. e rga’ fcs s o ae elcmn cs o dt sniie eia mtre epcal medical especially materiel medical sensitive date of cost replacement save to is focus program’s he he Army maintains its materiel at strategic locations that re-mark the materiel and maintain it for the for it maintain and materiel the re-mark that locations strategic at materiel its maintains he Army T S he replacement for NAAK is the Antidote T upply Center – Philadelphia ( T he Air Force and Navy maintain their medical CB materiel in decentralized unit locations.unit decentralized in materiel CB medical their he Navymaintain Forceand Air T R D he Air Force maintains its materiel at its local medical logistics activities that re-mark the materiel materiel the re-markthat activities logistics medical local its athe materiel its Forcemaintains Air T he eserve eserve epartment is maintaining a stockpile of antibiotics ( antibiotics of stockpile a maintaining is epartment T S he F n NAPP for the for NAPP T his new material will require periodic testing after it reaches 5 years, but may not be extended years,maybe 5 but not reaches it after testing requireperiodic will material new his DOD T DOD sions until the materiel fails or is removed for lack of sufficient on-hand quantities required quantities on-hand sufficient of lack for removed is or fails materiel the until sions D he S S A t Louis,t D A. . company but it obtains its atropine for the autoinjectors from a V S D A sends the inform . ervices. S V efense ok, and tocks, for NAAK, atropine autoinjectors, pralidoxime autoinjectors and CANA is CANA and autoinjectors pralidoxime autoinjectors, atropine NAAK, for /F S isibility of on-hand assets has been improved with the release of the Joint the of releaseimproved the been with has assets on-hand of isibility ecretary of ecretary D VIII T S M A he Atropine Autoinjectors willstillberequired, but inasmallerquantity. NAPP. T issouri. M T S (medical) portion of J of portion (medical) M he potency results are compared against a degradation curve, results aredegradation compareda against newpotency a he and potency helf Life Program has saved an average of $75.00 of medical chemical defense chemical medical of $75.00 of average an saved has Program Life helf he samples have an initial potency test performed, fo performed, test potency initial an have samples he S M edical oman Nerve PretreatmentNerve ( oman Pyridostigmine Agent ilitary,pre-treatmentagent for nerve a Janas 2003,in use the for M T arine arine Corps element deploys, and is returned to the centralized program upon M he use of use he Chloride Chloride requirof Autoinjectorsmay short fall T D dcl hmcl Biological, Chemical, edical D he Navy re-marks the materiel and maintains it with the unit.the with it maintains and Navy he materiel re-marksthe T efense Health Affairs and the and Health Affairs efense S A. he medical chemical defense production line is being maintained with an with maintained being is line productiondefense chemical medical he v­ tandardization Board ( Board tandardization DS a tion to the J ties and units worldwide.units and ties T CP) is working with he F he S NAPP will still require a complete audit trail, all the way to the to way the all trail, audit complete a require still will NAPP D A requests samples from the Joint the from samples requests A T R T reatment, Nerve Agent, Auto- injector (A T CAB and he F he A V T and the web-based the and D NAA will replace 2-PA i A no longer allows changes to expiration dates to dates expiration to changes allows longer no A cal resources developed the developedresources cal DMS M I S CN Pharm edical Asset ervices who ervices disseminate instructions to extend R e.g. B) manages the shelf-life extension program program extension shelf-life the manages B) T dooia, n Nuclear and adiological, M he same lots are subjected to yearly retest yearly to subjected are lots same he , ciprofloxacin, doxycycline) sufficient to sufficient ,ciprofloxacin,doxycycline) ilitary ilitary a ceut R M T DOD Class the epository,is which he materiel is issued from one of edical i cals to establish a requirements S M ervices to get materiel tested materiel get to ervices I e S n the area of biological agent ments.Convulsant Antidote G R Chloride Autoinjectors and NAPP) /F eadiness Clinical eadiness Advisory erman supplier.erman Currently l D lowed by a 90-day stress 90-day a bylowed D T epartments in response in epartments he complete label may label complete he A DOD S T helf Life Extension Life helf ablets (also knownablets(also D T /F efense NAA), is which M D T S A edical Asset oman,with he S M V M helf Life helf M isibility eridian eridian ateriel ateriel arines arines VIII

dioxide-oxygen exchange so no additional breathing apparatus is required.is apparatus breathing additional no so exchange dioxide-oxygen carbon required the allows still agent,but chemical a from providesprotection that –layer fivematerial special a of injuries,areathatmaythrough an have their still vaporhazard,a have to procured1991.been since not due suit or mask a wear to unable is who patient, a transport to used are Chemical which PatientWraps, potential danger. troops in—or serving identified to deploy to—the two high-threat areas where hostile anthrax-use poses the greatest agent. BW high-threat primary the Currently,U. the litter procured by the item.this of procurementnew initiating before wrap patient the for extended use and their use has been modified to a maximum of 3 hours.3 of maximum a to modified been has use their and use extended O ffice of the S urgeon T S he status and schedule oftheanthraxvaccinationhe status isprovided andschedule program inChapter 3ofthisreport. . total force (active and reserve forces) is being vaccinated against anthrax, which is considered is which anthrax, against vaccinated being is forces) reserve and (active force total . G S ervices and is no longer tracked asaCB andisnolongertracked ervices eneral and the U T he anthrax vaccination program is a three-phase program, starting with the with starting program, three-phase a is program vaccination anthrax he S A MM A with the Natick R N item. S oldier Center are currently assessing new material T he current stock of wraps has been tested for tested been has wraps of stock current he T T he decontaminable litter is now the only the now is litter decontaminable he he material is no longer produced.longer no is material he T he aremade Wraps T he H-37

ANNEX H H-38 ANNEX H Progr I x DOD e n n A T D T I defense-wide funding lines. Prior to FY1996, funding was included in severalseparate in included was FY1996,funding to lines. Prior funding defense-wide all which in year first the was 1996 year R wa biological those of exception the (with development, test and evaluation ( funds. ( T the amount of checks issued or other payments made (including advances to others), net of refunds and reimbursements. budgetrequest period. and Biological T funding lines. Budget FY2006–FY2013. t is to important note that funds appropriated for a given year may be expended incrementally over a period of years. i.e. hese budget submissions provide a detailed account of prior year accomplishments and planned activities for the for activities planned and accomplishments year prior of account detailed a provide submissions budget hese hus, expenditures shown in he term is frequentlyhe term used interchangeably with the term “outlays,” are which the measure of government spending providedis annex this in the in annually information funding Congress detailed to he esearch Projects esearch Agency,( efense-Wideexhibits,the budget in and ,payments liquidateto obligations repaymentthe than (other debt),of refundsof collections.)offsetting net and S Joi Table I-2 I ubmission. n accordance with 50 U 50 with accordance n a n m F m D efense Program (CB t t (and D Se un etailed funding request for FY 2006–2013 are provided separately in the President’sFY2008 the in separately provided are 2006–2013 FY for request funding etailed TableI-1 Figure I-2 rvi di D Table I-2 A ce n R PA) are consolidated into defense-wide program element (PE) funding lines.funding Fiscal (PE) element program PA)defense-wide into consolidated are g g (and RDT S ) provides a summary of expenditures by the C C 1522, C D Su P), President’s Budget he FigureI-1 will be updated in following years to show total expenditures of appropriated &E) and procurement for all mm S D ervice and ervice mi r epartment of epartment Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program Defense Biological and Chemical Defense of Department ae defense fare a cal ) provides) requestedand appropriated of from funding summary a r y D

an efense Agency CB defense programs were consolidated into wereconsolidated programs defense CB efense Agency D RDT efense Extract found in the Budget of the United the of Budget the in found Extract efense d Bio d S ubmission, E rgas odce b the by conducted programs &E DOD l ogi RDT chemical and chemical defense biological programs &E, DOD cal D efense-Wide and Procurement, CB DOD

S Defen D ervice and ervice P. Expenditures represent Joint D S efense Advanced efense ervice Chemical ervice D s e efense Agency

, research, , S tates. I -1 ANNEX I I ANNEX I -2

Table I-1. CB Defense Program Appropriations Summary

Program Element (PE) ($ in millions) FY06‡ FY07‡ FY08* FY09* FY10* FY11* FY12* FY13* 0601384BP – Basic Research 91.281 104.257 72.003 59.191 55.484 52.990 56.651 54.348 0602384BP – Applied Research 240.904 258.862 305.327 216.705 189.404 177.988 188.074 188.771 0603384BP – Advanced Tech. Dev. 227.204 235.760 232.302 388.487 313.810 203.549 193.416 184.822 Science & Technology Base Subtotal 559.389 598.879 609.632 664.383 558.698 434.527 438.141 427.941 0603884BP – Advanced Component Development and 127.371 80.407 57.160 42.467 170.556 184.559 185.620 209.767 Prototypes 0604384BP – System Development and Demonstration (SDD) 250.752 212.369 247.935 242.266 216.249 294.589 277.131 234.968 0605384BP – Management Support 100.510 82.521 99.053 100.889 114.164 116.006 120.932 123.180 0605502BP- Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) 6.579 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0607384BP – Operational Systems Development 9.671 7.008 7.716 10.359 12.707 14.841 15.376 14.050 Reimbursable Program Reimbursable Activity 0.123 1.165 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 RDT&E Subtotal 1047.693 981.184 1021.496 1060.364 1072.374 1044.522 1037.200 1009.906 0208384BP – Procurement Subtotal 713.351 516.909 548.753 540.685 552.575 552.927 585.649 637.743 CB Defense Program Total 1761.044 1498.093 1570.249 1601.049 1624.949 1597.449 1622.849 1647.649 ‡ Total Obligation Authority (TOA) * Estimated [from FY2008 President’s Budget Request]

Table I-2. CB Defense Program Expenditures Summary†

Program Element (PE) ($ millions) FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 RDT&E, Defense-Wide 338.682 382.288 398.055 584.170 620.572 677.226 609.413 420.850 15.383 Procurement, Defense-Wide 300.996 365.411 473.249 516.470 629.360 499.328 535.509 161.063 0.641 CB Defense Program Total 639.678 747.699 871.304 1100.64 1249.932 1176.554 1144.922 581.913 16.024 †Expenditures as of December 31, 2006 D Advanced †as of S ‡ FY06-FY07= cience and evelopment (Budget Activities 4through 7) ($ in millions)

D ($ in millions) $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ 1 1 1 1 1 ecember 31, 2006(includesreimbursable expenditures) $ $ $ $ 1 1 1 , , , , , $ $ $ $ 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 D , , , $ 2 4 6 8 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 T evelopment includes Advanced Component 0 0 0 0 0 $ 0 0 0 0 0 echnology Base includes Basic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 T A otal c F t u Y F a 0 Y O l 6 9 A ‡ bligational Authority (that is, *FY08-13=President’s actualappropriation) Budget p 9 p r o p r i Figure I-1.CBDefenseProgram AppropriationsSummary a F F t Y Figure I-2.CBDefenseProgram ExpendituresSummary Y i o 0 0 n 7 0 ‡ R esearch, Applied F Y F 0 Y 1 0 8 * P r e F s D Y i d 0 evelopment andPrototypes, e F 2 n R Y t ' esearch, and Advanced s 0 9 B * u d F g e Y t 0 R 3 e q F u Y e 1 s 0 t * ( F R Y e 0 q u 4 T e echnology s t e F SDD d Y 1 A 1 F p * Y , p M 0 r o 5 D anagement p r evelopment (Budget Activities 1 through 3) i a t i F o Y n F 1 ) Y 2 0 * 6 S upport, R equest (that is, requested appropriation) F F Y Y 1 S 0 B 3 7 * IR , and O R P S A P r D perational o r c d o T i c v e & c u a n u r E n c e r , e c e m D e m & d e e e n f T D n e t e , n t S e c D s ystems v h e e e n - l f o W o e p l n o i m d s g e e e y - n W B t a i d s e e I -3 ANNEX I I ANNEX I -4 J x S e n n A Progr involving agentsare fully liveorbiological protected andcarefully chemical monitored. unprotected human subjects to or chemical agents.biological All individuals involved in training or chemical or biological agents. T planned. is testing no and agents, chemical for 1975 since agents, biological with 1969 since testing such no been has there Table J-1 agents. has not conducted any experimentation since that time involving the exposure of human subjects to chemical warfare War T 28, 1975. Acting 1969. in ceased was agents warfare incapac with testing and neverwasdone warfareagents biological lethal with testing 1969.Human National warfare”in biological of methods other all weapons,and and agents tests and programs have been halted and disbanded. While requires thefollowing information: D T M under contract, involvewhich the use of human subjects for the testing of or agents.chemical biological example, t ests involving the exposure of human subjects to agents chemical began in the 1940s and continued following World he U requirement(50 reporting he efense Program was modified by modified was Program efense arch 1976. arch a D II t through the Cold War until the early 1970s. epartment is epartment in full compliance with the requirements of all laws regarding the use of human subjects involving DOD S e ecretary of Army Norman Augustine suspended testing of chemical compounds on human volunteers on July D m provides a summary of prior and planned tests conducted by the epartment of epartment Army, a conducted tests involving the tests of human subjects to chemical and biological agents in the past, all such en I n addition, there was extensive congressional testimony on this subject during 1975 and 1976.and 1975 during subject this on testimony congressional extensivewas addition, there n ms ms testing onthat subject. the advanceof in subject human each from obtained was testing the to consent informed that ofthe explanation purposes of the testing, adetailed the chemical or testing, biological agents tested, the and for the Secretary’s justification certification detailed a with together report, the bycovered period the during Defense of Department the by out carried was that subjects human agentson chemical or biological programanyof of testing involving the description A t t In Re vo g a DOD l rdi vi I nspector S C 1523) for the annual report to Congress on the on Congress to report annual the for 1523) C n is involved in no experimentation or any other efforts that involve the exposure of S T ection 1086 of the FY98 National FY98 the of 1086 ection n he last human testing of chemical warfare agents occurred on July 25, 1975.25, July on occurred agents warfare chemical of testing human last he g H g g C g G eneral u he m R S an T uch uch testing has been document and reported to Congress. mi eport, he United

cal Subjec D A IG S

an tates formally renounced the “use of lethal biological - I N 21-75, d Bio d ts D efense Authorization Act. D Use of Volunteers in Chemical Agent Research epartment of epartment S l ecurity ecurity ogi DOD D cal ecision 35, November 25,November35, ecision D Chemical and Biological Biological and Chemical efense, both directly and

Defen RDT i T tating biological biological tating he amendment he &E activities I n summary, s S e ee for DOD

,

J-1 ANNEX J J-2 ANNEX J S D and requirements. and potential healthhazard, the a presents testing in used simulant a that determined is it future the in point some at if recorded,and carefully are associated with the simulant, (b) all arepersonnel provided with appropriate protective equipment, and (c) all names absorption). For all involvedpersonnel in testing with simulants, (a) all arepersonnel of informed any hazards, if any, environment. contaminated biological or S chemical a in operations of realism the enhance to used sometimes are As part of some training and involvingprograms humansubjectsinvolves agents. orbiological the exposure ofthese subjectstochemical test and evaluate the safety, immunogenicity, and other effects of medical products (drugs, vaccines, therapies, M agents. orbiological human subjectstochemical environment.biological However, no research, development, test or evaluation involves the exposure of unprotected the of part As Federal Policy for the Protection of Human of Protection the for Policy Federal the “Common with compliance full in is trials these in subjects consent.human providedof informed use All protect against and agents.chemical biological decontamination equipment and systems.and decontaminationequipment Chem U. eval and test development,research, the in agents biological and chemical of Acquisition Since 1969/1975 July 28, 1975 November 25, 1969 tudies in Human Ethically Cannot be Conducted” be Cannot Ethically Human in tudies imulants are not or chemical agents,biological but may simulate some of their (e.g.,properties size, particle surface emonstrate Efficacy of New edical chemical and biological defense programs involve the use of human subjects in controlled clinical trials to trials clinical controlled in subjects human of use involvethe programs defense biological and chemical edical S Table J-1.SummaryofExperimentsandStudieswithHumanSubjectsInvolvingtheUse . forces to operate in protective equipment and to operate detection and decontamination systems in a chemical or R egulations (FA DOD T Chemical and Biological Biological and Chemical he F he D A has a proposed rule “New rule proposed a has A RDT R D ), epartment notifies the personnel of potential risks totheirhealth. ofpotentialrisks notifiesthepersonnel epartment D DOD rugs rugs for Use Against Lethal or Permanently &E activities sponsored by the agents have occurred since testing ended No activities with human subjects involving exposure to biological agents nor chemical Human chemical agent testing ended Human biological agent testing ended

D Chemical orBiologicalAgents irectives and S T D ubjects, Food and Food ubjects, he use of human subjects in these involvestrials volunteers who have i efense Program (CB Program efense cal and bi and cal I nstru O ctober 5, 1999. No medical chemical or biological defense biological or chemical medical No 1999. 5, ctober D o c rug and Biological Biological and rug tions, and logical agents are also used in small quantities in training in quantities small in used arealso agents logical DOD D CB rug Administr rug D all D P), P and by the other applicable laws, regulations, issuances, DOD D isabling D u requires the use of small quantities small of use the requires ation of detection, protection, and protection, detection, of ation rug Products; Evidence needed to needed Evidence Products; rug a tion (F tion M T oxic ilitary ilitary S D ubstances When Efficacy D A) regulations, Federal regulations, A) epartments, simulants etc. R ule,” ) to DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CWC CWC THE OF IMPLEMENTATION DEFENSE OF DEPARTMENT INTRODUCTION K x S e n n A W support on a non-interference, cost reimbursable basis.non-interference,reimbursableU. a cost on support inspections. industry chemical for agency lead the is U. at inspections CWC I Emergency and in the of organ making policy highest the I O compliance personnel. ( T facilities. I effective implementation oftheCWC. United extension requests to 2012 submitted by five of the six chemical weapons possessor industry associations were in attendance. Primary chemical to the agenda and was organizations the approvalnon-governmental sevenof the and chemical organizations,weapons destruction international eight least at states, member into force on April 29, 1997. As of January 1, 2007 there T are 181 Programs, to implement the CWC. equipment inspectionsundera and technical Entry responsibilities. CW storage, production and former BW DOD M at monitoring non-continuous and continuous n 2006, six countries ratified or acceded to the CWC.the to acceded or ratified 2006,countries n six n addition to supporting inspections at inspections supporting to addition n n 2006, TS t hreat he Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was openedfor signature onJanuary 13, 1993. PCW conducted eight chemical industry inspections in 2006.in inspections industry chemical eight conducted PCW ission- T a eap ). he Hague from 5 to 8 T t reaty T conducts a Chemical a conducts Weapons Agreements he R S u S DOD tates and eduction Agency ( Agency eduction T upport upport o O s o s he Army (the Army he M PCW is charged with overseeing worldwide implementation of the CWC.the of worldwideimplementation overseeing with charged is PCW n anager, the Acting Assistant to the hosted 96 inspections and visits at chemical weapons (CW) storage, former production, and destruction s Co s DTR f R T esponse (HAZW esponse

R raining ( DOD ussian Federation.ussian of decisionswerenumber A by made conferencethis ensure to thecontinued, A will maintain responsibility for expedited customs and immigration processing at the Point of DTR n S . chemical industry sites pursuant to a to pursuant sites industry chemical . D S T v ervice most directly affected by CWC implementation activities) and activities) implementation CWC by affected directly most ervice ecember 2006. E reaty Escort DTR A insures all escorts are trained andreadyA insures toreceive allescorts en ff A) continue to host and escort inspectors from the from inspectors escort and host to continue A) tio orts to O T hrough regularly recurring meetings, representatives of S PE chedule 1 facilities.chedule O R T DOD n raining, Hazardous )) to United to )) rganization for the Prohibition of Chemical of WeaponsProhibition the ( for rganization D elegates from the 122 of the 181 member states, four noteworthy non- facilities, S DOD ecretary of I mplementation Working I MO m CW destruction facilities and systematic inspections at inspections systematic and facilities destruction CW S ple A with T DTR tates DTR he eleventh session of the Conference of the of Conference the eleventhof he session DTR S D . chemical industry inspections began in began inspections industry .chemical M A supported supported A efense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological G A assisted the assisted A m S aterials aterials (HAZ DO A provides CWC overnment (U overnment tates Parties to the CWC, including the United D en uring 2006, uring M C. emorandum of Agreement ( Agreement of emorandum t t t DO he G D M roup (CW roup SG epartment of Commerce ( Commerce of epartment A DO C with training, escort, and logistic logistic and escort, training, with C T C ) National Escorts and other treaty other and Escorts National ) O O ), and Hazardous Waste C assumed all escort and logistics logistics and escort all assumed C S rientation rientation PCW he tates Parties, which included the O I TS mi W PCW TS inspectors conduct both conduct inspectors G T

OSD I cal T nspection he Convention entered ), chaired by the CW/ the by ), chaired raining and associated T echnical echnical O , the Joint MO PCW), convenedPCW), DOD

M A). S T ay2000. tates Parties,tates eams. DO O S ’s T ecretariat perations he S D D C) with C) taff, the S efense efense DOD DO tates. T he C

K-1

ANNEX K K-2 ANNEX K PREPARATION OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS DEFENSE OF PREPARATION INSPECTORS ORIENTATION FOR SAFETY Joint the CWC. Formal meetings of the CW destruction effort, and the environment.the and effort, destruction U. all T the CW the of support in requirements specific address protecting security concerns.protecting security affected commands take timely and appropriate measures, based on lessons learned, to demonstrate compliance while All of the treaty implementation andcompliancemeetings. S CWC, and many arewhich subject to inspections challenge even though not declarable, have been visited by inspections under the CWC. All defense installations arewhich subject to declarations under the requirements of the T under theCWC.inspections for prepared fully are elements military all that ensure to commands major their with liaison ongoing the at actively participate which offices, support for their commands and activities under the CWC. T attending required trainingat U. are being accomplished by the Army in T attended inspectors the 48-hour assigned currently equipment.protective163 Approximately required only for designatedthose inspectors by the is an 8-hour Ammunition atbasis U. mustmoreshort-term presentwho a than be on O required to attend a 32-hour safety orientation, which is broken down into two sections and is presented by the Army. All CWC provisions. CW/BW M for developing an exercise also produces a comprehensive Lessons Learned report to ensure inspections. possiblechallenge to report Learned Lessons comprehensive a produces also exercise an developing for inspection. challenge a during assume would they and procedures to test the operational readiness of personnel and facilities.and Commonly,personnel of readiness operational the test proceduresto lead and the S ervice representatives and ervice uch exercises involve the active participation of involveexercises activeparticipation the uch raining Facility in Edgewood, eAm i te xctv aet o te Chemical the for agent executive the is Army he he he ne section is a 24-hour health and safety orientation (H orientation safety and health 24-hour a is section ne ilitary ilitary O O M M S PCW inspectors who conduct continuous monitoring at U.at monitoring continuous conduct who inspectors PCW PCW in S ilitary ilitary taff,the . chemical warfare material while ensuring maximum protection of the public, personnel involved in the in involved personnel public, the of protection maximum ensuring while material warfare chemical . ilitary ilitary S M T ervices, and ervices, reaty ilitary ilitary S ervices ervices and S T M rie cniu t codnt atvl with actively coordinate to continue ervices he Hague, M ilitary ilitary S anager, was established within ervices ervices have held exercises to test their preparedness for short-notice CWC challenge inspections. DOD S ervices, and ervices, S DTR T afety Course. A 48-hour demilitarization protective ensemble ( he Netherlands. DTR agencies and activities coordinate planning efforts to ensure proper implementation of implementation proper ensure to efforts planning coordinate activities and agencies T M A have developed individual implementation and compliance plans to provide guidance he S D aryland aryland or in A technical experts. technical A . facilities. PE class in 2006. S ervices have initiated efforts to ensure that in the case of a challenge inspection, challenge a of case the ensurethatin haveto initiatedefforts ervices DTR T I W he Hague. T G A provide technical experts to support activity at the U.the at activity support to experts providetechnical A he Army works through works he Army are scheduled quarterly and meetings small aregroup quarterly are held as scheduled needed to DTR T he Hague. Annual 8-hour H DOD S A ensures that all inspectors receiveA ensures that allinspectors required training. T DTR ervice, DOD T he DOD O I W he orientations he areorientations conducted at the Chemical DTR D PCW M to address, as needed, CWC compliance concerns. A provides U G mltrzto Porm hc hs h msin o destroy to mission the has which Program emilitarization ilitary ilitary CW . Compliance A and the and SO OSD A will continue to support site assistance visits and visits assistance site Army support to continue will A S TS . chemical demilitarization facilities. .demilitarization chemical ) course, which is a U a is course,which ) I O OSD W , , whose responsibilities would include the use of such S DTR ervices ervices have individually established implementation PCW G S provide , . chemical weapons demilitarization facilities are facilities demilitarization weapons chemical . S and OSD ervices have exercised written written exercised have ervices SG A, and other A,and TS national for escorts inspectors attended H attended inspectors to ensure this program is compliant with compliant is program this ensure to R DTR SO eview S refresher courses are also required and rie oiy ieto, n conduct and direction, policy ervice t prepare to A G DOD SG roup (C roup requirement of all personnel personnel all of requirement representatives in the roles representativesthe in D PE) procedures is course RG O DOD PCW inspectors while ), also chaired by the by chaired ),also DOD SO S T ervice responsible ervice he second section second he ntlain for installations D training and 14 and training S DOD . emilitarization emilitarization readiness for readiness D elegation to elegation guidance OSD M ilitary ilitary , the ARTICLE X ASSISTANCE AND OTHER ASSISTANCE ASSISTANCE OTHER AND ASSISTANCE X ARTICLE PROGRAM INSPECTION EQUIPMENT TECHNICAL PROGRAM READINESS INSPECTION TREATY DEFENSE R other to weapons chemical of destruction storage,and transportation, CWC, the Under U CWC,the of United the G CWC,a the of X Under Article Convention of the by authorized process familiarization a through requirements security and environmental T conferences.and security S vulnerability assessment teams in of support any requirement to assess risks to critical national security assets, United depots. chemical its to training tailored with educational products (electronic and print media). facility and countermeasures, security CWC, the preparation to both government and about government contractors. information provide to program outreach extensive an T demonstrate compliance withtheChemical Weapons Convention. R I monitoring is conducted to protectto conducted is U. both monitoring inbound of monitoring the which by processes improvethe and agreement, Country Host the guidance,exercise compliance pre-existing contaminantsonthe T n coordination with the Force,with Air coordination n tates industry and research institutions. Program personnel also participated and presented briefings at controlarms he he E ussia and Albania under AF eneral of the SG S I verifies and confirms confirms and verifies tates Parties. Familiarization results are documented in the U. the in documented are results Familiarization Parties. tates D T deemsare necessary, tothoseCWC M echnical Equipment echnical efense ildenhall, UK, as the site.challenged O T reaty TS rganization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weaponsof Prohibition the for rganization . I n accordance with a condition established in the U. DOD I nspection O a nt rvdd n ceia waos eeto eupet r sitne n h safe the in assistance or equipment detection weapons chemical any provided not has S PCW equipment for all for equipment PCW DOD tates will provide “no assistance…other than medical antidotes and treatment,”and antidotes providemedical will tatesthan assistance…other the “no which I O nspection ( nspection PCW equipment entering and exiting the United the exiting and entering equipment PCW R ’s Cooperative eadiness Program ( S O tate Party to the treaty may make an appeal for assistance through the through assistance for appeal an make may treaty the to Party tate PCW verification equipment. DOD T E I sponsored a seven day mock challenge inspection exercise in 2006,using in exercise inspection challenge mock sevenday a sponsored S ) Program ensures Program ) tates Parties thattates have Parties requested assistanceunder XoftheCWC.Article S DOD .and T T he hreat ’s overall objective was to practice using existing and revised CWC O T O DTIR DTIR he program also provided the Army’s Chemical PCW inspection teams atPointteams the inspection PCW Entry.of PCW personnel and to preventto and personnel PCW inaccurateresult a as findings of R eduction (C P has provided, and will continue to provide, arms control provide, arms to continue will provided,and has P P), for which O I n 2006, PCW TR S S T . . “Certification “Certification . DTR ) program. echnical echnical TS S DTIR S enate’s Advise and Consent to the tates Parties, except that being providedto being that except Parties,tates verification equipment meets U. meets equipment verification A is the executive agent, has implemented P distributed arms controlP distributed arms and security S S ecretariat Equipment.”ecretariat tates and performs chemical agent chemical performs and tates R eport of Chemical Weapons of eport O T PCW Conference PCW he chemical agent chemical he M aterials aterials Agency DOD I R n addition, n atification D S . safety,. irector- would K-3

ANNEX K K-4 ANNEX K D T L x Co e n n A Implemented by Public Law 103-160, The FY94National Defense Authorization Act Title 50oftheU.S. Code, Sec. 1523. defense warfare onchemicalandbiological Annual report ext efense n (5)Measurestaken toimproveoverallmanagementand coordination of simulationsinwar games,battlesimulations,andtraining exercises. takentoinclude realisticnuclear,biological,andchemical warfare defensetraining andreadinessamongtheArmedForces measuresbeing (4)Thestatusofnuclear,biological, andchemical(NBC)warfare Forces. chemicalandbiologicaldefenseequipment andmaterialamongtheArmed (3)Measurestakentoensurethe integration ofrequirementsfor requirements. oftheDepartmentDefenseand industrialbasetomeetthose equipmentandmedicaltreatment,including anassessmentoftheability programs,forrequiredimprovements inchemicalandbiologicaldefense (2)Thestatusofresearchanddevelopment programs,andacquisition protectiveitems. requirementsforsupportoftheArmedForces,includingindividual chemicalandbiologicaldefenseequipmenttomeetwartimepeacetime (1)Thequantities,characteristics,andcapabilitiesoffielded Thereportshallincludeinformationonthefollowing: (b) Matterstobeincluded resultingfromuseofchemicalorbiologicalweapons. equipment,formedicalprophylaxis,andtreatmentofcasualties program,includingrequirementsfortraining,detection,andprotective (2)requirementsforthechemicalandbiologicalwarfaredefense tobetakenimprovesuchreadiness;and biologicalwarfareenvironmentandshalldescribestepstakenplanned (1)theoverallreadinessofArmedForcestofightinachemical- biological warfaredefense.Thereportshallassess-- Secretary undersection113(c)oftitle10,areportonchemicaland TheSecretaryofDefenseshallincludeintheannualreport (a) Reportrequired

of gr P C e ublic ssio hemical nal L aw

M and Rep andating B orti iological n g g R Requ eport D efense

ir on e m T en P he rogram D t:U 50 epartment S C 1523 C

of

L-1

ANNEX L L-2 ANNEX L coordinationandsupport. (B)themeansbywhichDepartmentdetermineslevelofsuch requirementsof,theoverallprogramofDepartmentDefense;and coordinatedandintegratedwith,supportstheobjectives (A)anassessmentofthedegreetowhichDARPAprogramis warfaredefense,including— overallprogramoftheDepartmentDefenseonchemicalandbiological warfaredefensetechnologiesandsystemsundersection1701(c)(2)withthe researchandadvancedtechnologydevelopmentonchemicalbiological theDefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency(DARPA)onbasicandapplied (10)Adescriptionofthecoordinationandintegrationprogram humansubjectinadvanceofthetestingonthatsubject. certificationthatinformedconsenttothetestingwasobtainedfromeach thetesting,chemicalorbiologicalagentstested,andSecretary’s justificationforthetesting,adetailedexplanationofpurposes Defenseduringtheperiodcoveredbyreport,togetherwithadetailed chemicalagentsonhumansubjectsthatwascarriedoutbytheDepartmentof (9)Adescriptionofanyprograminvolvingthetestingbiologicalor chemicalweaponsinothersignatorynationstotheconvention. assistanceinthesafetransportation,storage,anddestructionof ReadinessProgram,provisionofchemicalweaponsdetectionequipment,and inspectionsundertheconventionusingDefenseTreatyInspection trainingforinspectors,preparationofdefenseinstallations theimplementationofconvention,includingactivitiessuchas DefenseandtheOn-SiteInspectionAgencytoprepareforassistin (8)AsummaryofotherpreparationsundertakenbytheDepartment Convention. addressneedswhichmayariseunderarticleXoftheChemicalWeapons havebeenandarebeingundertakenbytheDepartmentofDefenseto (7)Adescriptionofthechemicalwarfaredefensepreparationsthat required. problemsforwhichadditionalresourcesoractionsbytheCongressare defenseprogramduringthepastyearandrecommendedsolutionstothose (6)Problemsencounteredinthechemicalandbiologicalwarfare thechemicalandbiologicaldefenseprogram. M x A e n n A ACP ACPLA – PerAgent Containing Particle Literof Air Prototypes AC M ACC ACAT − Acquisition Category ACADA − Automatic Chemical Agent Detector Alarm ACAA – Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm ACC – Air Combat Command AC − Active Component AB ABDU − Aviation Battle Dress Utilities AA AA AAP – Advanced Air Parification (model) AAE – Army Acquisition Executive AAA Accreditation ofLaboratory Animal Care AAALAC – Association for Assessment and 3- anddiverseCBdefenseactivities.to thevarious Note: c edical Education D V D S R –three-dimensional ro – Advanced Anticonvulsant M V – Assault Breacher M –afteractionreview &P – Advanced Component – Advanced Amphibious Assault T – Aircrew Protective E – Accreditation CouncilforContinuing he acronyms and abbreviations in this annex reflect an extensive, though not exhaustive, related list of terms ny ms ms an V ehicle d d A A M ask bb S D ystem evelopment & r e V ehicle vi a tio T he acronyms mighthave different meaningsinothercontexts. n s AEF AE – Aeronautical Evaluation AC AF AF AF AF Center AF AF AF AF AF AFI − Air Force Instruction AF AFCE AFB − Air Force Base AF – Air Force AE AE AEP AEL – Allowance EquipageList A D T S RRI R OT M I IO I DD T R TD C – Agile P – ForcesArmed A – Air Force – Alternative Footwear R S H – Air Force L – Air Force C – Air Education and P – Aircrew Eye/ AN – Air Force – Army Electronic Product H – Air Force P – First Army Engineering S EC – Air Force – Air Force – Advanced Concept – ForcesArmed A – Air Force CivilEngineer D evelopment Center I R T nspection Agency D I heater Hospital esearch Laboratory esearch nstitute of octrine octrine M O I R nstitute ofPathology anual espiratory Protection perational R adiobiology T T S raining D echnology echnology olutions ocument O ccupational Health S R T upport est &Evaluation esponder Program S upport upport Agency R esearch esearch D emonstration I nstitute M -1 ANNEX M M ANNEX M -2 A AP AP APC − Personnel Carrier Armored APB APB – Baseline Acquisition Program AP – Allied Publications A meter AN/ meter AN/U AN ANC Chemical ANBAC A A A A S A A Command A A A A AL AL AL I A A AF ndividual chool OR R M M MS MS M M M M M M IT ID TT S OD S S O N G WC – Air WC – Air E E C –U. AL – Authorized A A – American – Aeromedical – Army Prepositioned A – Air, Land, and – Analytical Laboratory E I VDR NY – Associated AA – Army – Acton Lightweight G – Advance for Planning Briefing – Area of DD DD O – Air National D T P – Air Force tactics, andprocedures techniques DR – Port of Aerial – Army National – Aircraft C – Advanced NC – Automatic IS C& – Army – Automated and NuclearBiological -2 –Portable dose-rate gamma/betaradiation I T -13 –Compact, wholebody radiation digital S nformation nformation raining . Army S – Army M M R obility Warfare Center obility Warfare Center M esponsibility M I M nterior nterior ateriel ateriel M I edical edical Association solation G M M ateriel Commandor ateriel Air M M uard S ustard Agent S edical Allowance List D ystem edical ea Applications edical G O ebarkation S D D uard O ystems Analysis Activity Course S epartment etector T tock verboot S eam or Advanced ystem S D chools ofNY chools epartment Centerand epartment D etector I ndustry M obility A A A A A Evaluation and A A S A Homeland A Affairs A A Acquisition, Logistics, & A A A AVA −anthraxvaccine adsorbed AU AU – Air University aTSP −active Topical SkinProtectant A Nuclear andChemicalBiological A A ATS − Automatic Transfer Switch A S A Autoinjector ATNAA − Antidote Treatment Nerve Agent A A A pecial ystem VI V TG T TG T TD T TSO TSD TSD TR TRRS S SD SD SD S S S S RS F – Active C – Active B AP – Advanced A(AL H – Air EC – Army C – Applied / S P – Anthrax R D –acuteradiation syndrome A – Association oftheU. v6 – Atmosphere ( (H (HA) – Assistant L – Acquisition, –afloat traininggroup – Advanced SO E (NCB) – Assistant tothe – Assistant tothe – Ability to P – Amalgam M D – Army O T /L ) – Assistant – Armed perations andLow- ) – Assistant T D I ransportable Hospital ransportable C) – Assistant efense S S T tandoff Facility tandoff Facility M T est andEvaluation Command T V echnology Center echnology raining T anagement accine echnology echnology S S S ituational Awareness Program V urvive and urvive ervices Biomedical ervices T irgo/ S S T echnology, andLogistics S ecretary of ecretary ecretary of ransport of ransport ecretary ofthe Army for I S T R mmunization Program ecretary of echnology equirements & S D ecretary of etermined Promise etermined I D S ntensity Conflict . Army S O emonstration ecretary of perate D D R efense forHealth efense for adiation D D efense D efense Programs R efense for esearch esearch R esources D V efense for ersion 6 ersion emulsion madefrom water, soybean oil, B BoN B BNC B BoN B BW – biological warfareBW –biological overboot B BU BuChE –butyrylcholinesterase BLA BL –BiosafetyLevel Bio- B B BE Core Course BECC –BasicEngineering B detergent, andthesolvent phosphate trin-butyl BC analysis BCA –BaselineCapability Assessment orbusiness case BA BA BAA –Broad Agency Announcement B. mallei B. anthracis B B B B SM S OI O VO IDS G D D DT DRD DO L-4 –BiosafetyLevel 4 S T IS T A M detector( –biological U –Battledress Uniform A –basisofallocation –BudgetEstimate –basisofissue O – Biodosimetry –Biodosimetry Assessment T T P –Battle Command –Business F – Biological F –Biological D / –Battlefield Anti- O − – Biological –Biological –Battledress E /A –BotulinumNeurotoxin A –BotulinumNeurotoxin P GVO Biologics Licensing Biologics Application –Blue – Biological –Biological D C –BasicNon-Commissioned T – –Bureau of – Biological –Biological Burkholderia mallei Burkholderia – – black vinyl –black overboot/green vinyl Bacillus anthracis G rass Army S ystem I ntegrated ntegrated D O D efense vergarment M etection O I S edicine and M ntrusion ntrusion perational Planning ubmission T also, odernization D B raining Center, oran T (glanders) epot (anthrax) ask Force D R biological defense) biological etection esearch esearch T D ool etection S urgery O S fficer Course T D ystem riton X100 riton epartment S T ystem eam CA CA/ CAA –Chemical Agent Alarm CA –commodityarea intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance C4 and intelligence C4 C3 –command, control, &communications C2PC –CommandandControl Personal Computer C2 –commandandcontrol BW BW BWA –Biological Warfare Agent CB S CBC CBAW CBA CBA –Capabilities-Based Assessment (also, and biological CB –chemical C/B) CA Cat CA R CA D CA CAP CANA –Convulsant Antidote Nerve Agent autoinjector CA CAE –Command Assessment Element CaE –carboxylesterase urvivability esponse ebarkation ISR I D TS TO DTS SR S M O –command, control, communication, computer, D D P T D DS S – chemical and biological defense andbiological –chemical –Chemical Agent x –catalytic oxidation C – Biological C –Biological Warfare –Biological Warfare –Consequence Assessment OD – Chemical and Biological Contamination –ChemicalandBiological – Chemical Biological –ChemicalBiological Advisory A X –catylitic oxidation –command, control, communication, computer, –Chemical Activity/ M –Chemical Agent Point R –Contamination Avoidance – Chemical Biological –ChemicalBiological Agent Water – Commander and –Contamination Avoidance at M C onitor D D D efense S epot taff etection Course D T R etection ool adiological adiological Accident D T etector S eam et S ea Ports of S ystem M T est onitor S uite M -3 ANNEX M M ANNEX M -4 CB CB M CB M CBW-CFX –CB Warfare Computational FluidEffects CBWA warfare andbiological agent –chemical warfarebiological orCBweapon warfare and biological orcounter CBW –chemical C–BW –CounterBiological Warfare Umbrella CBU –ChemicalandBiological CbtW C/B- and high-yieldexplosives CB Nuclear CB Nuclear CB Nuclear Countermeasures CB CB CB Protected Chemical Biological CBP CBP CB CB CB D CB Fund CB Center CB CB CB ecision emorandum ofUnderstanding anagement R R RMO R R R RD R R MS MS IR DI I D D I AC –ChemicalandBiological B S R NC –Chemical, Biological, N –chemical, biological, radiological, andnuclear NE –chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, N N - –chemical, biological, andradiological P – Chemical and Biological P –ChemicalandBiological E –CBdefenseequipment RRT F – Chemical Biological F –ChemicalBiological D – Chemical Biological Protective –ChemicalBiological F – Chemical and Biological F –ChemicalandBiological DST – Chemical and Biological Portable –ChemicalandBiological MD – Chemical Biological –ChemicalBiological –ChemicalBiological D D T –chemical, defense biological, andradiological A P –Chemical, Biological, –Chemical, Biological, D D U –Chemical, Biological, and S VMS – Chemical/Biological –Chemical/Biological –combating weapons of massdestruction efense Program efense – Chemical Biological –ChemicalBiological upport upport S –CB ystem T ool RD

T otal Asset M M I ncident S edical ass helter R R I D R D ndustrial Base ndustrial I R adiological, and adiological, and V S nformation nformation Analysis efense Program apid adiological, and efense pectrometer isibility S R ystems R S esponse Force R helter or adiological adiological esponse R I nitiative adar T eam CE CEN CE CEE CE –CivilEngineer Army Chemical C C Concept C warfareC–CW –counterchemical CC Ccr R C-CB CCA CCA –Contamination Control Area CJC C C R CHE ChE –cholinesterase T CHA M CHA c c c CF CF CF CF C-EW –CounterHigh-Yield Explosive G GM G ransportable Hospital ransportable adiological, Nuclear, andHigh-Yield Explosive isk Assessment DT D D I I anagement Plant L – Critical L –Critical A –Central y –centi LP –current S R M D SM M T - for C –Centers M –Consolidated S ROM S –CodeofFederal –Computational Fluid TT T MR F –CombinedChemical T P – current P –current –cubicfeetperminute F –Chemical M P –Comprehensive Emergency – Chairman oftheJoint Chiefsof –Chairman –halfmustard (2-chloroethyl ethylsulfide) R – cell-cycle regulated –cell-cycle methyltransferase –ChemicalEnvironment C H –Chemically/Biologically Hardened Air NE –CounterChemical, Biological, P –Chemically/Biologically Hardened Air – Critical Cave –Critical Air OM A D –Compact T evelopment Conference G –ChemicalHazardEstimation –CentralCommand ray I I tem List ntelligence Agency S G T G chool) ool ood LaboratoryPractices ood D D S efense torage Facilities isease Control and Prevention or D M R isk - egulations anufacturing Practices anufacturing T T D raining Facility (at theU. ransport ransport R T ynamic(s) ead est Facility S urvivability urvivability O nly M T eam anagement Plan S M taff emory M ethod M ask S . S CP- CP Counter-proliferation Program CP CP Expeditionary M CPE CPE –Collective Protection Equipment CPFH –Collectively Protected FieldHospital M CP CPC –U command post, orcounterproliferation) protectiveCP –chemical (also, collective protection, C C C C Co C C C C C-NW –CounterNuclear Warfare CN CN Education Nursing CNE –CenterforNaval orContinuing Engineering CNAF –CommanderNaval Air Forces C countermeasures C CL C ystem OTS O O O O O O O M M I edical edical C M S R O D S S I P –commonoperational picture NU N LP E –ConceptsofEmployment C C –Combat E –Continuing –Consequence SSS SI –Collective Protection support –contractorlogistics C –CommanderNavy M – Central Nervous –CentralNervous C – Counterproliferation C –Counterproliferation EP –ChemicalProtective –Consequence OM O – Chairman oftheJoint Chiefof –Chairman –commercialoff-the-shelf RO E S –Collective Protection for P M DS S S –continentalUnited S S –Combatant Commander upport orCollectivelyupport Protectived ystem E –Collective Protection –conceptofoperations AF Counterproliferation Center AF Counterproliferation –Collective Protection forExpeditionary DS –Chemically Protected M O edical perations Center M M M edical Education anagement, management, crisis or S anagement upport S ystem I nstallation Command O S ystem S vergarment R tates R eview Councilor eview Committee S mall D S taff eployable S helter I nstruction C C C C C- C C C Agreement C CPX –CommandPost Exercise CPU –ChemicalProtective Undergarment Facility CPE Evaluation CP- D CY –calendaryear CWNA I CW KA CW CWC –Chemical Weapons Convention CWA warfare –chemical agent warfareCW –chemical CU CU C Program C D D mplementation Working 2PC – V T SS S S R RG R R TR AB – AE –defenseacquisitionexecutive R FE –Centerfor F –consolidated storagefacility E C –Combat P – Critical P –Critical E A S GV GR W –Counter TR C –Civil I DD M -1A) I ST –Cooperative W D –Compliance P –Central F –Chemically Protected Expeditional A –Cooperative –CB -CB E –Collective Protection D VSIM –Casualtyand G – Chemical Warfare D efense Acquisition Board –Chemical Weapons Agreements ynamic R R –Chemical Warfare Naval S N Unmanned N Unmanned upport upport R V eagents Program T ehicle Crewmen T R est andEvaluation wo PhaseCommitment S adiological adiological Warfare T R eabees andFacilities Engineering hreat eview S R kills Course R equirements Estimation esearch and esearch G D R roup G G G D eduction round roup round irectional T echnology echnology R V I D nvestment ehicle econnaissance evelopment S D imulation etector (AN/ R M eadiness edical T ool M -5 ANNEX M M ANNEX M -6 DMS DMRTI DM D D D D D D D D D D D DDG DD D M D D D D D D D D ona Attack D G D D D D D D AWN – A A A AP – A eneral- LA – HH H FU – FP – E ep EP E EA EA – C C- C evelopment and C evelopment C CA – C – efense (Force HealthProtection and anagement R D SG SD R IG T O S C – AFB – S OSIMS M – F – R PA – – E – B – ec – S –defensecoordinating officer D D – D -HCF – /FHP& E –delayed effectsofacuteradiation exposure – E D D D D D D D & – D – D D ental Corps G DS D D D eployable Force Packages D D econtaminating Apparatus Portable D ofHomeland epartment efense Logistics efense Logistics Agency ata Exchange ata Exchange Agreement ef – ry FilterUnit ry iesel Engine iesel Engine amage Control Assistant efense uided D D D epartment ofthe epartment Army D efense Emergency efense Emergency I irectorate ofHealthCare D efensive Chemical efense epartment ofHealthandHuman epartment – – – V eposition and Weathering ofaChemical eputy CommandantforCombat efense efense Advanced avis- essel S D D R D D D ystem – eployable eputy eputy CommandantforCombat amage Control- M epartment ofthe epartment Army D M M D issile I istribution Center istribution ntegration M onthan AFB edical eputy Assistant edical S D ecretary of D riven estroyer M S tandardization Board R edical eadiness T R R esting Equipment esearch Projects esearch Agency esponse Fund O perating I S S D nspector ecurity ystems S O efense ecretary of ecretary T perations R raining eadiness) S urgeon S pace G S ervices eneral I nstitute I tems DOTM D andeducation,leadership personnel, andfacilities DOT D DO DO DODIG DODI DOD DO D D DMSS shortages material D DS DS Assistance DS DS DS DRMS DRMO DRID DRI DR DR DRO D Proving D D Evaluation DMSMS (PA&E) – o NW acid NA –deoxyribonucleic s P P PE – R CP – CA – /A 2 – – S S G F –dosereduction factor E N – E – C – – – NA –double standard C – S – &E – C – D – T – – S - – – D D D A – D – LPF –doctrine, organization, training, materiel, iplomatic – D D D D – G D D – diminishing manufacturing sourcesand –diminishingmanufacturing D efense D D D epartment of epartment econtamination D D emilitarization Protectiveemilitarization Ensemble D efense Planning efense D epartment ofEnergy epartment D epartment ofCommerce epartment rounds) epartment ofNavy epartment of epartment D efense efense efense isaster Preparedness efense D epartment of epartment D efense D efense efense Nuclear Weapons efense D epartment of epartment irector, iplomatic irector, Program Assessment and R M eform eform R R S S S R R upply Center, Philadelphia ecurity edical upport toCivilian upport Authorities R eform eform Establishment esearch eutilization and esearch and esearch eutilization and O S perational S tate D I ecurity/Antiterrorism ecurity/Antiterrorism D nitiative S S G efense I olution 2 urveillance urveillance D efense nitiative R uidance (also, efense NA S D pecialist Course T I nstruction evelopment Center est andEvaluation I D M nspector M S irective chool S arketing arketing ystem S D uffield ugway G S eneral O ervice ffice EF EquineEncephalomyelitisEEE –Eastern E EC ECU –Environmental Control Unit EC assayECLA –electrochemilluminescense ECL –electrochemilluminescense ECBC –Edgewood Center Chemical& Biological EB EAU –Equipment Assessment Units E2C2 –Expendable EquipmentCombat Consumption DV T DV D D DTT DTS DTR Analysis Center DTRI Chemical andBiological DTR DTR DT DT DTO DTIR DTI DT DT raining andExercise Program D U U –depleteduranium V O A V T AP – –ethyl dichlorarsine C – PA –diethylenetriamenepentaacetate / – S F – – Expeditionary Fighting –Expeditionary T A –EmbeddedCommon – –ExpandedCapacity OT –Ebolavirus A – U – – A(CB) – A – – AC – P – EX – D D D D ental D D –developmental/operational testing D iagnostic D D D octrine and octrine ynport ynport A D efense efense eputy Under efense efense R D efense D PA T efense isaster Preparedness D echs ordevelopmentalechs testing efense T T V T ransition echnology echnology T T accine Company T T echnology echnology Area Plan est hreat hreat reaty T T hreat actics T S et hreat S D R R I ecretary ofthe Army nspection efense eduction Agency eduction University V E I R nitiative Fund T ehicle O eduction raining R T V bjective echnical echnical Architecture eduction Agency’s ehicle D V irectorate ulnerability Analysis R eadiness Program I nformation nformation F1- E E E EPP –EnhancedPlanningProcess EPA –Environmental Protection Agency E E E E (web-based)Course E E E E FHPC –Force HealthProtection Council FE Experimentation F F FC FC Casualties Course FCBC –Field FB FA FAA –Federal Aviation Administration F Zone EZ –Exchange EUC EU –European Union E 1 –Fraction DT D TI T S S OD O M MT M M M M L savingA –electrothermal adsorption ST I R E –Education, T S A –Food and –Federal Bureau of V C – Emergency C –Emergency W – Expeditionary W –Expeditionary P vehicle mechical F –expeditionary A –Emergency C –Education and I –Future Combat –Federal Acquisition –Foreign Comparative – end-of-service lifeindicator –end-of-service E –Force R OM T –Fraction1- “ – Emergency –Emergency –Explosive –Foreign Emergency – Emergency –Emergency C – Emergency C –Emergency –European Command M D anagement of Chemical and Biological anagement ofChemicalandBiological evelopment D T M O rug rug Administration raining, andExercise M O rdnance anagement orelectromagnetic V M peration Center edical ” Antigen T S M anagement M ystems raining I nvestigations edical Preparedness aneuver Warfare R F T R egulations T D T echnician esting esponse esting and isposal I ntegration Council ntegration T eam T eam R esponse M -7 ANNEX M M ANNEX M -8 G G GIG Program GID GI G GD G G G G D FY FY99 –Fiscal Year 1999 FY –fiscalyear UnitEquipped FUE –First F F F F F FPC –FinalPlanningConference FPA –focalplanearray FP1 –Force Package 1 F Fo F F FNA –FunctionalNeeds Analysis F FLEE T S S R R O ORS OR M LP – L agent F –cyclosarin, anerve B –sarin,agent anerve A A –tabun, agent anerve 8 – Army efense Program P –Force Protection A –Functional S –gastrointestinal D X –Field A –flameresistance X – O O –Field –family ofsystems –soman, agent anerve T – EP – P –Future Years’ CE C – – T – First responder –First C G EX –FleetExercise(s) G M OM G M lobal ood LaboratoryPractices G 93/ overnment Accountability G –Force Evaluation -force inducedlossofconsciousness M overnment D –Forces Command T M eputy Chiefof anual raining Exercise I nformation nformation 93A S olutions Analysis I NBC D I S ndustry ndustry efense PlanorFuture Years’ R teering teering adiological adiological Assessment G R G econ S rid taff forPrograms M D odel G V ata Exchange ata Exchange roup ehicle O ffice T riage HA/ G G overboots GVO Protection Program G GSS G G G GOTS GM HPAC –HazardPrediction Assessment Capability HP –heteropolymer H HN –HostNation V H I H H HLA –highlevel architecture HHA –HandHeld HEPA particulate –highefficiency keratinocytes HEK –humanepidermal defense H Emergency HAZW HAZ HA HAC –House Committee Appropriations ncidents ehicle y – W UA P PFU – P –glycoprotein OD MM M M D R S –sulfurmustard, ablister agent, orhomeland P – –HospitalCorpsman –CB – OT C –House Armed A – DR M RDI /B –Headof W G –government off-the-shelf G A O – G ray VO – humanitarian assistance/disasterrelief –humanitarian R round T V G G AN – PE ood NE –Hospital –Hazardous –High G as Particulate FilterUnit as Particulate overnment Performance and – green vinyl –green overboots/black vinyl R lobal War on R esponse –Hazardous Waste M S DOD anufacturing Practice anufacturing oldier D M elegation I mmunochromatographic mmunochromatographic Assay obility -JPE S S M ystem ervices Committee ervices T M O aterial error H anagement ofCB M

R ultipurpose ultipurpose Wheeled eadiness O perations and I nstallation R esults Act R NE IM IM I I Exercise Conference I IID I I immediately dangerous tolifeandhealth ID D ID ID ID I I I I I I I H HuBuChe –humanbutyrylcholinesterase H H H H H H H HQ –headquarters L LE – / F E CA B B BA AW – A AB – evice Exemption V T T SO S S S RDS S V S ITS T M IS LH – environment digital E –integrated or C – oridentification –intradermal E –intramuscular C/YA –Human AC A –Health – A –High AC –heating, ventilation, andairconditioning – P – industry initiated demonstrationP –industry products H –High – – D – M TS C – –Heath and EC – – I I I – DR I I I ntegrated Footwearntegrated –Human ntegrated Logistics Logistics ntegrated I ntegrated Learning Environment Learning ntegrated I – nitial Entry nitial Entry nterim nterim Armored nteragency Board nteragency I ndustrial Base ndustrial ndependent n Accordance With I I I I nterim Biological Biological nterim Agent mmediate ndustrial Base ndustrial mproved Chemical Agent I –Health ntegrated ntegrated I nterservice/ T T hreat Area est Hypochlorite S ervice ervice Area R S T emains afety S D S raining D M ervice ervice Area Commander ystems Program ystems Program anger toLifeandHealthor I uty Corpsmen nformation nformation eteorological eteorological M V I O ehicle ndustry ndustry aintenance Contract S D S rientation (Course) rientation I upport ystem econtamination T D S raining etector M ystem S ystem onitor O ffice I nvestigational S imulation S ystem IT ISS ISO ISD IRTD IR IR I I I I I I I I I I IOT IO I I IMS IM JACK JACK JAB D J-8 –Force I IV Ensemble IT P P PP – P PE – PE –individualprotective equipment P P PC – orindividualprotection P –intraperitoneal N NA W irectorate, theJoint AP – T R M DT DS – information technology –information –infrared –intravenous & D C – P – – individual survival standards –individualsurvival G – – – – T TS – D &E – – – – – – –Joint Ambient Breeze – S S – I IM I I I I I I – nstallation Protection Program I I - –Joint Acquisition CB ntegrated Productntegrated I ndividual I n-Process nitial PlanningConference nternational nternational on ndustrial Preparedness ndustrial Preparedness ndustrial I I I nvestigational New nitial R I I nteragency nteragency Working mproved mproved Point (chemical) I ntegrated Productntegrated ncident - W –Joint Acquisition CB ndependent I I I mproved Nerve Agent M PE nitial S obility tructure, O I nventory perational Capability O S R R T oldier perational esponse oxicological oxicological Agent Protective eview S S pectroscopy tandards R S R taff esearch & esearch esources, and Assessment M D T anager etector eam T J D D raining T G rug evelopment T esting &Evaluation R O M M roup unnel N Knowledge rganization T easure(s) easures D reatment R D evelopment D N Knowledge etection etachment T eam S ystem S S ystem ystem M -9 ANNEX M M ANNEX M -10 JCB JEAU –Joint Equipment Assessment Unit JEAP –Joint Equipment Assessment Program JC JCPE –Joint Collective Protection Equipment S JC JC Consumption JCHE JCEP –Joint Collective Expeditionary Protection JCE –Joint ChemicalEnsemble JC JC and NuclearFamiliarization Course I JCB JCB Agent Water M JCBAW JCA JC3 –J JB JB JBP D JBA JB2 JB1 JAW JA Healthcare JCAH S JCB mprovement ystem ystem - iagnostic onitor TDS SDS S S IDS ID DRS D G G DS Q –J –Joint Chiefsof IDS R R R R D –Joint Combat S –JWA U –J U –J NFC –Joint Chemical, Biological, N C N –Joint CB AW MR –Joint Advanced Warfare O –Joint Chemical Agent –Joint Capabilities –Joint Biological –JointPoint Biological –Joint Biological –Joint CB S –Joint Biological Agent M –Joint Committeeon Accreditation of L S R M A IIT IST – Joint Chemical Biological –Joint ChemicalBiological Agent Water L S S eporting eporting Warehouse T S O – Joint Chemical Biological –Joint ChemicalBiological IST L L ystem R E –Joint CB M IST IST CBCoverall forC rganizations S I R N componentinterface device nitiative onitor Alternative –Joint Chemical ates Block 2 Block 1 Block R R N N D S taff D eveloper T R eam ismounted S T G G N tandoff actical I ntegration and ntegration love Uprgrade love Upgrade S D ource Qualification efense Capabilities D D V S etector I etection D D dentification and chool C D etection efense Equipment R etection econ R R S adiological adiological adiological, D S ystem ystem S evelopment S ystem ystem J D J D J JL Clinical andBiological JLAC –CB J JF JF JF JFC JEWC –Joint Electronic Warfare Center JE JECP –Joint Collective Expeditionary Protection JEC JPE JP JP JPACE –Joint Protective Aircrew Ensemble J J I JP J J J T J J J Program J JLA nstallation Protection M M MDS M M M M I ORD O MR MS M ool LA –Joint etection efense S O IR DS MIS S MG M EF –Joint CB A PAB –Joint NBC E C CB C –Joint Forces P – Joint Logistics P –Joint Logistics O OM SS G C –Joint Future EL –Joint –Joint Effects T E –Joint Firefighter R –Joint DR –Joint Portable –Joint Executive Program –Joint Exercise Control –Joint –Joint DS DR – –Joint Land, Aerospace, and –Joint Project –Joint –Joint I DST –Joint Forces Command P –Joint PP –Joint Project R –Joint P –Joint esearch Program esearch S D ystem –Joint I M Joint Logistics Joint Logistics Advisory Councilfor ndependent Logistics ndependent Logistics Assessment O M M M O ateriel ateriel M M perational EffectsFederation ission Essential eterial eterial perational edical Asset aster M ateriel Prioritization Prioritization ateriel Allocation Board M M odular Chemical and Biological odular ChemicalandBiological edical Chemical M S M edical Chemical and Biological edical ChemicalandBiological O taff College R odel M S D S edical NBC D D perational Capabilities upport Plan upport elease cenario Eventcenario List econtamination anager efense econtamination I ntegrated ntegrated M R R equirements anager epository T G I nformation nformation ask roup O D ffice G S R D ecision ea uardian esponse Ensemble efense S S S imulation ystem D ystem ocument S S R ystems upport upport esearch esearch J Equipment J J S J S J J D Chemical, Biological, J J J J JQ JP JP I JP JP S JP Protection JP Protection JP Biological JP JP JP JP Chemical andBiological JPE J J S ndividual Protection SI SI SG S S S RO RO RO R S S ystems urvivability ystems ervice ervice efense F CE A L LC –Joint S O MO MO M M M M M M ID CAB –Joint PP –Joint PE RR DS –Joint Portal IST O M P –Joint Program -CP –Joint Project -CB -B –Joint Program -CB C –Joint –Joint – Joint Platform –Joint Platform IS I SM M T -CB P –Joint Program –Joint –Joint Quarterly –Joint - –Joint Project D –Joint –Joint Program W I –Joint I P –Joint Project MS R –Joint –Joint Project nstallation Protection Program) G D N M T –Joint –Joint Executive Program –Joint Program D echnical echnical Working R edical M S S –Joint S equirements R enior Leaders Course enior Leaders S ervice ervice S ervice ervice Aircrew (or Air Crew) ask R S ervice Familyervice of equirements ervice Lightweight ervice S ervice ervice eadiness Clinical Advisory Board ervice ChemicalEnvironment ervice S S hield S ystem ervice ervice I O R M R nstallation PilotProject ( M I nterior nterior G equirements adiological, andNuclear ffice anager M M M anagement M D R eneral Purpose eneral Purpose M anager forCollective anager for eadiness efense anager for Biological anager forBiological anager for O anagement I ndividual Protective O M ffice G D versight Council anager forChemicaland roup D econtamination econtamination R I O ntegrated ntegrated O eview I I ffice nformation nformation ndividual ffice for O O M ffice for ffice for ask M S ask or, uit D S efense ystem Joint JW JW JW JWA J J J J J J S J D J Biological J S J S J J Assessment Program J J J Warehouse J Chemical/Biological J J J S T Chemical Agent T V S S S T TS T T S STO STO STDS SS SS SSDS SM S S ystem ystem ystem ystem echnology (individualprotection) echnology econtamination NBC W P NBC L LNBC A A AP –Joint W F –Joint E -CBB –Joint ST T IS DS S VR V –Joint L G CA D R C –Joint Warfighting Center G –Joint –Joint Weather T -CB –Joint P –Joint Warfighting –Joint –Joint –Joint N –Joint Warning and –Joint W –Joint –Joint –Joint –Joint D RS D RS EAP –Joint D –Joint –Joint D –Joint T –Joint T efense Working raining ask Force T V S otal Asset S accine Acquisition Program S S S T S cience & S ervice ervice ervices ervices Working ervice Personnel/ ervice ervice ervice ervice ervice raining, Working ervice ervice D S T ervice ervice S S otal Asset etector ervice Lightweight ervice ervice NBC ervice S S S ervice LightNBC ervice cience & D S ystem I S T S ervice NBC ervice mpact M efense tationary ensitive Equipment T ransportable ransportable V S echnology echnology ask Leakage isibility ustainment Chemicaland S V G and isibility R T S roup echnology echnology ystem eporting Network eporting R G D econnaissance G T S roup D econtamination kin Plan roup O Equipment D T R ffice S ester D R econtamination eporting eporting tandoff econnaissance econtamination O ffice for S ystem M -11

ANNEX M M ANNEX M -12 L D LFA L LC M M M M L L L D L LNBC L LL G LLCW LL –LincolnLaboratories L L dock) internal LH amphibiousassaultship LHA –generalpurpose LA L –lewisite, avesicant agent KPP –keyparameter performance KFE –Kunsan Focused Effort T DS D STI S S MS I ID roup emonstration etector P AC abs –monoclonalantibodies AA –missionarea analysis & A –low-threat areas P – Logistics P –Logistics CA V R S –Lethaldose D T A S DD –LittoralContact –Lightweight –Light Armored –low-level radiological –Lightweight –Life –modelingandsimulation – Logistics –Logistics – general purpose amphibiousassaultship(with –generalpurpose OM R D RS G –L –Lightweight –LargeFrame Aircraft –Low Level Chemical Warfare Agent Working –LightNBC – I ght S M ciences ajor Command D S I upport Plan upport etection And ntegrated Productntegrated D M T econtamination est Facility ultipurpose ultipurpose V S R ehicle S tand-off Chemical Agent hip econnaissance M K L R D anging econtamination S helter T S eam ystem S ystem M M M M R M Casualties Course M Program M M M M M M M S MD MD MD M M Procedures M Capability M M M M M M M M and Nuclear M Command ystem esearch Program esearch CBC – CBA C – CC CB B B A A A ANAA – AJC A CWP – protectiveCU-2A/P –achemical mask C C CPU – CPE – C C C CLB – CHF (L C DR GV T GT R R TT S OT O M DM A AP – A – – – DR F F RS D – –medicalcountermeasures OM M T OR OR P – – F – P – EA – C – M M – M – – M edical Corps P – M M M M marburg M aneuver Control DS edical Analysis ilestone PAC – C M M – arine Corps Corps arine S M M M M M odular Collective Protection Base Logistics Corps arine M ajor anagement of Chemical and Biological anagement ofChemicalandBiological M odified ChemicalProtective Undergarment tudy OM arine Corps Corps arine Warfighting Publication edical Chemical, Biological, D M ) – edical Chem-Bio Advisory M arine arine Air obile arine Corps Corps arine M edical Biological edical Biological edical Aerosolized Nerve Agent Antidote arine Corps Combat Corps arine efense edical Chemical and Biological edical ChemicalandBiological arine Corps Corps arine ajor Command D – M virus M efense Acquisition Program arine Corps Heavy Corps FuelL arine D D M arine Forcearine Pacific etection Assessment ecision Authority arine Forcearine Command M G O ateriel round T rder T ool actics, S O ystem or perations D T ask Force efense T echniques and echniques D evelopment M R T T obility esearch esearch S eam &E Activity R R ystem adiological adiological esponse DS D efense M M M O M M MO M M D M MMS M MITS MIST MI MI D MID S MI D MI M R M M M M M M M M MDS MD ystem adiation efense ispersion Assessment etector bservatory F EUEX – EU – E E NF –multinational force N NBC L H E EFEX – EF – E E E e E L L CA CA R R RS SO S IR I D D D S DR C – V A – – A – STD E – – – AX – /NBC W C – – – – – S D S T – – M DM OM M – -A M P – M M M – M M – M M M M MS M M M ajor End M – edical Equipment arine Expeditionary Force Expeditionary arine T ulti-Function ilitary Health ilitary odular M D arine Expeditionary Unit Expeditionary arine edical ultimission edical an-in- emorandum of Agreement M M edical Effectsof M ateriel – ultiple Launch ultiple Launch M – – M ulti-community Environmental M EL etector) M obility edical arine Expeditionary Force Expeditionary arine Exercise ultipurpose ultipurpose arine Expeditionary UnitExercise Expeditionary arine ilitary ilitary edical Nuclear M M M ilitary ilitary G D edical Nuclear Biological Chemical edical NuclearBiological eteorological eteorological edical Command S –NA I evelopment Conference D imulant dentification and I econtamination tem R I V nventory Control and Accounting eadiness and S accine Agency S tandard TO ensor (Program) S R S ystem Anti- ystem I adiac T ntegrated Chemical ntegrated Agent

R M est I S ocket ocket onizing edical NBC Working D et I nformation and nformation efense S et ( T S T raining S ystem or, R reatment ystem T errorism adiation R M esearch Program esearch ulti-Function S torm torm S ystems G roup M MRD MRD M M M M MO MOT MO NAPP – Nerve NAPP –Nerve PretreatmentAgent Pyridostigmine NAAK –Nerve Agent Antidote Kit mCPU – M MT procedures MTT MTO Facility, treatment ormilitary facility MT MT MST MSR MS S S MS MS MR MRT MRM M MTT ubordinate Command tem Cellsor P PH –milesperhour PF – P PC – UL ultipurpose Protectiveultipurpose CA – C – – A –mediumthreat area S DS W – F – X – U – protectivePP –mission-oriented posture – P – – FB – P – – O &E – multiservice operational test&evaluation&E –multiservice &E – P – defense –medicalradiological C – M – M – M M M M M M ass M M M M M M M ission Performance aritime Prepositioning Forcesaritime M M inimum edical ilitary ilitary id PlanningConference M obile ission M M emorandum ofUnderstanding ajor EFEX/ ulti-Purpose ulti-Purpose M ultiservice tactics,ultiservice techniques, and ilitary ilitary S odified ChemicalProtective Undergarment edical ultipurpose ultipurpose edical pectrometry ( ajor odified M T T T S edical R raining heater War(s) R reatment Facility, or ealift Commandor S ehearsal Exercise ehearsal S R M ange and R upport toCivil upport Authorities ustaining adiological adiological A esearch and esearch T GT able of S T ervice Corps Corps ervice O D eam S F econtamination ock) verboot N or, S T taff R est Facility Base S O milestone) tandard ( ates D rganization & Equipment T M efense Program raining Program ateriel Command ateriel M O M esenchymal esenchymal also, fficers or fficers aterial aterial S

ystem T est M ajor M -13

ANNEX M M ANNEX M -14 NB N NHP –nonhumanprimate N N N N NFPA –National Fire Protection Association NE NEC –Navy EnlistedCode N N N N N NC R NCB Corps NC –Nurse technology, andcoginitivesciences NBC NBC NBC NBC NBCC Conventional NBCC –Nuclear, Biological, Chemicaland NBC –nuclear, biological, andchemical NA NA NA Procedures NA NA NA adiological I GS GDS G G D DI DI D D A VS VM V I T TO TO S O AA –National B –National A U –National C –National C –nanotechnology, biotechnology, information ID A –National –Non- A –National Academy of –Next –new equipmenttraining R RV RS DT D V –Non-Commissioned EA –Naval IR –Nuclear, Chemical, Biological, and –Next- S –Next – North –North Atlantic P –National –NBCdefense E –NBC –NBCContamination –( S –NBC D –Naval Air –Naval Air –Naval S S D tryker) NBC tandardization G evelopmental eneration G G R D eneration Anthrax G eneration D D D econnaissance S efense I D uard Bureau rug Company rug efense ea M efense University nstitute of and Allergies efense Authorization Act S edical T S ystems Command raining and ystems Command T T S reaty I R ensor raining ndustry ndustry Association D econnaissance I S tem iagnostics O ciences fficer O S S urvivability rganization ystem (Fox O V accine perating S ystem V ehicle I nfectious V ehicle) N N N N S N N NK N N Health N N N D NWP –Naval Warfare Publication NY NU N N “nontraditional” agent chemical N N N N N N N N N N Practitioner NP –Nurse N Command N ecurity OR O MR MR MO M IST IMS IOS II I I iseases TT TS T S STM S SMO S RS R R R ORT H –National CP –National C –National WC –Naval N –National A –Novel N –National S O P –National L –Naval C –National R – nitric oxide –nitric E A P –Navy W –Navy P –Naval –National A –Naval Unit T –Navy Knowledge A C –Navy –New H –National –National HL D –Naval HC L –Navy D –nuclearmedicinescienceofficer C –New York – North –North American Aerospace S –Navy OM M T R T – Northern Command –Northern T hreat Agent ornontraditionalagent raining esearch Laboratory esearch S R M aterial aterial S actics, I S S R hips M I nstitute ofHealth R I egion egion urface Warfare Center I tem I ecurity Council ecurity nstitute of tock Number tock edical nventory Control Point esponse Plan ncident esearch Council esearch M ission Essential I nstitute for edicine T R I echnical echnical S T esiliency esiliency Analysis R dentification Number S S tate Academic echniques, andProcedures ystems Plan R elease outh West O esearch Center esearch M nline anagement S O tandards & ffice ofHomeland M O anual ccupational T asklist D D S ental Centers T ystem efense echnology S afety and O O Weapons (in O OOT OM OI OI OG O O O OTSG OT OT OS OS OSD of OS ORM ORD OR O O Policy O OI Freedom Enduring O O O O A P PLAN – PCW – FW – EA – C P PNA verarching & & 49 –Joint ContactPoint and D F/ F – P HA – A (CB U A – M G T –operational testing A O S M – T F efense for Chemical/Biological efense forChemical/Biological –operations and sustainment E T – – R O TS W –operations otherthanwar –operational requirements document E –overarching product teamor integrated NU – –operations & maintenance V – O – V O D N EF – O O O O F – – O O vergarment peration – G O O O OR D S perational ffice ofthe perational Effectiveness Assistance perational Advisory O perational bjective Force Warrior (Program) –outsidethecontinentalUnited – O O O ffice ofthe ne &C ccupational O rganization fortheProhibition ofChemical O T perational ffice oftheChiefNaval perational Plan –operational I O fficer Professional ntegrated Process ntegrated S he Hague) peration regon National tation Unit D I P) – raqi Freedom T S est Agency R ecretary of S D isk S M urgeon I afety and Health Administration raqi Freedom/ eputy Assistant tothe aneuver From the M O T T raining anagement &E force G G T G roup T M est Project uard eneral eam D ilitary Education ilitary efense D efense O O perations peration S S ea tates S ecretary S P P P P PC PC PCP PCC –Premature Chromosome Condensation enzyme humanbutynlcholinesterase pBuChE –plasma-derived PBA –PineBluff Arsenal PB –President’s Budgetorpyridostigminebromide PA PA PA PAC PACAF –Pacific Air Forces PA –protective antigen, orphysician assistant 2-PA P Defense Authorization Act ofFY94 P.L. 103-160 –Public Law 103-160, PK –pharamacokinetic P P P forPeacePFP –Partnership and Biological PE PE Element PE –Program P P3 trategy and D D DM DD D M I I I U –Patient P –Product C TS I O G M IO R R - P –Protein –phenyl dichlorarsine –Pre-Planned Product – program manager –program S T OM S E A - polymerase chain reactionA -polymerase assay chain reaction –polymerase chain -CB A –Power –Preventative and Aerospace M – personal icecooling system –personal –Protection Assessment – Program –Program – Program –Program Analysis and –Portable Collective Protection E M SS -pralidoxime –Post Engagement –Pacific Command D – Program –Program – Program Executive –Program S upport I D I solation Unit D mprovement Program D efense esign Process Program D riven ecision D irector for D econtamination Apparatus M P I mprovement G emorandum I round Effects T ntegration ntegration est O T ffice forChemical est Equipment S M ystem The National edicine S ystem O ffice M odule M -15

ANNEX M M ANNEX M -16 D R Analysis Network R Computation R Coordination (acourse) R R R R Q QPL –QualifiedProducts List QNF Q QEF –QualityEvaluation Facility Q P/ P P P PQ Execution PPBE P P P P P P SI S R OM O OI MO M M AP A A AC3 – AA & & evice S MS DR A –pressure swing adsorption TS A –Physicians A –quantitative activityrelationship structure –Proliferation M DI T D S L –petroleum, oil, andlubricant E –Professional C – program ofinstruction –program –Personnel Qualification ID – D T – S –Quality AN – –Quadrennial A –pressure/temperature swing adsorption – program objective(s) –program memorandum –Product S AC – –Preventative –Quantitative fittesting -Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and – – R R R esearch and esearch R esearch and esearch R adiological adiological Accident Command, Control, and S apid Aerosol Agent uggedized Advanced Pathogen R R ystem egional egional Atmospheric adiation M M R anagement anagement S ecognition Award M ecurity ecurity T D D D M echnology ilitary Education ilitary evelopment efense etection, aintenance Checks and aintenance Checks Q R I nstitute S O D R ystem S eview etection ffice tandard I ndication, and M easurement and I dentification S ervices ROT ROM R RM RI R R R R R (&) Evaluation RDT Command RD RDD RD R R rBuChe –recombinant butyrylcholinesterase R Warehouse RV RTI RT I RSOI RS RSD RS RR rPA –recombinant protective antigen rBot – ntegration W – radiological/nuclear warfareW –radiological/nuclear NA – FQ – F F –radiofrequency E est C C – P – A – EB –recombinant staphylococcal enterotoxin B CAAL – I F – TO L – R A –research, development, andacquisition EC – – C – O L – A – A – E (Also, – – – R R R R ps – P OM R R R R R eserve Component eserve R equest for S R eadiness esearch esearch R R R esponse apid R ecombinant Botalnum A/B edox R – equest forQuotation R ibonucleic Acid adiological adiological egional egional eception, ough eactive elease – esource Conservation and esource Conservation R R R estoration of V adiological Emergency Emergency adiological R emote RDT R accine Assessment or esearch esearch O T egulating Liposome T I riangle riangle O rder of mprovement Program M S ask Force I &E) – kin nformation ther S edical Commands S taging, D ensing Chemical Agent Alarm D ispersal ispersal D T econtaminating Lotion I evelopment and Engineering evelopment andEngineering M han Attack nstitute R O esearch, agnitude perations O nward D evice D V R T M accine R eams evelopment, eporting eporting ecovery Act ovement and O peration T est S S warfarechemical agents S SDS SD SD SDD SD Protective Equipment S M S Protection S S (U. S S S S S S S S Programs) Biological S S S S S S S S E E E – CPE – C CALP – B BCC BA –simulation-based acquisition A aratoga –aCBprotective overgarment A ACP AC – AA A(CB & E E ec EB – Battalion EABEE –Construction EA – odel RT RS IR R D G S ORM T K – F – – D S C – – PACWA – skinexposure reduction pasteagainst C – –science&technology M – . Army) – – ef – staphylococcal enterotoxins – – S S OM – S D S tand-off S S – S S S S S taphylococcal Enterotoxin B orbent S taphylococcal Enterotoxin A ensor enate Committee Appropriations S tudy Advisory S S kin &C ystem – mall Business S urface Enhanced S mallpox Epidemic hip (or enate Armed S S S enior Enlisted – pecial Assistant Airlift D elected Area Collective Protection ecretary of uit Contamination Avoidance Liquid S D D efense andChemical hareable Content S P) – olider, andChemicalCommand Biological econtamination Kit D D D D ata Fusion S evelopment and econ etector hipboard or S pecial Assistant (Chemicaland D S I G S nnovative ystem ervices Committee ervices efense D roup R amage Control S oman R orstatus ellepticus esponse O S implified) Collective bjective M D R D S ission esearch cattery emilitarization emilitarization emonstration T eam R eference S ystem S S SM S S S SIM STIM O ST ST ST S ST SS SS S S S SO S Chemical SORTS SORTS SO Conflict SO SO Pyridostigmine S S STTR STR STOM Antioxidant Liposomes NAPP – N – L LEP – LA ites P P P o U U utfit E –sensitive siteexploitation BA – S ANA AFF S OD M G EP B – VOS R U P /L F – A –systemofsystems – – M – A S F –selectively material permeable T T O AL – S – T ORTR – I –smallmoleculeanti-genomictherapeutics – S – HC S C – S S –( trategic National trategic S S C -C – – enior Level G – – trategic trategic – uper S S trategic Planning trategic pecial S S S S OM helf-Life ExtensionProgram pectral –standardization agreement tanding mall Business S S trategic Logistics Logistics trategic Asset OM S eaport of eaport S S S S tatus of oman Nerve oman Nerve Agent Pretreatment S elf-Contained ea Basing) emiconductor Ultraviolet imulation pecial ignal S AN T – tatus of ropical Bleach – O S I M perations Forces S nventory S trategic Command trategic T O ensing of Biological ensing ofBiological Aerosols outhern Command outhern AN – O ransduction R S perating Procedures D eminar perations andLow esources and T R ebarkation S raining and Analysis forFixed hip to T esources and S echnology echnology T urface Forces G M oxic Environment Protective uidance anager O M bjective ethodology M T T raining anagement T ransfer O raining T ptical I M ntensity raining aneuver S ystem S S ystem- ources M anual M -17

ANNEX M M ANNEX M -18 TI T T T T T T T TD T T T T T T T T T T T Command T T S T T D T T dispersion T SV S WA – v – echnologies echnologies actical Ballistic A A AP – AC AC A A A EU – E E E E E E – C C CP B B B – &E –test&evaluation & evelopment and Engineering Center evelopment andEngineering C – V VMS P – S M M I D M M RD R S TI T D A –table andallowances ofdistribution – – – – OM OM A – S – C – S PE P – C – – transport & diffusion or transport and &diffusionortransport –transport T T – – T ievert T T T echnical Escort echnical Bulletin echnical EC – T T S S T T echnical Equipment echnical T oxic – actical Engagement S T otal Asset oxicological oxicological Agent Protective bootsandgloves R – mallpox hreat Agent T echnical Escort Unit Escort echnical roop Equivalent T – ransportation ofBiomedical ransportation T T outhwest Asia ransformational Countermeasures Countermeasures ransformational I ransportable Collective Protectionransportable –tent-extendable modularpersonnel echnology echnology Area T oxic Chemical L T &E masterplan T I otal Asset S heater Battle ntegrated Logistics Logistics ntegrated T ank and Automotive Command I C – ndustrial Chemical ndustrial ank and Automotive I nitiative V M T V accination Program ank-Automotive Armaments issiles or isibility S V ciences isibility T D M R raining Course ose T anagement Core eview and Assessment T S I nspection imulation heater Ballistic M S anagement upport Center upport R esearch, M aterials or aterials S S M S ystem ystems ystems issiles TT TT TT TS TS TSI TSG TS TS TR TR TR TR T TO TO TO I TMTI T TIM U U U UNW UN UN –UnitedNations UJ U U FocusUFL –Ulchi Lens UC nitiative Q L S S R ID GVS C –trainingsimulation capability – W P – T R ACHPP A –United X –tabletop exercise P –tactics, techniques, andprocedures trainingequipment E –technical L – E – AN A W – – P –testoperating procedure F – C –Urgent T S S L –UniversalJoint – –uniqueitemidentifier – –tolllike receptors –UnifiedCommand DO –UrgentNeeds T –taskqualification training G T – echnical echnical D T –Unmanned S T T T T T – he opical C oxic –Unconventional Nuclear Warfare echnology echnology echnology echnology T T he ime ofFlight C – T raining OM ransformational ransformational S echnical echnical M S alk urgeon T I –United ndustrial ndustrial – raining and S S I S kin Protectant R nstitute tates Army T ecretariat O equirements Capabilities ransportation Command ransportation R R bjective Workshop S G upport upport Working eadiness Level eadiness Evaluation G eneral S round M S tatement T tates Army CenterforHealth ask List aterial D M U S octrine Command octrine uite edical V ehicle T echnologies echnologies S G ystem roup D D ocument efense U U U U U U U U U U U Acquisition, U U U California U U U U Promotion andPreventive Aerospace Chemical U U U U U M U I U Center & U O U nfectious SSO SSTR SS S S SM S SG S S SD SD S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S perations ateriel Command ateriel PAC N –United JFC FK –U. EUC CEN C AF AFE –United AF –United AC C –United A A A A A A A AF/X –United R MRM MRIID MRI MM M M G –United (Policy) –Under (A C –United S C M –U –United E E OM A T A OM OM T OM DD D L &L) –Under M T A –U. O C C S S D C C D C –U. S /311 D –U M –United –United chool OM –U S –U. OM efense C& Army –United OM –U iseases T –U. . Forces, Korea edicine 311 echnology andLogistics echnology S S S S S S –U tates S –U. S th tates CodeorUniversityof S tates –United tates Navy –U. Army Chemical S S S . Army S Pacific Command H tates Air Force S S European Command S tates Coast . Army tates . Army R tates Air Forces Europe . Army S S eserve S W –U. CentralCommand S S S G S hip . Army S S tates Joint Forces Command tates Air Force, S . Army overnment tates M ecretary of ecretary of M th M arines Corps arines Human M S M edical M tates edical edical S S edical edicine G M . Air Force pecial M uard edical Command edical S M S trategic Command trategic R S chool R D D R ateriel Agency ystems Wing esearch esearch O esearch and esearch esearch esearch efense for efense forPolicy D perations D irector of epartment epartment S chool of chool I S nstitute of I outhern outhern nstitute of V V VTT VT VS V S V V V VIG V V V V U U S U Command U Command W WEE – Western EquineEncephalomyelitis W W W WCF – Working CapitalFund WAA W& ervices ciences X – a nerve agent X –anerve & P NE -NC L particles LP –virus-like E EN EE – CA – V T S STR I DTI DT D 07– UH S STR RTS C – P V C –Unit –ultraviolet – – R A – Weapons T – M –verification andvalidation RS – Warning & C – West –working process team integrated AN V V C – West S V V – V – V ACK – – Uniformed –Uniformed accinia irtual Prototyping irtual enezuelan EquineEncephalomyelitis V – Wide Area Aerial oice Communication Adapter ideo ideo V V S igilant igilant S entilation C – irtual Emergency Emergency irtual OM T T T V ype Code eletraining eleconference V irtual Natural Environment irtual Net-Centric I D mmune apor, Liquid, and D S –United esert esert hield 2007 D esert esert isplay Area R M eporting S T odel ervices UniversityoftheHealth ervices T est Center G echnical echnical lobulin W S V S ystem tates R R econnaissance esponse T I S nformation Center nformation ransportation ransportation olid T T racking racking raining S ystem S M ystem odel M -19

ANNEX M M ANNEX M -20 W W W W W R Y. pestis XBLA S W W upport upport esponse S RSI RM R MD MD MD LA A – IR – War ST – war reserve materiel –war reserve T

-C –weapons ofmassdestruction IRT Yersinia pestis –whole-systemlive-agent testing – Walter T – External Blast –External ST eams T – Weapons of raining – Weapons of R eserves eserves R (Plague) eed Army S econdary econdary M M Y X ass ass I nstitute of D D estruction estruction I estruction Civil estruction tems R esearch I ncident DEPARTMENT OFDEFENSECHEMICALANDBIOLOGICAL DEFENSEPROGRAM ANNUAL REPORTTO CONGRESS

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM

ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

February 2007 February 2007