The New Venezuelan Parliament: Solving Or Perpetuating the Crisis?

december 2020 No. 19

The new venezuelan parliament: solving or perpetuating the crisis?

María Eugenia Fréitez Lorena Fréitez The new venezuelan parliament: solving or perpetuating the crisis?

By: María Eugenia Fréitez1 y Lorena Fréitez2

From the moment the Venezuelan National elections) decided not to participate, citing Assembly came under the control of the unfair conditions and calling on its supporters opposition, after the election of 2015, the to abstain from the ballot and delegitimize country has experienced a period of intense the process. political confrontation that has aggravated an economic and institutional crisis in which The results of the disputed ballot are that the more than 50 countries have taken sides. United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), The country’s political actors have attempted the party of President Maduro, and its allies, to reduce the level of the conflict and resolve now have an absolute majority in Congress, the crisis on three occasions by means of giving it broad ranging powers. However, three electoral processes, but success has been to put the results in context, with only 31% elusive. The most recent attempt took place of voters participating, the party received on December the 6th, when constitutionally two million fewer votes than in the presi- mandated parliamentary elections were held dential election of 2018, where it obtained for the 2021-2026 period. However, the prin- 6,245,862 votes. The party even polled a mil- cipal opposition block, supported by interna- lion votes less than the 5,625,248 it obtained tional pressure from both the United States in the 2015 parliamentary elections, in which and Europe, (which did not recognize the it was defeated by the opposition. In propor- tional terms, however, it performed better (27% of registered voters) than it did in 2005 1 Social communicator graduated from the Central University of Venezuela and researcher in Social Sciences. (14.3%) when it also participated in elections 2 Social Psychologist graduated from the Central University without any opposition; showing a sign of its of Venezuela. Political analyst and PhD candidate in Politi- cal Science at the Complutense University of Madrid. ability to recover over time. The new venezuelan parliament: solving or perpetuating the crisis? 2

Leaving aside the number of votes and seats norms that increased the number of seats by obtained, an analysis of the elections raises 66%, from 167 to 277, plus the modification some important questions: what purpose of the representation criteria and the calcu- did the elections serve?; will they resolve the lation of population bases, also aroused sus- political-institutional conflict?; what will the picion. The changes favored the large parties governing Chavismo do with an absolute to the detriment of the smaller, and accord- majority in the National Assembly?; with ing to the political scientist Michael Penfold4, the loss of the only institutional space held violated constitutional norms. by the opposition, will we see the end of the strategy of the ‘interim government’ of Juan Penfold added that the lack of international Guaidó?; is a new political cycle under way verification mechanisms also affected the in Venezuela?; and if so, will it be a cycle of credibility of the vote. The official electoral authoritarianism or of negotiation? body did however guarantee oversight by 1,500 electoral observation experts and 300 The controversy surrounding the elections political, social or institutional representa- tives from 34 countries. In the run up to the elections, the Maduro Government pardoned political prisoners In the circumstances, the opposition led by and repealed Constituent Assembly3 decrees Juan Guaidó claimed fraud and called for in order to facilitate the participation of mi- abstention, while proposing a ‘Popular Con- cro-parties. Even so, the elections still took sultation’ that began on December 7th and place in an environment of national and ended on December 12. By means of three international controversy over their legitima- consultation questions, Guaidó continues to cy. The main points of contention were the ask for what he was not able to achieve in judicial decisions that changed the makeup two years: the resignation of Maduro and of the electoral authorities, and intervened the holding of elections with the cooperation in the boards of directors of nine opposition and support of the international community. political parties. Both actions were con- sidered illegitimate for being imposed and A pre-electoral climate marked by consequently violating the principle of party fragmentation autonomy. The creation of new electoral In the words of sociologist Maryclen Stelling5, 3 Time limited plenipotentiary Parliament summoned the pre-election period spelled the reconfigu- to transform the State and write a new Constitution (according to art. 347 of the Venezuelan Constitu- ration of the political poles. Firstly, Chavismo tion). Nicolás Maduro called elections for a National Constituent Assembly (ANC) in the midst of the political crisis of 2017. The opposition did not participate, 4 Professor of Political Science at Universities in Colombia, Paris and the United States. Economic advisor to multilate- although the participation of 41.53% of eligible voters ral organizations and NGOs. Principal analyst for the Vene- was significant. In practice, the ANC mitigated violent zuelan opposition. opposition protest, functioned as a pro-government 5 Sociologist, media analyst and university professor at the counterpart, and did not draft a new constitution. It is Andrés Bello Catholic University of Venezuela. Recognized planned to dissolve the Assembly when the new parlia- analyst in the areas of Chavismo and promoter of social dia- ment meets. logue between Chavista and civil society opposition sectors. The new venezuelan parliament: solving or perpetuating the crisis? 3

no longer appeared as a single unified bloc, his proposal to postpone the election date in being represented by two different alliances: order to improve conditions. the Simon Bolívar Great Patriotic Pole, led by the United Socialist Party of Venezuela The political map after the election: (PSUV), and the Popular Revolutionary Alli- results that fail to solve the crisis ance (APR), a left-wing opposition group crit- ical of the Maduro Government and headed In parliamentary elections participation has by the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV). been markedly influenced by the general political situation, and evidences a high level of Secondly, the opposition was divided be- variability. For example, in 2005, when the tween those who decided to participate in major opposition block also decided not to the elections, and those who called for ab- compete, voter participation was 25%; while stention. One block of parties, distanced in 2010 it was 66%; and in 2015, when the from Juan Guaidó’s insurrectionary strategy, opposition gained control, it reached more decided to participate, forming two electoral than 70%. In all thirty one percent of a pos- alliances: the Democratic Alliance (Alianza sible 20,733,941 voters actually cast their bal- Democrática) and United Venezuela (Ven- lots, however the registered voters include an ezuela Unida), as well as a group of inde- approximately five million Venezuelans who pendent parties. The second, the G4 absten- have emigrated and are not eligible vote in tionist bloc consisting of the four majority this type of election from outside the country. opposition parties which have supported Guaidó’s leadership since 2019 - Democratic Abstention this time around was both explic- Action, A New Time, Justice First and Popu- it, i.e. those following the political line of the lar Resolve (Acción Democrática, Un Nuevo G-4, and endemic, arising from the disen- Tiempo, Primero Justicia, Voluntad Popular) chantment and even despair of the popula- 6 - split during the pre-electoral period. tion, as described by Víctor Álvarez . The Je- suit researcher Alfredo Infante7 describes this As a result of the break, this block now con- as a matter of “political depression”, the result sists of three separate currents: that of Juan of a growing “depoliticization of society”. Guaidó, Leopoldo López, and the 27 parties that called for abstention and support the The results reflect the projections of the -na ‘popular consultation’; that of María Corina tional pollsters and a scenario prepared by Machado, who insists on foreign military the opposition in order to claim a political intervention; and that of twice presidential victor a strategy supported by the interna- candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski, who tional community Washington, the Latin supported participation, secretly negotiated American ‘Lima Group’, and the European the release of 110 political prisoners with the Government, but finally withdrew due to 6 Economist. Mining in the government of Hugo Chávez. alleged diplomatic and economic pressure, Now critic of the government. 7 Researcher. President of the Gumilla Center, a Jesuit re- and because the Government did not accept search and social action center. The new venezuelan parliament: solving or perpetuating the crisis? 4

Union, all confirming their initial positions to participate, poses a huge representational regarding the illegitimacy of the vote. But crisis that will in no way permit the underly- for Álvarez, rather than a victory for the op- ing problems in Venezuela to be resolved”. position, abstentionism has in fact benefitted the ruling party: reducing the political cap- Antillano adds that the structural problem ital the opposition needs in order to present lies in the fact that beginning with the 2018 itself as a real alternative. presidential elections: “Elections no longer resolve political crises in Venezuela” (…) “A What did the elections achieve? decision has been made that the elections should function as a means to perpetuate In general terms, given that the Government those in power rather than solving the po- has defeated the opposition the elections litical crisis. For elections to resolve political have resolved the inmediate conflict, with- crises, they must be legitimate, i.e., where out, however, resolving the national crisis. permanence in power is at stake and where Researcher and activist Andrés Antillano8 the will of the majority is expressed.” explains that the resolution of the immediate political conflict “does not translate into For the PSUV: a strategic victory resolution of the crisis of legitimacy, govern- against the United States, and the ability or the economy. On the contrary, the annihilation of the opposition result could imply a kind of fossilization, of perpetuation of the crisis.” With 98.65% of the votes counted, the Great Patriotic Pole, led by the PSUV, has According to Antillano, these elections have obtained 4,276,926 votes out of a total of neither the capacity to guarantee external 6,251,080 valid ballots. The effects of the legitimacy, but even more importantly, do previously mentioned modifications to the not provide internal legitimacy “given that electoral system can be seen in the fact that the results of the elections are not a reflec- the Great Patriotic Pole will take more than tion of the correlation of real forces in soci- 90% of the seats (253 of 277) with only ety. In other words, the Government has an 69% of the votes, according to the latest offi- overwhelming majority in the National As- cial bulletin. sembly, but the majority of society no longer supports the Government.” For its part, the Popular Revolutionary Al- liance, APR, the wing of chavismo headed For his part, Michel Penfold points out that by the Communist Party of Venezuela, ob- “this latest electoral process, with its very low tained only 168,743 votes or 2.7% of the levels of electoral participation and dire re- total, sufficient to elect only one member sults for those opposition parties that decided of the Assembly. The fact that the APR dissociated itself from government policies did not help it crack the dominance of the 8 Social psychologist, criminologist. Researcher and professor at the Central University of Venezuela. Popular left activist PSUV, its gambit of being a voting option in Venezuela. The new venezuelan parliament: solving or perpetuating the crisis? 5

fordiscontented Chavistas yielding little in beyond thrill of victory; not giving in to the the way of electoral results. temptation for “revenge”; building a democratic, plural and transparent political en- According to Antillano, this is a strategic vironment; and promoting dialogue, agree- victory for the PSUV given the geopolitical ments, and negotiations between the various dimension of the Venezuelan conflict. That political factions. the opposition gambled everything on the intervention of the international community, For the opposition: a major crisis of hoping that the US sanctions would over- representation throw Maduro, shows that with these results the PSUV “has not only defeated the G4 op- As far as the opposition that did participate position but also the United States.” in the elections goes, the results were not in line with their expectations. The group’s With its percentage of votes, the PSUV will leaders had hoped to break the hold of the easily attain three fifths (166) of the 277 par- PSUV by winning around 112 seats, but the liamentary seats, and with its overwhelming combined percentage of votes of its two coa- majority, will be able to pass the National litions (“Alianza Democrática” and “Venezu- Budget and approve external debt, enabling ela Unida”) together with a handful of inde- laws, convene a National Constituent As- pendent parties, was only 29.7 % of votes, sembly, draft Constitutional Reform and Or- clearly insufficient to achieve the objective. ganic Laws, and elect and remove members The result is a loss of almost the entire op- of the Judicial, Citizen and Electoral bodies, position’s negotiating capacity, given that the amongst others. PSUV will have no need of their votes in order to pass any of its initiatives. Beyond the PSUV’s campaign promises, the backdrop is the economic changes that could Outside the parliamentary scenario, the sit- result from the decisions of its parliamentary uation of the opposition bloc also appears majority. According to Víctor Álvarez, the complicated. Michael Penfold explains that National Assembly could legally open up the “the opposition is going to face a major crisis economy, offering foreign investors a higher of representation, as without votes, none of percentage of equity participation in the joint the relevant actors will be able to demon- ventures created to exploit oil, gas, gold, dia- strate the origin of their representativeness, monds, coltan and other strategic minerals, as and the basis of their political presence will well as in the management of public services. consequently suffer.”

For the sociologist Maryclen Stelling, on the For both Víctor Álvarez and the historian other hand, in the longer term the election Margarita López Maya9, this crisis of results could be a stabilizing factor in Vene- zuelan politics. The immediate challenge for 9 Historian and PhD in Social Sciences. Senior lecturer (retired) at the Center for Development Studies (CENDES) of the Central the PSUV being political in nature: going university of Venezuela. Acclaimed researcher on democracy and participation in Venezuela. Critic of Chavista governments. The new venezuelan parliament: solving or perpetuating the crisis? 6

representation is the result of a disconnection debate; this will depoliticize the government’s between the population and the principal G4 management, depoliticize Chavismo and de- opposition leaders. For López Maya it was politicize the country,” explains Antillano. In “the strategy of exile” that caused them to the post-electoral scenario, we could therefore be seen as removed from the hardship of the see a disaffected society or one submerged in majority. While on his part, Álvarez points “political depression”, a fragmented opposi- out that abstentionism immobilized the option, and a Chavismo closed in on itself. position leadership, disconnecting it from national sentiment and leaving it with no ter- The PSUV, he considers, will deliberate be- ritorial structure or capacity for mobilization. tween its democratic and its authoritarian tendencies: “It could choose an opposition For López Maya, the “Popular Consulta- with which to negotiate, with which to open tion” promoted by Guaidó is precisely an a political forum, but on the other hand it expression of this social disconnection: “I could also become bogged down in an envi- can’t see what the benefit will be for the Ven- ronment of hegemony, of domination: un- ezuelan population (...) if the only apparent contested, unopposed. And that implies the objective is to legitimize to an opposition danger of an increase in the authoritarian whose popularity has declined sufficiently dynamics present in the PSUV, because it is that it will have difficulty in continuing to act also the result of victory.” and develop an adequate strategy. Another factor to consider, explains Antillano, In Maya’s opinion, despite the crisis of rep- is that internal struggles could also resurface. resentation, the opposition parties may have The differences were ignored in the context a rearguard in civil society: “What we are of the friend-enemy logic typical of “a rev- seeing is a greater visibility of social actors: olution under siege” discourse, but could collecting information, denouncing human reappear in a scenario of depoliticization rights violations, substantiating complaints and major social unrest. The conflicts will in the international arena, and talking about not only be internal, but could also spread to negotiations and agreements that would in- the popular sectors and even to the armed crease humanitarian aid to Venezuela. This forces. Under these conditions, he says, visibility is related to the crisis of representa- Venezuela is likely to move towards a 1990’s tion that we are experiencing at this moment Russian model: “Authoritarianism in politics, between political actors and the population.” liberalism in economics, with strong over- tone of gangsterism and corruption”. The Perspectives: between the crisis of political representation, authori- For Álvarez, this model might begin with a tarianism and a grand national pact process of opening up, liberalization, and privatization in a desperate bid to oxygenate With a PSUV unopposed, “every decision the economy and soften the impacts of the will be taken without little or no political blockade. “By opening public companies to The new venezuelan parliament: solving or perpetuating the crisis? 7

private capital and protecting their investments,” Along the same lines, Víctor Álvarez suggests he says, “the Government hopes to persuade that the Biden government will concentrate oil transnationals and foreign investors to its efforts on locating a new intermediary, join the international lobby and persuade acceptable to the armed forces, that can the US Government to lift the sanctions.” negotiate credible elections for a new government without having to force Maduro’s On the other hand, according to Antillano, resignation or establish a transitional regime. without counterweights the PSUV’s demo- Andrés Antillano, on his part, maintains that cratic impulses, and its openness to dialogue “Biden, will address the issue either through and political negotiation, could only flour- the relationship with Cuba, or through mul- ish in the presence of pressure from sectors tilateralism, a form of Atlanticism, i.e. an within the highest levels of government. alliance with Europe and with progressive This democratic impulse might however re- Latin America governments such as Mexico ceive support from the political calculations and Argentina.” of a party that, in the face of the legitimacy crisis it is experiencing, may conclude that it As for the European Union, even though needs to negotiate and that now is the best Portugal (which did not recognize Guaidó as time to do so. Having politically defeated the interim president) will assume the Presidency “largest empire in the world” may allow it to of the block in January, Penfold believes that be much less hard line in negotiations than “this will have little impact, because, regard- it has been so far, “with all aspects, including less of who leads the EU, it will favor a type the military, on the table.” of policy that seeks an institutional solution, a policy the International Contact Group The international community (ICG) has already been promoting.”

In January of next year, 2021, when the A progressive scenario: gradual nego- Venezuelan parliament is controlled by tiations and a governance pact Chavismo, Juan Guaidó is left with no con- crete institutional supports, and Joe Biden If these suggestions prove to be right, the assumes command of the White House, the most important challenge for Venezuela will international Atlantic community will likely be the consolidation of a negotiating agenda change its strategy, even though still not for- for resolving the country’s profound politi- mally recognizing the 2020 parliamentary cal crisis. In which case, it is worth thinking elections. about the possible terms, designs and the players of a process of political negotiation According to Michael Penfold: “We are going in Venezuela. to see an international community – especially Europe and the US – working in a more coor- The framework of possible negotiations can dinated manner on a policy that favors insti- be understood by examining three possible tutional solutions rather than the removal of scenarios. The first, maximalist and short- actors in order to promote regime change.” term, would be governed by “zero sum” The new venezuelan parliament: solving or perpetuating the crisis? 8

thinking. The second, another transactional the political forces; and the non-persecution and also short-term round of partial nego- of the political forces.” tiations focused on power quotas without a strategic horizon. Both have dominated the In his opinion, this could be an interesting for relationship between the government and the PSUV because “losing power would not the opposition up until now. mean the annihilation of its political force, or the dismantling of what the Chavista years The third, is a more long-term, incremen- have meant.” tal governability, (yet to materialize) which rather than a piecemeal approach, would include, as Antillano puts it, “grand agreements” that would be the result of a more global and strategic reading of the situation, and of progressive development.

The chosen or imposed logic will need to transcend the already tried models. Accord- ing to López Maya, “we have to get away from the zero-sum logic, leave the polar- ization strategy behind, and move towards short, medium and long-term strategies that imply micro agreements for solving some problems, with a view to rescuing Venezue- lan democratic institutions and eventually ar- riving at an electoral process with good, com- petitive conditions, where all Venezuelans have the right to be elected or to choose.”

For Antillano, the most effective policy would be to move towards a grand governance agreement or pact, “a kind of Pacto de Punto Fijo” (the 1958 pact on which Venezuelan party democracy is based). “Regardless of who holds power” he says, “there would be untouchable elements, aspects that endure: a mixed economy; social and collective rights; human rights; repre- sentative democracy; but also forms of par- ticipatory democracy; sovereignty over natu- ral resources; the respect and recognition of The new venezuelan parliament: solving or perpetuating the crisis?

By: María Eugenia Fréitez y Lorena Fréitez

Published by: Fundación Rosa Luxemburg Oficina Región Andina Miravalle N24-728 y Zaldumbide Phone: (593-2) 2553771 / 6046945 / 6046946 [email protected] / www.rosalux.org.ec Quito· Ecuador

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