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The New Venezuelan Parliament: Solving Or Perpetuating the Crisis?

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The New Venezuelan Parliament: Solving Or Perpetuating the Crisis? december 2020 No. 19 The new venezuelan parliament: solving or perpetuating the crisis? María Eugenia Fréitez Lorena Fréitez The new venezuelan parliament: solving or perpetuating the crisis? By: María Eugenia Fréitez1 y Lorena Fréitez2 From the moment the Venezuelan National elections) decided not to participate, citing Assembly came under the control of the unfair conditions and calling on its supporters opposition, after the election of 2015, the to abstain from the ballot and delegitimize country has experienced a period of intense the process. political confrontation that has aggravated an economic and institutional crisis in which The results of the disputed ballot are that the more than 50 countries have taken sides. United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), The country’s political actors have attempted the party of President Maduro, and its allies, to reduce the level of the conflict and resolve now have an absolute majority in Congress, the crisis on three occasions by means of giving it broad ranging powers. However, three electoral processes, but success has been to put the results in context, with only 31% elusive. The most recent attempt took place of voters participating, the party received on December the 6th, when constitutionally two million fewer votes than in the presi- mandated parliamentary elections were held dential election of 2018, where it obtained for the 2021-2026 period. However, the prin- 6,245,862 votes. The party even polled a mil- cipal opposition block, supported by interna- lion votes less than the 5,625,248 it obtained tional pressure from both the United States in the 2015 parliamentary elections, in which and Europe, (which did not recognize the it was defeated by the opposition. In propor- tional terms, however, it performed better (27% of registered voters) than it did in 2005 1 Social communicator graduated from the Central University of Venezuela and researcher in Social Sciences. (14.3%) when it also participated in elections 2 Social Psychologist graduated from the Central University without any opposition; showing a sign of its of Venezuela. Political analyst and PhD candidate in Politi- cal Science at the Complutense University of Madrid. ability to recover over time. The new venezuelan parliament: solving or perpetuating the crisis? 2 Leaving aside the number of votes and seats norms that increased the number of seats by obtained, an analysis of the elections raises 66%, from 167 to 277, plus the modification some important questions: what purpose of the representation criteria and the calcu- did the elections serve?; will they resolve the lation of population bases, also aroused sus- political-institutional conflict?; what will the picion. The changes favored the large parties governing Chavismo do with an absolute to the detriment of the smaller, and accord- majority in the National Assembly?; with ing to the political scientist Michael Penfold4, the loss of the only institutional space held violated constitutional norms. by the opposition, will we see the end of the strategy of the ‘interim government’ of Juan Penfold added that the lack of international Guaidó?; is a new political cycle under way verification mechanisms also affected the in Venezuela?; and if so, will it be a cycle of credibility of the vote. The official electoral authoritarianism or of negotiation? body did however guarantee oversight by 1,500 electoral observation experts and 300 The controversy surrounding the elections political, social or institutional representa- tives from 34 countries. In the run up to the elections, the Maduro Government pardoned political prisoners In the circumstances, the opposition led by and repealed Constituent Assembly3 decrees Juan Guaidó claimed fraud and called for in order to facilitate the participation of mi- abstention, while proposing a ‘Popular Con- cro-parties. Even so, the elections still took sultation’ that began on December 7th and place in an environment of national and ended on December 12. By means of three international controversy over their legitima- consultation questions, Guaidó continues to cy. The main points of contention were the ask for what he was not able to achieve in judicial decisions that changed the makeup two years: the resignation of Maduro and of the electoral authorities, and intervened the holding of elections with the cooperation in the boards of directors of nine opposition and support of the international community. political parties. Both actions were con- sidered illegitimate for being imposed and A pre-electoral climate marked by consequently violating the principle of party fragmentation autonomy. The creation of new electoral In the words of sociologist Maryclen Stelling5, 3 Time limited plenipotentiary Parliament summoned the pre-election period spelled the reconfigu- to transform the State and write a new Constitution (according to art. 347 of the Venezuelan Constitu- ration of the political poles. Firstly, Chavismo tion). Nicolás Maduro called elections for a National Constituent Assembly (ANC) in the midst of the poli- tical crisis of 2017. The opposition did not participate, 4 Professor of Political Science at Universities in Colombia, Paris and the United States. Economic advisor to multilate- although the participation of 41.53% of eligible voters ral organizations and NGOs. Principal analyst for the Vene- was significant. In practice, the ANC mitigated violent zuelan opposition. opposition protest, functioned as a pro-government 5 Sociologist, media analyst and university professor at the counterpart, and did not draft a new constitution. It is Andrés Bello Catholic University of Venezuela. Recognized planned to dissolve the Assembly when the new parlia- analyst in the areas of Chavismo and promoter of social dia- ment meets. logue between Chavista and civil society opposition sectors. The new venezuelan parliament: solving or perpetuating the crisis? 3 no longer appeared as a single unified bloc, his proposal to postpone the election date in being represented by two different alliances: order to improve conditions. the Simon Bolívar Great Patriotic Pole, led by the United Socialist Party of Venezuela The political map after the election: (PSUV), and the Popular Revolutionary Alli- results that fail to solve the crisis ance (APR), a left-wing opposition group crit- ical of the Maduro Government and headed In parliamentary elections participation has by the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV). been markedly influenced by the general po- litical situation, and evidences a high level of Secondly, the opposition was divided be- variability. For example, in 2005, when the tween those who decided to participate in major opposition block also decided not to the elections, and those who called for ab- compete, voter participation was 25%; while stention. One block of parties, distanced in 2010 it was 66%; and in 2015, when the from Juan Guaidó’s insurrectionary strategy, opposition gained control, it reached more decided to participate, forming two electoral than 70%. In all thirty one percent of a pos- alliances: the Democratic Alliance (Alianza sible 20,733,941 voters actually cast their bal- Democrática) and United Venezuela (Ven- lots, however the registered voters include an ezuela Unida), as well as a group of inde- approximately five million Venezuelans who pendent parties. The second, the G4 absten- have emigrated and are not eligible vote in tionist bloc consisting of the four majority this type of election from outside the country. opposition parties which have supported Guaidó’s leadership since 2019 - Democratic Abstention this time around was both explic- Action, A New Time, Justice First and Popu- it, i.e. those following the political line of the lar Resolve (Acción Democrática, Un Nuevo G-4, and endemic, arising from the disen- Tiempo, Primero Justicia, Voluntad Popular) chantment and even despair of the popula- 6 - split during the pre-electoral period. tion, as described by Víctor Álvarez . The Je- suit researcher Alfredo Infante7 describes this As a result of the break, this block now con- as a matter of “political depression”, the result sists of three separate currents: that of Juan of a growing “depoliticization of society”. Guaidó, Leopoldo López, and the 27 parties that called for abstention and support the The results reflect the projections of the -na ‘popular consultation’; that of María Corina tional pollsters and a scenario prepared by Machado, who insists on foreign military the opposition in order to claim a political intervention; and that of twice presidential victor a strategy supported by the interna- candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski, who tional community Washington, the Latin supported participation, secretly negotiated American ‘Lima Group’, and the European the release of 110 political prisoners with the Government, but finally withdrew due to 6 Economist. Mining in the government of Hugo Chávez. alleged diplomatic and economic pressure, Now critic of the government. 7 Researcher. President of the Gumilla Center, a Jesuit re- and because the Government did not accept search and social action center. The new venezuelan parliament: solving or perpetuating the crisis? 4 Union, all confirming their initial positions to participate, poses a huge representational regarding the illegitimacy of the vote. But crisis that will in no way permit the underly- for Álvarez, rather than a victory for the op- ing problems in Venezuela to be resolved”. position, abstentionism has in fact benefitted
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