I NEW MEMBERS, NEW BURDENS: BURDEN-SHARING WITHIN NATO

NEW MEMBERS, NEW BURDENS: BURDEN-SHARING WITHIN NATO A Dissertation Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Joel R. Hillison August, 2009 i © Copyright 2009 by Joel R. Hillison ii ABSTRACT NEW MEMBERS, NEW BURDENS: BURDEN-SHARING WITHIN NATO Joel R. Hillison Degree: Doctor of Philosophy Temple University, 2009 Doctoral Advisory Committee Chair: Professor Mark Pollack The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the burden-sharing behavior of new NATO members and the impact of enlargement on NATO burden-sharing. Qualitative and quantitative methods are used to test several hypotheses. The findings suggest that large NATO members are burden-sharing at a greater rate than smaller NATO members when looking at military expenditures and air contributions to NATO missions, in accordance with the logic of collective action. Contribution of troops to NATO missions depends on the mix of private and public benefits received, in accordance to the joint product model. The findings support the hypothesis that new NATO members are burden-sharing at a greater rate than older NATO members. An analysis of the burden-sharing behavior of NATO’s new members reveals that new NATO members have demonstrated the willingness to contribute to NATO missions, but are often constrained by their limited capabilities. However, new member contributions to NATO have improved and, in comparison to older NATO members, the new members are doing quite well. Finally, NATO expansion did not lead to greater free-riding behavior in NATO. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS There are countless people to whom gratitude is due for the successful completion of this dissertation. Limited space and failing memory preclude a complete acknowledgment here. To those omitted, I offer my sincere apologies. In fairness, I must first thank my advisor and mentor, Professor Mark Pollack. He is a respected expert in international relations, but more importantly a consummate teacher. Affable and insightful at all times, he successfully guide me through this process, improving the quality of the dissertation and teaching me how to present and conduct rigorous research. Professors Orfeo Fioretos and Kevin Arceneaux, members of my dissertation committee and outstanding scholars in their own right, also contributed immeasurably to my education as a political scientist and to the completion and quality of this dissertation. Their patience and ability to teach are only equaled by the power of their intellect. I am honored and privileged to call these three scholars friends and mentors. I am also thankful to the entire Political Science faculty and staff at Temple University, especially Tammey Duckett. They are an amazing group of professionals. Finally, I am grateful to Professor Jeffrey Groh, a scholar, soldier, and my colleague at the U.S. Army War College, for contributing as the outside reader on my committee. His rigorous examination of the dissertation and contributions to the quality of my defense are commendable. I would also like to thank Colonels Charles Van Bebber, Josef Kopecky, Krzysztof Mitrega, Vasile Roman, and Indrek Sirel for graciously agreeing to read parts of my manuscript. Their insights and suggestions were invaluable to the accuracy of this research. This dissertation would not have been successful without the assistance of Colonels Michael Klingele and Jeff iv Shivnen; Steve Mirr, Heather Wagner, Caroline Brady, Susan Vranckx, Dorothy Nevins and Dominique Vanmarsnille in assisting with my interviews. A special thanks goes to my friend, Sherwood McGinnis, for helping me get in the door with the Deputy Secretary General and members of his staff. Sherwood is a true diplomat and gentleman. My colleagues at the United States Army War College and National Defense University were also instrumental in the completion of this project. Their encouragement and camaraderie made the task more bearable. I owe a great debt to the Strategic Studies Institute for providing me a research grant and for publishing my monograph on NATO. Lieutenant Colonel Dave Barsness was extremely helpful in this regard. I would also like to thank my friend, Dr. Antulio Echevarria, for his assistance with the research grant. Finally, I have to thank Dr. Clayton Chun for giving me the opportunity and resources to pursue this dissertation. Dr. Chun is an inspiration to me and my fellow instructors. I would also like to thank the great library staff at the United States Army War College, especially Diane, Kathy, and Jeanette. They are great professionals and wonderful people! John Wheatley also provided prompt and succinct feedback that enabled me to complete this dissertation on time and on target. Last, but not least, I have been blessed with a supportive and loving family. Throughout my military career, especially the last four years, they have had to make many sacrifices for me, my job and the country. Thank you! I am especially grateful for my loving wife, Stacie. She spent countless hours reviewing chapter drafts, discussing ideas, preparing documents, and providing me feedback and encouragement. Stacie even sacrificed our twenty-fifth anniversary trip so that I could complete this dissertation. Any success and joy I have, I owe to her. v I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my loving family: Stacie, Nathan, Dena, and Claire. Their patience, encouragement, and support were essential to completing this project. They make all things worthwhile. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iv DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... vi LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. ix LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... xii CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................1 2. LITERATURE, THEORY, AND HYPOTHESES ...............................................20 3. BURDEN-SHARING DURING THE COLD WAR ............................................54 4. BURDEN-SHARING AFTER THE COLD WAR ...............................................95 5. SHARING RISK: CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO MISSIONS AND CAPABILITY ......................................................................................................157 6. UNDERSTANDING BURDEN-SHARING BEHAVIOR .................................241 7. CONCLUSIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD................................................334 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................357 APPENDICES A. COLD WAR STATA RESULTS ........................................................................378 vii B. POST-COLD WAR STATA RESULTS .............................................................404 C. STANDARDIZED OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEWS ...........................................433 viii LIST OF TABLES Table Page 2.1. Hypotheses on burden-sharing..................................................................................45 3.1. OLS Regression estimates of “spillover” effects on NATO military expenditures as a percentage of GDP using REG command, 1975 – 1991 ..........................................63 3.2. OLS Regression estimates of “threat” effects on NATO military expenditures as a percentage of GDP using REG command, 1975 – 1991 ..........................................69 3.3. OLS Regression estimates of “size” effects on NATO military expenditures as a percentage of GDP using REG command, 1975 – 1991 ..........................................72 3.4. Impact of Size (GDP, Pop, Area) with and without the U.S., 1975 – 1991 ...........73 3.5. Initial Findings from OLS ........................................................................................75 3.6. OLS Regression estimates (without lagged DV) and with independent variable controlling for domestic effects using REG command, 1975 – 1991 .......................77 3.7. OLS Regression estimates (without lagged DV) and with independent variable controlling for domestic effects using XTGLS, 1975 – 1991...................................81 3.8. Robustness check: Alternative estimation methods and alternative measures, 1975 – 1991 ........................................................................................................................83 3.9. Reexamination of Size (GDP, Pop, Area) with and without the U.S., 1975 – 1991 88 3.10. Summary of Findings from Regression, 1975 – 1991 ............................................90 4.1. OLS Regression estimates of “spillover” effects on NATO military expenditures as a percentage of GDP using REG command, 1992 – 2006 ........................................103 4.2. OLS Regression estimates of “threat” effects on NATO military expenditures as a percentage of GDP using REG command, 1992 – 2006 ........................................106 4.3. OLS Regression estimates of “size” effects on NATO military expenditures as a percentage of GDP using REG command, 1992 – 2006 ........................................112 ix 4.4. Impact of Size (GDP, Pop, Area) with and without the U.S.,

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