Case Shot & Canister

1BA Publication of the Delaware Valley Civil War Round Table Partners with Manor College and the Civil War Institute Our 21st Year

May/June 2013 4BVolume 23 5BSpecial Issue

Editor Special Supplement Patricia Caldwell

Contributors Hugh Boyle, Book Nook Editor Matt Bruce Nancy Caldwell, Artistic Adviser Bernice Kaplan Larry Vogel

Original Photos Patricia Caldwell (unless otherwise noted)

3BUOfficers President Hugh Boyle Vice President Jerry Carrier Treasurer Herb Kaufman Secretary Patricia Caldwell

e-mail:[email protected] U phone: (215)638-4244

website: HUwww.dvcwrt.orgU

Umailing addresses: for membership: 2601 Bonnie Lane The Chancellorsville Huntingdon Valley PA 19006

for newsletter items: 3201 Longshore Avenue Campaign Philadelphia PA 19149-2025

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Chancellorsville By Matt Bruce

James McPherson, in his Crossroads of Freedom - Antietam, applies the “historical contingency” model in identifying the Battle of Antietam as a turning point in American history. I believe that the Battle of Chancellorsville is also such a turning point, in the same sense that, as David Hackett Fischer notes in his preface to McPherson’s book, Antietam is a point after which the war might have gone very differently. Chancellorsville was more than just a stop on the way from Fredericksburg to Gettysburg. And it was more than just another Union failure with just another general. And it was more than just a crossroads, the name of which implied more than it delivered. Indeed, it was much more. As a battle it resulted in what some would call a tactical draw, which in turn would change the Union troops’ perception of themselves. And it would alter the cast of principal characters on both sides, in different ways. And perhaps above all, it would change Robert Lee’s perception of what he could and what he must do next. And this would change the war.

There was an early spring in 1863. After the brutal winter campaign around Fredericksburg, it provided some relief to the Army of the Potomac which had been mauled in the repeated attempts at the Fredericksburg hill. But it also meant that the spring campaign could get underway a little sooner. As the ground began to harden, commanders’ thoughts began to turn to movement.

Following the December debacle at Fredericksburg, Washington was rife with division, both military and political. The supporters of Little Mac thought the military outcome just right, and called for his reappointment to command of the army. Anyone willing to stand up for Ambrose Burnside was likely to assert that he had been forced by the administration to enter into the wrong battle at the wrong place and time. The politicians waxed political, with the Radical Republicans concerned about the effect on the release of the Emancipation Proclamation, planned for January 1st, and the Democrats quick to blame Mr. Lincoln for the bitter defeat, and with everyone outraged at the body count. The Republicans in the Senate passed a resolution calling for an investigation of the defeat. And a call was made for Secretary Seward’s resignation. The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War appeared at the Army’s headquarters at Falmouth, Virginia, with the public purpose of investigating the defeat, although it was thought by many that there was another agenda – to confirm to their satisfaction the Lincoln-pushed- Burnside explanation. And then there were the newspapers. . . . What couldn’t they do with over 1,200 killed, nearly 10,000 wounded and nearly 2,000 missing/captured, in the face of Confederate losses said to be less than half that? (Although looking back, it seems evident that Lee could not afford that loss. One more victory like that, and . . . . )

In following winter weeks, morale among the Union troops was low and still falling, fed by the failures of the army’s logistics system, compounding the military loss, and bad 2

judgments in the operation of the camp seemed to prevail. Rations and winter gear as well as pay were in short supply. The country wanted the war ended, it seemed. And among the troops there was considerable opposition to the Proclamation.

January was favored with rain, and troop movements were victimized by mud said to run to two feet deep. Into which Burnside’s movement plan for a resumption of the offensive seemed aimed. Although Burnside was described by some of his subordinate commanders as incompetent, he was apparently quite determined to continue on the offensive, and his plan was approved by General Halleck with an endorsement by Mr. Lincoln. He was going to move upstream along the left bank of the Rappahannock to a point well beyond Lee’s left flank, crossing the river at Banks’ Ford, beginning on January 20th. On the night before, a serious winter storm broke. By the 23rd, Burnside was forced to the realization that what came to be called his “mud march” was doomed to failure, with the morale of his army, the lack of confidence of his subordinates, his logistics and the weather, to say nothing of his plan, all against him. He ordered the Army back into what passed for winter quarters.

On January 25th, Burnside was replaced by “Fighting Joe” Hooker, who had a few days before called Burnside an “imbecile” and had in turn been ordered by Burnside to be dismissed from the service. Not exactly a salubrious beginning for the Army’s new commander. Joe Hooker was a man of many words, a lot of them in the form of bravado: Hooker was said to have declared, upon being named to command of the Army of the Potomac, “May God have mercy on Bobby Lee, for I shall have none.” However, he seemed to have his head around the mission of his army, to destroy Lee’s army. Also, Hooker was relieved of the burden of dealing with two officers who had made life difficult for Burnside by virtually openly identifying him as incompetent: Franklin and Smith.

The planning, following a grand review for Mr. Lincoln, appeared to build on the presumption by Hooker that Lee was by this time convinced that the Army of the Potomac wasn’t really of a mind to do serious battle. Thus, sensing a threat to Richmond and his rear in the form of reported Union troop movements along the coast, Lee had sent Longstreet with two divisions back to mind the store, thus leaving him even more short-handed than usual.

The plan was fairly well formulated. In a way, Hooker would attempt to do to Lee what Lee, with Stuart as the lever, had done to McClellan at the Seven Days: The new Union cavalry chief, Stoneman, with 11,000 troopers, would go far upstream where he would cross both the Rappahannock and Rapidan and swing a wide arc around Lee’s rear, cutting off both his supplies and his route of retreat. Meanwhile, Sedgwick, with his corps and Reynolds’ corps, would cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, and Couch, with his corps and Sickles’ would move upstream to Banks’ Ford, not exercising real secrecy. The assumption was that Lee, while necessarily concerned about those horsemen in his rear, would choose between Sedgwick and Couch (the anvil) as to which was the real attack and fix his attention there. Again meanwhile, Meade, Howard and

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Slocum, with their three corps – 48,000 troops! (the hammer) – would follow roughly the arc traced by Stoneman’s horsemen, and come swarming in through the woods around the Chancellor house to bag the Confederate army. And, Voilá!

At least that was how the scenario read. And indeed, well-performed it might well have worked. Hooker, with twice the number of troops that Lee had available, should be able to trap Lee between two sizeable forces and crush him. And the war should be over. But this was Robert Lee, not quite that readily led into a fixation on bait. Besides, Lee had a good idea how many troops “Fighting Joe” actually had under his command and would not be surprised, and “Marse” Robert was not about to lose the war in a single engagement, was he?

On April 14th, Stoneman sent Averill’s brigade across the Rappahannock where they met Fitzhugh Lee’s troopers and displayed signs of the maturity that would appear six weeks later at Brandy Station. But that night a heavy rain drowned the fords, leaving Stoneman’s main body marooned on the left (north) side of the Rappahannock. Things stayed this way for nearly two weeks, while Hooker rained on Stoneman with much profanity focused on the faint- heartedness of cavalrymen in general (Who in the pluperfect purple hell ever saw a dead cavalryman?). On the 28th, Hooker finally lost his temper completely and sent the three infantry corps into their turning maneuver, now without adequate cavalry screen ahead, thus allowing Stuart to keep easy track of them. And while Lee paid some attention to the bait now crossing the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg – you can’t really completely ignore a force of forty thousand – Stuart knew where to look for the main force, and kept Lee well informed of Hooker’s progress. Hooker got his troops out of the woods and headed east from the Chancellor house along the Orange Plank Road toward Lee’s rear, as planned. Can we cry Voilá! yet? No! Lee noted that the Union force under Sedgwick, now across the river, was shooting off a lot of artillery but not moving forward and he (Lee) correctly inferred which was the bigger threat. Characteristically, Lee chose to make an offensive move in response.

Hooker, with his force of 48,000 now headed in the right direction, east, and the chances appearing that his plan is working, but now beginning to meet Lee’s resistance, limited as it was, inexplicably decides that he is in trouble and calls for his troops to retreat to form a defensive position around the Chancellorsville crossroads, to the complete bafflement and utter fury of his commanders and the troops. Based on information supplied by Stuart about Hooker’s dispositions, Jackson recommended to Lee that he, Jackson, lead his 28,000 men on a march around the Union right flank on a surprise attack. Lee agreed, and the move was to begin at daybreak on May 1st. This was a highly risky move. If Hooker learned of Jackson’s move, a surprise attack by Hooker while Jackson was on the move, and Lee could be caught with only 14,000 men between Hooker and Sedgwick. What Hooker had planned. End of game. Rather, Hooker, in spite of the recommendations by his frontline commanders, had the men constructing earthworks. He had abandoned what was a pretty good plan that had appeared to be working. No matter what might come of Sedgwick’s moves at the river, Hooker would wait to be attacked by Lee.

Union commanders did become aware of Jackson’s movement and while Hooker showed little interest his commanders were outraged at his lack of action. And the troops were ready, even eager to meet the enemy. However, as things happened, just as Sykes’ Union troops were pulling themselves out of the wilderness, Jackson arrived and the two met briefly in the vicinity of the Plank Road. The

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Union troops began to make progress against Jackson, but an order to retreat arrived from Hooker at Chancellorsville, and that progress was stopped.

The extreme right flank of the Union line at this point was manned by units of the 11th Corps under Oliver O. Howard, in whom the 11th did not lack for a commander who led from the front. Indeed, he had lost an arm during the Seven Days. The 11th was made up in the main of German immigrants. But Howard was only recently named to command the corps and still wasn’t even over the language barrier. As Jackson’s move proceeded, late and thus having lost an hour of daylight, he formed them into line-of- battle three ranks deep and nearly a mile wide, focused right at Howard’s encampment. Howard’s Corps, arrayed in a shallow arc around the Wilderness Church along and across the Orange Turnpike, in spite of warnings about Confederates to their south, was preparing, with little security, for the night.

Late as the Rebels were they hit Howard hard and noisily, with total surprise, breaking down the Federal flank and sending them flying in panic, officers trying futilely to rally them, until daylight was lost. Jackson, accompanied by his staff and furious at having lost valuable time and the light, went looking for a way by which he could cut off any attempted Federal retreat. In the fading light he encountered a North Carolina regiment which, nervous and thinking that Jackson and his staff were Yankee cavalry, fired at them, hitting and severely wounding Jackson. Stuart was ordered to replace Jackson and the next day, May 2nd, he continued the assault begun by Jackson, destroying the Chancellor house in the process and producing large numbers of casualties, and another outcome of much greater import. Hooker was struck by debris from Stuart’s artillery barrage and rendered mentally hors de combat. The Federals were not out of the fight though, and led by Meade and Hancock prepared a stout defense, anticipating what Hooker would do in his dazed state: pull his troops into a tight defensive ring.

Although Lee managed to drive Sedgwick back across the river, the remaining fighting was inconclusive, and on May 6th Hooker withdrew behind a superb rearguard action by Sykes and Hancock at a place known as McGee’s Hill. The withdrawal was probably the prudent thing to do under the circumstances, but nevertheless not the necessary thing. Hooker still outnumbered Lee two to one, but he had lost his confidence. Hooker was finished as a commander (May 14th). The Army of the Potomac would change again. On May 10th, Jackson died of pneumonia, and Lee’s army would change dramatically.

The bill for the Chancellorsville exercise was large, including a single day’s (May 3rd) casualties exceeded only by Antietam. The totals for killed and wounded were approximately the same for the two sides (about 1,700 killed and 9,500 wounded) with the missing or known captured more than double for the Union forces compared to the Confederates (5,900 Union; 2,500 Confederate). The White House was appalled. But interestingly, the Army was of the

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opinion that they had again been poorly led, denied the opportunity to outfight the enemy. The Army of the Potomac was not beaten; its commander was.

While morale apparently dropped following the battle, the army’s perception of itself remained high, with a few exceptions. For the cavalry, or at least for the commander, George Stoneman, the record was up and down, but on the whole the troopers showed signs of maturing as a fighting force. Stoneman was replaced by Alfred Pleasonton. (John Buford would surely have been a better choice than Pleasonton, but his commission as a brigadier general was briefly predated by Pleasonton’s.) In short, it had to be fairly obvious that the Army of the Potomac was a fine cast in need of a better play and director.

Of even more consequence, however, was the effect of Lee’s experience. Losing Jackson was certainly consequential. There was no replacement for him at the same level in the army. But Lee must have realized that the effect on his army as a whole must have been nearly as significant. A second victory in a row entailing disastrous personnel and logistical statistics must have been a matter of serious concern to Lee. The cost in casualties for Chancellorsville was even more of a loss than Fredericksburg. And it was clear that these losses were not recoverable (another victory like this . . . .). And nothing had changed with respect to his supply system to make life any easier. Further, his command structure was altered by force; in addition to Jackson, the number of ranking commanders lost at Chancellorsville was untenable. And finally, Lee must have realized that he was facing an Army of the Potomac that was changing, maturing before his eyes, although retaining his confidence that he could beat them. While in the field sense, Chancellorsville was a victory for Lee, in the overall sense it reflected something foreboding: for the first time, Lee was not able to choose the field for battle and the type of battle he would fight. Further, while Lee won the victory, the Union army withdrew, but did not run.

Lee would have to change battle strategies: no longer automatically offensive. And his reasons for marching north would be different than he had previously planned. He would have to force the North into a position where they would feel compelled to sue for peace. But underneath, it had to lead to an end to the combat. That entailed destroying the Army of the Potomac, and doing so by out-generaling the next commander. (He must have seen that the commander whose reputation was most increased by Chancellorsville was likely George Meade.) Chancellorsville would determine Gettysburg. A turning point, indeed.

General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s Fate at Chancellorsville Article and photos by Bernice Kaplan

In July 2011 I had the opportunity to go on a most enlightening three-day tour to Fredericksburg, Virginia and Fort McHenry in Baltimore, Maryland offered by STARR Tours. STARR’s own Civil War historian and a member of the Delaware Valley Civil War Round Table, the inimitable Jane Peters Estes was our tour director.

A brilliant maneuver (one of many) on Jane’s part was to hire Scott Walker who is a long-time resident of Fredericksburg and well-known educator and historical/battlefield guide to provide us with an 8-hour tour of the Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville Battlefields as well as the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House Battlefields. 6

Although I did some research prior to the trip, I was still overwhelmed by the scope of Scott Walker’s knowledge and his detailed account of the injury and subsequent death of Confederate General during the Battle of Chancellorsville. This grueling battle began on April 27, 1863 and continued until May 6, 1863, exactly 100 years ago. Just a bit of information, despite the “ville” in its name, Chancellorsville was not a town. It was a 2 ½ story brick house that was located about 10 miles west of Fredericksburg at an important intersection. This is a striking example of an important battle named for a house rather than a town.

Between May 1 until May 3 Chancellorsville was the site of intense fighting. On May 2, the Confederate soldiers, under the command of General Jackson succeeded with a stunning surprise victory in which they were able to push back the Union soldiers. In the dark of the evening of May 2, the general and some of his men had been returning from an intelligence gathering mission when suddenly fire erupted from his own North Carolina brigade troops tragically mistaking Jackson and his men as a Union cavalry scout team. Within moments, Jackson had been shot three times, twice in his left arm and once in his right hand. Several of the general’s men were killed. Jackson’s beloved horse, Little Sorrel, ran off shortly after Jackson was wounded and was recaptured several days later. (Marker for Jackson wounding site to the right)

Because of the seriousness of his injuries, Jackson’s left arm had to be amputated by Dr. Hunter McGuire. Ironically, the general’s amputated arm was about to be tossed alongside the pile of limbs mounting outside the medical tent. However, Jackson’s chaplain, Beverly Tucker Lacy quickly intervened and the arm was buried in the Lacy Family Cemetery at Ellwood Manor, which was not far from the field hospital where it was amputated. In 1904 funds were provided for a grave marking (stone) which reads: Arm of Stonewall Jackson, May 3, 1863. (On left, Bernice with the marker for Jackson’s arm)

The unimposing but wealthy Ellwood house overlooking Wilderness Run had greeted many distinguished guests over the years, including the American Revolutionary War hero, Marquis de Lafayette, during his triumphant tour of America in 1825. For a time after the Battle of Chancellorsville, the house served as a Confederate field hospital. It later served as a Union hospital and the headquarters for Union Generals Gouverneur K. Warren and Ambrose E. Burnside during the in May 1864. In 1872 the Lacy family returned to Ellwood, and today the property belongs to the National Park Service.

Confederate Army Commander Robert E. Lee was extremely concerned about his indispensable and most competent general and wanted him to recuperate in a safe, quiet location. Lee had one point had uttered the now famous words in speaking of Jackson: “He has lost his left arm, but I have lost my right arm.” 7

One day after his amputation, Jackson, who was still holding out considerably well, was transported by ambulance 27 miles away to the office building on Thomas C. Chandler’s 740-acre plantation named Fairfield. Despite the relatively comfortable furnishings provided by the Chandlers and the constant attention of chief surgeon Dr. Hunter McGuire, Jackson developed pneumonia and became critically ill.

Mrs. Jackson and their baby daughter arrived on May 7. Mary Ann was at her husband’s beside most of the time. As the general became physically weaker, he continued to remain spiritually strong. On Sunday, May 10, 1863, the doctors had lost hope of any recovery. They shared their medical opinion with the general. Jackson, always a devout man, said the following. “It is the Lord’s Day; my wish is fulfilled. I have always desired to die on Sunday.” During the mid- afternoon, as his wife and others surrounded him, the general became delirious and started to scream out orders as if he were still on the battlefield. Once this fit of delirium passed and a sense of calmness ensued, Jackson stated in a soft voice: “Let us cross over the river, and rest under the shade of the tree.” (To left, bed where Jackson died)

General Stonewall Jackson, age 39, died on May 10, 1863.

The night Robert E. Lee learned of Jackson’s death, he told his cook, “William, I have lost my right arm” which Lee had stated before and also said to William, “I’m bleeding at the heart.”

Jackson’s body was moved to the Governor’s Mansion in Richmond for public mourning and then was buried in Lexington, Virginia, near Virginia Military Institute, in the Stonewall Jackson Memorial Cemetery. General Jackson’s arm was never reunited with the rest of his remains. Mrs. Jackson preferred that his arm remain buried at the site in Ellwood where it had been given a full Christian burial.

With his death, General Stonewall Jackson went from being a Confederate hero to an American icon. The Thomas Chandler plantation office building is today known as the Stonewall Jackson Shrine. There is a medium –sized tombstone standing near the Shrine stating Stonewall Jackson died May 10. 1863. Buried Lexington, VA (Chandler plantation office building on right)

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Stonewall Jackson’s Final Days Article & Photos by Larry Vogel

Since 2009 I have taken three Civil War tours with David Ward, through www.civilwartours.org. So in January, I checked out this year’s tour selections and saw that the tour “Chancellorsville: Lee’s Greatest Victory”, was being offered. Generally David’s tours start on a Friday night with lectures and then Saturday and Sunday you are out in the field. But since we are currently in the Sesquicentennial cycle, Dave has been trying to time his tours on the actual date that the events happened. Consequently “Chancellorsville” was scheduled for lectures on Wednesday Night May 1st with Robert Krick and Gary Gallagher and a tour Thursday May 2nd & Friday May 3rd with Ed Bearss. So that is what I was expecting when I signed up in January.

By April, the premise changed and the tour name was now “Chancellorsville: Sesquicentennial Tour. Ed Bearss was no longer involved. The guides would be the aforementioned Krick (left) and Gallagher (right). This tour, as I found out, would concentrate on Stonewall Jackson’s movements at the very moment (if possible) 150 years later. This was fine by me, as I have already been on the standard Chancellorsville tour. I had previously been on tour with Robert Krick a few years ago, but this was my first encounter with Gary Gallagher.

For those not familiar with Robert Krick, he is an expert on the history of the Army of Northern Virginia and a self-proclaimed fan of Stonewall Jackson. He is retired from the National Park Service where he served for many years as the historian at the Fredericksburg & Spotsylvania National Military Park, which includes the Chancellorsville battle field. His many books include: Stonewall Jackson at Cedar Mountain; Conquering the Valley and the Smoothbore Volley which Doomed the Confederacy. So basically this tour is right up his alley.

Gary Gallagher is no slouch in the Civil War field either. He played the perfect foil to Krick. The repartee between the two was worth the price of the tour.

During the opening night lectures, Robert Krick explained the new itinerary and said there would be at least three walks of a mile and a half, which worried me a little, because I am not exactly in the greatest shape of my life at this moment.

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So bright and early Thursday Morning May 2nd we set out, and visited the first days battle site 150 years-1 day later. A few years ago, this was private property and not available to be toured. Through many people and various organizations the land was saved and is now part of the National Park Service property. Interestingly, when Robert Krick arrived at Fredericksburg, the total park acreage was less than 3,000 acres. Now it is over 8,000 acres. Robert has been credited for much of that success, working to secure federal funding and pushing for legislation to acquire the land.

Part of the first day’s battle field was the high ground at the Zoan Baptist Church, which we drove by. The Union had advanced here early in the campaign. After a brief battle on May 1st, General Hooker decided to retreat back towards Chancellorsville, and fight a defensive campaign. This move outraged Hooker’s subordinates. General Meade said, "My God, if we can't hold the top of the hill, we certainly can't hold the bottom of it!" Even Hooker later said he lost confidence in himself.

Next on the tour we visited Robert E. Lee’s and Stonewall Jackson’s last meeting site (also called bivouac) which was held on st the evening of May 1 , 1863. At this meeting, the next day Marker for bivouac operations were planned. It was decided that Jackson would lead site about two thirds of the entire force around the union army on a flank attack.

We then attempted to follow Jackson’s 12 mile flank movement as much as possible, walking some of it, and riding some on bus, although the bus could not go in some places and we did not have time to walk all of it.

We stopped at “Catherine Furnace” where the rear guard of Jackson’s line clashed with Union forces who were trying to delay the movement. A stalwart group of hardy trekkers in the group climbed the hill behind the furnace to view the actual wooded path that Jackson used. I patiently waited with the others, for them to return, where we then moved on down the road on a gravel path which eventually met the wooded path. We then trekked Ruins of Catherine for a mile or so stopping along the way to discuss the Furnace action as it happened.

So after being out in the field for 6 hours our group went back to the hotel for a dinner break, and rest before heading out at 5:45 PM to retrace the final footsteps of the flank attack and the assault of the 11th Corps. In an effort of full disclosure, something funny happened to me that had never happened before. I am usually one of the first people on the bus, but this time after dinner I decided to sit down and watch the news at around 5:00 PM…….the next thing I know I hear a phone ring I look at my watch and it was 5:48 PM…I was going to miss the bus….so I sprang up and hurried to the front of the hotel, the good news I could see the bus in the distance, but the door was 10

closing as I was approaching. I just barely made it. I found out later that the guide had the hotel ring my room; otherwise, I would have missed it.

So after being slightly delayed, the bus made its way to the site designated by the NPS as the starting point of Jackson’s flank assault. We walked from that point for about ¾ of a mile over undulating private farm fields. We made it to the approximate point where Jackson’s guys clashed with the Eleventh Corps. I asked Gary if this property was normally accessible to anybody, and he told me “no, that it was private property”. The owners were only allowing access for the 150th Anniversary. Neither Gary nor Robert had ever been on the property. To tell you the truth, if you have seen one farm field you have seen them all. I personally was not that impressed. So we made our way back to the starting point.

Next we drove to Ellwood Manor to see where Jackson’s arm was buried. For more detail on this please see my article on that subject in the May regular issue of Case Shot & Canister.

Then back to the Chancellorsville visitor center so that we could be in the general vicinity of Stonewall’s wounding at the exact time 150 years later. He was wounded at just after 9:00 PM on May 2nd, 1863. Of course back in 1863, daylight saving time did not exist so to be “more exact” we were there at just after 10:00 PM. After a brief tour of the area, including interpretation by Robert Krick, we all gathered in our designated spot to watch and listen to the National Park Services “re-enactment” of the event. I wish we could have gotten closer but I think they were worried that our group would get separated and lose the bus, so we stayed quite a distance away near the bus. I was looking forward to this, but admittedly it was anti-climactic, as all we heard was a cannon shot, followed by a brief volley of rifle shot by re-enactors, and then another volley a couple of minutes later. And then we left. Although I was disappointed it was worth being there, especially since I probably won’t make the 200th Anniversary in 2063.

We started the next morning May 3rd at Hazel Grove where, on this day, 150 years ago, the Army of the Potomac abandoned a key artillery position, after reeling from Jackson’s flank attack the night before. General J.E.B. Stuart, the head of the Confederate cavalry, assumed temporary command of Stonewall Jackson's corps after Jackson was wounded the night before and planned to attack Hazel Grove the next morning. This move was made much easier when General Hooker made the crucial mistake of ordering an evacuation of the hill. Hazel Grove Once Stuart's artillery occupied Hazel Grove, the Confederates proceeded to wreak havoc on the Union lines around Chancellorsville. Rebel cannons shelled the Union line, and the fighting resulted in more Union casualties than Jackson's attack the day before. Hooker 11

himself was wounded when an artillery shell struck the column he was leaning against. Hooker soon ordered the retreat from the Chancellorsville area.

We then proceed to walk from Hazel Grove to Fairview about three quarters of a mile away, which is where the Union Artillery was placed. Following that walk we trekked back towards the bus, and then made our way to Hooker’s headquarters at the Chancellorsville Inn. During the battle the Inn burned to the ground after being hit by artillery. The family who owned the inn was still in the basement while the battle was going on. Fortunately, they escaped unharmed.

Hooker’s Headquarters site was closer to Fairview as the crow flew, than our trek back to the bus, but it was un-walkable because the “modern” four lane Route 3 was in the way. For the rest of the tour we were not trying to match Jacksons’ movements 150 years later but we visited two more significant sites of his life. The first one was Moss Neck Mansion where Stonewall and his men camped during the winter of 1862/1863. This is private property not open to the public. We were able to get access to the property because Robert Krick became friendly with the owners after he researched the property Moss Neck Mansion extensively for one of his books.

Built for well-known Virginian James Parke Corbin, the house was completed in 1856. As stated, the estate was used as Stonewall Jackson's winter headquarters from December 1862 through March 1863. Jackson was visited there at Christmastime by Generals Robert E. Lee and J.E.B. Stewart. This meeting was depicted in a scene from the Civil War movie "Gods and Generals." The general declined the indulgence of actually staying inside the mansion for more than one night, choosing to share the conditions outdoors with his men. The house was "too luxurious for a soldier, who should sleep in a tent," Jackson was quoted as saying.

We did not actually go in the mansion, though we ate lunch on the grounds and got a short tour of the grounds.

Oh, by the way, in case any of the readers are interested in a future retirement home, the property, including the 225-foot-long antebellum mansion with 9,000 square feet of living space, plus outbuildings, swimming pool, and all 288 acres, was up for sale recently, and the price was a mere $4.9 million.

For our final tour stop we traveled to what is now called the Stonewall Jackson Shrine. It is the place that Jackson died of pneumonia about ten days after being injured by friendly fire. After the general was shot, it was decided that Stonewall would be taken to Richmond. It took about twelve hours to travel the twenty-seven miles to Guinea Station for the train. However with the railroad tracks torn up, Jackson would get some needed rest while they repaired the tracks. Jackson himself chose the Thomas Coleman Chandler Plantation, as the family had been very kind 12

to him earlier in the year when camped on their property. When they arrived at the Chandler House, Dr. McGuire went inside and discovered that a patient already in the house had a contagious disease. Dr. McGuire then received the Chandler's permission to use the quiet, restful atmosphere of the plantation office building. This building survives today as the shrine.

Thus ended my tour, but not my vacation. As the bus was pulling into the hotel, my seatmate mentioned that the National Park Service was sponsoring an event at the Salem Church in an hour or so. As it was a short drive from the hotel I decided to go there.

Salem Church was built by local Baptists in 1844. Salem Church once in a pastoral setting – it is Stonewall Jackson Shrine now located amongst a virtual sea of shopping malls. Traffic is usually extremely heavy in this area especially during rush hour, which it was. Even though it looks easy to get to, it was not, but that is another story.

On May 3rd, 1863, Union and Confederate troops fought a bitter day-long battle on a slight ridge a few miles west of Fredericksburg. At the center of the action was a small brick building known as Salem Church.

Immediately after the battle, Salem Church became a field hospital. The church itself, empty and ravaged, was slowly restored after the war, and was used for services until New Salem Church was built in the 1950's. In 1961, the Salem congregation voted to give the old church as a gift to the American people. The church members presented a fine program, and the old Church was open for tours,

On Saturday I woke up bright and early and went back to the Chancellorsville visitor center where I could spend some time not impeded by the “canned” tour schedule. I watched the fine video and purchased the battlefield driving tour. Using the driving tour, I basically retraced my Salem Church steps from the days before, but I got a different perspective driving it. I was able to stay for as short or long as I wished, and I was able to drive the entire flank march as my car could go where the 54 passenger bus could not.

This was a great trip, with people who came from all over the country, on the 150th Anniversary of an epic battle.

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Delaware Valley Civil War Round Table 3201 Longshore Avenue Philadelphia PA 19149-2025

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