Case Shot & Canister

Case Shot & Canister 1BA Publication of the Delaware Valley Civil War Round Table Partners with Manor College and the Civil War Institute Our 21st Year May/June 2013 4BVolume 23 5BSpecial Issue Editor Special Supplement Patricia Caldwell Contributors Hugh Boyle, Book Nook Editor Matt Bruce Nancy Caldwell, Artistic Adviser Bernice Kaplan Larry Vogel Original Photos Patricia Caldwell (unless otherwise noted) 3BUOfficers President Hugh Boyle Vice President Jerry Carrier Treasurer Herb Kaufman Secretary Patricia Caldwell e-mail:[email protected] U phone: (215)638-4244 website: HUwww.dvcwrt.orgU Umailing addresses: for membership: 2601 Bonnie Lane The Chancellorsville Huntingdon Valley PA 19006 for newsletter items: 3201 Longshore Avenue Campaign Philadelphia PA 19149-2025 1 Chancellorsville By Matt Bruce James McPherson, in his Crossroads of Freedom - Antietam, applies the “historical contingency” model in identifying the Battle of Antietam as a turning point in American history. I believe that the Battle of Chancellorsville is also such a turning point, in the same sense that, as David Hackett Fischer notes in his preface to McPherson’s book, Antietam is a point after which the war might have gone very differently. Chancellorsville was more than just a stop on the way from Fredericksburg to Gettysburg. And it was more than just another Union failure with just another general. And it was more than just a crossroads, the name of which implied more than it delivered. Indeed, it was much more. As a battle it resulted in what some would call a tactical draw, which in turn would change the Union troops’ perception of themselves. And it would alter the cast of principal characters on both sides, in different ways. And perhaps above all, it would change Robert Lee’s perception of what he could and what he must do next. And this would change the war. There was an early spring in 1863. After the brutal winter campaign around Fredericksburg, it provided some relief to the Army of the Potomac which had been mauled in the repeated attempts at the Fredericksburg hill. But it also meant that the spring campaign could get underway a little sooner. As the ground began to harden, commanders’ thoughts began to turn to movement. Following the December debacle at Fredericksburg, Washington was rife with division, both military and political. The supporters of Little Mac thought the military outcome just right, and called for his reappointment to command of the army. Anyone willing to stand up for Ambrose Burnside was likely to assert that he had been forced by the administration to enter into the wrong battle at the wrong place and time. The politicians waxed political, with the Radical Republicans concerned about the effect on the release of the Emancipation Proclamation, planned for January 1st, and the Democrats quick to blame Mr. Lincoln for the bitter defeat, and with everyone outraged at the body count. The Republicans in the Senate passed a resolution calling for an investigation of the defeat. And a call was made for Secretary Seward’s resignation. The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War appeared at the Army’s headquarters at Falmouth, Virginia, with the public purpose of investigating the defeat, although it was thought by many that there was another agenda – to confirm to their satisfaction the Lincoln-pushed- Burnside explanation. And then there were the newspapers. What couldn’t they do with over 1,200 killed, nearly 10,000 wounded and nearly 2,000 missing/captured, in the face of Confederate losses said to be less than half that? (Although looking back, it seems evident that Lee could not afford that loss. One more victory like that, and . ) In following winter weeks, morale among the Union troops was low and still falling, fed by the failures of the army’s logistics system, compounding the military loss, and bad 2 judgments in the operation of the camp seemed to prevail. Rations and winter gear as well as pay were in short supply. The country wanted the war ended, it seemed. And among the troops there was considerable opposition to the Proclamation. January was favored with rain, and troop movements were victimized by mud said to run to two feet deep. Into which Burnside’s movement plan for a resumption of the offensive seemed aimed. Although Burnside was described by some of his subordinate commanders as incompetent, he was apparently quite determined to continue on the offensive, and his plan was approved by General Halleck with an endorsement by Mr. Lincoln. He was going to move upstream along the left bank of the Rappahannock to a point well beyond Lee’s left flank, crossing the river at Banks’ Ford, beginning on January 20th. On the night before, a serious winter storm broke. By the 23rd, Burnside was forced to the realization that what came to be called his “mud march” was doomed to failure, with the morale of his army, the lack of confidence of his subordinates, his logistics and the weather, to say nothing of his plan, all against him. He ordered the Army back into what passed for winter quarters. On January 25th, Burnside was replaced by “Fighting Joe” Hooker, who had a few days before called Burnside an “imbecile” and had in turn been ordered by Burnside to be dismissed from the service. Not exactly a salubrious beginning for the Army’s new commander. Joe Hooker was a man of many words, a lot of them in the form of bravado: Hooker was said to have declared, upon being named to command of the Army of the Potomac, “May God have mercy on Bobby Lee, for I shall have none.” However, he seemed to have his head around the mission of his army, to destroy Lee’s army. Also, Hooker was relieved of the burden of dealing with two officers who had made life difficult for Burnside by virtually openly identifying him as incompetent: Franklin and Smith. The planning, following a grand review for Mr. Lincoln, appeared to build on the presumption by Hooker that Lee was by this time convinced that the Army of the Potomac wasn’t really of a mind to do serious battle. Thus, sensing a threat to Richmond and his rear in the form of reported Union troop movements along the coast, Lee had sent Longstreet with two divisions back to mind the store, thus leaving him even more short-handed than usual. The plan was fairly well formulated. In a way, Hooker would attempt to do to Lee what Lee, with Stuart as the lever, had done to McClellan at the Seven Days: The new Union cavalry chief, Stoneman, with 11,000 troopers, would go far upstream where he would cross both the Rappahannock and Rapidan and swing a wide arc around Lee’s rear, cutting off both his supplies and his route of retreat. Meanwhile, Sedgwick, with his corps and Reynolds’ corps, would cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, and Couch, with his corps and Sickles’ would move upstream to Banks’ Ford, not exercising real secrecy. The assumption was that Lee, while necessarily concerned about those horsemen in his rear, would choose between Sedgwick and Couch (the anvil) as to which was the real attack and fix his attention there. Again meanwhile, Meade, Howard and 3 Slocum, with their three corps – 48,000 troops! (the hammer) – would follow roughly the arc traced by Stoneman’s horsemen, and come swarming in through the woods around the Chancellor house to bag the Confederate army. And, Voilá! At least that was how the scenario read. And indeed, well-performed it might well have worked. Hooker, with twice the number of troops that Lee had available, should be able to trap Lee between two sizeable forces and crush him. And the war should be over. But this was Robert Lee, not quite that readily led into a fixation on bait. Besides, Lee had a good idea how many troops “Fighting Joe” actually had under his command and would not be surprised, and “Marse” Robert was not about to lose the war in a single engagement, was he? On April 14th, Stoneman sent Averill’s brigade across the Rappahannock where they met Fitzhugh Lee’s troopers and displayed signs of the maturity that would appear six weeks later at Brandy Station. But that night a heavy rain drowned the fords, leaving Stoneman’s main body marooned on the left (north) side of the Rappahannock. Things stayed this way for nearly two weeks, while Hooker rained on Stoneman with much profanity focused on the faint- heartedness of cavalrymen in general (Who in the pluperfect purple hell ever saw a dead cavalryman?). On the 28th, Hooker finally lost his temper completely and sent the three infantry corps into their turning maneuver, now without adequate cavalry screen ahead, thus allowing Stuart to keep easy track of them. And while Lee paid some attention to the bait now crossing the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg – you can’t really completely ignore a force of forty thousand – Stuart knew where to look for the main force, and kept Lee well informed of Hooker’s progress. Hooker got his troops out of the woods and headed east from the Chancellor house along the Orange Plank Road toward Lee’s rear, as planned. Can we cry Voilá! yet? No! Lee noted that the Union force under Sedgwick, now across the river, was shooting off a lot of artillery but not moving forward and he (Lee) correctly inferred which was the bigger threat. Characteristically, Lee chose to make an offensive move in response. Hooker, with his force of 48,000 now headed in the right direction, east, and the chances appearing that his plan is working, but now beginning to meet Lee’s resistance, limited as it was, inexplicably decides that he is in trouble and calls for his troops to retreat to form a defensive position around the Chancellorsville crossroads, to the complete bafflement and utter fury of his commanders and the troops.

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