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GSSR-6.1-December-2017.Pdf Georgetown Security Studies Review 5:1 1 Georgetown Security Studies Review Volume 6, Issue 1 December 2017 A Publication of the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service http://gssr.georgetown.edu Georgetown Security Studies Review 6:1 GEORGETOWN SECURITY STUDIES REVIEW Published by the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service Robert Morgan Byrne-Diakun, Editor-in-Chief Jake Howry, Deputy Editor Shannon Mizzi, Associate Editor for Africa Rebekah Kennel, Associate Editor for Asia Luke Drabyn, Associate Editor for Europe Christen Soden, Associate Editor for the Middle East Emily Kangas, Associate Editor for National Security & the Military Jack Lucas, Associate Editor for Technology & Cyber Security Sarah Gilkes, Associate Editor for Terrorism & Counterterrorism Access the Georgetown Security Studies Review online at http://gssr.georgetown.edu Connect on Facebook at http://www.facebook.com/GeorgetownUniversityGSSR Follow the Georgetown Security Studies Review on Twitter at ‘@gssreview’ Contact the Editor-in-Chief at [email protected] DISCLAIMER The views expressed in Georgetown Security Studies Review do not necessarily represent those of the editors or staff of GSSR, the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, or Georgetown University. The editorial board of GSSR and its affiliated peer reviewers strive to verify the accuracy of all factual information contained in GSSR. However, the staffs of GSSR, the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, and Georgetown University make no warranties or representations regarding the completeness or accuracy of information contained in GSSR, and they assume no legal liability or responsibility for the content of any work contained therein. Copyright 2012-2017, Georgetown Security Studies Review. All rights reserved. ISSN 2474-8552 (print); ISSN 2474-8560 (online) 1 Georgetown Security Studies Review 6:1 TABLE OF CONTENTS The “Sick Man of Eurasia”: Quarantining the Russian Federation in the 21st Century ............... 8 Douglas A. Livermore The Russian Federation in the early 21st century is only a weak aspirant to the mantle of the former Soviet Union, which itself was never truly a geopolitical equal of the United States. The Russian Federation today is “The Sick Man of Eurasia” and nurses its delusions of bygone imperial grandeur despite its many weaknesses and crumbling prospects. Moscow is now diplomatically isolated from the post-Soviet world order, ideologically bereft of a viable vision with which to compete on the global stage, overwhelmingly reliant on a conventionally weak military, and facing an increasingly grim economic outlook. Demographic shifts are also changing the ethnic composition of Russia, which will have significant influence on the future direction of the Federation. Faced with such a weak global “competitor,” the best path forward for the United States and its allies is to pursue an updated “containment” or “quarantine” strategy, similar to that which succeeded in defeating the Soviet Union’s Cold War ambitions. This quarantine approach would minimize the potential for catastrophic state-on- state war with Russia, leverage Russia’s own internal weaknesses over the long term to mitigate its disruptive global activities, and increase the prospects of an eventual Russian transition to a more peaceful, responsible, and democratic form of representative government prepared to integrate into the existing world order. US Assistance to Syrian Kurdish Forces ..................................................................................... 22 Rebecca Lucas US Special Forces support for Syrian Kurdish forces fighting ISIS, most prominently the People’s Protection Units (YPG), has focused on military support such as train and equip missions. However, the YPG’s increasing territorial control indicates that in order to ensure long-term stability in Syria, the United States needs to assist with building the institutions necessary for good governance. Historical examples indicate that, even with this support, the United States cannot control its partners enough to ensure that they do not act in ways that perpetuate instability and popular dissent. 2 Georgetown Security Studies Review 6:1 Domestic Politics, Military Reforms, and Threat Perceptions: Three Factors Influencing Russian Decision-Making in its Near Abroad ............................................................................ 33 Nicholas Fedyk The troubling escalation in Russian-American tensions today partly stems from Russian meddling in Ukraine. Of all the countries that make up Russia’s near abroad, Ukraine is the most populous and prosperous, and its positioning between Europe and Russia has made it a flashpoint in big power politics in recent years. This paper explores why exactly Russia is destabilizing Ukraine by comparing President Putin’s different responses to two revolutions in post-Soviet Ukraine—the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2013-2014 Euromaidan. After establishing that the revolutions are sufficiently similar to merit comparison, I will evaluate three potential factors that influenced Putin’s response: 1. The transition of Putin’s inner circle of advisers from liberal, Western-oriented economists to security-community colleagues more skeptical and hostile towards the West. 2. Military reforms that significantly improved the performance of the armed forces. 3. Escalating threat perceptions associated with Ukraine and its Western allies. I conclude that in 2014 Putin was more willing (due to Russia’s domestic politics), more capable (due to Russia’s military reforms), and more threatened (due to Russia’s geopolitical situation) to utilize military force against Ukraine. At a time when Russia has become a major national security priority, this bears several lessons for countering future Russian adventurism. A Commitment to Peace or Just Good Enough?: Analyzing the Tuareg Uprisings in Niger (1990-2009) ................................................................................................................................. 48 Emily Gilbert Despite their treatment as two distinct rebellions, the Nigerien Tuareg insurgencies were one phenomenon that witnessed multiple swells of violence. The Nigerien government’s initial response was an attempt at an authoritarian counter-insurgency campaign. The government, however, had neither the institutional capacity nor the means to sustain such an operation. Prolonged fighting both weakened the state’s financial resources and undermined the quality of its armed forces. The state failed equally in its initial attempts at a negotiated settlement, allowing conflict to break out once again in 2007. Ultimately, despite the feebleness in the state’s responses, the insurgency ended not due to government efforts, but due to critical weaknesses in the insurgent groups themselves. 3 Georgetown Security Studies Review 6:1 The Role of the Security Services in Russian Foreign Adventurism and Its Consequences for US Policy ........................................................................................................................................... 64 Nicholas McCarty Russian intelligence services have garnered a great deal of press attention in the last year over cyber warfare, hacking, and their influence on Western democracy. Missing from this conversation (in the West at least) is the influence of the security services on Russia itself. As Vladimir Putin and Russia have become increasingly isolated from the international community, Russia’s foreign policy has become dominated by the so-called siloviki, ex-security service members who hope to steer the state toward their interests. Greater awareness of the history and role of the state security services in Russian society is needed if US policymakers are to respond correctly to future crises. An Unorthodox Call to Arms: The Humanitarian Case for Military Intervention in the DPRK ............................................................................................................................... 74 Bryant King In the landmark 2014 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the United Nations claims that the DPRK is presiding over “systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations” against its citizenry, whose “gravity, scale, and nature reveal a state that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world.” Consequently, it is appropriate for the United States and its allies to consider whether military intervention might be justified to address this situation, based on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) framework developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and the UN’s 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. Because preventive and non-military reactive measures implemented against the DPRK have not ameliorated the state’s human rights situation, the United States and its allies should view military intervention as a viable and legitimate course of action. However, the United States and its allies must recognize the ethical and political challenges they would face in the period leading up to and during the execution of a military intervention, and be willing to support long-running and extensive post-intervention state-building operations lead by the United Nations. While conducting a military intervention might seem a counterintuitive measure to address
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