FALL 2015 CAIRO REVIEW OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS www.thecairoreview.com Tahrir Forum

The Iran Nuclear Deal

Eight Experts on What It Means for Iran, the United States, the Middle East, and the World

ow to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons is perhaps the single greatest diplomatic challenge of our age. A particularly serious concern H arose in 2002 when evidence came to light that the Islamic Republic of Iran was conducting secret nuclear activities. Iranian leaders steadfastly denied any inten- tion to build a bomb, insisted on Iran’s sovereign right to peaceful nuclear energy, and threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Western powers demanded strict compliance with NPT requirements, and stepped up pressure on Iran with economic sanctions and warnings of military intervention. European negotiations with Iran began in 2003 and eventually expanded to include all five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council as well as Ger- many—known as the P5+1. The United States began participating directly in the negotiations in 2013, the highest level of talks since the Iranian revolution and U.S. embassy hostage crisis in 1979. On July 14 came a dramatic announcement at Vienna’s Coburg Palace: the parties reached agreement on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The agreement permits but restricts Iran’s uranium-enrichment activities for a period of fifteen years, and allows for intrusive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It extends for fiveyears and eight years, respectively, United Nations embargoes on sales of conventional weapons and ballistic missiles to Iran. The deal lifts crippling international economic sanctions that have curbed Iran’s oil exports and access to global financial systems, and frees an estimated $100 billion in frozen Iranian assets. What does the deal mean for Middle East peace and democracy in Iran? Will it lead to a rapproche- s Secretary of State John Kerry ment between Tehran and Washington? Eight Cairo and Iranian Foreign Minister Review contributors discuss these and other ques- Mohammad Javad Zarif, Austria tions in this special edition of Tahrir Forum. Center, Vienna, July 14, 2015. u Amir-Hussein Radjy U.S. State Department

CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 119

TAHRIR FORUM

Overcoming relationship remains fragile, and could still wreck itself on the mutual oblivi- a Hard Legacy ousness, missteps, miscalculations, bad By John Limbert timing, and bad luck that have a way of sabotaging U.S.-Iranian openings. During the first year of Barack Obama’s presidency, in response to Iranian feel- One of the perverse effects of the long ers about opening discussions, the United Iranian-American estrangement has been States decided that there could be no the two sides’ inability to talk about issues bilateral dialogue with Iran—about coop- that concern both, even when such talks erating to stem the flow of drugs from would benefitboth. In a reasonable world, Afghanistan, for example—before reso- American and Iranian officialswould have lution of issues around Tehran’s nuclear begun talking decades ago about such program. Following Hassan Rouhani’s issues—not as friends but as states with election as president in 2013, the Iranian interests. Even after 2009, when President side took a similar position, saying that Obama announced his desire for a “new priority would go to nuclear issues and beginning” with Iran based on mutual that discussion of other matters must await interests and mutual respect, starting a dia- an agreement between Iran and the per- logue proved very difficult. manent members of the United Nations Why has talking been so hard? I Security Council plus Germany (P5+1). would suggest the following: For better or worse, the United States and Iran decided to put their bilateral —A legacy of mutual mistrust. Each side eggs into a very difficult(nuclear) basket. remains deeply suspicious of the other, and Rather than look at issues where inter- the prevailing attitude is that the other side ests could push the two sides toward is devious by nature (“deception is part of shared benefit, they made their relation- the [Iranians’] DNA,” according to one ship dependent on finding agreement on senior American official) and that there a complex issue loaded with technical is always a hidden and nefarious purpose problems and political symbolism. Now behind even the seemingly innocuous that the Islamic Republic and the P5+1 actions and statements of the other side. group have reached a historic agreement in Vienna—restricting Iran’s nuclear pro- —Fear of the unknown. After more than gram in exchange for sanctions relief—can thirty years of trading insults, threats, the two countries begin the dialogue and accusations, neither side was capable they should have started decades ago? of doing anything else. Although such If they can, how should they talk, and exchanges produced no benefit, both what should they talk about? The whole sides at least knew how to do them. What

120 CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 TAHRIR FORUM they could not do was change the rela- need to deal with the base legacy issue: tionship into something more productive. trust and mistrust. If we disregard this Doing so would have meant venturing issue, the “ghosts of history” will haunt into unfamiliar territory. the effort and cripple efforts to change how the parties deal with each other. In 2012, —Personalities. President Obama’s first for example, when sailors from the Amer- term as president coincided with much ican destroyer USS Kidd rescued Iranian of President Mahmoud Ahmadine- fishermen from Somali pirates in the Ara- jad’s second term. The latter, thanks to bian Sea, the Iranian government’s public his dubious reelection in 2009 and his response was both incoherent and ungra- thoughtless rhetoric, had become part of cious. In the prevailing toxic atmosphere, a the problem between the two countries. simple “thank you” was apparently more By 2010, anything—reasonable or unrea- than the system could bear. sonable—associated with Ahmadinejad As long as we ignore the ghosts, the had become poisonous in Washington. whole process will remain fragile, and People simply stopped listening. any ill-considered statement or action will send the two sides back into the —Domestic politics. The Islamic Repub- futile arena of hostility. We cannot undo lic was born and shaped in an atmosphere the damaging acts and statements of the of virulent anti-Americanism and its past decades; but we can at least recog- survival has depended on keeping the nize them and limit the harm they do. political pot boiling with wars, crises, and turmoil. Although Iran’s issues are not The parties must take constructive steps. central to domestic U.S. political dialogue, The Islamic Republic needs to renounce among certain groups they evoke a pow- and distance itself from the U.S. embassy erful negative response. When necessary, hostage taking of 1979–81. Possible mea- Iran’s past misdeeds and Ahmadinejad’s sures include: provocative rhetoric will reinforce the Islamic Republic’s image as a center of —Quietly removing former hostage takers terrorism, violence, religious bigotry, and from key roles in the administration. oppression. Anyone advocating changing Washington’s confrontational approach —Ending or limiting the annual demon- is called naïve, delusional, and worse. strations commemorating the events of November 4, 1979. (President Mohammad As the United States and Iran explore areas Khatami did so during his time in office.) of cooperation and talk about issues such as Afghanistan, narcotics trafficking, the —Making some gesture toward the former environment, and public health, they also American hostages or their families.

CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 121 TAHRIR FORUM

—Ensuring security for future visiting or —Controlling language. President Obama’s resident American officials. 2009 statement, for example, that he was speaking to “the people and leaders of The Islamic Republic should cooperate the Islamic Republic of Iran,” had a sig- with investigations into acts of terrorism nificant impact and signaled a major, if in Germany, Argentina, Washington, and symbolic, change of U.S. policy. elsewhere that allegedly involved Iranian agents. Tehran should return Dawud The American government should, like Salahuddin, the alleged assassin of Iranian the Iranian side, acknowledge the uglier dissident Ali Akbar Tabatabai in Mary- aspects of its past policies and actions: the land in 1980, to American officials. 1953 coup d’état against Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh; the shooting The Islamic Republic should ease condi- down of Iran Air 655 by the Aegis cruiser tions of those American (and dual-national) USS Vincennes in 1988; and support both citizens it has detained without due pro- overt and covert for the Iraqis during cess or trial. The Islamic Republic should the Iran-Iraq war. If possible, for exam- cooperate with American authorities to ple, it would be helpful to withdraw or determine the whereabouts and status of downgrade quietly the medal given to the former FBI employee Robert Levinson, captain of the USS Vincennes. who disappeared in Iran in 2007. Old grievances should not be left to fester, but should be aired via “truth The American government should clar- and reconciliation” mechanisms, such as ify and demonstrate that it is not in the scholarly conferences, neutral investi- regime change or overthrow business. gations, and meetings of retired former Attitudes and suspicions will not change rivals. If his health permits, former Presi- quickly, but practical steps include: dent Jimmy Carter should visit Iran (just as former President Khatami has visited —Limiting the U.S. activities of the Ira- the United States). nian opposition group Mujahedeen-e Both sides should also acknowledge Khalq (MEK), including its payments to the positives in the relationship: the con- former officials to speak and lobby on tribution of Iranian-Americans to U.S. behalf of the group. science, culture, and the economy; the American scholars who have taught Per- —Ending any activity that would suggest sian language and history to American the United States is supporting Iranian students; American support for Iran’s ethnic or regional separatist movements. struggle for pride and independence, including the Constitutional Revolution —Denouncing acts of terrorism that target Iran. of 1905–11 and the Azerbaijan crisis of

122 CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 TAHRIR FORUM

1945–46; and American mediation during channels for dialogue, both sides should the oil nationalization dispute of 1951–53. work quietly and avoid the message that anyone is doing anyone a favor. For effective talks, it is important to get The U.S. should end its “no-contact” the basics right. These principles should policy with Iranian officials, a relic of help us keep our footing on the uncertain the era when Americans and “Chicoms” ground we will have to traverse: avoided each other. American and Ira- nian representatives everywhere should —Move carefully. Pay homage to the be able to talk. “ghosts in the room” that haunt the rela- There should be regular dialogue at tionship. Avoid overreach. Grand gestures the highest-possible level that allows for will be misread and seen as threatening. private discussions. There should also be regular meetings of experts. —Respect the power of symbol- The United States and Iran should ism. Handshakes, telephone calls, civil send official delegations to participate in encounters, all carry enormous symbolic conferences in each other’s country. value, whatever the substance. Washington should ease travel restrictions on members of Iran’s United —Respect the importance of words and Nations mission in New York. concepts. For the Iranian side, con- In conducting political dialogue, cepts of “justice,” “rights,” “mutual both sides must overcome the fear that respect”—for historical and religious “if we propose X or say yes to Y, we’ll reasons—carry enormous importance. look weak.” As in any relationship, the Avoid condescending phrases such as two sides should recognize that some “you might not understand…” and interests clash and others coincide. “change their behavior,” which belie Where they clash, the emphasis should professions of mutual respect. be on avoiding violence and recognizing that the other side is not going to change —Keep as much as possible out of the its policies simply because “we” wish it public realm and the media. Public to. In this area, for example, it would be exchanges encourage the most extreme useful to establish a diplomatic and mili- positions involving phrases like “not one tary hotline between the two capitals, inch” and “never.” and create mechanisms for avoiding inci- dents at sea or in the air in the Persian The two sides should create channels and Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Doing so mechanisms beginning with the assump- will require a new level of professional- tion that if they talk instead of shouting at ism from Iranian Revolutionary Guard each other, the sky will not fall. In creating Corps naval units.

CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 123 TAHRIR FORUM

Where interests coincide, the parties is that American medical professionals should explore the possibilities for joint could benefit from Iranian expertise in action. Iran and the United States coop- treating victims of poison gas, an area in erated effectively during the 2001–02 which the U.S. side has little experience. talks on Afghanistan, but that coopera- tion vanished in the wake of President —Exchanges. There is likely to be a George W. Bush’s 2002 “Axis of Evil” huge demand for Iranians to study in speech. The United States needs to rec- the United States in engineering, health, ognize that Iran can be part of solutions petroleum, computers, and so on. Barri- to crises in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. ers such as a visa and security clearance Although interests may not be identical, systems from hell and financial restric- there are enough shared goals—such as tions should come down. The United countering extremist groups like the Tal- States should no longer treat Iranian iban and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, grandmothers as security threats. Ameri- and preventing the splintering of Iraq cans should be able to teach, and pursue and Syria—to justify regular consultation studies and research in Iran. between military and civilian officials. We should speed up the pace and num- In the past, the Iranian side has bers of exchanges of educators, writers, deflected requests for consultations by artists, journalists, filmmakers, athletes, suggesting they be held in Tehran. Wash- musicians, religious leaders, and schol- ington should now be ready to call the ars. The United States should reopen the Iranians on these suggestions, and explore American Institute for Iranian Studies in where the process leads. Tehran. America should explore ways of restarting the Fulbright program both for Some ideas about the agenda for talks: teaching and research. The United States should institute —Technical Assistance. Make the rain exchanges outside of the federal executive fall up. There needs to be mutual ben- branch by sending bipartisan delegations efit. Rather than duplicate the old pattern from Congress and from state and local of “the U.S. gives and Iran receives,” we governments. should seek those areas in which Ameri- cans can benefit from particular Iranian —Representation and Properties. As part expertise. An example is the Mississippi of the official dialogue, both sides should Delta medical project, which has profited upgrade their representation in the other’s from the experience of Iran’s khaneh-ye- capital. American and Iranian diplomatic behdasht (rural health house) project to personnel should staff existing inter- deliver primary health care to one of Amer- est sections in Tehran and Washington ica’s poorest regions. Another possibility respectively.

124 CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 TAHRIR FORUM

Beyond issues of representation, the wrongdoing. Each side will claim that it two sides should address the question of has been the victim of terrorism and will diplomatic properties. Both hold valuable hint that the other side was responsible in assets in Washington and Tehran. If the some way. We should not let exchanges United States ever does open an office in descend into public confrontation and Tehran, there may be too many evil spir- trading accusations. Perhaps the best way its in the old embassy buildings. A new of dealing with the issue in the near term relationship needs an exorcism, or better, is to create neutral “commissions” to a new start in a place free of bad memories. look into complaints. The tone of com- munications will be crucial here, as we —Petroleum. By all accounts, Iran’s saw in the fiasco of the accusatory letter petroleum industry is aging and in need President Bill Clinton sent to Khatami of investment. Investment plans were in 1999—inviting better relations while shelved after the revolution and the oil accusing the Iranians of a terrorist strike income, with minimum investment, went on Americans in Saudi Arabia. to immediate needs of food and muni- tions. U.S. firms and U.S. technology —Finishing the Hague Tribunal. The have a major opportunity to participate Hague tribunal, set up in the wake of the in modernizing Iran’s oil industry if Iran Algiers Accords of 1981, should finish makes the necessary investment decisions. its work. Thirty-four years is more than Easing restrictions would also open enough time. Most of the remaining cases possibilities for energy cooperation with reportedly involve cancelled U.S. military Persian Gulf neighbors and with U.S. sales and military materiel paid for but firms’ participation, such as reviving the never delivered to Iran. While Iran is not Sirri-Dubai gas project that was stopped going to get the original military equipment by U.S. congressional action in 1994. it ordered, there should be a settlement that delivers either the blocked funds or some —Civil Aviation. A settlement would civilian equipment of equal value. open possibilities for Iran to modernize its aging fleet of Boeing civil aircraft and Good nuclear deal or bad nuclear deal, to buy replacement parts for its Airbuses. in the last two years the United States This area could prove difficult, however, and Iran have traveled far beyond their if Iran uses civilian aircraft to reinforce its long and futile impasse. A three-decade allies in Syria and Lebanon. freeze in relations is beginning to break. Rather than trade insults, accusations, —Terrorism. A difficult issue. In this and threats, American and Iranian offi- area, the best we may get is to “agree cials now hold meetings they describe as to disagree.” No one is going to admit “productive” and “positive,” adjectives

CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 125 TAHRIR FORUM unheard for thirty-six years. The sources ignores the nuclear program in Israel, of mistrust and dislike remain and will the only non-NPT party in the Middle be overcome only with patience and for- East. Equally disconcerting is that the bearance on both sides. The unfortunate “let’s be realistic” approach adopted in history of the last fifty years cannot be justifying the agreement is testimony to undone. But it can be acknowledged and a continuing and dangerous policy of balanced against current interests that nuclear nonproliferation procrastina- outweigh the need to repeat endlessly tion and exceptionalism in the Middle empty slogans and lists of grievances East, which exacerbates and perpetuates both real and imagined. security asymmetries. This procrasti- nation in the short run may respond to some extra-regional, but not Arab, Why Arabs Are security concerns and is ultimately det- Concerned rimental to all. The agreement with Iran has the By Nabil Fahmy potential to become a major diplomatic accomplishment or a historic strategic U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and miscalculation, exacerbating an already the other negotiators from the P5+1 tumultuous security paradigm. If fully (permanent members of the UN Secu- implemented and enforced, the specific rity Council plus Germany) have framed measures outlined—such as major reduc- the nuclear deal with Iran as a neces- tions in the number of Iran’s centrifuges sary measure to inhibit Iran’s ability to and its stockpile of nuclear materials— build a nuclear arsenal or quickly reach would substantially curtail Iran’s nuclear nuclear weapons breakout capacity. Arab capacity to weaponize for the stipulated leaders, members of the Treaty on the fifteen-year period. Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons However, there are justifiable con- (NPT), support nuclear nonproliferation cerns about what Iran may do at the and disarmament. Consequently, in prin- conclusion of this period, when its nuclear ciple, they would support any technically program is no longer bound by the terms sound agreement. Yet, there is profound of an agreement. It is noteworthy that all concern palpitating the region and for Arab countries are parties to the NPT and good reason. have relatively limited peaceful nuclear The agreement is far from sufficient programs. The agreement’s enforcement in dealing with the Middle East’s nuclear period provides time for policy change issues. It delays, but does not close the in Iran, where changing political dynam- door on, potential Iranian breakout. ics and cleavages have been so clearly Furthermore, the agreement completely displayed in the 2009 election protests

126 CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 TAHRIR FORUM and the differing approaches of former community. Iran’s evident and openly President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and pronounced influence in Lebanon, Syria, the incumbent Hassan Rouhani. None- Iraq, and Yemen is a case in point. theless, the complexities of Middle East In addition to these intra-regional dynamics augur against any consensus concerns, the Arab states are equally among analysts in projecting where the uncomfortable toward U.S. policies in region or Iran will be in the future. the Middle East, particularly regarding There is no basis upon which to present and future security policies in the assume that the risk of nuclear prolif- Arab Gulf region. Consequently, offering eration in the region will have subsided a U.S. nuclear umbrella or sophisticated at the conclusion of the agreement with hardware and defense systems will not Iran. In fact, it is more likely that the sufficeor respond to Arab concerns. Nor asymmetries between the capacities of will tactical responses—such as a more Arab versus non-Arab states in the region assertive United States in Syria or more will have increased. Israel, a non-NPT U.S. support in Yemen. Neither of these party presumed to have nuclear weapons approaches will respond adequately to and with confirmed nuclear technol- Arab concerns over and above what the ogy and capacity, would remain beyond Arabs received in security assurances any regional or international nonprolif- and guarantees from President Barack eration effort. Iran, albeit an NPT party, Obama at Camp David, and the Arabs would then have the right to enrich and accepting them as enough would be a repossess nuclear material, pursuant to major mistake. the NPT itself (Article 4, Paragraph 1), I am not suggesting that the United thus creating an asymmetry in break- States drop the agreement or that Iran out time if it decides to weaponize. Such should be held to a higher standard than asymmetry could spark an all-consum- others. However, dealing with nuclear ing and destabilizing regional war that nonproliferation in the Middle East would intensify international security should not be a choice between “realism” concerns. and “nothing at all.” It requires a prin- A third point of concern, particularly cipled determination to deal with nuclear for the majority of the Arab Gulf states, is nonproliferation in the region as a whole, how Iran will use the expected enhanced the courage of conviction to address these international and regional engagement issues throughout the region without after the removal of sanctions. Many prejudice or exception, and the maturity Arab states wonder whether Iran will and wisdom to accept concrete steps in embark on a more aggressive, assertive an incremental process, provided they are regional foreign policy, emboldened by within a serious, transparent, and pub- its reacceptance into the international licly announced strategy.

CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 127 TAHRIR FORUM

I believe this can be done by engaging Yemen. Use of force is a legitimate means; simultaneously on the following tracks to it is not, however, an end in itself. recalibrate the regional political balance: If Iran shifts its stance toward more con- 1. Arab countries need to be more forceful structive foreign policy, the Arab World in efforts to create a nuclear weapon-free should engage it in a regional dialogue zone in the Middle East before the fifteen- about the future of the Middle East. The year termination of the Iran nuclear deal. dialogue would then extend to Israel, as These efforts would provide not only stipulated in the 2002 Arab Peace Initia- for a continuous Iranian commitment in tive. Needless to say, this dialogue would this regard, but would also include the require more intensive efforts to resolve Israeli program and resolve the problem the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on the of deepening security asymmetries. basis of a two-state solution, albeit the prospects for success are not promising. 2. The international community, particu- larly the United States, must engage Israel in a more rigorous effort to have it revisit Beauty of the the logic of its nuclear program. One Pleiades wonders how George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn By Turki Al-Faisal can initiate the debate about the utility of nuclear weapons for the United States, There is a tradition that states that the yet the issue cannot be raised with Israel. Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) once ges- tured toward his Persian companion 3. Arab countries—and all members to Salman and said: the NPT—should insist on their right to enrich and reprocess nuclear material under “ ” International Atomic Energy Agency safe- guards, even if they do not all have an “Even if faith were near the Pleiades, men intention to do so in the near future. from among the Persians would attain it.”

4. Arab countries should also agree on the This tradition points to a few funda- establishment of a regional nuclear fuel mental truths about Persian history and bank under international safeguards. identity. In the ancient world, the Pleiades constellation represented the universe’s 5. Arab states should take the initiative in beauty and mystery, and its distance in providing political solutions to regional the sky was a reminder of the vastness hotbeds, particularly Syria, Lebanon, and of creation. In invoking the Pleiades, the

128 CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 TAHRIR FORUM

Prophet (PBUH) was testifying to the Persians came to accept Islam and adjust power of the Persian’s faith—that there to life under Arab rule. The Persian lan- was no obstacle large or far enough to guage adopted its own version of the prevent the Persians from attainment of Arabic script and borrowed heavily from true knowledge. Arabic vocabulary. Ancient fire temples We can also read this tradition as a were converted into arched mosques with testament to the Persian tradition of sci- beautiful, serene courtyards. The Persians entific and cultural achievement—that if of greater Iran adopted the political ideals anyone were able to grasp at the Pleiades, represented by the Islamic caliphate and it would of course be the Persians. In the became participants in another Golden Prophet Mohammed’s time, Persia was a Age, one with far more geographic fading imperial power, holding on to the breadth and cultural diversity than the glories of its civilization as it prepared Persian kingdoms of ancient times. to embrace a new era. Even today, Iran During the medieval flowering of is caught between pride in its ancient and Islamic civilization, Persian people and complicated history and the ambitions of Persian culture helped raise the Islamic its religious regime. World to greater heights of scientific In the pre-Islamic world, the Persian and artistic power. As Europe struggled Sasanian Empire, founded in 224 ad and in its Dark Ages, Persia produced some extending from Turkey and Egypt to the of the Islamic World’s most famous Indian subcontinent, was a cultural and scientists, mathematicians, theologians, political force rivaling that of ancient and poets. Al-Ghazali, the theologian, China, India, Greece, or Rome. The Sasa- scholar, and mystic often referred to as nians were envied by the Romans for one of the most important Muslims after their advanced military technology, Sasa- the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH), was nian artists and musicians were welcomed from a city near Mashhad in present-day by the royal courts of imperial capitals, Iran. The legendary polymath Avicenna and the Sasanian government was widely (or Ibn Sina), the greatest scientist and praised for its humane and effective style medical scholar of his age and author of of rule. The Persians of the ancient world over four hundred texts and a master of could even lay claim to one of the world’s the Greco-Roman and Indian scholarly monotheistic religions: Zoroastrianism, a traditions, made time to compose poetry faith based on the teachings of Zoroaster, in his native Persian. Hafez Shirazi is still who lived over 3,000 years ago. one of the world’s most famous and influ- By the seventh century ad the golden ential poets, and Persian poetry left an age of the Sasanians had long since passed indelible stamp on South Asian literature away. When Muslim Arabs arrived shortly and art. Omar Khayyam is well known after the death of the Prophet (PBUH), not only for his quatrains but also for his

CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 129 TAHRIR FORUM astronomical and mathematical genius. Islamic scholarship in the world. Under Al-Khawarismi gave us algebra and intro- Safavid rule, Persia grew in religious duced the zero into mathematics. prestige as its reputation as a center of In the later Middle Ages, newer aesthetic innovation declined. Islamic dynasties like the Mughals, the By the 1800s, Persian artistic and intel- Timurids, and the Ottomans took their lectual elites no longer delighted in the cue from Iranian art and literature to poetry of the Shahnameh or studied the cultivate their own civilizations. The mysticism of Al-Ghazali but instead sent flowing Nastaliq script of written Per- their sons to French finishing schools or sian, known for its beautiful long and took long vacations to European muse- sloping letters, was adopted by the Urdu ums and salons. Iran’s 1905 Constitutional language and revered by Ottoman artists, Revolution laid bare the corruption of who used it as an inspiration for their own the crumbling Qajar dynasty: in the early styles of calligraphy. Persian architecture twentieth century, Persia was vulnerable set a new standard for physical beauty in to Soviet expansion and colonial Euro- houses of worship in the Islamic world. pean influence, caught between larger But even in the Islamic Golden Age, powers. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Persians held some nostalgia for the who came to power in the aftermath of purity and power of their culture and his- a 1921 coup, was able to rescue Iranian tory. The poet Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh, pride of place from a geopolitical morass. or Book of Kings, an epic of Persian leg- His modernization programs—West- ends and history from the dawn of time ern-style university education, better until Islam, was written around the year healthcare, the development of railways 1000 ad, and Ferdowsi was careful to and infrastructure—helped the nation to avoid Arabic influence on his vocabu- join the developed nations of its era as a lary—he wanted a Persian epic to be peer. The shah was aware of his peoples’ represented in undiluted Persian prose. need to feel pride in a uniquely Persian heritage, and he capitalized on that need With the rise of the Safavid dynasty in to bolster support for his regime. It was the sixteenth century, Persia experienced Reza Pahlavi who insisted that foreign another great shift. The Safavids installed nations refer to Persia by its ancient name Twelver Shia Islam in their kingdom, and of Iran. In doing so, the shah was inten- Persia became a majority Shiite coun- tionally evoking thousands of years of try as well as a locus of Shiite religious Aryan lineage and framing the modern scholarship. The ancient city of Qom Iranian state around its ancient ethnic was Safavid Persia’s crowning intellec- identity. The shah’s son went by the hon- tual jewel, a site of religious pilgrimage, orific Aryamehr, or “light of the Aryans”; which became the largest center for Shiite while the name might sound antique, it

130 CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 TAHRIR FORUM was an innovation meant to remind Ira- drastically expanded popular understand- nians of their roots, to restore the dignity ing of the doctrine, enforcing his own of the concept of a specifically Iranian, interpretation of “guardianship,” and rather than Islamic, government. giving himself, as the country’s premier The shah’s regime represented a step religious leader, unchecked authority forward for Iran in many ways, but at the over Iran’s political affairs. same time, Pahlavi’s secular and authori- When the Islamic Revolution of Iran tarian rule alienated the country’s more replaced the shah’s elegant but fallen religious current. In 1971, the Pahlavi regime, some Iranians rejoiced at the government spent vast amounts of time prospect of Iran’s resurgence as an Islamic and money to celebrate the 2,500th anni- power. Others dreaded a move that they versary of the Persian Empire founded felt would divorce Iran from the rest of by Cyrus the Great. It was a lavish affair, the world. Iran’s Islamic Revolution was with food catered from Paris and giant a worldwide media sensation: in 1979, tents equipped with the latest technology. Ruhollah Khomeini became not only the The event was broadcast on interna- leader of a nation but TIME magazine’s tional television. As the shah paraded his “Man of the Year” and the singular face wealth and lineage in front of the world, of Islamic rule worldwide. While Kho- some Iranians grew angry: the religious meini’s “guardianship” did not extend right called the celebration “The Devil’s politically beyond Iran’s borders, his Festival,” Shiite clergy and the religious words and actions sent a message of an faithful were marginalized by the shah’s ambitious and wide-reaching claim to secular regime, while many leftists in Islamic leadership; a new caliphate, but Iran protested the methods of the shah’s with Shiite practice. secret police and what they saw as the Khomeini combined the Persian increasingly repressive tone of politi- imperial ambition of the shah with the cal discourse. The Islamic Revolution of more recent Shiite authority of his intel- 1979, which installed the powerful yet lectual ancestors in Qom. This was an polarizing Khomeini as supreme leader, Iranian empire like no one had ever seen: was a new and different articulation of insular, combative, and eschewing cultural Iranian identity. exchange in favor of a claim to universal Khomeini’s claim to rule was based truth. It took on a pugilist’s stance, not on his interpretation of the concept of an embracing one. Many Muslims around “the guardianship of the jurists,” a Shiite the world were dismayed by Khomeini’s doctrine articulated in the late nineteenth sudden claim to speak for them and what century which gave varying degrees seemed like callous disregard for other of civil authority to religious scholars Islamic traditions and ways of life. Mus- trained in Shiite Islamic law. Khomeini lims who followed theological traditions

CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 131 TAHRIR FORUM very different from the Twelvers’ and have restored Iran’s Islamic identity, lived in countries with rulers who were but they have also doomed the coun- nothing like Khomeini were disturbed to try to a cramped and narrow existence. have their religion so closely linked with Interaction between Iran and its Muslim Khomeini’s image, and to witness Kho- neighbors is limited and often hostile. meini embrace the role as the supreme In the aftermath of Khomeini’s death, leader not just of Iranians but of the entire Iran’s leaders have chosen to expand its Islamic world. nuclear program, a move that further In 1980, and after miscalculating the damaged Iran’s relationships with the extent of the political struggle that fol- international community. The sanctions lowed Khomeini’s return to Tehran, arising from Iranian leaders’ decisions Saddam Hussein launched his abortive have severely strained the country’s eco- attempt to topple Khomeini. For two nomic and political opportunities and years and until Saddam’s troops were forced its citizens to close themselves off pushed back into Iraq, none of the Arab from much of the outside world. And yet Gulf states supported him. Unfortu- clerical authorities in Iran still tend to act nately, Khomeini vowed revenge and as if they lead the Islamic World; issuing launched a counterattack on Iraq. He ultimatums, intimidating their neighbors, also miscalculated and the Iraqi people, and inciting dissidence and revolution. Sunni and Shiite alike, united in opposing Khomeini’s aggression. Only then did the Iran has the right to use nuclear power Arab Gulf states come to the aid of Iraq. for peaceful purposes, but brinksman- Khomeini’s intention may have been ship policies and the construction of secret to unite Muslims under a single banner, facilities do nothing to serve the country’s but, like Saddam, the aftermath of his best interests; nor do these policies allay actions thirty years later have only served the world’s suspicions. The best way to to further divide the Muslim world. move forward fairly on this issue is for Today, the lofty beauty of the Ple- Iran’s leaders to follow the policy set down iades can seem very far indeed from the by the shah in 1974. The establishment of a reality of daily life in Iran. The country Weapons of Mass Destruction free zone in is marked not by worldliness or even the Middle East will ensure a level playing by religion but by isolation; in contrast ground for all nations in the region. Iran’s to the traveling artists of the Sasanians leaders claim to support the zone. That and the multilingual scholars of the support should not be by lip service only. Islamic Golden Age, many famous and well-respected Iranian artists today have Iranians can be proud of their history and trouble even getting on a plane to another heritage. Arabs have the greatest respect country. Khomeini’s imperial ambitions for the faith and culture of Iranians, as well

132 CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 TAHRIR FORUM as the indelible Persian contribution to The Iranian leadership has the oppor- the marvels of Islamic society. But like all tunity to share so much of Iran’s heritage worthwhile achievements, Persia’s greatest and wisdom with other Muslims. But if masterpieces were the product of coopera- they wish to gain the respect of other coun- tion and education, of learning from and tries, they must first show respect to the with people of other backgrounds. Just as traditions, heritage, and political identity Arabs, Africans, Europeans, and Asians of their peers. The Islamic conversation continue to be enriched by Persian knowl- is richer with the Iranian voice in it—but edge and culture, Iran has been greatly theirs cannot be the only voice we hear. enriched by its Arab, Asian, and European partners. Pushing away these interlocu- tors, dividing Muslims with bombastic Democracy in Iran claims to religious leadership, threatening By Nader Hashemi their neighbors with false claims to Bah- rain, and refusing all rational solutions to Most of the debate in the West on the Iran the dispute over the Emirati islands, will nuclear deal has focused on questions not restore the former glory of Iran; it will related to Western security interests in the do just the opposite. Supreme Leader Aya- Middle East. Will a deal ultimately prevent tollah Ali Khamanei’s meddling in Iraq is Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon? the cause of the daily killings and suffer- Will it significantly inhibit a nuclear arms ing that the Iraqi people are enduring. The race in the region? How will Israel and the situation in Syria, in which the Iranian gov- Gulf Cooperation Countries be affected, ernment has chosen to support the butcher and to what extent will Iran be able to Al-Assad, is a case in point. Ruhollah expand its regional influenceafter the lift- Khomeini was famous for his claim as the ing of sanctions? Almost ignored in this champion of the mustazafin. Today, Kho- discussion, however, are the effects that a meini’s successors have chosen to support nuclear accord might have on internal Ira- the oppressor, not the oppressed. nian politics and society. Specifically, how Khomeini wore the black turban might a final nuclear agreement between that signified his pride in his long and Iran and the West influence the pros- noble Arab lineage. Khamenei, Khatami, pects for democracy and democratization and even Nasrallah wear it also. But the within the Islamic Republic? Iranian leadership’s meddling in Arab June 2009 is a key reference point in the countries is backfiring. Arabs will not be struggle for democracy within Iran. Fear- forced to wear a political suit tailored in ing a return of the reformists to power, Washington, London, or Paris. They also the Iranian regime falsified the presi- reject even the fanciest garb cut by the dential election results that would have most skillful tailor in Tehran. removed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from

CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 133 TAHRIR FORUM the presidency. As a result, a nonviolent political conditions that produced them mini-revolt known as the Green Move- were to change, however, these doors to ment demanded a vote recount, greater democratization could be reopened. political transparency, and more broadly, At the international level, Iran’s dis- the democratization of Iran. Protests pute with the permanent members of the rocked the country for six months before United Nations Security Council and they were violently suppressed. Accord- Germany (P5+1) has negatively affected ing to the commander of the Islamic the prospects for democracy in several Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Green ways. The broad sanctions placed on Iran Movement posed a greater threat to the have had a greater impact on ordinary Ira- internal stability of the Islamic Republic nians than they have had on the regime. than the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. In particular, civil society and the middle As a result of this event, Iran’s post- class, which forms the core support base revolutionary social contract lay in tatters. for the democratic opposition, have borne Until this point, Iran’s clerical leaders were the brunt of Iran’s collapsing economy. able to carefully manage public demands Rather than focus on political organiz- for political change and factional rivalry ing, a focus on simple survival has taken via an electoral process that though never priority. It is precisely for this reason that “free” was perceived to be “fair,” in the some of the most vociferous defenders of sense that the integrity of the ballot box a nuclear deal with the West are Iranian was guaranteed. After the stolen election civil society and human rights activists. of 2009 and the ensuing crackdown, this Secondly, Iran’s ruling oligarchy has consensus no longer existed. The base of successfully deployed a nationalist narra- support of the Islamic Republic narrowed tive to justify its nuclear policy internally. considerably as a deep crisis of political Tensions with the West are portrayed legitimacy set in. through the long history of foreign inter- Six years have passed, however, since vention in Iran. Iranians have been told this critical moment in Iran’s post-revo- by their rulers that once again Western lutionary history. While the legacy of the powers are bullying Iran, threatening Green Movement continues to haunt the to bomb them, and applying a double Islamic Republic, in recent years a set of standard in attempting to dictate Iran’s political developments, at the interna- internal energy policy. These arguments tional, regional, and domestic levels, have have resonated across the ideological coalesced to limit the prospects for politi- spectrum. Today many secular Irani- cal change and to bolster authoritarianism ans who wouldn’t ordinarily support in Iran. Collectively, these developments the Islamic Republic make an exception have closed the door for democratiza- when comes the nuclear impasse with the tion in the short term. If the social and West for reasons of national pride.

134 CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 TAHRIR FORUM

Thus, by casting itself as the defender events, aptly summarizes how recent of national sovereignty, Iran’s leadership regional chaos has reduced demands has benefited from the nuclear standoff for political change. Reflecting the new with the West. After a nuclear agree- temper among Iranian democrats, he ment, the manipulation of this issue to now takes the position that “if we want boost the regime’s legitimacy will be a far to emphasize our own points of view more difficult task. This point has been over those of our competitors within the indirectly acknowledged by the editor system, the result will be another Syria.” of Shargh, a leading reformist newspaper, All of this has shaped domestic Iranian who has noted that if “there’s less tension politics in negative ways for democra- internationally, there’ll be more stability tization. In 2015, several trends are now internally,” implying that a nuclear deal discernible. The first trend is unrelent- would help create better social conditions ing state repression. The crackdown that for democratization. followed Green Movement protests has A set of regional events has also indi- been ongoing and arguably the level of rectly bolstered authoritarianism in Iran. suppression is greater today than it was The post-Arab Spring regional chaos, in 2009. The hardline-controlled Iranian marked by sectarianism, the rise of the judiciary continues to hand out heavy Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the spread of sentences to civil society activists; censor- Salafi-jihadism, and the collapse of Libya, ship and executions are at record levels; Syria, Iraq, and now Yemen, have scared and women and minorities are subject to Iranians away from demanding political ongoing harassment, marginalization, and change. As one Iranian blogger has noted, discrimination. In a press conference that “People now think twice about taking coincided with the second anniversary of action to change the system because they his election, President Hassan Rouhani know change might result in a disaster.” admitted that since coming to power there These regional events have reinforced has been “little opening” for advancing his a preexisting Iranian disdain for vio- campaign promise to increase social and lence and revolutionary change. Iranian political freedoms. He blamed rightwing political culture has been deeply scarred “pressure groups” for this, while remind- by the upheavals of the 1979 revolution, ing his supporters to be patient because the bloody Iran-Iraq war, and the post- “changes cannot take place overnight.” September 11, 2001, chaos that engulfed The second trend pertains to the neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan in the ongoing and deepening crisis of legiti- aftermath of the American occupations. macy facing the Islamic Republic. This is Prominent reformist journalist and Green the Iranian regime’s Achilles’ heel. While Movement supporter Saeed Leylaz, who foreign crises help direct attention away was sentenced to prison after the 2009 from it, this dominant feature of Iranian

CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 135 TAHRIR FORUM politics fundamentally shapes state-soci- explicitly reject the values and norms of ety relations today. the Islamic Republic. Widespread secu- Evidence of this legitimation crisis is larization exists, especially among young abundant. For example, in February, the people and among the sizable urban and Iranian judiciary suddenly banned Ira- middle classes. This is most visible in nian media from publishing comments by terms of avoiding the key Islamic ritu- or images of former reformist President als of prayer and fasting. The Ministry of Mohammad Khatami. Why a two-time Health recently announced that 150 alco- president who occupied the second-highest hol treatment centers would be opening office in the country for eight years sud- in Iran in response to a growing societal denly posed a threat to political order is a epidemic. This is noteworthy because revealing question. Part of the answer lies the Islamic Republic officially bans the in the fact that as a reformist politician production, sale, and consumption of and Green Movement supporter, Khatami alcohol. After the 1979 revolution, there remains a popular and influential figure. was a major attempt to construct a new With parliamentary elections scheduled Iranian Muslim citizen that rejected for 2016, Iran’s clerical elite are starting to Western and secular values. The colossal panic. There is great fear that the control failure of this project is hard to miss. of the parliament could be lost to reformist Even the supreme leader has publicly parties. In fact, Ali Saeedi, Supreme Leader acknowledged that the Islamic Republic Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s special represen- faces a crisis of legitimacy. During the last tative to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard presidential election, fearing a low voter Corps, openly acknowledged this fear in turnout, he appealed to Iranians to turn a recent speech. Likewise, the head of the up at the ballot box including those who powerful Guardian Council, Ahmad Jan- “for whatever reason [do] not support nati, went a step further and announced that the regime of the Islamic Republic.” He when it comes to the ideological screening instead appealed to their sense of (secu- of candidates for parliament, “those who lar) nationalism, arguing that a high voter have an (ideological) background that is turnout would send a strong message to unknown and after investigation this still Iran’s enemies. In a more recent speech on remains unclear, the Guardian Council the anniversary of the death of Ayatollah does not have the right to approve them.” Khomeini, the supreme leader expressed In other words, there is an assumption that a fear of liberal values penetrating Iran. every Iranian citizen is guilty (of regime He specifically chastised those who were disloyalty) until proven innocent. distorting Khomeini’s legacy by claiming At the level of society, there is irre- he was “liberal-minded, which under no futable evidence of Iranians displaying conditions existed in his political, intel- behaviors and pursuing lifestyles that lectual, and cultural behavior.”

136 CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 TAHRIR FORUM

A nuclear deal could help put Iran modernization (literacy, mass commu- back on the road to democratization. One nications, and a modern economy), a of the most controversial aspects of the suitable class structure (the existence of a agreement is the sunset clause. This is the sizable middle class), and a proper political provision that states that for fifteen years culture (norms, habits, and values that are Iran will have a limited nuclear program democracy-enhancing). Equally impor- under strict international inspection but tant are the demographic numbers that are after this time period, these restrictions favorable to democratization. Specifically, will be lifted. Western critics have pointed young people now constitute the major- to this clause to argue that this “paves ity of Iran’s population. They are highly Iran’s path to the bomb”—all the country educated, globally connected, politically has to do is wait out the clock. Ignored in secular, and deeply alienated from Islamist this debate, however, is that in the coming rule, and what’s more, they desire substan- fifteenyears, the Islamic Republic will face tive gradual, nonviolent political change. increasing challenges from within society that will affect its future political stability and possibly its political trajectory. Human Rights Is The biggest challenge will be the likely Good Business death of the supreme leader, who turned 76 last July. Given the enormous power By Gissou Nia his office wields and the fact there is no senior cleric with sufficient political and Even before the dramatic announcement religious authority that can replace him, of a finalnuclear deal between Iran and the the inevitable departure of Ali Khame- permanent members of the United Nations nei will produce an enormous internal Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) in crisis for the Islamic Republic. When this Vienna, speculation began about the eco- will happen and how it might play out is nomic bonanza that could result from the unknown, but Khamenei’s passing will lifting of sanctions against Iran and its create a unique crisis of governance that reintegration into the global market. democratic forces will be able to exploit. In post-sanctions Iran, reinvigorated Thus, over the medium term, Iran’s oil revenues, a rising middle class of con- democratic prospects seem brighter. Not sumers with a taste for global brands, only is there a long tradition of demo- and an already growing tourism industry cratic activism stretching back to over are predicted to create major money- one hundred years, but the preconditions making opportunities for European and for democracy that social scientists gen- North American companies seeking to erally agree upon already exist in Iran. do business in the Islamic Republic. With To wit: high levels of socioeconomic the country’s vast natural resources and

CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 137 TAHRIR FORUM educated population of nearly eighty While the terms of the nuclear deal do million, it is no surprise that the Middle not tie human rights reform to the lifting East’s last untapped market has foreign of sanctions, the opportunity to do so in investors salivating over potential profits. another way remains. Corporate actors Amid all the excitement over the Iran looking to invest in the country can be as negotiations, there was scant discussion responsible for encouraging and uphold- of Iran’s dismal human rights record. The ing human rights as governments. And lifting of sanctions presents an opportu- governments, ultimately charged with the nity not only for big profits, but gains monitoring and oversight of corporate in the country’s human rights standards. actors under their jurisdiction, should Foreign corporations, and the govern- establish and enforce the regulation ments that regulate their activities both at needed for model corporate behavior. home and abroad, stand to play a major As a start, foreign investors look- role in attaching human rights norms to ing to partner on tourism ventures can the renewal of economic ties. insist that any business relationship be Over the past decade, the application conditioned on gender parity in the of human rights standards to business has workplace. This can counter recent ini- increased in global importance, starting tiatives, such as the Reducing Women’s in 2005 with the appointment of a United Work Hours Bill (introduced by the out- Nations expert on business and human going Ahmadinejad administration and rights, and a resulting framework of guid- passed by parliament in late 2014), aimed ing principles. While the initial focus of at curtailing women’s participation in the this growing practice within international workforce. law was to encourage state accountability Companies seeking to invest in Iran’s for human rights violations committed oil and gas sector could qualify such deals by (third party) private actors, the ques- on stringent environmental and labor tion of what responsibilities corporations standards. Investors exploring the poten- have in upholding these same standards tial for construction of hotels, shopping has also become increasingly important. malls, and retail chains should link their As a chronic human rights abuser, Iran investment to better rights protection for has no shortage of violations that poten- Afghan refugees, who are often tasked tial investors and governments should be with this manual labor. And companies aware of. Among the problems that stand seeking to enter Iran’s telecommunica- out are a soaring execution rate, discrimi- tions market must be apprised of the natory laws against women, persecution state’s monitoring of communications of ethnic and religious minorities, the tar- and use of this information in the repres- geting of journalists and dissidents, and sion of its citizenry, before making any the dismantling of labor unions. decision to partner in this sector.

138 CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 TAHRIR FORUM

Just as the startup scene in Iran is being willing to pay more for products and lauded as a hub of innovation and source of services provided by companies that are potential solutions to social and economic committed to positive social and envi- problems in the country, big business ronmental impact. should lead by tethering their investment Many argue that doing any business to human rights standards that will set with Iran will extend the lifeline of a the tone for socially responsible invest- repressive political regime. The removal ment in a post-deal Iran. Some states, like of sanctions will effectively eliminate the Namibia, Brazil, and Japan, have already legal tools for preventing investment in taken the initiative by incorporating dis- Iranian businesses. The best way forward cussion of Iran’s adherence to human is for both corporate actors and govern- rights standards in ongoing bilateral talks ments to link human rights reforms with concerning increased business and trade the promise of renewed economic ties ties, and advising corporate actors within with the Islamic Republic. their jurisdictions accordingly. In a world where corporations regu- larly turn a blind eye to state surveillance Tehran’s Post- and other human rights violations, such Deal Dilemma talk might sound overly idealistic. But there are cases where the reintegration of a coun- By Tarek Osman try’s economy into the global market has gone hand-in-hand with (relative) progress The deal to regulate Iran’s nuclear pro- in human rights. A closed and oppres- gram is a significant political success for sive regime, the Burmese junta moved the Iranian regime. It will dramatically toward democratic and social reforms on ease sanctions against the country, and the promise of renewed business ties with gradually allow Iran access to some $100 the outside world. The result has been not billion in frozen financial assets. And, it only economic, but political liberalization. demonstrates the Iranian regime’s ability In Iran, where a corrupt kleptocracy of to successfully negotiate a long, compli- clerics and militias controls much of the cated, and fraught process with Western economy, the promise of lucrative trade powers and arrive at a relatively favora- with the West might, ironically, provide ble result. Yet, the deal imposes an acute incentives for political reform. dilemma on the regime. Aside from the human rights implica- The deal presents Iran with a historic tions, enforcing market-wide standards opportunity to alter its regional and inter- is also good business: studies show national positioning of the last thirty-five that global buyers are becoming more years. Iran can now initiate a dialogue with mindful of their consumerism, and are the West with the objective of arriving at a

CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 139 TAHRIR FORUM new relationship between the two whereby Hassan Rouhani, has managed to absorb their interests in the region do not collide. some of the anger that his predecessor, The case is strong on both sides. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, had stirred For the West, Sunni militant Islamism is among wide groups of the country’s now the primary threat emanating from upper middle class. And yet, many Iranian the Middle East. Iran is the sole Middle strategists know that the dissatisfaction Eastern country with the military, intelli- that young compatriots have with the gence, logistical resources, and, crucially, regime has not subsided. They remember the willingness to commit ground forces that only six years ago, Tehran witnessed in battles against groups such as Jabhat major demonstrations that seemed the Al-Nusra, the Islamic State in Iraq and seed of an uprising. Significant economic Syria, and others (and with a record of improvements could be highly beneficial doing so). Also from a Western perspec- to the stability of the Islamic Republic, tive, Iran could be a stabilizing force in especially given the looming moment of potentially explosive countries, not only transition, as Supreme Leader Ayatollah Iraq but also Lebanon. Ali Khamenei, 76, leaves the scene. Economically, Iranian and Western Strategically, a rapprochement with interests could be aligned. Oil contrib- the West would inevitably lessen the utes less than 40 percent of Iran’s gross importance of the West’s (and especially domestic product. Reasonably priced oil America’s) alliance with the Gulf states. will not be detrimental to Iran, provided This would give Iran a much wider that the country benefits from favorable manuevering space in the Gulf and the trade agreements. eastern Mediterranean. Also from the A rapprochement does not necessarily Iranian perspective, there are soft factors fly in the face of Western values. Despite that make such a rapprochement appeal- its theological political system, Iran is by ing. Like all old nations with illustrious far more democratic than almost all West- histories, Iran craves respect, not from ern allies in the Middle East. Plus, Iran the countries it sees as lesser, “nouveau is an old, rich, and highly sophisticated riche” ones, but from those it deems its civilization; it has the cultural aspects peers, the big Western nations. that appeal to, resonate with, and get the Despite all of these reasons, a rap- respect of the West. prochement with the West would pose From Iran’s perspective, a rapproche- an excruciating dilemma for the regime. ment with the West presents the country Iran’s 1979 revolution, the legitimacy with potentially lucrative economic basis and anchor for the current regime, opportunities. In addition to the obvious was more than a populist uprising benefits, this will be of high value to the against an oppressive king, Shah Moham- regime. The current Iranian president, mad Reza Pahlavi. Despite its different

140 CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 TAHRIR FORUM constituents, the revolution quickly gave crucially Iranians’ veneration of their rich rise to a colossal social movement that history) were at best marginal ornaments came under the overarching umbrella of around the country’s defining identity: the political project that Ayatollah Kho- Islamism, at worst falls into sinfulness that meini had envisaged. This project was not ought to be corrected. Focusing on Islam- particularly focused on the shah; Kho- ism and eschewing Persianness gradually meini was also equally indifferent toward led to a distorted view of Iran’s history the wants of his people; he was almost and regional positioning: undermining the dismissive of the social and economic cultural factors that underpinned its cen- needs that many observers believed were turies-old intellectual hegemony over its the real triggers of the Iranian revolu- immediate neighborhood and accentuat- tion. For Khomeini, the shah was a minor ing its religious and ideological worldview. figure in a “corrupt global power struc- In this view, the Islamic Republic’s ture” led by the United States (“the Great support for groups such as Hezbollah Satan”) and perpetuated by “the sinful and Hamas, stance against the United West.” In his view, the revolution was a States and Israel, condescension toward religious wave emanating from the heart- modern Western modes of thinking and land of Islamic Shiism, heralding a return lifestyles, and antagonism against the to Islamic rule as he understood—and Arab monarchies of the Gulf, do not just defined—it. That wave was supposed stem from political calculations or stra- to reach Shiite-majority Iraq, the entire tegic objectives and interests. They are Gulf, and to extend to parts of the eastern rooted in the intellectual foundations Mediterranean, the home of large Shiite upon which the current Iranian political communities. And for a moment, in the structure was built. early 1980s, Khomeini even thought that his Islamic model could transcend Shiite Though some Iranian leaders in the last Islam and inspire new thinking in major two decades have tried to instill in the Sunni Muslim countries such as Egypt, Islamic Republic a more humanistic one that could inspire other Islamic revo- social contract and worldview, none has lutions. Khomeini’s project was not about ever sought to demolish the foundational local or regional politics. He believed he principles that Khomeini had erected. was resuscitating the one true form of In different ways, “reformers” such as governance anchored on the one true Mohammad Khatami, Mehdi Karroubi, legitimacy, the one mandated by God. and Rouhani, have wanted to evolve the Khomeini also shunned Persianness. system, widen the interpretation of what For him, Iran was first and foremost an an “Islamic Republic” means, and solid- Islamic country. Its specific cultural fea- ify the regime’s legitimacy, particularly tures (language, arts, crafts, cuisine, and after it became clear to them that, three

CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 141 TAHRIR FORUM decades after the revolution, demograph- from his legacy and policies would tran- ics and social changes were putting strong scend the realm of political and strategic pressures on the political structure. This thinking. For many influential Iranian means that the division within Iran’s decision-makers this would be tanta- political elite between “hardliners” and mount to betraying their own faith, what “reformers” is not about the nature of they sincerely believe is God’s will. the state, its position in the world, and Iran’s classic mercantile mentality its grand objectives; it is primarily about could prevail. Many Iranian decision- the permissible degrees of pushing the makers might try to leverage the oppor- boundaries that Khomeini had laid down. tunities that the deal offers, without A rapprochement with the West and deviating from the “righteous path” they pursuing a new regional positioning for believe Khomeini put them on. That will Iran, one in which its interests are aligned mean taking half measures: cooperating with the West’s, would be tantamount with the West in Iraq and Afghanistan, to removing the pillars upon which the against militant Sunni Islamism, and in Islamic Republic has relied for over three some trade agreements, while at the same decades. Even if the strategic and inter- time continuing to support “resistance nal political cases for that shift of strategy groups” such as Hezbollah and Hamas and positioning are compelling, it would and projecting Iran as a regional Shiite take a totally different worldview and a power. As it happens in the bazaars of dramatically charismatic set of leaders to Shiraz and Esfahan, half measures con- affect that change. None of these factors clude some transactions; traders return exist today within the Iranian leadership. home quite happy with the day’s profits. Such a shift would also be very pain- But half measures hardly make a mere ful. The vast majority of this generation trader a shabandar: a chief merchant who of Iranian leaders look to Khomeini as secures his political legitimacy over trade more than just a revolutionary leader who in a region and thereby acquires colossal created the regime they preside over. For wealth and prestige. them, Khomeini was the man who reju- It might take a new cadre of leaders venated Shiite Islamism after at least two in the Iranian political structure to see centuries of political and social margin- that Khomeini’s legacy has brought them alization. He was the man who came to nowhere. Some might understand that represent the will and aspirations of tens the anger that triggered the 2009 demon- of millions of Shiites, in and outside Iran. strations remains. And that military and To the Islamic Republic of Iran, Khomeini political successes in troubled countries is not the country’s George Washing- such as Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq do not ton but the Iranian Saint Peter. Casting assuage the frustrations of the groups with aside his views as obsolete and deviating the greatest potential in Iranian society.

142 CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 TAHRIR FORUM

The deal offers Iran a golden oppor- trouble-free until Shah Mohammad Reza tunity to evolve, with dignity and huge Pahlavi was overthrown in 1979. “After benefits, from the system that has held it the 1979 revolution, Iran started to inter- down for the last three decades, and shape fere in internal Arab affairs of countries a new present and future for its society around them,” a Saudi official told me and for itself in the region. But for that at a conference this year. “Before the to happen, Iran will have to escape the 1979 revolution, there was no conflict inhibitions of its taboos. So far, its leaders between Sunni and Shia. We want to live seem neither willing nor able to do that. in peace and harmony, but Iran will not allow the region to do so.” Putting aside this generous historical interpretation of Ending the Iranian-Saudi and Sunni-Shiite relations, Iranian-Saudi Saudi officials routinely emphasize both publicly and privately that Iran should Cold War stay out of “Arab affairs.” By Reza Marashi This overtly sectarian policy toward Iran (where are the Saudi government pro- While unprecedented diplomacy has tests against Turkey openly intervening in changed the face of United States-Iran “Arab affairs”?) is at worst racist and at relations over the past two years, the best dishonest. Riyadh’s zero-sum mental- opposite has plagued Iranian-Saudi ity fuels misperceptions that could cause Arabian relations. A diplomacy deficit it to miss the best opportunity in over a between the two regional powers has decade to build durable regional security. exacerbated volatility across the Middle Saudi misperceptions about Iran’s regional East. According to a well-connected ambitions cannot be overstated. “Iran Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) ana- seeks to be a hegemon. This is the real lyst, President Barack Obama was frank source of instability in the Middle East,” with his Saudi counterparts on this issue, another Saudi official told me. “Iran is telling them: “We’re solving our prob- trying to occupy Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, lems with Iran. You should do the same.” Bahrain, and Yemen. If it truly demon- Instead, misperceptions about Iran’s strates its desire for peaceful relations, we regional ambitions and its domestic pow- will of course reciprocate—but not until it erbrokers have caused Riyadh’s leaders to ceases its occupation of Arab lands.” With shun regional integration and collective the possible exception of Israel, no other security in favor of unnecessary attempts country in the world shares Saudi Arabia’s to counter Iranian power. extremist reading of Iran’s regional policy. To hear some Saudis tell it, rela- From Iran’s perspective, it has long tions between Tehran and Riyadh were suffered from strategic loneliness because

CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 143 TAHRIR FORUM it is a majority Shiite, Persian state in a bridge regional divides through political Middle East dominated by Sunnis and Islam. In doing so, they traded successes Arabs. It has no obvious regional part- and failures with the shah: Iran’s blend of ners or allies. Despite this, Iran is not political Islam and anti-imperialism won striving to become a regional power, as it valuable support on the Arab street, Saudi officials suggest—it is a regional but simultaneously destroyed relations power, based on its size, demograph- with many Arab monarchs and strong- ics, resources, and culture alone. From men—Saudi Arabia above all else—who monarchist to mullah, decision-makers feared political Islam more than the in Tehran have believed for decades that shah’s military and economic power. Iran is first among equals when it comes Today, a cornerstone of Iran’s regional to regional security issues. power status continues to be its support However, Iran has also learned the for Arab and Muslim constituencies that hard way that neither hard power nor soft seek to push back against perceived mar- power alone can produce regional accep- ginalization at home and in the region. tance of Iranian power. In the 1970s, From Palestine to Lebanon, Iraq to the shah understood that conventional Yemen, Iranian support has been directed military superiority and record oil rev- to ethnic and religious groups whose enues could not establish a sustainable domestic persecution predates the estab- position as a regional powerbroker. Iran lishment of an Islamic Republic in Iran. also needed its Arab neighbors to accept Rather than pushing for an overthrow Iranian power. To that end, he sought of the existing political systems in these legitimacy in the region by either befriend- respective countries, Tehran believes it ing regional governments or seeking to can achieve its strategic objectives by resolve outstanding issues of tension. committing varying degrees of money, The shah succeeded up to a point, settling weapons, intelligence, and political border problems with Saudi Arabia and advice to these communities. Contrary to Iraq, and improving bilateral relations Saudi assertions, Iranian decision-makers with Egypt after President Anwar Sadat do not need to interfere in “Arab affairs” realigned the country with the Western because they know they can outsource bloc. Yet, he did not fully gain acceptance the fight to marginalized constituencies of Iran’s regional power status because he who have self-motivating grievances. As neglected soft power: bridging the Sunni- Iran’s allies in these respective countries Shiite and Persian-Arab divides. empower themselves domestically, Teh- ran’s hand is strengthened as it jockeys After the revolution in 1979, the Islamic with Riyadh over regional power. Republic’s leadership recognized the Iran’s regional power is already a shah’s neglect of soft power and sought to reality. Saudi Arabia fears that Iran’s

144 CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 TAHRIR FORUM reintegration into the global political and Ayatollah Khamenei and the heads of the economic systems will tip the regional three branches of government. balance of power in Tehran’s favor. The current secretary of Iran’s SNSC, “Sunni Arab countries do not want to see Admiral Ali Shamkhani, is a former the emergence of close relations between defense minister in the Mohammad the U.S. and Iran,” a Saudi official told Khatami administration, an ethnic Arab, me. “Saudi Arabia does not want Iran to and perhaps most importantly, enjoys the become a U.S. ally.” confidence of Ayatollah Khamenei. He Saudi misperceptions about Iran’s was appointed Khamenei’s representa- regional policy powerbrokers are no tive on the SNSC in 2013, which should less pronounced. “Divide and conquer be noteworthy to Saudi Arabia given his is an Iranian strategic approach, so why demonstrated regional policy preferences: should we play into Iran’s hands by in 2004, he brokered and implemented trying to improve relations?” another a security agreement between Iran and Saudi official told me. It would be use- Saudi Arabia, and was awarded the less to talk to President Hassan Rouhani Order of Abdulaziz Al-Saud by the late or Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Saudi King Fahd Abdulaziz Al-Saud— Zarif, he said, because “they are not the the only Iranian minister to ever receive real powerbrokers.” Instead, he believed such an award. At that time, Rouhani was Qassem Suleimani, head of Iran’s Quds Khamenei’s representative on the SNSC, Force, and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Zarif was Iran’s ambassador to the United Khamenei “wield the real power in Iran.” Nations, and Soleimani had held his posi- It is frightening for a regional power and tion as commander of Iran’s Quds Force a neighboring country to have such a for approximately six years. fundamental misunderstanding of deci- The apex of Iran’s cordial relations sion-making processes within Iran. with Saudi Arabia came at a time when the Contrary to Saudi assertions, politi- same Iranian officials were driving Teh- cal power in Iran runs through a complex ran’s policy a decade ago. And since late and multilayered structure. Most deci- 2013, Shamkhani, Khamenei, Rouhani, sions are made in conjunction with Zarif, and Soleimani have once again been diverse and sometimes competing power working together in an effort to improve centers. Iran’s Supreme National Secu- ties with Iran’s Arab neighbors. For the rity Council (SNSC) is responsible for past two years, Iran has publicly pro- defining the country’s defense and secu- moted a narrative that its own national rity policies and priorities. In a 2011 security goals require peace and coopera- book, President Rouhani explains that tion with regional powers, which in turn key decisions are made in a small circle requires a certain degree of accommoda- of SNSC members, including mainly tion between Iran and the West.

CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 145 TAHRIR FORUM

From Palestine to Lebanon, Iraq to Riyadh does not want them to. In the Yemen, Iran’s philosophy in the region is meantime, Iran is unlikely to impose that everyone should be included in the heavy costs on Saudi Arabia for its poli- process. Even in Syria—the one example cies because Iranian decision-makers where Iran is backing the regime rather believe the Saudis are already paying than a marginalized minority—Iranian heavy costs for their own mistakes. If Iran decision-makers have long acknowledged takes action against Saudi Arabia, it will the need for political solutions based on only help justify false arguments against negotiated settlements between domestic Tehran emanating from Riyadh. Perhaps political actors and regional powers. It is more importantly, Iran’s regional policy Saudi Arabia that has rejected such nego- powerbrokers will continue to leave the tiations, instead issuing preconditions to door open for diplomacy because they diplomacy and preferring to exclude Iran know that if Iran’s regional power is not politically, diplomatically, and militarily. accepted by neighboring countries, Iran For its part, Iran has tried to repair cannot guarantee its own security. relations with Saudi Arabia from the outset of Hassan Rouhani’s presidency. Saudi Arabia is correct when it points out One month after taking office, he called that regional stability—elusive over the for closer Iranian-Saudi ties, hailed the past four years—requires Riyadh’s partici- kingdom as a friend and brother, and pation. If the new cast of Saudi characters said improving relations with neighbor- running the kingdom believes that stabil- ing countries is a top priority. Last year, ity can be achieved without Iran playing an Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Hos- equal role, they are doomed to repeat the sein Amir Abdollahian travelled to Saudi ideological mistakes that plagued the region Arabia to meet with then-Foreign Minis- throughout the 1980s, when Iran sought ter Saud Al-Faisal. One month later, Zarif to export its revolution and Saudi Arabia took the initiative to visit his Saudi coun- bankrolled Saddam Hussein’s eight-year terpart at the United Nations General war against Iran. With a nuclear deal com- Assembly. Zarif again extended an olive pleted, the time is ripe for Saudi Arabia to branch by traveling to Saudi Arabia for find a face-saving way to switch gears and the late King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz Al- reciprocate Iran’s offers of engagement. Saud’s funeral. According to two European Saudi officialstold me that a big over- Union officials, Iran has also tried track- ture from Iran could help jumpstart a two diplomacy efforts in their respective thaw between Tehran and Riyadh, but European capitals but Saudi Arabia is not when I pressed them for specifics, they prepared to take them seriously. reverted back to unrealistic talking points: Simply put, Tehran’s efforts to repair withdrawing Iranian support for Bashar relations have not borne fruit because Al-Assad in Syria as a precondition to,

146 CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 TAHRIR FORUM rather than an outcome of, negotiations. being a regional power that is a force for A more fruitful approach would be qui- stability and collective security. etly commencing high-level diplomacy This approach was advocated by between the two countries in an effort to Saudi Arabia as recently as 2004. At the accommodate legitimate Iranian security Manama Dialogue in Bahrain, Saud Al- objectives in return for Iranian policy Faisal announced “an urgent need for modifications. Trading concessions a collective effort aimed at developing a of equal value can serve as a force for new and more solid framework for Gulf regional stability by breaking down the security.” He went on to say: “A regional hostility and misperceptions that para- security framework that includes all the lyze bilateral relations. countries of the region is the best guar- For Riyadh, this would include rec- antee for peace and stability in the Gulf. ognition that: one, neither Saudi Arabia Such a framework should be based on nor global powers can contain Iran four pillars: the GCC, Yemen, Iraq, indefinitely; and two, it can better influ- and Iran.” He continued, “Iran should ence Iran by helping integrate the Islamic play a vital role in maintaining the secu- Republic into the region’s political and rity of the region. To do so our Iranian economic structures rather than trying friends need to come to terms with the to keep it out. Adopting a policy of inte- requirements of developing high levels of gration would better reflect the region’s political, economic, cultural, and security natural balance, which in turn would cooperation with their neighbors based make it more stable. Saudi Arabia’s cur- on common interests and the mutual rent winner-take-all approach has left it refrain from interference in the domestic in a weaker position, while its policy of affairs of others.” détente changed Iran’s pattern of conduct The Iran that Saud Al-Faisal was as recently as 2004. There’s no reason describing eleven years ago is the Iran to believe that it will produce different of today. Second chances don’t come results today. often. Ending the Iranian-Saudi cold For its part, Tehran must allevi- war, and building a collective security ate Saudi concerns by detailing how framework for the Middle East—one its regional ambitions do not, and will in which security is built and sustained not, outstrip its post-sanctions role and together rather than at the expense of one resources. Iran should also detail steps to another—is the only option that has not reduce its use of asymmetric warfare as a truly been tried. It is also the option most political tool in the region as Saudi Arabia likely to succeed. takes steps to reintegrate the Islamic Republic. Together, these measures will (Author’s note: The conference was held demonstrate Tehran’s commitment to under the Chatham House Rule, which

CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 147 TAHRIR FORUM requires that identities of speakers not be elder Netanyahu was a disciple of Vladi- revealed. Accordingly, I have not identi- mir Jabotinsky, founder of the school of fied speakers by name in this article.) Zionism that birthed, eventually, Israel’s Likud party. Jabotinsky advocated a Jewish polity Behind that would seek, unapologetically, maxi- Netanyahu’s malist territorial goals and stand proudly in the face of the inevitable international Obsession opposition and local resistance. For Zion- By Owen Alterman ists from the Left, anti-Semitism was a curse of being stateless, to be cured once Some say Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Jews were sovereign in their own land Netanyahu is obsessed with the Iranian and normalized among the peoples of nuclear issue. Some say he just cares deeply the earth. For Jabotinsky and the elder about it. Whatever the case, the feeling Netanyahu, nothing would cure Jew- draws on the historical passions of many hatred. The only option was for Jews others, including Netanyahu’s own father. to stand steadfast against it. The goyim Benzion Netanyahu, a history profes- hated the Jews, and they always would. sor, tutored his son on his own life’s work, What mattered was the resilience of an encyclopedic history of the Spanish Jewish fortitude. Inquisition. In 1492, with the Reconquista In 1937, Jabotinsky visited Warsaw to of Spain from Muslim rulers, King Ferdi- speak to the city’s Jews. “Liquidate the nand and Queen Isabella embarked on a diaspora,” he told them, “or the diaspora campaign to expel Jews from the country. will liquidate you.” The message: Jews For centuries, Spain had been the world’s should leave at once for the Land of Israel, leading center of Jewish life and host to or else lie exposed to a hostility that could a celebrated coexistence among Jews, one day boil over. Jabotinsky’s words Christians, and Muslims. But Ferdinand were not met with great enthusiasm. Yet, and Isabella unraveled that coexistence. by 1945, most of those in the room likely Spain’s Jews were banished, penniless, to were dead. Of Poland’s 3.3 million Jews, Amsterdam or Salonika, or else faced the 90 percent were massacred in the Holo- torture chambers of the vicious Tomas de caust. Again, history had confirmed the Torquemada. dark prophecies of Jabotinsky’s—and Benzion Netanyahu wrote a nearly Benzion Netanyahu’s—worldview. 1,400-page book on the Spanish Inqui- This outlook is hardly one held by sition and its narrative of deceit and only Jabotinsky, Benzion, or Benjamin hostility toward the Jews. The choice of Netanyahu. It resonates throughout much research topic was no coincidence. The of Israeli society and the Jewish diaspora.

148 CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 TAHRIR FORUM

Nearly every Jew—whatever their own Israel’s establishment, given the potential family tree—bears personal stories of per- consequences for the state’s character. But secution in their own family tree. Beyond Netanyahu believes, rightly or wrongly, the Holocaust, these stories may draw that the status quo can be managed. The from as far back as the Spanish Inquisition march of the Iranian regime, on the other or as recent as the mid-century pogroms hand, must be broken. of the Arab World, or the anti-Semitism The complexity, in history and today, of the Soviet Union that continued well is that the Iranian people are not the into the 1980s. This history of persecution enemy. Jewish tradition views the ancient continues to animate Israeli politics. Persians—in contrast to the Egyptians, Benjamin Netanyahu has found a Babylonians, Greeks, or Romans—as rel- ready audience for his worldview—and atively benign. The Persian ruler, Cyrus, has been elected three times by Israeli permitted Jewish exiles to return from voters. Netanyahu is not Barack Obama. Babylon to rebuild the Temple in Jerusa- He believes that human nature is rotten: lem. In the Book of Esther, a tale of Jewish the Palestinians will not make peace with salvation from annihilation by a Persian a Jewish state; the Arab Spring will be monarch, the story’s chief villain, Haman, won by the extremists; and the Iranian is, according to Jewish tradition, not even regime will build a nuclear bomb and Persian but Amalekite, part of a mythical leverage it to try to destroy the Jewish nation that will pursue the Jews until the commonwealth. end of days. In the ancient text, the Per- That latter threat has consumed sians may be decadent and gullible, but Netanyahu. On almost all issues—eco- unlike the Amalekite Haman they are not nomic reform, religion and state, even hostile, and even show tolerance in run- the West Bank—Netanyahu has shown ning their multinational empire. flexibility for the paramount goal of In modern times, too, Israel and Iran personal political survival. But the ques- enjoyed warm diplomatic and people- tion of Iran’s nuclear program is an issue to-people relations before the Islamic above political considerations. For that, it Revolution in 1979. An older generation seems, Netanyahu would even give up the of Israelis, particularly those with Ira- acclaim of the prime ministership. This, nian family roots, remembers the country he believes, is the issue of our time. Other fondly. Relations between Jews and Pales- foes, whether Arab nationalism or jihad- tinians have been toxic for nearly a century. ism, may menace Israel. Yet today, none In contrast, some Israelis’ attitudes toward has similar momentum or capabilities to Iran are more like those of Americans the Iranian regime. The specter of a Pal- toward Cuba: nostalgia for a long-lost past estinian demographic majority between and regret about the politics that cut short the river and the sea preoccupies much of the cultural connections.

CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015 149 TAHRIR FORUM

Still, there are points where Jabotinsky it seriously. To date, that thinking has not and Netanyahu’s reading of history meets led Netanyahu, ever risk-averse about reality—and confirms Jews’ worst fears. military engagement, to pursue a strike For more than three decades, the Islamic on Iran. But Israel has not been shy in the Republic’s leaders have paraded their fol- past: in 1981, the government led a strike lowers through the streets with shouts of on an Iraqi nuclear reactor, and is alleg- “Death to Israel!” They have stomped edly responsible for a 2007 strike on a Israeli flags and rolled missiles through reactor in Syria. streets as part of demonstrations against The nature of the Iran deal requires Israel. Motivations for this anti-Israel trust: trust in the Iranian regime to speech are both ideological and cynical. comply, and trust in the international Ideologically, the revolution’s leaders community to enforce. Netanyahu, along viewed Israel as an illegitimate affront to with many Israelis, trusts neither. the Muslim collective. Cynically, hostility Both the Hebrew Bible and Jewish toward Israel serves the geopolitical needs tradition teach that the Jews are “a people of the Iranian regime, which seeks a posi- that dwells alone.” Zionism originated, in tion of power in the Arab World. It helps part, to temper this sense of powerless- the regime bolster its soft power among ness. Sovereignty has supplied a sense of an Arab public hostile to the Jewish state. efficacy lost for centuries. Still, the sense The regime’s hostility is not just lim- of isolation persists, as Zionism runs ited to words; it’s propped up non-state up against its geopolitical limits. Israel proxy groups like Hezbollah and Hamas is a small country, and the Jews a small along Israel’s borders. The umbrella of people. Unlike Americans, Europeans, or a nuclear-armed Iran might allow these Arabs, Israelis cannot count on civiliza- groups to make further gains and cause tional allies on a Huntingtonian map. greater suffering to Israelis and many It is simplistic to embrace the Ben- others in the Levant. Of course, Israelis zion Netanyahu narrative in its entirety, also face the risk that the Iranian regime and dangerous to apply it crudely to the would actually attack Israeli cities with Iranian nuclear issue. But the opposite is nuclear bombs. This is what social scien- no wiser. Israel must survive in a world tists call a “low-probability, high-impact where hostile parties—that will always be event.” In all likelihood, Israel could present in some measure—have greater deter or destroy an incoming nuclear access to catastrophic means, including missile. But, if not, the impact would be nuclear weapons. However obsessive cataclysmic. For this reason, whatever Netanyahu’s views on Iran, the realities the likelihood of an apocalyptic scenario, of Jewish history and Israeli geopolitics Israeli policymakers like Netanyahu treat cannot be dismissed.

150 CAIRO REVIEW 19/2015