Vol. 3 No. 19 May 7, 2021

COVID-19 ISSUE (12)

Outbreak Reports Mild Breakthrough Infection in a Healthcare Professional Working in the Isolation Area of a Hospital Designated for Treating COVID-19 Patients — Province, , March, 2021 397

A COVID-19 Outbreak — Nangong City, Province, China, January 2021 401

Index and First-Generation Cases in a COVID-19 Outbreak — Province, China, 2021 405

Notes from the Field Two Imported Cases of New Variant COVID-19 First Emerging in Nigeria — Province, China, March 12, 2021 409

Emerging Variants of B.1.617 Lineage Identified Among Returning Chinese Employees Working in India — Municipality, China, April 2021 411

Profiles Xiaoping Dong, China CDC’s Chief Expert of Virology 414 China CDC Weekly

Editorial Board Editor-in-Chief George F. Gao Deputy Editor-in-Chief Liming Li Gabriel M Leung Zijian Feng Executive Editor Feng Tan Members of the Editorial Board Xiangsheng Chen Xiaoyou Chen Zhuo Chen (USA) Xianbin Cong Gangqiang Ding Xiaoping Dong Mengjie Han Guangxue He Xi Jin Biao Kan Haidong Kan Qun Li Tao Li Zhongjie Li Min Liu Qiyong Liu Jinxing Lu Huiming Luo Huilai Ma Jiaqi Ma Jun Ma Ron Moolenaar (USA) Daxin Ni Lance Rodewald (USA) RJ Simonds (USA) Ruitai Shao Yiming Shao Xiaoming Shi Yuelong Shu Xu Su Chengye Sun Dianjun Sun Hongqiang Sun Quanfu Sun Xin Sun Jinling Tang Kanglin Wan Huaqing Linhong Wang Guizhen Wu Jing Wu Weiping Wu Xifeng Wu (USA) Yongning Wu Zunyou Wu Lin Xiao Fujie Xu (USA) Wenbo Xu Hong Yan Hongyan Yao Zundong Yin Hongjie Yu Shicheng Yu Xuejie Yu (USA) Jianzhong Zhang Liubo Zhang Rong Zhang Tiemei Zhang Wenhua Zhao Yanlin Zhao Xiaoying Zheng Zhijie Zheng (USA) Maigeng Zhou Xiaonong Zhou

Advisory Board Director of the Advisory Board Jiang Lu Vice-Director of the Advisory Board Yu Wang Jianjun Liu Members of the Advisory Board Chen Fu Gauden Galea (Malta) Dongfeng Gu Qing Gu Yan Guo Ailan Li Jiafa Liu Peilong Liu Yuanli Liu Roberta Ness (USA) Guang Ning Minghui Ren Chen Wang Hua Wang Kean Wang Xiaoqi Wang Zijun Wang Fan Wu Xianping Wu Jingjing Xi Jianguo Xu Jun Yan Gonghuan Yang Tilahun Yilma (USA) Guang Zeng Xiaopeng Zeng Yonghui Zhang

Editorial Office Directing Editor Feng Tan Managing Editors Lijie Zhang Yu Chen Peter Hao (USA) Senior Scientific Editors Ning Wang Ruotao Wang Shicheng Yu Qian Zhu Scientific Editors Weihong Chen Xudong Li Nankun Liu Qi Shi Xi Xu Qing Yue Xiaoguang Zhang Ying Zhang

Cover Photo: The 'double mutant' COVID-19 variant first emerging in India has spread around the world and has been discovered in more than 20 countries. China CDC Weekly

Outbreak Reports

Mild Breakthrough Infection in a Healthcare Professional Working in the Isolation Area of a Hospital Designated for Treating COVID-19 Patients — Shaanxi Province, China, March, 2021

Chaofeng Ma1,&; Songtao Xu2,&; Yecheng Yao3; Pengbo Yu4; You Xu5; Rui Wu1; Hailong Chen1; Xiaoping Dong2,6,7,8,#

date, more than 130 million confirmed cases and 2.8 Summary million deaths have been reported worldwide for a What is already known about this topic? crude case-fatality rate of 2.2%. COVID-19 vaccines Healthcare workers are at high risk of acquiring made with several technologies are currently being used COVID-19 from occupational exposure to COVID-19 in many countries. China has a national policy to virus during their daily medical service work. Excellent provide COVID-19 vaccines free of charge, and by the infection prevention and control measures and end of March 2021, nearly one hundred million people adequate personal protective equipment (PPE) are have been vaccinated. However, China’s overall essential to reduce the risk of hospital-acquired population immunity is far from established, and COVID-19. healthcare workers at the frontline of the fight against What is added by this report? COVID-19 are at high-risk of acquiring COVID-19 On March 17, 2021, a female healthcare professional during medical procedures (3–4). In many countries, who already received both doses of the COVID-19 healthcare workers, together with elderly people, vaccination and was working in the isolation area of a residents and personnel in long-term care facilities, designated COVID-19 hospital was diagnosed with social care personnel, and workers in essential public COVID-19 in Xi’an city. Her exposure likely occurred services are prioritized for COVID-19 vaccination. We five days before illness onset when she obtained report the first domestic COVID-19 breakthrough nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal swabs from the two infection in China — a vaccinated healthcare imported cases that were identified as belonging to the professional working in the isolation ward of a

B.1.1.7 lineage, the variant first detected in the United designated COVID-19 hospital. Kingdom. What are the implications for public health INVESTIGATION AND FINDINGS practices? Since the healthcare worker had been fully vaccinated On March 17, 2021, Xi’an Health Commission and had mild symptomatology, it is considered a mild reported a domestic COVID-19 case. The patient was breakthrough infection. All vaccines are associated with a 36-year-old female laboratorian working in a hospital breakthrough infections. In addition to rigorous designated for treatment of imported COVID-19 adherence to infection prevention and control cases. That day she was febrile, with a temperature of measures, use of adequate PPE, and using good clinical 37.9 °C; she had a cough and headache. She reported practices, the potential role of chronic upper respiratory no dyspnea or shortness of breath. Chest computed infection in acquiring COVID-19 during medical tomography (CT) revealed flocculent shadows in both procedures deserves further consideration. lungs. Throat swabs and blood samples were immediately obtained. Throat swabs were positive by The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) COVID-19-specific quantitative reverse-transcription pandemic, caused by COVID-19 virus also known as polymerase chain reaction (qRT-PCR), with the cycle severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 threshold (Ct) values of 34 for N gene and 35.27 for (SARS-CoV-2), was declared by the World Health ORF1ab fragment (Figure 1). Rapid COVID-19 Organization (WHO) on March 11, 2020 (1–2). To antibody tests were weakly positive for IgG and

Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention CCDC Weekly / Vol. 3 / No. 19 397 China CDC Weekly negative for IgM. She was diagnosed as a confirmed the isolation ward for medical treatment and COVID-19 case (regular type). observation. Her highest temperature was 37.2 °C, An epidemiological investigation was immediately recorded on March 19. Her cough increased slightly. launched. She had been healthy without fever or other She described dry mouth and mildly decreased sense of relevant abnormalities during the 14 days before smell. Rapid testing for COVID-19 virus antibody starting work in the isolation area on March 4. She had showed IgG positive and IgM weakly positive. been vaccinated with inactivated COVID-19 vaccine Chemiluminescence assay for total COVID-19 virus ( Institute of Biological Products Co. LTD) on antibody appeared strongly positive with a cutoff index December 30, 2020 and again on January 20, 2021. (COI) of 1,368 (Figure 1). On March 20, her She and her 33 workmates were working in the temperature was normal, and her sense of smell isolation area for a 3-week period. She lived in the improved slightly. Viral qRT-PCR was positive for N dormitory in an area separate from the isolation wards. gene (Ct: 37) and negative for ORF1ab. Her She lived and shared a bathroom in the dormitory with temperature remained normal and all other symptoms one colleague. On March 2 and March 11, she tested disappeared in the following days. Her oxygen negative for COVID-19 by qRT-PCR in the hospital’s saturation was never below 98% and she never routine testing of staff. Her main work was obtaining required supplemental oxygen. The patient remained throat swabs for COVID-19 cases in the isolation in the isolation hospital due to weakly positive qRT- wards and conducting blood, urine, and feces testing in PCR. On April 9, she recovered and was discharged the isolation area’s BSL-2 laboratory. She alternated from the isolation ward. every other day with another laboratorian for this Whole viral genome sequencing was conducted on work. Medical history review showed that she has an insolate from a throat swab specimen obtained on chronic rhinitis and usually breathes by mouth when March 17. Due to the low viral load of the sample, wearing a mask. sequences covering only 82% of the entire genome After diagnosis, she was immediately transferred to were obtainable. Sequence analysis revealed that the

PCR(-) March 2 Case 1 Case 1 & 2 Into isolation region March 4 ORF:14.85 United Kingdom N: 13.45 E: 13.71 variant B.1.1.7 March 6 Sampling Case 2 ORF:12.62 N: 11.84 E: 13.49

Case 1 ORF: 28.57 PCR(-) March 11 N: 24.72 E: 27.14 March 12 Sampling Case 2 ORF: 26.04 N: 21.21 E: 23.82

IgG: weak pos PCR(+) Patient March 17 Onset Temp: 37.9 °C IgM: neg ORF: 35.27 United Kingdom Total Ab:1,368 N: 34 IgG: pos variant B.1.1.7 IgG: 345 March 19 Temp: 37.2 °C IgM: 77 IgM: weak pos March 20 Temp: 36.4 °C

FIGURE 1. Timeline of the patient’s medical work, her clinical course, and her virological testing. Abbreviations: PCR=polymerase chain reaction; Total Ab=Total antibody; IgG=Immunoglobulin G; IgM=immunoglobin M; ORF1ab=open reading frame 1ab gene; N=nucleocapsid gene; E=envelope gene; Temp=temperature; neg=negative; pos=positive.

398 CCDC Weekly / Vol. 3 / No. 19 Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention China CDC Weekly virus was a COVID-19 variant B.1.1.7 lineage virus and 27 after quarantine, the 33 staff were tested again and that it had high homology with isolates from 2 with qRT-PCR and all tested negative. COVID-19 patients in the isolation ward who had More than 3,000 healthcare workers and their returned to China from Uzbekistan on March 5. family members were asked to stay at their work place The patient had two close contacts with both of the or at home. All tested negative by qRT-PCR. returnees from Uzbekistan. With assistance from other Hundreds of environmental samples were obtained, nurses, she obtained nasopharyngeal swabs (left and including in the dormitory, isolation area, and other right nares) and an oropharyngeal swab from each buildings of the hospital. Other than positive samples returnee on March 6 and again on March 12. As from the patient’s room, all environmental samples shown in Figure 1, the 2 returnees had strongly were negative by qRT-PCR. positive qRT-PCR test results, with Ct values of the 3 targeted genes ranging from 11.84 to 14.85 in the DISCUSSION March 6 samples and from 21.21 to 28.57 in the March 12 samples. During interviews with her and her This case is the first infection of a healthcare colleagues, she indicated that she was well trained in professional working in an isolation region of a use of personal protective equipment (PPE) and designated COVID-19 hospital since March 2020. conducted medical procedures precisely, according to Based on viral sequencing, this laboratorian clearly standard operating procedures. acquired infection from hospitalized, imported The 33 colleagues on her team were transferred to COVID-19 cases. There was no outbreak of COVID- another designated hospital for quarantine. Three serial 19 in Xi’an at the time, and the only domestic case qRT-PCR tests, conducted between March 17 and reported since January was an imported case from March 19, were all negative. None of the team Hebei Province who had been infected by a different members became febrile or ill. Prior to working in the strain of COVID-19 virus. Routine viral qRT-PCR isolation are, all 33 staff had been vaccinated with the testing before and 7 days after she entered the isolation same type of inactivated COVID-19 vaccine; 30 staff area imply that it is extremely unlikely that she was completed 2-dose regimens, while 3 received only 1 infected outside of the isolation area. Due to a rapid dose due to personal reasons. Blood samples from all and timely response, transmission into the community 33 staff were obtained on March 19 and the levels of was prevented. COVID-19 virus total antibody, IgG, and IgM were Based on the epidemiological investigation, we measured by chemiluminescence. As shown in believe that the laboratorian was likely infected on Figure 2, all 30 fully vaccinated staff were positive in March 12 when she obtained throat swabs for the 2 total antibody with an average COI of 19.77 (ranging imported cases of COVID-19. She was negative by from 1.7 to 150.83) and positive in IgG with an qRT-PCR on March 11, and on March 12, when she average COI of 20.29 (ranging from 3.69 to 64.33). obtained swabs from the 2 returnees, both returnees The 3 staff who received 1 dose of vaccine tested had high viral loads of the B.1.1.7 variant. negative (COI<1.0) in total antibody; 2 of the 3 were Simultaneously obtaining two nasopharyngeal swabs also IgG negative; 15 of the 30 fully vaccinated and one oropharyngeal swab is a high-risk procedure. individuals were positive in IgM, while the 3 recipients People being sampled often sneeze or retch, expelling that received 1-dose were negative. On Day 6, 13, 20, virus. The laboratorian’s chronic rhinitis may have

A Total Ab B IgG C IgM Patient Close contact 1,500 200 400 80 100 5 150 1,000 300 60 80 4 100 60 3 500 200 40 COI 50 40 2 0 0 100 20 20 1 −500 −50 0 0 0 0 Close contact Close contact Close contact

Patient Patient Patient

Close contact Close contact Close contact

FIGURE 2. Serological assays for COVID-19 virus antibody for the patient and her 33 colleagues (shown as close contacts). Antibody titers were measured with commercial chemiluminescence kits for COVID-19 virus. Cutoff index (COI) values are indicated on the Y-axis. (A) Total antibody (Total Ab); (B) Immunoglobulin G (IgG); (C) Immunoglobin M (IgM).

Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention CCDC Weekly / Vol. 3 / No. 19 399 China CDC Weekly contributed to her propensity for mouth breathing, No.8 Hospital and the staff of Shaanxi CDC and Xi’an which may increase risk inhaling virus around a mask. CDC. Although the potential influence of chronic rhinitis on Funding: Chinese National Natural Science susceptibility to COVID-19 remains unknown, one Foundation Grants (81630062), Grant study has showed that allergic rhinitis and asthma (2019SKLID501) from the State Key Laboratory for confer a greater risk of susceptibility to COVID-19 Infectious Disease Prevention and Control, China virus infection (5). We believe that a combination of CDC and Science Technology+Action Plan-Medical factors may contribute to risk of infection. Research Project of Xi’an Science and Technology The patient and 30 of her teammates had completed Bureau (2019115713YX012SF050). the full COVID-19 vaccination regimen by the doi: 10.46234/ccdcw2021.094 beginning of February. Their serological assays # Corresponding author: Xiaoping Dong, [email protected]. confirmed COVID-19 virus seroconversion. Three individuals had received only one dose of vaccine; their 1 Xi’an Center for Diseases Control and Prevention, Xi’an, Shaanxi, 2 serological tests showed low antibody levels. Unlike for China; State Key Laboratory for Infectious Disease Prevention and Control, Collaborative Innovation Center for Diagnosis and Treatment the other staff, the patient’s whole antibody, IgG, and of Infectious Diseases, National Institute for Viral Disease Control and IgM titers were all very high — an observation that Prevention, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 3 implies that the patient had been immunized against Beijing, China; National Institute for Nutrition and Health, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Beijing, China; 4 Shaanxi by the vaccine, since the high titers are consistent with Center for Diseases Control and Prevention, Xi’an, Shaanxi, China; a boosting response. There are several types of 5 Xi’an No. 8 Hospital, Xi’an, Shaanxi, China; 6 Center for Global Public Health, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, COVID-19 vaccines on the market worldwide; all are Beijing, China; 7 Center for Biosafety Mega-Science, Chinese Academy effective, but none is 100% effective. One study of Sciences, , , China; 8 China Academy of Chinese Medical Sciences, Beijing, China. showed lower efficacy in a high-risk population that & had a high force of infection — healthcare Joint first authors. professionals — compared with a community Submitted: March 30, 2021; Accepted: April 07, 2021 population (6). Our case report serves as a reminder of the importance of appropriate PPE for medical staff, REFERENCES even after vaccination. Globally-available COVID-19

vaccines have been demonstrated to prevent severe 1. Zhu N, Zhang DY, Wang WL, Li XW, Yang B, Song JD, et al. A novel COVID-19 (7). Although it is not possible to prove by coronavirus from patients with pneumonia in China, 2019. N Engl J Med 2020;382(8):727 − 33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa2001 a single case study, the clinical course of the patient is 017. consistent with a COVID-19 vaccination benefit — 2. Di Gennaro F, Pizzol D, Marotta C, Antunes M, Racalbuto V, Veronese making the illness mild and short. N, et al. Coronavirus diseases (COVID-19) current status and future perspectives: a narrative review. Int J Environ Res Public Health The COVID-19 vaccines in use in China have very 2020;17(8):2690. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17082690. good efficacy, all meeting or exceeding the WHO 3. Rivett L, Sridhar S, Sparkes D, Routledge M, Jones NK, Forrest S, et al. Screening of healthcare workers for SARS-CoV-2 highlights the role of Target Product Profile efficacy requirements. asymptomatic carriage in COVID-19 transmission. eLife 2020;9:e58728. Breakthrough infections happen with all vaccines, and http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.58728. these breakthroughs merit study. We suggest 4. Gómez-Ochoa SA, Franco OH, Rojas LZ, Raguindin PF, Roa-Díaz ZM, Wyssmann BM, et al. COVID-19 in health-care workers: a living conducting routine, systematic study of every fully systematic review and meta-analysis of prevalence, risk factors, clinical vaccinated breakthrough case. Such study should characteristics, and outcomes. Am J Epidemiol 2021;190(1):161 − 75. include tracing the source of the virus, identifying the http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aje/kwaa191.

5. Yang JM, Koh HY, Moon SY, Yoo IK, Ha EK, You S, et al. Allergic virus lineage to find variants, measuring antibody disorders and susceptibility to and severity of COVID-19: a nationwide levels, and assessing for vaccine-associated cohort study. J Allergy Clin Immunol 2020;146(4):790 − 8. http://dx. enhancement of disease (VAED). Systematic study doi.org/10.1016/j.jaci.2020.08.008.

6. Palacios R, Patiño EG, de Oliveira Piorelli R, Conde M, Batista AP, requires controls matched to breakthrough cases for Zeng G, et al. Double-blind, randomized, placebo-controlled phase Ⅲ assessing severity of illness (for VAED) and clinical trial to evaluate the efficacy and safety of treating healthcare professionals with the adsorbed COVID-19 (inactivated) vaccine characteristics of the viruses and the vaccines (for manufactured by sinovac - PROFISCOV: a structured summary of a effectiveness). Systematic study will help ensure that study protocol for a randomised controlled trial. Trials 2020;21(1):853. vaccination continues to be the safest and most http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s13063-020-04775-4.

7. Kashte S, Gulbake A, El-Amin Ⅲ SF, Gupta A. COVID-19 vaccines: effective way to prevent COVID-19. rapid development, implications, challenges and future prospects. Hum Acknowledgements: Medical workers from Xi’an Cell 2021;7:1 − 23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13577-021-00512-4.

400 CCDC Weekly / Vol. 3 / No. 19 Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention China CDC Weekly

Outbreak Reports

A COVID-19 Outbreak — Nangong City, Hebei Province, China, January 2021

Shiwei Liu1,&; Shuhua Yuan2,&; Yinqi Sun2; Baoguo Zhang3; Huazhi Wang4; Jinxing Lu1; Wenjie Tan1; Xiaoqiu Liu1; Qi Zhang1; Yunting Xia1; Xifang Lyu1; Jianguo Li2,#; Yan Guo1,#

On January 3, 2021, Nangong City (part of Summary City, Hebei Province with 484,000 residents in 2017) What is known about this topic? reported its first symptomatic case of COVID-19. Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is widespread China CDC, Hebei CDC, and Xingtai CDC jointly globally. In China, COVID-19 has been well carried out a field epidemiological investigation and controlled and has appeared only in importation- traced the outbreak. On January 6, Nangong City related cases. Local epidemics occur sporadically in started its first round of population-wide nucleic acid China and have been contained relatively quickly. screening. On January 9, Nangong City was locked What is added by this report? down by conducting control and prevention measures Epidemiological investigation with genome sequence that included staying at home and closing work units traceability analysis showed that the first case of for seven days. As of January 27, 2021, 76 cases had COVID-19 in Nangong City acquired infection from a been reported in Nangong City; among these, 8 were confirmed case from City; infection asymptomatic. No additional cases have been reported subsequently led to 76 local cases. All cases were to date, and there were no COVID-19-related deaths

associated with the index case, and most were located in the outbreak. in Fenggong Street and did not spread outside of Nangong City. The main routes of transmission were INVESTIGATION AND FINDINGS family clusters, intra-unit transmission, and nosocomial transmission. The index COVID-19 case in Nangong City is a What are the implications for public health 34-year-old male office worker (Patient A) when he practice? noticed a fever and took his temperature, finding it to This study highlights new techniques for rapidly be 38.1 ℃ at 14∶00 on January 1, 2021. At 15∶30, he tracing cases and identifying COVID-19 transmission drove to the fever clinic of Nangong People’s Hospital chains. The different epidemiological characteristics in for evaluation and treatment and was screened for Nangong City, from the earliest stages of the outbreak, COVID-19 by nucleic acid testing. Patient A was suggest that allocation of health sources for prevention informed on January 2 that his nucleic acid test was and treatment were reasonable. Preventing transmission positive. On January 3, Patient A was diagnosed as a within medical institutions and isolation facilities and confirmed case of symptomatic COVID-19 and strengthening management in the community should treated in isolation. be priorities for COVID-19 control during a city The field epidemiological investigation and case lockdown. tracing found that Patient A went to the respiratory department of Hebei Children’s Hospital in Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is an Shijiazhuang City on December 25, 2020 and had infectious disease caused by a novel coronavirus (also close contact with a symptomatic case of COVID-19 known as severe acute respiratory syndrome in a waiting area. The contact, Patient B, female, from coronavirus 2; SARS-CoV-2) that was declared a , Shijiazhuang City, had asthma and pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) was febrile on December 25 (highest temperature in March 2020. COVID-19 is widespread globally but 38.5 ℃ ). Video monitoring showed Patient A and B has been well controlled in China with only scattered, were in a room 4.5 meters apart from each other for 16 importation-related local outbreaks following minutes. During this period, they did not talk or touch containment in April 2020. the same objects. Patient B removed her face mask

Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention CCDC Weekly / Vol. 3 / No. 19 401 China CDC Weekly twice to eat, and Patient A pulled down his face mask were generally moderate or mild. to make phone calls. Whole genome sequence Two cases, including the index case, were identified traceability analysis from Hebei CDC found that the by fever clinics; 16 were found by community-wide viral nucleic acid sample from Patient A, compared nucleic acid screening; 5 were detected by daily routine with the Wuhan reference strain (NC_045512), had tests for medical staff conducted by hospitals; and 53 mutation characteristics of the gene locus of the were discovered by regular, confirmatory nucleic acid European family of the L genotype and was on the screening of close contacts or sub-close contacts B.1.1.123 branch. The genome sequence has 21 including 48 (63.2%) identified during centralized nucleotide mutations that are same as virus samples isolation or quarantine. from Gaocheng District cases. The genetic sequences Transmission chains were characterized by mixed of Patient A’s and Patient B’s viruses were highly existence of intra-unit transmission, family clusters, homologous, presumably representing a common nosocomial infections, and community transmission transmission source. associated with the index case Patient A. There was 1 Considering dates of illness onset identified by the intra-unit transmission with 23 (30.3%) people field epidemiological investigation and the sampling infected, 2 family clusters (identified by ≥5 people date of the first positive nucleic acid test, the first infected) with 17 (22.4%) people infected, 3 re- COVID-19 infection in Nangong City occurred on transmissions in medical institutions with 8 (10.5%) January 1. Since then, the number of cases reported people infected, and 1 community cluster (identified each day increased rapidly and peaked on January 13 by ≥5 people infected) with 6 (7.9%) people infected. with 12 cases reported. Following the peak, the There was the possibility of cross-infection in isolation number of cases reported each day decreased until the places, but there is no definitive supporting evidence. last case was reported on January 23. The cumulative All COVID-19 cases in Nangong City were related to number of cases increased fastest from January 9 to the index case, Patient A; eight generations of infection

January 13 (Figure 1). Among all 76 cases, 46 (60.5%) were observed in the transmission chains. were among males; 63 (82.9%) were among young to middle-aged (15–59 years old) individuals; the ages DISCUSSION ranged from 2 to 83 years with a median of 34.5 years; 34 (44.7%) were farmers, 11 (14.5%) were office staff, This was a local outbreak of COVID-19, with the and 10 (13.2%) were health care workers; 59 (77.6%) first case coming from a known epidemic area came from Fenggang Street, and 17 (22.4%) came (Gaocheng District, Shijiazhuang City). The epidemic from seven other streets or townships (there are 15 was confined to a limited area — mainly Fenggang streets and townships in Nangong City) (Figure 2, Street — and did not spread outside Nangong City, Table 1). Symptoms among the 68 symptomatic cases indicating that the strategies used in Nangong City

Symptomatic cases Asymptomatic cases Cumulative incidence 12 80 2 10 60 8 1

6 40 1

Number of cases 4 Number of cases 1 20 2 1 2 1 2 5 2 1 2 3 4 3 7 4 10 4 3 1 5 1 1 4 1 3 1 0 0 1/1 1/2 1/3 1/4 1/5 1/6 1/7 1/8 1/9 1/11 1/10 1/12 1/13 1/14 1/15 1/16 1/17 1/18 1/19 1/20 1/21 1/22 1/23 1/24 1/25 1/26 1/27 1/28 1/29 1/30 Date of illness onset

FIGURE 1. Distribution of date of illness onset based on field epidemiological investigation and cumulative incidence of COVID-19 cases from January 1 to January 23, 2021 in Nangong City, Hebei Province, China.

402 CCDC Weekly / Vol. 3 / No. 19 Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention China CDC Weekly

N characterized by milder symptoms and faster and more insidious transmission and occurred mainly young and middle-aged adults. These characteristics suggest reasonable allocation of health sources and effective prioritization of health policies in the control, prevention, and treatment of COVID-19. Application of new technologies and new investigation methods were crucial for case tracing and identification of transmission chains. For various reasons, it can sometimes be difficult to provide exact information in field epidemiological investigation 0 5 10 km reports. When possible, we should integrate digital techniques, big data, trajectory tracking systems, monitoring videos, and sensitive and timely laboratory FIGURE 2. Geographic distribution of the 76 COVID-19 cases reported in Nangong City, Hebei Province, China, detection technologies into field investigations. Indeed, January 3 to January 27, 2021. in the Nangong City outbreak, source identification for the first case and transmission chain identification were highly effective. for subsequent cases were accomplished with the Compared with the earliest cases in China during assistance of monitoring video surveys. 2019–2020 (1–2), the epidemic in Nangong City was Early and proactive measures are highly effective and

TABLE 1. Epidemiological characteristics of the 76 COVID-19 cases reported in Nangong City, Hebei Province, China, January 3 to January 27, 2021. Symptomatic cases Asymptomatic cases Total Characteristics N Percentage (%) N Percentage (%) N Percentage (%) Total 68 89.5 8 10.5 76 100.0 Gender Female 29 42.6 1 12.5 30 39.5 Male 39 57.4 7 87.5 46 60.5 Age group (years) <15 5 7.4 1 12.5 6 7.9 15–29 17 25.0 2 25.0 19 25.0 30–44 20 29.4 3 37.5 23 30.3 45–59 19 27.9 2 25.0 21 27.6 ≥60 7 10.3 0 0 7 9.2 Occupation Farmer 31 45.6 3 37.5 34 44.7 Office staff 11 16.2 0 0 11 14.5 Health care worker 8 11.8 2 25.0 10 13.2 Workman 5 7.4 1 12.5 6 7.9 Teacher 5 7.4 0 0 5 6.6 Student 4 5.9 1 12.5 5 6.6 Child 2 2.9 1 12.5 3 3.9 Business services 2 2.9 0 0 2 2.6 Location Fenggang Street 52 76.5 7 87.5 59 77.6 Other streets 16 23.5 1 12.5 17 22.4

Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention CCDC Weekly / Vol. 3 / No. 19 403 China CDC Weekly play an important role in rapid control of infectious likely infected after he pulled down his face mask to diseases (3) as was seen in the COVID-19 outbreak in make a phone call. Case number 75 was likely infected Nangong City. First cases are usually identified in when removing his or her face mask for smoking while medical institutions, suggesting the necessity of in the presence of a COVID-19 carrier. continuously improving the sensitivities of symptom Acknowledgements: Hong Jin, Xiaofeng Zhang, surveillance, fever screening, and disease diagnosis in Yonggui Du, Yujie Cui, Siqi Zhang, Ying Wang, hospitals, private clinics, and even pharmacies. We Junqin Zhao, and Lin Ma from Hebei CDC; and should therefore strengthen and routinize standardized Xianghong Meng and Xuejie Gao from Xingtai CDC. construction and management of fever clinics and their training of professionals. We should work to avoid doi: 10.46234/ccdcw2021.077 nosocomial infection of COVID-19, and we should # Corresponding authors: Jianguo Li, [email protected]; Yan Guo, carry out rapid and accurate risk assessments in [email protected]. outbreaks, using nucleic acid testing for close contacts 1 Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Beijing, China; and people at high risk to provide evidence to further 2 Hebei Provincial Center for Disease Control and Prevention, improve evaluation and implementation of measures. Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China; 3 Xingtai Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Xingtai, Hebei, China; 4 Nangong Center for Disease When vaccines and effective medicines are not Control and Prevention, Nangong, Hebei, China. available on-demand, strictly implementing & Joint first authors. containment and suppression public health strategies (4) is urgently needed once an outbreak happens. Submitted: March 12, 2021; Accepted: March 18, 2021 However, it is challenging to prevent transmission in community and isolation points under a city REFERENCES lockdown. For communities, in addition to implementation of relevant control measures, we 1. The Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia Emergency Response Epidemiology Team. The epidemiological characteristics of an outbreak of 2019 novel should ensure supplies for normal living, strengthen coronavirus diseases (COVID-19)—China, 2020. China CDC Wkly management of service providers and volunteers, and 2020;2(8):113 − 22. http://dx.doi.org/10.46234/ccdcw2020.032. promote health education. In isolation points, we 2. Wu ZY, McGoogan JM. Characteristics of and important lessons from the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak in China: Summary should take strict prevention measures, such as staying of a report of 72 314 cases from the Chinese Center for Disease Control in separate rooms, not allowing visitors, ensuring and Prevention. JAMA 2020;323(13):1239 − 42. http://dx.doi.org/10. adequate ventilation, employing sensitive fever 1001/jama.2020.2648. screening, and properly disinfecting the environment. 3. Zhou L, Wu ZY, Li ZJ, Zhang YP, McGoogan JM, Li Q, et al. One hundred days of coronavirus disease 2019 prevention and control in Personal protection is one of the most effective ways China. Clin Infect Dis 2021;72(2):332 − 9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ to prevent infection. Measures should include cid/ciaa725. maintaining social distance, hand hygiene, respiratory 4. Li ZJ, Chen QL, Feng LZ, Rodewald L, Xia YY, Yu HL, et al. Active case finding with case management: the key to tackling the COVID-19 etiquette, face mask use, and not smoking. In the pandemic. Lancet 2020;396(10243):63 − 70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ Nangong City epidemic, the index case, Patient A, was S0140-6736(20)31278-2.

404 CCDC Weekly / Vol. 3 / No. 19 Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention China CDC Weekly

Outbreak Reports

Index and First-Generation Cases in a COVID-19 Outbreak — Jilin Province, China, 2021

Weihua Cheng1,&; Bing Zhao2,&; Enfu Chen3,&; Guoqian Li1; Jun Ma1; Yanling Cui1; Changxi Xu4; Yong Cui4; Bo Shen4; Mingyu Luo3; Dapeng Yin2,#; Laishun Yao4,#

effective protection, with one or more suspected or Summary confirmed COVID-19 cases any time starting 2 days What is already known on this topic? before onset of the suspected or confirmed cases’ Contact tracing and testing with isolated medical care symptoms or 2 days before sampling for laboratory of identified cases is a key strategy for interrupting testing of asymptomatic infected persons (3–4). At the chains of transmission of COVID-19 and reducing early phases of COVID-19 pandemic, the finding of mortality associated with COVID-19. At the early COVID-19 cases usually began from suspected cases phases of the COVID-19 pandemic, due to test due to delayed testing capabilities (5). capacity limitations, case finding often started from On January 9, 2021, the first case (Patient A) of a suspected cases. COVID-19 outbreak arrived unknowingly infected in What is added by this report? Dongchang District, Tonghua City, Jilin Province, The index patient infected 74 individuals who were China. He gave three product promotion lectures in close contacts that were identified through contact Location A and infected audience members during the tracing, and exposed individuals were monitored in lectures. By January 31, 2021, 74 lecture participants quarantine with daily polymerase chain reaction (PCR) were confirmed to have been infected and were testing. All individuals were asymptomatic initially, but considered first-generation cases. The Tonghua CDC all PCR-positive individuals eventually developed led an investigation of this outbreak that ultimately symptoms. Infectivity was documented up to 8 days identified 140 cases (6). In this article, we focused on before being confirmed as a symptomatic case, the 74 first-generation cases, which all had known approximately 4 days before turning PCR positive. exposure times and locations. Once Patient A had been What are the implications for public health diagnosed using polymerase chain reaction (PCR) practice? testing as being infected, lecture participants were During an outbreak, we suggest tracing close contacts located and placed in quarantine where they were from both PCR-positive individuals and suspected tested with PCR and evaluated for COVID-19 cases, rather than from suspected cases alone. Due to symptoms every day. This careful observation period the long period of infectivity before turning PCR under quarantine provided an opportunity to assess positive or developing symptoms, close contacts that infectivity period, incubation time, the time between had contact with a newly PCR positive case within 4 becoming PCR positive and developing symptoms. We days should be judged as at risk of being infected; close report results of our study of first-generation cases to contacts that had contact within 8 days of a newly further improve investigation and management of close

symptomatic case should be judged as at risk being contacts of COVID-19 cases. infected.

INVESTIGATION AND RESULTS Contact tracing — along with robust testing, isolation, and care of cases — is a key strategy for We obtained data about the index case and first- interrupting chains of transmission of coronavirus generation cases from the National Infectious Diseases disease 2019 (COVID-19), caused by COVID-19 Reporting System (NIDRS) and the Tonghua CDC virus also known as severe acute respiratory syndrome outbreak investigation. In response to the outbreak, coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), and reducing mortality close contacts were quarantined, and nucleic acid associated with COVID-19 (1–2). Close contacts are testing was conducted daily to determine whether the defined as individuals who have had contact, without contacts had been infected. Contacts who turned PCR

Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention CCDC Weekly / Vol. 3 / No. 19 405 China CDC Weekly positive were transferred from quarantine to a hospital positive) cases was 8.64 days (95%CI: 8.04–9.23) and were reported to NIDRS within 2 hours. CDC (Figure 1C). The average time between turning PCR- staff would complete an epidemiological report within positive and being diagnosed as confirmed cases was 24 hours. As soon as PCR-positive individuals 2.49 days (95%CI: 2.00–2.92). developed symptoms, they would be classified by Patient A had been infected by an adjacent passenger physicians as confirmed cases, and their NIDRS record on train K350 on January 5, 2021 (7). He tested PCR- would be updated with their new status as a confirmed positive on January 12, 2021 and was diagnosed as a COVID-19 case. confirmed (symptomatic) case on January 16. He On January 10 and 11, Patient A gave three lectures infected participants who attended his lecture in in Site A in Tonghua City. As of January 31, 74 close City, Jilin Province on January 8. contacts were diagnosed as COVID-19 confirmed Therefore, the earliest date that Patient A had cases. All were first-generation PCR-positive cases, and documented infectivity was January 8, 4 days before all were PCR-positive, first-generation infected Patient A tested PCR-positive and 8 days before his individuals ultimately became symptomatic. The diagnosis as a confirmed case ( Figure 2). median age was 72 (inter-quartile range, 60–87) years (Figure 1A); 12 (16.22%) were critical cases, 10 DISCUSSION (13.51%) were severe cases, 47 (63.51%) were moderate cases, and 5 (6.76%) were mild cases. During the earliest phase of the COVID-19 All first-generation cases had attended lectures by pandemic in China, the finding of COVID-19 cases Patient A on January 10 or 11. The average time was often delayed due to insufficient laboratory between exposure (lecture) and turning PCR-positive capacity, with long times between development of while in quarantine was 6.15 days (95%CI: 5.65–6.65) symptoms (i.e., a suspected case) and being confirmed (Figure 1B). The average time between exposure and as COVID-19 cases by PCR (4). Markedly improved being diagnosed as confirmed (symptomatic, PCR- PCR testing capacity was instrumental in stopping the

A 25 B 50

20 40

15 30

10 20 Number of cases Number of cases 5 10

0 0 30− 35− 40− 45− 50− 55− 60− 65− 70− 75− 80− 85− 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 Age subgroup (Years) Day

D 25 C 30

25 20

20 15 15 10 10 Number of cases Number of cases 5 5

0 0 6 7 8 9 10 14 19 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Day Day

FIGURE 1. Observations during quarantine of the 74 first-generation COVID-19 cases infected by Patient A on either January 10 or January 11, 2021, Jilin Province, China. (A) Age distribution. (B) Period between exposure to Patient A and turning PCR positive. (C) Period between exposure to Patient A and being confirmed as a COVID-19 case. (D) Period between turning PCR-positive and being confirmed as a COVID-19 case.

406 CCDC Weekly / Vol. 3 / No. 19 Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention China CDC Weekly

Had infectivity 8 days before diagnosed as confirmed case

Had infectivity 4 days before nucleic acid tested positive Index case Patient A infected Patient A infected Patient A was Patient A was Patient A was trainees at site trainees at site nucleic acid diagnosed as infected on A B tested positive confirmed case railway (K350)

Jan 5th Jan 8th Jan 10th Jan 11th Jan 12th Jan 16th

FIGURE 2. Timeline of infectivity of Patient A before and after testing positive with PCR and being confirmed as a COVID-19 case, January, 2021, Jilin Province, China. Tonghua outbreak (6). By the time of the Tonghua measured the incubation periods of the confirmed outbreak, samples from close contacts of cases could be cases and found the average to be 8.64 days. We found tested, and laboratory results obtained within 24 hours. that the time between turning PCR positive and Higher PCR throughput helped to efficiently find developing symptoms was 2.49 days. infected individuals among close contacts in order to Patient A’s infection timeline was clear: he was quarantine contacts and stop chains of transmission. infected on January 5; gave lectures and infected Based on the case finding with population-wide PCR participants on January 8, 10, and 11; turned PCR- testing used in this outbreak, we suggest that during an positive on January 12; and diagnosed as a confirmed outbreak response, close contacts should be traced COVID-19 case on January 16. The clear timeline from PCR-positive individuals and suspected cases, enabled determination of infectivity before diagnosis. rather than from suspected cases only. Patient A was infectious at least eight days before being Patient A caused a large cluster of COVID-19 cases diagnosed as a confirmed case and was infectious at infected during his lectures. Many cases were serious least four days before turning PCR-positive. This — 39% of cases were classified as critical or severe. All timing implies that using two days between close 74 of the first-generation cases developed symptoms, contact and PCR positivity as the risk period for possibly indicating that Patient A was at an early stage infection is too short of a time interval as many of illness and secreting large amounts of virus (6). His infections would be missed. One report in China lectures were lengthy and were held in small, non- found transmission as early as five days before onset of ventilated spaces, possibly increasing inhalation of symptoms in an index case (9). Our investigation virus. One recent study found viral loads among index suggests that the close contact tracing period should be cases to be a leading determinant of SARS-CoV-2 four days before samples are obtained for PCR testing transmission. In that study, risk of transmission from of asymptomatic infected persons, and even longer for symptomatic cases and shorter incubation times were confirmed cases with symptoms. strongly associated with viral loads during contact, in a This report was subject to at least two limitations. dose-dependent manner (8). First, all subjects were elderly; the corresponding time Local CDC staff traced his close contacts once periods and degrees of infectivity may be different for Patient A tested positive by PCR on January 12. The younger people. Second, all subjects were first- close contacts were quarantined and tested with PCR generation cases; subsequent generation cases may daily. Once PCR-positive, they were transferred to differ by infectivity or timing. However, studying first- fixed point medical institutions for medical observation generation cases while under quarantine or medical and treatment, when indicated. If a PCR-positive case observation allowed precise timing of infection or developed symptoms, clinicians would diagnose him or illness events. her as a confirmed COVID-19 case. All times were (Data updated on February 1, 2021) well documented, allowing precise analysis. We Acknowledgements: Shicheng Yu, Xudong Li, and

Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention CCDC Weekly / Vol. 3 / No. 19 407 China CDC Weekly

Lance Rodewald from China CDC Weekly. readiness-and-response-actions-for-covid-19. [2021-2-22].

3. World Health Organization. Contact tracing in the context of COVID- Funding: Beijing Natural Science Foundation 19: interim guidance. Geneva: WHO; 2020. https://www.who.int/ (L202008). emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019. [2021-2-21].

4. Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Guidelines for doi: 10.46234/ccdcw2021.093 investigation and management of close contacts of COVID-19 cases. # Corresponding authors: Dapeng Yin, [email protected]; Laishun China CDC Wkly 2020;2(19):329 − 31. http://dx.doi.org/10.46234/ Yao, [email protected]. ccdcw2020.084. 5. The Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia Emergency Response Epidemiology 1 Tonghua Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Tonghua, Jilin, Team. The epidemiological characteristics of an outbreak of 2019 novel China; 2 Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Beijing, coronavirus diseases (COVID-19) — China. China CDC Wkly, China; 3 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020;2(8):113−22. http://dx.doi.org/10.46234/ccdcw2020.032. , Zhejiang, China; 4 Jilin Center for Disease Control and 6. Yao LS, Luo MY, Jia TW, Zhang WG, Hou ZL, Gao F, et al. COVID- Prevention, Changchun, Jilin, China. 19 super spreading event amongst elderly individuals — Jilin Province, & Joint first authors. China, January 2021. China CDC Wkly 2021;3(10):211 − 3. http://dx. doi.org/10.46234/ccdcw2021.050.

7. Zhou L, Yao LS, Hao P, Li C, Zhao QL, Dong HL, et al. COVID-19 Submitted: February 22, 2021; Accepted: March 23, 2021 cases spread through the K350 train — Jilin and Provinces, China, January 2021. China CDC Wkly 2021;3(8):162 − 4. http://dx. REFERENCES doi.org/10.46234/ccdcw2021.026. 8. Marks M, Millat-Martinez P, Ouchi D, Roberts CH, Alemany A, Corbacho-Monné M, et al. Transmission of COVID-19 in 282 clusters

1. World Health Organization. COVID-19 strategy update - 14 April in Catalonia, Spain: a cohort study. Lancet Infect Dis 2021;21(5):629- 2020. Geneva: WHO; 2020. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/ 36. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30985-3.

covid-19-strategy-update---14-April-2020. [2021-2-21]. 9. Zhang Y, Muscatello D, Tian Y, Chen YW, Li S, Duan W, et al. Role of

2. World Health Organization. Critical preparedness, readiness and presymptomatic transmission of COVID-19: evidence from Beijing, response actions for COVID-19: interim guidance. Geneva: WHO; China. J Epidemiol Community Health 2020;75(1):84 − 7. http://dx. 2020. https://www.who.int/publications-detail/critical-preparedness- doi.org/10.1136/jech-2020-214635.

408 CCDC Weekly / Vol. 3 / No. 19 Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention China CDC Weekly

Notes from the Field

Emerging Variants of B.1.617 Lineage Identified Among Returning Chinese Employees Working in India — Chongqing Municipality, China, April 2021

Sheng Ye1,&; Yongjun Zhang2,&; Xiang Zhao3; Zhen Yu1; Yang Song3; Zhangping Tan1; Yun Tang1; Shuang Chen1; Mingyue Wang1; Hua Ling1,#

On April 22 and 23, 2021, 3 confirmed COVID-19 (GenBank Accession: NC_045512), also known as cases in passengers on an arriving airplane from Nepal SARS-CoV-2, these isolates possessed 34–36 variation were reported by Chongqing Public Health Medical sites in nucleic acids, including 8–10 variations in the Center. Preliminary epidemiological investigation spike protein. Phylogenetic analysis of genome revealed these 3 patients, males aged 20–30 years, were sequences indicated these isolates belonged to the coworkers of a cellphone company that has a Pangolin lineage B.1.617, an emerging variant in India manufacturing base in Noida, India, where they first identified in October 2020 and has recently been worked with their Indian colleagues since late 2019. designated as variants of interest (VOIs) by the World They were well protected at the workplace, where a Health Organization (WHO) (Figure 1) (1–2). dust-free environment was required as a cellphone Notably, 6 variation sites of amino acid residuals making industry standard, and they took relevant (T19R, L452R, T478K, D614G, P681R, and precaution measures against the coronavirus disease D950N), which were identical to those in Indian 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic in their daily life in B.1.617.2 variants, were observed in the 3 isolates, India. supporting that the COVID-19 infection on these 3 According to epidemiological investigation reports, patients probably occurred in India. Since most of their business trip started since April 19, when they B.1.617 variants reported in 17 countries contained 2 were escorted from Noida to New Delhi in a chartered key mutations, L452R and E484Q, these imported car. On the same day, with protective clothes, N95 cases in Chongqing Municipality were excluded from respirators, goggles, and gloves equipped throughout such double mutant variants. Constant surveillance of the trip, they flew to Kathmandu, Nepal. They arrived genome sequences in imported cases are required to at hotels in a chartered cab and lived there until April track transmission and evolution of COVID-19 virus 21. Then they went to the airport in a chartered cab in during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. the morning and flew to Chongqing Municipality, China, with full protective measures. Their COVID- doi: 10.46234/ccdcw2021.109 19 tests were negative on multiple occasions in India, # Corresponding author: Hua Ling, [email protected]. and the latest negative results for Patient A and Patient 1 B were on April 17, and for Patient C was on April 19. Chongqing Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Chongqing, China; 2 Chongqing Medical and Pharmaceutical College, Chongqing, However, their nucleic acid results for COVID-19 China; 3 National Institute for Viral Disease Control and Prevention, were positive at Chongqing Customs on April 21 and China CDC, Beijing, China. & subsequently confirmed by local CDC laboratories. Joint first authors. Patients were transferred to the designated COVID- Submitted: April 30, 2021; Accepted: May 01, 2021 19 hospital, the Chongqing Public Health Medical Center. Clinical manifestation of three patients REFERENCES included normal body temperature, blood tests, and liver-kidney functions. Abnormalities in chest 1. World Health Organization. Weekly epidemiological update on computed tomography (CT) suggested infectious COVID-19 -27 April 2021. https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/ lesions, classified as common type of COVID-19. weekly-epidemiological-update-on-covid-19---27-april-2021 [2021-4-27]. Specimens of the confirmed patients were sent to 2. Cherian S, Potdar V, Jadhav S, Yadav P, Gupta N, Das M, et al. Convergent evolution of SARS-CoV-2 spike mutations, L452R, E484Q Chongqing CDC and sequenced on April 28 and 30. and P681R, in the second wave of COVID-19 in Maharashtra, India. In comparison with the COVID-19 reference strain bioRxiv 2021. https://doi.org/10.1101/2021.04.22.440932.

Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention CCDC Weekly / Vol. 3 / No. 19 409 China CDC Weekly

hCoV-19/Canada/ON-PHL-21-03793/2021|EPI_ISL_1230441|2021-02 Lineage P.1 hCoV-19/Japan/TY7-503/2021|EPI_ISL_877769|2021-01 hCoV-19/Italy/UMB-IZSGC-96118.1.35/2021|EPI_ISL_1163822|2021-02-06 99 hCoV-19/Brazil/SP-1030/2021|EPI_ISL_872192|2021-01-18 hCoV-19/England/CAMC-1293C09/2021|EPI_ISL_1116310|2021-02-13 hCoV-19/USA/TX-HMH-MCoV-24400/2021|EPI_ISL_1078954|2021-01-17

hCoV-19/Brazil/GO-1206/2021|EPI_ISL_985313|2021-01-19 Lineage B.1.1.7 hCoV-19/England/MILK-9E05B3/2020|EPI_ISL_601443|2020-09-20 hCoV-19/England/CAMC-BBC4C0/2020|EPI_ISL_724145|2020-11-21 99 hCoV-19/England/ALDP-C5842F/2020|EPI_ISL_736160|2020-12-13 NC20SCU2740-1/Shanghai_strain_(December) LNDL-WY-0722-Y_S11/Dalian_strain 99 LNDL-XY-0722-Y_S10/Dalian_strain LNDL-SFL-0722-Y_S9/Dalian_strain LNDL-BHQ-0722-Y_S12_L001_R1_001 EPI_ISL_413997|hCoV-19/Switzerland/GE3895/2020|Europe/Switzerland| HLJ-0418-32-T/Heilongjiang_strain Shulan_02/Shulan_strain Shulan_03/Shulan_strain Lineage B.1.1 80 XJ2-0715-Y_S28/Urumchi_strain 93 XJ-THT-1-0715-Y_S25/Urumchi_strain XJ3-0716-Y_S29/Urumchi_strain XJ1-0715-Y_S27/Dalian_strain EPI_ISL_420877|hCoV-19/Australia/VIC-CBA3/2020|Oceania/Australia| HLJ-0418-36-Y/Heilongjiang_strain EPI_ISL_419559|hCoV-19/USA/FL_5125/2020|North-America/USA| EPI_ISL_420555|hCoV-19/India/c32/2020|Asia/India| EPI_ISL_417525|hCoV-19/Taiwan/CGMH-CGU-12/2020|Asia/Taiwan| EPI_ISL_418366|hCoV-19/Canada/ON_PHL3350/2020|North-America/Canada| EPI_ISL_419656|hCoV-19/Austria/CeMM0003/2020|Europe/Austria| EPI_ISL_420129|hCoV-19/Spain/Valencia45/2020|Europe/Spain| nCoVBeijing_IVDC-002_06_2020/Beijing_Xinfadi_strain nCoVBeijing_IVDC-003_06_2020/Beijing_Xinfadi_strain nCoVBeijing_IVDC-001_06_2020/Beijing_Xinfadi_strain 99 210102-512/Shijiazhuang 20210103/519/Xingtai 81 hCoV-19/Russia/OMS-ORINFI-8945S/2020|EPI_ISL_569792|2020-07-23 hCoV-19/Russia/OMS-ORINFI-9295S/2020|EPI_ISL_569793|2020-07-25 hCoV-19/Russia/NVS-RII-MH1137S/2020|EPI_ISL_596266|2020-07-30 hCoV-19/Russia/SPE-RII-MH1628S/2020|EPI_ISL_596301|2020-09-07 RM947-YS/Manzhouli_strain 99 93 RM948-Y/Manzhouli_strain hCoV-19/Nigeria/CV616/2021|EPI_ISL_906277|2021-01-07

hCoV-19/USA/NY-Wadsworth-21017703-01/2020|EPI_ISL_1226710|2020-12-30 Lineage B.1.525 hCoV-19/England/CAMC-C769B3/2020|EPI_ISL_760883|2020-12-15 XG2276-Guangdong hCoV-19/USA/MI-MDHHS-SC23658/2021|EPI_ISL_1058953|2021-01-26 hCoV-19/USA/NJ-Yale-1856/2021|EPI_ISL_1225612|2021-02-22 XG2275-Guangdong hCoV-19/Netherlands/UT-RIVM-15598/2021|EPI_ISL_1232273|2021-02-21 79 hCoV-19/Denmark/DCGC-48722/2021|EPI_ISL_1125020|2021-02-15 99 hCoV-19/Denmark/DCGC-37590/2021|EPI_ISL_928731|2021-01-18 hCoV-19/Nigeria/CV625/2021|EPI_ISL_906284|2021-01-11 hCoV-19/Spain/CT-HUVH-65208/2021|EPI_ISL_1059051|2021-02-10 75 hCoV-19/India/MH-NCCS-BJ2/2021|EPI_ISL_1415270|2021-02-21 hCoV-19/India/MH-ICMR-NIV-INSACOG-GSEQ-373/2021|EPI_ISL_1704434|2021-02-22 hCoV-19/Belgium/MBLG36792/2021|EPI_ISL_1599177|2021-03-25 99 91 hCoV-19/India/MH-ICMR-NIV-INSACOG-GSEQ-723/2021|EPI_ISL_1703923|2021-03-03 hCoV-19/Singapore/400/2021|EPI_ISL_1524800|2021-03-31 L Lineage B.1 hCoV-19/India/ILSGS00308/2020|EPI_ISL_1372093|2020-12-01 Lineage B.1.617 96 hCoV-19/India/MH-ICMR-NIV-INSACOG-GSEQ-1114/2021|EPI_ISL_1704599|2021-03-08 99 hCoV-19/India/MH-NCCS-87448/2020|EPI_ISL_1415203|2020-10-02

hCoV-19/India/ILSGS00969/2021|EPI_ISL_1663541|2021-03-22-B.1.617.2 Lineage B.1.617.2 99 hCoV-19/India/ILSGS00971/2021|EPI_ISL_1663543|2021-03-19-B.1.617.2 99 hCoV-19/India/ILSGS00961/2021|EPI_ISL_1663534|2021-03-28-B.1.617.2 hCoV/Chongqing/nCoV210050/2021 99 hCoV-19/USA/NY-PRL-2021_03_29_01C15/2021|EPI_ISL_1470959|2021-03-25 hCoV-19/Switzerland/AG-UZH-IMV-3ba47ad1/2021|EPI_ISL_1791066|2021-04-24 hCoV-19/Romania/Brasov_PV_412085/2021|EPI_ISL_1789673|2021-04-26 Lineage B 99 hCoV/Chongqing/nCoV210051/2021 76 99 hCoV/Chongqing/nCoV210052/2021 EPI_ISL_419660|hCoV-19/Austria/CeMM0007/2020|Europe/Austria| EPI_ISL_419296|hCoV-19/Japan/P1/2020|Asia/Japan| EPI_ISL_424963|hCoV-19/USA/NY-NYUMC156/2020|North-America/USA| hCoV-19/Bangladesh/BCSIR-NILMRC-220/2020|EPI_ISL_483710| 87 hCoV-19/India/HR-TF20/2020|EPI_ISL_508497| EPI_ISL_417018|hCoV-19/Belgium/ULG-6670/2020|Europe/Belgium| 83 S2-20201026/KS-first/Kashgar_strain 73 EPI_ISL_414626|hCoV-19/France/HF1684/2020|Europe/France| EPI_ISL_420324|hCoV-19/Belgium/DVBJ-030468/2020|Europe/Belgium| EPI_ISL_418219|hCoV-19/France/B1623/2020|Europe/France| EPI_ISL_422703|hCoV-19/Netherlands/NA_168/2020|Europe/Netherlands| HLJ-0418-1-1/Heilongjiang_strain EPI_ISL_421636|hCoV-19/Australia/NSWID930/2020|Oceania/Australia| EPI_ISL_424964|hCoV-19/USA/NY-NYUMC157/2020|North-America/USA| EPI_ISL_420150|hCoV-19/Norway/2084/2020|Europe/Norway| EPI_ISL_420238|hCoV-19/England/SHEF-C051C/2020|Europe/England| EPI_ISL_418926|hCoV-19/USA/WA-UW359/2020|North-America/USA| EPI_ISL_418349|hCoV-19/Canada/ON_PHL3650/2020|North-America/Canada| EPI_ISL_417693|hCoV-19/Iceland/25/2020|Europe/Iceland| EPI_ISL_422430|hCoV-19/Singapore/37/2020|Asia/Singapore| hCoV-19/Canada/ON-S171/2020|EPI_ISL_586371|2020-03-24

TJ138/Tianjin_strain Lineage B.1.427/429 EPI_ISL_420081|hCoV-19/Russia/StPetersburg-RII3997/2020|Europe/Russia| hCoV-19/USA/CA-CDC-22168770/2021|EPI_ISL_1194012|2021-02-15 hCoV-19/USA/WA-CDC-2-3936649/2021|EPI_ISL_1226397|2021-02-18 hCoV-19/Israel/CVL-2613/2021|EPI_ISL_1209555|2021-01-17 hCoV-19/USA/VT-MASPHL-02115/2021|EPI_ISL_1233348|2021-02-13 99 hCoV-19/USA/CA-LACPHL-AF00531/2021|EPI_ISL_1191116|2021-02-21 hCoV-19/USA/CA-ALSR-7049/2021|EPI_ISL_1185854|2021-01-20 hCoV-19/South_Korea/KDCA1839/2021|EPI_ISL_1209447|2021-02-21 Lineage B.1.351 80 hCoV-19/South_Africa/NHLS-UCT-GS-3556-KRISP/2020|EPI_ISL_696473|2020-11-19 99 hCoV-19/South_Africa/NHLS-UCT-GS-0633/2020|EPI_ISL_700478|2020-10-19 hCoV-19/South_Africa/NHLS-UCT-GS-1198/2020|EPI_ISL_700496|2020-11-03 hCoV-19/South_Africa/N00390/2020|EPI_ISL_712081|2020-10-08 99 hCoV-19/Botswana/1223-IN1490/2020|EPI_ISL_770475|2020-12-23 hCoV-19/South_Africa/Tygerberg-427/2020|EPI_ISL_745166|2020-12-06 hCoV-19/South_Africa/Tygerberg-408/2020|EPI_ISL_745161|2020-12-04 ACC_20SF18530 87 hCoV-19/Scotland/EDB11342/2020|EPI_ISL_764278|2020-12-26 EPI_ISL_422623|hCoV-19/Netherlands/NA_314/2020|Europe/Netherlands| EPI_ISL_418355|hCoV-19/Canada/ON_PHLU8150/2020|North-America/Canada| EPI_ISL_420623|hCoV-19/France/ARA13095/2020|Europe/France| EPI_ISL_420010|hCoV-19/Australia/VIC319/2020|Oceania/Australia| EPI_ISL_416731|hCoV-19/England/SHEF-BFCC0/2020|Europe/England| 70 EPI_ISL_417530|hCoV-19/Luxembourg/LNS2128808/2020|Europe/Luxembourg| 78 EPI_ISL_414624|hCoV-19/France/N1620/2020|Europe/France| EPI_ISL_415156|hCoV-19/Belgium/SH-03014/2020|Europe/Belgium| EPI_ISL_412973|hCoV-19/Italy/CDG1/2020|Europe/Italy| EPI_ISL_420080|hCoV-19/Russia/StPetersburg-RII3992/2020|Europe/Russia| hCoV-19/Myanmar/NIH-4385/2020|EPI_ISL_434709| YJ20201109-4525/Shanghai_strain_(November) EPI_ISL_406862|hCoV-19/Germany/BavPat1/2020|Europe/Germany| EPI_ISL_406036|hCoV-19/USA/CA2/2020|North-America/USA| EPI_ISL_424366|hCoV-19/Turkey/ERAGEM-001/2020|Europe/Turkey| EPI_ISL_417444|hCoV-19/Pakistan/Gilgit1/2020|Asia/Pakistan| hCoV-19/Myanmar/MMC_137/2020|EPI_ISL_512844| EPI_ISL_420222|hCoV-19/England/SHEF-C02F7/2020|Europe/England| EPI_ISL_420799|hCoV-19/Korea/BA-ACH_2604/2020|Asia/Korea| EPI_ISL_417732|hCoV-19/Iceland/94/2020|Europe/Iceland| 71 EPI_ISL_413016|hCoV-19/Brazil/SPBR-02/2020|South-America/Brazil| NC_045512.2_Severe_acute_respiratory_syndrome_coronavirus_2_isolate_Wuhan-Hu-1_complete_genome EPI_ISL_402125|hCoV-19/Wuhan-Hu-1/2019|Asia/China| EPI_ISL_403963|hCoV-19/Nonthaburi/74/2020|Asia/Thailand| EPI_ISL_418269|hCoV-19/Vietnam/19-01S/2020|Asia/Vietnam| Beijing_IME-BJ05/2020-MT291835.2 74 EPI_ISL_414487|hCoV-19/Ireland/COR-20134/2020|Europe/Ireland| EPI_ISL_407079|hCoV-19/Finland/1/2020|Europe/Finland| EPI_ISL_402119_|hCoV-19/Wuhan/IVDC-HB-01/2019| EPI_ISL_413015|hCoV-19/Canada/ON-VIDO-01/2020|North-America/Canada| EPI_ISL_404253|hCoV-19/USA/IL1/2020|North-America/USA| EPI_ISL_414555|hCoV-19/Netherlands/Utrecht_16/2020|Europe/Netherlands| EPI_ISL_408665|hCoV-19/Japan/TY-WK-012/2020|Asia/Japan| 83 Beijing_IME-BJ01/2020-MT291831.1 EPI_ISL_408478|hCoV-19/Chongqing/YC01/2020|Asia/China| EPI_ISL_416886|hCoV-19/Malaysia/MKAK-CL-2020-6430/2020|Asia/Malaysia| EPI_ISL_415584|hCoV-19/Canada/BC_41851/2020|North-America/Canada| Lineage A EPI_ISL_424673|hCoV-19/Mexico/CDMX-InDRE_06/2020|North-America/Mexico| EPI_ISL_417871|hCoV-19/Iceland/9/2020|Europe/Iceland| EPI_ISL_416666|hCoV-19/USA/WA-UW128/2020|North-America/USA| EPI_ISL_420879|hCoV-19/Australia/QLDID931/2020|Oceania/Australia| EPI_ISL_416445|hCoV-19/USA/WA-UW89/2020|North-America/USA| EPI_ISL_407976|hCoV-19/Belgium/GHB-03021/2020|Europe/Belgium| EPI_ISL_407193|hCoV-19/South-Korea/KCDC03/2020|Asia/South-Korea| EPI_ISL_406801|hCoV-19/Wuhan/WH04/2020|Asia/China|

0.0001

FIGURE 1. Neighbor-joining phylogenetic tree based on the whole genome sequences of COVID-19 representative strains. The 3 Chongqing strains are indicated by red dots; the representative strains from B.1.617 lineage are highlighted with a yellow background; strains associated with specific outbreaks in China are indicated by blue squares; and the Wuhan reference strain is shaded in gray. The PANGOLIN lineages were marked and colored on the right. The tree was rooted using strain WH04 (EPI_ISL_406801) in accord with the root of PANGOLIN tree.

410 CCDC Weekly / Vol. 3 / No. 19 Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention China CDC Weekly

Notes from the Field

Two Imported Cases of New Variant COVID-19 First Emerging in Nigeria — Guangdong Province, China, March 12, 2021

Yao Hu1; Xiang Zhao2; Zhencui Li1; Min Kang1; Xiaoling Deng1; Baisheng Li1,#

On February 19, 2021, a 48-year-old male (Case A, Compared with the Wuhan reference sequence XG2275) returning from Nigeria and a 38-year-old (EPI_ISL_402119) (2–3), the Case B (XG2276) strain female (Case B, XG2276) returning from Ukraine via displayed 22 nucleotide variation sites (C241T, airplane were tested by the laboratory of C1498T, A1807G, C3037T, C6285T, T8593C, Customs using nose swabs to test for coronavirus C9565T, C14407T, C14408T, C18171T, A20724G, disease 2019 (COVID-19). Both of them tested C21762T, G23012A, A23403G, G23593C, positive and were transported by ambulance from the T24224C, C24748T, T26767C, C28308G, isolation point to Guangzhou Eighth People’s A28699G, C28887T, and G29543T) including the Hospital. They are still undergoing centralized medical SNPs that defined the L-lineage European branch and observation in the hospital after recovery. belonged to the Pangolin lineage B.1.525 (Figure 1). On March 5, Guangdong CDC received the Furthermore, 9 amino acid mutation sites (E:L21X, samples and began virus isolation and genome M:I82T, N:A12G, N:T205I, S:A67V, S:E484K, sequencing analysis. On March 10, the 2 samples were S:D614G, S:Q677H, and S:F888L) and 3 amino acid sequenced using Nanopore GridION. On March 12, deletions (H69del, V70del, and Y144del) were the sequencing analysis concluded that the 2 virus detected in the protein that corresponded to the genomes belonged to lineage B.1.525, a new COVID- features of the Nigerian variant (B.1.525). 19 variant first emerging in Nigeria, which was first The variant first emerging in Nigeria (B.1.525) detected by genome sequencing in mid-December in shares the same 3 amino acid deletions (H69del, Nigeria but was also quickly found in cases in the V70del, and Y144del) with the 501Y.V1 variant (also United Kingdom, France, and elsewhere. As of March known as the B.1.1.7). The mutation E484K is also 8, 2021, a total of 577 counted sequences in 30 present in the 501Y.V2 variant first emerging in South countries were found in the world (1). Africa (also known as the B.1.351) and Brazilian Compared with the Wuhan reference sequence strains (501Y.V3). The amino acid substitution at (EPI_ISL_402119) (2–3), the strain from Case A position 677 (Q677H) is identical to that found in (XG2275) displayed 24 nucleotide variation sites variants recently described in the United States. The (C241T, C1498T, A1807G, G2659A, C3037T, C6285T, T8593C, C9565T, C14407T, C14408T, amino acid substitutions Q52R and A67V are unique C18171T, A20724G, A21717G, C21762T, to the B.1.525 (4). This is the third recent detection of G23012A, A23403G, G23593C, T24224C, a major international variant following the detection of C24748T, T26767C, C28308G, A28699G, the United Kingdom 501Y.V1 variant and the South C28887T, and G29543T) including the single African 501Y.V2 variant. The transmissibility and nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) that defined the L- pathogenicity of these mutant variants urgently needs further study (5–6). lineage European branch and belonged to the Pangolin lineage B.1.525 (Figure 1). Furthermore, 10 amino doi: 10.46234/ccdcw2021.074 acid mutation sites (E:L21X, M:I82T, N:A12G, # Corresponding author: Baisheng Li, [email protected]. N:T205I, S:Q52R, S:A67V, S:E484K, S:D614G, S:Q677H, and S:F888L) and 3 amino acid deletions 1 Guangdong Provincial Center for Disease Control and Prevention, (H69del, V70del, and Y144del) were detected in the Guangzhou, Guangdong, China; 2 National Institute for Viral Disease Control and Prevention, China CDC, Beijing, China. protein that corresponded to the features of the Nigerian variant (B.1.525) (4). Submitted: March 15, 2021; Accepted: March 17, 2021

Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention CCDC Weekly / Vol. 3 / No. 19 411 China CDC Weekly

97 RM947-YS/Manzhouli_strain 99 RM948-Y/Manzhouli_strain hCoV-19/Russia/SPE-RII-MH1628S/2020|EPI_ISL_596301|2020-09-07 37 hCoV-19/Russia/OMS-ORINFI-9295S/2020|EPI_ISL_569793|2020-07-25 41 hCoV-19/Russia/NVS-RII-MH1137S/2020|EPI_ISL_596266|2020-07-30 78 hCoV-19/Russia/OMS-ORINFI-8945S/2020|EPI_ISL_569792|2020-07-23 210102-512/Shijiazhuang 68 99 20210103/519/Xingtai 57 nCoVBeijing_IVDC-003_06_2020/Beijing_Xinfadi_strain nCoVBeijing_IVDC-001_06_2020/Beijing_Xinfadi_strain nCoVBeijing_IVDC-002_06_2020/Beijing_Xinfadi_strain EPI_ISL_420129|hCoV-19/Spain/Valencia45/2020|Europe/Spain| EPI_ISL_419656|hCoV-19/Austria/CeMM0003/2020|Europe/Austria| EPI_ISL_418366|hCoV-19/Canada/ON_PHL3350/2020|North-America/Canada| 8 EPI_ISL_417525|hCoV-19/Taiwan/CGMH-CGU-12/2020|Asia/Taiwan| 24 EPI_ISL_419559|hCoV-19/USA/FL_5125/2020|North-America/USA| 66 EPI_ISL_420555|hCoV-19/India/c32/2020|Asia/India| HLJ-0418-36-Y/Heilongjiang_strain EPI_ISL_420877|hCoV-19/Australia/VIC-CBA3/2020|Oceania/Australia|

XJ1-0715-Y_S27/Dalian_strain Lineage B.1.1 XJ3-0716-Y_S29/Urumchi_strain 85 XJ2-0715-Y_S28/Urumchi_strain 74 XJ-THT-1-0715-Y_S25/Urumchi_strain 26 LNDL-WY-0722-Y_S11/Dalian_strain 99 LNDL-XY-0722-Y_S10/Dalian_strain LNDL-SFL-0722-Y_S9/Dalian_strain 49 LNDL-BHQ-0722-Y_S12_L001_R1_001 EPI_ISL_413997|hCoV-19/Switzerland/GE3895/2020|Europe/Switzerland| HLJ-0418-32-T/Heilongjiang_strain

45 Shulan_02/Shulan_strain Lineage B.1.1.7 79 Shulan_03/Shulan_strain 14 hCoV-19/England/MILK-9E05B3/2020|EPI_ISL_601443|2020-09-20 99 hCoV-19/England/CAMC-BBC4C0/2020|EPI_ISL_724145|2020-11-21 hCoV-19/England/ALDP-C5842F/2020|EPI_ISL_736160|2020-12-13 80 NC20SCU2740-1/Shanghai_strain_(December) hCoV-19/Brazil/GO-1206/2021|EPI_ISL_985313|2021-01-19 43 Lineage P.1 hCoV-19/USA/TX-HMH-MCoV-24400/2021|EPI_ISL_1078954|2021-01-17 hCoV-19/England/CAMC-1293C09/2021|EPI_ISL_1116310|2021-02-13 99 hCoV-19/Brazil/SP-1030/2021|EPI_ISL_872192|2021-01-18 hCoV-19/Italy/UMB-IZSGC-96118.1.35/2021|EPI_ISL_1163822|2021-02-06 hCoV-19/Canada/ON-PHL-21-03793/2021|EPI_ISL_1230441|2021-02 30 23 hCoV-19/Japan/TY7-503/2021|EPI_ISL_877769|2021-01 76 ACC_20SF18530 Lineage B.1.351 94 hCoV-19/Scotland/EDB11342/2020|EPI_ISL_764278|2020-12-26 66 hCoV-19/South_Africa/Tygerberg-408/2020|EPI_ISL_745161|2020-12-04 59 19 hCoV-19/South_Africa/Tygerberg-427/2020|EPI_ISL_745166|2020-12-06 99 hCoV-19/Botswana/1223-IN1490/2020|EPI_ISL_770475|2020-12-23 hCoV-19/South_Africa/N00390/2020|EPI_ISL_712081|2020-10-08 hCoV-19/South_Africa/NHLS-UCT-GS-1198/2020|EPI_ISL_700496|2020-11-03 41 99 hCoV-19/South_Africa/NHLS-UCT-GS-3556-KRISP/2020|EPI_ISL_696473|2020-11-19 Lineage B.1.427/429 89 hCoV-19/South_Africa/NHLS-UCT-GS-0633/2020|EPI_ISL_700478|2020-10-19 Lineage B.1 hCoV-19/South_Korea/KDCA1839/2021|EPI_ISL_1209447|2021-02-21 hCoV-19/USA/CA-ALSR-7049/2021|EPI_ISL_1185854|2021-01-20 99 hCoV-19/USA/CA-LACPHL-AF00531/2021|EPI_ISL_1191116|2021-02-21 29 70 hCoV-19/USA/VT-MASPHL-02115/2021|EPI_ISL_1233348|2021-02-13 50 hCoV-19/Israel/CVL-2613/2021|EPI_ISL_1209555|2021-01-17 72 hCoV-19/USA/CA-CDC-22168770/2021|EPI_ISL_1194012|2021-02-15 42 46 hCoV-19/USA/WA-CDC-2-3936649/2021|EPI_ISL_1226397|2021-02-18 hCoV-19/Spain/CT-HUVH-65208/2021|EPI_ISL_1059051|2021-02-10 hCoV-19/Nigeria/CV625/2021|EPI_ISL_906284|2021-01-11 Lineage B 99 hCoV-19/Denmark/DCGC-37590/2021|EPI_ISL_928731|2021-01-18

87 hCoV-19/Denmark/DCGC-48722/2021|EPI_ISL_1125020|2021-02-15 Lineage B.1.525 33 hCoV-19/Netherlands/UT-RIVM-15598/2021|EPI_ISL_1232273|2021-02-21 4 12 XG2275 431 hCoV-19/Nigeria/CV616/2021|EPI_ISL_906277|2021-01-07 5 hCoV-19/USA/NY-Wadsworth-21017703-01/2020|EPI_ISL_1226710|2020-12-30 hCoV-19/England/CAMC-C769B3/2020|EPI_ISL_760883|2020-12-15 5 XG2276 hCoV-19/USA/MI-MDHHS-SC23658/2021|EPI_ISL_1058953|2021-01-26 16 34 hCoV-19/USA/NJ-Yale-1856/2021|EPI_ISL_1225612|2021-02-22 HLJ-0418-1-1/Heilongjiang_strain EPI_ISL_420081|hCoV-19/Russia/StPetersburg-RII3997/2020|Europe/Russia| 11 EPI_ISL_418926|hCoV-19/USA/WA-UW359/2020|North-America/USA| EPI_ISL_420150|hCoV-19/Norway/2084/2020|Europe/Norway| 10 8 EPI_ISL_421636|hCoV-19/Australia/NSWID930/2020|Oceania/Australia| EPI_ISL_424964|hCoV-19/USA/NY-NYUMC157/2020|North-America/USA| EPI_ISL_420238|hCoV-19/England/SHEF-C051C/2020|Europe/England| 16 EPI_ISL_418349|hCoV-19/Canada/ON_PHL3650/2020|North-America/Canada| EPI_ISL_417693|hCoV-19/Iceland/25/2020|Europe/Iceland| EPI_ISL_422430|hCoV-19/Singapore/37/2020|Asia/Singapore| hCoV-19/Canada/ON-S171/2020|EPI_ISL_586371|2020-03-24 74 TJ138/Tianjin_strain 67 EPI_ISL_414626|hCoV-19/France/HF1684/2020|Europe/France| 18 EPI_ISL_420324|hCoV-19/Belgium/DVBJ-030468/2020|Europe/Belgium| EPI_ISL_418219|hCoV-19/France/B1623/2020|Europe/France| 7 EPI_ISL_422703|hCoV-19/Netherlands/NA_168/2020|Europe/Netherlands| 93 hCoV-19/Bangladesh/BCSIR-NILMRC-220/2020|EPI_ISL_483710| 7 hCoV-19/India/HR-TF20/2020|EPI_ISL_508497| 69 93 EPI_ISL_417018|hCoV-19/Belgium/ULG-6670/2020|Europe/Belgium| 53 S2-20201026/KS-first/Kashgar_strain EPI_ISL_424963|hCoV-19/USA/NY-NYUMC156/2020|North-America/USA| 43 EPI_ISL_419660|hCoV-19/Austria/CeMM0007/2020|Europe/Austria| 40 EPI_ISL_419296|hCoV-19/Japan/P1/2020|Asia/Japan| EPI_ISL_422623|hCoV-19/Netherlands/NA_314/2020|Europe/Netherlands| EPI_ISL_418355|hCoV-19/Canada/ON_PHLU8150/2020|North-America/Canada| EPI_ISL_416731|hCoV-19/England/SHEF-BFCC0/2020|Europe/England| 90 EPI_ISL_420623|hCoV-19/France/ARA13095/2020|Europe/France| EPI_ISL_420010|hCoV-19/Australia/VIC319/2020|Oceania/Australia| 66 EPI_ISL_417530|hCoV-19/Luxembourg/LNS2128808/2020|Europe/Luxembourg| 10 EPI_ISL_414624|hCoV-19/France/N1620/2020|Europe/France| EPI_ISL_415156|hCoV-19/Belgium/SH-03014/2020|Europe/Belgium| 23 EPI_ISL_412973|hCoV-19/Italy/CDG1/2020|Europe/Italy| EPI_ISL_420080|hCoV-19/Russia/StPetersburg-RII3992/2020|Europe/Russia| hCoV-19/Myanmar/NIH-4385/2020|EPI_ISL_434709| YJ20201109-4525/Shanghai_strain_(November) EPI_ISL_406862|hCoV-19/Germany/BavPat1/2020|Europe/Germany| EPI_ISL_406036|hCoV-19/USA/CA2/2020|North-America/USA| 57 EPI_ISL_424366|hCoV-19/Turkey/ERAGEM-001/2020|Europe/Turkey| 28 EPI_ISL_417444|hCoV-19/Pakistan/Gilgit1/2020|Asia/Pakistan| hCoV-19/Myanmar/MMC_137/2020|EPI_ISL_512844| 5237 EPI_ISL_420222|hCoV-19/England/SHEF-C02F7/2020|Europe/England| 37 EPI_ISL_420799|hCoV-19/Korea/BA-ACH_2604/2020|Asia/Korea| 52 EPI_ISL_417732|hCoV-19/Iceland/94/2020|Europe/Iceland| 32 87 EPI_ISL_413016|hCoV-19/Brazil/SPBR-02/2020|South-America/Brazil| NC_045512.2_Severe_acute_respiratory_syndrome_coronavirus_2_isolate_Wuhan-Hu-1_complete_genome 75 EPI_ISL_402125|hCoV-19/Wuhan-Hu-1/2019|Asia/China| EPI_ISL_403963|hCoV-19/Nonthaburi/74/2020|Asia/Thailand| EPI_ISL_418269|hCoV-19/Vietnam/19-01S/2020|Asia/Vietnam| 25 Beijing_IME-BJ05/2020-MT291835.2 90 EPI_ISL_414487|hCoV-19/Ireland/COR-20134/2020|Europe/Ireland| EPI_ISL_407079|hCoV-19/Finland/1/2020|Europe/Finland| EPI_ISL_402119_|hCoV-19/Wuhan/IVDC-HB-01/2019| EPI_ISL_413015|hCoV-19/Canada/ON-VIDO-01/2020|North-America/Canada| EPI_ISL_404253|hCoV-19/USA/IL1/2020|North-America/USA| EPI_ISL_414555|hCoV-19/Netherlands/Utrecht_16/2020|Europe/Netherlands| EPI_ISL_408665|hCoV-19/Japan/TY-WK-012/2020|Asia/Japan| 54 Beijing_IME-BJ01/2020-MT291831.1 57 EPI_ISL_408478|hCoV-19/Chongqing/YC01/2020|Asia/China| EPI_ISL_416886|hCoV-19/Malaysia/MKAK-CL-2020-6430/2020|Asia/Malaysia| Lineage A EPI_ISL_415584|hCoV-19/Canada/BC_41851/2020|North-America/Canada| 71 51 EPI_ISL_424673|hCoV-19/Mexico/CDMX-InDRE_06/2020|North-America/Mexico| 61 EPI_ISL_417871|hCoV-19/Iceland/9/2020|Europe/Iceland| EPI_ISL_416666|hCoV-19/USA/WA-UW128/2020|North-America/USA| 48 EPI_ISL_420879|hCoV-19/Australia/QLDID931/2020|Oceania/Australia| 41 EPI_ISL_416445|hCoV-19/USA/WA-UW89/2020|North-America/USA| EPI_ISL_407976|hCoV-19/Belgium/GHB-03021/2020|Europe/Belgium| EPI_ISL_407193|hCoV-19/South-Korea/KCDC03/2020|Asia/South-Korea| EPI_ISL_406801|hCoV-19/Wuhan/WH04/2020|Asia/China|

0.0001

FIGURE 1. Phylogenetic tree based on the full-length genome sequences of the COVID-19 virus. The Nigerian variants (B.1.525) are highlighted in yellow and the Guangdong imported B.1.525 variant cases are marked with red dots. The strains associated with specific outbreaks in China are marked with blue squares. The Wuhan reference strain is shaded in gray. The 5 distinguished COVID-19 mutants are marked and colored on the right. The L(A)- or L(B)-lineage and sublineages of the COVID-19 virus were marked and colored on the right.

412 CCDC Weekly / Vol. 3 / No. 19 Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention China CDC Weekly

REFERENCES concerns for containment and vaccination. forbes. https://www. forbes.com/sites/williamhaseltine/2021/02/24/new-nigerian-variant- continues-the-trend-of-dangerous-strains-threatening-covid-19-progress/

1. “GISAID hCOV-19 Tracking of Variants (see menu option ‘G/484K.V3 ?sh=1328d5864140. [2021-03-08].

(B.1.525)’)”. http://www.gisaid.org. [2021-03-08]. 5. Chen HY, Huang XY, Zhao X, Song Y, Hao P, Jiang H, et al. The first

2. Tan WJ, Zhao X, Ma XJ, Wang WL, Niu PH, Xu WB, et al. A novel case of new variant COVID-19 originating in the United Kingdom coronavirus genome identified in a cluster of pneumonia cases — detected in a returning student — Municipality, China, Wuhan, China 2019−2020. China CDC Wkly 2020;2(4):61 − 2. December 14, 2020. China CDC Wkly 2021;3(1):1 − 3. http://dx. http://dx.doi.org/10.46234/ccdcw2020.017. doi.org/10.46234/ccdcw2020.270.

3. Wu F, Zhao S, Yu B, Chen YM, Wang W, Song ZG, et al. A new 6. Chen FJ, Li BS, Hao P, Song Y, Xu WB, Liu NK, et al. A case of new coronavirus associated with human respiratory disease in China. Nature variant COVID-19 first emerging in South Africa detected in airplane 2020;579(7798):265−9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41586-020-2008-3. pilot — Guangdong Province, China, January 6, 2021. China CDC

4. William AH. A new COVID-19 variant from Nigeria raises increased Wkly 2021;3(2):28 − 9. http://dx.doi.org/10.46234/ccdcw2021.007.

Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention CCDC Weekly / Vol. 3 / No. 19 413 China CDC Weekly

Profiles

Xiaoping Dong, China CDC’s Chief Expert of Virology

Yu Chen1; Peter Hao1; Nankun Liu1; Zhenjun Li1; Jingjing Xi1,#; Feng Tan1,#

Xiaoping Dong is the Chief Expert of Virology of China CDC, Adjunct Professor at Beijing University and Xi’an Jiaotong University, and Adjunct Principal Investigator (PI) at the Chinese Academy of Science and China Academy of Chinese Medical Sciences. He is a syndic of the Chinese Society of Microbiology and the Head of the Group of Medical Virology. During his roughly 40-year career, he has dedicated himself to the studies of medical virology and molecular biology, particularly in the fields of prions, human papillomavirus (HPV), and many emerging infectious diseases. He has also participated in emerging responses and controls of many viral infectious diseases domestically and internationally. In the period of 1980’s and 1990’s, his major research interest focused on human papillomavirus (HPV). With the help of DNA hybridization, Dong and his colleagues identified high positive rate of HPV DNAs in the tissues of cervical cancer. During 1991 to 1997, he went to Germany and explored the HPV carcinogenesis under the supervision of Prof. H. Pfister. Dong and the colleagues successfully mapped the binding sites of YY1, a new host factor, in viral long control region (LCR) and confirmed it as a negative regulator for the activity of HPV early promoter. This finding and several others supplied valuable evidence for carcinogenesis of HPV. Under the guidance of Prof. T Hung, a famous senior Chinese virologist, Dong shifted his research to prion diseases (PrD), when he returned from Germany in 1998. At that time, PrD was not widely recognized in China, and there was almost no capacity to diagnose human PrDs. Dong and his team started a mission to address this challenge by establishing various laboratory diagnostic tools. Chinese National Surveillance for Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (CNS-CJD) was set up a couple of years later under the leadership of China CDC. With the innovative surveillance methodologies and working mechanism, as well as dozens of training programs, the annual number of suspected CJD cases increased from a small dozen in the beginning to more than 500 cases currently. More than 2,000 cases were diagnosed as sporadic CJD (sCJD) and about 250 cases were diagnosed as genetic PrD (gPrD). Such groundbreaking work supplies not only the platform for diagnosis of human PrDs, but also contributed to the recognition of China as a bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)-free country. The accumulated data over the past roughly 20 years of CJD surveillance have helped explain the features of PrDs in China for the first time systematically and precisely. Dong’s team identified 19 different gPrD-associated mutations in for the first time. The top 5 most frequent gPrDs in Chinese were T188K-gCJD (29.8%), D178N-FFI (25.7%), E200K-gCJD (18.8%), E196A-gCJD (7.3%) and P102L-GSS (6.4%). Such pattern of PRNP mutants in Chinese gPrDs was not only completely distinct from that of Caucasian, but also different from Japanese and Korean. Some types of gPrDs showed geographic relationship, e.g., more D178N-FFI patients came from and Guangdong, and more T188K-gCJD cases lived in the northern provinces. These findings and others of Chinese gPrDs enriched the knowledge of gPrDs worldwide. After years of efforts, Dong and his team successfully set up two in vitro prion replication techniques, protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA), and real-time quaking-induced conversion (RT-QuIC), which are already widely used in various studies. RT-QuIC has been used in the diagnosis for human PrDs, with specimens of the brain, cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), and skin. Additionally, a series of infectious cell models, animal models, and transgenic mice models infected with different prion strains had been established. Those techniques form the solid and unique research platform for prions in the levels of molecules, cells, tissues, and animals in vitro and in vivo. In addition to human CJD surveillance, Dong and his team have several achievements in prion-related research including the following: 1) identification of autophagy activation in the brains of human PrDs and prion-infected rodent models; 2) global omics profiles that identified differentially expressed proteins and affected biological pathways; 3) aberrant alterations of biological functions in brains; 4) activation of brain native immunity;

414 CCDC Weekly / Vol. 3 / No. 19 Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention China CDC Weekly

5) abnormal changes of protein post-translation modifications; and 6) cross-species transmission demonstrated by PMCA assisting prion strains to overcome species barriers. These accomplishments helped enrich the knowledge of prion biology and pathology. In the past 20 years, Dong participated actively in the emerging response and control for many infectious diseases. In 2003, he dedicated himself to the fight against SARS. He went many times to the front lines in Guangdong, Beijing, and for case investigation, epidemiological survey, and laboratory diagnosis. Working together with Sinovac and the Chinese Academy of Medical Science, he contributed greatly to the research and development (R&D) of an inactivated SARS vaccine that was the first SARS vaccine to finish Phase I clinical trials worldwide. In an outbreak of human cases infected with H5N1 influenza virus in 2005, as the team leader from China side, he worked closely with the experts of the World Health Organization (WHO) for the investigations of the first two cases. He worked as a co-PI in the R&D of an inactivated vaccine of H5N1 virus for human use, which successfully finished Phase I and II clinical trials. In 2015, he went to Sierra Leone as China CDC’s team leader for Ebola disease. He and his colleagues set up a biosafety laboratory level III (BSL-3) in Freetown and conducted thousands of sample testing. Since the emergence of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in 2020, Dong has fully dedicated himself to the national and international responses. He attended numerous domestic and international consultant Webinars, went the front lines in Beijing, Heilongjiang, Shaanxi, etc., contributed to the biweekly reports of the global COVID-19 pandemic, consulted for the R&D of COVID-19 vaccines, and had several other contributions. Dong has rich experience in international cooperation, which has led to his appointment as Director of Center for Global Public Health of China CDC since 2018. He and his colleagues visited many countries in Africa and Asia, communicated with different international organizations, drafted China CDC’s global health strategic and development plan, created training programs, dispatched short- and long-term Chinese experts to different countries, and implemented international collaborating projects. New communication platforms have been developed and gradually recognized internationally, such as annual Consultation on Public Health Development (CPHD), roundtable of Belt & Road Public Health Cooperation Network, program of Molecular Diagnosis and Pathogen Determination (ModPad), etc. The collaborating fields cover major infectious diseases, emerging responses, public health events, training and education, task-force capacity building, laboratory capacity, and others. Dong has rich experience in medical virology and public health based on his long-term work in clinical medicine, laboratory, disease surveillance, and field emerging response. He has contributed significantly to academic research as a PI for more than 30 national and international projects and published more than 220 SCI-cited papers. Dong’s international collaborative experience has provided him with wider perspective on medical virology and public health, and he will continue to use this expertise as China CDC’s Chief Expert of Virology. doi: 10.46234/ccdcw2021.107 # Corresponding authors: Jingjing Xi, [email protected]; Feng Tan, [email protected].

1 Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Beijing, China.

Submitted: April 30, 2021; Accepted: May 03, 2021

Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention CCDC Weekly / Vol. 3 / No. 19 415 Copyright © 2021 by Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention All Rights Reserved. No part of the publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of CCDC Weekly. Authors are required to grant CCDC Weekly an exclusive license to publish. All material in CCDC Weekly Series is in the public domain and may be used and reprinted without permission; citation to source, however, is appreciated. References to non-China-CDC sites on the Internet are provided as a service to CCDC Weekly readers and do not constitute or imply endorsement of these organizations or their programs by China CDC or National Health Commission of the People’s Republic of China. China CDC is not responsible for the content of non-China-CDC sites.

The inauguration of China CDC Weekly is in part supported by Project for Enhancing International Impact of China STM Journals Category D (PIIJ2-D-04-(2018)) of China Association for Science and Technology (CAST).

Vol. 3 No. 19 May 7, 2021

Responsible Authority National Health Commission of the People’s Republic of China

Sponsor Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention

Editing and Publishing China CDC Weekly Editorial Office No.155 Changbai Road, Changping District, Beijing, China Tel: 86-10-63150501, 63150701 Email: [email protected]

CSSN ISSN 2096-7071 CN 10-1629/R1