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Algorithms to Support the Evolution of Information Assurance Needs

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Algorithms to Support the Evolution of Information Assurance Needs Introduction For decades NSA has had the role of ensuring the security of National Secu- rity Systems (NSS). NSA’s Directorate of Research designs cryptographic algo- rithms, operating modes, and protocols for this purpose. More recent cultural changes at NSA include an increased reliance on commercial cryptographic technologies for securing NSS and a greater sensitivity to the need to be more transparent and open in our efforts. In 2013, NSA released a pair of algorithms—Simon and Speck—for the cryp- tographic community to analyze and review. The goal for Simon and Speck is to provide options that could enable future devices in highly constrained environments to be secured, in particular where current options are not viable, and where classified solutions are not possible. This look into NSA design efforts is significant and almost unprecedented, and we express our gratitude to the cryptographic and engineering community for their analysis of both the security and performance of Simon and Speck. To provide additional insight and to clarify the appropriate use of Simon and Speck, NSA has decided to publish this document providing some Simon and Speck background and answers to frequently asked questions. The evolution of Information Assurance Since its creation in 1952, NSA has maintained the responsibility of securing classified federal telecommunications. Through the decades, this mission has continuously progressed to keep pace with the evolution of technology and the subsequent expansion of the role of information security. As we consider the future of the NSA IA mission, we see yet another evolution in computing, communications, and networks, which drives new and expanding use of cryptography all around us. We are standing on the precipice of the Internet of Things (IoT) revolution, an explosion of connected devices that will profoundly affect our daily lives and change the way we interact with the physical world around us. The IoT expands the Internet into a network of smart objects (“things”) that have the ability to communicate with each other and with centralized resources. Prominent IoT technologies today include RFID, which is a key enabler of modern supply-chain management and industrial logistics, and wireless sensor networks, whose applications range from home automation to traffic control to medical monitoring. When we consider the rapid increase in connected devices, it is evident that we are facing unprecedented challenges to security and privacy. For very highly constrained applications, the chosen cryptographic algorithms must be efficient enough to fit within the scarce resources available. Research is currently under way in the growing field of “lightweight” cryptography that strives to protect communication in these environments where limited power, energy, chip area, RAM, ROM, etc. are available, without sacrificing security. To meet these challenges, NIST has recently announced their intention to create a portfolio of lightweight primitives. Algorithms will be recommended for use only in the context of profiles, which describe physical, performance, and security characteristics. These profiles are intended to capture cryptographic algorithm requirements imposed by devices and applications where lightweight cryptography is needed. NIST will develop these profiles based on community input about application and device requirements for lightweight cryptography. While this document focuses on the single aspect of encrypting data in con- strained devices and networks, it is important to remember that we face many IoT challenges. There is more research and discussion required, in particular to address the unique authentication requirements posed by constrained net- works and to consider algorithm agility, especially to manage the potential for unanticipated interoperability needs as networks grow. We welcome the sup- port and involvement of the full breadth of the cryptographic community as we work to address these additional, outstanding challenges. We aim to further the discussion of lightweight cryptography by proposing Simon and Speck be added to the set of options to consider for particular con- strained applications. Simon and Speck Simon and Speck each refer to a separate family of block ciphers. A block cipher is an encryption algorithm that allows parties already sharing a common secret key to securely encrypt blocks of data. Simon and Speck each support a variety of block and key sizes, so that an algorithm can be tailored to a particular application. More specifically, each of Simon and Speck is a family of lightweight block ci- phers, meaning they are tailored to be particularly efficient when implemented on extremely constrained platforms, such as RFID tags, sensor nodes, micro- controllers, and other resource-limited devices. It should be noted that while the field of lightweight cryptography includes many primitives, schemes, and protocols specifically designed for efficiency in constrained environments, more general purpose algorithms such as AES may be capable of meeting the needs of many constrained environment applications. The term “lightweight” does not refer to the security of an algorithm, but only to its suitability for use on highly constrained devices. Thus a secure lightweight block cipher with a given block and key size provides the same level of security as any other secure block cipher with that same block and key size. A key element of the design of Simon and Speck is their flexibility, i.e., their ability to perform well on a full range of hardware and software platforms, and to allow a spectrum of implementations from those with a very small footprint and correspondingly low throughput to those with high throughput and a correspondingly larger footprint. The aim is to support implementations on heterogeneous networks, where good performance may be necessary on many disparate sorts of devices. With that said, Simon is optimized for hardware applications and Speck for software applications. So for an application mostly on hardware (respectively software) devices, Simon (resp. Speck) is the best choice. The flexibility of Simon and Speck is a by-product of their simplicity. They are built using a set of very simple operations (AND, XOR, addition, circular shift) that can easily be performed on just about any device capable of computation. As originally defined, Simon and Speck offered a broad range of block and key sizes: block size key size 32 64 48 72, 96 64 96, 128 96 96, 144 128 128, 192, 256 When we consider potential NSS applications, Simon 128/256 and Speck 128/256, which act on 128-bit plaintext blocks using a 256-bit key, are the only suitable options. Full descriptions of the algorithms can be found at [BSS+13]. Simon and Speck FAQ Here follows an FAQ for the algorithms Simon and Speck. 1. General Questions How do Simon and Speck factor into NSA’s plans for constrained applications? NSA’s Directorate of Research designs cryptographic algorithms, operating modes, and protocols in support of NSA’s Information Assurance Mission to ensure the security of National Security Systems (NSS). It is likely that future NSS will include constrained, commercial devices. The goal of Simon and Speck is to provide options that could enable future devices to be secured, in particular where current options are not viable, and where classified solutions are not possible. Many lightweight block ciphers have been proposed, but often these block ciphers target a particular platform (often an ASIC). The aim of Simon and Speck is to provide strong performance on multiple platforms, including future, unforeseen platforms. NSA has offered Simon and Speck to the cryptographic community in the hope that they will prove useful to the development of a robust set of algorithms suited to the full array of future constrained applications. We look to NIST and input from NSS operators to help define the appropriate role each algorithm should play in this space. When should Simon and/or Speck be used? AES is the standard for National Security Systems. For most usages, lightweight cryptography is unnecessary, and one should implement AES-256. Interoperability is an important consideration, and is another reason to prefer AES-256. For some highly constrained applications, Simon or Speck may be the best op- tion. This can especially be the case for a closed system where interoperability is not an issue or for systems where interoperability is achieved by communica- tion with a more powerful device (which would be able to encrypt and decrypt using any number of supported algorithms, e.g. Simon,Speck, or AES). Defining the use cases where specifically tailored lightweight algorithms will be needed is a current topic of interest. A discussion of military IoT applica- tions, where lightweight cryptography may be appropriate, can be found here in Leveraging the Internet of Things for a More Efficient and Effective Military from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). NIST is consider- ing applications of lightweight cryptography for sensor networks, healthcare, the smart grid, etc.; see NIST’s Lightweight Cryptography Project. NASA has expanding programs for extremely small satellites such as CubeSats which may have need for lightweight algorithms; see NASA’s definition of SmallSats and CubeSats. 2. Usage issues Are Simon and Speck interoperable? No. Different block ciphers do not interoperate. Thus data encrypted with Speck 128/256, for example, must be decrypted with Speck 128/256. Similarly, data encrypted with AES-256 must be decrypted with AES-256. How would Simon and Speck integrate into secure systems? When considering a new system design, it is important to remember that many factors come into play. Simon and Speck are cryptographic primitives that are meant to be used as components of highly constrained security systems. There is much in addition to the block cipher that is necessary to create a secure system. Key management is fundamental to secure systems, but is separate from the choice of block cipher used. Similarly, authentication remains an important issue for constrained systems as traditional solutions may impose undue burdens.
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