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Reporter NATIONAL BUREAU of ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NBER Reporter NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH A quarterly summary of NBER research No. 4, December 2017 Program Report ALSO IN THIS ISSUE Employment Changes for Cognitive Occupations, 2000–2012 Industrial Organization Percentage change in STEM and other managerial or professional occupations -20 0 20 40 60 * Teachers (K-12) Liran Einav and Jonathan Levin Managers (All) Nurses Health Technicians Health Therapists Comp. Sci./Programming/Tech. Support Accounting And Finance Economists & Survey Researchers Social Workers, Counselors & Clergy Physicians College Instructors Researchers in the Program on Industrial Organization (IO) study Lawyers and Judges Other Business Support consumer and firm behavior, competition, innovation, and govern- Operations Researchers Physicians' Assistants Medical Scientists ment regulation. This report begins with a brief summary of general Legal Assistants and Paralegals Pharmacists developments in the last three decades in the range and focus of pro- Dental Hygienists Mathematicians/Statisticians/Actuaries gram members’ research, then discusses specific examples of recent Dentists Social Scientists And Urban Planners Artists, Entertainers, and Athletes work. Marketing, Advertising and PR Pilots/Air Traic Control When the program was launched in the early 1990s, two devel- Biological Scientists Physical Scientists Architects opments had profoundly shaped IO research. One was development Writers, Editors, and Reporters Engineering And Science Technicians of game-theoretic models of strategic behavior by firms with market Draers And Surveyors 1 Engineers (All) power, summarized in Jean Tirole’s classic textbook. The initial wave -20 0 20 40 60 of research in this vein was focused on applying new insights from eco- Source: D. Deming, NBER Working Paper No. 21473 nomic theory; empirical applications came later. -
Course Proposal On
LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND INEQUALITY Daniele Checchi – EIEF spring 2013 1. Model of long-run inequality and mobility Oded Galor. 2011 Inequality, Human Capital Formation and the Process of Development. in Eric A. Hanushek, Stephen Machin and Ludger Woessmann (eds). 2012. Handbook of the Economics of Education. Elsevier. 441-493 Maoz, Y. and O.Moav. 1999. Intergenerational mobility and the process of development. Economic Journal 109: 677-97 2. Returns to education and inequality (skill-biased technological change, globalization) Daron Acemoglu and David Autor. 2010. Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for Employment and Earning. NBER Working Paper No. 16082 (published in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card (eds) 2011. Handbook of labor economics, vol.4/B, Elsevier 1043-1171) Daron Acemoglu and David Autor. 2012. What does human capital do? a review of Goldin and Katz's The race between education and technology. NBER Working Paper No. 17820 Alderson, A. and F. Nielsen. 2002. Globalisation and the great U-turn: income inequality trends in 16 OECD countries. American Journal of Sociology 107: 1244-1299. 3. Linking institutions to earnings inequality D.Neal and S.Rosen. 2003. Theories of the distribution of earnings. in A.Atkinson and F.Bourguignon (eds). Handbook of Income Distribution. NorthHolland. 379-428 D.Checchi and C.Garcia Peñalosa. 2009. Labour shares and the personal distribution of income in the OECD. Economica, 1-38 Richard Freeman and Ronald Schettkat. 2001. Skill compression, wage differentials and employment: Germany vs. the US. Oxford Economic Papers 53 (3): 582-603. 4. Labour and product markets regulation Tito Boeri. Institutional Reforms and Dualism in European Labor Markets. -
Trust and the Welfare State: the Twin Peaks Curve*
The Economic Journal, Doi: 10.1111/ecoj.12278 © 2015 Royal Economic Society. Published by John Wiley & Sons, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. TRUST AND THE WELFARE STATE: THE TWIN PEAKS CURVE* Yann Algan, Pierre Cahuc and Marc Sangnier We show the existence of a twin peaks relation between trust and the size of the welfare state that stems from two opposing forces. Uncivic people support large welfare states because they expect to benefit from them without bearing their costs. But civic individuals support generous benefits and high taxes only when they are surrounded by trustworthy individuals. We provide empirical evidence for these behaviours and this twin peaks relation in the OECD countries. Why does the welfare state take such a variety of different forms across countries? To this long-established question a recent literature responds with the hypothesis that the size of the welfare state depends positively on the country level of trust. In particular, Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) and Rothstein et al. (2010) argue that the persistence of large welfare states in Scandinavian countries is explained by the trustworthiness of their citizens. Those large welfare states, it is argued, rely on conditional cooperation. Trustworthy, or ‘civic’ individuals consent to pay high rates of tax only because they are convinced that their compatriots are paying their taxes too and not misusing social benefits. We show that this explanation is only one part of a much broader story. Figure 1 (a) shows that the observed cross-country relationship between trust and the size of welfare states is not monotonic, contrary to the traditional claim, but can be visualised as twin peaks. -
Fairness and Redistribution
Fairness and Redistribution By ALBERTO ALESINA AND GEORGE-MARIOS ANGELETOS* Different beliefs about the fairness of social competition and what determines income inequality influence the redistributive policy chosen in a society. But the composition of income in equilibrium depends on tax policies. We show how the interaction between social beliefs and welfare policies may lead to multiple equi- libria or multiple steady states. If a society believes that individual effort determines income, and that all have a right to enjoy the fruits of their effort, it will choose low redistribution and low taxes. In equilibrium, effort will be high and the role of luck will be limited, in which case market outcomes will be relatively fair and social beliefs will be self-fulfilled. If, instead, a society believes that luck, birth, connec- tions, and/or corruption determine wealth, it will levy high taxes, thus distorting allocations and making these beliefs self-sustained as well. These insights may help explain the cross-country variation in perceptions about income inequality and choices of redistributive policies. (JEL D31, E62, H2, P16) Pre-tax inequality is higher in the United support the poor; an important dimension of States than in continental West European coun- redistribution is legislation, and in particular the tries (“Europe” hereafter). For example, the regulation of labor and product markets, which Gini coefficient in the pre-tax income distribu- are much more intrusive in Europe than in the tion in the United States is 38.5, while in Europe United States.1 it is 29.1. Nevertheless, redistributive policies The coexistence of high pre-tax inequality are more extensive in Europe, where the income and low redistribution is prima facia inconsis- tax structure is more progressive and the overall tent with both the Meltzer-Richard paradigm of size of government is about 50 percent larger redistribution and the Mirrlees paradigm of so- (that is, about 30 versus 45 percent of GDP). -
Cooperation in a Peer Production Economy Experimental Evidence from Wikipedia*
Cooperation in a Peer Production Economy Experimental Evidence from Wikipedia* Yann Algan† Yochai Benkler‡ Mayo Fuster Morell§ Jérôme Hergueux¶ July 2013 Abstract The impressive success of peer production – a large-scale collaborative model of production primarily based on voluntary contributions – is difficult to explain through the assumptions of standard economic theory. The aim of this paper is to study the prosocial foundations of cooperation in this new peer production economy. We provide the first field test of existing economic theories of prosocial motives for contributing to real-world public goods. We use an online experiment coupled with observational data to elicit social preferences within a diverse sample of 850 Wikipedia contributors, and seek to use to those measures to predict subjects’ field contributions to the Wikipedia project. We find that subjects’ field contributions to Wikipedia are strongly related to their level of reciprocity in a conditional Public Goods game and in a Trust game and to their revealed preference for social image within the Wikipedia community, but not to their level of altruism either in a standard or in a directed Dictator game. Our results have important theoretical and practical implications, as we show that reciprocity and social image are both strong motives for sustaining cooperation in peer production environments, while altruism is not. JEL classification: H41, C93, D01, Z13 Keywords: Field Experiment, Public Goods, Social Preferences, Peer Production, Internet * We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the European Research Council (ERC Starting Grant) and logistical support from the Sciences Po médialab and the Wikimedia Foundation. We are grateful to Anne l’Hôte and Romain Guillebert for outsdanding research assistance. -
Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Algan, Yann (Ed.); Bisin, Alberto (Ed.); Manning, Alan (Ed.); Verdier, Thierry (Ed.) Book — Published Version Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe Studies of Policy Reform Provided in Cooperation with: Oxford University Press (OUP) Suggested Citation: Algan, Yann (Ed.); Bisin, Alberto (Ed.); Manning, Alan (Ed.); Verdier, Thierry (Ed.) (2012) : Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe, Studies of Policy Reform, ISBN 978-0-19-966009-4, Oxford University Press, Oxford, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660094.001.0001 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118673 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available -
Antoinette Schoar
ANTOINETTE SCHOAR Massachusetts Institute of Technology 50 Memorial Drive, Room E52-433 Cambridge, MA 02142 (617) 253-3763 [email protected] www.mit.edu/~aschoar ACADEMIC POSITIONS Michael M. Koerner (1949) Professor of Entrepreneurship, MIT, July 2008 - present. Michael M. Koerner (1949) Associate Professor of Entrepreneurship, (with tenure), MIT, July 2005 - present. Michael M. Koerner (1949) Associate Professor of Entrepreneurial Finance, MIT, July 2004- 2005. Maurice F. Strong Career Development Fund Assistant Professor, MIT, July 2001-2004. Visiting Professor University of Chicago GSB, February - June 2003 Assistant Professor in Finance, Sloan School of Management, MIT, July 2000-2001. EDUCATION Ph.D. in Economics, University of Chicago, June 2000. Diploma in Economics, University of Cologne, Germany, April 1995. HONORS AND AWARDS Ewing Marion Kauffman Prize Medal for “Distinguished Research in Entrepreneurship,” 2008. Rensselaer Polytechnic Prize “Rising Star in Finance”, 2008. NSF Grant # 22-3471-00-0-79-449 to study “Judge Specific Differences in Chapter 11”. Kauffman Foundation Grant # 22-2344-00-0-18-449 to build a “Repository Database of Bankruptcy Resolutions in US Small Businesses”. IFC Chief Economist Grant for research on “Access to Finance in Emerging Markets”. Brattle Prize (First Prize) distinguished paper in the Journal of Finance, 2003, for the paper “Effects of Corporate Diversification on Productivity”. NASDAQ Award for the best paper on capital formation at the WFA 2003 “Private Equity in the Developing World: The Determinants of Transaction Structures” (joint with Josh Lerner). Michael J. Borrelli, CFA Research Grant Award 2003 for the paper “Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence and Capital Flows” (joint with Steve Kaplan). -
Johan Hombert
Johan Hombert HEC Paris Email: [email protected] Finance Department Phone: +33 1 39 67 72 57 1 rue de la Liberation Web: johanhombert.github.io 78350 Jouy-en-Josas, France Blog: johanhombert.github.io/blog Employment HEC Paris 2021{ Associate Dean, Director of the PhD Program 2015{ Associate Professor of Finance (with tenure) 2010{2015 Assistant Professor of Finance INSEE (National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies), Paris 2009{2010 Economist 2006{2009 Teaching Assistant at ENSAE Other Academic Appointments 2015{ CEPR Research Affiliate Education 2018 H.D.R. (French diploma to supervise Ph.D. theses), Toulouse School of Economics 2009 Ph.D. in Economics, Toulouse School of Economics 2005 M.Sc. in Economics, ENSAE and Paris School of Economics 2004 B.Sc. in Applied Mathematics and Economics, Ecole Polytechnique Publications Incentive Constrained Risk Sharing, Segmentation, and Asset Pricing with Bruno Biais and Pierre- Olivier Weill, conditionally accepted at the American Economic Review. Can Unemployment Insurance Spur Entrepreneurial Activity? Evidence from France with An- toinette Schoar, David Sraer and David Thesmar, Journal of Finance, 2020, 75(3), 1247-1285. Anticompetitive Vertical Mergers Waves with Jerome Pouyet and Nicolas Schutz, Journal of In- dustrial Economics, 2019, 67(3-4), 484-514. Can Innovation Help U.S. Manufacturing Firms Escape Import Competition from China? with Adrien Matray, Journal of Finance, 2018, 83(5), 2003-2039. The Competitive Effects of a Bank Megamerger on Credit Supply with Henri Fraisse and Mathias Le, Journal of Banking and Finance, 2018, 93, 151-161. The Real Effects of Lending Relationships on Innovative Firms and Inventor Mobility with Adrien Matray, Review of Financial Studies, 2017, 30(7), 2413-2445. -
Document De Travail N°
DOCUMENT DE TRAVAIL N° 605 DIVERSITY AND EMPLOYMENT PROSPECTS: NEIGHBORS MATTER! Camille Hémet and Clément Malgouyres October 2016 DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DES ÉTUDES ET DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DES ÉTUDES ET DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES DIVERSITY AND EMPLOYMENT PROSPECTS: NEIGHBORS MATTER! Camille Hémet and Clément Malgouyres October 2016 Les Documents de travail reflètent les idées personnelles de leurs auteurs et n'expriment pas nécessairement la position de la Banque de France. Ce document est disponible sur le site internet de la Banque de France « www.banque-france.fr ». Working Papers reflect the opinions of the authors and do not necessarily express the views of the Banque de France. This document is available on the Banque de France Website “www.banque-france.fr”. Diversity and Employment Prospects: Neighbors Matter! Camille H´emet ∗ Cl´ement Malgouyres y ∗Ecole´ Normale Sup´erieure(ENS), Paris School of Economics (PSE) Contact: [email protected], Webpage: http://sites.google.com/site/camillehemet/ yBanque de France Contact: [email protected] We are grateful to Yann Algan, Bruno Decreuse, Nina Guyon, Jordi Jofre Monseny, Alan Manning, Thierry Mayer, Fabien Moizeau, Hillel Rapoport, Matthieu Solignac, Maxime To, Javier V´asquezGrenno and Yves Zenou for insightful comments and discussion. We are deeply indebted to two anonymous referees whose comments helped us substantially improve the paper. We also thank participants at the following events for their remarks: Workshop on Cultural Diversity (Paris 1 Panth´eon-Sorbonne), 10th UEA meeting, 2014 SOLE meeting, IEB seminar, National University of Singapore seminar, PSE Applied Economics lunch seminar, 62nd annual meeting of the French Economic Association (AFSE) and WZB workshop on Ethnic Diversity. -
Nber Working Paper Series Family Values and The
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES FAMILY VALUES AND THE REGULATION OF LABOR Alberto F. Alesina Yann Algan Pierre Cahuc Paola Giuliano Working Paper 15747 http://www.nber.org/papers/w15747 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 February 2010 We thank Francesco Giavazzi, Luigi Guiso, Joel Guttman, Andrea Ichino, Etienne Lehmann, Etienne Wasmer and seminar participants at Brown University, IZA, the London School of Economics, New York University and the CEPR Conference on Culture and Institutions in Milan for helpful comments. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer- reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2010 by Alberto F. Alesina, Yann Algan, Pierre Cahuc, and Paola Giuliano. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Family Values and the Regulation of Labor Alberto F. Alesina, Yann Algan, Pierre Cahuc, and Paola Giuliano NBER Working Paper No. 15747 February 2010 JEL No. J2,K2 ABSTRACT Flexible labor markets require geographically mobile workers to be efficient. Otherwise, firms can take advantage of the immobility of workers and extract monopsony rents. In cultures with strong family ties, moving away from home is costly. Thus, individuals with strong family ties rationally choose regulated labor markets to avoid moving and limiting the monopsony power of firms, even though regulation generates lower employment and income. -
MARIANNE BERTRAND Graduate School of Business University of Chicago 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue Chicago, IL 60637 Tel:773-834-594
MARIANNE BERTRAND Graduate School of Business University of Chicago 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue Chicago, IL 60637 Tel:773-834-5943 E-mail:[email protected] EMPLOYMENT Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, July 2003 - Present: Professor of Economics Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, July 2002 - June 2003: Associate Professor of Economics Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, July 2000 - June 2002: Assistant Professor of Economics Department of Economics and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, July 1998 - June 2000: Assistant Professor of Economics and Public Affairs EDUCATION Harvard University, Cambridge. MA, 1993 - 1998: Ph.D. in Economics Universit´eLibre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium, 1991 - 1992: Maˆıtrise en Econometrie (M.Sc. in Econometrics) Universit´eLibre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium, 1987 - 1991: Licence en Economie (B.A. in Economics) PUBLISHED AND FORTHCOMING PAPERS • “The Role of Family in Family Firms,” (joint with Antoinette Schoar), Journal of Economic Perspectives (forthcoming). • “Behavioral Economics and Marketing in Aid of Decision-Making among the Poor,” (joint with Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir) Journal of Public Policy and Mar- keting (forthcoming). 1 • “Banking Deregulation and Industry Structure: Evidence from the French Banking Reforms of 1985,” (joint with Antoinette Schoar and David Thesmar) The Journal of Finance (forthcoming). • “Credit and Product Market Effects of Banking Deregulation: Evidence from the French Experience,” (joint with Antoinette Schoar and David Thesmar), DICE Report- Journal for Institutional Comparisons, vol 3, 2005 (3). • “Implicit Discrimination,” (joint with Dolly Chugh and Sendhil Mullainathan), The American Economic Review, May 2005. -
David Thesmar
DAVID THESMAR PERSONAL DATA Born 07/03/1972 in France French Citizen MAIN POSITIONS HELD 2016- MIT Sloan school of Management • Franco Modigliani Professor of Financial Economics • Professor of Finance 2015-2016 Haas School of Business, UC Berkeley. • Visiting Professor of Finance and Baxter Fellow. 2005-2016 HEC Paris • Professor of Finance (2009-) • Associate Professor of Finance (2005-2009) 2003 – 2005 INSEE (French statistical office) • Lecturer & researcher at ENSAE (2002-2005) • Eurozone Economy, Macroeconomic Forecasting Division (1999-2002) • Researcher at CREST (1997-1999) EDUCATION 2000 - PhD in Economics, EHESS (Committee: P. Cahuc, C. Chamley, D. Cohen, P. Rey, F. Kramarz) 1997 - MPhil in Economics, LSE 1996 - MSc Economics, ENSAE and PSE 1995 - BSc Economics and Physics, Ecole Polytechnique OTHER POSITIONS HELD 2014 - 2017 Member of the scientific board of ESRB (European Systemic Risk Board) 2012 - 2016 Member of the scientific board of APCR (French Banking & Insurance Supervisor) 2012 - 2016 Senior Research Consultant, CFM, Paris 2008 - 2013 Member of the council of economic advisers (with the French Prime Minister) PUBLICATIONS Asset management & financial markets 1. "Sticky Expectations and the Profitability Anomaly", with Bouchaud, Krüger and Landier, Journal of Finance, 2019 2. "Wholesale Funding Dry-Ups", with Pérignon and Vuillemey, Journal of Finance, 2018 3. "Sovereign Crises and Bank Financing: Evidence from the European Repo Market", with Boissel, Derrien, Ors, Journal of Financial Economics, 2017 4. "Banking Integration and House Price Comovement", with Landier and Sraer, Journal of Financial Economics, 2017 5. “The Sovereign-Bank Diabolic Loop and ESBies", with Brunnermeier, Garicano, Lane, Pagano, Reis, Santos, Van Nieuwerburgh and Vayanos, AER P&P, 2016 6.