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AIR U N I VE R S ITY \ rcuicuu SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1969 AIR rcuicwU N I VE R S ITY THE P R O F E S S I O N A l J O U R N A L OF THE U N I T E D S T A T E S AIR FORCE Some Refl ec t ion s on a Tour of Duty....................................................................................................... 2 Gen. J. P. McConnell, usaf M odern Combat Air l if t .......................................................................................................................................12 Gen. Howell M. Estes, Jr., usaf A New Era for MAC’s R eser ve Forces.......................................................................................................26 Maj. Gen. Gilbert L. Curtis, usaf C ombat Air l if t T r a in in c in MAC............................................................................................................. 35 Maj. Gen. Courtnev L. Faught, usaf W ea t h er Mo d if ic a t io n in Su ppo r t of Mil it a r y Ope r a t io n s................................................... 44 Maj. Thomas A. Studer, usaf T echnology .and Aer o spac e Power in the 1970s ............................................................................. 51 Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, usaf (Ret) H ist o r y, Vie t n a m , and the Concept of Det er r en c e.......................................................................58 Col. William C. Moore, usaf Air Force Review I n Sea r c h of an Aviation Environment Master Plan..........................................................64 Maj. William R. Sims, usaf Capt. Ângelo J. Cerehione, usaf Military Affairs Abroad A N ew Chief for the Soviet A ir Forces..................................................................................................73 Harriet Fast Scott In My Opinion Moscow S pea x in c ....................................................................................................................................................77 Lt. Col. Donald L. Clark, usaf Books and Ideas Amer ica Faces the Third W orld............................................................................................................... 83 Dr. Charles A. Lofgren W orld War II: E urope in the Throes of Total War..........................................................90 Maj. David Maclsaac, usaf T he Contributors............................................. 04 the cover Address manuscripts to: Editor, Air Univer- Focus of our September-October issue is on aity Review, Aerospace Studies Institute, Max- the Military Airlift Command with emphasis well Air Force Base, Ala. 36112. Printed hy \ on jet-age combat airlift, MAC’s Reserve Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Forces, combat airlift training, and on sig- Subscriptions are sold hy Air University Book Department, Maxwelí Air Force Base, nificant results in weather modification for Ala. 36112: yearly $4.50, back issiies 75 military operations. But another emphasis vvas cents. USAF recuhrinc pu biic a t io n 50-2. inevitable in the receipt of General McConnell’s last testament as Air Force Chief of Staff and the realization that General Estes, too, would re- Vol. XX No. 6 S eptember -O ctober 1969 tire on 1 August as MAC Commander. To both: Ave otque valei G ener a l J. P. Mc C onnell A little reflection makes a skeptic; a lot of reflection makes a believer. —L o u is P asteur HILE assembling some notes for this article, I ran across the cited quotation attributed to the famous nineteenth century Wchemist. Realizing that my comments would appear in the Air University Revietc barely a month after I had left ofBce as the Air Force Chief of Staff, it occurred to me that Pasteurs thought would be a useful guide for vvriter and prospective reader alike. It is hardly necessary for me to call attention to the flood of criticai comment that has been directed toward a wide variety of govemmental activities, particularly in the last year. I have often thought that much of this criticism has shown signs of what Pasteur would have called skepticism because it has been founded on much speculation, little fact. and far less reflection. I have no desire to be labeled a skeptic, nor can I see at this point in time any benefit that could result from criticai comment by me on recent controversial events. Such events merit far deeper examination and “a lot of reflection”— by myself as well as others—before valid conclusions can be drawn. In this article, therefore, I shall discuss briefly some of my long-held views and convictions and make some observations on my recent tenure in ofiBce. In looking back over the past few years, I recall vividly the personal distinction inherent in my nomination as Chief of StafF and confirmation by the Senate. VVithout question, the confidence and trust embodied in these actions represent the highest honors that have been bestowed on me during my lifetime. But symbols of honor are temporal, and, in my own mind at least, that initial sense of honor was fully matched by the deep sense of obligation and responsibility that I felt during my entire tour of duty. During those early months of 1965, I, like others before me, had a base of experience through Service as the Vice Chief of Staff under General Curtis E. LeMay. Although I occupied that position for less than a year, the experience proved beneficiai for a number of reasons. One was the fact that I became intimately familiar with both joint and Service issues of particular interest to the Air Force. More importantly, I gained what I regard as indispensable to a Chief of Staff: a thorough knowledge of the environment of govemment in which sênior military ofBcers must operate to fulfill their responsibilities. By “environment” I am referring not only to the division of authority among govemment oíficials and the procedures through which military proposals are considered but also to the policies and attitudes of the individuais who must become involved in the decision-making process. I am confident that most of my readers are well informed on the legal and functional aspects of govemment operations and the procedural machinery involved in our system of decision-making as it pertains to national security. However, I am not as certain 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW that there is an equal degree of understanding this relationship has not always been fully ancr about the nature of national security problems universally accepted as a practical reality wher to be solved or the realistic roles of sênior applied to a decision on a particular proposa_ military officers in the process of decision- or issue. making at the national levei. On a number of occasions in recent years In recent years there has been ample evi- I shared the disappointment of other military dence that military professionals have accepted officers over unfavorable decisions on proposi the idea that national problems involving se- ais which, after meticulous study and reviev curity can no longer be rigidly identified as of altematives, appeared to be the most effec: exclusively military, political, economic, or tive Solutions to specific problems from a mili social in nature. Yet I have found some ves- tary point of view. But, as I indicated earlier tiges of an outdated belief that responsibility most of our national security problems hav< for Solutions to such problems can and should significant nonmilitary implications. In sucl be assigned to particular authorities and de- cases, I found that the productive role of tht partments of govemment. From my own ex- jcs was to identify key factors that were vita perience, I can readily testify that the major from a military standpoint and to provide < security issues facing the nation are too com- number of suitable altematives for the appli plex to be placed in exclusive categories or cation of military power. It also was clear tha acted upon through a single instrument of altematives which fully considered politica national influence. and economic implications were more likely t< To illustrate th is point, I need cite only be accorded attention in depth, since nationa the single example of the conflict in Southeast authorities could choose the one which bes Asia as a many-sided problem that has aífected solved the problem as they saw it. I believ< practically every facet of national activity. that one of the more difficult realities for ; There can be no doubt that this problem has military officer to accept is the fact that, ii conditioned the attitude of the entire nation. a modem govemmental environment, a mili More to the point, the repercussions of nearly tary solution to a problem may not be full; every official proposal or action with regard consistent with the broader objectives in th' to military aspects of the problem have been mind of the decision-maker. felt throughout the political, economic, and A related point that merits additional un social activities of government. As for my own derstanding is the fact that sênior militar activity as the Air Force Chief of Staff, it is officers are not only advisers and advocate no exaggeration to say that the war in Viet- in the decision-making process, but they ar nam and related issues commanded the largest also the agents for carrying out a decision onc amount of my personal time and attention, it is made. During my tenure in office I re both as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff garded a decision made by a duly constituteii and as the sênior military officer responsible authority as my decision and one to be carrie» for the management of Air Force support for out to the best of my ability. I have alway that conflict. believed that responsive action must accom To retum to the question conceming the pany recognition of authority, and as the Chie roles of sênior military officers in the decision- of Staff I frequently told members of the Ai making process, I have been pleased to note Staff and others that when a man in uniforr among military professionals an increased un- felt that he could not support a decision c derstanding of the pertinent laws and direc- higher authority it was time to “tum in hi1 tives.

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