AIR U N I VE R S ITY \ rcuicuu

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1969

AIR rcuicwU N I VE R S ITY THE P R O F E S S I O N A l J O U R N A L OF THE U N I T E D S T A T E S

Some Refl ec t ion s on a Tour of Duty...... 2 Gen. J. P. McConnell, usaf M odern Combat Air l if t ...... 12 Gen. Howell M. Estes, Jr., usaf A New Era for MAC’s R eser ve Forces...... 26 Maj. Gen. Gilbert L. Curtis, usaf

C ombat Air l if t T r a in in c in MAC...... 35 Maj. Gen. Courtnev L. Faught, usaf W ea t h er Mo d if ic a t io n in Su ppo r t of Mil it a r y Ope r a t io n s...... 44 Maj. Thomas A. Studer, usaf T echnology .and Aer o spac e Power in the 1970s ...... 51 Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, usaf (Ret) H ist o r y, Vie t n a m , and the Concept of Det er r en c e...... 58 Col. William C. Moore, usaf Air Force Review I n Sea r c h of an Aviation Environment Master Plan...... 64 Maj. William R. Sims, usaf Capt. Ângelo J. Cerehione, usaf Military Affairs Abroad A N ew Chief for the Soviet A ir Forces...... 73 Harriet Fast Scott In My Opinion S pea x in c ...... 77 Lt. Col. Donald L. Clark, usaf Books and Ideas

Amer ica Faces the Third W orld...... 83 Dr. Charles A. Lofgren W orld War II: E urope in the Throes of Total War...... 90 Maj. David Maclsaac, usaf T he Contributors...... 04

the cover Address manuscripts to: Editor, Air Univer- Focus of our September-October issue is on aity Review, Aerospace Studies Institute, Max- the with emphasis well Air Force Base, Ala. 36112. Printed hy \ on jet-age combat airlift, MAC’s Reserve Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Forces, combat airlift training, and on sig- Subscriptions are sold hy Air University Book Department, Maxwelí Air Force Base, nificant results in weather modification for Ala. 36112: yearly $4.50, back issiies 75 military operations. But another emphasis vvas cents. USAF recuhrinc pu biic a t io n 50-2. inevitable in the receipt of General McConnell’s last testament as Air Force Chief of Staff and the realization that General Estes, too, would re- Vol. XX No. 6 S eptember -O ctober 1969 tire on 1 August as MAC Commander. To both: Ave otque valei G ener a l J. P. Mc C onnell

A little reflection makes a skeptic; a lot of reflection makes a believer.

—L o u is P asteur HILE assembling some notes for this article, I ran across the cited quotation attributed to the famous nineteenth century Wchemist. Realizing that my comments would appear in the Air University Revietc barely a month after I had left ofBce as the Air Force Chief of Staff, it occurred to me that Pasteurs thought would be a useful guide for vvriter and prospective reader alike. It is hardly necessary for me to call attention to the flood of criticai comment that has been directed toward a wide variety of govemmental activities, particularly in the last year. I have often thought that much of this criticism has shown signs of what Pasteur would have called skepticism because it has been founded on much speculation, little fact. and far less reflection. I have no desire to be labeled a skeptic, nor can I see at this point in time any benefit that could result from criticai comment by me on recent controversial events. Such events merit far deeper examination and “a lot of reflection”— by myself as well as others—before valid conclusions can be drawn. In this article, therefore, I shall discuss briefly some of my long-held views and convictions and make some observations on my recent tenure in ofiBce. In looking back over the past few years, I recall vividly the personal distinction inherent in my nomination as Chief of StafF and confirmation by the Senate. VVithout question, the confidence and trust embodied in these actions represent the highest honors that have been bestowed on me during my lifetime. But symbols of honor are temporal, and, in my own mind at least, that initial sense of honor was fully matched by the deep sense of obligation and responsibility that I felt during my entire tour of duty. During those early months of 1965, I, like others before me, had a base of experience through Service as the Vice Chief of Staff under General Curtis E. LeMay. Although I occupied that position for less than a year, the experience proved beneficiai for a number of reasons. One was the fact that I became intimately familiar with both joint and Service issues of particular interest to the Air Force. More importantly, I gained what I regard as indispensable to a Chief of Staff: a thorough knowledge of the environment of govemment in which sênior military ofBcers must operate to fulfill their responsibilities. By “environment” I am referring not only to the division of authority among govemment oíficials and the procedures through which military proposals are considered but also to the policies and attitudes of the individuais who must become involved in the decision-making process. I am confident that most of my readers are well informed on the legal and functional aspects of govemment operations and the procedural machinery involved in our system of decision-making as it pertains to national security. However, I am not as certain 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

that there is an equal degree of understanding this relationship has not always been fully ancr about the nature of national security problems universally accepted as a practical reality wher to be solved or the realistic roles of sênior applied to a decision on a particular proposa_ military officers in the process of decision- or issue. making at the national levei. On a number of occasions in recent years In recent years there has been ample evi- I shared the disappointment of other military dence that military professionals have accepted officers over unfavorable decisions on proposi the idea that national problems involving se- ais which, after meticulous study and reviev curity can no longer be rigidly identified as of altematives, appeared to be the most effec: exclusively military, political, economic, or tive Solutions to specific problems from a mili social in nature. Yet I have found some ves- tary point of view. But, as I indicated earlier tiges of an outdated belief that responsibility most of our national security problems hav< for Solutions to such problems can and should significant nonmilitary implications. In sucl be assigned to particular authorities and de- cases, I found that the productive role of tht partments of govemment. From my own ex- jcs was to identify key factors that were vita perience, I can readily testify that the major from a military standpoint and to provide < security issues facing the nation are too com- number of suitable altematives for the appli plex to be placed in exclusive categories or cation of military power. It also was clear tha acted upon through a single instrument of altematives which fully considered politica national influence. and economic implications were more likely t< To illustrate th is point, I need cite only be accorded attention in depth, since nationa the single example of the conflict in Southeast authorities could choose the one which bes Asia as a many-sided problem that has aífected solved the problem as they saw it. I believ< practically every facet of national activity. that one of the more difficult realities for ; There can be no doubt that this problem has military officer to accept is the fact that, ii conditioned the attitude of the entire nation. a modem govemmental environment, a mili More to the point, the repercussions of nearly tary solution to a problem may not be full; every official proposal or action with regard consistent with the broader objectives in th' to military aspects of the problem have been mind of the decision-maker. felt throughout the political, economic, and A related point that merits additional un social activities of government. As for my own derstanding is the fact that sênior militar activity as the Air Force Chief of Staff, it is officers are not only advisers and advocate no exaggeration to say that the war in Viet- in the decision-making process, but they ar nam and related issues commanded the largest also the agents for carrying out a decision onc amount of my personal time and attention, it is made. During my tenure in office I re both as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff garded a decision made by a duly constituteii and as the sênior military officer responsible authority as my decision and one to be carrie» for the management of Air Force support for out to the best of my ability. I have alway that conflict. believed that responsive action must accom To retum to the question conceming the pany recognition of authority, and as the Chie roles of sênior military officers in the decision- of Staff I frequently told members of the Ai making process, I have been pleased to note Staff and others that when a man in uniforr among military professionals an increased un- felt that he could not support a decision c derstanding of the pertinent laws and direc- higher authority it was time to “tum in hi1 tives. Here I am referring to the numerous suit.” documents that prescribe the relationship be- tween the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chiefs of the military Services as indi- viduais and as members of the Joint Chiefs A t the time I entered office, th of Staff ( jc s ). At the same time I have felt that essential elements of the organized approac SOME REFLECTIONS ON A TOUR OF DUTY 5

to defense management as we know it today Solutions. Above all, these systems have en- were weli established. The process of develop- hanced our ability to coinmunicate with most ing and issuing strategic and logistic guidance echelons of govemment, thus affording both under the Joint Strategic Planning System had the opportunities and the means for making been in existence for years, although it is true constructive military inputs into the decision- that relatively minor changes in that system making process. were incorporated since 1965. Additionally, With all its merits, the modem approach the OflBce of the Secretary of Defense had to defense management has both real and po- adopted a body of integrated management tential limitations. One is that the appropriate- techniques now known collectively as the ness of our proposals and the validity of Planning-Programming-Budgeting System decisions are still largely dependent on per- ( ppbs). Notwithstanding its relatively recent sonal judgment. Our planning system, for ex- arrival on the scene, the system itself was al- ample, remains tied to our ability to interpret ready a firmlv established method of relating facts as we believe they exist and to the accu- military requirements to forces and systems racy of our projections of trends into a future and their costs. I am confident that most read- over which we have little control. This prob- ers of this joumal are thoroughly familiar with lem is not new, but the translation of perceived the objectives and procedural aspects of these threats and national policy into comprehensive systems, and mv comments here are intended strategies and supporting force structures is merely to reflect my own views of their value becoming more difficult—as well as crucial— in contributing to the total effort of the De- as time goes on. In practical terms, we have partment of Defense. not yet developed reliable techniques for an- In general, I believe that the organized swering the age-old questions, “Is this abso- approach to defense management as it has lutely necessary?” and “How much is enough?” evolved over recent years has served a useful A second limitation to our current man- and responsive purpose. VVithout question, the agerial approach is the risk of using the tools joint plans and documents have been instru- of management as a substitute for strategic mental in fulfilling the obligations of the Joint thought. In recent years, there has been evi- Chiefs of Staff to provide planning guidance dence in some quarters of an attempt to fit for the armed forces and to submit the advice the elements of future strategy into the same and recommendations of the jcs to the Secre- packages that were designed to facilitate the tary of Defense. I can think of no better way management of forces and systems. It is well to bring together the results of military studies recognized that the current inventory of forces of factors which bear on national strategy and was developed from concepts of defense pos- the collective judgments cf responsible mili- ture and potential warfare that were com- tary leadership conceming actions required to monly accepted in the fifties and early sixties. implement that strategy. In following the established management pro- Similarly, the modem approach to pro- cedure, we now categorize such forces into gramming and budgeting has enabled us to relatively distinct elements according to pre- examine proposals for changes in force struc- determined military missions. ture with a greater degree of objectivity, to It is true that such an approach facilitates submit such proposals with more clearly de- a choice between weapon systems competing fined substantiation, and to process decisions for the same preconceived mission and aids in on those proposals in a more orderly fashion. defining the performance requirements of a Coupled with an improved data base, ad- system to accomplish that mission. But the re- vanced data-processing equipment/ and pro- sulting danger I see is a type of strategic think- gressively more effective analytical techniques, ing that limits the employment of military force the ppbs has given us an expeditious method to narrowly conceived, unrealistic concepts of of examining complex problems and a higher warfare and that leads to the development of levei of confidence in proposing altemative forces and systems with inflexible mission ca- 6 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

pabilities. I believe that the Air Force has will forego a chronology of events and reitera- demonstrated the value of a more flexible tion of force structure changes. Instead, I will approach by interchanging vvith telling suc- focus on several factors that have had a sig- cess the traditional roles of strategic and tac- nificant influence on the pace and direction of tical aircraft in Southeast Asia. Air Force affairs in the last four and one-half Then, too, the integrated system of man- years. agement depends on a planning input by indi- When I entered office as the Chief of Staff vidual elements that have specialized interests in 1965, it was clearly evident that the strate- and competence. It is only natural for a spe- gic capabilities of the Air Force represented cialist to look at a complex problem from a the strongest instrument of military power in somewhat narrovv point of view. As a result, the world. At the same time the Air Force, as there is an inherent risk that the specialist well as all other elements of the Department vvill give disproportionate weight to one seg- of Defense, was well along in its progress ment of the problem and will devise alterna- under a strategic concept that emphasized tives and advocate courses of action which ballistic missiles as the primary systems for place his specialty in a prominent role as the nuclear deterrence and the growth of general- driving force in solving the problem. The haz- purpose forces as a means of providing a “flex- ard of bias can occur in any system; to guard ible response” to a wider range of crises and against it, advocacy must be balanced by per- conflicts. As was true under my immediate spective. In my opinion, the key to success in predecessors, the Air Force faced three major our whole approach to defense planning and tasks: first, to maintain a strategic force ca- management is not in the organizations and pable of performing assured-destruction and procedures that make up the system but in damage-limiting missions as the basic elements the attitudes and actions of the people in it. of nuclear deterrence; second, to continue the The system vvorks if the people in it allow it improvement of tactical and airlift forces to work. under an approved mid-range program; and On this score, it has been my experience third, to study long-range requirements and that military personnel involved in defense propose research and development efforts that management at the national levei have been we believed would be effective in fulfilling and are now both personally responsive and those requirements. organizationally efficient in serving the pur- The decision to greatly expand our in- poses of the management system. The Joint volvement in the Southeast Asia conflict, of Staff is coinpetent and is fully meeting the de- course, added a fourth task which soon proved manding requirements of the jcs. I have found to be dominant. Without question, the fulfill- also that the individual Service staffs have ment of immediate and continuing needs asso- been equally eflFective in contributing to joint ciated with combat operations in Vietnam has and unilateral service needs. As the Chief of had a decided effect not only on Air Force Staff of the Air Force, I was particularly affairs at top management leveis but also on pleased vvith the quality of work produced by the posture of major air commands and op- the Air Staff and the support I received from erating elements throughout the world. The major commanders and their staff personnel. requirement for substantial reallocations of To me, this performance reflected not only a human, material, and monetary resources to deep sense of dedication to the Air Force and support the war in Vietnam has placed severe full support of national policy but also a restrictions on Air Force progress in other growth in understanding of national security criticai areas. In effect, we have been forced issues and the need for handling them with to adapt rather than change and to modify sensitivity and skill. rather than modernize. In spite of the obstacles created by war- I n presen t ing some views on the time involvement, I believe that the Air Force progress of the Air Force in recent years, I has made significant progress in meeting a During one of his tours of the combat zone iu Vietnam while lie ivas the Air Force Chief of Stoff, General John P. McConnell pauses to talk with two officers of the Republic of Vietnam Air Force. 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

number of requirements arising from that con- some current statements on defense matters, flict. The substantial improvement in tactical we seem to be charged with an exclusive con- air control, the extensive modification of weap- cem for the narrower issues—that is, the align- ons and systems for increased effectiveness in ment of functions among the military Services all-weather and jungle environments, and the and the specific impact of that process on our refinement of global and in-theater air trans- development and procurement of needed Sys- port Services are just a few among many tems and facilities. examples. I think it is fortunate for the country that More important, Air Force experience in the military did not succumb to this kind of combat has reaffirmed our fundamental con- mental torpor in the period immediately fol- victions conceming the eífective use of air lowing World War II. The controversy about power. Particularly noteworthy, I think, has atomic weapons and the general-war/small- been the clear demonstration of the versatility war assumptions for U.S. defense posture dur- of manned aircraft and the ability of man to ing the late forties served an important adapt in the environment of battle. purpose. Lacking the stimulus which that con- troversy supplied, we could have gone into an extended and continuing period of crisis and T he effec t iven ess of air power conflict without benefit of many of the ap- has always been a vital concem of the Air proaches to strategic planning that have since Force, and at this point I would like to bring proved to be essentially sound. up a related subject that has been very much In many respects, I believe that the mili- on my mind. Throughout the latter years of tary is suffering from at least a partial stag- rny career and especially during my Service as nation in strategic thinking today. For this Chief of Staff, I became increasingly con- reason, I want to present several of my basic vinced of the requirement for more eífective viewpoints conceming the task of using mili- contributions by the military in the vital and tary power in support of national objectives— continuing study and discussion of military if only to stimulate additional thought. strategy. At the outset, I am convinced that the sole My basis for this statement is provided measure of effectiveness of a military strategy largely by the fact that since the Korean War, is and will continue to be its adequacy and and over the past decade in particular, the appropriatencss for supporting this countrvs public expressions of strategy have become basic objectives. To achieve those objectives, dominated by the writings of civilian analysts. a succession of national administrations has In making this point, I want to acknowledge, pursued a policy of helping to create a world first of all, my respect for the contributions environment in which the rule of law is re- to our fund of knowledge on this subject by spected and in which the United States and experts who have demonstrated a depth of other free nations can survive and prosper. understanding of strategic issues and the abil- From my experience, a military strategy ity to take an objective position. This in no geared to such objectives must provide forces way alters the fact, however, that the views that our national leaders can employ as an aid of such analysts can be fully productive only in deterring or defeating aggression at all when considered by authoritics and opinion- leveis of conflict. Using military power in com- molders along with a complementary input of bination with political, economic, and other strategic analysis by the military. elements of national influence for this purpose In most of our day-to-day discussions of is a complex undertaking. A sound strategy security matters, we are now giving the ap- must justify confidence on the part of our na- pearance of having outgrown the need for tional authorities that our military forces can explaining the broad rationale of strategy in operate effectively against the full range of the context of current and future problems of threats and at acceptable leveis of expenditure national security. Judging from the scope of and risk. SOME REFLECTIONS ON A TOUR OF DUTY 9

I am convinced that our continued suc- aerospace power as being primarily an instru- cess in providing such forces will demand ment of full-scale nuclear attack. That identi- several key adjustments in our strategic con- fication has imposed. a decided disadvantage cepts. I want to underscore the need for those on the Air Force because of the long and adjustments by inviting attention to some heated campaign against the concept of “mas- widely held views of the threat that I feel to sive retaliation.” Further, in the aftermath of be at least partialiy in error. the “massive retahation” controversy, there One such view is the frequently expressed emerged the concept of “flexible response.” opinion that the prime threat is that of a mas- This concept brought no special recognition sive nuclear attack from the . for air power, because “flexible response” was This is true in the sense that the Soviets novv considered to apply almost solely to the em- have the capability for such an attack. A con- plovment of general-purpose forces in land tinued deplovment of Soviet intercontinental and sea actions at the lower leveis of conflict. bailistic missiles ( ic bm’s ), especially improved As will be recalled. that concept was devel- versions with multiple vvarheads, would en- oped in a time period prior to the Southeast hance that capability in the future. It is also Asia conflict, and the thinking behind it re- true that the potential consequences for us flected a belief that ground action would be are so grave that we must continue to give first dominant in all conflicts below the nuclear priority to deterring that threat. I do not be- levei. heve, however, that such an attack is what the As an outgrowth of this logic, several Soviets are most likely to undertake. Their trends have developed in the field of strategic more probable aim is to use their expanding planning that strike me as being counterpro- strategic capabilities as leverage to allovv them- ductive. The first of these trends has been the selves a broader range of initiatives in the field tendency to think of all conflict as being of diplomacy, military aid, and conventional polarized into the two extremes of all-out operations. nuclear war at one end of the spectrum and It is for this reason that we should avoid low-level conventional war at the other. Fur- a reaction to the Soviet strategic threat that ther, there has been a tendency to split up our makes us weak and vulnerable in other areas. interacting strategic and tactical elements to For example, we do not want a kind of muscie- an extent that could leave us vvithout the bound strategic power that is suitable only for essential reinforcing strength that we require. use in the least likely event of all-out nuclear In this regard, I reiterate my point made war. earlier that the mere grouping of forces and Nlaintaining an unassailable capability for systems into convenient packages for pro- assured destruction of some fixed percentage gramming and budgeting actions does not of the Soviet population and industrial base is give us a reliable guide for developing strate- only part of the task. We should also seek to gies or for assigning operational tasks. increase the flexibility of our strategic forces. And, finally, we have seen an increasingly This improvement is needed to give us credi- rigid classification of vveapon systems accord- ble options for responding to major confronta- ing to either their strategic or tactical func- tions that could involve a limited exchange of tions, thereby reducing the flexibility we need nuclear weapons. A failure to act on this prob- to attain a desired effect by the best available lem could produce an operational gap that means. On this latter point, we should recog- would make us vulnerable to limited coercive nize that the improved performance and versa- attacks. tility of modem aerospace systems have made There is still another popular misconcep- almost meaningless any attempt to classify tion that I believe has obstructed to some them rigidly within strategic or tactical cate- degree the Air Forces full contribution to our gories. As I emphasized before, the successful national security posture. I have in mind the interchange of roles betvveen heavy bombers persistent and widespread tendency to regard and fighter-bombers in Southeast Asia indi- 10 AIR UN1VERS1TY REVIEW

cates that the artificial distinctions between and by the growing capability of Communist so-called strategic and tactical systems should requires a wide range of closely related gradually disappear. I think it helps to clear defense arrangements. In this regard, I main- up this confusion if we think in terms of tar tain that the Air Force should continue to im- gets that are tactical or strategic, rather than prove its active and passive defenses against categorizing the weapon systems which might bombers and standoff missiles and initiate ac- be used to attack those targets. tive defensive measures against ic bm s and In proposing Solutions for these specifíc submarine-launched ballistic missiles (sl bm’s ). problems, we should continue to build toward To meet the bomber / standoff missile a posture of operative deterrence that not only threat, we will require a balanced combination closes the gaps in our war-fighting capability of systems, including an advanced interceptor but also opens up opportunities for restoring and the Airbome Waming and Control System. greater meaning to the strategic objective of These defenses should be closely tied in with deterring aggression at all leveis. I believe that the sa fec ua r d abm program, which is de- we can best avoid all-out nuclear war by dem- signed to protect a portion of our Minuteman onstrating a clear ability to prevail throughout force, thereby helping to preserve the credi- the intermediate as well as the extreme ranges bility of our deterrent. of conflict. In proceeding with sa fec ua r d, w e should A posture that would improve our capa- carry on the examination of additional con- bility for selective retaliation against limited cepts for missile defense. To me, the more nuclear attacks has been and will continue to promising Outlook for the future is toward air- be opposed by some, particularly by those bom e systems that will be able to detect, whose strategic thinking is confíned to tradi- track, intercept, and destroy hostile missiles tional pattems. But I believe that the under- during their boost or mid-course phases. lying concept of operative deterrence has cer- Despite the recent setback associated with tain requisite merits. For one, it is pertinent the suspension of the Manned Orbiting Labo- to actual requirements and provides guidance ratory ( mo l ) program, the Air Force should for the application of military force. It also advance in exploiting its opportunities for comes to grips with the projected range of space defense and Communications. In my threats, and it establishes a workable pattem opinion, a failure to do so would leave an of response. What is more to the point, I am operational gap that could be filled by our convinced that it does these things better than adversaries, with serious implications for our the altematives. own national security. To be sure, we must continue to maintain In the category of tactical aircraft, the Air and improve our forces for assured destruc- Force has compelling requirements for an ad- tion. It should be recognized, however, that vanced air-superiority fighter with unequaled the utility of our current ballistic missile force performance for air-to-air combat and a spe- is essentially limited to the role of nuclear cialized close-air-support aircraft to assist in deterrence or employment at the highest leveis fulfilling the Armys future requirements for of warfare. This is true in spite of projected this kind of support. The two types of aircraft improvements in both land- and sea-based bal- now under consideration, together with the listic missiles. We therefore should also insure programmed inventory of modem tactical that additions to our strategic force give us a fighters, will constitute a family of general- clearly visible means for projecting usable purpose weapon systems that will go a long power in the lower ranges of conflict. These way toward meeting what I believe are the are some of the reasons why I have consist- priority tactical requirements for the future. ently recommended the development of an Of course, there are many other subjects Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft ( amsa). and areas of Air Force interest that merit com- Moreover, I believe that the massive and ment here, but there is one that I consider to sophisticated threat posed by the Soviet Union be important above all others. I am referring SOME REFLECTIONS ON A TOUR OF DUTY 11

to the human element as the most vital asset ment possessing the most advanced and so- in our inventor}' of resources. phisticated equipment that technology and Since the beginning of my military career, industry can provide. But this equipment will I have vvitnessed the most dramatic changes in be useless unless it is managed, operated, and the qualit}- of military personnel. No longer maintained by a team of military professionals. do we have squads of soldiers, sailors, and air- It is this combination of superior equipment men manipulating machinery under the auto- and people that now gives us an ability of cratic direction of bosses. We now have inte- sufficient scope, versatility, and quality to grated teams of highly trained “warfare spe- meet the demanding requirements of protect- cialists” managed by highly qualified leaders. ing the nation’s security. What has impressed me most about todays military men and women is not only their un- precedented levei of education and sldll but C oming ba c k to Pasteurs observation that “a also their fortitude and high standards of moral lot of reflection makes a believer,” I hope it responsibility in an enviromnent of severe is apparent from these reflections on my mili- challenge. I am certain that these character- tary career that I am a believer indeed. I istics have been the underlying reasons for the believe in this country’s ideais, in our demo- remarkable accomplishments of the Air Force cratic form of govemment, in the vital mission in recent years. of our military establishment, and, above all, The global and complex threats which this in the ultimate success of this nation in lead- nation is facing call for a military establish- ing the search for a peaceful and secure world. Washington, D. C. MODERN COMBAT AIRLIFT

G ener a l Howell M. E st es, J r .

My mind was open and free to receive any new impressions, without having to struggle against the hias which a lifelong practice of routine operations cannot fail more or less to create. Sir Henry Bessemer, F.R.S.— An Autobiography MONG the foremost lessons leamed by military practitioners throughout his- p - tory has been the need to beware of i leamed—especially when someone else ses to have leamed them. here is a universal tendency to 'ieam s” from every exercise and operation, as :S they reinforce the notions the leamer y holds dear. If \ve can force experience ióh us the same lesson two or three times ig. the inevitable next step is to proclaim: ; o f c o u r s e . a x i o m a t i c t h a t . . w h i c h aiently forgets that “axiomatic” means, >m. ‘vou’!! just have to take my word

r * *v 14 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

And so the proponent of almost any con- the Military Airlift Command ( ma c ) are im- cept or piece of hardware can in time, if he is mune to the temptation but because this kind ingenious enough in deducing what he wants of combat airlift does not exist amjwhere and from experience, assert that his proposition is cannot therefore be admitted into evidence. self-evident. But to say that a proposition is It does not exist physically because the, believed because it is self-evident is only to C-5 Galaxy is fundamental to the actuality and< baptize the difficulty, as Poincaré remarked, the operational C-5 force is still in the future.j not to solve it. But even with the fully programmed force of Thus, there is a tremendous premium on C-141s and C-5s, modem combat airlift will isolating the true and valid lessons of military not automatically spring into being. Combat experience from the greater body of narrow airlift, as it will be described herein, is in its and self-serving traditions which, among other essence a concept—a n d a c o n c e p t , i n o r d e r t o well-known anomalies, prescribed boots and become a reality, must be thoroughly under- spurs as part of the early flying uniform. stood, supported, and proved. In mathematics, this sort of filtering prob- The best we can hope to adduce, then, is; lem is addressed by the “Theory of Groups,” that the revolution in airlift, which I described which seeks to determine those things that re- three and a half years ago in these pages,1 is main invariant under groups of transforma- as much conceptual as technological and that tions. Or, in broader terms, as Alfred North certain conceptual conclusions flow from the Whitehead put it: ‘To see what is general technical antecedents with inevitable logic. in what is particular, and what is permanent The technology detailed in the earlier in what is transitory, is the aim of scientific article can be brieflv summarized: The C-141 thought.” obviates many of the historie constraints upon The problem was well addressed in terms airlift ( in speed, range/payload trade-off, flexi- of the Army by its Chief of Staflf, General bility of employment, cubic capacity, loadabil- William C. Westmoreland, during the course ity, self-sufficiency, terminal base requirements, of an interview toward the end of 1968. “The fuel dependency, and direct operating cost) Army must retain the experience we gained by virtue of its high speed ( above 425 knots) from our operations in Vietnam,” he said, “and and its range/payload options (up to 32 tons profit from the lessons learned.” or 154 troops nonstop to Europe or nonstop “Yet,” he added, significantly, “we must from the West Coast to Tokyo with reduced exercise caution in this application of experi- payload). Requiring little more than 4000 feet ence, because our operation in the environment of runway for takeoff or landing, the C-141 of Southeast Asia was unique. Many of the can use about 1850 airports around the world, lessons learned have broad applications, but greatly enhancing flexibility of employment. It some do not. We must have an Army that is is loaded straight-in from the rear, utilizing versatile enough to carry out its assigned mis- 463L Materials Handling System equipment, sion in any terrain, in any climate, and against and incorporates a troop/cargo airdrop capa- any enemy.” bility. It is not, however, an outsize carrier, Put another wav, the classic lesson turns being capablè of lifting only 58 percent of cur- out to be that there is, in the last analysis, no rent major items of Army divisional equipment. classic lesson—except to be reaclij for anything, Since that article was published, the C-141 amjwhere, at any time. has been tested for operations on landing mat The thesis advanced in this article is that surfaces and has proved to have quite promis- modem combat airlift is fundamental to the ing flotation characteristics. Further work is strategic mobility by means of which our being directed toward adapting the aircraftl armed forces can maintain that kind of univer- for primitive field conditions akin to the C-5 s sal spatiotemporal readiness. The thesis will capability in that sort of environment. not be defended by a tortuously documented Finally, from a produetivity standpoint. panoply of lessons learned—not because we in the C-141 accomplishes approximately 10,0001 The C-141 Starlifter has more than lived up to its early prom- ise, having operated for nearly four years at 160 percent of its programmed peacetime rate. . . . lt is rear-loaded, utilizing the 463L Materials Handling System. 16 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW ton-miles of vvork per hour, a factor-of-four materiais or cooling methods, to double power improvement over the C-124, which it has vir- at lower specific weight and one-third less spe- tually replaced. cific fuel consumption, to the considerable pay- VVhat has become a great deal more cer- loads and ranges thereby made possible at tain since the 1966 article is that the C-141, lower cost, to the end result: a powerful am- having proved its great reliability and main- plification of the strategic range of military/ diplomatic options available to the President tainability, can easily be flown many more for his enforcement of national policy goals. hours a day than any of its piston or turboprop He is thus afforded more latitude for maneuver predecessors. Thus, its inherent productivity and more time for decision. is greatly magnified in practical application; we have, in fact, been operating the C-141 force Since that was written, results of testing for more than three years at 160 percent of the first three C-5s have been encouraging. programmed peacetime rates. As a direct re- For one thing, they have demonstrated 2% less sult, MAC-managed ( active force plus military drag at cruise speed than the guarantee speci- reserve and commercial augmentation) ton- fies, which translates into greater payloads mileage, on a vvorldwide basis, climbed from over both long and short ranges. Takeoff and 2.29 billion in fiscal year 1965 to 7.47 billion landing performance is also about 2% better in fy 1968, an increase of 226 percent. The rea- than predicted. At an average gross weight of son for the forced acceleration vvas, of course, 532,000 pounds, the C-5 has landed in 1700 the war in Southeast Asia, and most of the feet on asphalt and 2600 feet on dirt. Takeoff increased production was focused in that di- distance is 6860 feet at basic design weight, rection. In fy 1965 we airlifted 136,000 tons and less in the long-range configuration. of cargo and 595,000 troops and passengers That being a summation of the technology, throughout the entire Pacific Command. By it may be seen that the C-5 and the C-141 fy 1968 the volumes to and from Southeast mutually fill any gaps that the one or the other Asia alone had swelled to 595,000 tons and might singly leave exposed. The C-141 does 1,900,000 troops/passengers—increases of 338 its optimum work and reaches its highest and 219 percent, respectively. efficiency in carrving high-density cargo and The 1966 article then described the C-5 troops. The C-5, on the other hand, is singu- technology. The basics were a speed of 440 to larly well suited, as it was designed to be, 470 knots, a productivity of more than 40,000 to accommodate the very large and bulky ton-miles per hour, payload capacity up to 132 ( although generally less dense) items of equip- tons (with mission options of 55 tons for 5500 ment that are organic to heavy combat divi- nautical miles or 110 tons for 2700 nautical sions. Together these two aircraft provide the miles), troop/cargo airdrop capability, volu- full potential for modem combat airlift. metric capacity of 35,000 cubic feet, drive- through loading and unloading ( front and rear openings and kneeling landing gear), high- W hat, then, is modern combat flotation characteristics for operation in primi- airlift, and what conditions underwrite its ne- tive environments, high fuel capacity to elimi- cessity? In short, what conceptual conclusions nate support dependence upon the forward flow with logical necessitv from what technol- battle area, and low direct operating cost ( esti- ogy has made possible? One answer, of course, mated at the time to be 4M cents per ton-mile, is the broadening of statecraft’s options as since refíned to about 3M cents). mentioned above with reference to the TF-39 An important key to this efficiency was power plant. But that is close to the surface, the high-bypass-ratio TF-39 power plant. Its and the underlying need goes a great deal far-reaching impact was summed up in these deeper. words: To start digging, we might consider a It is not too complicated a chain of rea- statement by Admirai U. S. G. Sharp, made soning to follow from single advancements in when he was Commander in Chief, Pacific: The 94-minute maiden flight of the C-5A Galaxij at Marietta, Geórgia, on 30 , was completely successful, justifying the great expectatiom for the world"s largest aircraft. Although in flight deceptively like the C-141, the C-5A realhj represents a higher order of technology in many respecta, notably the high- bypass-ratio poicer plants and the drive-througli loading and unloading feature made possible by kneeling landing gear. . . . The 500,000-pound behemoth, which can carry more than half that ueight in cargo, gets readied for the flrst flight. 18 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

It is [at] the first destination in an under- To help prevent any type of war, if possi- developed country that we run into trouble. ble, and to help bring it to a swift conclusion Ports and airfields—if there are any—are so if deterrence fails are the basic functions of lacking in modern facilities that they cannot a modem combat airlift force. Any other bene- efficiently receive and redistribute the huge fits that may accrue from such a force—and tonnages which our transportation system can deliver. they can be shown to be numerous—flow from the nature of that primary capability and can He then went on to point out that this in no sense be considered as deserving higher problem was solved in Vietnam by a massive precedence in designing, exercising, and op- construction program—“a costly solution, but erating that force. acceptable if the strategic concept calls for a The role of modern com bat airlift, then, gradual buildup over a protracted period of is to airlift com bat forces and all their battle time.” equipment, in the size and mix required—with “But,” he asked at that point, “what about the greatest speed—to any point in the world, those situations when time is of the essence, no matter how remote or primitive, where a vvhen a rapid deployment of force could mean thrcat arises or is likely to erupt. the difference between war and peace, when The strategic airlift force must be so con- the success or failure of subsequent military stituted and so geared as to perfonn this task, operations is at stake, when there isn’t time with the added possibility of having to deploy to build ports and airfields?” sizable forces in opposite directions simultane- Admirai Sharp in those words captured ously and keep them all resupplied until, if the very essence, the irresistible rationale for required, surface lines of communication are a modem combat airlift capability. For I would fully established and operating at capacity. submit that the time-dependent situation he Derivatively, airlift also rnakes it possible postulated has the highest probability of oc- to reduce stock leveis in the theater of engage- currence and that a strategic concept of grad- ment, so that the troops, having arrived, can ual buildup has always—an invariant under move quickly into action without having to transformation—exacted a very high price. delay for the cushion of a large stock build- Of course, one of the presumptive lessons up. Thus, fewer men and fewer supplies are leamed after World War II was that there needed to support the men and supplies in the would never again be time to prepare—but for combat force, and the ratio of combat troops different reasons: the push button was going to support personnel is thereby increased. to replace the infantry as the Queen of Battle. Given the capability to satisfy this maxi- W e have seen, though, that the modes of war- mum demand, the airlift force can with lesser fare since 1945, contrary to any lessons that effort operate jointly with sealift or preposi- appear to have been taught, have all been of tioned equipment or both, or in tandem with the “limited” type and have been staged by fast deployment logistic ships, once the initial and large in the most remote and underdevel- rapid-reaction requirements have been ful- oped arenas of the globe. filled. But the basic requirement is invariant: to rush integral', combat-ready fighting forces anywhere, including the battle area itself, S o what, if anything, has remained without a preliminary massing of logistics, invariant under transformation and deserves within hours of the time a decision to commit truly to be called axiomatic? In warfare, at has been taken; and to reinforce and sustain least two maxims have retained their validity them for as long as airlift is the only practica- over the twenty-four centuries since they were ble way to do it. enunciated by Sun Tzu: “The highest art is Regardless of transforniations that have to win a war without battle,” and “There has taken place through the ages, surprise and never been a protracted war from which a mass have been invariants in all military con- country has benefited.” siderations. Maximum force deployed in mini- Just as the C-5A dtcarfs the C-141, so the TF-39 turbofan jet engine, power plant for the Galaxy, looms before flight engineers and jet-engine training instructors mastering its intricacies.

mum time ac-hieves both. As long as minimum for granted may be most misleading because a time is a factor. it must inevitably be recog- new order of experience requires new ways of nized that an airplane covers as much distance thinking about it. A revolution cannot be mas- in one hour as a ship can in a full day’s sail- tered until it develops the mode of thinking appropriate to it. ing and that an aircraft, having arrived in the theater, can land or drop its troops and equip- That may explain why the real revolution ment directly in the battle area. in airlift is not as thoroughly perceived and Thus, while airlift is certainly one element understood as it might be. Many think of tlie in the national defense transportation struc- strategic airlift capability of the near and more ture and can verv effectively complement the distant future as being precisely what it has more massive sealift capacity, it must again be always been, except that there is more of it: emphasized that this is a derivative capability in effect, merely a “brute force” quantitative and a secondary role. This concept is by no expansion of something we had in World War means universally understood. and until it is II. What they do not realize is that the jet age understood—and applied—there will be no and the technology that makes an aircraft like modem combat airlift in the ultimate sense the C-5 possible have also engendered a radi- of that term. cal qualitative alteration in airlift. Total ton- In his book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign mile capability will soon have increased by at Policy (1957). Dr. Henrv A. Kissinger wrote least an order of magnitude over 1961— true— with a high degree of perception: but the important point is that we have at the Contemporaries are in a peculiarlv difficult po- same time achieved a whole new kind of airlift. sition to assess the nature of revolutions througli which they are living. All previous experience will tempt them to integrate the new into what So we might look upon this new has come to seem familiar. The)’ will have difíi- kind of airlift—strategic combat airlift—as a culty understanding that what is most taken proof in search of the validating experiment. Conlinued on page 22 Strategic Airlift Capability ■ *r

Airlift has changed through the years since World War II, and the change is more than an increase in range and capacity. Speed of response to a crisis situation is a vital factor that has hecome achievahle with jet and other jet-age technology. The C-141/C-5 working in con- cert will enable the Military Airlift Command to apply full military capability on a greatly foreshortened time schedule. Exercises like Bold Shot/Brimfire in (right, clockwise) . . . Operation Bonny Jack . . . Big L ift . . . a n d R e fo rg e r ha v e b e e n steps alon g th e way to airlift’s goal: effective deterrence of “limited” war.

22 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Because airlift has been used to date, with ton; thereafter a further series of long thrust minor exception, in the traditional way. The exercises rotated these units back and forth. record of several exercises \vill illustrate the The revealing aspect of this first operation point. ( long thrust I had been canceled the year • big sl a m/pu e r t o pin e , March 1960 - before) was the impact of a jet transport, the first of the so-called strategic mobility exer- C-135. While mission flying time to Germany cises conducted on a large scale. A total of for the older aircraft ranged from 31J4 hours 21,000 troops and 11,000 tons of cargo were on the C-133 to 38/4 for the C-124 (with all airlifted from 14 bases in the United States to the maintenance, supply, servicing, and sup- Puerto Rico, and return, in a 15-day period. port complications at the way-stops), the While the numbers seemed inipressive at the C-135s Hew nonstop in 10J4 hours. While these time, the troops were from a large assortment converted tankers were highly productive and of Strategic Army Corps units, not an integral efficient, they were not fully effective for the fighting force; the cargo was miscellaneous, combat airlift mission. They were, for one not organic divisional battle equipment; and thing, unstressed for intensive hauling of heavy the distance from the conus to Puerto Rico military equipment, and, for another, they had was short compared to real-world military to be loaded through a side door high off the strategy. Rated a highly “successful failure,” ground, which restricted the individual items big sl a m did dramatize the deficiencies of a of battle gear that could be accommodated. C-118/C-124 type of force, while at the same They also required long concrete runways for time providing a vivid glimpse of what combat takeoff and landing. They were, in short, more airlift coulcl be. closely akin to the “people hauling” jets of the airlines than to combat airlift workhorses. • lonc pa ss, February 1961 - This exer- But they did, once and for all, underscore cise, by spanning the Pacific, remedied the what speed and range could do for the rapid- range deficiency of the Puerto Rico scenario, response military mission, and they strongly but it had to make a corresponding trade-off foreshadowed today’s ability to fly modified in the size of the force airlifted. Slightly more polar great-circle paths to achieve minimum than 1000 Army troops and 1000 tons of cargo distance and shortened enroute times. were carried from the conus to the Philippines and back, while 200 troops and less than 100 • big lift, October 1963 — Again dem- tons went from Hawaii to Clark ab. With some onstrating rapid and “massive” reinforcement added Tactical Air Command personnel and of nato forces, this exercise airlifted a full equipment, the total force package carne to division—more than 15,000 troops—and closed 1700 troops and 1400 tons. It was a brave the force in 63 hours. The concept of the oper- attempt by C-118s, C-124s, and C-133s, but ation was for the troops, deploying from Texas still only a veiled hint of the genuine possi- with little more than toothbrushes in the way bility of airlift. of impedimenta, to “marry up” with equip- ment already prepositioned in Germany. Thus, • long thrust IIA, January-February the grand total of cargo airlifted was some 440 1962 - This rotational tvpe of deployment to tons, and three-fourths of that belonged to a the nato area was the first definite manifesta- tac Composite Air Strike Force that was also tion of the enormous promise of jet airlift. The involved in the exercise. distance, from the State of Washington to Ger- many, was realistic enough. However, the So, while highly touted as a “landmark ’ 5300 troops and 170 tons of cargo could not operation, big lift was little more than an- be described as overwhelming, nor was the other lonc thrust—but with three times as closure time—almost six full days—for a force many troops, slightly more cargo, and a clos- of that size awe-inspiring. Two of the three ure time less than half as long. These were battle groups remained in Europe, while the important improvements, to be sure, but it is other was redeployed to Fort Lewis, Washing- perhaps unfortunate that they were so widely MODERN COMBAT AIRLIFT 23

idvertised because even today the bic lift ances resulted in the stabilization of both type of thinking seems to dominate a good situations and thereby proved to be a work- deal of the prevalent insight into airlift. able deterrent. We may have been a little As a matter of fact, one would have to say short in the capability department, but the ;that the reforgeb I/crested cap I operation of United States left no doubt as to its intention ijjaxly 1969 was, basically, big lift revisited: and determination. The invariant in that case about the same number of troops, oífloading would certainly seem to have been our speed ■jnce again at the vast, modem Rhein-Main of response. mplex, very little more cargo, and a longer The same effect was achieved during the ie to close the force. 1961 Berlin crisis, when ma c airlift played a It should be noted, in the last connection, large part in moving tac forces to Germany. -that force closure time is rarely constrained Again in the Cuban missile confrontation, air- bv anv limits inherent in the airlift system it- lift brought a massive concentration of power jself. given a certain irreducible minimum dic- into focus in the Southeastem United States tated by the distance to be covered and the and also moved a large force of Marines from size of the force to be moved. The original Califórnia to Guantanamo Bay. And in 1965, u » íg thbust, for example, could have been regardless of what one may feel^about the accomplished much more quickly; big lift casus belli, the immediate appearance of a could have beaten even the low 63-hour mark; sizable show of force in the Dominican Re- and certainly the reforcer exercise could have public did quell the disturbance. been greatly compressed in time. The actual No proof can be had as to what might have closure time, in such cases, is prescribed by the happened in any of these situations without planners of the force being moved, by budget- airlift, but the rapid marshaling of forces was ary considerations, by the prioritv accorded the common denominator in every instance— the operation (vis-à-vis, for example, the un- the undeniable invariant. Thus, there is very idiminished need for airlift to Southeast Asia powerful presumptive evidence that national and the rest of the world), and any number of will, made immediately manifest and unmis- other factors. takable through high-speed strategic mobility, This is not to say that such exercises are was the operative element. not extremely useful. They exercise both the With such precedents, one is strongly Mac force and the airlifted forces in concert, tempted to speculate upon what effect the they test the entire airlift system, and they same sort of demonstration, on a much larger demonstrate both the capability and the in- scale, might have had in Southeast Asia in the tention of the United States to honor its Inter- early —or even in 1964 or 1965. national commitments. One possibility may be deduced from Pro- But what they do not do is demonstrate fessor Walt Rostow’s New York Times inter- conclusively what combat airlift can be and view at the beginning of 1969, in which he should be. Those two things, interestingly postulated that the United States would have enough, were first demonstrated—although on been better off to interVene with military force a somewhat microcosmic scale—almost two in Vietnam on a major scale nearly three years years before big sl a m ever took off for Puerto before it did in 1965. Bico. Or from a lecture delivered at Air Uni- The summer of 1958 was one of those versity by Dr. Frank N. Trager of New York times of “double trouble” that have become University in : more the rule than the exception in the years To achieve a limited-war goal does not following. Almost simultaneously, help was necessarily imply that the conventional means critically needed in both the Middle East and employed should be applied with restraints or the Strait. Mac airlifts to both Leba- other forms of gradualism. . . . one should use non and the Far East brought a modest show sufficient conventional power to achieve his jof force to each area, which to all appear- goal in the shortest possible time. . . . It seemed 24 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

to me that the doctrine of limited war and esting aside, a part of the cargo carried by limited means to achieve íts ends . . . omitted ma c duplicated urgently needed military from consideration the operative concept of equipment which had already been shipped time in the use of power. I have unsuccessfully via surface but which—because of long unload- argued that the speedy use of enough conven- ing delays—was in ship bottoms sitting off the tional power in Vietnam would have been more acceptable at home and less costly on the battle- harbors in Vietnam. Another vital part of the field.'- load consisted of equipment for improving and enlarging the harbors and replacement parts This thesis would seem to have been con- for the heavily used handling equipment at tained within the body of official Department the ports. of Defense policy, as evidenced by extracts In addition to the constantly accelerating, from Secretary Robert S. McNamara’s posture high-volume logistical role, ma c combat airlift statements before various committees of the also carne into play in the succeeding period. Congress: Flying integral battle units and their equip- The ability to concentrate our military ment into the war area, such operations as power rapidly in a threatened area can make a BLUE LICHT, EAGLE THRUST, COMBAT FOX, and great difference in the size of the force ulti- bo n n y ja c k were the first combat airlifts con- matelv required and, in some cases, can serve ducted under a de facto state of war. But, to halt aggression before it really gets started. while they previewed what the C-141/C-5 [ fy 67 Defense Budget] force would be capable of doing in the future, All of our studies show that the length and they did not provide the definitive laboratory cost of a war, as well as the size of the force experiment that would prove the basic con- ultimately required to terminate it favorably, cept. For one thing, a good part of the massive are importantlv influenced by how fast we can logistical base had already been fairly well bring the full weight of our military power to established; and, for another, the concept of bear on the situation. [ fy 68 Defense Budget] operation did not call for minimum closure . . . the ability to respond promptly to clear times. threats to our national interests and the secur- For example, ea gl e thrust, which was to ity of our allies, possibly in more than one place airlift the lOlst Airbome Division less one at the same time, can serve both to deter and to brigade from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to prevent such threats from expanding into larger Bien Hoa, Republic of Vietnam, was sched- conflicts. [ fy 69 Defense Budget] uled by the Army to move in three echelons In each instance the Secretary was addressing over a period of 42 days. If required, the en- the addition of the C-5 to the ma c strategic tire national strategic airlift resource could airlift force, major improvements in the na- have been massed behind the task and the tional sealift posture, and the presence of pre- entire mission completed in less than 2M days, positioned equipment in specified areas. None even in that end-1967 time frame. of the three conditions obtained when the A precise summation of the sea operation serious buildup of our forces in Southeast Asia was given by General Westmoreland to the ( sea ) began in 1965. There were no C-5s in Holland Society of New York in November ma c, and ma c had only about one-sixth of the 1968. “During those early days of 1965,” he| full C-141 force. Sealift was in rather marginal pointed out, “I took a calculated risk on our condition with respect to both the available marginal logistic capability. Finally, in thei number of bottoms and the berthing and han- latter half of 1966 our physical facilities and1 dling facilities in Vietnam. And prepositioning logistical organization were able to receive the1 had not applied to that immediate area. magnitude of forces required to move into sus-i Therefore, a rather sizable burden de- tained combat and to keep constant pressurei scended upon the airlift segment, and the re- on the enemy.” From that point on, he con-i sultant great increase in strategic logistical tinued, beginning in late 1966 and continuing| airlift has already been described. As an inter- into 1967, we brought to bear on the enemy j MODERN COMBAT AIRLIFT 25

in South Yietnam the full measure of our of circumstances, in conjunction with sealift power. and prepositioned equipment. What ma c combat airlift will be able to But, to deter hostile action anywhere in accomplish, in the C-141/C-5 era just ahead, the world, or to contain aggression with maxi- is to bring about that application of full mili- mum force in minimum time, ton-mile effi- tary power—not in one year, or two or three, ciency per se is far less relevant than fast, but within a greatly foreshortened time from effective force deploijment. And that is the one the moment a threat is perceived. dominant capability of the ma c combat airlift T h is could, of course, be accomplished force. more easily if major items of equipment were prepositioned in the objective area. But it I have sa id that we do not physically have a is manifestly impossible to have everything combat airlift capability in the ultiinate sense everywhere, aside from political. diplomatic, because such a capability presupposes the C-5 and caretaldng problems. type of aircraft. By early fali of this year, we The fdl concept could alleviate many of will be close to an initial operational capability these difBculties and is, in my own opinion, an essential element of sealift capability for with the C-5. But we will still not have gen- concept of militarv purposes. In fact, whatever combat uine combat airlift until the full airlift may be able to achieve in the way of modem strategic mobility is fully understood. deterrence, it is difficult to conceive of anv If we look upon big lift—and its various sustained operation that does not ultimately repetitions—as the ultimate airlift “lesson depend upon surface lift for the great bulk of leamed,” then we will not really have leamed routine supply. It would therefore certainly anything of durable value at all. I hope I have be desirable to improve our total sealift re- shown that the strategic mobility of this nation source, including a highly responsive commer- in the future will be of an order entirely differ- cial segment similar to our own Civil Reserve ent from anything we have yet experienced Air Fleet program. and that it can be, above all, an effective Numerous studies have concluded what deterrent against protracted and eroding “limited” wars. appears almost self-evident: the ma c C-141/ C-5 force would make its maximum contribu- And that, beyond any doubt, is what the tion to the national effort, under a wide variety revolution in airlift is really all about. Scott Air Force Base, Illinois

Notes 1. HoweU M. Estes, Jr., “The Revolution in Airlift,” Air 2. Frank N. Trager, “What Is Security in Southeast Asia?” Univeriity Review, XVII, 3 (March-), 2—15. in Air University Review, XX, 1 (November-), 103-12. A NEW ERA FOR MA CS RESERVE FORCES

M ajor Gen er a l Gil be r t L. C urti:

A NEW and revolutionary era has arrived / ^ for the Military Áirlift Command -A- gained Reserve forces. Old concepts have given way to new outlooks which prorn- ise to bring a more vital and direct involve- ment of Air Force Reserve forces in the mission of the Military Airlift Command ( ma c ). In- asmuch as these forces are an integral part of the total ma c force available to meet any levei of increased activity, the concepts and struc- ture which shape thcm must be compatible with the active force. We in the Military Air- lift Command feel that the benefits gained from bringing this compatibility to the ma c active and Reserve forces constitute the most significant development to affect afr forces limited logistics agency, the airlift force today in manv years. is evolving to the point of sustaining large- scale deployments and resupplying these forces so as to create an effective on-scene impact of the revolution in airlift military reaction force that could, in fact, deter The 1966 naxne change of the Military large-scale land warfare. Air Transport Service to Military Airhft Com- In contrast, the relatively new ma c Re- mand has often been related to the current serve airlift units, first activated in 1959, were ongoing revplution in airlift. This revolution equipped with aircraft that were being re- also relates to the evolution of the modem jet placed in the active force by a new genera- airlift aircraft, the C-141 and the C-5. This tion of jet airlifters, the C-141. The new jets, change in the basic character of the airlift including the C-5, will be 4 to 16 times as force, started in the latter years of the Eisen- productive as the aircraft assigned to the hower administration, was greatly accelerated Reserves. Ironically, this gap in the relative by President Kennedy’s 1961 decision to alter capabilities of the Reserve and active airlift the national strategy that had been oriented forces occurred before the Reserves were fully to nuclear-war deterrence. The change to a equipped with the obsolescent C-124s. strategy of flexible response to meet a greater The conversion of ma c to a jet airlift number of contingency situations had a pro- force meant that the worldwide airlift support found effect on MAC and its Reserve compo- system would also be converted, with main- nents. the Air Force Reserve and the Air Na- tenance and materials-handling equipment tional Guard. The term “Reserve” in this dis- necessary to support jet aircraft. In essence, cussion refers to both components. if the reciprocating-engine reserve airlift was When measured against the characteristics to be effectively utilized, it would require of an airlift force demanded by the flexible either the existence of a costly support system, response strategy, the aircraft then possessed including island bases that would not be prop- by ma t s were not adequate. The airlift force erly utilized in peacetime or the necessary of the late 1950s and early ’60s was essentially lead time to deploy a full support system in limited to an island-hopping, terminal-to-ter- time of contingency. The conversion process minal, airline-type operation. To provide the to maintain jet aircraft is fully under way. flexibilitv required for the new strategy, the Traditionally, Reserve capability has been ma c airlift force was programmed to become, increased by assigning Reserve forces more by the early 70s, a mixed force of C-141 and capable aircraft released from the active force. C-5 aircraft. The long range, relatively high In the case of strategic airlift, this procedure speed, high capacity. and advanced military is not feasible. The change of ma c to an all-jet operating characteristics of this force will per- force is occurring over a relatively short time mit operation into forward combat areas. span. Accordingly, equipment is not available Instead of being a relatively inflexible and for assignment to the Reserves.

27 28 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

This problem is further complicated by mander of ma c , General Howell M. Estes, Jr., the fact that new aircraft are so expensive that directed in a complete reapprais- the altemative of purchasing them for the al of the command’s future Reserve needs. Reserves is not likely to be acceptable to the While the main focus was to be on strategic decision-makers in Washington. airlift, the full range of ma c s many mission This apparent incompatibility in active areas was to be included. Four key points of and Reserve resources was not lost on the guidance were followed: ( 1) that augmenta- Department of Defense. In fact, by the mid- tion would be primarily by organized units, sixties dod had already ordered a complete ( 2 ) these units would be complementary to phase-out of MAC-gained airlift units. and compatible with the force to be aug- As the ma c force changes to an all-jet mented, (3) the units’ organizational struc- force of C-141s and C-5s, the number of air- ture and concept of operation should permit craft will be reduced by almost one-thixd, but flexible response at all leveis of activity rather at the same time the ton-mile capability will than only under general war mobilization, and more than double; under certain operational (4) that the units’ operation must be cost conditions, it may actually quadruple. The effective. capability to realize the full potential inherent The Reserve Associate Unit Program was, in the new jet aircraft is, however, limited by developed from that review. These units are the manning that can be expected in future distinctly different from the typical Reserve peacetime budgets. These aircraft can and flying unit. They do not possess their own should be operated at considerably higher organic aircraft but rather share the C-141s, rates than we can expect from our peacetime and later the C-5s, of an active ma c wing. manning. Therefore, the phase-out of the ma c - Further, their organizational structure and gained Reserve airlift units and the subsequent personnel strength are predicated on a total loss of the experienced Reserve airlift person- force (active and Reserve) Unit Detail List nel were not in macs interest. ( udl ), which is designed to meet the wartime requirements of a ma c wing at a greatly accel- erated activity rate. Reserve Associate Unit concept In this regard, perhaps the most strildng In consideration of these facts the Com- difference from the typical Reserve flying unit

Group Hq

6 off A^T* 1 1 amn 4 17 total

Military Aerial Port Fl Support Sq Materiel Sq Airlift Sq

ART 5 off 4 off ART 51 off ART 1 o f f 27 amn 4 230 amn 83 56 amn 28 24 amn 1 32 total 234 total 107 total 25 total 67 officers 348 airmen Totais 415* (120 ART) 12 civil Service 427

•Air Reierve Technicion Air Reserve Forces Associate Group A NEW ERA FOR MAC’S RESERVE FORCES 29

The low-wing C-124 Globemaster, obsolescent equipment for Military Airlift Command active forces, currently serves as the workhorse of tlie commanrTs Reserve units. 30 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

is the absence of large support functions used one airlift squadron for each airlift squadron primarily to open new bases overseas. Th is is in the active wings. The airlift squadron will explained by the fact that ma c does not in- initially have 16 aircrews, which represent a crease its base structure in wartime. Rather, wartime capability of 2.5 hours per day for ma c operates at an increased rate through its each of the active squadrons’ 16 C-141s or existing bases and through the coisrus and C-5s. The materiel squadron has enough per- overseas bases of other major commands. sonnel to support that sized flying-hour pro- An associate group with 415 people as- gram. The aerial port flight has the number of signed will be organized at each of the eight personnel needed to meet the increased traffic bases in the U.S. where ma c airlift units are load associated with the increased activity. to be located. Organizationally, the group will And, finally, the support squadron contains the consist of a headquarters, a materiel squadron, numbers and skills necessary to support the a support squadron, an aerial port flight, and increased base population. A NEW ERA FOR MAC’S RESERVE FORCES 31

In essence, the associate group is a mis- training is not conducted at the expense of sion-oriented organization that is tailored to active force productivity. ma c s specific requirements. Accordingly, the Reservists are trained to the same stan- associate program is not recommended for dards as active duty personnel. Pilots and general application to all ma c missions or to Hight engineers attend the ma c C-141 transi- other commands. tion training unit ( ttu ), which is followed by The heart of the peacetime unit is an Air additional training in their own unit, to com- Reserve Technician ( art) force of 120 people, plete requirements for worldwide qualifica- which provides the necessary management and tions. For pilots, this includes flying 60 hours support of peacetime training activities, pri- per quarter to maintain currency. The navi- marily in the form of flying hours and instruc- gators and loadmasters attend local flying train- tor capabilitv. The existence of this art force ing detachments ( ftd), followed by flying is vital to the program, to insure that Reserve training in their units. The satisfactory com- pletion of “combat airlift training” signifies the end of the initial upgrade training program. Initially, the new group will lean heavily on the active wing for training assistance. How- ever, the Reserves will eventually be fully capable of conducting their own training pro- grams. Peacetime training for the associate air- crews has distinct advantages over present training programs. The Reservist will have a greater opportunity to fly with the shorter elapsed round-trip times of the jets and the more frequent mission departures of the 32-64 aircraft of a wing than is possible with a Re- serve unit with only eight aircraft. For the Air Force, this training is also productive. After initial qualification, more than 70 percent of annual training will be on productive airlift missions. This productivity, if replaced by commercial airlift at current rates, would cost almost twice as much as the annual cost of the Reserve training program. The Reserve unit’s dependence on the ac- tive force for equipment and facilities resulted in a unique approach to combat-readiness ( C ) ratings. While active and Reserve units report their C-status separately, there will also be a combined rating, and the periodic readiness inspections will be based on the combined active and Reserve units’ capability. Thus, the Utilizing an HU-16 Alhatross fixed-wing aircraft, the 301st Air Force Reserve Aerospace Rescue and active wing commander shares the responsi- Recovertj Squadron at Homestead AFB, Florida, is bility with the Reserve group commander for one of five Reserve squadrons svpporting Military operational readiness. Airlift Com m and rescue missions. . . . T h e pro- The wartime capability of Reserve forces posed replacement of the Albatross and the HC-97 with the HH-3 "Jolly Green Ciant” helicopter is the basic reason for their existence. In the used in Southeast Asia would make Reserve capa- associate program, participation during pe- bilities more compatible with combat requirements. riods of increased tension short of general war The Aerospace Audio-Visual Service may acquire Reserve assistance in fulfilling photo documentation requirements in Southeast Asia.

is emphasized. Formerly, MAC-gained Reserve define the progqtjn concept developed at ma c airlift forces have flown as much as 60 per- headquarters. Emphasis was placed on con- cent of their wartime rate in voluntary sup- verting an optimum number of Reserve C-119 port of the Southeast Asia ( sea ) logistics aircrew members rather than recruiting former mission. This effort was difficult because of ma c C-141 personnel. Furthermore, members the personners 12-15 days avvay from civilian of the C-124-equipped parent wing were not employment, and it was also difficult to form allowed to transfer because of their involve- alI-Reserve crews. It is possible for this par- ment in sea support missions. ticipation rate to be equaled or exceeded in A particularly tight schedule, for a Re- the associate program because of the shorter serve unit, was decreed for attaining C-2 round-trip times and the flexibility for a status: 24 , 11 months after the Reservist to fly with an active crew or for an activation date of 25 . The 944th active crew member to fly with a Reserve crew achieved this C-2 milestone on 20 February that is short a crew member. Obviously, in 1969—in fact, it had sufficient crews already the event of mobilization, ma c will have an transport-qualified and scheduled for combat immediately available expanded wartime ca- airlift training so that C-l could be attained pability to meet increased Joint Chiefs of in short order. Staff requirements on a sustained basis. Approval of additional units was forth- coming even before the 944th began operation as an associate unit. To date, 12 C-141 associ- associate program activation and management ate airlift squadrons within seven groups have dod approved the associate program in been approved for activation by the end of and ordered the 944th Tactical fy 70. Airlift Group to move from March afb, Cali- A great deal of thought was given to the fórnia, to Norton afb, Califórnia, and be re- inherent problems associated with such an organized as a Military Airlift Group (Associ- unusual undertaking, primarily resulting from ate), to be associated with the 63d Military the concept of shared equipment and inte- Airlift Wing ( ma c ). This initial group was grated wartime organizations. In peacetime, considered a pilot unit to test and further both units needed strong unit integrity, yet A NEW ERA FOR MAC’S RESERVE FORCES 33

at all times they had to strive to develop a areas of ma c as well. The aeromedical airlift cohesive unit that could achieve rapid and system within the United States has had to be productive consolidation should mobilization increased significantly in recent years to han- require. The regular force must have its in- dle the casualties returning from the Vietnam tegrity to respond immediately and effectively conflict. Augmentation in wartime was planned to any contingency, especially under political to use Reserve airlift aircraft from the strategic conditions that preclude Reserve participation. airlift force. The Reserves must also have unit integrity to Two factors made this a less realistic con- conduct a strong training program without de- cept: dod had, in fact, programmed the phase- grading the active force capabilitv. Unit in- out of all ma c Reserve airlift units; and the tegrity is a key to the ultimate success of the increased emphasis on support of deploying program. United States Strike Command forces meant Emphasis is placed on equality and com- that the secondary aeromedical role might not mon standards. Resende art’s in the mainte- be accomplished with the required degree of nance area have been integrated into the func- certainty. tional areas, working daily in the position they ma c therefore proposed creating an asso- will occupy upon mobilization. In this way ciate aeromedical airlift group to augment the the active and Reserve units gain respect for 375th Aeromedical Airlift Wing at Scott afb, each other as well as an understanding of the Illinois, which is presently converting to the mutual dependence which exists as they attain twin-jet McDonnell Douglas C-9 aircraft. The an effective capabilitv. 932 MAGp presently at Scott is converting The C-141s of the 63 MAWg fly both the from the C-124 to the C-9, having started in wing and 944 MAGp insígnias, indicative that . they are sharing these aircraft. The same idea To meet the rest of the requirements for has been carried out on facilities that are movement of general-war patients, ma c gained shared and on signs along the base perimeter. dod approval to convert four C-121-equipped MAWgs to the aero- tvorldwide airlift support medical airlift mission, which they had pre- viously performed in a secondary role. Airlift operations depend heavily on a worldwide support system located on bases aerospace rescue and recovery that are associated with the normal flow pat- tem to overseas locations. Obviously, contin- Another ma c support mission is the Aero- gencies will occur that require new support space Rescue and Recovery Service. Rescue, squadrons at locations previously nonexistent as it is more commonly known, has five Re- and related to the conflict. Reserve aerial port serve squadrons equipped with HC-97 or squadrons and mobile enroute support squad- HU-16 aircraft. These units are performing in rons provide this kind of expansion. an outstanding manner in the search and res- The 1966 ma c analysis showed that while cue missions, as well as in the precautionary the twelve existing aerial port squadrons were orbit (duckbutt) missions that support fighter adequate, two support squadrons were needed deployments. in addition to the existing six. dod approved The units are not able, however, to per- one of the two in 1967 for activation in March form adequately in the new and more publi- 1968 at Norton afb, and ma c will continue to cized Rescue roles now being performed in seek approval for the second squadron. Vietnam, principally combat aircrew recovery. ma c therefore has suggested re-equipping CONUS aeromedical evacuation these squadrons with HC-130 aircraft and HH-3 helicopters, so that their mission capa- The new emphasis on the flexible response bility will be more compatible with any con- strategy had its effect on the other mission tingency requirements of our combatant forces. 34 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

Another Rescue role is that of Local Base to be organized. A similar increase in contin-j Rescue ( lbr). When we were faced with new gency operations by mobilization of opera-1 requirements in sea , our only course was to tional Reserve units would require still another transfer units from conus: there has never photo squadron. Therefore, ma c feels that a been an expansion capacity in either the active Reserve combat photo documentation squad- or Reserve air forces. The lbr role is similar in ron is a realistic contingency resource. nature to the peacetime help given for many years by the Air National Guard to Air De- T he command’s experience in implementing fense Command interceptor units on alert this ambitious package of program changes duty. ma c felt that Rescue could use a number has already validated this unique “total forces” of Reserve lbr’s in the same way. The Reserve approach to Reserve affairs. Thus, our units lbrs would be located at the more stable usaf are flexible enough that they can be produc- bases (those not subject to short-notice de- tive in peace as well as war. The cost-effective- ployment), such as Air Training Command ness aspect of the program significantly lessens bases. The active units would continue to be the problem of program justification during at Tactical Air Command bases in the conus periods of austere budgets. and at all overseas locations. The commands approach to a Reserve Obviously, care must be taken to have a force is best summed up in a statement by proper balance of active and Reserve units, to General Estes after the Department of De- insure that we maintain a proper personnel fense approved the initial associate unit: base for overseas rotation during peacetime and nonmobilized emergency conditions. A The Air Force Reserve, over the years, very favorable aspect of the Reserve lbr is the has given to the regular Air Force tremendous expansion capability with the larger Reserve backup in both flying and ground units. . . . As far as the Military Airlift Command is con- personnel complement. With the stable alert cerned, the Air Force Reserve has provided commitment, there are more personnel in a support in terms of airlift units and air rescue Reserve unit, whose members participate on units in addition to a number of different types a part-time basis, than in a regular unit. Upon of ground units. It is vitally important to the mobilization, a resource base will exist that capability of the Military Airlift Command that permits at least one new lbr, assuming equip- this Reserve support continue into the future. ment is procured, which could be activated for Furthermore, it is important as we achieve each Reserve lbr in existence. new and modern aircraft in the inventory of the Military Airlift Command, such as the C-141 and the C-5, that our Reserve forces be capable Aerospace Audio-Visual Service of operating these more modern types of air- craft rather than back up the regular force ir The final area of ma c support missions, outmoded older style aircraft. requiring a new Reserve approach, is the Aero- This is the purpose of the Associate Pro- space Audio-Visual Service ( aavs). Unlike gram within the Air Force Reserve: To directh other organizations, this area has not had Re- couple formed Reserve units, not individuais serve unit augmentation in the past. Like the with regular units flying these modem aircrafi other mission areas, the photo documcntation so that in times of emergency we are capablf mission has had its scope and focus signifi- of achieving maximum capability which is in cantly increased by the new national strategy. herent in these new modern aircraft. I am surr that this is going to be a fine program for th« aavs tasks in documenting Air Force op- Reserves and the . erations in sea exceeded the existing capability so greatly that the 600th Photo Squadron had Hq Military Airlift Cominatu *0

COM B AT AIRLIFT TRAINING IN MAC

M ajor Gen er al C ourtney L. F aug ht N THE Military Airlift Command, “com- area. This elapsed time includes two-houi bat airlift” is defined as the employment ground time at Elmendorf afb, Alaska, and I of strategic airlift forces to fly fighting four hours at , Okinawa. The elements directly into a combat zone; airland- four hours at Kadena are required to enable ing or airdropping the troops and their equip- the force to “close in” and then take off with ment; and resupplying them through either a 30-second formation interval for a 10-second direct, long-range air lines of communication in-trail separation to the objective area. The ( aloc) or high-volume intertheater opera- 46-hour saving not only is significant as a mat- tions. The method of insertion into the objec- ter of accelerated responsiveness, which could tive area is a function of the mission that the in itself spell the difference between success airlifted forces are to carry out and of their and failure, but is magnified many times over capability. when the situation calls for recycling the air- ma c s ability to carry out this combat air- lift force for massive delivery within a short lift mission gives our national planning and time period. And of course planning factors decision elements a rapid, responsive capabil- are greatly simplified by the elimination of ity for direct delivery of coNUs-based battle- transloading, and potential confusion is cor- ready units to areas of conflict or threat any- respondingly reduced. Comparable savings of where on earth. On certain occasions in the time and complication apply, of course, to any past, rapid reaction to deteriorating situations other area of the globe. (Lebanon and the Taiwan Strait, among others) has helped to limit and contain con- staff reorganization for responsiveness flicts which, without the timely interposition This very fundamental difference between of suíficient force, might have grown into un- the old C-124 type of capability and the com- controllable threats to world peace. bat airlift potential of the C-141/C-5 force has: The rapidity, as well as the size, of such necessitated a great deal of change within responses will in the near future be greatly ma c . The command is now in the process of enhanced with ma c s all-jet C-141/C-5 combat reorganizing its staff structure from the head- airlift force. Whereas it has previously been quarters down to the airlift wings, so as tc necessary to use intermediate staging bases to carry out its combat mission more effectively. transfer combat forces from long-range pro- New combat tactics and techniques staffs are: peller-driven aircraft to short-range tactical responsible for the support and planning func- aircraft in order to execute the employment tions that were previously divided among di- phase of the mission, the combination of the verse staff agencies in the various headquar- C-141 and C-5 will eliminate the necessity for ters. Complete and responsive staff support is that deployment/employment transfer. now provided for all the tactics and techniques The difference is perhaps best illustrated required for training and deploying the ma c by a typical scenario from onload at Pope Air airlift forces. The planning functions of these; Force Base, North Carolina, to airlanding or new staff agencies include the employmenl airdrop in Southeast Asia. portion of operations plans, operations orders With the C-124 type of force, 73 hours and frag orders. elapse between first takeoff at Pope and des- tination. The time is generated by the low aircrew training speed of the aircraft, mid-Pacific routing to maximize the allowable cabin load ( acl ), and Combat airlift/airdrop training is requirec a 12-hour ground time at Kadena to transfer of all ma c C-141 aircrews, and the entire C-141, to the theaters C-130 aircraft for the final aircraft force possesses the airdrop missior (employment) segment of the mission. capability. The crews accomplish aerial deliv- With the C-141/C-5 force, the elapsed ery training in their local areas, using drop time is 27 hours from first takeoff at Pope to zones ( dz) selected to meet all criteria for í arrival of the formation over the objective safe training environment.

36 COMBAT A1RLIFT TRAINING IN MAC 37

MAC Reserve Forces flying the Southeast Asia shuttle look forward to being equipped with C-141 jet transports soon. . . . Mean- time the piston-engine C-124 will continue their faithful workhorse.

A training mission begins when the crews flight portion of the mission includes the arrive for the mission briefing, which includes maneuvers of fonnafion takeofiF and assembly, a descriptíon of the operation, navigation in- if r and vfr climbTOut, weather penetration, formation, weather, Communications, and the orbits, descent into the objective area, low- other details necessary for successful perform- level enroute navigation, two types of slow- ance. Specialist and serial lead briefings are down procedures, and, finally, the airdrop. also held if the nature or complexity of the The tactical airdrop formation of the pres- training operation so dictates. The aircraft ent era is an in-trail aircraft formation with commander or his representative conducts a 2200 feet between element aircraft (three air- troop briefing at planeside. Specific times are craft to an element) and a two-mile separation determined for each portion of the mission, between element leaders. All aircraft maintain from start engines to taxi, takeofiF. on-course the same altitude, with the element wingmen departure, time over target, and landing. The establishing wingtip clearance to the left and 38 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

Rough-terrain loaders transfer palletized cargo from aerial port storage to flight line for air- lift to the combat zone. These same vehicles onload cargo for paradrop from C-141 Starlifters.

40634

right, respectively, to avoid jet wash and wing- not use the World War II airdrop formation, tip vórtices. A slowdovvn to drop airspeed (130 with its nose-to-tail and wingtip-to-wingtip knots) is established one to three minutes prior clearance. The answer goes back to 1963 and to arrival over the dz. The vfr in-trail forma- the Tactical Air Commands Project Close tion is normally used for entry and exit of the Look, which evaluated new equipment and objective area at minimum altitude and high tactics for improvement of aerial delivery speed. Drop altitudes for training are 1000 modes. Among the conclusions was a recom- feet for personnel and between 700 and 1100 mendation that the high-speed, low-level, in- feet for equipment. Equipment drop altitude trail formation be adopted in place of the V varies with the type of parachute and whether formation, for the following reasons: parachutes are used singly or in clusters. For a. Enroute and dz weather minimums could wartime airdrop of personnel, the altitude can be lowered. go as low as 600 feet, according to the decision b. The formation is more maneuverable, of the troop force commander. The equipment permitting maximum evasive action and con- drop altitude, however, vvill be the same in sequent reduction of vulnerability. war as in training, since it is realistically based c. As the number of aircraft increased be- upon the altitude at which the recovery para- yond 27, less time would be required for de- chute load system can be expected to function livery on the dz by the in-trail than by the V reliably. formation. The question has arisen as to why we do d. Training requirements for initial pilot Marines line up to board MAC C-141s for paradrop during a ioint MAC/Marine Corpx training exercise.

checkout would be reduced, resulting in better sible. This specialized technique, of course, economy of operation. will be applicable only to a situation like that The new procedures, together with other in Vietnam, lacking counterair. possibilities, were thoroughly field-tested in The ma c airdrop training program is pres- 1966 in a large-scale maneuver, Exercise Rapid ently being strengthened through use of Stra- Strike II. Out of this three-week operation, tegic Air Command’s radar bomb scoring which included the airdrop of 9075 personnel, ( rbs) sites. Runs are made by C-141 aircraft 282 vehicles, and 67 tons of other equipment, against the rbs site at the culmination of a carne the jointly agreed position that the in- low-level navigation route. The aircraft is trail formation be adopted as the standard scored according tò its actual air position in technique. relation to the desired computed air release ma c is now developing an additional for- point ( carp ) position. After departing the rbs mation procedure growing out of low-level air- site, the crew makes a run on a local dz. The drop experience in Vietnam. With complete combination of the rbs run and a standard air- control of the air in that conflict, it is tactical- drop provides varied and realistic training for ly more sound for the airlift force to approach all crew positions. the dz above 5000 feet, descend in-trail to ar- In addition, ma c conducts large-scale (36 rive at the dz airdrop altitude and airspeed, C-141s) airdrop training exercises, with air- accomplish the drop, and then begin climb craft and crews from every C-141 airlift wing. and increase airspeed in order to get out of These cold ma ss operations provide aircrew, range of any small-arms fire as rapidly as pos- staff, and command/control training in large- Continued on page 42

• 1

Combat Control Teams

Three members of the first USAF combat control team to parachute in combat— 4 April 1966, near Saigon—mark the drop zone for the jumpers who follow. . . . A combat controller of the 7th Aerial Fort Squadron rádios an incoming aircraft that the DZ is clear. . . . The parachuting soldiers belong to the Army of Vietnam Airborne Division. 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

scale formation techniques and procedures, as lift Control Element ( alce) is used for com- well as a practical basis for their refmement. mand and control of the mission. Within the The Military Airlift Command also spon- alce is a nucleus of personnel who are special- sors an intracommand conibat airlift competi- ists in the operation of deployed missions; tion that brings together the finest airdrop they are supplemented by other wing person- crews from each wing in a contest to deter- nel resources as required by the scope of the mine the best crew and wing in MAC. The particular task to be accomplished. In addi- competition fosters the objective of all-around tion to the control function, the alce fumishes improvement in the command’s aerial delivery operations, materiel, aerial port, and support competence. resources at the deployed location. mission support exercises

The entire training program requires a The ma c airlift force is tested for capa- great deal of specialized support from other bility as realistically as possible during large- wing sections. The aerial delivery section of scale joint training exercises, deployments, and the ma c Aerial Port Squadron is a case in maneuvers. The ma c contribution to these point; its day-to-day mission is to provide missions is broadly variable: it ranges from cargo parachute packing, airdrop load buildup, deployment to a theater staging base; through aircraft loading, and dz load and parachute participation in the employment phase by air- recovery Serv ices. Th is type of unit is manned drop of personnel alone, or equipment only, or by airfreight personnel and aircrew loadmas- personnel and equipment in combination; or ters who specialize in aerial delivery opera- by airlanding only; to any combination of tions. One of their typical functions is the these various leveis of participation. In many packing of 64- and 100-foot-diameter cargo of these varied airlift tasks, ma c joins with the parachutes, by means of which 4000-pound Tactical Air Command ( tac) and theater air- supply loads, jeeps, and other Army vehicle lift forces. and equipment items are delivered. Some typical missions of the above cate- Another essential support section of the gories include the airlift of the lOlst Airbome Aerial Port Squadron is the Combat Control Division ( — ) to Vietnam in ; Team ( cct). The ccr is manned by Air Force the 10,000-man Army/Marine reinforcement jumpers whose war mission is to parachute of our Southeast Asia forces in ; into the objective area to mark the drop zones the airdrop of 2000 U.S. and Greek paratroop- and provide Communications and air traffic ers with equipment 20 miles from the Bulgar- control at the airhead in an airbome opera- ian border in ; a large airdrop in tion. The unit also provides landing, taxi, and east central Spain during December 1968; the takeoff instructions during an airlanding op- airdrop of 82d Airbome Division elements on eration when normal air traffic control Services Vieques Island, Puerto Rico, in January 1969; have not previously been established. The cct and the deployment and redeployment of the is equipped with portable uhf, vhf, fm, and 24th Infantry Division ( — ) from Fort Riley, hf rádios, visual marking equipment, radar Kansas, to Nümberg, Germany, in February- beacons, and the weapons and field gear nec- . essary to support deployed combat operations. The ma c force is also tested for mission During local aircrew training, the cct mans capability through the médium of the wing the dz and fumishes jumpers to satisfy wing Operational Readiness Inspection Test ( ohit), aircrew training requirements for dropping which commences with the no-notice arrival of personnel. an inspection team from ma c headquarters. In For deployment missions at locations the course of the orit the wing is evaluated on where ma c does not have established opera- its performance and reaction in all aspects of tions, a special organization known as an Air- wartime, contingency, and disaster conditions. COMBAT AIRLIFT TRA1NING IN MAC 43

One part of the response is a six-aircraft day/ Beyond that, affiliated troop units have night mission \vith a personnel/heavy equip- been fumished construction drawings for a ment airdrop. The mission imposes precise re- universal loading simulator ( uls) designed for quirements as to takeoff time and time over local fabrication. The simulator can be quickly target. and the air-delivered loads of personnel modified to provide load training for the C-5, and equipment must impact on the dz within C-141, C-133, and C-130 aircraft. Through use 300 yards of a predetermined point. of the uls, training costs for both ma c and the user are significantly reduced, eliminating some of the static load requirements for use affiliation program of actual airframes. Combat airlift training within ma c is sup- To round out the affiliation arrangement, plemented by an active wing/division affilia- the wing and unit stafFs periodically review tion program. This program estabiishes liaison airlift requirements, prepare load plans, and between specific MAC wings and identified develop onload airfield marshaling procedures Army, Marine, and Tactical Air Command —all aimed at optimizing effective utilization units. The activities of the program are di- of the combat airlift force and ensuring a rected toward the ultimate goal of faster re- smooth, integrated flow of troops and equip- action to contingency requirements. Individual ment. They also survey adjacent airfields for ma c airlift wings are associated with from equipment and facility capability, as well as four to nine units of the other Services, ranging availability for support of future deployment in size from a brigade to a division. The unit operations. These surveys enable ma c to de- staífs maintain a close working relationship, termine the number of alce personnel and the with cognizance by each of the others mission, equipment necessary to support operations capabilities, and requirements. The planners from such locations. of both the ma c units and the supported units The payoff of all these joint affiliation ac- have developed a deeper awareness and un- tivities is a responsive effort that has materi- derstanding of airlift planning requirements ally reduced the time required to plan and under various conditions of deployment. This load forces for whatever emergency or con- close and informal working liaison at all leveis tingency may arise. ensures more effective response during de- ployment outloading as a result of unified team effort; such teamwork is facilitated be- cause the people involved have labored to- T he combat airlift task of the Military Airlift gether during both training exercises and Command has been shown to include a full actual contingency conditions. range of command and joint programs to sup- The affiliation training program is strength- port and increase mission effectiveness and ened by classroom instruction in load docu- efficiency. These programs include: responsive mentation, preparation of equipment for air staff organization; a continuous and compre- shipment, aircraft capabilities and limitations, hensive aircrew training regimen; necessary load planning, tie-down, and loading proce- mission unit support arrangements; a vigorous dures. The instruction is provided by ma c wing/division affiliation program; and an ac- aerial port loadmasters to the personnel of the tive exercise schedule to ensure current and user units. Classroom training is fcllowed by proved performance capability along the en- four to eight hours of actual aircraft loading tire spectrum of the Military Airlift Command practice, with various aircraft configurations combat airlift mission. and loads. Hq Military Airlift Command WEATHER MODIFICATION IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

M ajor Thomas A. Studer

E A T H E R modification is novv being accepted as one of three major areas toward which efforts to advance meteorology Wshould be directed. It is taking its place alongside development of a comprehensive observing system and of a more sophisticated, reliable prediction capability, to form an inclusive weather-support system. Weather modification has only lately come to tliis levei of prominence in the meteorological community, and the emphasis that it is to receive when competing for attention and resources is not yet clear. Its general acceptance by the military and the seriousness with which its potential is viewed are even more ambiguous. Within the Air Force, individual opinions on weather modification, if reduced to basic convictions, seem to fali largely into two categories. The first category holds that weather modification does not have sufficient promise, either for supporting conventional military operations or as a weapon system itself, to warrant expenditure of developmental time or effort. This opinion, however, is seldom baldly stated; it is usually qualified or hedged, in recognition, perhaps, that many similar positions taken with regard to other new fields in their infancy have proven to be embarrassing. The profoundly pessimistic quahty of many original estimates for the future of the airplane is a case in point. The second category is convinced that eventually. WEATHER MODIFICATION 45

in the arsenais or weapon-support areas of fu- that supercooled fog and stratus (composed ture milítary forces, weather modification will of liquid water droplets at temperatures below have an important role. Often this opinion is freezing) can be dissipated over areas many accompanied by a tacit affirmation that a us- square miles in size. able capability is so far off that there is little (2) Extensive theoretical work has revealed point in mounting a vigorous effort in the area several possible ways to dissipate warm fog yet. It is felt that weather modification prop- (temperatures above freezing) on a scale at érly should be allowed the benefit of further least large enough to lift airfields above instru- grinding in the mills of pure research until it ment approach minimums. reaches a form coherent enough to vvarrant (3) It is possible to modify the normal mihtarv attention. Not irrelevantly, much of growth of clouds and as a eonsequence change the civilian communitv may hold similar views, nonnal pattems of rainfall. Except in certain with the added qualification that weather special meteorological situations it is not modification, hke Chemical and biological known in what manner or to what extent agents, is too insidious to be used morally in either the cloud growth or rainfall is altered. war. In all probability it is within these three Enough is now known about the basic general areas that all weather-rnodification physical processes that control the world’s efforts aimed at operational capabilities will weather engine to State with considerable cer- fali for a number of years to come. The im- taint>’ that the first opinion will be proven portant point is that man-induced changes can wrong. The second view, however, is a differ- be made now in each of the categories. Al- ent matter and will, with its many variations though often these changes are small and the and gradations, play an influential part in de- means to accomplish them crude, the changes ciding the eventual role which weather modi- nevertheless are real. In the third area, a con- fication will assume in the military. siderable spectrum of potential weather-modi- There is ample reason for a sober, con- fication tools actually exists. servative approach. Many immense problems With the rise of weather modification to must be solved before dramatic capabilities a position where it is being viewed seriously, are in hand. In many instances substantial ad- there has been a corresponding swell of opin- vances in the basic knowledge of cloud physics ion holding that the actual employment of all and the earth’s general circulation are neces- weather modification should be confined to sary prerequisites to either the development peaceful purposes. The magnitude of its po- or the responsible employment of weather- tential effects, extending as they can to large modification capabilities. More sophisticated areas of the earth and into long periods of statistical and climatological techniques are future time, strongly suggests that this power- required, to permit an adequate distinction to ful tool be subjected to thorough review of all be made between the effects caused by at- possible results, in an atmosphere of open, un- tempts to modify the weather and those that hurried discussion, prior to careful and cau- would have occurred naturally. These factors, tious responsible implementation. The current however, should not be allowed to loom so large lack of adequate means to measure or even that they are predominant in all decisions and estimate the full effects resulting from inter- virtuallv dictate that nothing more than mod- fering with the normal course of weather lends est research efforts shall take place for the further support to this position. foreseeable future. It is important that ade- The reasonableness of such an approach quate recognition be given the small but very is unquestionable, particularly if intemational real possibilities that now exist. It is perhaps agreements with, eventually, appropriate mon- in this area that maximum value can be gaincd itoring provisions are enacted. Assuming this from investment of military development re- to be the general course toward which em- sources. To enumerate: ployment of weather modification will tend, (1) It has been demonstrated conclusively two points should be made: 46 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

( 1) It appears there will be a class of cold-fog dissipation weather-modification capabilities that create In the main, only techniques to attack fog weather changes of only a local or transitory have advanced this far. During the past two nature. Their impact on weather or climatol- winters, Air Weather Service has carried on ogy over large geographical areas is negligible. a program of operational testing or application Their military value may, however, be sub- of several techniques for dissipating super- stantial. An example of such a capability would cooled fog. The results have clearly shown a be techniques to dissipate warm fog over very practical use for such a capability. Ad- the approaches to airfields. Such capabilities mittedly, supercooled fog is not a major prob- should be omitted from the list of actions lem, considered from the standpoint of all Air that are intemationally restricted to peaceful Force and Army activities. At a small number purposes. of airfields and operating locations in northem (2 ) There will be a continuing need to climates, however, supercooled fog is an ag- explore the military applications of all tech- gravating problem for several months each niques to change weather, if for no other rea- year. Elmendorf afb in Alaska is an example. son than to achieve an ability to detect at- From November to the rniddle of February tempts by unfriendly powers to alter the this terminal is subject to intervals, lasting weather over the territories of the United occasionally for several days, when cold fog States or its allies. There is no reason to think restricts visibility to less than airfield-approach that scientists of the free world will be unique minimums. In the past this caused serious in- in their ability to develop weather-modifica- terruptions to an orderly flow of scheduled air tion skills. In fact, there is reason to suspect traffic—interruptions that became increasingly that the Soviet Union is well beyond us in costly and intolerable as U.S. military forces some areas and that even Red China is rap- became more and more involved in Southeast idly expanding its efforts in weather modifica- Asia. During the past two years airborne fog- tion. Common sense demands that we remain seeding operations have been carried out at aware of the possible military uses which these Elmendorf afb with a WC-130 aircraft of the world powers can make of their growing aws 9th Weather Reconnaissance Wing. The knowledge. number of aircraft diversions necessitated by Military interest and programs in weather supercooled fog has thereby been markedly modification will, then, continue. So far, these reduced. programs have been concemed primarily with No formal test and development program in-house research or with monitoring research was undertaken to create a proven capability being carried on in other agencies or institu- before seeding operations were begun at El- tions. As understanding of the basic physical mendorf. The Alaskan Air Command had a principies involved increases, however, the problem, and the best available equipment need and justification for developmental pro- and techniques were applied in an effort to grams designed to adapt tliis basic knowledge eliminate or relieve it. Dry ice was chosen as to the solution of operational problems will the most proven agent to create the necessary steadily increase. A broader effort involving freezing nuclei. In view of the terrain and the more field testing may already be overdue. almost entirely unknown value of ground- Since the Air Weather Service has a newly dispensed seeding materiais, it appeared man- assigned responsibility to provide, or to ar- datory to use an aircraft; and the WC-130 was range for, weather-modification support to selected as the seeding platform because its units of the Air Force and Army, it has a performance and range made it ideally suited strong general interest in the research which to this kind of work. As the WC-130 s prime is under way and a particular interest in those mission is typhoon and hurricane reconnais- areas where techniques or equipment have sance and as these phenomena seldom occur advanced to the point that operational testing during the tliree winter months when the in the field is warranted. supercooled fog occurs, the WC-l30s are to WEATHER MODIFICATION 47

some extent available to support fog missions. predicted over the approach to the runway A single WC-130 was used at Elmendorf. Pro- or the flight pattern and dispensing rate were cedures were established whereby it could be unsuitable for the fog occurring at the time. launched in less than an hour on a 24-hours-a- Though the physical basis for useful opera- day, seven-days-a-week schedule if fog threat- tional techniques against cold fog have been ened airfield operations. known for years, only recently has real inter- Though the additional aircraft landings est been shown in developing them for rnili- and expedited departures thus made possible tary use. Much still remains to be leamed to do not describe fully the value of the fog seed- improve their reliability. A particularly criticai ing and their number is sometimes difficult to need is to find some means of coping with the calculate exactly, they give some quantitative low-level winds tliat cause the seeded fog to basis for assessing whether the cost of employ- drift. ing a WC-130 in such a role is justified. Best This need has been convincingly illus- estimates are that during the winter of 1967- trated in seeding operations carried out in 68, 91 aircraft landings and 93 expedited de- Europe. During the winter of 1968-69, Air partures could be attributed to seeding opera- Weather Service conducted operational tests, tions. With more fog during the winter of using a WC-130, at Hahn, Bitburg, and 1968-69. the estimate rose to 180 aircraft land- Spangdahlem Air Bases in the Eifel region of ings made possible and 155 departures ex- West Germany. At Hahn ab tests frequently pedited. By far the greater portion of these were conducted in which areas of fog were were ma c C-141 Starlifters en route to and seeded as much as ten miles upwind from the retuming from Southeast Asia. ma c has esti- intended target of clearing, the approach to mated that the cost of diverting a single C-141 the runway. The three accompanying photo- or commercial contract carrier at Elmendorf graphs were taken during a test in which a afb is approximately $1000. The saving in six-mile-long lane was seeded 12 miles south- operating costs is obvious. The results of a east of the Hahn runway, in the top of fog seeding operation carried out to assist incom- approximately 900 feet thick. The photographs ing aircraft on the moming of 29 December are from a point adjacent to the runway over- 1968 are shown by the adjacent photographs. run. Seeding was done at 1013, and the wind The first was taken at 1120, just before seed- in the fog was estimated to be 130° at 12 knots, ing began, when the entire base complex was although subsequently it was determined to be shrouded in fog; the surface visibility was a closer to 20 knots. At 1110 (first photo) no quarter mile. The second photograph was effects from seeding had been observed at the taken at 1230 from approximately the same runway. At 1120 (second photo) a clearing position. The entire runway is now clear, al- had moved over the entire approach and though the unseeded fog can still be seen touchdown area, the sky overhead became farther out. Four C-141s landed between 1215 clearly visible, and horizontal visibility in- and 1320. creased to over one-half mile. Precipitation In all probability this support will con- fallout leading to improved visibility had ob- tinue in the future, so long as the density of viously taken place before the clearing reached air traffic through Elmendorf is at a levei high the runway. At 1135 (third photo) the wind enough to justify it. The effectiveness of fog had drifted the seeded area north and west seeding should improve as further experience of the base and fog again covered the ap- is gained in applying it operationally. The proach and runway. In this test a reasonably lack of a thorough development and test pro- good estimate was made of the direction and gram before beginning actual operational sup- distance from the desired clearing that the port was evident on occasion. At times seeding fog should be seeded. In the majority of seed- failed to lift the approaches to the airfield ing operations, this was true. Sufficient failures above operating minimums, principally be- occurred, however, in both Alaska and Eu- cause either the seeded fog failed to move as rope, to identify this as the greatest single 48 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW problem in seeding of supercooled fog. warm fog and stratus The most immediate and pressing weather stratus dissipation problem facing all the Services is that caused The aircraft and equipment used against by warm fog and stratus. It is correct to say supercooled fog can be employed with even that no other single weather phenomenon, greater effectiveness to dissipate supercooled considered from a military standpoint, is so stratus clouds. Between 1961 and 1964 the Air important. The principal cause of reduced Force Cambridge Research Laboratories, in visibility, worldwide, is warm fog and stratus. response to a requirement stated by the Tac- Reduced visibility has greater impact on Army tical Air Command, developed equipment and operations than does reduced trafficability or techniques especially for this purpose. Interest extremes of temperature; reduced visibility in of the operating command waned during the airfield-approach zones and over tactical bat- development period, however, and none of tle areas interferes far more with Air Force op- these Systems was actually brought into the erations than does turbulence, hail, or other inventory. In part, the low interest stemmed commonly recognized hazards to flight; and from the fact that stratus does not interfere reduced visibility outranks winds and high with the normal peacetime training mission to seas as a hindrance to naval operations. In the same degree that fog does, and it is rather Project Reforger I/Crested Cap I, a joint Air easy to lose sight of the problems that it can Force-Army test of a new tactical deterrent cause during combat in northem climates. concept carried out in early 1969, warm fog Future joint Army-Air Force training exer- and stratus hampered airlift operations just cises in Europe and Alaska during winter enough to indicate how serious and crippling months will be carefully watched, and air- they could be to the effective use of such a bome Systems used in the theater against cold concept in emergency operations. fog will, if practical, be used against interfer- More and more attention is being focused ing supercooled stratus clouds. A greater ap- on this problem as advances in technology preciation of the impact that low stratus can reveal promising new avenues to possible Solu- have, primarily on effective tactical close air tions. Almost all effort so far has been directed support, should be gained. to finding ways to live with or get around the problem. As an example, much of the research ground-based fog dissipation aimed at finding ways to allow aircraft to land To complement airborne Systems for dissi- during periods of low visibility has been con- pating cold fog, Air Weather Service is testing cerned with work on the so-called zero-zero ground-based systems, which are potentially landing system. This system would instrument more economical because no airframe is re- aircraft and terminais with sophisticated land- quired. Obviously they are less flexible, since ing aids that would permit essentiallv pilot- inherently they lack the freedom provided by free, “hands-off” landings with no requirement an aircraft, which permits seeding in almost for forward visibility. Work has reached the any area desired or where necessitated by point where the tremendous cost and complex- existing low-level winds. A first series of tests ity of such a system are being revealed. A carried out with ground propane dispensers at great deal of the cost is generated by the need Fairchild afb, Washington, has shown that re- to have almost error-free systems. Where liter- sults on a scale large enough to permit launch ally hundreds of passengers and a multi-mil- and recovery of aircraft can be attained. Test- lion-dollar aircraft are involved in a single ing is to continue. If a reliable ground system landing, no doubts as to the reliability of the can be devised, it should prove of considerable landing aids can be tolerated. value at a number of airfields where cold-fog It may be practical now to give more problems do not justify the cost of an airborne serious consideration to a carefully planned system. frontal assault on the fog itself. Though warm Fog Seeding Operation

The WC-130, primarily utilized for typhoon and hurricane reconnaissance, becomes an airborne seeding platform during fog-dissipation tests c o n d u c t e d in A laska a n d E u rop e. . . . Dry ice, chosen as the best proven freezing agent effective against supercooled fog, is brought aboard the aircraft in cakes and stored in cold chests until the operation begins. . . . Wfien the most advantageous area upwind from the intended target for clearing is reached, crushers process the dry ice to the proper seeding consistency. . . . The agent is then dispensed from the airborne system through a dropsonde chamber. 50 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

fog can be (iissipated only by “brute-force” in all attempts to apply these to solving spe- teehniques that are cumbersome and expen- cific operational problems, one point must be sive, there are situations vvhere such tech- kept clearly in mind: weather modification is niques might be a cheaper alternate solution going to grow step by step. Often these steps to a problem. In zero-zero landing systerns, will be very small and laboriously taken. At the stringent performance requirements for present the Science of weather modification is landing aids could be greatly relaxed if suffi- in a stage roughly equivalent to the aeronau- cient visibility were assured so that aircraft tical Sciences at the time the Wright brothers could be landed visually in the conventional made their historie flight at Kitty Hawk. In manner by a pilot. Incorporating a fog-modi- all probability it will be a considerable period fication capability into a zero-zero landing of time before the equivalent of an SR-71 system to provide a slant-range or forward comes off the weather-modification drawing visibility of at least 700-1200 feet not only may boards. To advance at all will require a will- be less costly but also may enhance the safety ingness to invest time and resources in efforts of the landing operation. An airborne capabil- that carry considerable risk of failure. itv to dissipate warm fog on a scale large Initially, weather-modification capabilities enough to permit uninterrupted airlift opera- are going to be crude and primitive and fre- tions of the type needed in Reforger/Crested quently so costly that only very careful esti- Cap may be within the state of the art. If means mates of their cost-saving features will prevent to improve visibilities to one-half mile can be their being summarily dismissed as impractica- made relatively inexpensive, they can be very ble. This will be compounded often by the useful at many airfields too small to justify even need to resort to statistical teehniques to esti- the landing aids needed to lower approach mate the results of their application. There is minimums to one-quarter mile. every reason to think, however, that with con- Some developmental work has been car- tinued research, carefully planned develop- ried out in the past three years, particularly ment, and conscientious operational testing, by the Naval Weapons Center and commercial these capabilities will steadily improve in organizations funded by the Air Transport power and value and will repay many times Association. Greater efforts are needed. over the effort and money invested in them. Scott Air Force Base, Illinois I n all work undertaken to develop opera- tional capabilities in weather m odification and TECHNOLOGY jj AND AEROSPACE POWER IN T H E 1970s

G en er a l Ber n a r d A. S chriever, USAF (Ret)

HE TITLE ‘Technology and Aerospace which these people considered provocative was Power in the 1970s” leaves the infer- our strategic superiority, which they thought T ence that somehow technology will dic- would induce or initiate action leading to new tate miiitary policy. I would like to correct weapon systems. The theory was that these that inference. While technology is vital, we new systems would tend to escalate the arms have to have the proper policy and the proper race, especially nuclear weapon systems. attitude at the leadership levei if we are to I will not argue whether these beliefs and have the necessary aerospace power. the actions taken in recent years on the basis During the past several years, we have of these beliefs were right or wrong. I will had a policy which has inhibited technology. leave it to your judgment to determine whether For the past eight years, we have had a very we have made any real progress toward a active policy leading toward a political dé- meaningful political détente. But the fact re- tente with the Soviet Union. I am sure no one mains that in recent years we have slowed quarrels with the basic idea of a détente be- down our progress- in miiitary technology as tween the United States and the Soviet Union. a result of the détente theory. What is debatable is whether a détente is Dr. John Foster, as Director of Defense actually possible and how we should go about Research and Engineering in the Office of the achieving it. Secretary of Defense, stated last year in his There were people who expressed the be- testimony before the Congress that financial lief as far back as the early 1960s that the support for technology had been steadily re- Soviet Union desired an accommodation with duced since 1964. Under this policy of re- the United States. They felt that if we could duced research and development, we have not only reduce cold war tensions by avoiding initiated any new weapon system programs. provocations with the Soviet Union we could Admittedly, we did begin a major program in fact achieve a détente. Among the things for the very large logistic transport aircraft.

51 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the C-5A, which is novv undergoing airbome was being done by the Defense community. testing. But we did not initiate any new stra- By comparison, there seems to be some tegic systems. As a result, we now have reached change in Defense policy under the new a condition of strategic parity with the U.S.S.R. administration. Secretary of Defense Melvin In one of his last statements before leaving Laird, on the tv program “Face the Nation,” oflBce, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford recently gave some very enlightening facts officially stated that we would arrive at strate- about what the Soviets had been doing to gic parity with the Soviet Union in 1969. strengthen their military posture. He stated, The advocates of political détente remain for example, that in the area of defense against very aggressive today—aggressive and ada- missiles the Soviets had been spending at the mant that their approach is the right one. rate of 3.7 dollars to every 1 of ours. And that Their aggressiveness is manifested in a num- this ratio equated to about 7 to 1 if the gross ber of ways, particularly in the stories we see national produet of the two countries was taken in the East Coast newspapers. Their attack on into account. Mr. Laird also stated that the the antiballistic missile ( abm) system is un- Soviets had maintained a substantial margin ceasing. Unfortunately, there are some vulner- over the U.S. in their recent expenditures on abilities in this system which make it a logical offensive systems. I think this is the kind of target for criticism. But, if they are successful factual information that the American people in blocking the deployment of this system, need to be told if they are to provide the right they will undoubtedly expand their attack to kind of recommendations to their political rep- include all other military developments as resentatives in Washington on matters of na- well. Their campaign includes constant ref- tional security. I think without question that erences to the so-called military-industrial the American people should express their be- complex. Hardly a day goes by without some liefs about national security, but they cannot article in the Washington Post and New York offer very sound opinions unless they have the Times on this subject. The articles in these essential facts. I was pleased that Mr. Laird papers and in some popular magazines as offered these enlightening facts to the Ameri- well contend that the military has done a can people on Soviet military programs. miserable job in designing and developing After the right policy has been adopted, new systems for national security, that cost its implementation depends upon the right estimates have been unrealistic, and that re- attitude. Hence attitude among leaders is ex- liability has been low. The purpose of these tremely important. Attitude can be described attacks has obviously been to undermine the in many different ways, but I would think that confidence of the American people in what a leader must exhibit a positive attitude, char- acterized by dedication, motivation, initiative, and innovation. Such a positive attitude is es- sential for leaders of groups and organizations in this dynamic technological age. The policy under which we have been operating during On 19 February 1969, Air University pre- the past seven or eight years has placed a senteei another Thomas D. White Lecture, considerable amount of inhibition on our lead- when General Bernard A. Schriever, former ers in technology who would normally have Commander of the Air Force Systems Com- a positive, can-do attitude. And the manage- mand, spoke on the subject “Technology and ment procedures governing Defense R&d and Aerospace Power in the 197Os.” Air Univer- systems acquisition have imposed additional sity Review takes pleasure in presenting an frustrations on those who had a positive atti- adaptation of General Schriever s views to tude. Instead of building hardware, the De- its readers. partment of Defense has conducted endless T he Editor studies. And the sense of urgency that existed during the Fifties in developing our ic bm TECHNOLOGY IN THE 1970S 53

force and getting us into space has all but for the future. Some areas promised major disappeared during the Sixties. breakthroughs or quantum jumps.® Let me cite examples from some of my The technological areas recommended for personal e.vperiences. The Thor, you will re- high-priority r & d were rather broad. One area call, was a medium-range ballistic missile. We was materiais; propulsion was another; aero- selected a contractor for the Thor in two dynamics was still another; and electronics in weeks’ time. Under present procedures, it its broadest sense was recognized and recom- vvould take a year or longer. In regard to the mended, along with nuclear weapons and Minuteman, which is now the backbone of lasers. I would like to address myself to a few our intercontinental balhstic missile ( ic bm ) of these, just two or three, because they are force, we had a similar experience. When I still, today, in 1969, the areas of highest po- first went to to discuss the tential. They still contain the promise of the Minuteman, no one had ever heard of an quantum jump that we used to talk about in ic bm with a solid propellant. But we gave a the Fifties. complete briefing on the planning and tech- Let us look first at materiais. Materials nical studies that we had carried out to deter- are basic to evervthing we build these days, mine the feasibility of such a missile, and especially to aeronautics and to aerospace. within forty-eight hours we had approval to Designers are always looking for lighter and go ahead with the Minuteman. stronger materiais and for materiais that can Initially, we were authorized only $50 withstand higher temperatures. In recent years million for the first year of the Minuteman there has really been a breakthrough in mate- program. We knew it would take $150 million. riais, particularly in boron filament compos- But we were betting that the other $100 mil- ites, carbon filament composites, and several lion would come, and it did. A year later, Gen- other advanced composites. They are stronger eral White called me in to ask me to knock and lighter than aluminum or titanium or a year off the Minuteman schedule. stainless Steel. Aircraft structural weights can That was the climate of the day and the be reduced by as much as 30 percent with the sense of urgency that existed during the use of these materiais. This weight advantage Fifties. has been thoroughly substantiated in the labo- In more recent years, the idea has been ratories. Detailed studies have been made by presented that we are on a technological both nonprofit organizations, like the rand plateau. Many of us who have spent our lives Corporation, and by industry. This kind of in technology simply cannot agree with that weight advantage really constitutes a major thesis. And I think the comments that I make breakthrough. As a matter of fact, it is prob- later will substantiate the fact that we are not ably the most important breakthrough in ma- on a technological plateau. Back in 1963 and teriais since the Bronze Age, and that was 1964 we made a massive study in the Air Force 3000 years ago. of the potential of technology—what we called Engine weights can also be reduced very a “technological forecast.” In other words, we substantially by thè use of these advanced tried to predict what technology could do, materiais in compressor blades, engine cases, what deficiencies it could fill, what improved and all odier parts that do not have to be sub- weapon capabilities it could provide during jected to high temperatures. the next five-, ten-, and fifteen-year periods. In addition, some high-temperature ma- The study was made by members of the gov- teriais have been developed, as well as new emment, both military and civilian, but the cooling techniques, which together allow for study group also included experts from indus- a very substantial increase in turbine operat- try and the academic community. Project ing temperatures. To name one example: the Forecast, as it was designated, recommended certain high-priority areas for r &d , recommen- °Editor’s note: General Schriever’s article entitled "Forecast” was published in Air XJniversity Review, XVI, 3 dations based on the greatest potential payoff (March-), 2-12. 54 AIR UNIVERS1TY REV1EW airplane vvith the highest performance today, for air-breathing engines? We have been strug- the SR-71, can fly at speeds of over mach 3 gling to design an aircraft that will fly at mach or more than 2000 miles per hour. It has a 3, three times the speed of sound. We are fac- turbine inlet temperature of 2200° F. With the ing many difficulties in our supersonic trans- application of some of the new materiais and port ( sst ) program. Throughout the program, cooling techniques, there is no reason why we the State of the art has been pushed to buüd an cannot raise inlet temperatures to 3000° F. aircraft that can fly at mach 3.2 economically If both the lightweight and high-tempera- for commercial use. With supersonic combus- ture materiais were used, engine designers tion, we can jump immediately from mach 3 to could give us engines with thrust-to-weight something like mach 6 to 10, meaning that we ratios (a measure of the efficiency of an en- would more than double the speed of our fast- gine) of over 20, as eompared with today’s est aircraft today. Theoretically, it is possible common thrust-to-weight ratios of ten or less. with supersonic combustion to attain speeds These more efficient engines would give us that are almost orbital. From a technical stand- substantial increase in fuel econoiny, or what point, the “aerospace plane” that we were talk- we call specific fuel consumption. ing about a few years ago—one that could take These more powerful and more efficient off on a runway and climb and propel itself into engines and the stronger and lighter aircraft orbit—may not be as farfetched as some people structures could be available during the Seven- then thought. I will not predict this kind of ties. I think it is just a matter of sooner or later, plane for the 1970s, but it certainly is techni- not “if.” In fact, the first applications are al- cally feasible and could very well be developed ready being made. For example, recently Lock- before the tum of the century. heed selected a Rolls Royce engine for its new People who have been advocating a slow- jumbo jet or airbus, the L-1011. Why? Because down in military r &d , who oppose the research Rolls Royce was using carbon filament com- necessary to give us supersonic combustion, pressor blades, which substantially reduce the often support their arguments by claiming that weight of the engine and give it considerable such r &d would be too costly. I disagree. I do growth potential. Since Lockheed made that not think that a valid case can be made for a decision, both of the U. S. jet engine manufac- reduction in research and development, or for turers, General Electric and Pratt & Whitney, reduction in the Defense budget as a whole, on have initiated programs to apply the advanced the grounds that defense costs are overstraining materiais in their new engines. I am sure we the national economy. Even with Vietnam, our will see these new materiais being introduced military expenditures have been less than 10 in an evolutionary process in the newer engines percent of the gross national product per year. that will soon be going into production. The 1970 budget is projected at $79 billion, and The second technological area that was that is 8.2 percent of the cnp. Economists agree identified in Project Forecast for high-priority that this is not an overwhelming burden on the r &d was propulsion. A vital goal to reach in pro- economy of a developed nation. The Soviet de- pulsion is supersonic combustion. All our jet en- fense budget is closer to 15 percent of the cnp. gines today bum their fuels at subsonic speeds, even though the aircraft may be traveling at supersonic speeds. The result is a great deal of W hat can we expect to see in drag in the inlet ducts because the air has to be the 1970s and ’80s? I think it is fair to say that slowed down in going through the combustion technology—available technology—could bring chambers. With supersonic combustion, this about a revolution in aeronautics. I imagine drag would be eliminated and engine efficiency this statement comes as a shock to many. would be significantly increased. Supersonic When we climb aboard the commercial trans- combustion has been achieved in experiments, ports of the day and cross the country in four both in and outside the laboratory. to five hours in parlor comfort, it is difficult What does supersonic combustion mean for us to imagine that we could be just enter- TECHNOLOGY IN THE 1970S 55

ing into a revolution in aeronautics. But we But as we begin to design very large aircraft must remember that the VVright brothers made for very long-range operations, the demand their first flight just a little over sixty years for nuclear propulsion will retum, and this ago. When í went through flying school in time I think it will be heeded. 1932, we flew in open cockpits, wore helmets Another area in which there could be with goggles, and tíed scarves around our revolutionary development in aviation in the necks. Snoopy didnt have anvthing on us at next decade or so is the short takeoff and all—we looked just like him. So, if we consider landing ( st o l ) aircraft. We have had the the progress that has been made since I technology to build st o l aircraft for quite entered flying school thirtv-six years ago, it some time, but we have not been able to build should not tax our imagination to foresee an economical or efficient one, for either com- revolutionary progress in the next thirty-one mercial or military use, except for very special- years, between now and the year 2000. When ized purposes. We are now entering a period I predict a revolution in aeronautics, I mean in which we can expect profitable, efficient, just that. high-performance st o l cargo aircraft. I know Let me give one example of how the revo- many airline executives who think that st o l lution might develop in regard to our new aircraft will be the next major development in logistics aircraft, the C-5A. This huge airplane commercial aviation. I am convinced that, if will weigh over 700,000 pounds fully loaded we include some of the new technologies in and wall carrv over 100,000 pounds of cargo materiais and propulsion in the next genera- 6000 miles, nonstop. With some improvements tion of st o l aircraft, we can have an accept- to the engines, such as I have mentioned, plus able one. I think we might also be able to the introduction of some advanced materiais develop an effective st o l tactical aircraft quite in the airframe, there is no reason why the soon, and eventually I am sure we will also be range of that aircraft could not be extended able to design one for strategic use. to 10,000 miles with an increased payload. There has been quite a debate about With the advent of these large, efficient, whether a requirement exists for an airplane and economical aircraft, we could have de- with hypersonic flight, that is, flight above velopments bevond airbome waming and con- mach 5. There is no doubt in my mind that trol to, perhaps, a mobile air defense System. a requirement does exist, both commercially Those who are familiar with our technological and militarily. Of course, one of the big prob- forecast will remember that we talked about lems with respect to the supersonic transport mobile air defense ( ma d ) and airbom e de- is that it will produce a sonic boom in excess fense. With large aircraft for command and of three pounds per square foot. That is com- control and with fighter aircraft similar to the pletely unacceptable for overland flight. But F-12, which would have a long-range radar a hypersonic airplane, flying at 150,000 feet, and long-range missiles on board, and with would create only a very low-order sonic tankers for airbome refueling, it would be boom that would be tolerable for overland entirely feasible to use a force of that kind to flight. That same hypersonic vehicle might sweep large air defense areas or to achieve also serve as a reusable booster for space flight. and maintain air superiority. In other words, The same propulsion technique could be ap- the mission of air defense for North America plied. And a reusable booster would be a could be extended to other areas. major step forward in economical space op- Taking a look at the aeronautical revolu- erations. tion from another direction, I foresee a re- If we could couple a reusable booster generation of interest in nuclear propulsion with a lifting body (i.e., a wingless vehicle for aircraft. We know that it is feasible to whose whole configuration develops lift), we build nuclear propulsion Systems for aircraft. could have controlled re-entry instead of to- There has been a lot of progress since the day’s retum to earth via ballistic trajectory, earlier program was canceled a few years ago. which has been the course followed by Gem- 56 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ini, Apollo, and other manned flights. A con- against missiles. But we do need to make a trollable or maneuverable re-entry vehicle start. We have been carrying on r & d for a long would add a great deal of operational flexi- time, and, as I said, we have made important bility. We know that, technologically, such advances in electronics applying to the abm vehicles can be developed. system. These technologies, however, will not We need still other capabilities in space. move forward aggressively unless there is the To our proven capability to rendezvous, we impetus and motivation of having an active need to add a rescue capability, a repair ca- system program and the continuing responsi- pability, a resupply capability, and a maneu- bility of improving the system. This responsi- verable re-entry capability. I call these the five bility has always been the key to progress. In Rs of space. They are all within our grasp, the ic bm program we started with the Atlas, from a technological standpoint. If we could a “soft” missile system. Within five years we develop a reusable booster and a maneuver- had progressed to the Minuteman in hard- able re-entry vehicle, we would be able to add ened silos and the sea-protected Polaris and a whole new dimension to space operations. Poseidon missiles. In other words, we must get The technology is in the laboratory; we need going in order to get there. In my opinion, we to push the application. need definitely to proceed with an antiballis- Another area of technology on which I tic missile system. would like to comment briefly is electronics. I am confident we can make the necessary Electronics was one of the areas identified by technological advances to give us an effective Project Forecast as having a high potential for abm system, possibly as early as the 1980s. development and deserving priority r &d . I We know that the Soviets are working hard to would like to expand the term “electronics” improve their existing system. And the country to include inertial guidance Systems, infrared that has an effective abm system will have a technology, and some laser applications. One tremendous advantage in the strategic balance of our most difficult technical problems in the of power. I would be very much concemed if Air Force is fínding and identifying targets and the Soviets had it and we did not. then being able to hit them accurately. This problem is particularly difficult at night and I hove that this discussion has pointed up the in bad weather. The answer to the problem very great potential for further development lies in some recent developments in electron- in the next two or three decades in the areas ics, especiaUy in infrared and laser technolo- of materiais, propulsion, and electronics. A gies. Our experience in Vietnam has taught survey of those other areas of technology us again that our ability to find and identify identified by Project Forecast would reveal targets is a pacing factor in the application of the same kind of potential, I assure you. In air power. We need to press forward vigor- short, we are not on a technological plateau. ously with developments in electronics rela- Technology remains extremely dynamic. It tive to this problem. holds tremendous challenge, tremendous prom- The state of the art in electronics also ise, and a very serious threat. The Soviets have has strong impact on cur abm system, with not slowed down their efforts to advance tech- particular emphasis here on infrared technol- nology. They have moved forward vigorously ogies and nonnuclear means for the destruc- in every area and with all the speed they can tion of warheads. Although most of the current muster. The advance of Soviet technology re- debate about the abm is more confusing than mains a threat. enlightening, the fact is that there are some If we are to get our technology moving soft spots in the system from the standpoint forward again, we must have a change in pol- of technology. It might be well for us to re- icy and attitude. I believe such a change is member that there never has been a 100 per- in the offing, judging from what Secretary cent effective defense system against aircraft, Laird has been saying recently. It is my obser- and we would be wise not to expect one vation that a feeling exists in the Department TECHNOLOGY IN THE 1970S 57

of Defense and in other governmental depart- ever, I would expect the fy 71 budget to place ments that under no circumstances can we substantially more emphasis on new weapon allow our technology to lag behind the Soviet systems. The levei of that emphasis will be Unions. influenced to some extent by Vietnam, unless That does not mean that \ve cannot nego- we have been able to bring that situation tiate with the Soivet Union to try to bring under control. about an end to the cold war or to reduce I might point out that other govemment world tensions. There is no reason why we agencies are entering into the field of research cannot advance our technology and negotiate and development. This is especially true of the at the same time. That is precisely what the Department of Transportation, the Depart- other side will be doing. ment of Housing and Urban Development, We should also recognize that the high- and the Department of Health, Education and risk r &d, which onlv the Department of De- Welfare. I am sure that any of you who have fense can justifv and carry out, applies not to go through the traffic jams in New York or onlv to our national security but also to our Washington or elsewhere will welcome addi- economy. Spin-offs from Defense research and tional r &d in these areas. Studies I have seen development greatly benefit oiu economy. in transportation, in ground systems as well as As for the change I predict in policy and air systems, have presented some fantastic attitude relative to technology, let me add the futuristic schemes. I am convinced that we will qualifier that some of the procedures, some see some of these in the next ten to twenty of the Systems, that have been put into opera- years. tion in recent years cannot be easily reversed Regardless, however, of the debate going or streamlined. After some twenty-odd years on now relative to investment in security around Washington, I have leamed that it is versus investment in domestic affairs, the na- verv difficult to unseat the bureaucrats. They tion will continue, in mv opinion, to support become entrenched and verv difficult to re- in increasing amounts the technology neces- direct. But I think there will be changes even sary for our national security. there, though it will take a little time to bring I am quite optimistic that we have tumed them about. Along this fine, do not expect the comer and that we are going to see tech- any immediate changes in the levei of Defense nology pursued in a more vigorous manner in resources being applied to technology. How- the future. Arlington, Virgínia HISTORY, VIETNAM, AND CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE

COLONEL WlLLTAM C. XlOORE

VER since the United States became involved in Vietnam, the strategy being followed has been debated from every conceivable angle. The hue E and cry often reached deafening proportions, with the press pointing the finger of blame in al) directions but specifically demanding °that the militarv devise a new strategy. These demands carried the connotation that the militarv was responsible for the strategy that failed. In rebuttal. a few voices fmainly militarv) pointed out that it was a civilian strategy', devised by civilians and executed by civilians, to include control of the smallest detail of military' operations. As in most debates, there is a bit of truth on each side. Perhaps more time must pass before the facts can be objectively sifted, coldly analyzed, and trans- lated into irrefutable conclusions by the Toynbees, Tolstois, and Morisons of the future. But what are the historians of the future likely to find in their search for facts upon which to base analvses? What will the periodicals of todav tell them.'1 How are they likely to categorize the person- cided on flexible response and simply sought alities involved, their philosophies, the forces out General Taylor in order to obtain support at play, the authority in contention, and the and give his strategy a military flavor. But this decisions made? is conjecture which is best left to the future In one arena, the military, the events have historian. been so continuous, so open, so widely publi- It is not historical conjecture, however, cized in the joumals of the world that the play that President Kennedy, by selecting the strat- and counterplay of military forces, their subtle egy of General Taylor, in effect accepted application in the power struggle, their threat- advice outside the active, organized military ened use, their actual use, hardly need the jell- establishment, outside his principal advisers, ing process of time to make sense. Thus his- the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In fact, this same body torians of the future are likely to view today s of military men had rejected General Taylors events in the military arena much as we now concept. President Eisenhower, Supreme Com- do. They are likely to find that there has been mander during World W ar II, rejected it. Yet a pattem, a sense of direction, a thread that the rejected concept suddenly became national traces its course throughout the period of war policy. Historians have no choice but to view and near war in which we live. this as fact. They are likely, for instance, in research- Historians will only be able to speculate, ing the current debate on strategy in Vietnam, however, whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to find that the military does have legitimate a corporate body would have recommended contentions that the strategy being followed is that flexible response should have been an- largely a civilian strategy and that the Controls nounced as U.S. strategy. Most certainly, there imposed by civilian authority have been re- is evidence in the joumals of the time that the strictive on military operations. The historian Joint Chiefs wholeheartedly supported such will also find, however, that the military is far a strategy; but supporting a decision once it from blameless. The basic strategy, the strat- has been made is quite different from recom- egy of flexible response, the strategy of gradual- mending the decision. History will undoubted- ism, was promoted and sold to civilian au- ly conclude, therefore, that the military cannot thorities by responsible military flnen. A quick disown entirely any responsibility for a con- review of the joumals of the years 1955 to cept of fighting a war that by all standards has 1961 should dispel any doubt that General been found wanting in Vietnam. Maxwell Taylor was the principal architect Why the strategy of flexible response has of the strategy of flexible response. This is been found wanting is not such a moot ques- well documented, and no analysis or conjec- tion to the historian as the debate implies. ture will be required by future historians to Some of the reasons for the predicament of set down as fact that General Taylor tried to Vietnam become apparent if the concept of sell his concept when he was a member of the flexible response is analyzed in the light of Joint Chiefs of Staff; that he was unsuccessful; historical events leading up to flexible response that General Eisenhower, then President, is and its impact on the enemy. How did the po- reported to have used the word “parochial” to tential enemy view this shift in U.S. policy? describe Taylors feelings; that General Taylor Did his subsequent actions reveal his views as left the Joint Chiefs and wrote a book; that he to our intentions in relation to possible actions continued to promote his concept; that Presi- he might take? What were his conclusions as dent Kennedy recalled him to active Service. to what might happen to him, what risks he Perhaps President Kennedy had already de- could take?

59 60 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

The historian must ask these questions in clear. He will find that at the end of World the light of the basic U.S. objective. This ob- War II the United States reduced its military jective, from a historical point of view, has capability to the point of impotence. The Soviet been and always will be to deter war and, Union initiated no corresponding reduction. hopefully, to eliminate war as an instrument of As a result, her strength in conventional forces national policy. In this light, the historian must vis-à-vis that of the United States became over- also recognize that the strategy to deter war whelming. The United States was confronted is quite different from the strategy to fight a by a situation in which the few nuclear weap- war once it starts. One strategy involves what ons available for use against the Soviet Union the potential enemy thinks is likely to happen would certainly wreak havoc, but the number to him, while the other is what actually does might not be sufficient to prevent the Soviet happen. Flexible response by its very nature Union from overrunning Europe. Furthermore, is associated with the latter—how to fight a there existed in the world and in most segments war after it starts. The whole concept revolves of U.S. society a moral compulsion against the around the theory that, in the nuclear age, use of nuclear weapons. wars must be managed and kept within ac- As a result of these factors, the power ceptable nonnuclear limits. To the historian position of the Soviet Union was sufficiently this may well be considered the first flaw in strong to permit exploitation by the leaders of the concept of flexible response, or at least the Communism. Accordingly, Soviet policy and official announcement that U.S. policy would actions during the period of 1946-48 were ex- be based on such a concept may be so con- tremely aggressive and gave every indication sidered. The historian will ask himself: Did that the Soviet Union intended to place all of not the announcement of such a concept re- Europe, and ultimately the rest of the world, move some doubts the aggressor had as to what under the red banner of Communism. Soviet might happen to him? Did not the announce- diplomacy was characterized by naked, often- ment carry with it the suggestion that the U.S. brutal force, rarely restrained by fear of effec- was attempting to find an acceptable strategy tive counter action by the United States. for war somewhat short of a nuclear strategy? The United States, reacting to this threat Did this not, in tum. carry with it the deep, and pursuing the objective of “peace through significant implication that the United States strength” (deterrence), forged a mighty nuclear- believed that nonnuclear war was inevitable? capable force, consisting primarily of strategic Analyzed in this light, in the light of the enemy air power, with which to confront the leaders reaction, the announcement that flexible re- of the Soviet Union unless they refrained from sponse would be U.S. policy could have no the use of force to support their plan to com- other effect than to convince would-be aggres- munize the world. sors that the U.S. was weakening its deterrent, that the risks of aggression were not as great, that caution was not so important. T he po l ic y of nuclear deterrence The historian will find that until the con- was successful. The leaders of the Soviet Union cept of flexible response became U.S. policy were deterred from initiating general war. many people firmly believed that considerable They were also deterred from overt use of progress had been made toward reducing the their forces in limited war for fear such a war likelihood of war. This hope of progress was would escalate to nuclear war. Soviet planners, based on the apparent fact that the existence in analyzing U.S. strength, realized that the of a capability for nuclear warfare was suffi- United States had no altemative except to use cient to deter war, to make it unthinkable, to nuclear weapons to prevent defeat in limited eliminate it as an instrument of national policy. war. The spectrum of wars likely to occur, In reviewing history as it pertains to the therefore, was compressed. The threat of Soviet philosophy of deterrence, a historian may find forces could no longer tip the balance in favor in the annals of time that the facts are quite of a Communist take-over. Winston Churchill HISTORY, V1ETNAM, AND DETERRENCE 61

attested to this fact when he expressed the view ence similar to Korea. No longer would the that if it vvere not for the existence of U.S. United States respond with undue restraint to nuclear power all of Europe vvould be under aggression by China or her proxies. No longer Communist domination. The Soviets under the would sanctuaries be respected. No longer threat of nuclear war vvere forced to temper would the United States lean over backward their probes against the West. No longer could to keep the war from escalating to the use of Soviet diplomacy remain untethered; no longer nuclear weapons. The U.S. would use all of could the Soviets risk the provocation of direct, its power if a situation like Korea erupted overt challenge. Soviet diplomacy vvas forced again. This impression was not lost on the to become less inflexible, less daring, more Communists, and the tactic of direct overt in- cautious. In fact. the Soviets vvere forced into vasion of one small nation by a Communist a policy of peaceful coexistence, a policv vvhich satellite vvas discarded. The spectrum of war gave promise that future relations betvveen the was compressed further. The Communists were Free World and the Communists vvould become forced further down the scale to find a type less of a dangerous polarity involving constant of aggression that was acceptable, not so risky risk of war and more of an equilibrium vvith as to provoke U.S. counteraction, not too so- adherence to diplomatic standards designed phisticated (so as to circumvent U.S. techno- to minimize the risk of war—to prevent the logical superiority), and, most important, a casus belli from arising because the conse- type of war in vvhich the U.S. threat to use quences of war would be disastrous. nuclear weapons would not be credible. The threat of nuclear war vvas undoubtedlv the major contributing factor to this tempering efiFect on Soviet diplomacy and Soviet aggres- .A t about the same time that the sive intentions. The Soviets realized that fur- Communists were searching for new ways to ther aggression by the Communists had to be expand their system by force, the United States, more covert, less provocative, less discemible having just concluded an election vvhich re- —aggression somevvhat lower in the spectrum sulted in a change in administration, suddenly of war. War by proxy appeared to be an ac- announced that flexible response vvould be- ceptable risk, and the invasion of South Korea come U.S. policy. In essence, the new policy by North Korea resulted. Here too the chal- as reported in the press of 1961 contained two lenge vvas met. North Korea was defeated. The main points: Communists were forced to escalate the war First, the policy of nuclear response vvould by the introduction of Chinese military units serve primarily as a deterrent to all-out general in order to salvage their original position. They war. Second, aggressions short of general war never quite succeeded. Shortly thereafter the should be deterred by creating powerful, bal- Communists sought to negotiate an end to hos- anced forces that could be used in flexible tilities. Many factors undoubtedlv influenced combinations. Response to aggression should the Communists to end the war short of be with only the amount of force needed to achieving any of the objectives for vvhich the stop the aggression. war had begun. Not the least of these factors Analyzed in relationship to history, an- was the fear that the United States was con- alyzed as to its impact on the enemy and its sidering the use of nuclear weapons and threat - impact on the basic U.S. policy to deter war, ening courses of action, the logical conclusion to eliminate war, the announcement couldn’t of which would be escalation to engulf Com- have come at a worse time. To a historian munist China. analyzing events in the perspective of past The war ended, and although there has United States policy, the sudden shift from an been constant bickering ever since, the one announced policy of massive retaliation to one impression that was created, the climate of of flexible response vvas an open invitation for opinion that has endured, is that the United the enemy to calculate U.S. intentions and States vvould not go through another experi- determination accurately. The shift told the 62 AIR UN1VERS1TY REVIEW

Communists things that many people believed of the contending parties will seek to negotiate would reverse the desirable trend toward less before the scope and intensity of the combat daring, more cautious action vvhich had com- escalate into a war of great magnitude. And pressed the spectrum of war to a very low the theory presupposes that both sides are will- order. The flexible response policy was an in- ing to fight to a draw or that one side is willing vitation to disaster, an invitation to the enemy to accept a Limited defeat both in combat and to test the policy. The policy of nuclear retalia- in the negotiations which follow. tion, on the other hand, had inhibited him from In regard to the effect on the enemy, is not trying something for fear that the response such a theory self-defeating? By accepting war would be overwhelming. as inevitable, do we not invite it? Does not History will reveal that, during the Eisen- acceptance of the nonnuclear, flexible response hower years when this country followed an theory only serve to convince the Communists announced policy of massive retaliation, we that the United States does not plan ever to were in reality following an unannounced pol- use nuclear weapons? And does this not in icy of flexible response. The historical events tum encourage the enemy to begin a war, of Lebanon, the Taiwan crisis, action in Laos, knowing the restraints imposed offer a gamble Vietnam, and Berlin—all support this view. In at odds favorable to him? History tends to other words, this country followed a grand support this conclusion. Since the announce- strategy involving a policy within a policy— ment of the policy of flexible response, Com- one political, the other military. It was an munist probes have been bolder and more ag- overall political strategy to deter war, to pre- gressive. Witness the Berlin wall, the subse- vent war, to eliminate it as an instrument of quent Berlin crisis, Cuba, the Dominican affair, Communist policy. It was a military strategy Vietnam, and lately the Pueblo incident. Iron- of response according to our desires, entirely ically, the Cuban crisis was resolved not by unpredictable to the enemy. the threat of flexible response but by President In the light of history, there is no conten- Kennedvs threat of retaliatory nuclear attack tion that it does not make sense to pursue a on the Soviet Union itself. policy of flexible response. But many people History, therefore, is likely to conclude believe that it did not make sense for the that previous U.S. actions in confronting the President to announce such a policy. Announc- U.S.S.R. in Europe, in meeting the challenge ing to the world that the U.S. would follow in Korea, in the Taiwan crisis, in Cuba, and flexible response only served to weaken the in other incidents forced the Communists to U.S. deterrent by informing the enemy that choose less intense, less provocative, less overt the political or grand strategy was being sub- forms of aggression. The specter of likely de- ordinated to the military strategy. Our sudden feat in major war or the risk that limited ag- shift could only mean that we were concemed gression would escalate to major war tempered with finding an acceptable strategy to fight a relations between the Communists and the war once it began, rather than a strategy to Free World. War, therefore, was less likely. deter war. We were in effect saying that war The casus belli was missing, and there existed cannot be eliminated as an instrument of na- a hope that war between major powers could tional policy; that war is an acceptable policy conceivably be eliminated as an instrument of if the fighting is kept within manageable pro- national policy. portions. The concept of flexible response and the This “managed war” theory was also say- manner in which it is being applied in Vietnam ing more. For one thing, the theory presupposes appear to reverse this trend. The fear is that that either side may accept defeat, even to the Vietnam has convinced the Communists that extent of losing large numbers of men and the United States is willing to engage in con- great quantities of materiel, rather than using ventional operations of considerable magni- all its available power, if necessary, to avoid tude, to impose self-restraints, and to use less defeat. The theory also presupposes that one than its full power against an aggressor. The HISTORY, VIETNAM, AND DETERRENCE 63

Communists can rightfully conclude, therefore, the world that the United States is willing to that the need for caution in diplomacy and in escalate—indeed will escalate in order to pro- the use of force to support political objectives hibit the aggressor from achieving his objec- has been lessened because the consequences tives—then we have taken a major step toward of miscalculation have been diminished. The a retum to a strategy of dynamic deterrence. pohcy of flexible response as a deterrent to the This willingness to escalate is the key to de- cautious probe, the disguised intemal uprising, terring future aggressions at the lower end of the undiscemible coup de main is not credible! the spectrum of war. This, I think, is why his- Whether our preoccupation vvith flexible tory will be kind to President Johnson and response has placed the United States govem- Secretary of State Rusk, because if we con- ment in a position from which it can never tinue to stand firm in Vietnam as they advo- retum to a strategy of dynamic deterrence only eated, then the world vvill have made incalcu- the enemy knows and only history vvill reveal. lable progress toward eliminating war as the It can be argued that the deterrent to the cau- curse of mankind. Why? Because any would- tious probe has been destroyed by the pro- be aggressor, the Soviet Union included, must longed nature and magnitude of the war in face the inescapable conclusion that the higher Vietnam. It can also be argued, and history a war escalates, the greater will be the military will tend to prove, that the theory of flexible advantage of the United States. The fear of response has not been applied as the theory escalation, therefore, is a definite advantage intends. The concept of flexible response re- to the United States. It is a tactical advantage quires the response to be rapid and in such in operations. It is a strategic advantage in the strength as to quicklv restore the situation to political struggle between the Free World and the previous status quo. The enemy should not the Communist World because it has a tem- only be stopped, he should be confronted with porizing effect, it creates doubt, it discourages such ovenvhelming force that he cannot pur- aggression. sue his original course of action successfullv If we had failed to stand firm in Vietnam, and therefore will abandon the effort, return- if we had sought to negotiate at any price, if ing to his original position. In other words, the we had announced, as some wish to announce, enemy must not be permitted to escalate at a that the United States will never again become pace within his capability and resources. This involved in a war such as Vietnam, then a re- mode of flexible response has not been applied tum to a strategy of deterrence would be well- in Vietnam. On the contrary, U.S. escalation nigh impossible. Progress toward eliminating has been gradual and at a pace the enemy can war would have been slowed. From the long- match; hence, the term “gradualism,” the con- range point of view, our willingness to esca- notation of which is a violation of the concept late to forestall success by the enemy, our of flexible response. willingness to continue fighting rather than But there is reason to believe that Ho Chi accept a disguised defeat at the Paris peace Minh would never have initiated action in talks, and the determination we have shown Vietnam had he vaguely suspected that U.S. are the only means of salvaging what was determination would escalate the war to its almost lost by the 1961 decision to announce current magnitude. There is also reason to be- a strategy of flexible response, a strategy of lieve that this lesson has not been lost on other how to fight rather than how to deter war. would-be aggressors. If Vietnam is a lesson to Bolling Air Force Base, D.C. Air Force Review

IN SEARCH OF AN AVIATION ENVIRONMENT MASTER PLAN

M ajor W llliam R. S im s

C aptain  ngelo J. C er c h io n e

From a perch well above the soldiers and artisans laboring on the walls, he sat with his plans before him, carefully noting the progress of the work. Fortifijing this place was not a simple undertaking —not as simple as had first been indicated by the council of elders. The census when taken proved that the plans for the outer walls had been in- adequate. Less than half the peoplc in the region tvould have been able to find shelter here. Below, the gangs of men struggled with massive stones which in the hands of his masons would become walls, gates and passageways. The work itself was relatively eastj. However, it was the long, interminable talks with the people who would ultimately occupy this place that he found monu- mentally exhausting, sometimes frustrating work. His thoughts turned to the still unfinished inner walls. Somehow within that defensive core true self-sufficiency had to be achieved. In addition to the palace and the temple which had long occupied this favored high ground, there was need for a cistern and a granary. It was enough to split a soldiers brain. He leaned his head back against a boulder and tried to remembcr a day when life had been simpler.

64 AN has come a long way since the days ing but a ring-wall surrounding the crown of M when his communities were ringed a hill.1 with walls and defense was the citys raison dêtre. Military reservations today are being In the years since the Greeks coined the surrounded by cities, and defense seems some- word polis, the character of warfare has how not directly related to the security of changed. In the process Toynbees citadel was neighboring communities. However, the evo- divorced from its urban core, and the two were lutionary force that severed the military man sent in separate directions. The core remained from his role as an urban planner is about to at stage center while its defensive shell was bring them together again. sent into the wings. Except for the frontier The United States is beset with urban prob- forts and seacoast defenses, military establish- lems that can only be solved by agencies work- ments in the United States were relegated to ing together at all leveis of government. So the more remote parts of the country. During pervasive are the effects of growth and change the past 75 years, Américas wars have been that the complexity of the situation has begun fought somewhere beyond its borders. Its to cast military men in roles with which they military camps became jumping-off places for are not entirely familiar. Daily they may be troops bound for distant fronts rather than found in eamest conversations with zoning fortresses charged with the immediate defense commissioners, Federal Aviation Administra- of a nearby city. This was no less true for the tion officials, mayors and town councilmen, nation’s emerging aviation arm. airport operators, school principais, city plan- The Air Force, with its mandate to train ners, sanitarv and highway engineers. These great numbers of men in the relatively new and conversations are as important to the survival risky art of flying, invariably selected base sites of a base as is its ability to defend itself against that lay far from neighboring towns. In point of an aggressor; but, unfortunately, these many fact, the present-day standard for a virgin base diverse yet interrelated activities have often limits siting to no closer than 15 miles but no been pursued in an uncoordinated manner. farther than 25 miles from its “support city.”2 This fragmentation of purpose may pose a very Fortunately, many of the sites originally chosen real danger to the future of Air Force bases. were among the best the country had to offer. Some of the changes taking place in the United By the late 1950s the Air Force was comfortably States, both on the ground and in the air, are ensconced on some 9.6 million acres of land indeed recasting the military’s role in urban that is currently worth $14 billion.3 Equivalent and regional planning. More important, such in size to Connecticut, Delaware, and New changes point to the need for a higher order Jersey, this land is composed of approximately of coordination among base agencies and be- 2900 separate sites, only a hundred of which tween base and town. have a flying mission. The historical precedent is there to be The trek into the wilderness may be near- studied, for at one time the city builders were ing an end, for the military is about to retum also the city protectors. No less an authority to its ancient role of deep involvement in city than Amold Toynbee reminds us of the original and regional planning. This stems partially purpose of the city: from the fact that Americans are buying more homes, and, like hyperactive bactéria in an Cities . . . were an exceptional form of human agreeable Petri dish, new communities are settlement, and their abnormality was signal- rapidly spreading outward from the old popu- ized and symbolized by the wall that demar- cated a primitive city’s diminutive area from lation centers. Generally speaking, the move- the vast surrounding countryside. Behind and ment seems to be in the direction of tlie Air within these physical defenses, a new form of Force’s once remote bases. social life could, and did, take shape. The In part, the predicament arises from popu- Greek word for city-poZi.s-originally meant a lation growth. During the Second World War, citadel, and this citadel might consist of noth- posters proclaimed that 160 million Americans

65 66 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW had gone to war. Today Americans number irrigation System. In its primary capacity it 200 million, and within less than a decade the moves people, and where people congregate— country will add another 40 million.'1 even momentarily—business flourishes. This The dramatic increase in population has economic growth always means better employ- been accompanied and compounded by several ment opportunities, and the newly employed other factors. In particular, the growing trend prefer to live closer to their jobs. The attrac- among Americans to leave the city for a home tiveness to airport employees of shortened com- in the suburbs is putting new pressure on the muting distances is one factor that influences remaining open spaces. In a book published home developers to encroach upon the lands last year, Air Transportation 1975 and Beyond: bordering an airport.7 Finally, it is only a mat- A Systems Approach, the root causes of the ter of time before the new settlers become fully city-to-country flight were identifíed. “Increas- acquainted with an airports almost continuous ing incomes and the automobile, abetted by aircraft noise. Here are the oil and water that the Federal policy that built roads and guaran- will not mix: unregulated urban growth and teed home mortgages, made possible the home jet noise. in the suburbs.”5 Once an appreciable number When confronted with the noise problem, of people had settled in an area, business and most people assume that Science will soon come industry would be attracted to this new market to their rescue. But the Jet Airaaft Noise Panei and labor pool. of the Office of Science and Technology has Into the suburbs and beyond the home- reported that development of a quiet engine steaders advanced, and no movement as vast is not even on the horizon.* as this could take place without affecting the With no hope in sight for a breakthrough rest of the country. Lewis Mumford, in his book in engine noise suppression, a second avenue The Urban Prospect, lashes out at the excesses must be explored: controlling urban growth which accompany the exodus now in progress: near airports. Recently, civilian aviators and planners have begun to stump for joint airport/ The upper-income group image of urban dis- community planning in the aviation magazines. persion is the green ghetto of the exurban com- munity, just far enough beyond the metropoli- A leading planning consultant, H. McKinley tan center and its spreading suburban belt to Conway, Jr., has called for such an approach: be able to zone its territory for housing at a . . the typical within-the-fence-only airport minimum density of one family to the acre. . . . master plan is a luxury we can no longer afford. Every year, . . . a million acres of agricultural For every airport, there must be an airport area land are taken over for housing, largely scat- plan which integrates the airport into the urban tered in green acres, and another million acres complex.”9 are withheld from farming through speculation At the heart of most area plans is one of and social erosion .8 two basic techniques for converting an airport In the aviation world, the civilian airports into a compatible neighbor. Airport manage- generally were the first to come in contact with ment (or community leaders) either may seek this latest wave of settlers. As airports are tra- to create a buffer between themselves and their ditionally located closer to the communities neighbors through the outright purchase of they serve than are Air Force bases, many air- surrounding acreage or obtain zoning protec- port owners and operators soon carne to realize tion through special legislation. that they were directly in the path of rapidly Although the first altemative is an expen- advancing communities. sive one, developers of jumbo jetports are Although the public initially considered seriously considering the land buffer option. the airport to be much like any other business, In fact, the Dade-Collier International Airport its effect is far more potent, for an airdrome in the Florida Everglades is large enough to close to a highway System helps to form a hold four of the nation’s biggest airports. transportation nexus. A dynamic component, As planned, Dade-Collier will cover 39 the airport has all the life-giving force of an square miles, and under a twin-county agree- AIR FORCE REVIEW 67

Aircraft Noise and Federal Housing Regulalions

Some years ago lhe Federal Áviation Adminislration sponsored a study by a civilian firm which was laler distributed by lhe Air Force as AFM 86-5, Land Use Planning with Respect to Aircraft Noise. The noise exposure as discussed in the report is interpreted in relation to expeeted response from residential communities; the concept of composite noise ratings (CN R) in noise measurenient is introduced also. A CNK is determ ined only after giving consideration to the basic variables, such as frequency of operations, lim e of day, aircraft gross weights, and runway utilization percentages. The CNR’s are then con- verted into one of three categories: Zones 1, 2, and 3. Each carries a verbal description of predieted reactions for the groups living within the described zone. Zone 1: Essentially no complaints would be expeeted. The noise may, however, inter- fere occasionally with certain activities of the residents. Zone 2: Individuais may complain, perhaps vigorously. Concerted group action is possible. Zone 3 : Individual reactions would likely include repeated vigorous complaints. Con- certed group action rnight be expeeted. The Federal Housing Administration (FH A ), in a letter to field offices, eoncurred that “. . . areas falling into the classification of Zone 3 . . . are not acceptable for proposed new residential development.” The letter stated that under certain conditions mortgages for homes in Zone 2 would be underwritten. Commanders should thoroughly investigate the conditions set forth in FHA Underwriling Letter Number 1989, dated April 16, 1965, for complete details. In order for local FHA field offices to be aware of those factors which will adversely affect m arketability (the key determ inant influencing the FHA’s decision to grant or with- hold assistance), the commander or his representative must ensure that a copy of the air- craft noise intensity study has been transmitted to the proper FHA representative. It would be equally prudent to have copies of this document sent to the FAA and to zoning boards at each levei of jurisdiction.

ment it will be zoned for aviation use three bases whose primary mission involves flying, miles beyond the boundaries of the jetport only 11 have sufficient acreage to qualify as proper, malcing a total of 51 square miles de- containers of noise. Excluding Eglin and Ed- voted exclusively to aircraft operations.10 As wards afb’s (464,980 and 301,000 acres respec- the Honorable Earl M. Stames, vice-mayor of tively), the other 98 bases average only 6400 Metropolitan Dade County, has pointed out: acres.12 “Dade-Collier has not only been planned to There is another reason for possessing contain aircraft and allied industries, but to such large tracts of land: to exclude high- serve as a Container of aircraft noise.”11 density housing from a potentially dangerous area. According to the Directorate of Aero- space Safety, in a report entitled “Summary of How well do usaf bases stack usaf Aircraft Accidents in Vicinity of Airfields up as “noise containers”? Not too well. De- 5 Mile Zone,” almost ten percent of all aircraft pending on a number of factors, it would take accidents happen within an air base’s control somewhere in the neighborhood of 20-30,000 area. Based on 174 usaf accidents in 1960-64, acres of land to embrace w'hat the bioenviron- the report leaves no doubt about this high- mental engineers define as “Zone 2” a n d “Z o n e hazard area for dwellings, and it concludes 3” noise leveis (see box). Of the 100 usaf with the recommendation that “. . . base com- takeoff

Figure 1. From a study of USAF aircraft accidents in 1960-64, the Directorate of Aerospace Safety plotted the location of 174 accidents within 5 miles of air bases. The approaches to run- ways took the greater toll—66 on Ianding, 32 on takeoff—while 39 more mishaps occurred within 2% miles of the bases. Obviously these areas especially should be Ianding kept free of high-density housing.

manders use this summary as a basis for dis- States, it seeks to promote the health, safety, couraging local civil authorities from approv- and general welfare of the county’s inhabitants ing zoning requests for housing and commer- by preventing the creation or establishment cial enterprises in areas along the extended of airport hazards as public nuisances.14 This centerline of runways for at least two and one ordinance was probably adequate for its task half miles.”13 (See Figure 1.) in 1957, when the airports subject to its pro- Recently, the study was used for just that visions were surrounded by desert or agricul- purpose by a southwestem Air Force base tural lands. The county has since had a phe- seeking to secure the support of its local com- nomenal rate of growth (second in the nation), munity council in countering the threat of and the nearby desert and farms are fast dis- urban encroachment. Alarmed by the report appearing beneath concrete and asphalt. that work was soon to begin on a housing If lives, property, and the public invest- development a short distance from the base, ment are to be safeguarded by zoning, its the commander advised local offi ciais of the definition of hazards must be broadened to predictable aftereffects. They held meetings to include the effects of urban encroachment. investigate the matter thoroughly. The bases To remedy the shortcomings of the county zoning protection flows from a county airport ordinance, the base commander suggested to zoning ordinance, enacted in 1957. Similar to city and county officials that the area sur- many such ordinances in effect in the United rounding the base be zoned for low-density AIR FORCE REVIEW 69

housing—one house every one or two acres. “At what point in time will the constricting This recommended low-density belt (seven urban matrix cause the flying mission to be and three-quarter miles long by two and one- outlawed?” half miles wide) encompasses the high-hazard Obtaining the necessary research data area identified in the Directorate of Aerospace was a simple matter. Each of the 12 nearby Safetys five-year study. Further, the suggested communities had commissioned studies to revision emphasizes that this same area is also guide their long-range development. Several subject to Zone 2 and Zone 3 leveis of noise were little more than inventories of commu- intensity. nity resources, but most of them discussed in In this particular instance the classic text- detail projected population growth and even- book solution is being sought. Fortunately, tual use of the surrounding land area. Put the commander and his staff recognized the together in mosaic fashion, a composite map incipient encroachment trend in time to take encompassing some 500 square miles graph- action, and they found local agreement that ically draws attention to the future growth the bases recommendations were sound and intentions of the region. (See map, page 70.) that the base had the welfare of its neighbors In recent years, two urban corridors ex- at heart. At this writing the ordinance revision tending froni the metropolis to the east have has not yet been approved, but the progressive begun to converge on the base in a pincerlike spirit manifested by both the base and its movement. According to all the urban studies neighbors exemplifies this important lesson: consulted, the area surrounding the base is timely urban planning is the foundation of one of three major areas in the region in tomorrow’s successful community relations. which future population expansion should be expected. At the predicted rate of growth, the base has only five to ten years before nearby W hex the trend toward urban en- communities begin to crowd into its high air- croachment is ignored, the problem may be- craft disaster potential areas and intense noise come a much more difficult one. For when zones. poor planning allows two community sub- Not all the base’s problems are so far off. systems (e.g., a base and a housing develop- Plans are being considered to open a university ment) to become entrenched in a situation branch campus next year a mile from the pe- in which only one can survive, the resulting rimeter fence and well within the Zone 2 noise conflict may cause untold hardship for the intensity pattem ( estimated enrollment by entire region. Only recently has it been ac- 1985: 36,000). Farther south a satellite airport cepted that cities, like the men who built anticipates within the next five years a fleet them, can sicken and die. Restoring health and of some 300 permanently based light aircraft. vigor to a stricken community or base is surely To further complicate the situation, plans are a herculean task. On the edge of the Sonoran being made to use this facility as a training Desert, for example, an Air Force base is now site for large commercial jet aircraft (mainly receiving such intensive treatment. Its history for “touch and go’s”). This could lead to a dan- sheds light on the collective efforts necessary gerous airspace problem, since our air base has to improve what is fast becoming a hostile over 200 jet fighters in combat crew training. environment caused by the urban growth in If disregarded, this situation would lead to its direction. an easily predictable outcome. However, from First indication of the potential threat to the moment the Urban Encroachment Study the base (referred to in a recent issue of the defined the problem, it was apparent that an Review15) carne in a report entitled, Urban enlightened solution would require a fully co- Encroachment Study, 1968-1990,16 which ordinated staff effort. For this reason a Com- sought to project future growth trends of the munity Relations Advisory Committee was communities surrounding the base. The study formed. Chaired by the wing vice commander, was primarily concemed with the question, it has as permanent members the base com- 70 AIR UN1VERS1TY REV1EW

mander, deputy commander for operations, number of other interested individuais. In base civil engineer, and the heads of the legal, addition, briefings were given to several key safety, and information offices. A wing sup- transportation committees inquiring into the plement to afr 190-20, “Community Relations future needs of aviation in the State. Program,” reqnires all base agencies to inte- To secure the greatest possible legal pro- grate their activities into the overall wing com- tection, the committee is also investigating munity relations program.17 the possibility of having the county zone the An interdisciplinary group is charged with areas beneath the runway approaches for low- the formulation of long-range community re- density housing. It is within these same ap- lations plans, and it has within its membership proach limits, the Directorate of Aerospace the expertise to carry out those plans. It Safety emphasized, that 56 percent of all the amounts to an urban planning board which is base-side aircraft accidents occur. actively seeking to communicate with all local Since the cluttering of local airspace is organizations on the future of the base and part of a broader problem stretching beyond the community. State borders, the base joined with several To launch its broad-gauged community State agencies to host a symposium on the relations program, the committee sent copies need for master-planning the aviation environ- of the Urban Encroachment Stucltj to city and ment; a second symposium is planned for county zoning authorities, the state’s depart- . Out of that first symposium ment of aeronautics, the communities that grew a movement to create a State air trans- were inadvertently fostering the encroach- portation master plan and the necessary legis- ment problem, legislators representing the lation to make it possible. affected areas. higher headquarters, and a As with the earlier case study, a quick fix

Unrestricted housing construction within Zones 2 and 3 and in the potentially high aircraft disaster areas (much of which falis within Zone 3 along the extended center lines of the runways) would surely produce an outcry from affected residents occupying those lands. Real estate will be increas- ingly in demand as area population more than doubles by 1985 and townships fill the remaining open land. Aircraft using will disturb residents in commu- nities D and M, and increasing traffic at airport L must share airspace with jet fighters of the base. A university campus (crosshatch) will soon be

tone 1 AIR FORCE REVIEW 71

is not anticipated because of the variety and at the local and regional leveis dictates an complexity of the interests involved. The early formulation of a base policy guidance course set for the base may not bear fruit for group. One useful approach has been the Com- a number of years, but it offers the hope of munity Relations Advisory Committee men- ultimately being able to achieve a rational tioned earlier. This group focuses attention solution with the help of local citizens and directly on the “total community” aspects of community agencies. While it is too early to the bases existence. It does so not only by con- be able to pass judgment on the eífectiveness stantly evaluating its position vis-à-vis those of this particular program, the integrated who share the surrounding ground and airspace broad-spectrum approach is worthy of emula- but also by continually examining its spiritual tion on an Air Force-wide basis. Certainly the and psychological links with its neighbors. Fur- problem is becoming that vvidespread. ther, this group eould establish base “identity” The danger always in sounding alarms is concepts appropriate to present and projected to be regarded as either a Chicken Little or a missions. It eould periodically assess the base Cassandra and summarily dismissed. Yet one and all its activities in relation to its position need only awaken from the dream that there within the total local and regional fabric. still exists a frontier America of inexhaustible Once the bases policies have been defined resources to realize that the problems are rap- and the activities of participating agencies idly multiplying while the options are steadily have been orchestrated, specific objectives and dwindling. Happily, the continent is still a guidance might be given to such specialized plastic médium that can be molded, but time groups as the Real Property Resource Review may allow it to solidify before its man-made Board. This board is charged with solving deformities can be eliminated. zoning problems and with maintaining liaison with phvsical environment planners. Other agencies as well would receive their mandates from the advisory committee, for at the very I n the two case histories discussed, core would be a master plan that enunciates a variety of techniques were employed to solve goals based upon a full understanding of the looming urban problems. Of these, which ele- total physical and psychological setting. Such ments should a basic- program contain? comprehensive planning is vital if the base is The single step which more than any other to accomplish its mission without antagonizing will determine how soon (if ever) a base will the public, upon whom the Air Force depends have homes sidling up to its perimeter fence for support. is the accomplishment of an encroachment Many of the individual projects we have study. Depending upon the installation, this mentioned were established in response to a can be as simple as a chat with the town clerk particular set of circumstances. How far the or as complex as the 60-page study mentioned Community Relations Advisory Committee earlier. It should be remembered that this may wish to pursue public education programs regional survey plots the occupation of land or cooperative association with the military by home owners against time; but without an and civilian aviacion communities will have to accompanying jet aircraft noise intensity study be determined by the local situation. Once the it is meaningless. The base bioenvironmental interdisciplinary advisory committee has been engineer has the capability to perform this formed and the basic survey of the local en- Service; in fact, the study should be on file as vironment has been made, any number of part of the installation’s master plans. The major or minor variations may be employed. combination of the two studies will aíford an It is the integrated committee approach accurate picture of the extent of encroachment which is most important, for in years past each around the base. agency went its own way in dealing with prob- Whether these studies indicate trouble lems peculiar to its discipline. Like the seven ahead or not, the pace at which change occurs blind men examining the elephant, each had 72 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

a narrow view of reality. Hence, the flight mission of safeguarding the liberties of some safety people made an in-depth study of the 260 million Americans. incidence of aircraft accidents within five The time is at hand for the Air Force to miles of the base; the information office staff take its position in the vanguard of the move- devised programs to explain to the public that ment for comprehensive long-range urban and aircraft noise is a modem-day necessity; the regional planning. To do so would be to pro- civil engineer updated the base master plans tect the publics investment in its air arm and once a year to satisfy an outmoded regulation; to ensure that the Air Force of tomorrow will the base commander met with local organiza- possess a system of bases unfettered by de- tions and tried to win a new, critically needed bilitating urban problems. bridge or replied repeatedly to official nui- sance complaints; the flight facilities officer From his office near the flight line, he sat with the sought to protect his airspace from constant base master plans before him, noting the work his assault by commercial jets, parachutists, crop office had nurtured through to completion. Serving dusters, and balloonists; and the legal officer the new mission was not a simple undertaking—not prepared a defense for a newly enacted zoning as simple as had flrst been indicated by headquar- ordinance because a local Citizen rightly or ters. First, it was the new construction for that wrongly felt that it was an abridgment of his behemooth the C-5, and then carne the V/STOL rights. This cannot be the way in which the requirement. And all of it had to be shoehorned into 6400 acres. worlds most modem Air Force will step into the coming decades. His thoughts turned to the newly enacted regional zoning ordinance. The best of many thousands of The America of the 1970s and ’80s will be years of mans experience in learning to live to- bigger, more complex, wealthier, more excit- gether with other men went into its making. He ing—and a dozen other positive or negative could not help smiling as he thought of this superlatives. Civilian aviation will be seeking achievement which he and the base urban planning some 800 new airports to add to the 10,000 group had brought off. With that kind of creativity already in operation. Certain segments of the available to the world, who need be afraid of the aviation industry are predicting a 400 percent twenly-flrst century with its billions of people? He increase in business within a decade. And in leaned his head back and laughed aloud, exulting the midst of this tumed-on country will be the in his strength, and tried to remember a day when life had been more heautiful. United States Air Force with its continuing Luke Air Force Base, Arizona

Notes 1. Amold Toynbee, ed., Cities of Destiny (: McGraw-HilI Book Company, 1967), p. 13. 9. H. McKinley Conway, Jr., “Crisis in Airport Planning,” 2. "Site Selection (New Bases),” Air Base Master Plan- Airport World, I, 2 (), 50. ning Manual, AFM 86-6, February 10, 1959, Chapter 6, pp. 10. Earl M. Stames, "Airport Operation and Urban Plan- 35-37. ning,” Master Planning of Airspace: A Total Systems Approach, 3. William Marlow, realty specialist, Hq USAF, an inter- p. 72. view, June 1968. 11. From a personal conversation during the symposium 4. Leslie L. Thomason, "Manna in the Marketplace: Con- sponsored by the Arizona Department of Aeronautics, Arizona straints in the System,” Master Planning of Airspace: A Total State University, and Luke Air Force Base, 26 . Systems Approach (Verbatim), . 1968, p. 7. 12. “Guide to Air Force Bases,” Air Force and Space 5. Bemard A. Schriever and William W. Seifert, Air Digest, , pp. 182—96. Transportation 1975 and Beyond: A Systems Approach, Report 13. “Summary of USAF Aircraft Accidents in Vicinity of of the Transportation Workshop (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Airfields 5 Mile Zone,” Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Deputy Press, 1968), p. 4. The Inspector General, USAF, Norton AFB, Califórnia, Study 6. Lewis Mumford, The Urban Prospect (New York: No. 21-65, pp. 1-2. Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1968), pp. 130-31. 14. Airport Zoning Ordinance, County of Maricopa, State 7. Airports like New York’s John F. Kennedy International of Arizona, p. 1. may have as many as 37,500 employees. At both military and 15. Ângelo J. Cerchione, “A Case for Continuity,” Air civilian airports, such a group becomes the spearhead of urban University Review, XX, 3 (March-), 39. encroachment. 16. Urban Encroachment Study, 1968—1990, Office of 8. "The Alleviation of Jet Aircraft Noise near Airports,” Information, Luke AFB, Arizona, August 1968. U.S. Office of Science and Technology, , quoted by 17. “Community Relations Program," AFR 190-20, Luke Schriever and Seifert, op. cit., p. 28. AFB Supplement 1, 21 August 1968, para 3b-5. Military Affairs Abroad

A NEW CHIEF FOR THE SOVIET AIR FORCES

H arbiet Fast Scott

OR the first time in tvvelve years the Soviet takhov was put in the number two aviation F Air Forces have a new Commander-in- role. The then First Deputy Commander-in- Chief. In March 1969 Marshal of Aviation Pavel Chief of the Air Forces, 63-year-old Marshal Stepanovich Kutakhov replaced Chief Marshal of Aviation Rudenko, was transferred to a new of Aviation Konstantin A. Vershinin as head of assignment as head of the Gagarin Air Acad- the worlds second most powerful air force. emy.1 (On the army side, the famed General Marshal of Aviation Kutakhov, 54 years Shtemenko was made Chief of Staff of the old, reached his present position after a mete- Pact Forces two vveeks before the oric rise during the past three years. In 1966 invasion.) he was a tvvo-star general-lieutenant, assigned Eighteen months after gaining his third as Commander of Aviation for the Odessa star, Kutakhov was again promoted, in Feb- Military District. The next year he was trans- ruary 1969. to become a Marshal of Aviation.2 ferred to Moscow—the “center”—to the post A month later it was learned that he had of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air moved up to take over as Commander-in- Forces. In this move he picked up a third star, Chief. There was no formal announcement in denoting the rank of a general-colonel. the Soviet press of Marshal Vershinin’s retire- \ot long before the Soviet invasion of ment from that position. Red Star, the official Czechoslovakia, by one of the strange coinci- Soviet military newspaper, carried an item on dences that abound in the Soviet Union, Ku- March 19, 1969, that at first glance appeared

73 74 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW to be a routine news item. It listed the sênior gator of the U.S.S.R. These awards are “for Soviet guests at a reception held at the Mon- special Service in mastering aviation equip- golian Embassy on the previous evening cele- ment, for a high showing in training and edu- brating the 48th anniversary of the Mongolian cating flying cadres, and for many years of People’s Army. Among the guests vvas “Com- continuous flying safety records.”5 mander-in-Chief of the Air Forces of the Kutakhov is a World War II fighter ace, U.S.S.R., Marshal of Aviation P. S. Kutakhov.”3 with 13 German aircraft individually confirmed This is often the way in which the outside as destroyed and 28 additional assists in de- world leams of changes in the Soviet political- struction.u During that war—the Great Patriotic military structure, through some obscure press War, as the Soviets call it—he served on the announcement that lists a new name in a posi- Karelian front, where in 1943 he commanded a tion previously held by someone else. squadron in the 19th Guards Regiment of the Kutakhovs predecessor, Chief Marshal of 7th Air Army. Aviation Vershinin, had occupied the Com- Along the Karelian front the Soviet Union mander-in-Chief position since 1957. In fact shared a border with Norway. One can conjec- Vershinin, now 69, had also served in that ture that during that time Kutakhov was at- position from 1946 to 1949, being moved to a tempting to protect American ships carrying job in National pv o (air defense) when Stalin supplies into the Soviet port of Murmansk. put Marshal of Aviation Zhigarov in command This was a primary route for supplies sent to in anticipation of forthcoming Korean events. the Soviet Union by her two main allies, the Vershinin, one of the worlds sênior airmen, United States and Great Britain. The huge has spent a half century in Soviet aviation, convoys, assembled in Britain, were escorted beginning his air career during the Civil War through the North Sea by British and Cana- of 1919. dian naval forces, since the greater part of the Kutakhov has yet to be promoted to Chief United States Navy was engaged with the Marshal of Aviation, which ranks higher than Japanese in the Pacific. These convoys were the four stars of Marshal of Aviation or Gen- under attack by wolf packs of German sub- eral of the Army but somewhat below Marshal marines as well as by surface raiders as the of the Soviet Union. At the present time ships neared German-occupied Norway. After there are three Chief Marshals of Aviation in that, the convoys carne under attack by Ger- the Soviet Union. One of the most sênior is man land-based aircraft until they got within Novikov, head of the Soviet Air Forces during range of Soviet fighter protection in the Mur- World War II and imprisoned by Stalin after mansk area. Between March and July 1942, that war. He was “rehabilitated” after Stalin’s over one-fourth of all U.S. ships sent to death and now is Commandant of the Civil Murmansk were sunk before reaching their Air Fleet Academy. Another is Chief Marshal destination. of Aviation Golovanov, former head of Soviet Kutakhov made good both as a command- Long Range Aviation, whose present position er and as a fighter pilot. By May 1943 he is unknown. As to the position of Chief had received the award “Hero of the Soviet Marshal of Aviation Vershinin, he will remain Union,” one of the first Soviet Air Force offi- on active duty for life, since there is no pro- cers to be singled out for this decoration in vision for retirement in the Soviet Armed World War II.7 Also he was transferred to be- Forces beyond the 4-star rank. ' come commander of the Red Banner Guard s Commander-in-Chief Kutakhov is well Fighter Regiment of the 7th Air Army. known in the Soviet Union for his airmanship. Kutakhovs regiment was engaged in fly- In 1966 he, along with 30 other Soviet officers, ing fighter cover, in Yaks and LaGGs, for the was awarded the honorary title of Distin- lower- and slower-flying Sturmoviks. During guished Military Pilot of the U.S.S.R., and at the first day of their counteroffensive against the same time six navigators were awarded the German positions, in October 1944, the regi- honorary title of Distinguished Military Navi- ment’s pilots flew as many as a dozen indi- MIL1TARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 75

vidual sorties. According to Soviet accounts, in-Chief of the Soviet Air Forces on the basis during the first escort mission of the day of his military abilities alone. His political the Sturmoviks were jumped by 18 Me-109s. promotions must parallel his military promo- Kutakhov was leading the Soviet fighter escort tions. Although little is known about Kutak- of S aircraft, which pressed the attack against hov’s participation in the affairs of the Com- the Messerschmitts. The German attack was munist Party, he was a delegate to both the broken, Kutakhov claiming one Me-109 and XXII and the XXIII Congress of the Com- his flight four others.8 munist Party of the Soviet Union ( cpsu),10 From the Yaks and LaGGs that Kutakhov and it can be assumed that he has served at flew in World War II. the Soviet Air Forces various leveis in Party activitics within the have progressed to entirely different air weap- Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, for ex- on systems. In August 1968, on the occasion of ample. His predecessor, Marshal Vershinin, is Soviet “,” Kutakhov described a mcmber of the Central Committee of the the Soviet Air Forces as follows: Communist Party, a political position almost inherent to the military position that he oc- Owing to the equipment with new arma- cupied. As for Marshal Kutakhovs political ments, including nuclear vveapons, the fire- beliefs as a member of the Communist Party, power of each combat plane was increased. That which in the years of the Second World his article in the December 1968 issue of War was beyond the power of large aviation Aviation and Cosmonautics should be care- formations, in our day can be resolved by a fully studied. At that time the future Com- group of a few airplanes. Our long range avia- mander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air Forces, tion, in cooperation with the Strategic Rocket echoing the Party line, wrote: Troops and the Navy, can carry out effective strikes on important enemy objectives both on We live in a complicated and strenuous land and on the ocean expanses which are time, a time uf great social achievements and located quite far from our borders. This kind of high tension in the class struggle on a of aviation has every possibility for waging worldwide scale. The dirty war of the U.S.A. combat actions on a global scale. in Vietnam, the middle-eastern adventure of The aircraft in frontal aviation can suc- Israel, the sinister military-political union of cessfully destroy small-sized objectives and, in the U.S.A. and the Federal Republic of Ger- cooperation with surface-to-air missile units, many in Europe—these are the most striking protect troops from strikes from the air. Mod- examples of the aggressive intrigues of impe- ern military transport aviation can transfer rialism in different parts of the world. troops and different combat equipments, in- However, the imperialist aggression is suf- cluding artillery weapons, rockets, armored fering one failure after another. In our day the transports and tanks, by air, over enormous indestructible world socialist system has be- distances and at great speed. come the decisive force of social development. Aviation rocket equipments are constantly Imperialist forces, and first of all the imperial- improving. Modem new kinds of guided avia- ists of the U.S.A., are losing hope of stopping tion rocket projectiles and winged rockets have the powerful march of socialism by military been created. Supersonic rocket-carriers can means, so they -are more and more banking carry out nuclear rocket strikes on objectives on ideological diversion. The whole enormous from a great distance without entering the air apparatus of anticommunist propaganda is di- defense zone of the enemy. Modem radar Sys- rected now toward weakening the unity of tems of rocket guidance, intercept stations and socialist countries, the international communist radiotechnical systems allowing the release of and workers’ movement, setting off one social- rockets and the dropping of bombs from great ist State against another and tearing them away heights as well as from extremely low altitudes, from the Soviet Union. at maximum speeds, day or night, in ordinary How dangerous the ideological diversion or in bad weather conditions, are found in the of imperialism is was clearly shown by the armaments of aviation.0 development of events in Czechoslovakia. The counterrevolutionary and right-wing forces in An officer does not become Commander- this country, under the flag of fighting for 76 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

“democracy,” unleashed a furious campaign readiness, must be uncompromising struggle against the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia with enemy ideology in all its manifestations.11 and its leading role, against the basis of the socialist government in Czechoslovakia. Seizing But what of China? Interestingly enough, means of mass propaganda, they used these this major threat that Kutakhov’s fighters and means for unbridled antisocialist demagogy, for bombers may face during the next decade is undermining friendship with the Soviet Union not mentioned in his article. Soviet political- and other socialist countries. Over Czechoslo- military spokesmen explain the fighting along vakia hung the real threat of losing socialist the Sino-Soviet borders as the work of a gains. And only the fraternal aid of the Soviet Chinese military dictatorship and the person- Union and other socialist countries saved the ality cult of Mao Tse-tung. Communist doc- Czechoslovakian people from this threat. trine does not recognize conflicts between Events in Czechoslovakia once again have shown that the ideological struggle is an acute “fraternal socialist countries.” class struggle where there is not and cannot be Marshal of Aviation Kutakhov has taken neutrality. V. I. Lenin wrote that “this is the command of the Soviet Air Forces at a very only question: bourgeois or socialist ideology. criticai time in Soviet history. Well-known There is no middle course . . And here the World War II leaders have been retiring for conclusion was made: “Therefore amj belittling several years, and this change has now begun of socialist ideology, amj moving away from it to affect the highest leveis of the military thus means strengthening bourgeois ideology.” hierarchy. What effect this will have on the Our answer to the subversive activities and in- future posture of the Soviet Air Forces is yet trigues of the imperialists, in addition to the to be seen. further raising of the vigilance and combat M cLean, Virgínia

Notes 1. V. Yezhakov, Colonel, and V. Cheremnykh. "The 7. S. A. Krasovsky, Marshal of Aviation, editor, Aviation Anniversary of the Great Vietory,” Sfilitary Histonj Journal, and Cosmonautics U.S.S.R. (Moscow: Military Publishing House No. 10. 1968, p. 87. of the Ministry of Defense, U.S.S.R., 1968), p. 541. 2. Red Star, February 23, 1969. 8. Across the Fiords, p. 109. 3. Red Star, March 19, 1969. 9. P. S. Kutakhov, General-Colonel of Aviation, “Guard 4. A. A. Grechko, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Minister of the Peaceful Sky,” Izcestia, August 18, 1968. of Defense, U.S.S.R., "About the Projected Law on General 10. XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Military Obligation,” Pravda. , 1967. Union and XXIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 5. Aviation and Cosmonautics, No. 10, 1966, p. 2. Union (Moscow: Political Literature Publishing House, 1961 6. Collected authors, Across the Fiordx (Moscow: Military and 1966), list of delegates. Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense, U.S.S.R., 1964), 11. P. S. Kutakhov, General-Colonel of Aviation, "To p. 109. Imitate Those Who Are Moving Ahead,” Aviation and Cosmo­ nautics, No. 12, 1968, p. 2. In My Opinion

MOSCOW SPEAKING American imperialism—wary slavery, racism!

L ieu t en a n t Coloxel Donald L. Clark

OSCOW SAYS: ‘The American Army the United States government or its military. M is the loyal servant of the monopolists but, strangely enough, few Americans seem to and plays the role of the butcher of freedom, be aware of the constant flow of crude and democracy, and progress. The American mili- virulent anti-American propaganda that is car- tary vulture was one of the main organizers ried on within the Soviet borders. of the intervention against the worlds first gov- As a recent returnee from two years’ duty emment of vvorkers and peasants.” in Moscow, I am asked many questions about One would not be surprised to hear or see life there. The one answer which my question- such statements emanating from Red China, a ers are most surprised to learn—even some- land in the throes of violent upheaval, or per- times dubious about believing—is that of the haps even from Cuba, where, after only ten uncalled-for and blatant anti-American cam- years of Communist rule, rabble-rousing and paign which continues today in the U.S.S.R. U.S.A. baiting are still the order of the day. In 1967, the 50th year of Soviet rule, the But what about the U.S.S.R., the world’s first, Communists diligently worked to establish an most prosperous and respectable Communist image of success, maturity, power, and leader- state?—a nation that wraps itself in peaceful ship. The Soviets were veiy proud of this Tashkent robes and claims for itself the mature image and reacted with neurotic sensitivity to leadership of the world s masses. No one ex- the literally hundreds of articles in the West- pects the U.S.S.R. officiallv to heap praise on ern press describing their country. A few of

77 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the articles, which many of us read, were ganda broadcast beamed to backward parts of rather sharp indictments of the failure of the world but a direct quotation from the 28 Communism, but most were at least grudg- December 1968 issue of Red Star, an official ingly complimentary and many erred only on Russian military newspaper with much larger the side of overemphasizing Soviet achieve- circulation than our military publications. It ments and painting too attractive a picture of is a daily paper found on every newsstand in the U.S.S.R. today. In spite of this the Soviets the Soviet Union, and it carries world, party, complained bitterly about the “polemics” in and sport news as well as military articles. the articles and were insulted because the Red Star is frequently displayed in total on Western world did not force its press to be public billboards at bus stops and convenient more polite and diplomatic in its treatment of locations, just like the more famous Pravda their State. (To a country with complete con- and Izvestia. The article from which the quo- trol of the news media, freedom of those tation was selected is a review of a new Soviet organizations elsewhere is incomprehensible.) book entitled The US Army—What It Is Like. Not once during this same grand cele- The book is an alleged exposé of our Army, bration, however, did the Soviets lessen or calling it the force that has invaded almost sweeten their internai program of anti-Western every country in the world—a well-organized, propaganda. The United States, West Ger- armed-to-the-teeth army of low moral compo- many, and Israel were still caricatured daily sition unlike its Red counterpart. The book as vile, untouchable nations involved in enslav- purports to reveal several “expressions” of gi’s ing, maiming, and exploiting mankind. Even which exhibit their disdain for the Vietnamese the 50th year parade in Red Square featured people and their conditioned reflex to shoot floats depicting Uncle Sam as a dollar-mad unarmed Vietnamese without remorse. creature poised with atomic bombs over the Articles of this nature are not uncommon. heads of the enslaved masses. Indeed, they appear almost daily, along with I do not mean to be unfair or overly criti- greatly distorted cartoons, either ridiculing, in- cai of the Soviet people or their govemment. sulting, or maligning the United States, Israel, Indeed, today in the U.S.S.R. there are en- or West Germany. Even Red China, which for couraging signs of genuine progress, maturity, its part has elevated the U.S.S.R. to the status and peaceful leadership. They have recorded of public enemy number one, receives better outstanding accomplishments in education, in- treatment in the Soviet communication media dustry, and scientific exploration, but I feel than we do. Coverage of Communist China that more Americans should be aware of some is given, but the articles tend to be objective other facts about the Soviet Union, such as the narrations of the events rather than “distortive, lies and distortions with which the communi- name-calling” types. (The fact that factual ac- cation organs of the Communist Party of the counts of current events in Red China are U.S.S.R. indoctrinate and saturate their popu- sufficiently damaging may explain this.) lace. Indeed, only an awareness of this pro- Soviet propaganda organs in the recent gram can lead to action to stem it, and it must past have concentrated their tirades on U.S. be silenced if there is to be any real hope for diplomats, bankers, former President Johnson, the peoples of these two great nations to leam former Secretary of Defense McNamara, Gen- to understand each other. eral Westmoreland, General Moshe Dayan, the In November of 1967, posters depicting a “Sick Society,” and particularly the U.S. mili- U.S. soldier sticking a bayonet through a child tary forces and their “junior partners,” a name and announcing the slogan of the U.S. Army used at times to describe Canada, any and to be “rape and destroy” were noted on many all members of nato, Israel, South Vietnam, Street comers in Moscow. Nor is the quotation South Korea, and others. Currentlv the most with which this article begins fictitious. The popular area of attack seems to be U.S. Chemi- use of “butcher” and “vulture” as descriptive cal and biological weapon research. A long of the American military is not from a propa- article in Pravda on 18 January 1969 is en- IN MY OPINION 79 titled ‘T h e Poisonous Weapons of the Penta- and in an involved plot saves the day by send- gon” and is typical of several that have de- ing the banker off to the insane asylum in his scribed the evils of such warfare. This article place. Every conceivable clichê of the “capital- broadly hints that the United States refused ist hater” is used in this play. Negrões are to ratify the Geneva Accords because she shown as slaves who are kicked and humili- secretly planned to make effective use of the ated, the working class has escaped reality by weapons it outlawed. The article States, quot- drunken debauchery, and the police are gum- ing a Japanese source, that the United States chewing, fat servants of the banking clique. has been illegally using poison gas in Vietnam It was really funny until one realized that it and in 1964 alone killed 30.000 women, chil- was serious and that the Soviet audience was dren, and old men through the wide use of enjoying it—believing it to the point of pulling Chemical warfare. The article’s author, a Soviet hard for the defeat of the degenerate banker. lieutenant general, writes, ‘T h e ‘ruling circles’ How long, how many times, do such pictures of the U.S.A. use their propaganda machine of the West have to be shown to a man before to bewilder the public and hide the ‘beastlike’ he believes? How wise does he have to become activities of the militarist.” He closes with a to reject this propaganda? And what chance statement calmly mentioning that the Soviet for sound judgment exists when such propa- Chemical Corps is prepared and on guard to ganda is almost the only “information” he re- defend the innocents of the world against such ceives? As I thought of these questions and evil weapons and then issues this waming: watched the audience reaction, my first re- sponse of humor tumed to anger and sadness. Mr. Imperialist, you must not forget that Arguments can be made that such propa- those monstrous weapons of war cannot stop ganda serves many Communist purposes and the Progressive movement of mankind toward needs. How else can the Soviet leaders, foi progress. Poisonous weapons of the Pentagon— example, while constantly espousing a love for they are the weapons for the advocates of a peace and a revulsion from the rotten tools of bankrupt strategy. war, justify to their own people the large and This provocative program is not limited to clearly evident role that they have given to radio, the press, and television. The Soviets Chemical and biological warfare training and long ago recruited the arts as a weapon in research? By what better way can they justify their drive to “educate” the masses about the their increasing military expenditures to their evils of the “capitalists.” One of the most un- deserving, demanding, and needy consumer pleasant nights I spent in the Soviet Union population than by playing up the warlike and was in the city of Krasnodar, where I visited monstrous qualities of the capitalists? It has the local musical theater to see the play Moi been noted that articles of the “all foreigners Bezumni Brat (My Crazy Brother). This was are spies” type get their biggest play close to in 1968, and the play was one of the new Secret Police Day, and articles of the “U.S. repertoire being offered to the people in all warmongers and their ic bms” type increase fifteen of the Soviet Republics. The play takes as Rocket Forces Day approaches. Still, one place in contemporary U.S.A., and—to give a cannot help wondering if it has not become a nutshell synopsis—the story concems a rich conditioned response—not with the people but “yankee banker” who has decided to destroy with the disseminators. the Soviet Union and perhaps start World Envision a land that can join satellites in War III. With no apology, he is portrayed as space, compete with respect and success in having the power to lift the phone and launch intemational athletic competitions, educate the and to control all the once backward tribes of Tadzhik, and produce police and govemment offi ciais. The bankers a scientist who can write: twin brother ( “crazy” because he does not The division of mankind threatens it with approve of exploiting the masses and accumu- destruction. Civilization is imperiled by: a uni- lating wealth) discovers the evil man’s plans versal thermonuclear war, catastrophic hunger 80 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

for most of mankind, stupefactíon from the ganda gives the United States a key indicator narcotic of mass culture and bureaucratízed of the sincerity of Soviet détente moves. It dogmatísm, a spreading of mass myths that put would be an easy matter for the West to point entire peoples and continents under the power out to the Soviets that this program creates of cruel and treacherous demagogues. . . . an unhealthy atmosphere and is a barrier to In the face of these perils, any action in- creasing the division of mankind, any preaching any genuine understanding or agreement. We of the incompatibility of world ideologies and could refuse to negotiate any matter while nations is madness and a crime.1 such flagrant violations of intemational cour- tesy continue. The Soviets vvill continue the A land so well endowed has no real need for program only as long as it gains more for this kind of propaganda unless from fear—an them than it loses—if they can negotiate and irrational fear of the truth. at the same time self-indoctrinate. they will. An awareness of this misuse of propa- On the other hand, if negotiations which are

A Soviet Sampler

Soviet propaganda posters blazoning the anti-U.S. theme reiterate ad nauseam the same dreary themes: the tvar, the bomb, the Klan, the dollar, racism, hate, etc.

1 □ H nr PCTBO I05b)

CMOTPH 6 OGR! IN MY OPINION 81 mutually attractive are prohibited because of U.S.S.R. and that that is impossible until the the propaganda campaign, the Soviets would Soviet people become convinced “that the be forced to re-examine it for need and pur- Western World is not as hostile to them as pose. Such an examination in the light of the communist propaganda insists that it is. world and current Soviet realities might find . . .”2 The key factor in that misunderstanding the program so lacking in both these areas that is the program of distortion and exaggeration the Soviets would tum the valve and shut off described herein. the flow. Would this be a worthwhile Western W e know that the United States is not a objective? Many beLieve that it would. Re- perfect country, but neither is it anything like cently the Secretary General of nato, Manlio it is portrayed to the Soviet people. Coexist- Brosio, stated that the real lesson of Czecho- ence would become a more readily obtainable slovakia was that genuine détente will come goal if the Soviet child in school and man on only through improved relations with the the Street, who may become a Central Com- 82 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW mittee member, heard and saw a more bal- acceptance of our oft-proffered proposal of anced picture of the United States. For the weapons limitation with on-site inspection. But sake of 240 million Soviet citizens, vve must what about the long-term benefits in the areas become aware of the effects of this opprobri- of mutual understanding and reduction of ten- ous treatment of the West and seek to have sions? A change in these areas, albeit gradual the System changed. The time is ripe—the and over the long haul, is an inviting prospect Soviets, for many and varied reasons, are call- and might well create the environment that ing for negotiations in several areas, and a would lead to successful future negotiation of precondition from our side that Soviet intemal criticai problems. coverage of the United States must be re- Current conditions are ideal for seeking aligned to conform with truth and intema- this change from the Russians. We have a new tional nonns should have a good chance for President, whom the Soviet press has already success. This need not be a publicly stated treated with extreme faimess and caution, and demand. Soviet official reaction to it, no mat- they have exhibited an eagerness to negotiate ter how presented, will be to shout “Interfer- seldom matched in our modem relations.3 ence in intemal affairs.” Their official answer, Only one ingredient is missing from the brew however, is unimportant; the real answer will —awareness. I am reminded of the expression become readily evident. The Soviets have dem- “What vou don’t know can’t hurt you” and onstrated that they know how to switch on struck by its enormous falsity. We have not and off and retool their propaganda (Stalin, been fully aware of the Soviet officially sanc- China, De Gaulle, Yugoslavia are examples), tioned description of our nation, but none- and they could respond quietly with no loss theless it has hurt us, the Soviet people, and of face, yet with absolute assurance that their the world. As few Americans have lived in response would be detected by the West. the U.S.S.R. and watched this system of mis- A positive Soviet response to the proposed information enveloping the unsuspecting popu- precondition would certainly not ensure imme- lation, this article is designed as a partial diate agreement in negotiations. It would not substitute for that experience. result in speedy withdrawal of Soviet troops Air Com m and and Staff College from Czechoslovakia or in sudden Soviet

Notes Credit for the article title belongs to the Soviet author Yuri 2. Manlio Brosio, “Soviet Policy: Weakness Yes, but Daniel, whose short story entitled “This Is Moscow Speaking” Danger Too,” The Atlantic Communittj QuartcrUj, VI, 4 (Winter led to his jail sentence. The author recommends the story to 1968-691,499. those interested in contemporary U.S.S.R. 3. The reasons for the current Soviet eagerness to negotiate 1. From "Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Co-existence, merit treatment in a separate article but include, to name a few, and Intellectual Freedom” by Andrei D. Sakharov as translated budgeting problems, the Czechoslovakian invasion, and Soviet in the New York Times, 22 . Dr. Sakharov is a leading intemal disturbances. As a result, their particular eagerness Russian physicist and a leader of the national intellectual move- offers diplomatic advantages to the West that are exploitable. ment in the U.S.S.R. Books and Ideas

AMERICA FACES THE THIRD WORLD

D r . C harles A. L ofgren

N T H E LA ST several years? critics of I American foreign policy have advanced a variety of arguments against foreign involve- ment. Some question commitments in specific geographical areas; others attack foreign com- mitments in general. Another dispute arises 84 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

over the type of activities the nation should ant horrors to the Third World and assump- undertake beyond its borders, regardless of tion by the United States of the role of Inter- area. Should American assistance be limited to national policeman. The final result can only economic aid? Should it include military ma- be an intensification of the very revolutionary teriel but not personnel? Advisers but not com- fíres which the policy-makers desire to bank, bat forces? Should aid be provided only to while at the same time the national revolu- those regimes fostering political democracy tionaries themselves are driven to believe that and social reform? their only hope lies in intemational action. “The In the face of issues like these and the United States,” writes Bamet, “has succeeded protracted war in Vietnam, it is not surprising in íulfilling its own prophecy.” (p. 57) that in February of this year Dr. George What explains the National-Security Man- Gallup detected an upswing of isolationist sen- agers' Outlook? Bam et argues that security, timent in the country. But many of the critics stability, and peaceful change have become would reject the isolationist labei. Richard J. obsessions with them because, seeing these as Bamet is one of these, yet there can be no normal conditions, they fail to realize that doubt about his quarrel with recent trends in other societies may be unable to operate with United States foreign policy. or share such values. Yet the National-Security B am ets argument in Intervention and Manager feels perfectly justified in using vio- Revolution: The United States in the Third lence as a coercive instrument to bring such Worldf begins with the notion that a group societies into the modern, stabilized, American of men vvhom he labeis “National-Security world ( and, in the process, to make the world Managers” make American foreign policy. a safe place for Americans). These policy-makers unfortunately see the Such an approach amounts to an American world in terms more appropriate to the 1930s policy of unilateralism. Bamet’s solution is a than to the 1960s, for stability is their major policy of multilateralism—a revitalization of goal. and they equate anything that threatens the peace-keeping and ( if I read correctly be- to upset the stability of the world with the tween the lines) the social and economic ma- imperialism of Nazi Germany. Aggression, if chinery of the United Nations. not stopped, can only lead to more aggression Within Bam ets own framework, however, and ultimately to a direct threat to the United evaluating his policy preferences proves diffi- States. cult. About two-thirds of his study concen- Because of this Outlook, these men find trates on essentially historical material, and especiallv alarming the instability which today most of the remainder consists of observations characterizes the “Third World,” an area on the present scene. His proposal of multi- “roughly equivalent to what used to be called lateralism receives attention only in a part of the underdeveloped world,” in which Bamet his last chapter (Chapter 11), and the discus- includes Latin America, África, the Middle sion there contains few specifics on the new East, and Asia outside the Soviet Union. (p. 4) policies (or nonpolicies) which he wishes the But the National-Security Managers are not so United States would implement. Thus, unless disturbed by just any disruption of the status Bamet succeeds in convincing his readers that quo in this region as they are by left-leaning anything would be better than the present movements, which, they fear, provide openings system, he really establishes no case for trying for Communism, a menace with intemational his solution. implications. But since so much of his account does This viewpoint, according to Bamet, has consist of historical material, I think it fair to led to extension of the cold war and its attend- begin an evaluation of the book by assessing

fRichard J. Bamet, Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third W orld (New York: World Publishing Company, 1968, $6.95), 302 pp. BOOKS AND IDEAS 85

the quality of Bamets history. A review of his makers have recognized U.S. vulnerabilities. history, of course, vvill not automatically es- Bamet could have avoided such infelici- tablish the worth of his conclusions. For one ties had he consulted a broader range of thing, the logical relationship between his sources; as his book stands, however, it rests historical and other empirical data and his too often on an overly narrow base. In discuss- conclusions is not well developed. Neverthe- ing the nineteenth century phenomenon of less, the historical segnients of Intervention Manifest Destiny and again in reviewing the and Revolution provide insight into Bam ets diplomacy of the New Deal, for example, standards of scholarship and judgment. he strangely overlooks, among other standard To begin, one might well question the accounts, a number of respectable histories adequacy of Bamet’s background history, that written by members of the “New Left” (or is, his treatinent of the pre-1945 period. In “Wisconsin”) school of historians. Thus, from discussing American foreign pohcy in the relying on Weinberg’s Manifest Destiny, first 1930s, for instance, he correctly pictures the published in 1935, Bamet describes the nine- early New Deal as, on balance, isolationist. teenth century thrust for empire in largely (pp. 83-84) But he also indicates that ideological terms, whereas LaFebers 1963 “[Franklin] Roosevelt himself supported the study, The New Empire, might have directed Neutrality Act of 1935,” without noting that his attention to some concrete commercial fac- FDR’s actual preference was for legislation tors underlying expansion in the latter part of that would have given him selective powers the century.3 Similarly, Gardner’s Economic to invoke neutrality, rather than for the act Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy might have actually passed, which did not permit him to led Bamet to mention the intemational eco- discriminate, as he wished to, between aggres- nomic implications of the same early New sors and their victims.1 Deal policies which he sees as isolationist Bamet then goes on to portray FD R’s politically.4 (I do not mean to say, of course, quarantine-the-aggressor speech as “his first that the New Left’s approach to the study of major step away from neutrality in the direc- American diplomatic history is without fault, tion of asserting world police responsibility for it most assuredly has its own defects, and for the United States. . . But at least one re- I suspect that it ultimately will prove more cent study seriously questions whether Roose- provocative than convincing.) velt had anything so bold in mind.2 Thus But Bamet is most concemed with the Bam ets brief treatment of the middle and period since 1945, which, because of its im- late 1930s would lead the reader to think that mediacy to the present, best illuminates what there were sharp tums in policy, when in fact he regards as the current misdirection of that was not the case. American policy toward the Third World. On the other hand, the postwar willing- Thus, early in his account, he stresses the im- ness of the American govemment to undertake portance of the Korean War (pp. 66- 68), formal political and military commitments which he describes as “the most mysterious abroad definitely does mark a distinct depar- event in the long history of Stalin’s dealings ture from past practice. Yet one’s understand- with foreign coinmunists,” adding: ing of the new approach gains nothing from Bamets contention that since World War II It is one of the essential assumptions of official “the national-security bureaucracy has as- Cold War history that Stalin ordered the war. sumed for the first time in over one hundred Indeed, Korea being the only [sic!] case in the postwar period of the overt use of communist years that the United States is vulnerable to armies across an intemational frontier . . . , it attack.” (p. 77, italics added) From Lincoln has been used again and again as the prime and Seward and their fear of British interven- example of communist aggression. tion in the Civil War, down to Franklin Roose- velt and his concem with what he saw as a Others have also questioned why Stalin Nazi military threat, at least some policy- ordered the Korean attack, but for Bamet the 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW mystery begins to dissolve if one rejects the military forces in a divided country, but assumption that Stalin ordered the attack and whether the communist forces were directed if one considers the provocative actions taken by the Soviet Union.” In dealing with this ques- by South Korea in the two years prior to the tion, he finds plausible the argument of W. W. attack. “It is certainly at least as plausible that Hitchcock, who had earlier been with the the North Koreans attacked to forestall an United States military government in Korea, attack from the South,” he concludes, “as that that North Korea attacked without Consulting this was a case of Hitler-like aggression.” Sig- the Soviet Union. Yet Barnet cautions that “the nificantly, the South Koreans had taken a mystery remains, for it is hard to credit a highly belligerent stance toward the North communist government established by Soviet during the two or so years prior to June 1950, occupation with an act of such audacious as evidenced by Major General Charles A. independence.” Willoughby’s statement that “the entire rok But does this suffice as an adequate assess- [South Korean] army had been alerted for ment? Hitchcock’s article was published in weeks and was in position along the 38th paral- 1951, well before the war in Korea was over lel.” Additionally, South Korean President and well before many of the historical retums Syngman Rhee had been publicly proclaiming on it were in. In fact, much of what Hitchcock his intention to unify the península by force. says does not stand up in view of later evi- In arguing his case, Barnet closely follows dence, and much of it rests on a particular set Professor Flemings revisionist account, The of assumptions. Beyond that, we have fairly C old W ar and Its Origins. In fact, as he ac- conclusive evidence that Soviet advisers were knowledges, he took the Willoughby quotation attached to the North Korean army down to from Fleming, who in tum took it from an the divisional levei and that the final prepa- article by Willoughby in Cosmopolitan Mag- rations for the attack took at least ten days, azine for December 1951. But Flemings ver- vvhich makes reasonable the inference that the sion of the Willoughby quotation has the Soviets knew beforehand of the atttack. And North Korean army, not the South Korean, in a day when the North Koreans were almost alerted and in position. (Actually, as W il- totally dependent on the Soviets for military loughby himself has described elsewhere, both materiel, not to mention other types of aid, it armies were in position by 25 June.)5 seems unlikely that the Soviets could not have More important, the composition of the stopped the attack had they wished to.6 rok forces needs mentioning. Intended and Unfortunately, Bamet’s treatment of Korea equipped primarily for internai security duties, is not his only debatable interpretation. In the South Korean army lacked the capability the fíve chapters that comprise Part Two of to undertake an invasion of the North. That Intervention and Revolution (“The Truman fact alone, of course, does not rule out the Doctrine and the Greek Civil War, ‘The chance that the North Koreans saw the South Lebanese Civil War and the Eisenhower Doc- Koreans as a real threat. Their view of reality trine,” “T h e D om inican R ep u b lic: T o the may have been a warped one. But in the Johnson Doctrine,” “America in Vietnam: The absence of any concrete evidence on how Four Interventions,” and “The Subversion of North Korea did perceive its southem neigh- Undesirable Governments”), he takes sufficient bor, it would seem proper to note that the liberties with some of his major sources to condition of the rok army could easily have raise doubts about the whole enterprise. worked to discount the conclusion that South In discussing the subversion of leftist re- Korea posed a threat. gimes, for instance, Barnet argues that the It may not be fair, however, to judge United States supported the central govem- Barnet too harshly on this matter, because he ment of the Congo against the Stanleyville contends that for his purposes “the crucial secessionists because American policy-makers question is not whether communist military feared that otherwise the Communists would forces attempted to conquer noncommunist move in. Especiallv seeking to discredit the BOOKS AND IDEAS 87 idea that the Americans had any humanitarian the critics charge, the United States has at- motives in aiding the rescue of the Western tempted the impossible and in the process has hostages held by the Stanleyville rebels, he created strife in the developing nations and maintains that the United States could have stifled their legitimate aspirations. Such an saved the hostages simply by ordering the cen- accusation is clearly implied by a statement tral Congolese govemment to stop bombing like this: Stanleyville. That such action was not taken For years the model of a successful counter- is evidence for Bamet that the real and pri- insurgency was Greece. . . . But in the process, mary objective of the United States was to the political structure of the country was under- bring down the Stanleyville rebellion. (pp. rnined. In the atmosphere of suppression, the 248-51) extreme-right wing flourished. Twenty years He bases his argument on Ambassador after the Truman Doctrine was announced, the William Attwoods account of his adventures most reactionary military dietatorship in Eu- in African diplomacy, an account which indi- rope or the Near East carne to power. . . . cates that a number of Africans told Attwood (P- 277) that Stanleyville said the hostages vvould be But does it make sense to blame the pres- released if the bombings ceased. But Attwood ent situation in Greece on the Truman Doc- also makes it plain that there were otlier indi- trine? One might as easily assert that the cations that the Stanleyville authorities could Greeks today are not behaving much differ- do little to control their own troops. In other ently than in the past—during, say, the inter- words, no matter what the Stanleyville gov- war period. To put the point more generally: emment said it might do, harm was likely to Even if Americans have sought worldwide befall the Western hostages held by the rebel stability, it may tum out rather to be the forces.7 Bamet may be correct in his conclu- critics of American policy who harbor the real sions (and undoubtedlv the actions of the illusions of American omnipotence. For it is United States were prompted by more than difficult otherwise to understand how they simply humanitarian motives), but if he cites could lay at the doorstep of one nation quite a former ambassador as an authority, he has so much responsibility for all the tribulations an obligation to report his views accurately. of the world. Similar problems occur in connection with From the beginning of the book onwards, Bamet’s use of Major Edgar 0 ’Ballance’s The in any case, the underlying assumption is that Greek Civil War, 1944-1949 and John Bartlow much, or perhaps most, of Américas postwar Martins Overtaken by Events, an account of activity in the Third World has been ill- Martin s Dominican experiences. And while it advised. Beyond that, Bamet is never quite is still too early to judge the aecuracy of much clear as to whether he is explaining why the of what Bamet writes about the Vietnam in- events he writes about occurred, whether he tervention, the title he gives the chapter on is examining those events in order to test VTietnam is itself strange and betrays a basic hypotheses that could explain the course of weakness of the whole book. Bamet fails to postwar policy, or whether he is simply de- specify what he regards as the four interven- scribing what happened. The confusion ap- tions in Vietnam, and the reader is at a loss pears early in the study at a rather explicit to determine this for himself because Bamet levei (pp. 11-19) and continues thereafter. never States his criteria for determining what Most basically, however, what is missing is a constitutes an intervention. careful elucidation of the standards one might More broadly, the book echoes the oft- use to judge the wisdom of America’s policies repeated complaint of contemporary foreign and actions abroad. policy critics that Americans, or at least Amer- To illuminate what this vvould involve, ican policy-makers, suffcr from mistaken ideas one might well begin by recalling a comment about American omnipotence. In seeking to that John F. Kennedy made about the game impose American-style stability on the world, of rating the Presidents: “How the hell can 88 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

you tell? Only the President himself can know To illustrate: One author calculates that what his real pressures and his real altema- there were “thirty-eight wars with an average tives are. If you don’t know that, how can you duration of 5.8 years between 1945 and 1962.” judge performance?”s Kennedy’s statement A recent popular account focuses on 25 con- suggests that understanding and judging key flicts in the post-World War II period.9 Many policy decisions are difficult, at best. But this of these wars and other conflicts involved does not mean that one can attempt to assess insurgency against established govemments. what does go on in govemment or prescribe It might be fruitful to examine intensively what should go on, without first trying, as best several in which the existing govemments he can, to determine the pressures and alter- were brought down and several in which that natives that confront policy-makers as a result did not happen. But my hypothetical study of both domestic and foreign developments. would also have to make clear why particular For years now, it should be noted, careful wars received attention and others did not. historians of the policy process have sought to Otherwise the reader would have no way of understand what policy-makers in particular evaluating its real significance. In short, sys- past situations regarded as the range of alter- tematic attention to selection criteria is a ne- nativos open to them. They have also examined cessity in any policy study drawing on history how earlier decisions served to limit the range for its evidence. of policy-makers’ future alternatives. More re- Nevertheless, judgments about foreign cently, in works with which Bam et must be policy, like judgments about almost anything familiar, his fellow political scientists have at- else, usually take one beyond the empirical tempted to analyze system a ti ca lly the decision- realm, for different men may use different making process in general. basic frames of reference to interpret what Only after the foreign policy critic has de- they see in the world. Thus I think honesty veloped a full picture of the pressures on dictates that the foreign policy critic should policy-makers and the alternatives open to thoroughly understand, and should describe for them is he in the position to assess the policies his readers, the relevant fundamental premises and actions emerging from the govemmental of the men whose actions he is assessing, and process. From that point on, as a minimum, his own premises as well. In gaining the re- he must compare the results and implications quired understanding, however, an adequate of the policies under study with the proba- sampling process is again necessary if the ble results and implications of both inaction critic uses the historical approach, as Bamet and possible altemative decisions and actions. does. For logic demands that if the critic is Apropos Bam ets final chapter, one might ask to understand fully the policy-makers’ basic when and how the outcomes of particular frames of reference—that is, if he is to deter- situations would have been different if inter- mine their preconceptions both about how the national agencies had borne the burden of world operates and about what constitutes the action in the Third World. national interest of the United States in the In part, this kind of comparative approach world, as those preconceptions relate to in- would involve fairly factual considerations. I surgency, revolútion, and intervention—then think, for example, that Bam et is mistaken in he must give careful attention to their actions asserting that “Isolated acts of terrorism by in episodes that did not trigger American in- revolutionaries will not prevail against . . . tervention as well as in ones that did. [the power of constituted govemments] unless In evaluating Bamet’s closing recommen- the authorities have lost their capacity to dation — that the United States shift from govem.” (p. 280) It seems to me that terrorist unilateralism to multilateralism — one should activities can seriously affect a government’s consider an additional question: Is it really “capacity to govem.” Careful study of rele- possible for a powerful nation to avoid inter- vant situations in the recent past could per- vention, try as it may to do so? Let me stress haps resolve the matter. that this is an especially significant question. BOOKS AND IDEAS 89 for it calls attention to the likelihood that ferent. And if, to put it bluntly, some of the whatever great powers do has an effect on the worlds hungry people become aggressive be- course of the world. In sum, intervention may fore they die (perhaps when told that others be an unavoidable fact of intemational life. are not so hungry), can the resulting violence Consider a problem that has received in- be blamed on American intervention? creasing notice in the last few vears. Reputa- Or consider the worldwide operations of ble authorities contend that within ten to American business. Even the Europeans are twenty years there absolutely will not be now finding it difficult to meet what J.-J. enough food for the worlds population, no Servan-Schreiber calls “The American Chal- matter how it is distributed.10 If these fore- lenge.”11 Assuming that the United States gov- casts prove correct, a surplus-producing nation ernment refrains from intervention abroad, like the United States cannot possibly avoid American influence in the world will not there- making decisions about distribution priorities by suddenly cease or come under multilateral —decisions which almost automatically will control, unless a major reorientation of the constitute intervention from the perspective of domestic political economy is effected at the some people, even if the chosen course is same time. And tliis seems unlikely. simply to pass the question on to a body like The world remains a complex one and the United Nations. Someone is going to go generally presents policy-makers with no com- hungry in any case—someone who might not pletely satisfactory altematives. have, had the pattem of distribution been dif- Stanford University

Notes 1. See Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Ncutrality South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950), (: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 81—121. [U.S. Army in the Korean War, vol. 1] (Washington: Office of 2. Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern the Chief of Military History, 1961), pp. 7—12. Hitchcock’s arti- Crisis of 1933—1938 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, cle, “North Korea Jumps the Gun,” may be found in Current 1964), pp. 369-98. See also Divine, pp. 211-14. History, XX (March 1951), 136—44. Interestingly, one of the 3. Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny: A Study of works cited by Bamet (p. 75n ) in connection with his discus- Nationalist Expansionism in American History ( Baltimore: Johns sion of Korea is Allan S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Hopkins Press, 1 9 3 5 ); Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan, Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860—1898 (Ithaca, New 1960), which largely assigns responsibility for the war to the York: Comell University Press, 1963). Among the non-New Soviets; but Bamet appears not to have accorded Whiting’s Left studies which Bamet might have consulted on the subject remarks much weight. of Manifest Destiny are Norman Graebner, Empire on the 7. William Áttwood, The Reds and the Blacks: A Personal Pacific (New York: Ronald Press, 1 9 5 5 ), which assesses the Adventure (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 191—217. commercial motives underlying expansion in the 1840s; and 8. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Frederick Vlerk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American Kenncdy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Miffiin, 1965), History (New York: Knopf, 1963), which introduces some p. 674. needed distinctions regarding the ideology of expansionism. 9. Emest W. LeFever, “The U.N. as a Foreign Policy In- 4. Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal strument: The Congo Crisis," in Roger Hilsman and Robert C. Diplomacy (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964). Good, eds., Foreign Policy in the Sixtics: The Issucs and the For two non-New Left studies of foreign policy in the 1930s, Instruments (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 144; see notes 1 and 2. Carl and Shelley Mydans, The Violent Peace: A Report on Wars 5. D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917— in the Postwar World (New York: Atheneum, 1968). 1960, 2 vols. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubledav, 1961 ), II, 5 89- 10. See William and Paul Paddock, Famine 19751 Amer- 608 (the Willoughby quotation is on p. 599); Major General ica’s Decision: Who Will Survive? (Boston: Little, Brown, Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, MacArthur, 1967); and Dr. Paul R. Ehrlieh, The Population Bomb (New 1941-1951 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954). pp. 350-55. York: Ballantine Books, 1968). 6. Soon Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950: 11. J.-J. Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge, trans. An Ecaluation of American Responsibility (Berkeley: University Ronald Steel, with foreword by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (New of Califórnia Press, 1967), pp. 245—75; Roy E. Appleman, York: Atheneum, 1968). WORLD WAR II: EUROPE IN THE THROES OF TOTAL WAR

M ajor D avid M acI saac

HAT tiresome old soldier Clausewitz case in point might be made of the theorists T once offered a waming to soldiers and at the Air Corps Tactical School in the 1930s. statesmen, one thus far heeded more in the Carefully nurturing a doctrine predicated upon breach than in the observance. Reflecting on the precision bombardment of selected indus- the new forces released by the French Revo- trial targets, not for a minute would they have lution and the wars that follovved, he observed conceded that Dresden or Tokyo or Hiroshima that in the new circumstances, once battle was lay at the end of the furrow they ploughed. joined, warfare tended to swallow up its origi- The nuclear age brought with it new im- nal purposes and take on a momentnm of its peratives to find Solutions to the problem of own. controlling and directing military forces. Many Events since Clausewitzs day have amply rose, both within and without the professional demonstrated the accuracy of that gloomy ob- military establishment, to answer the call. But servation. Who, for example, South or North, whether we take gaming theory or computer- could have foreseen that the firing on Fort aided command/control Systems, Kahns esca- Sumter would lead to the butchery of Antie- lation ladders or McNamaras “controlled re- tam and Gettysburg, the buming of Atlanta sponse,” the dispassionate observer on the and Columbia? Surely none of the powers that sidelines might be pardoned if he smiles now rushed to the aid of Serbia in 1914 had any and then, out of tum as it were. “Have these idea at all of the holocaust awaiting them. men done their- homework?” he might ask. And who in the govemments of Great Britain “Are they aware that their essential confidence and France a quarter-century later could have in their ability to direct and keep under con- foreseen the outcome of their decision to go trol an actual conflict situation is a confidence to the defense of Poland, a nation whose fate that has been shared by innumerable prede- they abandoned before the war was over? cessors?” It is this question that darts in and Wherever we look (and Vietnam promises to out between the lines of two new contribu- be no exception), the end result of a decision tions to the ever increasing flood of books to commit a problem to a solution by force dealing with World War II. In the first of the almost invariably tums out to be either unfore- two, and that most likely to be of interest to seen or unintended or both. present readers, the question is put in stark All this is not to say that the intended terms; in the second it appears in more muted victim is not done in. Hitler and the Japanese form, but it is there nonetheless. warlords were, after all, defeated, and deci- Setting aside questions of theme for the sively so. But who in 1939 or 1941 could fore- moment, let me say at the outset that Anthony see either the limits to which that war would Verriers Bom ber Offensive\ is a good book, go or the problems it would in itself create representing a valuable addition to the pio- and leave behind? Even within the confines of neering work of Craven and Cate1 in this a single conflict the self-generating momentnm country and Webster and Frankland- in Great of modem warfare seems to carry men well Britain. A former defense correspondent for beyond the limits of rational calculation. A New Statesman, Observer, and Economist and fAnthony Verrier, The Bomber Offensive (New York: Macmillan, 1969, $8.95), x and 373 pp., appendices, maps, diagrams, bibliogra- phy, index. BOOKS AND IDEAS 91

author of An Army for the Sixties, Verrier has a result of this, along with the personality of put together the best one-volume interpreta- Sir Artliur Harris, the vacillation of Churchill, tion of the strategic air offensive over Europe. and the American attempt to make General What happened and when is by no means Carl Spaatz “the top airman in Europe,” the ignored, but his primary concem is with show- raf closed ranks behind Harris, and the bomb- ing how and ivhy the chosen policies and ing offensive ran on out of control. The defeat strategies developed. In attempting this he of the German Air Force and the depletion of takes into account the struggle of the Royal its fuel supply (largely U.S. achievements), Air Force to remain independent after World coupled with new techniques for increasing War I, the doctrinal development in the the accuracy of both British and American air thirties, the situation (and personalities) when forces, opened up possibilities never present in war broke out again, Germanys air defense the early stages of the war. Nevertheless, by system, and the purely tactical (or operational) early 1945, wedded to tactical doctrines that factors that determined the limits of flexibility earlier were inescapable, both air forces re- open to Britain’s Bomber Command and the verted, night and day, to what can only be U.S. . Relying largely on the fairly described as “area bombing.” Having British and American oflBcial histories (both become obsessed with what was tactically of which he takes to task on occasion) and feasible and being determined to break the other published materiais, Verrier supplements ground stalemate, they pounded away at Ger- these with the results of interviews with nu- many with club rather than sword; Dresden merous survivors, especiallv crew members. was the inevitable result. After citing the dif- The interviews paid off in at least one respect: ferences and disagreements at all the higher his treatment of the day-to-day life of crew leveis ( FDR, Churchill, the Combined Chiefs members, in training and in combat, in the air of Staff, Eisenhower and his staff at sh a ef), and on the ground, provides insights often Verrier concludes: “The fact nevertheless re- lacking in the official accounts. mains that they were not of one mind and it Unlike a number of other writers, Verrier follows therefore that airmen who knew what took the pains to find out, and explain, the they wanted to do were allowed to go ahead precise workings of the radio and navigational and do it, and in their own way.” aids introduced during the offensive; whether If this analysis is correct (and Generais it is Gee, Oboe, tLS, H2X, or SN-2 (German Spaatz, Eaker, and Doolittle would not agree night fighter radar), he introduces each at the that it is), how might it be relevant for us appropriate place and describes it in terms a todav?J Let Verrier answer: layman can understand. In this same respect The short answer to the question is that the his description of the German defensive tech- twentieth-centurv version of total and global niques (e.g., the Kammhuber Line) is more war has led to a search for deterrents to it, but informative than that found in most German one on the whole conducted by men whose accounts that have been published on this side capacity for taking a political or strategic argu- of the water. Thus, in crew life, danger, cour- ment to its logical eonclusions has been rather age, technique, Verriers account, for reasons less than their wish to preserve the fabric of other than its comparative brevity, is likely to national armed forces and, above all other con- be favored by those performing similar tasks siderations, retain separate, and so far as ad- today. ministratively and operationally possible, inde- But for all this, Verrier is a joumalist first pendent Services for the planning and the prosecution of campaigns by sea, land or air. and historian second; in the conduct of the offensive he sees a message for today, and his Hard words, these, and reflecting deep- basic theme dominates the whole book. The seated fears. The problem with Verriers thesis offensive, he argues, except for its part in pre- is one that affects antj more or less one-sided paring the way for overlord, never held a interpretation of historical events: somewhere clear-cut place in overall Allied strategy. As within it lies at least an element of truth; or, 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW lacking that, an insight into the processes of means something more than hurling every change that participants in the events, blinded available element of physical force into the by the exigencies of the moment, were unable fray; it also involves the total ordering behind to grasp. (Cynics, of course, point out that that effort of society in all its parts—political, this is what keeps historians in business.) But economic, social, scientific, and psychological. the major question is unavoidable: Is Verrier’s The chapters on the psychological and analysis on the whole correct? This reviewer scientific dimensions of the war cover ground takes a charitable (wishy-washy?) position that has been worked before in great depth and suggests that it is closer to the mark than if not within integrated narratives of the war we might vvish it were. A close reading of the as a whole. But other chapters provide cogent records justifies the late Major General Orvil summaries of less familiar aspects of the war, A. Anderson s observations that during World its “economic dimension,” for example, and War II (1) air warfare advanced from infancy “Europe’s response to conquest: the Resistance to adolescence, and (2) what evolved ovcr movements.’ The economics chapter treats the Europe was “an improvised air war." Perhaps following general topics: the economics of the reallv relevant question is whether the sort blitzkrieg; the Western Allies, from compla- of control and review of policy whose absence cency to action; economics as an offensive Verrier deplores is even possible in the throes weapon; the Soviet economic effort; and the of total war. The Herman Kahns among us economics of total war in Germany. Here one either think so or hope so. If the former, let finds, just as an example, a comparative analy- us be skeptical; if the latter, we can only join sis of what lengths each country went to in them. supporting its war effort. If the German side of the story is well known to many Americans. the Soviet and British sides are not. Here, C ontroversy and provocative in- however, the mysterious workings of Britain s terpretation take second place to dispassionate Ministry of Economic Warfare (involved in narrative in Gordon W rights truly excellent commodity control, pre-emptive buying, se- and quite unusual history of the war in lection of targets for the bomber offensive) are Europe. t W rights volume is the twentieth in explained and evaluated.:i The chapter on the justly famous “Rise of Modem Europe” Resistance movements covers each country, series, edited by William L. Langer and pub- from Norway to the Balkans, and does not lished by Harper & Row. What makes this omit the part played by such organizations as volume so unusual (and valuable) is the the Special Operations Executive, Britains authors decision to concentrate not on the equivalent of our Office of Strategic Services military, air, and naval conduct of the war but (oss). rather on what was going on behind the fight- It is this broad-gauge treatment that gives ing fronts, how the war affected the lives and the book its special dimension. The student fortunes of the peoples of Europe as a whole. concemed to find out what was going on in True, he begins in the standard manner: Hungary or Czechoslovakia during the Nazi Chapter I, “Europe on the Brink”; Chapter II, occupation can find out quite a bit if he is a “The Expansion of German Power.” But be- patient researcher and can read a number of yond this point he departs from the normal languages. But he cannot normally find such pattem, and only 37 of the remaining 224 matters in a general history of the war—not, pages of narrative are devoted to the resurg- that is, until now. And as with all the volumes ence of Allied power and the defeat of the in this series, the Bibliographical Essay, ar- Third Reich. Total war, Wright reminds us, ranged under 28 subheadings4 in 37 closely

fGordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945 (New York: Harper & Row, 1968, $7.95), xviii and 315 pp. (Also available in paperback, Harper Torchbook, TB 1408, $2.25.) BOOKS AND IDEAS 93

packed pages, is a significant contribution in that began to infect the Great Coalition once its o\vn right. victory seemed assured.fi These concluding All this is not to say, however, that the chapters contain many of the most thoughtful soldiers’ war finds no place; it is merely con- pages yet addressed to questions of lasting densed and placed within a larger context, one importance. Not only to end where we began vvhich most veterans of that war never saw but, more importantly, to give Professor but which European civilians can never forget. W right’s own eloquence its due, it seems ap- The bomber oífensive, for example, is covered propriate to conclude in his words: in onlv nine pages, but, interestingly enough, The changes for which men consciously thirst its contribution to final victory is rated higher and work and die are not the only ones pro- than its frequent critics would allow. It “un- duced by a great war. More profound and more doubtedly hampered the German war effort in sweeping, perhaps, are those that are un- much more than a marginal way. What it intended and even unforeseen. . . . Thus the failed to do was to destroy civilian morale— Second World War seems to have initiated or to break the German people’s vvill to work and reinforced trends toward a mood of lawless- to endure.”3 ness, toward a confusion and eorruption oí Wright concludes with two chapters in values, toward a decline in man’s belief in a which he tries to show, first, how the war it- rational universe. . . . The battlefield, no longer limited and defined, was everywhere; it was self. particularly the conflicting purposes of occupied by civilians and soldiers alike. . . . the Allies, prepared the way for the cold war; Old beliefs in causality tended to dissolve be- and second, the impact of the war on the fore these evidences of chãos; there was a social, cultural, and psychological stability of growing sense that irrational forces rule mans the European peoples. Calmly, dispassionately, fate. No scientist, no historian has yet dis- and with no trace of the rancor that bedevils covered a technique for measuring the endur- the “revisionists” who trv to show that the cold ing after effects of war; but no thoughtful man war was entirely the fault not of the Russians can doubt their severity or their persistence. but of the Western Allies, he traces in detail United States Air Force Academy the misunderstandings and mutual distrust

Notes

1. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The movements (5 pages on this alone); wartime diplomacy; intel- Army Air Forces in World War 11 (University of Chicago Press, lectual and cultural aspects of the war period; domestic events 6 vols., 1948-55). in the nations of Europe. 2. Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Stra- 5. This view accords with that of Webster and Frankland tegic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939—1945 (London: and the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. The latter's report on Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 4 vols.. 1961). morale concludes that morale was affected, but nowhere does it 3. The U.S. counterpart to Britain's Ministry of Economic go so far as to suggest that morale was destrcnjed. Craven and Warfare was our Foreign Economic Administration. While Cate pretty much skirt the question. Among Verrier’s five speeific almost all histories of the war refer to the FE.Vs main responsi- conclusions (pp. 312-23) is one that States: . . the collapse bility, the Lend-Lease program, rare indeed are those that treat or even the deteriorution of enemy civilian morale should not its other, rather more clandestme, activities. Very secret at the be included as an objective.” This conclusion is labeled a time and involving activities somewhat at variance with those "factor” pertaining to air warfare as demonstrated in World normally associated with a free-enterprise system, the whole War II. The other four conclusions are that control of operations story of the FEA (like that of the Economic Warfare Division must be concentrated; intelligence of enemy strength must be of the U.S. Embassy in London) will probably never be told. reliable and up to date—more so than is required for ground 4. To wit: published or microfilm source materiais; periodi- operations; command of the air is more than the capacity to cals; general accounts; immediate background; the problem of continue operations; and “precision bombing” is a term of art Hitler’s war aims; military aspects, general; Polish campaign; only, making for false optimism and inaccurate estimates of Norwegian campaign; Western campaign; Battle of Britain; the ratio of force to target. Mediterranean and North African campaigns; the war in Rússia; 6. Chapter X abounds with examples. One to which the campaign in Italy; Normandy and the invasion of Germany; Wright gives special place is the U.S. and British refusal to war in the air; war on the sea; espionage and intelligence opera- allow the Soviets to participate in the Italian settlement in 1943. tions; civil-military relations in wartime; economic aspects of In Stalin’s eyes, he suggests, here was the cordon sanitairc being the war years; Science and technology; psychological warfare; re-established. “Although Stalin’s charges of bad faith were un- psychological impact of the war; German occupation policies; founded, he was doubtless convinced ol their validity." Nazi persecution of “racial” and political enemies; Resistance T he C ontributors

Military Airlift Command. He was commissioned in 1940 and spent the war years in B-17 and B-29 training and command assignments. Since then he has served in Hq Far East Air Forces as Chief, Cargo Traffic Control Section and Transportation Division, to 1949; student, Air Command and Staff School, continuing there as an instructor until 1953; in Hq USAF as Chief, Traffic Division, and of Re- quirements and Allocations Division, to 1956; as Deputy Commander and Commander, 1502d Air Transport Wing, Hawaii, to 1959; ADCS/O, Hq Military Air Transport Service, G en er a l Howell M. E st es, J r . Scott AFB, to 1964; Commander, (USM A) was Commander, Military 63d Troop Carrier Wing, at Hunter Airlift Command, for five years pre- AFB, Geórgia, to 1966 and at Norton ceding his retirement on 1 August AFB, Califórnia, to August 1968, 1969. After three years with the cav- when he assumed his present position. alry and in Hying training, 1939—40, General Curtis is a graduate of the G en er a l John Paul Mc C onnell he served in varions training and Industrial College of the Armed Forces. (USMA) was Chief of Staff, United command assignments during World States Air Force, from I February War II. Other assignments have been 1965 until his retirement on 1 August at Hq USAFE, in chief and deputy 1969. After flying training in 1933, chief roles in plans and operations, to he served for a time as a fighter pilot; 1948; at March AFB. Califórnia, as other early duty was in operational, Commander, lst Air Base Group, 22d engineering, and administrative as- Bomb VVing, and 44th Bomb Wing, to signments, including Assistant Execu- 1951; on combat duty and as Vice tive to the Acting Chief, Army Air Commander, FEAF Bomber Com- Forces; Chief of Staff, AAF Technical mand, 1951; at March AFB as Com- Training Command; and Deputy Chief mander, 105tli Bomb Wing, later 12th of Staff, AAF Training Command. Air Division, to 1953; Commander, Assigned to the China-Burma- Air Task Group 7.4, Joint Task Force Theater in 1943, he saw combat in Seven, Operation CASTLE, Eniwetok, Burma and held training, staff, and 1954; at Wright-Patterson AFB as Di- command positions in índia, Ceylon, rector, Weapons Support Operations, and China, where he was Sênior Air later Assistant Deputy Commander for Adviser to the Chinese Government, Weapon Systems and Commander, until 1947. Subsequent assignments Detachment 1, Hq ARDC, and Di- have been in Air Force Headquarters rector of Systems Management, to as Chief, Reserve and National Guard 1957; at Hq USAF as ACS/Air De- Division, later of Civilian Components fense Systems, later ADCS/O, to Group, DCS/O, to 1950; in England, 1961; in Air Force Systems Command where he commanded the Third Air as Deputy Commander for Aerospace Force and 7th Air Division, to 1953; Systems, Los Angeles, 1962; and as M ajor Gen er a l Courtney L. in Hq Strategic Air Command as Vice Commander, AFSC, Andrews F aught is Deputy Chief of Staff, Op- Director of Plans, to 1957; as Com- AFB, Maryland, to 1964. General erations, Hq Military Airlift Command. mander, , SAC, Estes is a 1949 graduate of the Air Commissioned from flying training in Barksdale AFB, to 1961; Vice Com- War College. 1942, he served in the Southwest mander in Chief, SAC, to 1962; and Pacific Theater as a flight leader, cx- Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. ecutive officer, and commander. Post- European Command, France, to Au- war assignments have been in combat gust 1964. when he was appointed crew and troop carrier training and Vice Chief of Staff. USAF. operations, 1945—46; Professor of Air Science and Tactics, Ohio University, 1947—49; Commander 8th and 7th Troop Carrier Squadrons, 1950—52; Commander, 6th Troop Carrier Squad- ron, Japan, 1953; Director of Opera- tions, 315th Air Division, FEAF, to 1956; and since 1957 in Military Air- lift Command in staff or command positions, except in 1960—65 at Hq USAF in DCS/O or P&O for tactical and transport forces and JCS matters. General Faught is a graduate of Air Command and Staff School and Na- tional War College.

M ajor Gen er a l Gil be r t L. C urtis is Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, Hq Service Command. Postwar assign- ments were as Chief, Scieutific Liaison Section, DCS/Materiel, Hq USAF; student, National War College, 1950; Assistunt for Development Planning, Hq USAF, to 1954; Assistant to the Commander, Air Research and Devel- opment Command, and Commander, AF Ballistic Missile Division, ARDC, to 1959; and Commander, ARDC, until creation of the Air Force Sys- tems Command in 1961. General Schriever is now Chairman of the Board, Schriever 6t McKee Associates, Arlington, Virgínia. He is also presi- dent of the Air Force Historical M ajor Wil l ia m R. Sxms (M.F.A., Foundation. Architecture, Princeton University) is Course Director, Base Civil Engineer Course, Air Force Institute of Tech- M ajoh Thomas A. S tuder (M.S., nology, where he specializes in base University of Utah) is Chief, Aero- master planning. An AFROTC gradu- space Modification Division, DCS/ ate of the University of Kentucky, he Aerospace Sciences, Hq Air Weather has served in maintenance and civil Service (M AC). After eaming a B.A. engineering assignments at Andrews degTee from St. John’s University, AFB, Maryland, 1958-61; RAF Sta- Minnesota, and his commissioning in tion, Bentwaters, England, 1963—67; 1953, he served in various AWS as- and at Don Muang RTAFB, Thailand, signments, providing weather support 1967-68, where he was also Chief of to the Tactical Air Command, Strate- Programs. Major Sims is registered in gic Air Command, and Aerospace Kentucky as a land surveyor, engineer, Defense Command. Major Studer is a and architect. His “Architecture of graduate of Squadron Officer School the Lunar Base” was published in and a professional member of the Proceedings of the Lunar and Plane- American Meteorological Society. His tunj Space Exploration Colloquium current assignment involves the study (1963). of techniques and tools for environ- mental modification to enhance mili- tarv mission performance.

COLONEL WlLLIAM C. MOORE (USMA) is Chief of Staff, Headquarters Com- mand USAF, Bolling AFB, D.C. After flying training and B-24 transition, he joined the 494th Bomb Group, spending the last year of World War II in the Pacific Theater, where he commanded the 867th Bomb Squad- ron. Postwar assignments have been as Director of Statistical Services, , 1949; as Com- mander, 29th Troop Carrier Squad- ron, Germany, during the Berlin Airlift; Chief, Combat Operations Center and Combat Operations Plans C aptain Ângelo J. C er c h ion e Division, Hq Eastem Air Defense (B.A., Miehigan State University) is Force, 1952; Member, Strategic Plans Chief, Information Division, 4510th Group, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1956; Combat Crew Training Wing, TAC, Director of Requirements, Far Eastem Luke AFB, Arizona. He enlisted in the Air Forces, Japan, and on the war U.S. Navy in 1952 and served aboard G en er a l Ber n a r d A. S c h r iever planning staff, CINCPAC, 1960; as the aircraft carrier USS Miduiay, re- (M .S., Stanford University) was student, National War College, 1961; verting to inactive reserve in 1956. Commander, Air Force Systems Com- Director of Operations, 810th Air He enlisted in the Air Force in 1958, mand, when he retired in 1966. After Division (SAC), 1963; and in Plans attended Miehigan State University in flying training in 1933, he flew as a and Policy Division, Supreme Head- 1962 under the Airmen Education bomber pilot, commercial airline pilot, quarters Allied Powers Europe Commissioning Program, and was and Army Air Corps test pilot during (SH A PE), until joining Headquarters commissioned in 1963. He served as the thirties. He attended the Air Corps Command, 1966. Information Officer, 81st Tactical Engineering School at Wright Field Fighter Wing, RAF Station, Bent- and later studied aeronautical engi- waters, 1964—67. In 1966 his unit neering at Stanford, 1941—42. He received the American Ambassador’s then joined the 19th Bombardment Award for Community Relations. He Group, Southwest Pacific Theater, has attended the Air Force Course in and in 1944 assumed command of Public Relations and Communications, Advance Headquarters, Far East Boston University. University) is Chief, Communist World Branch, Air Command and Stalf College. Commissioned from AFROTC upon graduation from Southern Methodist University, he has held assignments in Strategic Air Command, Air Training Command, USAF Security Service, Hq USAF, and Air University, as crew member (navigator), provost marshal, squad- ron commander, and instructor. Ile was Assistant Air Attaché in Mos- cow, 1966-68. Colonel Clark is a graduate of the Squadron Officer H aiuuet Fast Scott lived and trav- School and Air Command and Staff eled extensively throughout the Soviet College and is a frequent lecturer on Union as the wife of Colonel William the U.S.S.R. in the civilian commu- F. Scott, U.S. Air Attaché, 1962-64. nity as well as Air University. M ajor David MacI sa a c (A.M., Yale Her fluency in the Russian language University) is an Assistant Professor and her familiarity with Russian mili- of History, United States Air Force tary writings have been reflected in Academy. Since his commissioning in articles in Military Review and Air 1957 from AFROTC, his assignments University Review and in selections have been as Chief, Personnel Control and translations from the Soviet mili- D r . C harles A. L ofcren (Ph.D., Branch, 4245th Strategic Wing, Shep- tary press appearing in the Pentagon‘s Stanford University) has been an pard AFB, Texas, 1959-61; Chief, Current News and The Friday Review Assistant Professor of American His- Officers Branch, Military Personnel of Defense Literature. Mrs. Scott is tory at Claremont Men’s College, Division, Hq , coauthor, with Dr. William R. Kint- Califomia, since 1966 and also teaches Torrejon AB, Spain, 1961-64; Instruc- ner, of The Nuclear Revolution in at Claremont Graduate School. He tor in History, USAFA, 1964-66; and Soviet Military Affairs (1968). served as an enlisted man in the U.S. Ph.D. candidate in history (AFIT- Army Reserve, 1957-63. While com- sponsored), Duke University, 1966- pleting his doctorate, he was an in- 68. His dissertation on the U.S. Stra- structor in history at San Jose State tegic Bombing Survey, 1944—47, is College, Califomia, 1965—66, and in nearing completion. His articles have 1968-69 he held an appointment as been published in Air University Visiting Assistant Professor of History Review, and he is on the Editorial at Stanford University. With interests Board of Aerospace Historian. in American diplomatic and constitu- tional history and recent U.S. history, Dr. Lofgren has published articles in Military Affairs, Military Review, and The Review of Politics.

L leutenant Colonel Donald L. C lark (M A ., George Washington

AWARD

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected “A New Vitality in Soviet ‘Defense’ Posture” by Major William T. Wilson, USAF, as the outstand- ing article in the July-August issue of the Review. EDITORIAL STAFF

C olonel Eldon NV. D owns, USAF, Editor J ack H. Mooney, \fanaging Editor L ieu t en a n t Colonel John H. Scrivner. Jn., USAF, Assoe ia tr Editor L ieu t en a n t Coloxel Laun C. S mith , J il , USAF. Aysociate Editor E dmund O. Barker, Financial and Administra tive Xlanagcr J ohn A. YVest c o t t , J u ., Art Director and Production Manager E nrique Gaston, Associate Editor, Spanish Language Edition L. M id o si May Patterson, Associate Editor, Portuguese Language Edition W il l ia m J. De Paola, Art Editor and Illustrator Sec on d Lie u t e n a n t M. P atrícia Holden, USAF, Editorial Project Officer

ADV1SERS

C oloxel W il l ia m R. E dg ar, Hq Tactical Air Command

C oloxel Jack L. C ia n n in i, Hq Militanj Airlift Command

C oloxel W il l ia m H. Hl ntlev, J r .. Hq Air Training Command

C oloxel James F. S undehman, Hq United States Air Force Acadennj

C oloxel R e ade F. T íi.ley, Hq Aerospace Defen.se Command

L ie u t e n a n t C oloxel G eo r c e N. K en t , H(/ Strategic Air Command

Dr . H aro lo H el f m a n . Hq Air Force Systems Command

L a V er n e F. W oods. Hq Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories

ATTENTION

Air University Review is published to stimulate professional thought concerning aerospace doctrines, strategy, tactics, and related techniques. Its contents re- flect the opinions of its authors or the investigations and conclusions of its edi- tors and are nof to be construed as carrying any official sanction of the Depart- ment of the Air Force or of Air University. Informed contributions are welcomed. AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

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