Community Livelihood Recovery: Experiences from 2006 Oil Spill in the Noe John Joseph E. Sacramento a * and Dhino B. Geges b a College of Social Sciences, University of the Philippines Cebu b College of Human Ecology, University of the Philippines Los Baños

* Corresponding author: Noe John Joseph E. Sacramento ABSTRACT

The 2006 oil spill in Guimaras, Philippines, ravaged coastal communities, causing loss of fishing resources, and pollution of the coastal environment. This case study examines the community’s live- lihood recovery efforts after the disaster. The “Build, Back, Better” approach (Clinton, 2006) provided the lens to describe the stakeholder’s participation and empowerment for inclusive and planned community livelihood recovery. The study focuses on Barangay La Paz, , Guimaras, a profoundly affected coastal settlement during the oil spill in 2006. Key Informant Interviews (KII), Focus Group Discussions (FGD), and secondary data collected from published research reports and government documents are the major data sources. The study employs thematic analysis. The find- ings reveal that various actors involved in community livelihood recovery provide alternative sources of income and help restore the livelihood sector. Building the community’s sense of ownership in the recovery process is shaped by several push and pull factors and thus also affects the sustainability objectives of the livelihood. Conditions for the release of financial assistance and claims are crucial to alternative and sustainable community livelihood recovery. Participatory planning involving the fishers themselves in deciding the terms and directions of the initiatives is strategic and important for sustainability. In gist, community livelihood recovery effort entails a chain of responsibilities among actors in the process. Recommendations for sustained community livelihood recovery based on the lessons from this case are provided for humanitarian organizations.

Keywords: community, fisher, livelihood, oil spill, recovery

INTRODUCTION also adversely impacts community livelihood, ecological balance, and the continuity of living Different kinds of disasters regularly strike the traditions and cultures. Philippine archipelago. The National Disas- ter Risk Reduction and Management Council In the past, the country experienced sever- (NDRRMC) reported that among the disasters, al oil spills. In 1994, an oil spill of 1,112.91 to floods and typhoons hit the country yearly, re- 143,088.57L of fuel oil from the bunker barge sulting in loss of human lives, property, crops, Petro Queen took place at the entrance of the natural resources, and other natural assets. Pasig River (ITOPF, 2010). In 2013, an oil spill While natural disasters heavily impinge on vul- that happened in Manila bay damaged the coast- nerable groups and communities, technological al towns of Rosario, Tanza, and Naic in Cavite. disasters such as oil spills adversely distress An estimated 500,000 L of oil were spilled from and “destroy the bio-physical environment an undetermined source. However, the M/T through the breakdown of technological pro- Makisig, a fuel carrier or the submerged pipe- cesses and systems” (Flagg, 2017). The oil spill lines of Petron, a fuel company was alleged to 50 January - December 2019 be the source of the spill (Rappler, 2013; Sabil- post-disaster restoration and improvement in lo, 2013). Cebu in the same year had the same people’s lives. Lindell (2013) mentioned that catastrophe when the RORO passenger vessel disaster recovery measures aim at “re-estab- St. Thomas de Aquinas collided with container lishing normal social, economic, and political ship Sulpicio Express 7 as they approached routines” of the community. The recovery of a Cebu port. The collision resulted in the release community from a disaster links various aspects of 120,000L of intermediate fuel oil (ITOPF, and institutions of the society, and the goal of 2013). Another case was recorded in Estancia, community recovery should go beyond what is , after the devastation of Typhoon Haiyan, “normal” in addressing their physical, social, and locally known as “Yolanda”. From the report of economic vulnerabilities. Community livelihood United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) recovery is important for affected sectors to re- and United Nations Office for the Coordination cuperate from disasters and fully regain better of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the heavily community life. Community livelihood recovery loaded oil tankers that ran ashore during the ty- involves processes and strategies of restoration phoon caused the massive spill of an estimated that impact income levels, access to resources, 800,000L of oil that dented the already severely assets of individuals, and households (Joakim & damaged coast of the town (UNOCHA, 2013). Wismer, 2015). Primarily, community livelihood A recent spill was recorded in Zamboanga City recovery measures are facilitated by govern- in 2017 from the old submerged pipelines of the mental support and humanitarian relief assis- Western Mindanao Power Corporation (WMPC) tance from helping organizations and private that operates for bunker fuels used in the pow- groups (Mannakkara, Wilkinson, and Potanga- er plant which was immediately fixed (Rosal- roa, 2014). However, the participation and own- ado, 2017). Among these cases of the oil spill ership of communities of their recovery is vital in in the country, the worst occurred in 2006, the sustaining these measures. Since most disas- M/T Solar 1 incident in Guimaras that resulted ter studies and community livelihood recovery in the impairment of marine biodiversity and research are people-centered, scholars and life in the island-province. The tanker, carrying practitioners encourage the use of participatory 2,067,000L of bunker fuel bound for Mindanao approaches and frameworks such as “bouncing sank along the southern coast of Guimaras is- back” to allow people perform community liveli- land, initially spilling 200,000L (UNOCHA, 2006) hood recovery interventions in addressing the that destroyed the people’s sources of livelihood vulnerabilities from a pre-disaster state along- across coastal communities, marine life, biodi- side addressing their recovery and building bet- versity, and protected areas. Studying one of the ter conditions. This post-disaster paradigm was stricken coastal barangays in Nueva Valencia, further framed from the perspective of “Bounc- Guimaras is essential to understanding com- ing Forward” (Manyena, O’Brien, O’Keefe, & munity livelihood recovery as central to disas- Rose, 2011: Kelman, Gaillard, Lewis, & Mercer, ter recovery. The roles of stakeholders such as 2016) and “Build Forward Better” (Murphy & community members, local government, help- Ricks, 2013: Kelman, Gaillard, Lewis, & Mercer, ing groups, Non-Government Organizations 2016). (NGOs), and People’s Organizations (POs) are the focus of this study to provide new insights to It is crucial to assess the socio-economic dy- any humanitarian organization in responding to namics and the life of coastal communities in community livelihood recovery, especially that Guimaras province after the disaster. Since technological disasters cause irreversible and the main livelihood of affected communities is hostile impacts on the environment, people, and fishing, small-scale fishers who depend heavily the community. on their catch were affected when the govern- ment regulated fishing activities. The culturally Community livelihood recovery is vital towards embedded traditional panginhas or gathering of

Issue No. 8 51 seafood as daily sustenance for the family and The Locale of the Study for survival was also discouraged. Years later, the disaster even caused fewer crustaceans to Nueva Valencia is a 3rd class municipality in the gather. Community livelihood recovery from di- province of Guimaras that has 22 barangays. saster is important for communities to improve Fourteen barangays are coastal, six are inland, their state and bounce back from adverse im- and two are island barangays. The population pacts of the catastrophe. This study sought to of the municipality is 39,810 (PSA, 2015). Most examine the community livelihood recovery ef- areas in the municipality are hilly, and most of forts on livelihood loss after the oil spill. It par- the coastal regions are flat. In 2006, the oil spill ticularly aims to: a) discuss the major livelihood contaminated the coastal area of the municipal- recovery project implemented in the community ity, and among those hugely devastated was after the oil spill, b) explain key issues and prob- Barangay La Paz. Whilst the barangay is one lems that the fishing community encountered in of those severely damaged by the oil spill, the recovering their livelihood, and c) provide possi- case of La Paz will essentially provide insight ble strategies or approaches to improving com- into community livelihood recovery measures munity livelihood recovery in disaster-affected since most humanitarian organizations have ex- communities. tended their assistance and support to the area.

Barangay La Paz is a coastal community locat- METHODOLOGY ed beneath a group of islets fronting the coast- al community of Nueva Valencia. La Paz has Theoretical Support of the Study a land area of 7.0459 km2 and a population of 1,921 (PSA, 2015). The barangay’s population This study employs the “Build, Back, Better” ap- represents 4.83% of the total population of the proach (Clinton, 2006) that accentuates the im- municipality. The major industries and sources portance of providing the possibility for a com- of livelihood in La Paz are fishing and farming munity-centered recovery initiative specifically with 334 fishers and 144 farmers or 17.39% through livelihood loss recovery. Two proposi- and 7.50% of the population, respectively. Ac- tions from this approach connect to community cording to the Local Government Unit’s (LGUs) livelihood recovery namely a) “governments, agriculture department, the fishers are high- donors, and aid agencies must recognize that ly dependent on open water fisheries for their families and communities drive their recovery,” livelihood along the coast of the municipality. In and b) “from the start of recovery operations, 2006, the coastal areas of La Paz were among governments and aid agencies must create the those heavily damaged by the oil spill. La Paz conditions for entrepreneurs to flourish.” Since suffered a significant difference in the sources the inclusive participation of the community is of livelihood, income, and daily food of the lo- an essential factor in the post-disaster recovery, cals. People in the community heavily depend mobilizing and engaging the people in collective on the fishing industry, and the oil spill altered decision making can address livelihood loss. the life of the community. The discourse on the success of recovery ini- tiatives expands through empowering commu- Research Design nity members in recovering their livelihood and finding other sustainable means for sources of The case study approach (Creswell, 2003) living. The role of enablers, such as the gov- was utilized in this research to understand the ernment, private sector, donor agencies, is to post-disaster community livelihood recovery guide, evaluate, and assess the initiatives while initiatives. Case studies are important to delin- the decision-making is incumbent upon the peo- eate implications that can help in improving ap- ple themselves. proaches and frameworks for action and come 52 January - December 2019 up with an in-depth analysis of a social phenom- old. The informants were generally literate, hav- enon. Studies in the field of disaster recovery ing finished secondary education (47%), while utilize this to understand social, economic, and others were able to study in high school (33%) political phenomena extensively. Similarly, this and elementary (20%). All the informants fished approach is necessary to understand resilience for their livelihood. All of them perceived their and how people overcome their vulnerabili- economic status as poor. Some (40%) of them ties to disaster. In this paper, the researchers said that they were very poor, and more than utilized a case study approach to examine the half (60%) classified themselves poor. The fish- recovery initiatives on fishing community’s live- ers are part of vulnerable sectors in the coun- lihood. Since this case study offers an intensive try stricken by poverty. In 2015, the Asian De- investigation, it is also essential to uncover the velopment Bank identified some 21.3% of the initiatives that the community and other actors Philippine population as living below the poverty undertook, and the underlying and continuous- line (ADB, 2015). Also, a group of five home- ly prevailing problems and issues left by the oil makers, female, between 25 to 35 years old, spill. generally literate who have at least reached or graduated from high school, in an FGD provid- This case study utilized both primary data and ed supporting information in the case study. The secondary data gathered from the community. informants were selected purposively based on The study used Key Informant Interviews (KII) their term of residence in the area, occupation, with the fishers and with barangay and munic- and whether they are survivors of the 2006 oil ipal officials, and a Focus Group Discussion spill. The interview with municipal government (FGD) with a group of homemakers or “house- officials, employees, and barangay officials who wives.” The researchers also conducted KIIs were directly involved in response and recov- with local government officials of the municipal- ery during the oil spill aims to gather informa- ity and employees from various departments tion based on their narratives. The researchers in the LGU to know how they responded to the briefed the informants about the study and solic- disaster and served as intermediaries in deliv- ited their availability, consent, and willingness to ering assistance and aids from helping institu- participate in the KIIs or FGD. The data gather- tions, other agencies, and organizations. The ing was from August to November 2018. KIIs and FGD participants were all purposively selected. At the same time, the researchers re- The study used thematic analysis in processing trieved secondary data from reports and issu- the qualitative data. Secondary data were also ances through web data mining. The research- used to support some arguments in the study ers coordinated with the municipality of Nueva from facts, to claims and arguments, based on Valencia before conducting the study, to know reports and other studies. The responses from locations and barangays much damaged by informants were sorted and coded based on the oil spill. The study utilized an open-ended themes that support or debunk the arguments semi-structured interview guide formulated for of this study. The results were then presented a) the fishers and a group of homemakers, and in the community through an open forum par- b) the municipal government, and barangay of- ticipated in by representatives from the fishing ficials and employees, who are directly involved sector, barangay officials, and other community in the recovery initiatives and revitalization of members. The study mainly focused on discuss- livelihood after the oil spill. ing the community livelihood recovery initiatives of various actors and their sustainability. The Data Collection, Analysis, and Presentation data and discussion in this research, however, are only limited to the narratives of communi- Fifteen (15) fishers were interviewed from the ty-level actors. barangay, all male, and between 29 to 50 years

Issue No. 8 53 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Sadto, naga pamukot pa kami sang pagka diskubre namon sang oil spill, ang The following discussions will provide an un- isda nga nampukot namon indi na ma derstanding of the major community livelihood baligya kay ga pililit ang bunker. [Be- recovery measures, the roles of institutions, fore when we discovered the oil spill, stakeholders, and humanitarian aid, and the we used to catch fish using our nets, challenges encountered by the community. The however, we can no longer sell them study also presents insights from the “Build, since it was all heavily smeared with Back, Better” approach which highlight the im- bunker oil.] portance of participation in community liveli- - Fisher 7 hood recovery. The UNDP (2006) reported that around 7,870 Damage of Oil Spill on Livelihood and families (39,004 people) were adversely affect- Resources ed by the oil spill in general. The fishing industry suffered the most with around 20,000 fishers The 2006 oil spill in Guimaras Island damaged across the islands of Guimaras, Panay, and Ne- the biological and social life of coastal communi- gros having no way apart from fishing to source ties. Before the disaster, the people on the island out their income (UNDP, 2006). In Guimaras were highly dependent on the fisheries resource alone, the provincial government recorded that for income and survival. The oil spill destroyed 6,266 fishers’ livelihood were affected. Accord- the marine life, caused the loss of resources, ing to World Vision (2006a), US$1.14 million and caused economic instability among fishers worth of marine resources in fish cages and as they struggled to find means to provide food pens reported by the Bureau of Fisheries and for their families. A fisher mentioned: Aquatic Resources (BFAR) were destroyed. At the same time, “the Department of Tourism has projected US$71,400 worth of lost tourism rev- enue” (World Vision, 2006a). Alas, the oil spill drastically changed the lives of the people and socio-economic and environmental conditions of the community. The marine fish production in the province suffered extremely, while the catch in marine municipal water gradually became stagnant after the oil spill (see Table 1).

Table 1. Marine Fish Catch/Production in Guimaras Province 2004-2008

Type 2005 2006 2007 2008 Marine Fish Pen Volume in metric tons 0.34 0.20 - 4.46 Value in ‘000 (Php) 53 30 - 447.12 Marine Fish Cage Volume in metric tons 15.50 3.20 4.63 0.75 Value in ‘000 (Php) 693 204 266 75 Marine Municipal Fishing* Volume in metric tons 4,265.88 4,079.57 4,512.42 4,549.25 Value in ‘000 (Php) 66,917.45 275,106.02 337,149 379,508.92

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority PSA (2008) *Catch using ≤ 3 tons (gross capacity) fishing boats/vessels; no reports retrieved on small scale open water fishing

54 January - December 2019 Stakeholders and Community underscores that “many other formal organi- Livelihood Recovery zations are part of people’s post-disaster lives because they are responsible for responding Stakeholders such as institutions, organizations, to and helping people to recover from disas- the community, and sectors play an essential ters” (Forrest, 1986: Flagg, 2017). Hall (2010) role in disaster recovery. Table 2 summarizes added that the post-disaster problem demands various recovery initiatives and assistance by immediate action and response from the gov- different actors on reviving community livelihood ernment. The processes of recovery and reha- and in providing alternative means for people to bilitation would still require effort from the state source their income after the oil spill in Guim- as supported by other institutions. Even Tobin aras in 2006. Some organizations focused on and Montz (1994), in Tobin (1999), underscored identifying probable ways and means to improve that “recovery does not entail simple clean-up the state of the environment through research. and restoration operations to get a community Essentially, the post-disaster context demanded back on its feet but requires long-term rehabili- actors to perform key roles in addressing com- tation processes that are affected by prevailing munity livelihood recovery measures, and at the socio-economic conditions and structural con- same time, deliver the needs of the community straints.” and its people. Forrest (1986) in Flagg (2017)

Table 2. Various Actors on Community Livelihood Recovery after the 2006

Actors Functions Actions

- Department of Environment • Crafted a recovery agenda and Natural Resources • Coastal environment recov- • Coordinated with experts from UPV and interna- (DENR) ery and rehabilitation tional advisory teams on developing researches and alternative ways to recover the natural Department of Social marine habitat • Formulation of recovery 1 Welfare and Development programs • Introduced poultry and livestock production, (DSWD) ornamental fish production, aquaculture, vegeta- ble production, and training or capitalization for

small-scale enterprises 2 Department of Labor and • Implemented cash for work program as imme- ernment Agencies • Implementation of training Employment (DOLE) diate economic relief that provided families an Key/ Line National Gov income of Php 400 a day • Coordinated and served as a frontline in the implementation of programs and projects of the Provincial and Municipal national government and private agencies. Government • Promoted marine environment protection for sustainable marine resource production and use • Coordinating body through conservation policies and establishment • Gatekeepers of Marine Protected Areas MPAs • Policy maker • Introduced tour guiding and island hopping • Information disseminator • Took charge of distribution of financial assis- • Frontline agency tance from various agencies • Key assessor • Pioneered the seaweeds productions as an al- Barangay ternative livelihood for the locals after the oil spill and promoted marine resource conservation Local Government Units • Facilitated community vegetable gardening and

food processing 3

Issue No. 8 55 • Provided financial and technical assistance; damage claims by the community and the reha-

bilitation of affected ecosystems 4 United Nations Develop- • Source of funds (Monetary) • Initiated livelihood programs such as chicken ment Program (UNDP) production, duck eggs production, fish culture, chicken eggs production and ginger tea produc-

tion 5 • Provided 12-month relief and rehabilitation

• Source of funds (Monetary) package for the affected areas 6 World Vision • Program implementer • Offered alternative sources of income that are

agriculture- based 6 • Funded the research entitled “Oil Spill Re- University of the Philippines sponse Program” (OSRP) Visayas (UPV) • Research funding • Led research agendas on the assessment of

sea farming and recovery of coastal resources 7 • Provided pollution compensation in cash International Oil Pollution • Source of compensation amounting to 10,000- 20,000 for every household Compensation (IOPC) funds (Monetary) depending on the extent of damages brought by the oil spill • Facilitated the claims from the IOPC • Facilitator • P 5-million alternative livelihood programs from Petron • Source of funds (Monetary) Petron foundation • Donated land resource to the barangay • Resource donation, distri- • Provided agricultural training through the Private Firms (Family) bution, and assistance barangay and other government line agencies; NGOs, Private Agencies, and people organization NGOs, Private Provided farming tools • La Paz Small Fisherfolk • Recipient or beneficiary of programs and proj- Association (LaSFA) ects for livelihood and community recovery • La Paz Fisherfolk Aquatic • Recipient/ Beneficiaries • Key proponent for the mangrove rehabilitation Resources and Mangrove project 7 Management Association • Engaged in mangrove planting and mainte-

Inc (LAFARMA) nance work 7

Data Source: 1Yender and Stanzel, (2011); 2 Hall (2010); 3 Defiesta & Badayos-Jover (2014); 4 UNOCHA (2006); 5 UNDP (2006);

6 World Vision (2006b); 7 Ferrer (2015); 8 Philippine Government (2007);Other data are from the KIIs and FGD

56 January - December 2019 1. On the Government calamity. From then, we ban fishing activities. As part of the recovery The government, in general, has a central role measures, we extended projects to in responding to the post-disaster situation of the barangay and fishers affected by communities. Nonetheless, the municipal gov- the oil spill.] ernment played a significant role in response and recovery as a frontline agency. At the time -Municipal Official 1 of the oil spill, the Local Government Unit of Nueva Valencia through the office of the Mayor Sang na tabo ang oil spill, gin pa declared a state of calamity in the entire mu- untat dayon ang pangisda diri eh. Ti sa nicipality. The issue was quickly elevated to the amon barangay 80% bala ang ara sa provincial government. The provincial governor fishing sector kag didto sila naga kuha acted also by proclaiming a province-wide state sang ila pangabuhian. Tapos sadto, of calamity. The oil spill devastated 1,143.45 wala na sila nag pangisda tapos nag hectares of the Department of Environment cash for work nalang dayon sila. [When and Natural Resources (DENR) marine re- the oil spill happened, fishing activ- serve, 245 km of coastline, 1,128 hectares of ities were stopped. Here in the ba- mangrove area, loss of livelihood for the locals, rangay, 80% of the people belong to among others (UNOCHA, 2006). The situation the fishing sector where they source escalated as a national concern that called the out their livelihood. And during that attention of the national government, voluntary time, they stopped all fishing activi- organizations, and other agencies to extend as- ties and attended the cash for work.] sistance to locals affected by the disaster. The LGU informant shared: -Barangay Official 1

Ang dako nga role sang muni- sipyo sang una kay ang pag hatag sang aksyon dayon sa pag declare sang mu- nisipyo under sa state of calamity. From there, gin ban namon ang fishing dayon. As part of the recovery measures, nag extend man kami sang livelihood proj- ects sa mga barangay nga apektado gid sang oil spill, ilabi na ang aton nga mga mangingisda. [The most prominent role of the municipal government is to give immediate action through plac- ing the municipality under a state of

Issue No. 8 57 - - [On the livelihood after the oil the livelihood [On (Seaweeds Farming) Alternative Livelihood On the livelihood, pagkatapos sang oil spill kag asta su bong, gina try namon nga e-reduce ang naga kuha sang isda sa municipal waters sang Nueva mga fishers nga una, naga sige kami introduce sang Halin sang Valencia. seaweeds culture. Para at least ma reduce sila, protek tahan ang municipal waters, kag para may alternatibo man sila nga palangabuhin, gina ubra sang kag padayon ni nga munisipyo asta subong. spill, we try to reduce the number of fishers who go for Since Valencia. Nueva of waters municipal the in fishing seaweeds culture. So introduce we continuously then, can we least, at activities fishing the reduce can we that protect the municipal waters, and we give the municipal the and alternative livelihood, communities fishing government continuously work on this intervention.] -Municipal Official 1 - [We in the barangay [We

Clean-up drive [We were called by the barangay for a [We [We also go to the barangay, if they will call us.] also go to the barangay, [We . Naga conduct kami sa barangay sang regular nga coastal clean-up kag regular man nga focused group discus sion para ma pa intyendi sa ila ang importansya sang pag protektar sang environment. conducted a regular coastal clean-up and focus group discussion so that they will understand the importance of protecting the environment.] -Barangay Official 1 ga kadto man tamon sa barangay kon patawag kami Ti, nanda -Fisher 1 Gina patawag man kami sang barangay kung may meeting kag gina istoryahan namon kung ano pwedi ma obra para protektahan ang dunang mangad namon kag mapamaayo ang lugar eh. meeting to discuss the things and ways that we can do to protect our natural resources.] -Homemaker 5 - - - - -Fisher 3 -Homemaker 4 [The line agen -Municipal Official 1 Cash-for-Work [When I used to work during the oil the during work to used I [When [In the cash for work, we are tasked to plant

Ang mga line agencies, ang DOLE, DSWD, gilayon nga nag cash for work sila in replacement sa loss of livelihood sang time, ang mga tawo imbes nga mangis mga tawo. So that Halos ang lead government agency clean up lang.da sila, kay kami man sa munisipyo, kay ti first thing gid kay i-save nimo ang tawo para indi sila magutman. DSWD, immediately offered cash cies such as DOLE, the loss of livelihood the as a replacement to for work the fishing, in engaging of instead time, that So people. govern municipal The clean-up. the for worked people the operation, agency in frontline and ment was the lead first thing in mind is for us to save the people, and not to let them suffer from hunger.] Sang ga ubra kami sa oil spill, dako-dako man to ang suhol dako2 man to ang na bulig ya Ti sang una, Php400 a day. sa amon sang una. is it Well, before, Php400 a day. the wage is right spill, already a big help for us.] Sa cash for work, gina pa tanom kami to sang saging. Gin hatagan kami sang inug tanom, mag luwas dira, may swel kalsada ukon sa nag ulubra sa Ang iban kay dohon kami. higad dagat. same materials;at the planting us gave They bananas. Others were tasked to clean paid. time, we are getting the sidewalks of road or seashore] Table 3. Post-Disaster Recovery Measures of the Government (Summary Narratives) Table Source: Narratives from KII and FGD 58 January - December 2019 Table 3 presents the initiatives of the government entities. Hall’s (2010) study noted that each of after the oil spill to address problems concerning the government agencies provided livelihood livelihood loss and environmental damages. The projects which includes poultry and livestock government’s “cash for work” program became production, ornamental fish production, aqua- a temporary remedy for the locals to bounce culture, vegetable production, and training or back from the severely affected livelihood sourc- capitalization for small-scale enterprises after es. Displaced fishers worked under the program the oil spill. However, these initiatives were and were assigned for clean-up initiatives. It was drawn based on what they believe appropriate the most workable economic intervention after to implement to resolve the concern on live- no fishing activities were declared. lihood loss. Importantly, it is the locals in the community who can identify and adapt to the The DENR, together with other institutions and negative effects of the disaster. agencies, provided support for coastal resource and mangrove rehabilitation. Yender and Stanzel In this case, it can be noticed that the local com- (2011) recognized the expertise from the DENR, munities can effectively perform their roles as UPV, and other international advisory teams partners in tackling this livelihood tragedy. Noy, which coordinated for natural approaches to re- Ferrarini, and Park (2019) reiterate from the covery and monitoring, subsequently followed “Build Back Better” (BBB) approach that low- to by restoration as a remedy to the oils that re- middle-income countries are less considered mained in the fishes’ habitat. On the other hand, and materialized for long-term recovery trajec- the barangay served as a frontline government tories. Like any development initiative, commu- unit in ensuring the recovery of the community nity livelihood recovery measures should be from disaster. A barangay official mentioned how sustainable and long term in effect. Mainly, the important was the LGU’s role in community live- responsiveness of the people of the community, lihood recovery during disasters (see table 3). LGUs, humanitarian organizations, and other in- Since the coastal environment’s resources are stitutions in the locality is necessary to address the primary source of income for the locals, en- long term concerns that will rest on “incomes, vironmental restoration is imperative. asset prices, productivity, and sectoral employ- ment; demography and human capital—that is, Consistent with the LGU’s environmental protec- health and education; and institutions and social tion objective, seaweed production was promot- capital” (Noy, Ferrarini, & Park, 2019). ed and implemented as an alternative source of income for the community. At the same time, it 2. On Petron and Humanitarian Organiza- was oriented to becoming a sustainable liveli- tions hood for the locals. The damage of the oil spill on fishing nets and gear and the growing fear to- The Petron company, being liable for the oil wards public safety in seafood consumption had spill, extended help to the community. The com- challenged the local fish market and harmed the pany provided financial assistance to the high- fishing economy on a wider scale. The tradition- ly affected communities. They also facilitated al panginhas which is apparent in the community the monetary claims from the International Oil (collecting of panginhason intertidal crustaceans Pollution Compensation (IOPC). The barangay and mollusks during low tide) was similarly dis- was then responsible for listing those members tressed by the oil spill incidence. of the community that were affected by the oil spill, gather accomplished forms, and submit to The LGU, as gatekeepers, was able to point out Petron to process the financial assistance. The key concerns after the disaster and coordinated same process also ensured for the monetary various initiatives in line with livelihood recov- claims to the IOPC, where Petron is the inter- ery through the national agencies and private mediary. The decision on how to use the claims

Issue No. 8 59 depended on the beneficiary. Some used it to officials. Similarly, some private organizations establish alternative livelihood and small-scale and companies tapped the barangay to offer enterprises (e.g., sari-sari store), while others livelihood programs to the affected groups and bought materials for their fish pens and cages sectors. As expressed by one of the barangay such as fishnets as a replacement to the de- officials: stroyed ones. The affected fishers recounted: Actually, may nag kadto nga kompanya Nag claim kami sa damage sa amon sa amon, gin request nila ang mga mang- pumpboat sang natabo to ang oil spill. ingisda na potential as beneficiary, gin Mga 10,000 ang amon na claim sad- tagaan nila sang duta kag gin organize to. [We also claimed for the damage siya as cooperative, kag ang purpose caused to our motorized boats after ato tani himuoon ang mga mangingisda the oil spill. We claimed around 10,000 i- transform into a farmer, pero unfortu- during that time.] nately, primero lang, sang ulihi wala na - Fisher 14 sila kay daw ka budlay gid nga isaylo mo ang mangingisda sa farmer. [Actually, Nag claim kami sa barangay para sa there is a company that coordinated damage sa amon palangabuhian pag- with us and requested the fishers to katapos sang oil spill. Ang mga pukot organize as a cooperative and benefit namon, indi ma puslan man kay na puno from land distribution and transform sang oil. [We process our claim for the them into farmers. Unfortunately, the damages caused by the oil spill to our plan did not go well because it is chal- livelihood at the barangay’s office. We lenging to turn fisher to a farmer] can no longer use our fishnets -be cause it was smeared with bunker oil.] - Barangay Official 1

- Fisher 2 Essentially, private entities and NGOs provided most post-disaster development programs to Ti gin gamit to namon ang claims para the community. These activities aimed “to re- sa amon palangisdaan eh. Para maka store access to local production of basic com- bakal bag-o nga gamit kag iban pa. modities and petty services, to start other types Apang, wala man maka sustiner kay of pre-existing economic activities again, and dako gid ang halit sang oil spill sa mga to secure employment, income, and dignity for isda. Gamay na lang gid ang isda nga the majority of survivors” (Régnier, Neri, Scuteri, ma hulik namon asta subong. [We used & Miniati, 2008). Restoring the microeconomic the claims for our livelihood and to activities is a critical element in achieving a self- buy new equipment. However, that did reliant and sustainable community livelihood re- not sustain our needs. Huge damage covery after the disaster. was done by the oil spill to the fishes. There is less fish to catch at all, until 3. On People’s Organization now.] There are two existing people’s organizations - Fisher 10 in the barangay, the Lapaz Fisherfolk Aquatic Resources and Mangrove Management Associ- Various NGOs and other relevant agencies ation Inc. (LAFARMA) and Lapaz Small Fisher- extended assistance to re-establish their live- folk Association (LaSFA) founded in the 1990s lihood. The assistance processing was coordi- as a response to the proclamation of Taklong nated and facilitated by the barangay through its Island as a national marine reserve (Ferrer, 60 January - December 2019 2015). After the oil spill, LAFARMA was revived hood project. By mobilizing community organi- to address the concerns on coastal resource zations, the expected impacts might be wider in management and disaster recovery. LaSFA was scope. Community organizations are essential likewise restructured to facilitate livelihood as- to recovery since it is considered as a mecha- sistance since a barangay-level fisher organiza- nism of the people to be properly guided, unit- tion is an essential requirement (Ferrer, 2015). ed, and coordinated on the steps and measures in finding ways and solutions to the issues that May organisasyon kami, ang Small Fishers As- they confront in a post- disaster context. How- sociation. Sang una ang barangay ang naga bu- ever, both became inactive due to issues with lig, sang una lang man to. [We have an orga- management and membership participation. nization, the Small Fishers Association. The barangay helped us a long time ago, it was Key Issues and Problems only during that time.] The study found that the problems concerning - Fisher 2 community livelihood recovery involve primarily the concern over Petron and its accountability to The barangay took the lead in the rehabilitation affected communities, the importance of Com- efforts of these organizations since most NGOs munity-Based Organizations (CBOs) in the pro- and donors were looking for an established cess, and the plans and objectives for the use and organized community association that they of claims and monetary assistance. These were could partner with for funding support. This based on the congruence of the narratives from course of action has been strategic to ensure the informants. Table 4 summarizes the key is- sustainability of the possible alternative liveli- sues raised in this study.

Table 4. Key Issues and Challenges in the Livelihood Recovery

Aspect Key Issues on Livelihood Recovery • Lack of concrete, context-fit, workable, and sustainable alternative livelihood plans for the com- munity from Petron and other agencies • Insufficient action on the part of authorities in holding Petron accountable and liable to the loss Livelihood management of community life (Planning and Orga- • Lack of cognizance from Petron of the environmental, economic,and social impacts of the oil nizing) spill on the community • Failure to involve the community in the planning phase • Failure to factor in the environment and community in general as components for revenue and resource loss and the pollution compensation claim • Alternative livelihood implementation was not sustained Implementation and • Further recovery initiatives were left at the expense of the locals Sustainability • Beneficiaries were recognized as mere receivers of programs Consultation and • Lack of unity and participation of affected community members Participation • Lack of consultation on the needs of the community for their recovery • Claims and compensation were centered on households and individuals Finances • Alternatives in sourcing out income for daily survival were not practical • Helping institution’s fatigue; funding ceased from the community

Source: Consolidated from key informant interviews

Years after the disaster, survivors of the ca- accountability of the company that caused the tastrophe mentioned that the recovery initiative oil spill and in effect the loss of community life. was left to their expense. Primarily, what made The informants highlighted the laxity of Petron the coastal communities hurdle problems and in taking full responsibility for environmental issues concerning recovery years after the di- damages and economic loss after the oil spill. saster were insufficiencies in reinforcing the They even clamored that Petron should be held

Issue No. 8 61 accountable in the long term as long as the lo- Pagkatapos sang pila ka bulan nga nag cals still experience the drawbacks brought by bulig-bulig ang Petron, wala naman day- the oil spill. on. Wala naman sila nakabalik diri sa amon. Wala gid ah. [Months after the After Petron provided instantaneous assistance Petron helped us, there’s nothing that to families affected in Barangay La Paz, distrib- we received from them. They never re- uted financial assistance, and processed the turned to us. Never.] IOPC claims, the company just shirked from any responsibility in the recovery process. The -Fisher 2 informants have not mentioned any concrete Other salient issues include the lack of unity and measures from Petron for community livelihood grit of the community in addressing livelihood recovery after the disasters, aside from the recovery, uninformed and mismanagement of fi- financial assistance mainly used to support their nancial assistance and claims, lack of recovery economic needs. To their dismay, the informants provision for income, resource, and ecological professed the culpability of Petron in restoring loss. On community participation and unity, Cret- the environment and livelihood of the locals. ney (2016) emphasized that community organi- zations also “play an important role in respond- Pagkatapos sang ila clean-up operation, ing to the unique needs of their community, and wala na sila ka balik sa barangay kag the broader processes of disaster response and wala man sila nag ulikid na dayon diri recovery” (Cretney, 2016). On uninformed and sa amon, ilabi na sa mga dako gid nga mismanaged financial assistance and claims, na apektohan nga mga fishers. Dapat it is important that helping institutions should gani may balikan pa sila kung sayuron have clear and directional conditions for the re- ya. [After the clean-up operation, they lease of assistance and claims. Clinton (2006) never got back to the barangay, and emphasized that conditions are important at the they never looked after us, especially start of recovery operations. Aside from asking those highly affected fishers. Suppos- communities to establish cooperative or peo- edly, they could have returned.] ple’s organizations as primary conditions, help- ing groups and agencies are also tasked to de- - Barangay Official 1 velop mechanisms that will guide beneficiaries towards entrepreneurial development (Clinton, Ang isa sa problema kay ang compan- 2006). On concerns for recovery attention on ya nga hinungdan sa sini nga oil spill, income, resource, and ecological loss, Mayer, after nila gin declare nga limpyo na ang Running, and Bergstrand (2015) in Bergstrand dagat, kung imo tan-awon, damo pa guid and Mayer (2019) point out that the municipal ya gihapon ang na bilin wala pa bala na government could even strengthen their claims limpyohan mayo. Nag deklara lang sila over spill-related expenditures and loss of taxes. dayon nga limpyo na! [One of the prob- Perhaps, in oil spill disaster situations like this of lems is the company responsible for Guimaras, the community together with the gov- the oil spill after they have declared ernment through the help of concerned groups that the sea is already clean and free and institutions should stringently exact liability from bunker fuels, we can still see from the company responsible for the damage, that there are still a lot of bunker fuels regardless of how long the recovery process will that need to be cleaned. They just de- take. Likewise, the local government could have clared that it is already clean!] paid more attention to community-interventions and community development programs (Mayer, - Barangay Official 2 Running, & Bergstrand, 2015: Bergstrand & Mayer, 2019). 62 January - December 2019 It is important to note that actors’ roles in com- may nalang ang na bilin nga mangingis- munity livelihood recovery after the disaster da diri. [They found other ways to work. are critical. As Chandrasekha (2012) identified: They never stayed here. Every family “(1) the changing urgency of stakeholders and needs to have one member to find a job. the continued relevance of recovery planning Others worked as “kargador”, “pangga- to them; (2) stakeholders having or not having rab”, “naga bolante” for them to earn a power, and their exercise of it; and (3) the build- living, and then fishing was left. Now, ing or breaking down of trust between stake- there are only a few fishers who were left holders” are roots of concerns and problems here; others have gone to other places in addressing community livelihood recovery. for work.] Furthermore, socio-economic conditions in the community, the needs and capacities of stake- - Fisher 4 holders towards recovery, and the standard practices and policies that exist in place before Migration for work took place in town centers the disaster also are context factors to recovery and neighboring cities. Most worked as manog- dynamics. bolante (workers in export trading and tracking of raw products), panggarab (daily-waged la- The Crux of Post-Disaster borers to harvest crops), panday (daily-waged Economic Situation construction workers), and kargador (loader or carrier of products for delivery at the ports or the The issue of community livelihood recovery is business center and hub for commerce) in an attributed to people’s reaction to post- disaster adjacent town. The community suffered a col- economic situation. There were reports about lapse of its human resources since people opt- the fishers who left the community to look for ed to transfer places and migrate to areas for a job to satisfy their economic needs. Tan and their new economic engagements. As a reme- Pulhin (2012) supported this, saying that post- dy, some organizations introduced programs on disaster environments dislocate the people in sustainable sources of income and livelihood, the coastal communities. How they were able but they did not go well since they were far from to counter the immediate adverse effects was fishers’ livelihood orientation. However, the peo- seen in their adaptive capacity to look for new ple of the community were unable to participate opportunities after the oil spill. and avail of those. In a narrative of a barangay official: Ang iban nga tawo diri nangayaw gani sa iban nga lugar para manggarab. [Some Damo man tani ang training program of the fishers here have gone to other sang barangay para sa ila, pero ang ra- places for the harvest season.] son nila ngaa indi sila kay ano ang kan- on sang pamilya nila samtang ga training - Housewife 1 sila. Amo man na ang na budlayan na- mon. [The barangay has a lot of train- Ang iban tuya kay nangita man sang iban ing for them; however, they declined nga ubra. Wala man sila di nag tinir na. and reasoned that if they attend the Kada panimalay may isa gid nga mangita training, then their family will be left sang ubra eh. May iban naga kargador, nothing to eat] panggarab, naga bolante kay dira man sila maka kita kwarta, tapos ang palais- - Barangay Official 1 daan, ti na pabay-an na eh. Subong, ga- may na man lang ang naga tiner diri, ang Sa cooperative to tani para sa farming, iban na ngayaw naman sa iban lugar, ga- dako na to ang investment sa ila, pero

Issue No. 8 63 indi man ang mga mangingisda kay lain The oil spill caught the attention of various in- gid ya ang ila orientasyon. [In the coop- stitutions and humanitarian organizations that erative for farming, there is already a resulted in extending assistance in various fac- big investment; however, the fishers ets. Though other helping organizations have declined because it is very far from set conditions (i.e., establishing cooperatives their orientation.] or POs) before granting assistance, however, the monetary claims and grant financial assis- - Barangay Official 2 tance, which is a huge chunk, extended by the IOPC and Petron, respectively, have not reiter- Sustainable Community Livelihood ated conditions for how the fishers will use it. In Recovery: Reflection from “Build, Back, Bet- this case, the beneficiaries have independently ter” decided where to use the monetary claims they got from Petron and IOPC. Some bought new The oil spill disaster in the island-province has fishnets and gear and repaired the damage on led to a new normal to the fishing community their boats, while others allotted it for an alter- that affected the social and economic dimen- native source of income or kept it for family’s sions. They pervasively experience today qui- consumption. Clinton (2006) asserts that at the etly the same drawbacks that they used to have start of the recovery, government and helping after the oil spill like less catch in shallow waters institutions should identify conditions for entre- and small number of crustaceans that they can preneurial initiatives for survivors to establish gather. Though there are measures initiated and a sustainable alternative for economic means. implemented by humanitarian organizations, This is essential for communities to bounce government institutions, and helping groups to back from disaster to a better state and an op- provide for the needs in community livelihood portunity for community members to develop recovery, the locals mentioned that these did sustainable means for their livelihood. Hence, not last long, and they were unable to sustain the government, as gatekeepers, together with what those groups have started. Lack of sus- helping agencies, has a central role in facilitat- tainability of these initiatives was rooted in the ing this task (Clinton, 2006). In the case of the failure of helping institutions to make the com- Guimaras oil spill, Petron likewise has a crucial munity and its members realize that they drive role in sustainable community livelihood recov- their own recovery (Clinton, 2006). In communi- ery. ty livelihood recovery, the role of enablers is vital as it guides the members and the community to coordinate and facilitate finding solutions to CONCLUSION AND drawbacks brought by disaster on livelihood, RECOMMENDATIONS and help the community to sustain initiatives and stand on its own. However, helping groups The study obtained a thorough understanding of missed the mark when they treat the communi- the processes of community livelihood recovery ty and the stakeholders as mere receivers. Tan undertaken after the Guimaras oil spill in 2006. and Pulhin (2012) pointed out that the tensions It provides a clear picture of the roles of vari- in the state of livelihood and weak adaptive ca- ous actors involved in the process and the key pacity had loosened the collective efforts and issues and problems that the community faced activities of the people of coastal communities. in restoring their livelihood. In this case study, The people themselves were not able to fully qualitative data from 15 fishers, five homemak- realize their vulnerabilities after the disaster. ers, and municipal, and barangay government Strengthening the community-based institu- officials largely contributed to the discussion of tions and empowering its members could have the findings. The study is anchored on the two of helped them during recovery. the “Build, Back, Better” propositions on the role 64 January - December 2019 of actors on livelihood recovery to elucidate the tiate the implementation. Since the oil spill as a case of the community. technological disaster has ravaged the coastal environment, which is the source of living for the The roles of actors in community livelihood re- community, it is right that the conception of mea- covery were identified from the beneficiaries, sures and steps to alleviate their state should the government institutions, NGOs, private or- start from them as they know what they need. ganizations, to the company responsible for the Helping institutions and groups should consid- oil spill. The key helping actors in community er this instead of providing already established livelihood recovery after the Guimaras oil spill and well-planned solutions for the community to have provided plans and measures for the com- receive. Also, the actors in community livelihood munity; however, it was not properly maintained recovery, such as government institutions, hu- nor sustained. The community has accepted manitarian organizations, and private entities, the initiatives from helping groups; however, it have a crucial role by creating conditions on has not fully grasped their role as beneficiary of where and how the beneficiaries will use their these programs. The community simply recog- monetary claims and financial assistance. Les- nized that there is help poured after the disas- sons from this case indicate that helping actors ter for their livelihood, and they just accepted it. needs to enable and empower the community Petron, on the other hand, falls flat in perform- to create a concrete direction and plan for using ing its responsibility to thoroughly rehabilitate the money they received to find or build sus- the ravaged natural environment that aggravat- tainable alternative sources and to recover the ed the post-disaster economic situation. Years community’s livelihood. Three main points can after the oil spill, it has failed to reinforce the be learned from the Guimaras oil spill case: recovery of the community. At the same time, there were no conditions on entrepreneurial a) It is feasible to promote sustainable livelihood development upon release of Petron’s finan- recovery efforts if helping institutions secure cial assistance and IOPC monetary claims for active participation from beneficiaries through alternative income source and community live- involving them in the processes of planning and lihood recovery measures. Also, the communi- making decisions in recuperating their sources ty was unable to maintain its people’s organi- of income and finding ways for other alterna- zation, which could have helped in advancing tives. The beneficiaries should not be treated as their interest concerning livelihood. Similarly, mere receivers, but as someone who own and the need for providing the immediate economic build their own sense of recovery. means for the fisher’s family drives them to find an instantly paying job in the commercial cen- b) The oil spill is an environmental and econom- ters, which made it difficult for the community ic disaster; thus, response and recovery efforts livelihood recovery initiatives to be implemented should include conditions that will help commu- successfully. nities plan and sustainably implement ways for long-term sources of income, to recuperate the In conclusion, the case of the 2006 Guimaras oil environment and their livelihood. spill disaster points out that the link and shared accountability between formal institutions and c) Disasters may be natural or technological humanitarian organizations (i.e., NGOs, private caused by chemical and physical hazards; both entities, government) and the company respon- can inflict harm on human and environmen- sible for the oil spill to the community is vital to- tal relationships. Recovery measures in forms wards community livelihood recovery. The study of claims entitlement, or compensation for the highlights that communities need to own the loss, should also include the environment as it process of recovering their livelihood as plan- is intertwined with the resources for human live- ning should start with them, and they should ini- lihood and source of income.

Issue No. 8 65 experiences of economic marginal- ACKNOWLEDGMENT isation in a disaster context. Asian Fisheries Science, 27(Special Issue), We would like to extend our gratitude to the in- 97-109. formants for their cooperation and valuable con- Ferrer, A. (2015). Assessing governability of tribution. To the two peer reviewers, we sincere- small-scale fisheries in ly appreciate your constructive comments and National Marine Reserve in the Phil- suggestions to enhance and develop our paper. ippines. In Interactive Governance for Small-Scale Fisheries. Springer, Thank you Ms. Ma. Amale Y. Larrazabal of UP Cham. 379-395 Cebu- College of Social Sciences for the sug- gestions and Prof. Jason A. Baguia of UP Cebu- Flagg, J. (2017). The social consequences of a natural/technological disaster: evi- College of Communication, Arts, and Design for dence from Louisiana and Mississip- professional help as our language editor. pi. Local Environment, 22(3), 306- 320. Forrest, T. (1986). Disaster gipsies: the role of REFERENCES informal relationships in administer- ing disaster assistance. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Di- ADB. (2015). Poverty in the Philippines. Re- sasters, 4(1),51-67. trieved on March 1, 2020, from https:// www.adb.org/countries/philippines/ Hall, R. (2010). Governance during disasters: poverty Intra-governmental and non-gov- ernmental coordination in the 2006 Bergstrand, K., & Mayer, B. (2019). The Com- Guimaras oil spill. Philippine Political munity Helped Me: Community Co- Science Journal, 31(54), 117–152. hesion and Environmental Concerns https://doi.org/10.1080/01154451.201 in Personal Assessments of Post-Di- 0.9723527 saster Recovery. Society and Natural Resources, 33(3), 386–405. https:// ITOPF. (2010). Philippines. https://www.itopf. doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2019.170 org/knowledge-resources/coun- 9002 tries-territories- regions/countries/ philippines/ Chandrasekhar, D. (2012). Digging deeper: Participation and non-participation ITOPF. (2013). St Tomas De Aquinas, Phil- in post-disaster community recov- ippines, 2013. https://www.itopf. ery. Community Development, 43(5), org/in-action/case- studies/case- 614–629. https://doi.org/10.1080/155 study/st-thomas-de-aquinas-philip- 75330.2012.730538 pines-2013/ Clinton, W. J. (2006). Lessons learned from tsu- Joakim, E., & Wismer, S. (2015). Livelihood re- nami recovery: Key propositions for covery after disaster. Development in building back better. New York: Office Practice, 25(3), 401-418. of the UN Secretary-General’s Spe- cial Envoy for Tsunami Recovery Kelman, I., Gaillard, J., Lewis, J., & Mercer, J. (2016). Learning from the history of Creswell, J. (2003). Research design: qualita- disaster vulnerability and resilience tive, quantitative, and mixed method research and practice for climate approaches. Thousand Oaks, Calif: change. Natural Hazards, 82(1), 129- Sage Publications. 143. Cretney, R. (2016). Local responses to disaster: The value of community led post di- Lindell, M. (2013). Disaster studies. Current So- saster response action in a resilience ciology, 61(5–6), 797–825. https://doi. framework. Disaster Prevention and org/10.1177/0011392113484456 Management, 25(1), 27–40. https:// doi.org/10.1108/DPM-02-2015-0043 Mannakkara, S., Wilkinson, S., & Potangaroa, R. (2014). “Build Back Better: Im- Defiesta, G., & Badayos-Jover, M. (2014). Do plementation in Victorian Bushfire catastrophes exacerbate gender Reconstruction.” Disasters 38 (2): bias? An analysis of coastal women’s 267–290.

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Issue No. 8 67