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Islamic Republic of Iran October 2017

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Islamic Republic of Iran October 2017 October 2017 Islamic Republic of Iran Chief of State: Supreme Leader Ali Hoseini-Khamenei Government: Theocratic Republic Capital: Tehran National Holiday: 1st April1 GDP by sector: Agriculture (9.1%), Industry (39.9%), Services (51%) Export Partners: China (22.4%), India (8.7%), Turkey (8.5%), Japan (4.5%) Import Partners: UAE (39.5%), China (22.3%), South Korea (4.7%), Turkey (4.6%) Top Exports: Petroleum (80%), Chemical and petrochemicals, fruit and nuts, carpets, cement, ore2 Conflict areas: Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Israeli occupation of Palestine, US interference, Saudi Arabian influence Major Religions: Muslim (99.4%) — Shia (90 – 95%), Sunni (5 – 10%), other (Zoroastrian, Jewish and Christian)3 Current Landscape International Relations part they have an abundance of conventional missiles6. However, the goal to become a nuclear power is in Iran’s foreign policy with its neighbours and globally alignment with its regional ambitions to have better US is entrenched in a number of issues. One that it is deterrence and more regional political leverage. The dominated by the petrochemical industry, nuclear Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), set forth enrichment, an ideological framework, regional turmoil requirements for Iran to halt its uranium enrichment, and relative isolation4. Since the fall of the Soviet and make efforts to alter regional activities, including Union and the increased presence of US troops in the supporting proxy groups and terrorist organisations, for region, it has had to handle perceived existential threat some sanctions relief. The US Trump administration has from the US and its allies and a unique set of regional adopted an oppositional outlook towards Tehran once influences5. Overall Iran experiences cordial relations again however, as evidenced by changing their position with South Caucasus and Central Asia, underpinned on the JCPOA. by a pragmatic outlook that does not want to upset Moscow or Beijing. It sees Armenia as its “gateway to Internal security posture Europe” and Turkmenistan as its “gateway to Central Asia”. Iran prioritises relations from the Persian Gulf Securing control of its internal political space is a top and Levant alongside Turkey. It sees Israel and Saudi priority for the Iranian regime. The ability to cause soci- Arabia as threats to its existence and its future as the etal discontent through online communication channels, dominant regional power. Iran’s nuclear ambitions have and generate conflict was felt keenly by the Middle East been the cause for ongoing international sanctions in the aftermath of the Arab Spring in 2011. Since then, against its financial, petrochemical, transportation and Iran has invested in internal internet governance and shipping sectors. Reports surrounding their enrichment pursued a hard-line stance against perceived dissident program suggest the country is a long way off equipping or anti-revolutionary activity. The Islamic Revolutionary missiles with nuclear warheads and that for the most Guard Corps (IRGC) website details some of the country’s 1. A public holiday celebrating the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979 2. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html 6. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html 4. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/170421_Farhi_Iranian_Power_Projection.pdf 5. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160420_Milani_IranReconnectingEurasia_Web.pdf 6. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/141218_Cordesman_IranRocketMissileForces_Web.pdf 1 © 2017 Anomali, Inc. All rights reserved. strategy in this area, and justifies its goals as helping to all voiced opposition to Trump’s unilateral stance. During define parameters for “acceptable culture”7. The pur- 2016 the economy experienced a notable recovery. suit of internal control has led to the implementation of the National Information Network (NIN). This is based National Cyber-Strategy on ideas to monitor internet usage, and block subver- Iran’s attention was drawn to the development of its sive content, not unlike SORM of Russia and the “Great own offensive and defensive cyber capability after being Chinese Firewall”. The data captured by this national attacked by the Stuxnet virus, followed by Duqu and intranet can be accessed by the country’s intelligence Flame. The government pledged $1 billion investment and law enforcement agencies8. Freedom of expression in 201113, creating the Supreme Council of Cyberspace is regularly reported as being restricted as well. Iranian (SCC), Cyber Headquarters (under the Armed Forces legislation makes many non-violent crimes punishable General Staff), Cyber Command, the Basij cyberspace by death. Many ordinary users of social media have been council, Cyber Police FETA and began recruiting talent brought to the IRGC or arrested for making comments into the industry. ICT ministries cooperated with the on controversial issues (such as fashion)9. In 2016 Iran AFGS Cyber Headquarters to monitor vulnerabilities carried out the largest mass executions in years. Despite and threats to infrastructure. The SCC works with the being considered a moderate, President Rouhani has National Center of Cyberspace under the direction of been accused of not doing enough to counter the more President Hassan Rouhani and Secretary Abolhassan hard-line actions of the judiciary or the IRGC10. Firouzabadi, coordinating and implementing cyberspace 14 Economy policy in Iran . The MAHER/ Iran National CERT is responsible for incident response15. Since Stuxnet, Iran Iran is the second largest economy (after Saudi Arabia) has matured into one of the more advanced actors in the Middle East and North African region (MENA), globally, not afraid of being offensively oriented. and has the second largest population after Egypt11. The country relies heavily on oil revenues. Rigorous imple- mentation of sanctions over the last several years have Iranian Intelligence and Cyber been hard hitting on the economy. Between 2011 and Services 2014 the currency took a nosedive as the Rial lost 80% of The fast development of Iran’s cyber capability has meant its value against the dollar12. Iran has the second largest that a number of organisations have been either created proven natural gas deposits globally, and could counter or have developed their own subdivisions to carry out the impact of sanctions on oil, but it requires foreign activity. The Supreme National Security Council under investment. Due to the sanctions, many countries and the auspices of the Supreme Leader Khamenei, seems companies have shied away from investing in Iran’s gas to oversee all of the different intelligence services. The deposits. Despite some gains under previous sanc- most prominent intelligence service seems to be the tions in the international community’s eyes, present US Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), which works leadership does not seem to articulate a very promising in conduit with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp’s outlook. However, Europe, Russia, China and India have (IRGC) Quds-Force and intelligence unit. Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Head: Supreme Leader Ali Hoseini-Khamenei President: President Hassan Fereydoon Rouhani Areas of Concern: To “watch over the Islamic revolution and safeguard the Islamic Republic of Iran’s national interests”. To “coordinate political, intelligence, social, cultural, and economic activities”16 7. https://www.aei.org/publication/iran-comprehensive-legal-system-for-internet-and-cyberspace/ 8. https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2016/10/ten-things-you-should-know-about-irans-national-internet-project/ 9. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/iran 10. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/iran 11. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iran/overview 12. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/140122_Cordesman_IranSanctions_Web.pdf 13. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/154842/No375_15OCT2012.pdf 14. http://techrasa.com/2017/08/27/all-you-need-know-about-internet-censorship-iran/ 15. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/154842/No375_15OCT2012.pdf 16. http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/Supreme-National-Security-Council.html 2 © 2017 Anomali, Inc. All rights reserved. Ministry of Intelligence and Security Minister: Seyyed Mahmoud Alavi17 Headquarters: Mehran, Tehran, Tehran Province, Iran Type of Service: Domestic intelligence service Areas of Concern: Intelligence collection and analysis, counter-intelligence, disinformation, works with Quds-Force, to identify antirevolutionary forces, provides resources to proxy-groups (Hamas, Hezbollah etc.) 18 Branches: Counterintelligence Directorate, Oghab 2 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Chief Commander: Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari19 Areas of Concern: Defending the regime, Military operations, HUMINT, SIGINT20 Branches: Land force, Navy, Airforce, Intelligence Unit, Quds-force (special forces), Basij (has cyberspace council21)22 Associated Groups: Iran Cyber Army (ICA)23/ Iran cybersecurity division24 25 26, Ashiyane Digital Secuirty Team27 28, Hizbullah Cyber Army, Qassam Cyber Fighters, Virtual Anonymous Jihad29, APT33?30, Rocket Kitten? 31 32 Campaigns: Operation Cleaver, Shamoon, Operation Ababil, Saffron Rose, Newscaster, Diginotar, Comodo33, Operation Wilted Tulip34 Cyber Police FATA Chief: Seyyed Kamal Hadianfar Headquarters: Police Headquarter, Attar street,
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