Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria's Image Building, 1999-2015

CITIZEN DIPLOMACY IN NIGERIA’S IMAGE BUILDING, 1999-2015

MICHAEL BABATUNDE ALEYOMI

UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA 2017

CITIZEN DIPLOMACY IN NIGERIA’S IMAGE BUILDING, 1999-2015

MICHAEL BABATUNDE ALEYOMI

Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

June 2017 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First and above all, I praise the Almighty God, the giver of life and master of destiny, for His eternal love and unfathomable provisions, opportunity and granting me the capability to proceed successfully. He has made my weaknesses perfect in His strength. Indeed, to God alone is all the Glory.

I cannot concur more on the philosophy of the former First Lady of the United States of America, Mrs. Michelle Obama, who said: “Success isn’t about how much money you make; it’s about the difference you make in people’s lives”. Undeniably, at personal level, there are people who have aided the successful completion of this seemingly insurmountable and herculean pursuit of my Doctoral degree. More so, after passing through several processes, this thesis appears in its current form because of the help and direction of numerous people I cannot take for granted. Thus, my profoundest appreciations go to quite a few them.

My utmost intellectual debt of gratitude goes to my supervisor, Professor (Madya) Dr. Mohamad Zaini Abu Bakar, who meticulously understands my helplessness and vigorously encourages me at every bit. Without his love, understanding, encouragement, and support for granting me Graduate Research Assistantship (via Pemerkasaan Masyarakat Melalui Sekolah Pondok, Pesentren, Dalam Kerangka Kearifan Tempatan- 1001/PSOSIAL/816303), my PhD journey would have been rougher. His critical comments and observations are valid and valuable. His words intrinsically motivate me not only to higher level of thinking, but also to think universally. He is such a wonderful ‘father’ which every postgraduate student would pray to have. I am lucky to have you and your kid gloves treatment would be forever remembered. I am so very grateful Sir.

Universiti Sains Malaysia provides fascinating and pleasant ambience to undertake a PhD degree. I have enjoyed my time as a Doctoral student at the well-equipped libraries particularly 24hours Open Library and Social Sciences Postgraduate Studying Room (Balai Siswazah Sains Kemasyarakatan). USM is an interesting place that linked me to the world of knowledge and intellectualism. It is a place that helps me get in touch with outside connections without putting my family at risk or jeopardizing home-based friendships. I also acknowledge the erudite scholars and staff of the School of Social Sciences like the immediate past and current Deans, Assoc. Professor Dr. Nor Malina Malek and Professor Dr. Azlinda Azman respectively, Assoc. Professor Dr. Azrina Husin (Deputy Dean

Academics, Students & Alumni) and Assoc. Professor Saidatulakmal Mohamad (Deputy Dean Research, Postgraduates & Networking).

I can never forget the input of many distinguished academics in the Department of Political Science, whose contributions during my proposal defense. Their tutelage greatly broadened my horizon in the academic world. They include the versatile Head of Political Science Unit, Dr. Siti Zuliha Razali, Assoc. Professors Azeem Fazwan Ahmad Farouk, Benny Teh Cheng Guan, Zainal Abidin Sanusi, Drs. Woo Kuan Heong, Razlini Mohd Ramli, Soon Chuan Yean, and Nadrah A. Kadir. My appreciation also goes to Dr. Premalatha Karupiah, Mr. Ahmad Zaki (Assistant Registrar) and Encik Abdul Aziz Razak (Executive Officer, Postgraduate-Research Mode)

Several people have helped in developing this work, particularly those who agreed to participate in the interviews and focus group discussions and to those who made documents available for use in the research. All of them are very busy people with little time to respond to inquiries such as mine. I am indebted to them for their willingness. Their enriching views are highly appreciated. I would be the greatest ingrate if I failed to appreciate Commodore (Surgeon) Bola Sanni and his family for rekindling my hope when I had lost hope. I know you would not want to be mentioned but your financial, moral, and prayer supports towards the completion of my PhD degree programme cannot be left unacknowledged. You are indeed a philanthropist to the core, benefactor per-excellence, fatherly personified, and God-fearing destiny builder. I pray that God will remember all your children for good and reward you with long life in good health and sound mind. Thank you so much sir.

Although words are of limited use in expressing the appreciation I have for my mentors and teachers who have contributed to my character and learning. In this space, I briefly acknowledge those that have helped me through the dissertation process. Specifically, the fatherly investments and academic mentorship I received from Professor Mathew OlaRotimi Ajayi, the pioneer Vice Chancellor of Landmark University, cannot be ignored. I also appreciate the magnificent contributions of Professor Bola A. Akinterinwa whose in-depth insight and wealth of knowledge in Nigeria’s foreign policy significantly contributed to the success of this thesis. Likewise, I thank Professor Jeremiah Shola Omotola and Dr. Ekanem Asukwo Ekanem who both stimulate my analytical thinking and sharpen my intellectual debate. Your guidance, intellectual assistance, and suggestions no doubt enhanced the quality of this thesis.

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The days and nights spent pursuing a PhD cannot be easy for a family man. My family, both nuclear and extended, has been incredibly supportive. Much love and deeply felt appreciations are due to my loving parents, Elder and Deaconess Timothy I. Aleyomi and my siblings who joyously celebrate my little and big accomplishments. I also appreciate my Spiritual Father, Pastor S.A. Olaiya for his unswerving prayers. They have been crucial to the successful completion of this thesis. I am so fortunate to have strong, understanding and support system of my lovely and caring wife, Sweetheart Kenny, and my dearest son, Prosper. They have sacrificed a lot and I shared their loneliness. I also would like to thank my brothers and sisters-in-law, for they have provided assistance in numerous ways.

To my wife, you have always believed in me. I can never forget the courage you ignited in me when I was having a rethink of travelling to Malaysia due to financial constraints and leaving you all alone with just our 2-month old baby. You said to me “you can and you will succeed”. I appreciate the energy you put in to making sure that our baby boy that I left with you for my PhD degree in Malaysia grows up with the best training you can offer. I will never forget the whole period you spent without me. I thank you very much. To my son, I feel you and see myself in you every time I looked at your pictures. I cannot appreciate your endurance more on how much you have missed the fatherly love. I can never repay you for your silent day and night prayers. For your enormous contributions and sacrifices, I felt obliged to dedicate this thesis to both of you.

Finally, I appreciate the hospitality of Dr. Richard Alonge, Dr. Isaac Akuva, Sister Ellys Purpa and the entire Certified Nigerian Students and Postgraduate Students Association in USM, Malaysia. I everyone particularly those I cannot mention due to reasons of force majeure. I cannot round up this without expressing my gratitude to my employer – Landmark University, Omu-Aran, Nigeria for releasing me to pursue my PhD at one of the best Universities not only in Asia but in the world.

M. B. Aleyomi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgement ii Table of Contents v List of Tables ix List of Figures x List of Acronyms xi List of Foreign Words xv Abstrak xvi Abstract xviii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background to the Study 1 1.2 Statement of the Problem 6 1.3 Research Questions 11 1.4 Research Objectives 12 1.5 Significance of the Study 12 1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study 14 1.7 Research Methodology 15 1.7.1 Research Design 15 1.7.2 Population of the Study 17 1.7.3 Sample Size and Sampling Technique 18 1.7.4 Data Collection Techniques 20 1.7.4(a) Primary Sources 21 1.7.4(b) Secondary Sources 22

1.7.5 Data Analysis Techniques 22 1.7.6 Limitation to the Methodology 25 1.8 Justification of the Study 25 1.9 Organization of Chapters 28

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 2.0 Introduction 30 2.1 Conceptual Clarification 30 2.1.1 The Concept of “Nation” and “State” 30 2.1.2 External Relations/Foreign Policy 32 v

2.1.3 Afrocentrism 33 2.1.4 Citizen and Public Diplomacy 34 2.1.5 Relative Power Distribution 40 2.1.6 Image Building 41 2.2 Review of Relevant Literature 44 2.2.1 Foreign Policy and Nigeria’s Diplomatic Practice 44 2.2.2 National Interest and Nigeria’s Image Building 50 2.2.3 The Nexus between Foreign Policy and National Interest 57 2.2.4 Foreign Policy and Perception in Policymaking 58 2.2.5 Historicizing the Roles of Nigeria in African Affairs 59 2.2.5(a) Nigeria’s African Policy in Perspective: Political Sector 63 2.2.5(b) Nigeria’s African Policy in Perspective: Economic Sector 66 2.2.5(c) Nigeria’s African Policy in Perspective: Security and Global Peacekeeping Efforts 68 2.2.6 The Dichotomy in Nigerian African Policy 72 2.2.6(a) The Anti-Afrocentrism School 73 2.2.6(b) The Pro-Afrocentrism School 74 2.3 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 76 2.3.1 Meaning and Relevance of the Concept of Soft Power and Neoclassical Realism (NCR) to the Study 76 2.3.2 The Conceptual Weaknesses of “Soft Power” to the Study 79 2.3.3 Justifications of the Conceptual and Theoretical Framework to the Study 81 2.4 Concluding Remarks 84

CHAPTER THREE: RELATIVE POWER DISTRIBUTION AND RATIONALE FOR THE ADOPTION OF CITIZEN DIPLOMACY

3.0 Introduction 85 3.1 Relative Power Distributions in Nigeria’s African Policy 85 3.2 Background to Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy 89 3.3 Rationale for the Adoption of Citizen Diplomacy 96 3.3.1 Bad Leadership in Nigeria as Perceived by the International Community 96

3.3.2 Electoral Malpractices and its International Condemnation 98 3.3.3 Corruption and the International Perception of Nigeria. 101 3.3.4 Human Rights Abuses and its External Response 103 3.3.5 Niger-Delta Militancy and International Perception of Nigeria 105 3.3.6 Dwindling Economy that Triggers International Condemnation of Nigeria Abroad 107 3.3.7 Globalization and Nigeria’s Image Abroad 110 3.4 Conclusion 113

CHAPTER FOUR: IMPACT ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN DIPLOMACY ON NIGERIA’S IMAGE BUILDING

4.0 Introduction 114 4.1 Impact of Citizen Diplomacy on Nigerians in Nigeria 114 4.1.1 Citizen Diplomacy and Nigeria’s Political Environments 117 4.1.2 Citizen Diplomacy and Nigeria’s Economic Conditions 127 4.1.3 Citizen Diplomacy and Nigeria’s National Security 136 4.2 Impact of Citizen Diplomacy on Nigerians Abroad 151 4.2.1 Citizen Diplomacy and Nigerians in Nigeria’s Immediate Neighbours 151 4.2.1(a) Nigerians in Benin Republic (formerly Dahomey) 152 4.2.1(b) Citizen Diplomacy and Nigerian’s Residents in Cameroon 158 4.2.1(c) Ill-treatments of Nigerians in Chad 163 4.2.1(d) Citizen Diplomacy and Nigerians Welfare in Equatorial Guinea 164 4.2.1(e) Nigeria’s Relationship with Niger Republic 166 4.2.2 Citizen Diplomacy and Nigerians in other African Countries 168 4.2.3 Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy and the International Community (Beyond Africa) 180 4.3 Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy and International Organizations 186 4.4 Conclusion 189

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CHAPTER FIVE: STATE RESPONSE TOWARDS IMPROVING NIGERIA’S IMAGE ABROAD

5.0 Introduction 190 5.1 Chief Olusegun Obasanjo’s Administration and Nigeria’s Reintegration, 1999-2007 190 5.1.1 Obasanjo’s Initiatives on image Recovery at the International Level 192 5.1.2 Obasanjo’s Initiatives on image Recovery at the Domestic Level 198 5.2 Alhaji Musa Yar’Adua’s Doctrine on Reputation Management, 2007-2010 208

5.2.1 Yar’Adua’s Initiatives on Image Management and the Treatment of Nigerians 210 5.2.2 Yar’Adua Initiatives on Image Management at the Domestic Environment 215 5.3 Dr. Goodluck Jonathan’s Transformation Agenda, 2010-2015 222 5.3.1 Jonathan’s Initiatives on Image Building 224 5.3.1(a) Electoral Reform and Democratic Consolidation 224 5.3.1(b) Diaspora Involvement/Protection and Foreign Direct Investment 226 5.3.1(c) Amnesty Programme and War Against Boko Haram Insurrections 228 5.4 Conclusion 231

CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.0 Introduction 233 6.1 Summary of the Findings 233 6.2 Conclusion 237 6.3 Recommendations 240 6.3.1 Diplomatic Strategies 240 6.3.2 Socioeconomic Strategies 243 6.3.3 Politico-Security Strategies 245

6.4 Direction for Future Research 247

REFERENCES 249 APPENDICES 278

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LIST OF TABLES

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Table 1: Nigeria’s Participation in Africa/Global Peacekeeping Operations, 1960 – 2015 70

Table 2: Nigeria’s Contribution of Force Commanders/Chief Military Observers, 1960 -2015 71

Table 3: Soft Power Sources, Referees, and Receivers 82

Table 4: Nigeria’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 1999 – 2015 135

Table 5: Some Important Timelines of Boko Haram Activities between 2009 and 2015 146

Table 6: Synopsis of Key Militants that accepted the Presidential Amnesty in 2009 218

LIST OF FIGURES

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Figure 1: Physical Map of Nigeria Showing the 36 States and FCT, Populations Density and Neighbouring Countries 2

Figure 2: Conceptual/Theoretical Framework Chart 84

Figure 3: Functional Circle of Citizen Diplomacy 95

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACTUs Anti-Corruption and Transparency Units ADB African Development Bank ADF African Development Fund AFRICOM Africa Command AFRODAD African Forum and Network on Debt and Development

AIDS/HIV Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome/Human Immune Deficiency Virus AU African Union BBC British Broadcasting Corporation CAP Capacity Acquisition Programme CBN Central Bank of Nigeria CHOGM Commonwealth’s Heads of Government Meeting CNN Cable Network News CoD Community of Democracies CR Card Reader CSOs Civil Society Organizations DFI Development Financial inflow DMO Debt Management Office DPO Due Process Office DR Direct Reduction DRC Democratic Republic of Congo ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring Group ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EDF European Development Fund EFA Education for All EFCC Economic and Financial Crime Commission EPZ Export Promotion Zone FDI Foreign Direct Investment FGN Federal Government of Nigeria G 77 Group of Seventy-Seven

G8 Group of Eight Industrialized Countries GDP Gross Domestic Product GSM Global System of Mobile HDI Human Development Index HDR Human Development Report HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICC International Criminal Court ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICJ International Court of Justice ICPC Independent Corrupt Practice Commission ICT Information and Communication Technology IDA International Development Association IMF International Monetary Fund INEC Independent National Electoral Commission IOM International Organisation for Migration IPA International Peace Academy IPCR Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution JTF Joint Task Force

LEEDS Local Government Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy LGBT Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender MAP Mandatory Attachment Programme MDGs Millennium Development Goals MEND Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MNC Multinational Corporations MoU Memorandum of Understanding MTN Mobile Telephone Network NAFDAC National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control

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NAM Non- Aligned Movement NAPEP National Poverty Eradication Programme NBS National Bureau of Statistics NCR Neoclassical Realism NDDC Niger Delta Development Commission NDI National Democratic Institute NEEDS National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development NEPD Nigeria Enterprise Promotion Decree NIDO Nigerian in Diaspora Organisation NIIA Nigeria Institute of International of Affairs NILS Nigerian Institute of Legislative Studies NIPC Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission NIPSS Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategies Studies NNGO National Non-Governmental Organization NNPC Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation NNVS Nigerian National Volunteer Service NPF Nigeria Police Force NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty (of Nuclear Weapon) NSDA Nigerian Steel Development Agency OAU/AU Organization of African Unity/African Union ODA Overseas Development Assistance OMPADEC Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Fund Committee OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ORO Operation Restore Order PPC Public Procurement Commission PRGF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PVC Permanent Voters’ Card

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R&D Research and Development RNP Rebrand Nigeria Project SAP Structural Adjustment Programme SEEDS State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy UN United Nations UNCTAD United Nation’s Conference on Trade and Development UNDP United Nation Development Programme UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization YES Youth Empowerment Scheme

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LIST OF FOREIGN WORDS Ab initio Initially; at the outset Ad hoc Up to this time; with respect to this Ad libitum Omissible; non-preparation Camaraderie Friendship Crème-de-la-crème Who is who Cul-de-sac Impasse; blind ally Vis-à-vis Regarding; in connection, Desideratum Necessity; wanted Détente Easing of tension, especially in a relationship Entente Understanding Manu military In a military fashion

Note Verbale A type of diplomatic letter with standard opening format Pacta sunt servanda Sanctity of agreements Per se Intrinsically; by itself/himself/herself Raison d’etre Reason for Rendez-vous Appointment; engagement Sine qua non Indispensable; very essential Status quo As it is now; current situation Tete-a-tete One on one Vie Internationale International Life

DIPLOMASI RAKYAT DALAM PEMBINAAN IMEJ NIGERIA, 1999-2015

ABSTRAK

Kajian ini bertitik tolak daripada dua isu berkaitan dengan projek Nigeria. Pertama, ia terhasil dari hasrat untuk menilai impak hubungan domestik dan luar Nigeria tentang masalah yang dihadapi oleh rakyatnya di tanah air sendiri dan juga di luar Negara; dan yang keduanya, tentang keperluan untuk menilai keberkesanan usaha-usaha kerajaan dalam menangani krisis berkaitan imej. Nigeria, yang mempunyai penduduk berkulit hitam paling ramai di dunia, yang menjadi satu pengukur bagi Afrika dan sebagai pusat bagi wilayah Afrika Barat, ia ‘pemain’ utama dalam hal-ehwal politik Afrika dan strategik terhadap masyarakat global sebagai sebuah negara yang kaya dengan hasil minyak. Kekayaan yang dimiliki daripada hasil galian dan sumber manusia telah memberi tanggapan bahawa Nigeria telah ditentukan peranannya di

Afrika dan menjangkaui sempadannya. Namun begitu, para pemerhati dan ilmuwan berkaitan hal kenegaraan Nigeria sedar tentang usaha pembentukan imej yang masih perlahan dan layanan buruk terhadap rakyat Nigeria di dalam dan juga di luar negara. Oleh yang demikian, kajian pertanyaan Kesan Diplomasi warga Nigeria reputasi pengurusan. Dalam mencari jawapan bagi persoalan ini, kajian ini telah menentukan perkaitan antara faktor-faktor dalaman dan luaran terhadap pembentukan polisi yang boleh membantu dalam krisis imej tersebut serta pengenalan bagi Diplomasi Rakyat dalam projek Nigeria ini. Secara khususnya, objektif kajian ini adalah: pertama, untuk mengenal pasti rasional di sebalik pendekatan berorientasikan rakyat dalam mendorong polisi luar Nigeria; kedua, untuk menganalisis kes-kes layanan buruk terhadap rakyat Nigeria; dan ketiga, untuk menilai strategi negara dalam membentuk imej yang positif. Oleh itu, kajian ini menilai impak Diplomasi Rakyat terhadap pembentukan imej

Nigeria di antara tahun 1999 dan 2015. Apabila suasana antarabangsa memberi reaksi terhadap tindakan yang diambil dari polisi nasional, telah wujud persamaan di antara suasana amalan domestik dengan tanggapan dari luar. Oleh itu, konsep Kuasa Lembut dan fahaman

‘Neoclassical Realism’ telah membentuk teori berkaitan kefahaman tentang kajian ini.

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Menggunakan kaedah primer (pemerhatian, temu duga dan kumpulan khusus) dan sekunder

(penilaian dokumen dan bahan rujukan) dalam pengumpulan data, yang dibentuk secara kualitatif dan dianalisis melalui pendekatan deskriptif berlatar belakangkan sejarah dan induktif, kajian ini mendapati bahawa imej yang negatif telah terhasil berkaitan kefahaman teoretikal dalam kesedaran diplomatik terhadap Diplomasi Rakyat. Dalam proses menganalisis pelbagai tahap, wujud ruang kosong yang jelas dalam hubungan dalaman dan luaran berkaitan dengan pembentukan imej Nigeria disebabkan oleh jurang yang besar di antara kepimpinan yang tidak berfokus dan ketiadaan rasa patriotik para pengikut yang diburukkan lagi dengan gejala rasuah. Maka, kajian ini mencadangkan demi untuk mewujudkan tanggapan positif terhadap imej Nigeria, negara itu paling utamanya perlu memperbetulkan keutamaan domestiknya tanpa membezakan antara perkaitan dan hubungan antara politik dalaman dan antarabangsa. Manakala dari segi penelitian teori pula, perlu ada kesepakatan dan penggabungan yang terbentuk dari sebarang perbincangan dan tindakan.

Kajian ini mencadangkan kombinasi strategi sosio-ekonomi, politik-keselamatan dan diplomatik dalam meningkatkan tahap kebajikan rakyat Nigeria di samping memperbaiki imej negara tersebut.

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CITIZEN DIPLOMACY IN NIGERIA’S IMAGE BUILDING, 1999-2015

ABSTRACT

This research is developed from two related concerns about Nigeria project. First, the desire to evaluate the impact of Nigeria’s domestic and external engagements on the plights of its citizens both at home and abroad, and second is the need to assess the effectiveness of government initiatives towards image crisis. Nigeria, with highest concentration of black people on earth, a bellwether for Africa and a hub for West Africa region, is a major player in

Africa political affairs and strategic to the global society as an oil-rich country. The rich endowment of mineral and human resources contributes to the notion of Nigeria’s manifest destiny in Africa and beyond. However, avid observers and scholars of Nigerian polity will notice a tottering image building and maltreatments of Nigerians both at home and abroad.

Consequently, the study queries the impact of Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria’s reputation management. To respond to this query, the study establishes the synergy between the internal and external factors in policymaking that conduce to image crisis and the introduction of

Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria project. Specifically, the objectives of the study are: one, to identify the rationale for citizen-oriented approach in Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust; two, to analyse the cases of ill-treatments on Nigerians; and three, to examine state’s strategies towards positive image. Indeed, the study evaluates the impact of Citizen Diplomacy on

Nigeria’s Image Building between 1999 and 2015. Since international environment reacts to actions emanating from national policies, domestic conditioning is coterminous with external perception. Therefore, the concept of Soft Power and Neoclassical Realism provide the theoretical insight into the study. Applying primary (interviews and focus groups) and secondary (literature and document reviews) methods of data collection, which were qualitatively designed and analysed through historically descripto-explanatory and inductive approach, the study discovers growth in the tree of negative image and indifferent theoretical insight in diplomatic realization of Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy. At the levels of analysis,

xviii there is lack of well-articulated internal and external dynamics in Nigeria’s image building because of wide gap between unfocused leadership and unpatriotic followership cum endemic corruption. Thus, the study shows that the ripple effect of the country’s inability to address its internal exigencies coupled with ineffective utilization of Citizen/Public Diplomacy in power capabilities is the bad external image and highhandedness in the treatment melted to Nigerians by most foreign countries. Hence, the study posits that most image building initiatives in

Nigeria are only addressing the symptoms of image crisis but not the root causes. For Nigeria’s image to be positively perceived, the country must first get its domestic priorities right without separating the interface and dynamics between domestic and international politics, through the practice of public diplomacy. And on the theoretical rigor, the pattern of outcomes of state’s interactions and its behaviours should be reconciled and incorporated. The study recommends multidimensional combinations of socioeconomic, politico-security and diplomatic strategies towards enhancing the welfare of Nigeria’s citizenry as well as improving on the country’s image climate.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The perception of a country’s global standing is an indispensable item in the diplomatic market. It is based on this perception, like every other country in the world, that the quest for a good image of Nigeria that is reflective on its citizens both at home and abroad has been the enduring components of the Nigeria project and the country’s policymaking on a range of issues like; the country’s enablement to evaluate how specific political, socio- cultural, security, ethno-religious, economic and regional dynamics interconnect; and how to provide insights in support of successful policy engagement. Hence, this research is developed from two related concerns about Nigeria project. First, the impact of the country’s policies on the welfare of Nigerian citizens. And second, the veracity and effectiveness of the government’s programmes on reputation management.

1.1 Background to the Study

That every sovereign state exists and operates within a much larger community of states, and should relate with the other sovereign members of that community is globally incontestable and one of long history (Alons, 2007; Branch, 2011; Buzan & Lawson, 2015; Mahoney, 2000). Thus, foreign policy is the primary instrument for the conduct and management of that relationship, and its goal is to defend and uphold the national interest and the overall welfares of the citizenry, which is reducible to politico-security and socioeconomic evaluations. Similarly, how a country is perceived is an indispensable item in the diplomatic market which defines its international standing.

Simon Anholt, cited in Akinterinwa (2010), opines that “the country’s reputation can be measured on the direct impact it has on every aspect of its socio-economic and politico- cultural progress” (p.199). In view of this, the study is developed out of the convergence of two related concerns about Nigeria’s image climate. The first, which is the core and a more normative interest to the study, is a desire to evaluate the impact of Nigeria’s domestic and external engagements on the plights of its citizens both at home and abroad. And the second is the need to assess the effectiveness of government initiatives towards image crisis.

This focus is important because Nigeria is strategic to the global society as an oil-rich country, a bellwether for Africa and a hub for West Africa region. Indeed, Nigeria is a major player in Africa’s diplomatic market and an important actor on the global stage. The country 1 is not only Africa’s most populous with second largest economy (after South Africa) but also has the highest concentration of black people on earth, with diverse natural and material endowments. Nigeria covers a whole area of about 923,768 square kilometers making it the 32nd largest country of the world by area (CIA World Factbook, 2016) and 7th most populous countries in the world with an estimated population rate of 182.2 million (UN Estimate, 2015).

On the coastal boundary, Nigeria is surrounded with the Gulf of Guinea in the south and shared land boundary with Cameroon in the east and Benin in the west. In the North are Chad (North East) and Niger (North West) (see Figure 1). It shares maritime borders with Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, and São Tomé and Príncipe. The latitudinal and longitudinal extent of the country is 4° to 14°N and 2° to 15°E respectively (Nigeria’s Profile, 2015). Abuja is Nigeria’s Federal Capital Territory (FCT) with over 1 million people. Lagos is its largest city with over 21 million people. Other prominent cities in Nigeria include: Kano (2.5 - 3 million), Ibadan (3.2 million), Port Harcourt (1.4 million), Benin City (1.2 million), Kaduna (800,000), among others (Nigeria’s Profile, 2015).

Figure 1: Physical Map of Nigeria Showing the 36 States and FCT, Populations Density and Neighbouring Countries

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Population_densit_map_of_Nigerian_states_-_English.png

The most prominent feature of Nigeria is the main rivers, Niger (where it got its name from), and Benue, the main tributary of the Niger (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The country climatic

2 condition is equatorial, arid and tropic in the south, north and center respectively, with the topography of valleys, plateaus, and hilly areas. Nigeria got its independence from Britain on 1st October, 1960 and became the 99th member of the United Nations on the 7th October, 1960.

It practices a Presidential system of Government, where the Head of State is also the Head of Government, and multiparty system with bicameral and unicameral legislatures at the Federal and State levels respectively. The Federal legislative arm is also known as the National Assembly with two Chambers: The Senate made up of 109 Senators (3 senators from each state representing the 3 Senatorial districts and 1 senator from Abuja) led by the Senate President, and the House of Representatives made of 360 Representatives (seats shared among states per population size) headed by the Speaker. At the state levels, there exist Houses of Assembly as the law-making body which is headed by Speakers (Chapter V, Part I&II of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria).

Culturally, Nigeria is a heterogeneous society with a great cultural diversity. The country is a multiethnic nation without any official figure for the number of ethnic groups in the country (Falola & Heaton, 2008; Nbete & Greene, 2013). While it is difficult to identify the exact number of ethnic groups in Nigeria, more than 250 ethnic groups have been estimated. There are three major ethnic groups (Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo) with no one enjoys absolute numeric majority. Economically, Nigeria has the strongest economies in Africa. This has been the foundation on which Nigeria’s African policy is built since independence. In 2014, the country became the largest economy of Africa going by the 2013 economic rebasing in the continent. The presence of the oil reserves in the country has contributed in its growing economy.

Nigeria dependends heavily on crude oil for revenue generation (95% exports) of the country while cocoa and rubber are other exports commodities with insignificant rate. Other natural resources of the country apart from petroleum which are yet untapped are: natural gas, tin, columbite, iron ore, coal, limestone, niobium, lead and zinc. Nigeria’s arable land is put at 38.97%. Agriculturally, Nigeria is endowed with arable land. The country’s agricultural products that are not exported include: cocoa, cassava (tapioca), yams, corn, millet, rice, sorghum, peanuts, rubber, cotton, palm oil, timber, cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, fish. Nigeria has a labour force of over 53.83 million, with over 23.9% unemployment rate (Nigeria’s Government Profile, 2013).

Nevertheless, the ability of a nation to diplomatically interact with other nations reflects its acceptance internationally. This comprises a couple of evaluations, which includes among other things; external image, national development, and its level of civility in terms of behavioural conformity with legal principles codified in both domestic and international laws (Akinterinwa, 2013c). This means that the conduct and management of any country’s foreign policy must recognize that international politics is a struggle for power, influence and prestige in a competitive international arena where the golden rule of state behaviour has always been self-help (Sampson, 2016). Therefore, it was no mistake seeing Nigeria returned to democracy in May 29, 1999 as a much-needed opportunity for the country to repair its relations with the international community which had been dented by a prolonged military rule (Alli, 2010a).

More so, a state’s external actions and behaviour, which may otherwise refer to as foreign policy, is absolutely a vital tool for image building, national development and the ability to project power in the international arena (Aleyomi & Abu Bakar, 2015; Bulley, 2014; Cristian, 2014; Cantir & Kaarbo, 2012; Oppermann & Spencer, 2013). Foreign policy is the basis for external relations of any given social formation through the internal dynamics of that formation for achieving certain interest that is national in configuration and all- encompassing the populace (Ujara & Ibietan, 2014). These dynamics at the domestic level determine a state’s foreign policy objectives.

Nigeria’s strategic position in Africa, its teeming population, and rich endowment of mineral resources including oil have all contributed to the notion of its manifest destiny in Africa and beyond (Bach, 2007). Since independence, Nigeria's objectives in its relations with the rest of the international community reflect the determinations of promoting and defending Africa's interests while at the same time ensuring the defense of its national interest (Adejumobi, 2016; Eze, 2010). These foreign policy objectives as highlighted by Sir Tafawa Balewa, the only Prime Minister of Nigeria, are predicated on the national interest and enlightened self-interest of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and its citizens (Alao, 2011; Amao & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015).

To briefly situate its role in the international environment, Nigeria had championed, led, and participated in so many interventions of some countries that were majorly under the ravages of conflicts, colonialism, racial discrimination (apartheid) and in fact, internecine Wars that happened in various countries at West African sub-region, Africa, and other parts of the world by sending its troops for peacekeeping missions in various war-zones (Uduma &

Nwosu, 2015). Nigeria led the challenge against apartheid in South Africa and helped many countries like Congo, Namibia and Zimbabwe to achieve independence. Nigeria also engaged in the contributions of financial and material largesse to the wellbeing of fellow African as well as Caribbean countries. This impactful role and orientation earned Nigeria significant image of a responsible and well-respected member among the global comity of nations.

The predominant components of Nigeria’s external relations have received ample attention in the literature and upon which actions and rhetoric have been deployed. Indeed, there is a general agreement among Nigerian scholars that the global perception of Nigeria, immediately after independence was that of a nation that had been destined to lead Africa and the entire black race, hence, necessitates Afrocentric posture (Akinyemi 2009; Akinterinwa, 2007; 2013c; Alao, 2011; Alli, 2011; Amao & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015; Bach, 2007; Effiong, 2012; Folarin, 2013; Fawole, 2003; Saliu 2006; 2014 etcetera). However, while not discarding Nigeria’s diplomatic gains from Africa countries and other nation- states, the quest of this policy thrust has oscillated between activism and docility.

Hence, the investiture of civil rule (Fourth Republic) in May 29, 1999 signaled a break with decades of military dictatorship and the general usurpation of the political will of the Nigerian people, with a renewed hope and succor to repair the country’s image and regain its lost glory with the global community (Alli, 2010a). Before the advent of the Fourth Republic, the image of the country was poisoned and relegated. Nigeria was in a state of disrepair which nosedive to a pariah status of the country. A once upon a time globally celebrated country plummeted into a state of ridicule not only in the international arena but also among its fellow Africa (Okeke & Aniche, 2014).

The Fourth Republic opened the hitherto constricted political space, which allows the welfare of Nigerian citizens and their rights to be guaranteed in line with the international instruments. The country in May 1999 ‘theoretically’ assumed a changing role in its political leadership for Africa and foreign policy commitment to fend for the welfare and security of Nigeria and Nigerians partly because colonialism and apartheid was out of reach with reality in Africa. Nigeria government presents a policy thrust, anchors on responsibility and sensitivity to benefit the Nigerian citizenry irrespective of where they reside (Maduekwe, 2009; Nwogbaga, 2013; Pine, 2011). More so, the policy thrust was adopted to improve Nigeria’s image and salvage its ‘pariah status’ that was bequeathed by several years of military rule (Okeke & Aniche, 2014; Ujara & Ibietan, 2014).

Indeed, this policy initiative that is citizen-oriented in approach, in objective and in outcome was officially espoused by Chief Ojo Maduekwe, the then Foreign Affairs Minister, as Citizen Diplomacy in 2007, which is a technique for the conduct and management of diplomacy using the citizens. However, it is not only contentious if Nigeria is yet to appreciate and begin to take advantage of it, but also disconcerting to assert if there has been sensitive consideration and responsiveness in the pursuit of people-oriented policy, to both domestic and external issues, as it affects Nigerians since 1999. Consequently, this ‘new’ diplomacy is analyzed in terms of its contents, coverage, and impact.

Flowing from this background, it is essential to examine the impact of Citizen Diplomacy on Nigeria’s image building between 1999 and 2015 in making Nigeria’s external relations more constructive in design and beneficial in outcomes. Specifically, the study examines how Nigeria’s external relations have responded to domestic issues within its external context and vice versa, and considers the degree to which it has impacted Nigerian citizens and the country’s image between 1999 and 2015. It considers how policymakers articulate and distribute the country’s power capabilities (especially the people/Nigerian citizens) to advance its image officially and unofficially within West Africa sub-region, Africa, and the entire world, when politico-security and socioeconomic landscapes of the country are assessed. It is in the light of these considerations that this research proceeds to clarify the statement of problem.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The perception of Nigeria and Nigerians (both at home and abroad) by other independent countries across the globe constitutes, perhaps, the major and most critical domestic and external challenges to Nigeria’s political stability, economic development and social cohesion (security). Many scholarly studies on Nigeria’s polity have tended to pay attention on virtually every conceivable topic on Nigeria project that could culminate into good perception of Nigeria image climate. Some of these scholars include: Adebajo (2015); Adebajo and Mustapha (2008); Adeyemo (2002); Akinboye (2013); Akiba (1998); Akindele (1990); Akinterinwa (2007; 2010; 2013c); Aluko (1981); Ashiru (2013); Bach (2007; 2013); Best (2007); Coker (2003); Edomah, Foulds and Jones (2017); Effiong (2012); Eze (2010); Fayomi, Chidozie and Ajayi (2015); Folarin (2010); Idang (1973); Lafenwa (2016); Mazrui (2006); Nwanolue and Iwuoha (2012); and Obi (2008; 2013)

Others include: Ogunnubi and Isike (2015); Ota and Ecoma (2015); Otobo and Obaze (2015); Pine (2011); Saliu (2007; 2014); Sampson (2014; 2016) Shaw and Fasehun (1980); 6

Ubi and Akinkuotu (2014); Usman (2016); and non-African scholars like Ruddock (2009); Bach (2007; 2013); Basedau, Vullers and Korner (2013); Blanchard (2015); Bokpin (2017); Campbell (2013); Graham (2017); Page and Barabas (2000); Schmit (2014); Tuman and Shirali (2017); and among other international groups, have tended to pay attention on virtually every conceivable topic on Nigeria project that could culminate into good perception of Nigeria image climate.

But an important area which, however, seems not well covered in these scholarly works is the Nigeria’s behaviour towards the use of relative power distributions (via the people or Nigerian public) that birthed citizen-oriented policy initiative, and inadequacy in addressing the lack of policy direction and focus in Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives as they affect Nigeria’s image building. In Nigeria, the ability to harness and judiciously distribute “power” between the domestic and international environments through people-to- people/citizen-to-citizen diplomatic means, towards articulating national interests and in enhancing positive image perceptions has not been clearly analyzed partly because of the ambiguity in Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives which are semantically interpreted by different leaders and foreign policy actors, or maybe because of the vagueness in interpreting Nigeria’s national interest (Adebajo & Mustapha, 2008; Akinterinwa, 2007; Anyaele, 2005; Bankole, 2015; Amao & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015; Eze, 2010).

Adebajo and Mustapha (2008) opine that the multi-ethnic nature of Nigeria with over 250 ethnic groups, its in-built cleavages, and dysfunctional inequalities, among other major issues, have made the definition of national interest problematic. The common agreement among scholars depicts that Nigeria’s policy on external relations is in a state of fluctuations. Thus, there is insufficient rationale for power distributions vis-à-vis how the external forces influence internal reactions and vice-versa, thereby create a gap in Nigeria’s image building in the body of literature. The study underscores this gap by identifying the reasons for internationalization of Nigeria’s external relations, then, provides ways of domesticating the foreign policy of Nigeria for achieving its objectives and the overall national interest of the country, which is reducible to safeguarding Nigerians’ welfare from mistreatments, and enhancing good image.

Notwithstanding the sizeable volume of scholarly contributions and literature in circulation on Nigeria project towards positive image, there is a dearth in scholars’ attention on the impact of the country’s policies making on Nigeria and Nigerian citizens both at home and abroad vis-à-vis the country’s external image. Nigeria’s external image has been of major

7 concern to the people and government of Nigeria. Without making any attempt of reviewing existing literature, Nigeria’s external relations have focused on Nigeria immediate neighbours; dynamic of Nigeria foreign policy towards external exigencies; Nigeria external policy and image crisis; the structure of the external influence in African conflict (Adebajo, 2008; Akujuru & Ruddock, 2016; Bach, 2013; Brown, 2016).

More so, intellectual write-ups have focused on Nigeria’s demographic and economic gigantism as rationale for pronouncing Africa as a centerpiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy (Bach, 2007; Mailafia, 2010; Ojo & Aghedo, 2013; Usman, 2016). These scholars and many other commentators have paid attention to query the gains and the losses of this enterprise on domestic affairs. Yet, Nigeria has not only become progressively demobilized in the sight of its citizenry, but also has caught napping in regional power and global affairs. Thus, creates a gap of power game resulting to Nigeria’s external image and continental leadership doldrums. This work aims at addressing this gap by examining the internal and external factors that inhibit Nigeria’s image and continental power by providing ways of consolidating the country’s initiatives on good image making at the continent and beyond.

Similarly, the question that arises from the conceptual issues is how has Nigerian government responded to the treatments of Nigerians both at home and abroad in improving on image climate? Several approaches and perspectives have been advanced to analyze Nigeria’s policy behaviour. Extant literature focuses on pattern of issues and behaviours of Nigeria’s interactions that affect Africa like continental integration and the pursuit of good neighbourliness (Adebajo & Landsberg, 2000; Mailafia, 2010; Nwanolue & Iwuoha, 2012); war against apartheid, decolonization and independence in Africa (Agbu, et al 2013; Bukarambe, 2000; James, 1999); security crises, peace-keeping operations and conflict resolution (Amao & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015; Bamidele, 2015; Obi, 2008; Sampson, 2016); development challenges (Bach, 2007); environmental degradation, political stability as well as economic development (Wogu, Sholarin & Chidozie 2015; Uddoh, 2016; Usman, 2016).

Whichever of these perspectives or combinations of them are employed depends on the writers’ interest and focus. However, avid readers will notice an obvious palpable limitation to Nigeria’s leadership and followership role especially in Citizen Diplomacy, hence create Nigeriancentric gap which has resulted into policy imbalance and conceptual reactions. There is little concentration of efforts on ‘citizen-centered’ diplomacy rather much concentration has been on the formations and malformations of Afrocentric policy and Nigeria’s ‘big-brother’ role in Africa.

Besides, the challenges of having robust, altruistic, and all-encompassing national interest in State’s policy architecture occupy a central concern not only in the academic circle, but also in the domains of civil society, foreign policy actors, analysts, the public policy and the entire citizenry from time immemorial (Effiong 2012; Flanik, 2011; Lafenwa, 2016; Saliu, 2014). Studies have tended to limit the effort on having foreign policy design that will enhance domestic interests in a globalized world chiefly because it is often a task difficult as establishing, if not much daunting, since there is difficulty is separating domestic policies from environmental factors and vice versa.

More so, previous studies have not adequately addressed the blurred distinctions between what is considered national and international interests and how to harmonize the basic parameters for Nigeria image building. Thus, there is a lacuna in reflecting on the internal and external factors that make up the country’s diplomatic objectives and image climates. This affects the country’s power, position and above all image climate in regional, continental, and global politics. In addressing this concern, the study introduces the politico- security and socioeconomic spheres as parameters to analyze Nigeria’s diplomatic thrust in the Fourth Republic by suggesting some robust and altruistic recommendations that will enhance positive image and ensure the Nigerianness in public policymaking. This will give the country global preference and increase its regional recognition as Africa’s hegemonic power.

In addition, scholars like Adebajo (2015), Bach (2007), Eze (2010) and host of others have made attempts to address the paucity of political will by the leadership and foreign policy actors towards the workability of economic development. Nigeria has virtually lost its autonomy in domestic economic policymaking because of lack of leadership political will. The country is dictated to by Western-oriented international institutions like the World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This situation has continually weakened the management of nation’s economy of the required independence and nationalism that can enable Nigeria to surmount dependency, underdevelopment, and poverty in a globalized world.

Lack of political will is a major issue of, and harmful influences on Nigeria’s image projection and national development that is responsible for its low rating in the world particularly among the comity of African nations. The work tends to address this major concern which has been previously noticed but sparingly attended to, by suggesting the inclusion of Nigerians both at home and abroad (from every segment and agency of the

9 society) in the day to day affairs of the country’s productive political economy and security development that can fend for beneficial economic and political engagement to enhance national development and citizens’ welfare.

Unarguably, Nigeria’s fate has a great impact on the concentric circle which defines its external rendezvous with West Africa as the inner concentric, the continent of Africa as the second, while the rest of the world is the third domain of the country’s external relations in order of priority (Adejumobi, Osunkoya & Omotere, 2011; Ajulo, 2007; Akinterinwa, 2012c; Ashaver, 2014; Gambari, 2008). Nigeria’s external relations reflect on the Member states of Gulf of Guinea, its immediate neighbours, ECOWAS, African Union, United States of America, European Union, United Nations, Common Wealth of Nations, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries among others international institutions and engagements.

Significantly, Nigeria is a regional peacekeeper, ranking as the Africa largest economy in 2014, a generator of business and investment, and a key interlocutor on debt and continent- wide initiatives such as the African Union-led negotiations and peace-keeping operation in Dafur region of Sudan among other places. Regrettably, as Goldwyn and Morrison (2005) opine that “an alternative scenario in which Nigeria is wracked by internal conflict or unable to manage crime and violence within its borders would lead the country to become an exporter of refugees, criminal activities and in an extreme case, a safe-haven for terrorism…” (p. 5).

Indeed, until recently, the Nigeria’s security challenge as a result of a terrorist group called Boko Haram was presumed to be an internal affair of Nigerian State that required an internal solution. The abduction of two hundred and seventy-six (276) Chibok school girls in April 14, 2014 and the international condemnations that were associated with the dastardly act, externalized the country’s security crisis beyond the shores of Nigeria (Chothia; 2014). As Garuba (2011) opines that “the world is becoming a global village, and the development in communication and computer technology has made state behaviour to be subjected to global scrutiny” (p. 33). In his view, Gurtov (1996) maintains that the greatest advantage of the present New World Order is that “borders have become increasingly porous and have been wiped out or re-arranged by global economic forces, trans-boundary environmental problems, ethnic, religious and cultural ties…” (p. 10).

Above all, Rose (1998) incorporates both external and internal variables by updating and systematizing the assumptions from classical realism and maintained that “the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the 10 international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities” (p. 146). Rose (1998) clarifies further that: …the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level… relative material power establishes the basic parameters of a country’s foreign policy… Foreign policy choices are made by actual political leaders and elites, and so it is their perceptions of relative power that matter, not simply relative quantities of physical resources or forces in being… because these affect the proportion of national resources that can be allocated to foreign policy. This means that countries with comparable gross capabilities but different state structures are likely to act differently. And finally, systemic pressures and incentives may shape the broad contours and general direction of foreign policy… limiting the menu of foreign policy choices considered by a state’s leaders at a particular time, rather than in forcing the selection of one particular item on that menu over another (pp. 146-147). Consequently, existing literature on Nigeria’s foreign policy thrusts seems to have ignored Rose’s (1998) assertion that deals with the State’s behaviour and relative material power capabilities which motivate the rationale for policy thrusts and domestic constraints, such as political, economic and military capabilities that influence State’s decisions towards image making. In this study, the application of neoclassical realism theory examines the specific details of state initiatives. This means that Nigeria’s foreign policy may not necessarily track the pattern of outcomes of its African policy, but must closely examine and understand the behavioural link between power and national interest within which State’s (foreign) policies are formulated and implemented.

Extant literature has not made significant attempt to link the internal and external exigencies to proffer solution for haphazard power distribution in Nigeria policymaking, hence create lacuna in the body of theoretical foundation. This work therefore attempts to fill this gap by interrogating the rationale for power distribution towards the exertion of Citizen Diplomacy; its impact on the treatment of Nigerians; and the efforts of the government towards image building/management in other to consolidate Nigeria’s global influence, positive perception, and national development.

1.3 Research Questions

To rationalize and put the above problem statement in proper perspective so as to understand the dynamics of Citizens Diplomacy on Nigeria’s Image Building, the study is designed to answer three basic questions:

1. What is the rationale for citizen-oriented approach as Nigeria’s foreign policy thrusts? 2. How has Citizen Diplomacy impacted Nigeria’s Image Building between 1999 and 2015? 3. In what ways has government initiatives helped to improve Nigeria’s image perception? 1.4 Research Objectives

In line with the research problems, this work is generally aimed at establishing a clear connection between the domestic and the international environments; and how a synergy between the external and internal factors in policymaking can conduce to the nation’s national interest, especially in terms of image management and protection of Nigerian citizens against mistreatment among the comity of nations. Specifically, the study is aimed at achieving the following objectives:

1. To identify the rationale for citizen-oriented approach as Nigeria’s foreign policy thrusts.

2 To analyze the impact of Citizen Diplomacy on Nigeria’s Image Building between 1999 and 2015. 3 To examine the government initiatives towards improving Nigeria’s image perception

1.5 Significance of the Study

The pursuit of national interests within a framework of continuity and change is the hallmark of both domestic and foreign policymaking and execution. International politics is currently witnessing new environmental conditionings that affect the exercise of national sovereignty and individual citizens of the world. The new face of international terrorism; the deepening implications of globalization; the increasing emphasis on multilateralism, to the detriment of States’ autonomy; the AIDS/HIV pandemic; and Africa’s renewed determination to liberate itself from the clutches of economic poverty, scourge of diseases and political instability, etc., are some of these new international environmental conditionings. The immediate implication of this, without any jot of doubt, is the need for re-articulation of Nigeria’s internal and external policies within an acceptable framework that considers, as a matter of priority, the survival of Nigerians, both at home and abroad, as a people and maintenance of the country’s positive image externally

The significance of this study lies on the policymaking behaviour of Nigeria’s State in the Fourth Republic. It is designed to know how policymaking has impacted the country’s national interest and image climate when Nigeria’s political, socioeconomic and security landscapes are assessed. The reason for this is to underscore a clear assessment of what led to Nigeria’s pariah status and the perception of the country during the Fourth Republic (1999 - 2015), in order to explore where the nation is heading to. As Lars-Göran Stenelo, reframes from Effiong (2012), has argued that in the field of foreign policy, predictions and forecasting have characterized futurology. Consequently, some measures of credibility are made in this study to forecast and fill the lacuna existing in the corpus of literature on Nigeria’s policymaking and image question.

Even though many scholars have written extensively on the Nigeria’s project and foreign policymaking (Adebajo, 2000; Adebajo and Mustapha, 2008; Adigbuo, 2005; Akinboye, 2013, Akinyemi, 1985; 1986; 2009; 2014; Amusan, 2006; Bach, 2013; Bokpin, 2017; Chidozie, et al, 2013; Fawole, 1990; Folarin, 2010; Fayomi, Chidozie & Ajayi, 2015; Pine, 2011; Tuman and Shirali, 2017 etc.), their contributions have tended to accuse or acquit the role of Nigeria in Africa vis-à-vis Citizen Diplomacy among others. None of these scholars has analyzed the impact of Nigeria’s policy thrust, using politico-security and socioeconomic capabilities as parameters, in an attempt to balance the distribution of elements of power to further enhance the country’s national interest and development of image climate. Conceptually therefore, the study would contribute to the existing literature.

More so, the study is empirically significant to benefiting the Nigerian citizens and non- citizens. The investigation into this study would help the State, non-state actors, diplomatic corps and foreign policy analysts, sociopolitical analysts, and the public to pinpoint the reasons for Nigeria’s behavioural pattern in its relationship with other countries. Also, it would allow the readers to analyze the objectives of Nigeria’s policy thrust on how it will snowball the country into maintaining positive image, and enhancing national development among the comity of nations.

This will help in boosting for the small niche of diplomatic studies of Nigeria’s external relations, and form the basis of a vibrant Nigeria that would be a pride and joy among the comity of nations and enhance the economic, political and security interests, domestically. Confronted with sweeping change, this study on Nigeria’s foreign policy would help to reflect and theorize on current trends and innovations in diplomatic practice, or even turn to scenario study of what may lie ahead.

The recommendations from this study would serve as guiding tools to the policy makers to avoid the catastrophes of some groups in Nigeria, who for one reason or another, not satisfied with the present sociopolitical, economic, and security situation in Nigeria, to resort to arms like Boko Haram and Niger-Delta militancy. For illustrative purposes, the recent renew of efforts for the emancipation of a ‘Biafran State’ (a movement for a sovereign state that claims to fight politics of domestic marginalization) in Nigeria’s south-eastern part, the challenges associated with Fulani herdsmen, and the allegedly ‘skewed’ anti-graft fight across the country are a good case of focus. This could weaken the Nigeria government and result in the disintegration into several splinter states, reminiscent of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Owugah, 2010).

1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study

To obtain well-shaped areas of investigation, the scope of this work stresses the importance of Citizen Diplomacy as foreign policy orientations of Nigeria between 1999 and 2015, on the country’s national interest towards enhancing positive image perception and the aspirations for its citizens’ welfare wherever they (citizens) reside. Because, it is sufficing to state that a vivacious and productive foreign policy depends on a fecund domestic polity and vice versa. So, for a nation to project its national interest, good foreign and domestic policy making and articulate implementation are indispensable. Hence, this study is delineated to assess the impact of Citizen Diplomacy in maintaining positive perception of Nigeria’s image.

This clarification has become necessary because Nigeria’s internal and external policymaking entails a lot of issues which a single study cannot contain all. Therefore, by limiting it to the dilemma of Nigeria’s policy initiatives in the Fourth Republic ventilated by the operative words of ‘image’ and ‘treatment’ of Nigerians enables the researcher to give the study a focus and the necessary attention that it deserves. The study also identifies and makes insightful reference to the past events since 1960. It is pertinent to probe the past to prospectively project into the future to enhance Nigerianness abroad and nation-building.

More so, this study has a period which coverage ranges from 1999 to 2015. This period includes three civilian administrations (Olusegun Obasanjo, May 29, 1999 - May, 29, 2007; Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, May 29, 2007 – May 5, 2010; and Goodluck Jonathan, May 6, 2010 – May, 29, 2015). The research cautiously selects the Forth Republic because the

14 period is quintessential in Nigeria’s political and diplomatic history that ostensibly symbolic in many respects.

First, in 1999 after a long period of military rule, Nigeria transited to civil rule which marks the new democratic dispensation and the beginning of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic as an independent nation. Second, the period opens the way for democracy and democratization and gives room for Nigeria’s rebirth. Third, it was also the period that President Obasanjo reawakened the country’s hope in image building that has been dented by the praetorian rule. And indeed lastly, 1999 to 2015 which spans 16 years affords enough time to evaluate the dynamics of Nigeria project in image building and the perception of the international community about the country.

Consequently, the theoretical and methodological standpoints of the study emphasize Nigeria’s image building and its diplomatic future. Nevertheless, to evaluate Nigeria foreign policy adequately, detail accounts of the foreign policies of the countries with whom Nigeria interacts is indispensable. This will be quite tasking for a work of this nature, hence, the problem of exhaustively dealing with the scope of subject. The scope is therefore drawn from empirical and theoretical formulations on various aspects in resetting Nigeria’s external relations. In both cases, clear ideas, strategies, focus and political will underpinned Nigeria’s policymaking, derived from strong intellectual basis and articulation.

1.7 Research Methodology

Blaikie (2003); Creswell (2014); Hennink (2007); Jonker and Pennink (2010); Newman (2011); and Obasi (1999) affirm that research methodology is the range of approaches used in research to gather data which are to be used as basis for inference, interpretation and for explanation and prediction either through qualitative or quantitative methods or the utilization of both. Thus, the research methodology for this study contains how the presented data was generated and analyzed in other to meet the objectives of the study. And so, the following techniques have been adopted.

1.7.1 Research Design

Indeed, all researches involve the elements of observation, description and analysis of what happens under certain circumstances either qualitatively or quantitatively or the combination of both (Creswell, 2014). However, this study adopts qualitative method due to its significant advantages. First, qualitative research is highly contextual, being collected

15 in a natural ‘field’ setting over periods of time. Second, it gives elaborate details of how and why events happen instead of giving a mere snapshot of events. And thirdly, it integrates participants’ enthusiasms, ideas/insights, manifestation of personal experience on a phenomenon or event either on agreement or conflict (Gray, 2013). It suggests that qualitative data are often inaccessible for immediate analysis without processing stage like transcription and editing notes before analyses.

Besides, Beasley et al (2012) and Patton (2004) posit that the use of qualitative approach in data gathering is advantageous as they are more open to changes and refinement of research ideas as the study progresses. This implies that qualitative data gathering tools are highly flexible that produce results that give meaning, experience and views. Qualitative method has been criticized for being lacking in methodological rigour, prone to researcher subjectivity, and based on small cases or limited evidence (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). However, it has been scientifically proven that qualitative research provides powerful source of analysis that describes and clarifies the flow of events chronologically leading to (un)expected findings (Creswell, 2014; Gray, 2013)

The adoption of qualitative instead of quantitative method enables the researcher to embark on an in-depth study of the Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy as well as appraising its impacts on national interests or image climates. As confirmed by Biereenu-Nnabugwu (2006) “…rather than emphasizing on the extent of objectivity and statistical manipulation…qualitative research is characteristically more involving” (p.159). Again, Baker (1999) declares that “qualitative research of all types, assumes a more naturalistic approach than quantitative research” (p.242). Qualitative method was also chosen because its aim is to construct meaning from social environment and helps to filter the data through a personal lens that is situated in a specific sociopolitical and historical moment (Creswell, 2014; Newman, 2011; Pope & Mays, 2000; Smith, 2004).

Consequently, the study is designed in a combination of historical ‘descripto-explanatory studies’ and inductive interpretation through thematic analysis, which helps to capture the normative dimensions of the study. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009) argue that when a “research project utilizes description, it is likely to be a precursor to explanation, such studies are known as descripto-explanatory studies” (p.140). The foregoing opinion suggests that descriptive study is a means to an end and not an end in itself. So, to further establish a causal relationship between citizen diplomacy and Nigeria’s image crisis through politico-security and socioeconomic considerations between internal and external

16 environmental conditionings necessitates the application of descripto-explanatory approach. Hence, the study adopts the historical descripto-explanatory throughout the analyses, and utilizes inductive interpretion to draw conclusions from data with ideas synthesized (Jonker & Pennink, 2010).

While on one hand, the historical descripto-explanatory process is not only considered as an extension or forerunner of exploratory research, it involves investigating, recording, analyzing and interpreting the events of the past for the purpose of discovering perspective on present and future directions. In fact, the objective of descriptive research is “to portray an accurate profile of persons, events or situations” (Robson, 2002, p.59). On the other hand, the inductive approach, being non-experimental, helps to group and understand the relationship between variables and the development of generalizations, principles or theories that have universal validity (Creswell, 2014; Hennink, 2007; Johnson, 2015; Katz, 2015).

Be that as it may, the research design of this study allows for evidence-based enquiries to explore, as Evera (1997) opines that, “whether events unfold in the manner predicted and (if the subject involves human behaviour) whether actors speak and act as the theory predicts” (p. 23), the inductively historical description is required to understanding the contexts and contents of how states’ actions or inactions reflect on Nigeria’s image climate at both domestic and international levels of analysis. This helps to x-ray the perspectives of Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria’s Image Building, 1999-2015.

1.7.2 Population of the Study

Indeed, in every research, the most important thing that attracts the researcher is whom or what to study. Ngulube (2005) describes population as the total collection of animate and inanimate objects under study. Based on this description, Biereenu-Nnabugwu (2006) defines population as not only to the number of people for study, but also institutions, things, objects or members of the target being studied or observed. Therefore, population could be seen as the entire group of people, events or things of interest that a researcher wishes to investigate.

Undeniably, Nigeria’s external relation is concerned with interaction between the domestic and the external environment vis-à-vis some changes in the opinion of decision makers, which lend credence to Beasley’s et al (2012) position on the use of qualitative method. Hence, in this study, the Nigerian state actors and its agencies especially the Presidency,

National Assembly, carrier diplomats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Institutes, among others formed part of the population of the study. The non-state actors include National Non-Governmental Organizations (NNGOs), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), selected individuals like Civil Servants, Businessmen, and Academia in the field of Political Science, International Relations and Foreign Policy among others also formed part of the population (see Appendices A & B).

Similarly, Nigerian foreign policy environment is anchored on concentric circles namely inner-most (Nigeria); inner (Africa); and outer (World) circles. Thus, these concentric circles equally constitute part of the population of the impact of “Citizen Diplomacy on Nigeria’s Image Building”.

1.7.3 Sample Size and Sampling Technique

Having accurate and reliable data from the entire population of the study as identified above, would be a daunting and unrealistic task. Hancock, Ockleford and Windridge (1998), Marshall (1996), and Smith (2004) rightly maintained that the main purpose of sampling is to effectively manage and reduce time and cost that would have been spent, if the total population were studied. Similarly, Johnson (2015), Marshall and Rossman (2014) also affirm that sampling is necessary when the entire population is large, when the time available for the project is limited and when resource (human and material) available for the project are inadequate.

Indeed, in line with the above observations, the study population is large and more importantly, the researcher does have enough human and material resources to cover the entire population. Hence, the researcher restricts findings to key personalities selected across the state and non-state actors, research institutes and policy formulators which eventually constitute the sample size of the study (Jonker & Pennink, 2010; Onwuegbuzie, et al, 2009; Smith, 2004). Therefore, the choice of the key representative members drawn from both the State and Non-State actors assists in minimizing cost and ensuring timely completion of this study.

The representative members or the sample size include: State’s policymakers; diplomatic and business community; scholars and experts in Political Science and International Relations; seasoned foreign policy analysts (especially those that worked with the three administrations that form the scope of this study); the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA); the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS); the Institute

18 for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR); some selected NNGOs and CSOs; and the opinions of some selected individual public commentators were relied upon in giving useful information that assisted in completing this study (Creswell, 2014; Johnson, 2015).

Furthermore, the technique of the sampling, which the researcher adopts in generating data for this study, is purposive sampling. It is practically impossible on epistemological basis to use the entire samples that are as representative as possible of the population under study (Gray, 2013). Therefore, the study adopts small samples of people, cases and phenomenon nested in the context of citizen diplomacy and Nigeria’s image crisis. The main goal of purposive sampling in this study is to focus on the perception of elites towards policy formulation, which enables us to achieve the objectives of the study and provides justification that forms generalizations (Patton, 2004).

Tongco (2007) observes that the use of purposive sampling technique depends on the goal of the study, and strongly recommends it for use; if the goal of the study is to obtain ideas, good insights and experience critical appraisal. Another justification for the use of purposive sampling in contrast to random sampling is the dynamic nature of data in qualitative method unlike the quantitative that is planned/pre-planned. In other words, samples in qualitative method may evolve during fieldwork and not necessarily need to be pre-planned unlike the random sampling.

Significantly therefore, this suggests flexibility in the selection of respondents. The choice of and consulting a participant may snowball into a decision to select another informant(s) which may not have been choosing initially by the researcher. Undeniably, in line with Tongco’s position and the flexibility in the use of purposive sampling, the researcher engaged with quite a number of key informants who are well-informed on critical appraisal of the Nigeria’s external image and the treatment of its Citizens both at home and abroad.

In terms of selection criteria in an attempt to measure the objectivity in the process yielding to the ‘richest’ data and not peripheral cases (Miles & Huberman, 1994), audience of the intelligentsia and the crème-de-la-crème (with prime focus of the study) across the highlighted sections of the population were selected for interview. The eligibility and inclusion criteria for sampling are knowledge of and contribution to the subject matter (most especially the policymakers who are not only knowledgeable but having the political ‘willpower’ to implement the result of the study), as well as expertise and active participation in Nigeria’s foreign policy process which falls within Tongco (2007) and Johnson (2015) recommendations. 19

For instance, the researcher finds it appealing the wealth of experience and contributions of some intelligentsia like past and present Director-Generals of Nigeria Institute of International Affairs; Directors in Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs Ministry; Director-Generals of Policymaking Institutes; some aides and Special Assistants to former Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Interior (Domestic Affairs) between 1999 and 2015; some Nigeria’s Legislatures and Legal Practitioners; Professors of Political Science and International Relations; and some seasoned scholar on Nigeria’s foreign policy; NGOs and CSOs; and private individuals.

Specifically, to avoid the pitfall of generalization, some members of the Senate and House of Representatives committees on Foreign and Internal Affairs were also interviewed. Also interviewed was the former Chairperson, House Committee on Diaspora and now Senior Special Assistant to President Buhari on Diaspora Affairs, Hon. Abike Dabiri-Erewa. Similarly, Professor Oshita Oshita, the Director-General Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution; Directors of Policy Planning Division; African Affairs and their counterpart in the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Nigeria; the Divisional Head of International Politics, Professor Osita Agbu, and some other Research Fellows at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs among many other career diplomats were consulted.

Again, in view of the spread that the research required, and in line with the positions of Beasley et al (2012), Gilbert (2006), and Marshall and Rossman (2014), two Research Assistants (Mr. Babatunde Fashiku and Mr. Lahei Toma Minti) were engaged. Mr. Fashiku assisted the researcher to organize the conduct of interviews and Focus Group Discussions at the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Abuja and at its Institute in Lagos. In the same vein, Mr. Minti assisted the researcher in facilitating respondents for interview at National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) in Kuru, Jos, and Ministries of Information and Internal Affairs (interior) in Abuja. Added to this, tape recorder was used as a tool for the entire interviews.

1.7.4 Data Collection Techniques

There is wide spectrum of data collection in any research specifically in qualitative method, but this study does source for its data via field studies and document reviews. In other words, the sources for data collection involve library and field research (Creswell, 2014; Onwuegbuzie, et al, 2009; Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009; Smith, 2004). Based on the adoption of qualitative research design which is analytical in nature, it is more useful in evaluating data from both primary and secondary sources as imperative to this study than 20 any other method (Hennink, 2007; Marshall & Rossman, 2014; Wray, Markovic & Manderson, 2007).

1.7.4(a) Primary Sources

The Primary data is sourced through the utilization of interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). Field notes which are supplemented by diaries written by the researcher, tape recordings were transcribed as quickly as possible for an overview of data and provide a guide as to which files and transcripts to consult at the analysis stage (Flick, 1998; Gray, 2013). While 32 Key-Informant Interviews (KII) was conducted (see Appendix B), a total number of twelve (12) NNGOs and CSOs (see Appendix A) in five different open free-flow focused group discussions (FGDs) (see Appendix C), were equally drafted to volunteer their perceptions, attitudes, and opinions towards the government initiative on the introduction of Citizen Diplomacy and its impacts on Nigeria’s image (Flick, 1998; Robson, 2002; Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). The interviews and FGDs were conducted by the researcher and the two research assistants (Mr. Tunde Fashiku and Mr. Lahei Toma Minti)

The Key-Informants and FGDs respondents were selected purposively due to their knowledge, insights and experienced in appraising Nigeria project as it concerns the country’s diplomatic relations. Five (5) groups were formed for the FGDs with minimum of five (5) participants in each group (Blaikie, 2002; Marshall & Rossman, 2014). The high cost of logistics and time constraint limit selection of members in the FGD to five, apart from the fact that it is the minimum requirements for qualitiative research (Marshall & Rossman, 2014). The key-informants for the interview increased to 28 as a result of qualitative advice by some of the interviewees of the need for the researcher to consult some suggested names of people for further information/data. This is in line with Marshall and Rossman (2014) who opine that the beauty of qualitative method is its openness to changes as the study progresses. The researcher came to a conclusion that the selected samples were sufficient at the saturation stage of information.

On the technical aspects during the interviews and FGDs, respondents were encouraged to relate their experiences on the significance of Citizen Diplomacy and Nigeria’s image. They were also free to narrate useful events that could assist in confirming or rejecting information derived from other sources in line with McNabb (2015) who affirms that unstructured interview assists the respondents to provide their own definitions of their opinions and attitudes as they see fit. Babbie (2007) explains further that “the interviewer 21 has a great deal of freedom to probe various areas and raise specific queries during the course of the interview” (p. 265).

Other primary source consists of unprocessed information from government and diplomatic documentations (like diplomatic notes, memoir, and correspondences). The ‘raw’ nature of data collection makes primary source of data high reliable in social research (Babbie, 2007; McNabb, 2015). However, the possibility of participants distorting information is likely (Marshall & Rossman, 2014; Onwuegbuzie, et al, 2009; Tongco, 2007). Hence, to avoid this pitfall, all the sources (fieldwork and literature) including raw data from official gazettes were scrutinized by the researcher via Gilbert’s (2001; 2006) and Wray, Markovic and Manderson (2007) principles of data triangulation and intensive-research practices.

The primary source helps to reconcile the data collected from governmental institutions and other sources, which inform the findings and position of this study (Hennink, 2007; McLafferty, 2004; Onwuegbuzie, et al, 2009). The study adopts both semi-structured and unstructured interview as one of the instrument of data collection. The reason for semi- structured interview was connected to the fact that some key informants complained about time constraint and unavoidable logistics to meet them one-on-one. So, they responded to the questions via email (Gray, 2013; Harrell & Bradley, 2009; Newman, 2011).

1.7.4(b) Secondary Sources

The secondary data from literature and document reviews, on the other hand, is sourced through library materials such as books, journal articles, published official gazettes, national dailies, published and unpublished materials like thesis, monographs, besides materials from surfing the internet (Hennink, 2007; Marshall & Rossman, 2014). They constitute greater percentage of data sources and used extensively in this study. The secondary data helps to increase the validity of research findings and minimize likely biases from the primary sources. The materials were obtained from Universiti Sains Malaysia, University of Ilorin, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Libraries, National Library Ilorin, as well as National Library Abuja.

1.7.5 Data Analysis Techniques

Data analysis involves the process of separating or deconstructing the whole data into its smaller component units to reveal the meaning, observable elements, nature and structure of the data (Creswell, 2014; Gilbert, 2006; Gray, 2013). Indeed, Blaikie (2003) opined that data analysis is the process of evaluating and treating data collected for answering the 22 research question(s). Thus, the study applies thematic analysis to qualitatively scrutinize data collected. Also, thematic and direct quotations were applied as the technigues of analysis for the interviews transcription and FGDs. Data were gathered and repeatedly scruitinised via ‘immersion’ with the intention of finding emerging patterns, themes, and sub-themes (Gray, 2013). This allows the researcher to categorize the data under different sections.

Thematic analysis makes inferences about data, which is usually text, by systematically and objectively identifying special categorized characteristics within them for themes or sub- themes (Wray, Markovic & Manderson, 2007). The study applies historical descripto- explanatory and inductively interpreted. The historical-descriptive cum explanatory approach lays the basis for analysis while inductive interpretation helps to explain, understand and gain insights to reach a generally acceptable conclusion.

The application of thematic analysis in this study is quite significant due to the following factors among others. One, it is simple, less time consuming, cost-effective and flexible without the need to design and issue costly questionnaires. And two, it allows the use of existing documentation such as high-powered committee reports, unpublished government gazettes, memoranda, memoire, or electronic mails to serve as the basis for data (Gray, 2013). However, some researchers have criticized thematic analysis that the approach relies on simple ‘old’ data, rather than gathering fresh information. More so, it has been disparaged of incapability of exploring association and causal relationships between variables (Flick, 1998). Notwithstanding the above criticisms, the justification of thematic analysis in this study apart from using field studies is to provide a description and understanding the motivation and result of the study. Also, the motivation is not to locate or establish a ‘new’ theory unlike grounded theory approach rather the study is designed to identify and interpret state’s behaviour and external perceptions on Nigeria and Nigerians (Locke, 2001)

On the units of analysis, the state behaviour and external perceptions of Nigeria at the domestic and international levels become indispensable. In other words, the level of analysis is focused on two indices. First, is the nexus between the domestic and external policies in the distribution of power and drafting of Citizen Diplomacy, and second, is the role of state in the implementation of Citizen Diplomacy. These two levels necessitate the theoretical framework of the study, which highlights the structural focus in explaining foreign policy decisions of individual states rather than predicting patterns of outcomes at the system level.

This helps to assess the Nigeria’s diplomatic thrust and its performance on the national interests and the country’s image building over a period of time.

From the foregoing, the study focuses on very important parameters. There are many indicators that can be deployed to explain Nigeria’s project/initiatives that influence the country’s national interests and its image perception. They include: personal idiosyncrasies of the leaders/actors, geographical location, socio-cultural factor, ethno-religious milieu, political, economic, military among other environmental factors, but based on this research work, three main indicators namely; socioeconomic, political, and military/security are employed.

These politico-security and socioeconomic tools are critical parameters for domestic and international levels of analyses in this study because they form the essence and the whole existence of any state (Adeola & Ogunnoiki, 2015; Bach, 2013; Obi, 2008). Besides, they facilitate the understanding of how other environmental factors influence the behaviour of Nigeria State towards image perception and management. These levels of analysis also corroborate the loopholes in domestic and external milieus of Nigeria’s policymaking, cum leadership/elite’s perceptions in choosing, framing and implementing Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy.

Consequently, the research applies triangulation technique comprises of three different tools (primary source, secondary source, and unprocessed official materials). These different tools reliably help to validate the efficacy of each other data collected (Creswell, 2014; Onwuegbuzie, Dickinson, Leech & Zoran, 2009; Yeasmin & Rahman, 2012). Golafshani (2003) and Gray (2013) observe that triangulation is an authoritative and scientific technique in research design, especially a qualitative one that helps to validate several collected data by adopting cross-confirmation, to strengthening the credibility and defensibility of results. Indeed, the triangulation principle concerns the use of different tools in the same study to collect data to verify the validity of any findings and enhancing their robustness

Therefore, the researcher held three principles of objectivity in line with Gilbert (2001; 2006) in mind to achieve the goals of triangulation as a method of social research namely: “Authenticity”, which explains if the evidence is genuinely obtained without any questionable biases. Secondly, “representativeness”, explains if the data is distinctly

24 collected or not; and finally, “meaning”, which aims at discovering the degree to which the data collected is flawless and easily understood.

1.7.6 Limitations to the Methodology

This study encounters limitations, especially in the areas of logistics and finance. Indeed, the researcher met some difficulties due to prevalent logistics while collecting information and sourcing for materials for the timely completion of this work. The oath of secrecy in Nigeria’s public service which was promulgated in line with Public Service Act of 1962 prevented many career officials to volunteer valuable and necessary information to the researcher. The oath of secrecy conceptualizes the administrative loyalty, commitment and dedication of the public servant to the government. This is an effort to control the flow of information in and outside the government parastatal.

In addition to logistics challenges, an appointment was booked with Chief Ojo Maduekwe, the then Foreign Affairs Minister, who officially introduced Citizen Diplomacy into the lexicon of Nigeria’s foreign policy, for Monday July 11, 2016 but unfortunately, he died, on June 29, 2016, before the scheduled date for the interview. However, the researcher got succor and quality responses from those who worked with him during his tenure as Foreign Affairs Minister, especially from Bola Akinterinwa, Alade Fawole, Osita Agbu, with some retired career diplomats and some that are still working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

More significantly, textbooks are costly, and the worst of all, the researcher was self- sponsored. There was no financial assistance from government or corporate organization, coupled with family needs which the researcher was bound to give adequate attention. Again, even the transport fare of moving from one destination to another (most especially from Malaysia to Nigeria and vice versa) including domestic transportation cost within Nigeria, for gathering reading materials and fieldtrips, conducting oral interview and Focus Group Discussions, are occasionally problematic.

1.8 Justification of the Study

While it is apt to keep profitable and viable relationships, it is critical to input priority to the various relationships and periodically reassess or redefine such relationships to meet the realities and dynamics of the rapidly globalizing world most especially in this twenty-first (21st) century (Sampson, 2016). Based on this bedrock, the work is designed not only to fill the gaps associated with Nigeria’s diplomatic policy as enunciated in the problem statement above, which explains the seriousness attached to the need for a new course in the country’s 25 international engagement, but also to fully assert itself truly as the giant of Africa in the improved areas of socio-political economy, industrialization, national integration, security stability, and above all image improvement.

The review of Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust in the Fourth Republic focusing on Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria’s image building is inevitable because it is intended to bring out the whole essence of Nigeria’s diplomatic relations and sum up the country’s interests and refocus its policy direction towards image building within the international system. This area, however, remains one of the unfulfilled potentials by previous scholars, analysts and actors of Nigeria project and foreign policy.

Literature on Nigeria’s external relations must not be shortsighted in the considerations for any new foreign policy at this stage of the country’s history, in the ever-dynamic global village, of which Nigeria is a member. There is, at best, little public knowledge of Citizen Diplomacy. The littleness cannot be separated from little publicity or little awareness, and perhaps more importantly the newness of the policy thrust. This work will help to publicized the concept of Citizen Diplomacy

The challenges of achieving sustainable development and good image attributable to both internal and external dynamics, call for serious introspection because the country cannot continue to do the same things the same old way and expect different results. As Ashaver (2014) opines that “without a well-fashioned and articulated foreign policy framework, a nation would only be heading to a cul-de-sac in international diplomacy” (p.7). In other words, as imperative it is to put in place a viable policy framework, it is also expedient to have periodic review to avoid a situation whereby policy progress will be made impossible. Nevertheless, it is understandable when Nigeria’s foreign policy under the Fourth Republic between 1999 and 2015 is critically assessed. There is need for strategy reflection on Nigeria’s policymaking most especially after a period of 16years of uninterrupted democratic rule. This assessment will drive the country’s policy direction to advance its national interests at both domestic and external levels.

Its return to democratic rule in 1999 and in pursuing its national interests, Nigeria has faced serious challenges on development and image issues. Though, the country seems to have assumed a changing role in its political leadership for Africa as Pan-African policy is out of touch with reality. Unfortunately, this changing role has not been adequately formulated and implemented. This necessitates the urgent need for self-preservation, particularly for its vast

26 natural resources, against the backdrop of Nigeria’s comprehensive framework for transforming into one of the world twenty leading economies by the year 2020.

As it has been emphasized in this work that continental issues of Africa were the primary focus and concern of the Nigerian government from independence, the assessment of the nexus between ‘Nigeria’s citizen-centricism’ and ‘Afro-centricism’ is long overdue. Extant literatures have revealed that in the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy, the demarcation among the layers (domestic and international) has remained vague (Adejumobi, 2016; Adejumobi, et al, 2011; Adoba, 2014; Ashaver, 2014; Effiong, 2012; Ogunsanwo, 2010; Usman, 2016).

Chief among is enormous resources that were committed to the cause of Africa at the detriment of the interests of inner circle (Nigeria) of the concentric, and misunderstanding of what the concept of Citizen Diplomacy is meant to be and what it is also meant to serve. However, there is little or no effort made from available literature to impressively find out the rationale for power distribution and exertion of Citizen Diplomacy as a ‘new’ foreign policy thrust in harnessing the elements of power to further the country’s national interest and image building.

The xenophobic action in South Africa against Nigeria citizens in the wake of global crisis should have been an impetus for the Nigerian government to reassess the country’s leadership role in Africa and its Citizen Diplomacy as it has not been significantly beneficial. More so, the failure of Nigeria yet to be a permanent member in the UN Security Council despite its roles in international politics as a result of regional competition to that effect is a major diplomatic concern. Hence, a timely review of articulating Nigeria’s interest in its domestic and foreign policy architecture, based on history and current happenings, is sacrosanct. This work is devoted to achieving that, therefore, makes the study highly significant

Finally, suffice to say that external and internal issues are inextricably linked and that only for analytical purposes could the distinction between them become necessary, but absence of empirical and normative inquiries in contrasting foreign and domestic issues has forced scholars of foreign policy to rely on speculations from secondary source rather than data from field survey (Adeola & Ogunnaiki, 2015; Bach, 2007; Ojo & Aghedo, 2013; Ujara & Ibietan, 2014; Usman, 2016). It is imperative to bridge this gap, hence, the justification for

27 this study because while the state’s interest should come first, the interface between domestic and international politics should not be erroneously separated from each other.

1.9 Organization of Chapters

This study on “Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria’s Image Building, 1999 – 2015”, is organized into six chapters. Chapter one is titled Introduction, and it contains Background to the Study; Statement of the Problem; Research Questions; Research Objectives; Significance of the Study; Scope/Limitation of the Study; Research Methodology; Justification of the Study; as well as Organization of Chapters.

Chapter two is titled: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework. It contains an introduction and divided into three sections. The first section comprises some conceptual clarifications. The second section is the review of some related literature. The third section is the theoretical framework which contains the Meaning and Relevance of the concept of Soft Power and Neoclassical Realism, conceptual weaknesses, and Justifications of the Conceptual and Theoretical Framework before Concluding Remarks.

Again, Chapter three is titled: Relative Power Distribution and Rationale for the adoption of Citizen Diplomacy. It contains introduction; Relative Power Distributions; Background to Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy. It explores the backgrounds of Nigeria’s policymaking which establishes the trend that runs through elites’ perception and relative power distributions. The substantive section, Rationale for the Adoption of Citizen Diplomacy, contains the nitty-gritty of the chapter and addresses the first objective of the study.

In addition, Chapter four is titled: Impact Analysis of Citizen Diplomacy on Nigeria’s Image Building. This chapter discusses the central theme of the research, which is predicated on how citizens are treated at home and abroad. The examination of the impact of Citizen Diplomacy on the welfare of Nigerians as discussed in the chapter is divided into internal and external phases. The chapter contains Introduction, and divided into three major sections: Impact of Citizen Diplomacy on Nigerians in Nigeria; Impact of Citizen Diplomacy on Nigerians Abroad; and Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy and International Organizations.

Chapter five is titled: State Response towards Improving Nigeria’s Image Abroad. The chapter begins with an introduction, and highlights the roles played by each of the three administrations under the scope of the study (Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, 1999-2007; Alhaji Musa Yar’Adua, 2007-2010; and Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, 2010-2015) towards image 28 building and their reactions to cases of mistreatment of Nigerians abroad. Lastly, chapter six contains the Summary, Conclusion, and Recommendations before References and Appendices.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 Introduction This study on Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria’s image building is an integral part of Nigeria foreign policy analysis. Foreign policy has been an intellectual attraction to both local and foreign scholars as well as public commentators and observers of Nigeria’s politics. Consequently, this chapter, which carefully examined scholarly views of both local and foreign scholars on Nigeria foreign policy, has three sections. The first section explicates some germane concepts of the study. While section two reviews some relevant literature relevant to discuss their essential arguments and their contributions to the theme of Nigerian foreign policy, with the aim of identifying existing gaps in the literature. The third section covers the theoretical framework and its justifications for analyzing the study.

2.1 Conceptual Clarifications

2.1.1 The Concept of “Nation” and “State”

The problem of defining concepts in the study of social sciences is a longstanding one. Hence, there is a conceptual impasse characterizing studies of concepts such as ‘nation’ and ‘state’. The main reason for this is due to the belief that it is not the essentiality of the nation that matters, but rather the real problem to define it. Several scholarly definitions of nation are copious in the literature. Barkin and Cronin (1994), Checkel (1999), Folarin (2010), Hobsbawm (2012), Meyer, et al (1997), Osuntokun (2013), Rose (1998), Seymour (2000), Zarri (2012), have defined nation in different ways but central to these definitions is the agreement that the term nation share common understanding in its characteristics like territory, common language and economy, mentality (shared beliefs), and so on. Hence, is Nigeria a nation? Seymour (2000) points out a conceptual pluralism that explains the term “nation”. This conceptual pluralism includes:

i. Ethnic concept of nation, which sees the nation as group of individuals who have the same ancestry or who believe that they have the same ancestry. ii. Civic account of the nation. In this case, the nation is equated with a sovereign state or a country. iii. The third is the purely cultural definition of the nation as sharing the same language and culture and sharing an attachment to the same history.

iv. There is also the diaspora definition of nation which assumes the existence of many groups having roughly the same culture. v. And finally, there is the sociopolitical concept of the nation which sees a nation as a certain sort of political community.

Thus, nation could be simply referred to as the people, and by implication, Nigeria is a nation. The country is created by a shared belief that the people inside the country are connected to each other. The idea that people of a nation are connected to each other is called nationalism because a nation is a large group of people with strong bonds of identity. Therefore, Nigeria’s nationalist leaders like Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Dr. N. Azikiwe, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, among several others who fought for Nigeria’s independent, apart from laying the foundations of the country’s foreign policy, viewed Nigeria as a nation that is obviously formed and amalgamated by Sir Lord Fredrick Luggard to fill the leaderhip roles in Africa and the world (Bach, 2007; Folarin, 2010, p.3; Ota & Ecoma, 2015).

A nation according to Folarin (2010) is “a group of people with common heritage and homogenous socio-cultural and political elements who live in a social space or community” (p.23). It is a prevailing metaphor that form the two social groupings of polity (state), and ethnic entity (the people), which fight for their exclusive property. National identities focus on issues affecting the people, which can be defined as “state or national”, because the state is a composite whole made up of many parts—the citizens who compose it (Zarri, 2012).

Therefore, issues relating to nation-building can be called state-building. Subsequent upon this, how can state be defined? Kukathas (2014) defines a state as a form of political association, which is only one form of human association. This definition suggests that the state is the most powerful of all social institutions which does not incorporates into any other political associations, but incorporates others. A state arises out of society, but it does not contain or subsume society (Kukathas, 2014; Sampson, 2016). Again, a state is described by the famous Declaration of the 1933 Montevideo Convention of the (then Pan American Union) Organization of America States, Article 1 as a pattern of international law that possess: a permanent population; a defined territory; government; and capacity to enter relations with other states (Grant, 1998).

Montevideo’s definition is legalistic and reflective of the prevailing situation of a country’s issues in its relationship with other country which underscores foreign policy. The nation and the state serve as the fundamental parts of the nation-state. Hence, Meyer, et al (1997)

31 defined nation-state as a “worldwide institution constructed by worldwide cultural and associational processes…” (p. 144). It could be deduced from these definitions that from time immemorial, States (political leaders) have been conscious of the importance of their national image in their external engagements (Kunczik, 1997; Uduma & Nwosu, 2015).

The nation state is a system of political, socioeconomic, security, geographic, and cultural organization, in which people with a common identity live inside a country with firm borders and a single government. However, it is one of the most important parts of peoples’ life that is often ignored (Barkin & Cronin, 1994; Hobsbawm, 2012; Usman, 2016). The nation state is held together by its physical boundaries, identity, language, laws and its government, and the fact that the people believe they are connected to each other. Although the attributes of the state may still hold today but the legalistic approach to its conceptualization is increasingly coming under challenge because most states do not sustain these characteristics in full chiefly due to the presence of globalization and international configurations most especially after the Cold War in 1991.

For the purposes of this research the definition of nation-state by Smith (1991), which illustrates that it is “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (p. 14), will be adopted. Consequent upon Smith’s illustration of state, Nigeria could be seen as a nation-state, not because of its increasingly ethno-nationalities of over 250 groups (Nbete & Greene, 2013), but because nation-building and nationhood is indeed an evolutionary process with a long lifespan. Nigeria therefore fit into Smith’s position of a nation-state, as long as it is still evolving.

What informed this clarification is because the essence of nation-state (Nigeria citizens) is rarely defined and considered in Nigeria’s foreign policy. Regardless of the theoretical approach however, the concept of Nigeria as a nation-state tends to be practically viewed as a static and a fixed concept as a set of ideas that underlies Nigeria external relations.

2.1.2 External Relations/Foreign Policy

External relations are synonymous with foreign policy (Palmer and Perkins, 2000). It is a broader term that entails all kinds of interaction that traverse states borders. The interaction could be in economic, political, social, religion, cultural, military, or even in sports. The term external relations to Goldstein (2006) and Saliu (2015), is a holistic term that contains all the relationships between states and non-states actors (international organizations,

32 multinational corporations, individuals etc.) about other social structures (including economic, cultural, and domestic policies). Indeed, external relations include almost everything that does with human relations across the world. Foreign policy is the primary instrument for the conduct and management of that relationship. Therefore, external relation is synonymous with foreign policy, which is reflective on the citizens or national interests.

From the strength of the forging, foreign policy is substantive and legislative. This is deliberate steps taken by a state which intends to maximize the opportunities that are available outside its geographical boundaries, at the same time minimizing the perils that abound. This can be achieved via states objectives which include primary, secondary, and tertiary (Omotere, 2011; Saliu, 2013). In order of importance and ranking, primary objectives are those concerns that are critical and essential for the existence of a state. Secondary objectives are the concerns that a state has outside its shore. For instance, protection of rights of citizens living outside the country, while tertiary objectives are utopia which no state can achieve on its own. In other words, Nigeria foreign policy is the deliberate and conscious decision taken by the state in coping with its external environment.

2.1.3 Afrocentrism

Afrocentrism denotes Nigeria’s paraphernalia to ensure the unity and integrity of African in the spirit of camaraderie. Basically, when Nigeria attained independence in 1960 the country, led by the first and last Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, and the first Nigerian President, Nnamdi Azikwe, leaders of Nigeria’s First Republic, established the ‘historic mission’ and ‘manifest destiny’ of Nigeria in Africa and thereby committed efforts at addressing the scourge of continental concerns. These leaders put up certain objectives and outlined the guiding principles that will characterize Nigeria’s foreign policy (Bach, 2007).

One of these objectives is to maintain unity and solidarity in the Africa continent which propelled the establishment of the first African organization known as Organization of African Unity (now called African Union-AU) in May 25, 1963 as the vehicle for promoting and managing intra-African relations, and also the formation of a regional institution which covers the entire West Africa region known as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in May 28, 1975 as efforts to promote economic cooperation and integration. In other words, Afrocentric policy thrust not only motivated Nigeria’s membership of OAU and ECOWAS but propelled the country as one of the founding members of these organizations.

Above all, the issue of ensuring unity among African states is very critical to Nigeria. Indeed, to avoid the pitfall of oversimplification, Afrocentricism is a Nigeria foreign policy that sees Africa as the corner stone of Nigeria’s external engagements (Akinterinwa, 2012b; Agbu, Okereke, Wapmuk & Adeniyi, 2013; Bukarambe, 2000; Osuntokun, 2008). It is based on these heavy-duty roles that Nigeria’s foreign policy is often refers to as Nigeria’s African policy. Therefore, Africa is the fulcrum on which Nigeria’s foreign policy is built. Nigeria’s interest, as the largest concentration of black people in the world, is inextricably tied to the survival of Africa as Nigeria emphasized African cooperation and liberation and need to fight for and restore the dignity of every black man (Adebajo, 2008; 2015).

One critical point worthy of note is that, the Afrocentric policy thrust is an idea that is based on the principle of voluntarism because all the Nigeria’s ‘investments’ are out of the country’s volition and not forced or mandated by any state. This may have served as a point for scholars to challenge the persistent efforts towards Afrocentric policy even when it is perceived unrewarding. This notwithstanding, a country like Nigeria with the significance of its size, location, abundance natural resources (tapped and untapped), coupled with its large and dynamic population, could be a pride internally and have an important role to play not only in Africa continent but also in the global system, if its goals are set right in balancing and harnessing the elements of national power to further the country’s national interest. This is the overall focus of this study.

2.1.4. Citizen and Public Diplomacy

Indeed, the cardinal unit of a nation in its decision-making is the citizen’s engagement and interest (Baum & Potter, 2008). Specifically, in the liberal democracy, the duties and rights of people coupled with non-infringement on the citizen interests and privileges constitute democratic principles (Chandler, 2011). While on the one hand, the word “citizen” is used to qualify a ‘legitimate’ member of a State, “citizenship” describes the processes and methods of becoming a citizen of a nation or society. On the other hand, diplomacy, as one of the means of implementing foreign policy, is described as the peaceful process and skillful method of negotiation by which the government of nations manage their external relations with other actors in international politics (Folarin, 2014; Saliu, 2010)

Diplomacy is a means to an end, and not an end itself. This suggests that it can be bad or good. It is the application of tact and intellect in an environment of conflicting international interests and belligerency. Therefore, Citizen Diplomacy, may describe the processes

34 through which the interest and welfare of the citizen, which must be sacrosanct, constitutes the essence of any country’s domestic or foreign policy. Drawn from this position, a nation irrespective of its level of interaction with another nation is expected to put into consideration its national interest which must be obviously seen on its citizenry. When every government comes into power in Nigeria, with respect to its interaction with international arena, it tends to articulate a vision or thrust of its foreign policy. Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs Ministers overtime like to give a distinctive appellation to their own foreign policy style.

Be that as it may, Ibrahim Gambari, former Nigeria’s Foreign Minister (1984-1985) under General Muhammad Buhari, introduced ‘Concentric Circle approach’ to foreign policy making. He posited that foreign policy should be prioritized, made and implemented using concentric approach. With this, Gambari who is also a foreign policy scholar, canvassed for foreign policy that was concentric-sized into four, comprises both innermost circle and outer circle. The innermost circle (which is Nigeria and the most important) contained national self-preservation, national security, and national survival among others. The outer circle comprises West Africa, the entire Africa continent, and the World outside Africa respectively, in order of importance to underscore economic cooperation and development where Nigeria responds to challenges of international politics, globalization, peace and security, and economic growth and development (Akinterinwa, 2007; Omotere, 2011).

Indeed, as a modification to Gambari’s policy thrust, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, another former Nigeria Foreign Affairs Minister between 2003 and 2006, formulated ‘Constructive and Beneficial Concentricism’ as a new thrust of Nigeria’s foreign policy (Adeniji, 2005; Ashaver, 2014). Ambassador Adeniji agreed with the concentricism of Gambari, however, he added that in each concentric circle, Nigeria’s interest should be constructively articulated to benefit the Nigerian people (Osuntokun, 2007; Saliu, 2007). In other words, citizens should be the primary focus of Nigeria in conducting bilateral and multilateral engagements. Thus, the constructive and beneficial concentricism as a foreign policy thrust, according to Akinterinwa (2004; 2012) was people oriented in conception, in design, and in implementation

In the same vein, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, the Foreign Minister between 2007 and 2010, introduced ‘Citizen Diplomacy’ as a rational policy thrust of Nigeria’s external relations. This policy thrust is a re-branding of the Constructive and Beneficial Concentricism formulated by Ambassador Adeniji (Akinterinwa, 2013c). The concept of Citizen Diplomacy originated from the United States of America and was coined by David Hoffman

35 in 1981 in an effort to alleviate the cold war and “rankism” between the US-led capitalist West and the Russian-led socialist East to promte peace (Odoh & Nwogbaga, 2014). Indeed, Citizen Diplomacy is a prime example of soft power for reputation management, legitimacy and credibility, but it is easily dismissed as too soft and peripheral to the real issue of policy (Nye, 1991)

Thus, the concept of Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria, which though was popularized by the Yar'Adua administration, is essentially an old practice in international relations because that is the whole essence of building nation’s credibility in external relations. Thus, Citizen Diplomacy is as old as Nigeria’s diplomatic history. Reemphasizing Nigeria’s external relations which will manifestly benefit the interest of Nigerians and enhance their noticeable involvement of the citizen in the diplomatic environment, irrespective of where they live across the globe, necessitated the formal introduction of Citizen Diplomacy as a foreign policy thrust.

Consequently, in the eyes of Ozoemenam Mbachu of Nigerian Defense Academy, Citizen Diplomacy is aimed at economic recovery and increased democratization with the potential of ushering in increased export opportunities for Nigeria, increased foreign direct investments in Nigeria, financial assistance as well as bringing about technological transfer to Nigeria, especially from Nigerians in Diaspora (Mbachu, 2009). While Eze (2009) sees Citizen Diplomacy from two legal perspectives: State duty to the citizenry and sanctity of pacts or agreements. Akinterinwa (2010) opines that it is a technique and strategic use of millions of Nigerians, irrespective of where they reside abroad, as Nigeria’s diplomats.

However, Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy denotes the reorientation of the country’s external policy pursuits for the purpose of benefitting the politico-security and socioeconomic engagement, in enhancing citizen welfare and image building. This new direction in Nigeria’s foreign policy may sound prosaic, but, its normative implications and transformative potentials are enormous because it is a major development on concentric foreign policy. Besides, nations have always tried to create and modulate their reputations in order to achieve loyalty at home and influence abroad. This notwithstanding, the conception of Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria to a great extent (as discussed in the subsequent chapters of this study) may not be different from Public Diplomacy as an integral part of the concept of ‘Soft Power’, which has become a popular currency in political and ideological debates among scholars, politicians, and diplomats (Nye, 2008).

This connection is so on a number of factors. Firstly, the above definitions of Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria simply limit the scope of involvement, which is supposed to be profound on individual, group of individuals coupled with nongovernmental organisations (NGOs and CSOs) or private sectors, to the roles of the state (Akinterinwa, 2010; Eze, 2009; Maduekwe, 2009). Secondly, Government, leadership and policymakers are viewed as fundamental in engaging and gaining trust of citizen as a way to improve Nigeria’s image. Thirdly and most significantly, the four major paradigms of Public Diplomacy that see citizen/public as an extension of diplomacy; as a matter of national/image projection; as a form of external communication for cultural relations; and as a political instrument or warfare (Brown, 2012), are all constituted as part of the assumptions of Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy

Specifically, Citizen Diplomacy is “the engagement of individual citizens in programs and activities primarily in the voluntary, private sector that increase cross-cultural understanding and knowledge between people from different cultures and countries, leading to a greater mutual respect” While Public Diplomacy is the “promotion of positive and credible perceptions of a country generally and of a country’s foreign policy specifically through activities and programs carried out (by individual citizens) primarily under the auspices of the federal government” (Schodde, 2012, p.8). The above understanding of Public and Citizen Diplomacy shows that, whereas, Public Diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest of a country (Nigeria) through understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences about the country’s image. Citizen Diplomacy gives right, if not the responsibility, to Nigerian people to be citizen diplomats of the highest order for their respective villages/communities they come from, states, country and the whole world.

Unfortunately, the operationalisation of Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria, apart from insufficiently conceived by its proponents, did not outline a clear definition and comprehension of who are the citizen diplomats? What functions or responsibilities are these diplomats to perform? How and where are they to carryout their duty to promote Nigeria’s image building? In the US, according to Ursala Oaks (cited in Schodde, 2012), “Citizen diplomats listen to others with compassion and an open mind; learn about history, culture and ways of life and thinking different from their own; respect peoples' rights to views and approaches other than their own; explore other cultures and places with curiosity and openness; act to understand, engage, and work with people from around the world; and embrace a role as someone who can connect and make a positive difference in the global

37 community” (p.8). Thus, as citizen diplomats, the individual citizen has the power and right to influence the image of their native country abroad

Consequently, it can be deduced from the above that Nigeria is set at variance with the concept of Citizen Diplomacy or citizen diplomats as it is practiced in the US. Nigerians are yet to be citizen diplomats at home let alone at the global community. Nigeria is a country that is exploding with information, completely interconnected and interdependent, trends that will only increase. However, the country is yet to fully understand that in the 21st century, the very nature of a country’s responsibilities as a citizen needs to include being globally literate so as to strive and compete in an interconnected world. It is however, debatable if Nigeria has all the requisite paraphernalias and wherewithal to execute Citizen Diplomacy and meet its challenges, especially in terms of the application of the principle of reciprocity. Being ignorant of immediate and external environments with lacking the capacity of meeting the challenges of Citizen Diplomacy will threaten the political, socioeconomic competetiveness and national security.

Citizen Diplomacy could be a good policy thrust if it can be adequately conceptualized and practiced because it is in the interest of Nigeria and every Nigerian. Indeed, citizen is a major stakeholder in the art and science of diplomacy. It must be appreciated that the most powerful asset of Nigeria is Nigerians. Thus, citizen’s role in shaping Nigeria’s external image with government efforts should not be seen as overemphasized or inconsistent. More so, Nigerian government is required by law to protect the citizen and the non-citizens or foreigners alike that reside legally in Nigeria.

Hence, both the citizen and the non-citizen constitute the general public to which Citizen Diplomacy has to apply in one way or the other (Akinterinwa, 2010, p.59). People, ab initio, are to be seen as chief stakeholders in any diplomatic market and should thereby be made the primary beneficiaries of any external engagement that Nigeria embarks upon in its foreign policy concentric circles (Agbu, 2015; Akinterinwa, 2013c). In this view, Public or Citizen Diplomacy is increasingly about ideas and values, and involving non-governmental agents as one of the most effective ways of promoting and developing a country’s image climate. In fact, Public Diplomacy remains a cipher for the domestic public i.e Citizen Diplomacy (Huijgh, 2011). From the above clarifications, it would be difficult to draw a line of demarcation between Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria and the concept of Public Diplomacy. Indeed, the two concepts are synonymous and used interchangeably in this study

Nevertheless, as much as this argument has some merits, there is no disputing the fact that the cardinal purpose of Citizen Diplomacy, like beneficial concentricism, is to better the lots and focused on the Nigerians both at home and abroad. In fact, the operative word on which it was predicated upon for the purposes of conception and action is treatment. This explains how citizens are treated at home and abroad which has to do with national credibility question and international stability. In other words, the Law of Nations requires that all citizens be treated as human beings. Citizens are entitled to enjoyment of fundamental human rights and there must be acceptable and legitimate basis before any of such rights may be denied. Citizen Diplomacy, without doubt, is the crescendo of all the various thrusts on Nigeria’s external relations since time immemorial, responding to the challenges of globalization (Akinterinwa, 2013c; Uduma & Nwosu, 2015).

Though, governments may embark on the protection of their citizens through the philosophical foundation of Citizen Diplomacy, but the style, principle and effectiveness in implementation upon which it is predicated varies from one state to the other. Without losing focus, both the domestic and external environments are involved in diplomacy, and there is a thin line of demarcation between domestic and international politics. Hence, the interface between the two cannot be separated. With this, Citizen and/or Public Diplomacy articulates what is or should be implicit as the major goal of Nigeria’s policymaking, for the protection of all Nigerians both at home and abroad and above all to serve as a mechanism for image building (Eze, 2009; Saliu, 2010).

From the foregoing explications therefore, Akinterinwa (2010) summarises Citizen Diplomacy as the crescendo of Nigeria’s foreign policy thrusts, as well as a new philosophical approach to nation building in which the citizen is the most important instrument and the ultimate beneficiary of foreign policy dividends. He subsumes further that: Citizen Diplomacy, a la Nigeriane, is one of the many techniques adopted by the Government to complement official diplomacy and to engage law- abiding Nigerians in nation-building efforts, protecting and promoting their interests, celebrating their feats, as well as deepening their relationships with other peoples of the world, on the basis of principle of coexistence, mutual respect, reciprocity, and cooperation in all areas of human endeavours, and particularly of strengthening the nexus between Nigerians in Diaspora and Nigerians at home… the art and process of reconciling the psyche and world view of the citizen, on the one hand, with the pursuit and protection of Nigeria’s foreign policy interests, on the other hand, in such a way that the dignity and interests of the citizen are not only enhanced, but also in a manner that Nigerian citizen is well respected and not subjected to any form of undue mistreatment (p.80). 39

It is in line with the above submission that the study engages in the impact analysis of Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria’s Image Building to assess the role of government and citizen in maltreatment of Nigerians both at home and abroad, and in promoting the country’s external image. Be that as it may, Citizen and/or Public Diplomacy are vital tools that can be used to augment normal diplomatic procedure. Unlike traditional diplomacy, which concentrates on government-to-government interaction, Citizen and Public Diplomacy are the tools required to build understanding with foreign publics. Public Diplomacy discussions includes a range of activities aimed at influencing the views of international publics (government to public) while Citizen Diplomacy focuses on citizen to citizen contact that builds cultural awareness and understanding and can improve relations between countries (Anholt, 2007; Baylis, Owens, & Smith, 2017; Huijgh, 2011; Kanji, 2016; Melissen, 2005; White & Radic, 2014).

Without prejudice to various terms used to describe Citizen Diplomacy, the concept implies that individual citizens are not just centre-piece of state policies, but also have the rights and even the responsibility to help realize the county’s national interests through their interactions to compliment official diplomatic activities (Huijgh, 2011; Odoh & Nwogbaga, 2014). It is therefore expedient to analyze the provision of the peculiarities, intellectual contents and scorecards of Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria, and to create an increased understanding of Citizen Diplomacy and how it can aid in influencing and projecting the international image of Nigeria. This is crux of this study.

2.1.5 Relative Power Distribution

Power, in lay usage, simply means the ability of one person or group of persons to make another person or group of persons conform to a particular pattern of action. It connotes the ability to compel compliance to certain strands of conduct which could be relative or relational (Cox, 1999; Nnoli, 2003). Therefore, relative power is the ability of a state to force or influence another state to do something it would not have done through the mobilization of diplomacy (political), economic aid or military resources. The important of relative power distribution to the study is regarded as the use of political, economic, and military capabilities of Nigeria (through the instrumentality of Nigerian public/citizens) in its pursuit of foreign policy objectives, to influence how the international community perceives Nigeria.

In order to protect national interest and image building, each state seeks influence, relevance and power. Indeed, it is a widely-held perspective among political scholars and practitioners that power is the currency of international politics such that the more of it a state possesses, the more it seeks (Morgenthau, 1978; Vasquez, 1998). As Saliu (2013) argues that a buoyant nation can pursue its foreign policy by deploying economic or military resources to needy countries, which Nigeria has been doing since independence, to maintain hegemony in African continent and positive external image. Hence, Wright (1998) affirms that Nigeria external relations reveal a pattern of dominance without power.

But, Bach (2007) posits that: “ever since independence, messianic references to a natural Nigerian leadership in the affairs of the African continent have been ingrained in the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy…However, Nigeria’s ‘manifest destiny’ remains more about influence than power” (p.301). This suggests that Nigeria’s performance with respect to projection of relative power distribution in it foreign policy thrust remains elusive. This is so because, Nigeria’s activism in the field of Afrocentric policy is yet to produce tangible result, which by contrast, Africanisation processes convey patterns of Nigerian dominance.

These remain constrained due to severe conversion problems which could be caused either by domestic or external or combinations of both factors. In a period of down-turn in the economy, the resort to economic resources could create some discontent among the citizenry. Currently, accusations are that, the peacekeeping operations in other African countries by Nigeria is responsible for the drain on the national resources (Ade-Ibijola, 2013; Adoba, 2014; Bamidele, 2015; Eze, 2010)

2.1.6 Image Building

A country’s image is a multidimensional picture, description, and inferential beliefs that give information about any country. The direction of a country image can be internal (self) and external (mirror). Scholars have extensively tried to rationalize the concept of image building or image branding, including Simon Anholt who theorized on the country of origin effect and the impact it could have on national politico-security and socioeconomics (Anholt, 2002; 2005). Frost (2004) makes a strong case for nation branding campaigns when he remarked that: "There's no arguing that the image we have of another country says a lot about how we view it as a tourist destination, a place to invest or a source of consumer goods" (p.9).

However, image building though Citizen/Public Diplomacy has to do with symbol, visual, sociocultural, political and sport activities for promoting or strengthening nation’s image branding (Anholt, 2007; Brown, 2012; Kanji, 2016; Rothman, 2011; Wang, 2017; Wuthnow, 2008; Parmar & Cox, 2010; Lam, 2007; White & Radic, 2014; Wang, 2008; Hong, 2011; Melissen, 2005). Kanji (2016), in Harvard International Review, illustrates the soft diplomacy (Public Diplomacy) and nation branding through popular culture as a diplomatic strategy which stands warm, humane, and in appealing ways rather than the coercive military power. Hence, the nature of Citizen/Public Diplomacy is ever-evolving, and the variables that impact it are different in different countries (Passow, Fehlmann, & Grahlow, 2005).

For instance, through anime and manga, Japan was able to achieve foreign policy goal when both art forms enjoy a broad audience, inside and outside of Japan. The promotion of anime and manga through competitions and festivals serve the purpose of furthering “understanding of and trust in” Japan which harnessed the popular culture to polish Tokyo’s international image (Lam, 2007; Wang, 2017). More so, the British Council heads up several arts and education based initiatives to lay foundation for prosperity and security around the world with the hope to strengthen the connections with all countries in order to build international stability (Melissen, 2005; Kanji, 2016).

Turkish citizens also promote popular traditions to attract the global crowd to view Turkey’s favourable image through a website called Turkayfe – a blog-like interface that relies on articles written by citizens to counter the world news that only focuses on negative aspects of the country. The site takes issue with the positive aspects of Turkey’s international image (Kanji, 2016; White & Radic, 2014). While the United State of America us the sports diplomacy program with the universal passion for sports to transcend sociocultural differences, Finland with the concept of “Mission for Finland” established in 2010 leverages on the strategic activities (tourism, business, investments) involved 72 organizations worldwide and public/citizens involvement in the creation and realisation of the Finland national ‘project’ (Parmar & Cox, 2010).

Consequently, drawing insight from Anholt’s and Frost’s views suggests image building of any country or project for that matter, goes beyond designing a fancy logo and slogans or insertion of the media jingoism. The actions or inactions of a country both at the domestic and international levels are the key elements of a country image which serves as reflections of perceptions. Thus, in this era of globalization countries are competing against each other

42 in the same way as brands do. “Strong countries” brands have a huge competitive advantage (Anholt, 2005; Cotîrlea, 2015; Jaffe & Nebenzahl, 2001; Jenes & Malota, 2013; Wang, 2017). Weak national image, judging from the study problem statement, is part of the major catastrophe that reduces Nigeria attraction and places the country in low positions among the international community. Hence, image building is a subset of Nigeria project

Indeed, the image of any country is an important determinant of how well the country is doing at home and abroad (Cotîrlea, 2015; Ojo & Aghedo, 2013). In order words, image is a function of perception, which influences behaviour especially in inter-state relations. Nigeria’s image, be it self or mirror, is the perception of international community about Nigeria. Depending on what factors are considered, an image can be perceived to be good or bad, negative or positive. There is no disputing the fact that a good/positive image constitutes a source of good will, respect, influence, prestige and patronage for a country. Whereas, bad/negative image shows the exact opposite of all attributes of positive image (Egwemi, 2010). International image gauges the international standing of a country and provides a basis for self-re-appraisal in the event of any bad image (Nworah, 2009). This is the essence of image building.

Nigeria’s image shows the picture, idea, value, or quality that renders Nigeria and Nigerians desirable within and outside the shores of the country. It is a superficial indicator of Nigeria’s reputation that distinguishes it from other countries. In fact, Nigeria’s image is seen battered under the successive military regimes due to their opportunistic style of administration and insincerity articulating national interests that are both internal and external (Eminue, 1999; Eyinla, 1999; Ojo & Aghedo, 2013). The impression that has ingrained in the minds of Nigerians especially those living abroad was that the Nigerian state did not care about the plights of its citizen. Eze (2009) concludes that Nigerians in difficulty abroad are sheep without shepherds. This is rather unfortunate for a country with over 100 missions abroad. Hence, that the country is in dire need for image building is not in doubt.

Be that as it may, Citizen/Public Diplomacy is a nation-state’s attempt to favourably influence public opinion in other countries, which relies on and helps build national reputations. The perception of national reputation is a collective judgment based on a number of factors including foreign policies, responsible and responsive government, people and culture, economic policies, and economic strength among others (Passow, Fehlmann & Grahlow, 2005; Wang, 2017). White and Radic (2014) place Public Diplomacy

43 as a pillar of national reputation management; other scholars have depicted Public Diplomacy and national reputation management as interlocking circles. Wang (2006) contends that cultivating a positive reputation is a mandate of public diplomacy. Any country that wants global respect, establishing a favourable reputation as a politically responsible, security cooperative, and economically stable nation-state is paramount (White & Radic, 2014). Thus, the politico-security and socioeconomic perceptions of Nigeria must not be vacillating for a good reputation of the country?

2.2 Review of Relevant Literature In a historical-descriptive and explanatory research, review of relevant literature is sine qua non, in determining the nature of the research because it provides the basis for the understanding of what other have written about the subject matter. Thus, reviewing what other scholars have written about Nigerian foreign policy and national interest towards its image building, with special attention on the Fourth Republic, become imperative. The literature reviewed in this study is done not only to identify existing gaps in the extant literature, but also aim at bridging such vacuum.

Some of the scholarly works that are reviewed include: Adebajo and Mustapha (2008), Adebajo (2015), Adeyemo (2002), Agbu (2006), Akinbobola and Adebowale (2008), Akinboye (1999; 2013), Akindele (1990), Akinterinwa (2007; 2010), Alkali (1996), Akujuru and Ruddock (2016), Ashafa (2010), Assis (2007), Bach (2007), Coker (2003), Donnelly (2005), Emmanuel (2014), Eze (2010), Folarin (2010), Heilbrunn (2009), Idumange (2010), Inamete (2001), Kia, Nwigbo & Ojie, (2016), Ogwu (2005), Ojiakor (2007), Pham (2007), Pine (2011), Saliu (2014), Saliu and Aremu (2006), Sampson (2016), Ubi and Akinkuotu (2014), Ujara and Ibietan (2014), Usman (2016), Wright (2006), among others. The obvious gap in all these scholarly works is the inability to reach consensus identification on what is Nigeria’s national interest

2.2.1 Foreign Policy and Nigeria’s Diplomatic Practice

The end of Cold War in 1991 greatly affected the calculations of foreign policymakers, thereby making the concept of foreign policy as it affects nation building difficult to have a universally acceptable definition (Bynander and Guzzini, 2013). Some of the developments at the international system that shape the conceptualization of foreign policy by national governments include the widespread adoption of democratic philosophy and institutions, accelerating technological and economic integration, the emergence of non-state actors as

44 key players in world politics, and the recognition of transnational problems such as terrorism, weapon proliferation, development crisis, and environmental decay (Hook, 2002; Lamido, 2002; Pedi, 2014; Usman, 2016). Hence, there is no specific consensus among scholars to the concept of foreign policy.

A review of Alkali (1996), which reexamines Nigeria’s foreign policy after the end of the Cold War and the demise of apartheid in South Africa, becomes imperative to this study. Alkali’s work titled: Issues in International Relations and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy is important to this study considering the vicissitudes in the global affairs that have threatened Nigeria’s position in Africa and above all the internal challenges that influence negatively towards Nigeria’s image building. The book examines how Nigeria, after independence, assumes leadership position in Africa and emphasizes Africa as the primary focus of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The work is directly useful to this study in providing information regarding Nigeria’s Afrocentric policy. However, it failed to survey the influence of Babangida and Abacha regimes (domestic factors) on the image crisis of the country (external pressure), which is the crux of this study.

Adebajo and Mustapha (2008) examines Nigerian foreign policy during the first twelve (12) years after the end of the Cold War in order to answer questions associated with changes in the global arena and determines whether Nigerian foreign policy remains relevant in this new period of international relations. The sixteen chapters edited book is a masterful contribution to the study of Nigerian foreign policy, which provides incisive analytical coverage, conceptual insights and empirical richness, pointing to the factors and imperatives which have shaped Nigeria’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War (Omeje, 2010). The book argues that Nigeria is the most populous and powerful states in Africa but has been hindered by absence of domestic cohesion and lack of professionalism to fulfill its leadership aspiration and development potentials. However, the book did not sufficiently explore the question of Nigerian national interest and importance of Citizen Diplomacy.

Another important work on Nigerian foreign policy that is significant to this study is Inamete (2001). The work examines Nigeria's foreign policy decision-making system together with the other factors (domestic) that shape and determine foreign policy. It gives the reader an understanding of the foreign-policy structures, processes, dynamics, and outputs in Nigeria. What makes Inamete’s work significant to this study is that it looks at how personalities affect the development of Nigeria’s foreign policymaking. The work explicates how foreign policy decision-making system impact on foreign-policy outputs in medium-sized countries.

One important issue limiting the work is that no special attention was given to the Fourth Republic which is the major concern of this study.

Akinterinwa (2007) is another important work strategic to this study. First, it reveals the role of Nigeria in global affairs and second, it examines the relevance of citizen diplomacy, which is a variable of this study. Akinterinwa argues that the disposition of Nigeria in its external relations is tilted to concentric circle from time immemorial. The work argues that Nigeria’s interest is the focus of the country’s foreign policy efforts, and Nigerians are primary beneficiaries. In other words, Nigeria’s interests in global affairs should be in the physical Nigeria and her immediate neighbor in West Africa, larger Africa, then the rest of the world and international organizations.

Sequel to the foregoing, while good neigbhourliness policy being pursued by Nigeria is commendable and a sign of enlighten self-interest, the book failed to put into consideration the changing times in the global system because of globalization. Saliu (2011) argues that “Nigeria’s participation in peace support operations is not totally satisfactory because the environment for the policy does not complement the experience which the country has acquired from it over the years” (p.270). More so, as instructive and important the book is to the exposition of Nigeria’s preoccupation in the global affairs, the problem of Nigeria’s image still persists. Nigerians are still not being respected in virtually all countries where the nation had committed huge resources in liberating. This study is therefore poise to close the gap by suggesting vigorous diplomatic strategies.

Related to the above is Akinterinwa (2010). The book is a theoretical treatise on the concept of citizen diplomacy in Nigeria. The book justifies Nigeria determination to project and promote the welfare and protection of its citizenry both at home and abroad. The book succinctly presents a review of Nigeria’s foreign policy since independence and concludes that Citizen Diplomacy has been the thrust of Nigeria’s foreign policy from time immemorial. The central argument of the book, which is the empirical analysis of some cases of mistreatment of Nigerians abroad and the role of government in the pursuit of Citizen Diplomacy coupled with the principle of reciprocity, makes the work essential to this study. However, the observable limitation of the study is when the author asserts that Nigeria’s problem is systemic in nature. Most of Nigeria’s challenges, besides its systemic nature could also be man-made and must be solved by man (Magbadelo, 2012; Kia et al, 2016).

Adoba (2014) sees foreign policy as an activity which entails actions, reactions and interactions of state actors. To Adoba, this activity is viewed from a conscious awareness, through which foreign policy may or may not be felt or experienced, in transitional or initial stage of a process in the sense that the policy makers exist on cutting-edge between two worlds (the domestic politics of the state in question, and its external environment). The main task of these policy makers is to “mediate” between the domestic and external environments for effective policy making and execution (Evans & Newnham 1999). This aligns with Inamete’s (2001) position, when he argues that foreign policy structures, processes, dynamics, and outputs cover both the internal and external factors. Despite the alignment, they failed to examine the influence of external environment and non-state actors on domestic pressures and how this can be addressed without affecting the national interests.

Emmanuel (2014) examines the domestic factors in Nigeria’s foreign policy, and asserts that various constituent elements at the domestic structure are not irrelevant in Nigerian foreign policy. Like any other country’s foreign policy, domestic forces, at least to a very large extent, the terrorist activities, the non-state actors or the civil society exert direct or indirect influence in facing a country’s foreign policy. In line with Emmanuel’s observation, the factors and forces serve as the framework within which the domestic political contest over foreign policy issues must be fought. Although, there are not only numbers of trajectories among states in summing up these available opportunities but there are also various dilemmas in achieving and implementing the available opportunities (Olumide, 2006). This is what George and Keohane (as cited in Kersch, 1995) describe as “conundrum in defining foreign policy” (p.45). Hence, defining national interest in foreign policy becomes controversial.

According to Ubi and Akinkuotu (2014) the “key focus of any foreign policy is gaining access to strategic material resources that nations do not have enough of or having adequate resources to cater for the populations at home” (p. 416). Historically, Nigeria has been unable to show the nexus between its foreign policy and national interest because of its Afrocentricism instead of citizen-centered diplomacy (Adoba, 2014; Jega, 2010; Maduekwe, 2009). Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust over the years strategically concentrates on the African countries at the expense of its populations both at home and abroad. Major objectives and principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy have been the promotion of peace, economic cooperation and integration, development and the fight against all forms of discrimination and colonial domination, revolving around the domain of the concentric circles (Kuna, 2003; Omotere, 2011; Ubi & Akinkuotu, 2014). 47

Foreign policy must accommodate the rapid changes occurring around it both at the domestic or/and global levels. The developed countries, such as United States of America, Russia, China, Japan, and the European Union (EU) have played significant roles in managing internal and external pressures in their foreign policy behaviour (Folarin, Olarewaju & Ajayi, 2014; Hook, 2002; Kia et’al, 2016; Wiarda & Wylie, 2002; Zakaria, 1998). Nigeria has played key roles in the evolution of regional relations and significant influence at the global level (Amao & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015; Nwanolue & Iwuoha, 2012; Okolie 2010; Saliu, 2000a), but there is a serious concern in addressing the internal dynamics (Bach, 2007; Folarin et al, 2014). The difficulty of addressing and solving the political, economic, security and social-cultural challenges in Nigeria is the major impediments for development and image crisis (Saliu, 2015; Usman, 2016).

A renowned power and post-World War II realist theorist in International Relations, Hans Morgenthau, sees foreign policy within the context of national interest and State motivations (Morgenthau, 1978). In line with national interest, Morgenthau argues that foreign policy refers to the decisions that set out the goals or objectives that a nation seeks to achieve and the actions that are taken to implement the decisions. This suggests that foreign policy is a reflection of a country’s domestic reality and the pursuit of its national interests. Ajetunmobi, Osunkoya and Omotore (2011) argue that foreign policy begins with the recognition and expression of national interest. Corroborating Morgenthau’s view, Onyisi (2011), argues that foreign policy is the expansion of domestic policies which, to all intents and purposes, projects any nation’s relevance and participation in the international system.

To put it more succinctly, Alli (2010a), proffers that states’ foreign policy is a plan through which governmental elites and political leaders seek out to influence the global terrain so as to accomplish a particular political goal. It is important to note from these definitions that foreign policy entails a framework of decision making undertaken by states in the pursuit of their national interest within the international system and whatever a nation’s interest represents is what sets the basis for the formulation and implementation of policies at the domestic and the international level (Usman, 2016). Therefore, the place of national interest remains sacrosanct and needs adequate protection because national interests form the basis of foreign policy which determines the image perception of a country.

Eze (2010) looks at fifty years of Nigeria's relationship with the rest of the world and how it has generally reflected its efforts at promoting Africa's interests and at the same time grappling with its domestic development. The work is also germane to this study as it

48 examines how other institutional actors affect Nigerian foreign policy. The foreign policy implementers and monitors identified in part two are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Directorate of Technical Aid Corps, the Directorate of Technical Cooperation in Africa, and the Mass Media. The issues and challenges with which they are faced are explicated. For instance, the prospects and challenges facing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in an evolving global environment was analyzed. One of the noted major constraints facing the Ministry is the issue of gross under-funding which Orjiakor (2010) describes as “recurring and perennial” (p.99).

However, one major inadequacy of Eze’s edited work is the absence of devoted chapter to discuss the issues of Nigeria’s image. Throughout the twenty-one chapters of the book, no effort was made to put the image of the country into perspective. While Saliu’s contribution focuses on Citizen Diplomacy, the work fails to identify the impact of Nigeria’s role in global affairs on the ill-treatment of Nigerian citizens abroad and the impact on the image of the country. To stem the tide of eroding professionalism and decline among the career diplomats and Nigerian diplomatic missions abroad, and to take advantage of the prospects and opportunities presented by a changing domestic and external environment, the Nigerian foreign policy establishment must seek to confront and address the litany of known image crisis in the global community.

Citing example from the Western World, Rolenc (2013) defines foreign policy as “the positioning of the state towards its surroundings and other players in the international system” (p.5). This definition seems to balance the domestic and external parameters of Nigeria’s foreign policy, which identifies the position of the Nigeria-centric diplomacy this study focuses on. Rolenc’s work illuminates the readers in a simplistic manner about the theoretical and practical underpinnings of domestic and external factors that influence Nigeria’s policymaking. However, an in-depth x-ray of Eze’s (2010) analytical study, as reviewed above, on the various aspects of Nigeria’s foreign policy shows the opposite of Rolenc (2013) view which negates the realities and current global trends. More so, Rolenc’s work does not centre on state’s behaviours on policymaking and the impact analyzes of Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria’s Image Building.

Regardless, as authoritative as these works are, there is much to be covered on Nigeria’s foreign policy and national interests in the Fourth Republic. First, what necessitates Nigeria’s foreign policy behaviour on citizen diplomacy and to what extent is Nigerians mistreatment in the global setting? Second, what is Nigeria’s image since 1999? Most of the

49 scholarly contributions, as reviewed above, reveal the lacunas in Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust especially as it relates with national (citizens) interests. None stimulates a new vision of succeeding generations of Nigeria towards its image building and national interest. This is the area this study on Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria’s image building focuses on bridging the gaps in the existing literature

2.2.2 National Interest and Nigeria’s Image Building

It is believed that the concept of National Interest was developed in 1950 by Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson and since then it has remained one of the most controversial conundrums in policymaking (Burchill, 2005; Eminue, 2013; Eze, 2010). The reasons for this controversy are not far-fetched. First, the concept of national interest, just like any other social science concept, does not hold to single connotation, hence various scholars, political analysts, and commentators differently interpret the concept. Second, the idea of national interest is globally a subject of abuse by the state and policymakers due to their political and selfish interest. And lastly, the concept is not easily susceptible to analysis (Burchill, 2005; Muhamad, 2014; Smith, 2012).

These factors notwithstanding, every nation still seeks to achieve some interests either internally or externally. Theories of International Relations are based on the idea that states always act in accordance with their interest (Aworawo, 2011; Burchill, 2005; Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 2004; Vasquez, 2008; Weldes, 1996). So, national interest is the most important motivating factor of foreign policy, but it is contestable if there is any ‘interest’ that can be called ‘national’ when there are numerous prevailing personal, capabilities or power resources, class, group, sectional, and public interests in a state (Aworawo, 2011; Folarin, 2010; Wohlforth, 1993). However, the territorial security of any nation and its national integrity vis-à-vis its institutions are sin qua non to national interest of a state which must be adequately balanced (Asobie, 2007; Eze, 2010; Saltzman, 2012)

This is why some scholars view national interests as the interests of the political or ruling class as a result of the position they are holding either constitutionally or militarily (Aleyomi & Abu Bakar, 2015; Akinboye, 2013; Eze, 2010). Therefore, when a state takes a particular position on a certain issue, there may not be a public domestic backing of it. A nation’s foreign policy is (and should be) in the service of its national interest and image building. While foreign policy defines the basis on which a state engages another, the idea of national interest does not seem to lend itself to such easy generalization and overview (Muhamad,

2014; Saliu, 2014; Smith, 2012; Usman, 2016). The meaning of national interest in Nigeria attracts diverse viewpoint by different analysts or foreign policy practitioners.

According to Joseph Frankel cited in Burchill (2005), national interest is distinctively divided into two, namely objective and subjective national interest. The objective national interests are those which relate to a nation-state’s ultimate foreign policy goals. These goals are prepared but not determined by the policymakers but through systematic enquiries. These are permanent interests, comprising factors such as geography, history, neighbours, resources, population size and ethnicity. Subjective national interests are those which depend on the preferences of a specific government or policy elite, and include ideology, religion and class identity. These interests are based on interpretation and are subject to change as governments themselves alter

This account holds that national interests are the ingredients of decision-making in foreign policy and has a self-consciously behavioural slant rather than a philosophical or normative method. The effectiveness of foreign policy lies in the proper understanding of national interest which is articulated and implemented, through which both the permanent and subjective national interests will in turn result to vibrant foreign policy. While the principles guiding Nigeria external relations since independence have not changed and conform to the objective strand of national interest (Ade-Ibijola, 2013; Agbu et al 2013; Bamidele, 2015), it has been argued that the subjective strand of national interest has not yielded substantial return to the country (Adebajo, 2015; Akinboye, 2013; Amao & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015; Bach, 2007). This is because of the difficulty in defining national interest and the vagueness of the concept in Nigeria’s Constitution. Hence, there is need to de-problematize and redefine Nigeria’s national interest.

Be that as it may, understanding how Nigeria maximizes its national interests at the international political arena portends serious difficulty. This is characterized by clash of civilization, technological advancement, and instantaneous switch of capitals across states frontiers, terrorism, and proliferation of nuclear weapons, among others (Aworawo, 2011; Owa, 2012). Therefore, the nexus between foreign policy and national interest is controversial in Nigeria. However, if states are to reproduce themselves, Wendt (1999) suggests that “national interests must be seen as physical survival, autonomy, economic wellbeing and ‘collective self-esteem’” (p. 235). In line with Wendt suggestion is the need to account for Nigeria’s image in its pursuit of Citizen Diplomacy, which is seen as the

51 national interest in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. This is another aspect that concerns this study.

To begin with, it is expedient to identify the vital objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy. On August 20, 1960, at the Federal House of Assembly, Tafawa Balewa highlighted the primacy of the national interest of Nigeria. Balewa views Nigeria as a fortunate country that barely needs a foreign policy because, her neighbours are all weak and have no desire or capacity to threaten the country in any serious way, therefore adopting clear and practical policies about Africa becoming the sole aim of Nigeria, as against formulating concrete interests for the country (Arhewe, 2014; Balewa, 1964; Ifidon, 2007; Nwanolue & Iwuoha, 2012). Hence, what constitutes Nigeria’s national interest was not explicitly articulated rather it marked the genesis of Nigeria’s Afrocentric posture.

Therefore, Folarin (2010) avers that “the weak outlines or lack of documented set of well- articulated national interests [in Nigeria] could have also been responsible for the ambiguous and weak line of role conception” (p.25). By implication, Nigeria national interest during Tafawa Belawa was not clearly articulated and classified in time and space. To justify the Afrocentric posture of Nigeria, Ota and Ecoma (2015) describe Nigeria’s national interest as “those values and ideals which a nation so cherishes that she would rather go to war than compromise” (p. 57).

Indeed, Balewa administration and the successive regimes since independence merely premised their foreign policies on their perceptions of what they considered as Nigeria’s interests rather than a documented policy with the exception to Murtala/Obasanjo’s administration between 1975 and 1979 (Akinboye, 2013). The Murtala/Obasanjo’s regime in 1975, attempts to clearly address the broad strands of Nigeria’s national interest. Akinboye (2013) states that Murtala/Obasanjo’s regime in its own ingenuity set up the Adebayo Adedeji Commission to articulate Nigeria’s interest among other things. Based on the commission’s report, Akinboye (2013) identified the core elements of Nigeria’s National Interest which also constitute the objectives of its foreign policy to include:

The defence of our sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, the creation of necessary political and economic conditions in Africa and the rest of the world which will facilitate the defence of the independence and territorial integrity of all African countries while at the same time foster national self-reliance and rapid economic development, the promotion of equality and self-reliance in Africa and the rest of the developing world; the promotion and the defence of justice and respect for human dignity

especially the dignity of the Blackman; the defence and promotion of world peace (p.8)

Sequel to the Adedeji commission’s report and its inability to identify specific interest of the country, various authorities about national interest have come up with what they consider to be the components of the Nigeria’s national interest. According to Eminue (2013): Nigeria’s national interest can be identified as predicated on the nation’s military, economic, political and social security. Anything that will enhance the capacity of Nigerians to defend their national security must be seen as being in their national interest. Anything that will promote Nigeria’s economic growth and development is in the national interest anything that will make Nigeria politically stable is also in the national interest (p.76).

An overview of Nigeria’s foreign policy in Akindele and Ate’s (1986) work, although dated, reflects an exceptional history of Nigerian foreign policy and presents a good argument for a permanent Nigerian national interest. From Akindele and Ate’s (1986) assertions, the analytical concept of ‘national interest’ refers to policy preoccupation with the quest for national independence; national cohesion; territorial integrity; security of the individual citizens, especially as regards to food, shelter, health and housing; and the promotion of national ethics of discipline, self-reliance and patriotism.

Literature review of Scholars like Ade-Ibijola (2013), Bynander and Guzzini (2013), Eminue (2013), Eze (2010), Jega (2010), Owa (2012), Ubi and Akinkuotu (2014), Uddoh (2016), Saliu (2010) among others, indicate overwhelmingly that they subscribed to the above definition as being the most comprehensive and all-encompassing definition of national interest because, self-preservation or survival is almost the most fundamental component of state’s national interest. The preservation of the nation as a political unit is sine qua non for a nation’s foreign policy and therefore, a paramount consideration because, without that imperative of national survival, no other value, goal or objective can be realized. While survival is the irreducible minimum elements for national interest, the above scholars did not consider the citizen’s welfare outside the shore of Nigeria and positive image making as part of the Nigeria’s national interest.

However, it has been argued that Nigeria’s elites and those in power are not significantly pursuing public accountability and social credibility rather they play Afrocentric role effectively by setting Nigerian foreign policy firmly in the pan-Africanist context and assume their personal welfare and the welfare of their family (Akinboye, 2013; Eminue, 2013; Garba, 1991). The citizens’ desideratum such as security, provision of economic wellbeing, by way of provision of food, shelter, improved health condition and other basic

53 needs which guarantee citizens’ comfort and happiness, are not substantially incorporated into the national interest.

Meanwhile, concern for security of economic wellbeing of the people is very vital in a state for the citizens to seek such “state interest” as power, prestige, defend the integrity of the state and be law abiding, and willing to make excruciating sacrifices in the interest of their nation. This is why Adisa cited in Ekoko and Vogt (1990) succinctly points out that “… national allegiance is best secured in an environment where the generality of people regard their government as being responsible and concerned with social justice” (p.27). This suggests that domestic dynamics is not only powerful and influential to the pursuit of foreign policy and image making but must be incorporated in a country’s national interest.

Another important component of national interest is the maintenance of domestic and international peace. Obiozor (1999) points out that achieving domestic and international peace through a country’s national interest, depends on whether or not the political leader is endowed with “specific qualities such as courage, vision, integrity and above all, a strong sense of history… capacity for clarity, ability to mobilize the people for national causes, open-mindedness, and the capacity to inspire trust…” (p.71). Corroborating Obiozor’s view, Eminue (2013) suggests Nigeria’s national interest as “to keep its house in order and to reduce the level of serious threats to its survival as ‘one nation under one government and under one destiny’ by minimizing the number and intensity of ‘national crises that attract international attention” (p.80).

From Obiozor and Eminue position, Nigeria national interest is to ensure domestic peace and tranquility which presumes the prevalence of political stability, economic prosperity, social harmony, and distributive equity or justice. This suggests that for ‘peace’ to prevail at domestic level, Nigeria leaders must ensure that there is peace at the international level and vice versa. From the foregoing, national interest portends the totality or aggregate core values of Nigeria as determined by its leadership or policymakers. Hence, since the Nigeria’s national interest is determined by its policymakers, it is vulnerable to abuse by the policymakers at the consternation of the citizens’ interest

According to Akinboye (1999), the former military President, General Ibrahim Babangida, conceives Nigeria’s national interest as the capacity of Nigerians to defend their national security, promote Nigeria’s economic growth and development, and make Nigeria politically stable among the comity of nations. This was predicated on the nation’s military,

54 economic, political and security issues. Ojo and Sesay (2002) observe that national interest is the opinion and perception of the policymakers at any point in time. Corroborating Ojo and Sasay’s observation, Folarin (2010) describes national interest as an “ambiguous and create the smokescreen for the justification of parochial individual, class or group interests by those in government” (p. 24). Therefore, national interest describes the basic motivations which undergird the skill and tact of relationships that exist among the respective nations within the international system

More so, Jega (2010) defines national interest along with the core objective of Nigeria’s African policy as “protection and defense of the territorial integrity of the country, as well as pursuit of economic development” (p. 4). In the same vein, Okolie (2010) identifies Nigeria’s national interest as the “stability in the region and the promotion of greater regional cooperation; prevention of refugee exodus from conflicts; keeping foreign troops (national armies and mercenaries) out of the region; developing markets for investments, goods, services and labour” (p.94). While Mailafia (2010) proposes the “re-direction of Nigeria’s national interest to focus on solving Nigerian socioeconomic problems to be more selective in providing development assistance” (p.11), Ade-Ibijola (2013) defines national interest as “the motive behind Nigeria’s relations with other countries of the world” (p.566). These definitions suggest that Nigeria’s national interest is the objectives that the country intends to actualize during its relation with other countries most especially the African countries.

Consequently, Section 19(a-e) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended), encapsulates Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives to include: (a) promotion and protection of the national interest; (b) promotion of African integration and support for African unity; (c) promotion of international cooperation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations, and elimination of discrimination in all its manifestations; (d) respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication; and (e) promotion of a just world order (1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria). It is obvious from the above section that the definition of what national interest is was not provided in the constitution by implication, the meaning is, therefore, left to what any leader who has interest in such definition gives it.

The point been made here is that since Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999, the major trend found in Nigeria’s foreign policy is the desire to establish and maintain friendships

55 with countries that have historically shaped global diplomacy (Adebajo, 2015; Alli, 2010a; Amao & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015). This trend reflects the country’s overall objectives as envisioned in its Vision 2020 document (Alao, 2011). Bearing in mind that the Second Schedule to Section four of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria places foreign policy institutions such as diplomatic, consular and trade representations as well as external affairs on the exclusive legislative list, it is pertinent to inquire the strategic instruments for realizing these foreign policy objectives.

To this end, six major determinants have underlined Nigeria’s foreign policy since 1999. These include: (i) removing the near-pariah status that the country attained during the last phases of military rule; (ii) remaining a key player in regional or continental politics, particularly in light of the increasing importance of the Gulf of Guinea; (iii) ensuring that external relations assist in domestic economic development, especially through strategic cooperation with traditional and emerging global economic actors; (iv) bringing about debt relief; (v) obtaining assistance to consolidate democracy; and (vi) improving the image of the country affected by negative press on the illegal activities of its nationals abroad (1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; Alao, 2011; Akinboye, 2013; Usman, 2016). This citizen-oriented strategy has also had a parallel domestic policy of ensuring an agenda to make the nation proud.

These works are directly useful to this study as they help in providing information regarding citizen diplomacy and Nigeria’s image building between 1999 and 2015. What can be deduced from the various administrations in terms of articulation of national interest is that, it is inextricably wedded to the leadership and apparently, depends on the aggregate need disposition, ideology and perceptions of the role of incumbents (Adebajo & Mustapha, 2008; Agbu et al, 2013; Akinboye, 2013; Bamidele, 2015; Sampson, 2016). However, the survival and prosperity of Nigerians irrespective of where they reside should be the ultimate goal of Nigeria’s national interest. Therefore, Nigeria’s national interest should include Nigeria’s socioeconomic and welfare success, protection and politico-security of the nation cum national integrity and cohesion.

Also, it is within the framework of this research to champion the course of Nigerians interests and image management, both at home and abroad, as catalysts in the achievement of Nigeria’s foreign policy goals. The overarching objective must be shifted to the country’s strategic doctrine from a concentric continental circles posture to a more balanced approach by reviewing global and regional contingencies in identifying and emphasizing her priorities

56 among comity of nations. Hence, domestic policy “as a course of action or a reasoned choice emerging from the consideration of competing options” (Akinboye & Ottoh, 2005, p.115), must be put into consideration. He who fights outside with global recognition without harmony at home is not yet safe. Thus, there is need to establish the linkage between Nigeria’s national interest and foreign policy for positive external image.

2.2.3 The Nexus between Foreign Policy and National Interest

There is a symbiotic relationship between foreign policy and national interest. Thus, it is pertinent to find out whether national interest is used for invoking popular support towards the country’s image or for analyzing foreign policy, as the two intertwined concepts are germane to this study. According to Troy (2013), in simple positivistic terms of social science conduct, the dependent variable is seen as the foreign policies (behaviour) of states and the independent variable as the relative power distribution to systemic forces while the intervening variable is the domestic factors. These variables are sacrosanct for any state to accomplish its national interests. The country must comprehend the environment in which it is pursuing such interests, and also understand its dynamics and realities (Idumange, 2010; Effiong, 2012; Foulon, 2014; Sampson, 2014; 2016).

This could be made manifest by the re-definition of its foreign and domestic policies toward appreciating complexities of domestic forces and foreign policy actors and their behaviours (Dueck, 2009; 2014). Therefore, the conceptual view of the policymakers within the framework of investigative construct will be considered useful to avert any confusion and distortions of the research viewpoint, which according to Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman (2009) include: “the politics of threat assessment; the politics of strategic adjustment; and the politics of resource extraction, domestic mobilization, and policy implementation” (p. 31).

Foreign policy is the primary instrument for the conduct and management of relationship that exists and operates among much larger community of sovereign states, whereas national interests motivate such relationship. This instrument is also considered as the country’s material power capabilities such as economic, political strengths and military capability among others through which states can influence each other. The point of convergence between the domestic and foreign policy crystallizes national interest (Adeola & Ogunnoiki, 2015). Therefore, national interest reflects the perception of the leaders because it is hard to rationalize in idea.

Therefore, state power is the ability to extract these resources as determined by its institutions as well as state’s ideology (Rose, 1998). The state gets ‘better’ with a strong foreign policy, while a state suffers what they must when it has weak foreign policy (Rose, 1998). Stoica and Purdel (2012) opine that systemic pressures may alter the direction of a country’s foreign policy. But, this is inadequate to determine the state behaviour in entirety. Therefore, countries with comparable gross capabilities but different state structure will probably act differently.

Hence, the strength and structure of the states, relative to their societies must be put into consideration because they influence the quantity of national resources that can be allocated to foreign policy. State interests often include self-preservation, military security, economic prosperity, and influence over other states. Sometimes two or more states have the same national interest. For example, two states might both want to foster peace and economic trade. And states with diametrically opposing national interests might try to resolve their differences through negotiation or even war. The ability to influence others comes from its independent variable, the relative power, which Wohlforth (1993) sees as the capabilities or power resources. To him, the distinction between these power resources and state’s foreign policy interests is the objectives and aspirations that guide state’s external relations

2.2.4 Foreign Policy and Perceptions in Policymaking

It has been variously argued that states’ external actions are shaped in significantly by domestic decision-making process (Adebajo, 2015; Akinboye, 1999; Aleyomi & Abu Bakar, 2015; Arhewe, 2014; Bach, 2007; Bamidele, 2015; Burchill, 2005). A country’s position in the international system, which is also refers to as external image, can be viewed through the prism of it foreign policymakers’ perception, which is popular among foreign literature of foreign policy analysis (Jenes & Malota, 2013; Ota & Ecoma, 2015).

Indeed, policymaking is the leadership perception with ample understanding within the environment of states’ roles in the domestic and/or external politics (Folarin, 2010). This is done to maintain positive image as it reflects in the American’s system (Folarin, 2014). This foreign policy concept is also getting popularity in Nigerian foreign policy literature (Adigbuo, 2005; Fawole, 1990; Folarin, 2010; Omilusi, 2016). This effort has become increasingly necessary in Nigeria to demonstrate a clear identification of role perception under the Fourth Republic dispensation. From the above reviewed literature, Africa has been

58 the common perception of Nigeria’s leaders, since independence, in its efforts on external relations.

It is, however, expedient to underscore what influences the Nigerian foreign policy vis-à- vis its elites’ perception in external relations most especially towards African states since independence with emphases on the fourth republic, a period some scholars argued a shift in elites’ perceptions and relative power distribution from the traditional method of Afrocentrism (Afrocentric policy) to beneficial concentrism (Citizen Diplomacy). This will help to ascertain Nigeria’s efforts towards image building through diplomatic relations.

2.2.5 Historicizing the Roles of Nigeria in African Affairs

The foundations of Nigeria’s contemporary diplomacy and foreign policy were laid in 1957 (Saliu, 2014). Today, the impact of Nigeria’s leadership in Africa is plain. It has played a major role in the prevention and management of regional conflicts, and led the way in the strengthening of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the creation of the African Union (AU) and establishment of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Nigeria is not only a leader within Africa but also a leading member state of the United Nations engaged in multilateral efforts to address the political, economic and social issues of central concern to Africa and the world. In his Speech at the 16th Session and 1031st Plenary Session of the United Nations General Assembly on October 10, 1961, the First Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Jaja Anucha Wachuku observes that: …Nigeria is an African nation, it is part and parcel of that continent of Africa and therefore it is so completely involved in anything that pertains to the continent that it cannot be neutral and must never be considered as a neutralist country… We are independent in everything but neutral in nothing that affects the destiny of Africa (cited in Sinclair, 1983, p.1). Indeed, Nigeria’s ability to play a crucial leadership role in Africa predates Nigeria’s independence in 1960 (Folarin, 2010). National and anti-colonial leaders such as Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe who later emerged as the first Nigerian President had said on July 31, 1959 that “it should be the manifest destiny of Nigeria to join hands with other progressive forces in the world to emancipate not only the people of Africa but also other peoples of African descent from the scourge of colonialism” (Azikiwe, 1961, p. 59). According to Agbu (2011): Right from Nigeria’s independence, beginning with Tafawa Balewa government, the guiding principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy, especially as it concerns Africa had been well articulated and understood. Suffice is to say that the country’s foreign policy is oftentimes determined by what it considers to be in her National Interest (p. 23). 59

Although, conceptualizing national interest is problematic, because, it could be determined by the relative bargaining power of the interest groups or policymakers in a particular country. However, Obiozor (1992) opines that national interest should be distilled both from the human security angle, as well as national security dimension with each interwoven and reinforcing each other.

Indeed, the purpose of this opinion is to differentiate security or defense of territorial integrity and sovereignty from personal or citizens’ interests which are measurable in image making and national development because most of what is tagged as national interests is the personality interest of the leader (President or Head of State) at a particular point in time. Azikiwe’s perception could be likened to the story of the rich neighbour whose presence amid the poor is a divine arrangement so that the affluent neighbour can give succour to the needy around it (Folarin, 2010). This line of thought became a strong passion that characterized the thinking of first generation of Nigerian policymakers and statesmen towards image building.

Besides, in the pre-independence era of Nigeria and post-independence of Ghana in 1957, there appeared contradictions in the dynamics of Pan African solidarity and its expression in intra-African relations. This contradiction led to the division of African states into two camps, one radical, led by Kwame Nkrumah (the then President of Ghana), and later Known as the Casablanca Group, while the other was conservative, led by Tafawa Balewa (the then Nigerian Prime Minister, 1960-1966) and known as Monrovia Group. According to Alli (2011), the Casablanca Group has a maximalist conception of African unity calling for a continental United States of Africa government, which the Monrovia Group has a minimalist conception of African unity, accepting only a functional cooperation framework.

Alli (2011) further stressed that “the direction of African affairs and the politics of intra- African relations was to be determined by the outcome of the competition over the soul of African politics and the content of its diplomacy” (p. 196). Hence, Tafawa Balewa emphasized the leadership role of Nigeria in Africa and reacted to Nkrumah’s call for a political union in Africa, saying that “Nigeria is big enough and does not need to join others… If others wish to join Nigeria, their position would be made clear” (Balewa, 1959 cited in James, 1999, p. 460).

In another forum, Belewa clearly portrayed Africa as the foremost concern of his foreign policy. Balewa (1960) cited in Nwanolue & Iwuoha (2012) boosted and surmised that:

So far I have concentrated on the problems of Africa. Please do not think that we are not interested on the problems of the rest of the world; we are intensely interested in them and hope to be allowed to assist in finding solutions to them through this organization, but being human we are naturally concerned first with what affects our immediate neighborhood (p. 77). Balewa’s opinion constitutes the first elites’ perception for Nigeria in Africa. Belewa was particularly committed to the unity and progress of Africa as well as the decolonization of Africa. However, the above declaration clearly suggests that Nigeria, perhaps, had no problem to be contending with. For this reason, there is need to solely concentrate effort on Africa challenges, even, with a promise to replicate that on the global system. This cannot be so because from time immemorial, Nigeria has had its own share of political upheaval even before independent. Apart from the unstable political atmosphere that has engulfed the country, politicians are intolerant and unwilling to abide by the rule of law and fair play in government. These factors responsible for the transitory First Republic and Nigerian government headed by Nnamdi Azikiwe and Tafawa Balewa did not last for long

Analysts have seen this role as a wake-up call to the continent to accept the nation’s benevolent hegemony (Aluko, 1981; Gambari, 2008; Osuntokun, 2013). However, this brotherly gesture has painstakingly demanded of Nigeria, both financial, material, military and other logistical assistance from Nigeria even at times loss of lives of its own citizens which are probably made in the name of brotherly sacrifice (Nwanolue & Iwuoha, 2012). Among the leadership roles perceived and vigorously executed were the liberation of the continent from imperialism of all kinds, fighting apartheid and racism in Southern Africa and in the Diaspora, uniting Africans to make their voice loud enough in global politics and using the enormous resources of the country to assist needy African states (Saliu, 2014). Again, the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria surmised Nigeria’s objectives at the external level, at independence, as follows cited in Agbu (2011) thus: The State shall promote African Unity as well as total political, economic, social and cultural liberation of Africa and all other forms of international cooperation conducive to the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect and friendship among all peoples and states, and shall combat racial discrimination in all its manifestations (p. 26). The provision for the promotion of African unity and cultural liberation for African countries clearly indicates a strengthening of Nigeria’s Africa policy on African integration. There have been discourses on the debate of the Afrocentric nature of Nigeria’s foreign policy. There is a popular school of thought in Nigerian foreign policy literature that Nigeria’s foreign policy whether under military or civilian rule has not shifted from the

African focus since October 7, 1960 when Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa enunciated the set of national roles considered for post-independence Nigeria. In his acceptance speech at the United Nations (Adeyemo, 2002; James, 1999; Nwanolue & Iwuoha, 2012). Adeyemo (2002) highlighted some of these roles, as they are important to this study, to include:

1. The termination or eradication of all forms of colonialism or colonial rule in Africa; 2. Eradication of racial/apartheid policy in Southern Africa most especially in Rhodesia Namibia and South Africa; 3. Commitment to functional co-operation with a view to promoting African unity; 4. Promotion of peace in Africa and the world; and 5. Promotion of human dignity especially the dignity of the black man (p. 66).

It is therefore appropriate to ask whether the Fourth Republic policymakers have redefined Nigeria’s perception and commitment in Africa in view of the irrelevance of the first two points. South Africa has been liberated from apartheid since 1994 and there is no state in Africa still under political colonization. Folarin (2010) believes that it is possible for nations to assume certain roles in the international politics when there is no conceived one. In this circumstance, it means that nation only responds to issues and developments as they unfold in international politics, but does not have guiding principles because of the lack of clearly defined roles. Such state would either be relying against its wish on traditional roles of the country (Rosenau, 1990).

Since independence, Nigeria has pursued a policy of good-neghbourliness despite the socioeconomic realities and security threat, within the West African sub-region as contained in the first and second concentric circle, and the pursuit of peace and enduring unity in Africa, as contained in the third concentric circle (Adeniji, 2000; Agbu, et al 2013; Akinbobola, 2000; Akinboye, 2013; Amao & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015; Bukarambe, 2010; Fawole, 2004; Inamete, 2001; Kuna, 2003; Saliu, 1999). The pursuit of good neighbourliness has been a function of a historical role conferred on the country by the virtue of its largest concentration of black people in the world and reinforces the centrality of Africa in Nigeria’s foreign policy (Mailafia, 2010; Ota & Ecoma, 2015). The reason(s) for Nigeria’s consistent in afrocentric mission was clearly justified by the Second Republic President, Shehu Shagari, in one of his presidential addresses. Shagari (1980:871) cited in Agbu (2011) notes that: The size, the population and economic potential of this country has imposed on us a special duty to respond responsibility to international issues and problems. When it is realized that Nigeria’s population makes every fifth 62

African, as well as every sixth black person in the world a Nigerian, it becomes doubly incumbent upon us in formulating our policies, to bear in mind our historical responsibilities to Africa and the black diaspora (p. 27- 28) The concept of good neighbourliness was not anchored on and sustained by the principle of reciprocity. As cited in Bukarambe (2000), Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, put it: “We belong to Africa and Africa must claim first attention in our external affairs” (p.10). This does not suggest that Nigeria should treat her neighbours as they treat Nigeria. Although, this self- imposed Afrocentric mission has been questioned severally (Coker, 2003; Dumbuya, 2008; Maduekwe, 2009).

For instance, to what extent is Nigeria able to protect and project its interests and image- building in Africa which is supposedly to be the centre-piece of the highly endowed and populated Black Country in the world? In answering this question, critics have maintained that the policy is politically unsustainable beyond rhetoric, and that it is casting a role for the country far beyond its capability (Adebajo & Landsberg, 2000; Bach, 2007). This is an undertaking of double-jeopardy and frustration since Nigeria is not gaining from its ‘investment’ and yet loosing ‘resources’. It is not very clear whether Nigeria’s impressive role is just to assume leadership position in Africa or to improve its’ national image. However, Tafawa Balewa affirms on this ambitious Afrocentric stance thus: If we conduct ourselves well and if we appear well-meaning to the countries of Africa there is no reason why they should not give us our recognized position by virtue of our size and population; but it is not for us to go out to show to those smaller countries that we are big in size and population and therefore, they have to come trailing behind us (cited in Bukarambe, 2000, pp.104-105). Be that as it may, the period under study 1999-2015, represents a watershed in Nigerian political history because it witnessed the succession of three democratic regimes in the Fourth Republic (Obasanjo, Yar’Adua and Jonathan). Studies on Nigeria’s foreign policy, particular those on Africa policy, during the period had reflected what each administration set out for itself as a means of image building. These studies explain that the additional burden on Nigeria to assume critical roles in Africa is because of the demands of the first and second of the concentric circles in Nigeria’s foreign policy approach (Omotere, 2011; Ubi & Akinkuotu, 2014). From the forgoing and in reviewing Nigeria’s efforts in image building, the following sub-section examine the perspectives in Nigeria’s African roles

2.2.5(a) Nigeria’s African Policy in Perspective: Political Sector

Some studies have examined the “human factor” or group behaviour in Nigeria’s African policy. For example, Fawole (2004) in a study of the institution, structure, processes and performance of Nigerian foreign policy, establishes the centrality of the human element in foreign policy and explains it using the Nigerian experience under civilian rule, how the policy making process is affected by individuals. During the civilian dispensation from 1999-2007 for instance, the personality and activeness of President Olusegun Obasanjo decimated the foreign policy-making process. This was probably because of the political stability in Nigeria for a relatively longer period for the first time in the history of Nigeria existence as independent state, than previous political experiences.

Folarin (2010) implies that “consistency of political leadership would thus be required to achieve maximum success in the execution of foreign policy” (p. 73). While Agbu (2011) maintains human factor and political stability, but added that the principle which runs through Nigeria’s African relations is the purist of peace and enduring unity. Nevertheless, a retrospect would show relative stability and continuum in the African policy of Nigeria, but as relevant to this study, three perspectives will be reviewed. These comprise political, economic and military/security. It is believed that they can easily be used to determine national image and development.

The issue of Nigeria leadership in Africa dominates Nigerian foreign policy literature during the period under study. A long range foreign policy objective of Nigeria is to assume continental and global power, which like Morgenthau (1978) states, is the objective of most ambitious states in the international system. Nigeria is committed to Africa and it is by this commitment that it has earned a respectable place in global politics. The quest for political cooperation has been Nigeria’s political role in Africa (Adoba, 2015; Amujiri et’al, 2015). The formation of Organization of African unity OAU in 1963 and respect for its Charter, especially those aspects of the Charter that concerns the inviolability of inherited frontier and the strengthening of African solidarity, attest to the political and diplomatic role played by Nigeria.

The predominant components of this policy thrust that have received ample attention in the literature and upon which actions and rhetoric have been deployed include internal insurrections against national governments (for example in Congo, Chad, Sierra Leone and Liberia, among others), decolonisation cum liberation struggles, regional integration and development challenges, among others. To rid Africa of the vestiges of colonialism and racism, Nigeria became deeply involved in decolonisation and liberation struggles in

Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe and anti-apartheid struggles in South Africa (Osuntokun, 2013). The successes recorded in this area have accorded the country the status of a ‘frontline state’ in the maintenance of international peace and security. To promote integration, the country has adopted the multilateral approach through the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU)

More so, Nigeria’s enviably committed to solving African problems through political means in the various peace and mediation talks hosted in the country. Nigeria hosted and mediated between Sudanese government and Darfurian rebel factions; between rebel factions in the Liberian crisis. The country also granted asylum to Somalia’s Siad Barre, Yormie Johnson and the former Liberian President Charles Taylor in order to end crisis in that country. Nigeria also restored power to the President of São Tomé and Príncipe, Mr. Frederique Menezes, after military take-over in July 2003. In a similar vein, Nigeria succeeded in ensuring that due constitutional process was followed in installing democratically elected government in Togo, after the death of President Gnassingbe Eyadema in February, 2005. Nigeria led the way in preempting of a “Continental African Unity”. Nigerian leaders consistently interpret the national interest with “functional association” of independent African states (Agbu, 2011)

Nevertheless, Nigeria’s leadership position is considered to be earned because of its natural endowments, and not demanded (Bamidele, 2015; Bukarambe, 2000; Saliu, 2006). It thus arrogates to itself the responsibility of catering for the well-being of Africans wherever they may be at the consternation of its’ national interests. Saliu (1999) states that it is arguable that the well-being of the African continent is intricately tied to Nigeria’s, justifying it with references to its swift response to the Congo crisis in 1960-1961, a few months after independence; its intervention in Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Uganda, and Tanganyika was well documented.

Meanwhile, Nigeria had declared that its independence would be incomplete if any other African state was under colonialism. It supported revolutionary struggles for independence, fought apartheid to a standstill and was relentless in distributing financial assistance to needy African States. Having identified Nigeria’s Africa policy and its political role in Africa, it is necessary to examine these principles in the contemporary system towards image building in era of globalization. Nigerian governments had been accused of being conservative in their reactions to explosive radical issues in the continent, which often resulted in the wrong perception of its actions

2.2.5(b) Nigeria’s African Policy in Perspective: Economic Sector

In economic relations, Nigeria’s efforts culminated in the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in May 1975 and formation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The pivot of these Organizations has remained dominant in literature in financial, material and economic assistance to needy African states (Akinbobola, 2000; Olusanya & Akindele, 1990). Nigeria extended minority assistance and contracted various trading and economic cooperation agreements with countries like Benin, Togo, Niger and many others. These consider the milestone in Nigerian economic diplomacy, with details of Nigeria’s loans, grants and donations to African states. In fact, a denominator of Nigeria’s foreign policy making since 1980s to date has been oil and energy.

The discovery of oil increased the revenue of the country and positioned it to generously aid needy African States (Agbu, 2011; Nwanolue & Iwuoha, 2012). Nigeria made oil and gas to neighbouring African states readily available, while also providing steady electricity to some of them. Soremekun (2003) and Shaw (1987) however believe that the primacy of oil in Nigeria’s foreign policy architecture has given Nigerian foreign policy makers a false ego to engage in messianic pretensions, which has made them to fritter away precious resources meant for purposeful internal development. According to Shaw (1987), “Nigeria exaggerated its potentials and overrated its capacity, thus over-doing things in the name of commitment to Africa and relevance in the world” (p. 40). Nigeria was essentially a rentier- state, but metamorphosed into a debtor-state as a result of the huge costs of what Soremekun (2003) calls “messianic pretensions” (p. 4).

As a corollary of the above, Bach (2007) asserts that the Nigeria’s leadership domination in Africa which he refers to as Nigeria’s ‘manifest destiny’ is nothing but dominance without power. To Bach (2007), he opines that: Ever since independence, messianic references to a natural Nigerian leadership in the affairs of the African continent have been ingrained in the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy… Nigeria’s endowments of human and natural resources, deeply asymmetrical interactions with neighbouring states and the active engagement of successive regimes in the affairs of the continent have called for the country’s treatment as a regional power…however, Nigeria’s manifest destiny remains more about influence than power (p. 301)

A review of Bach (2007) in line with the above, suggests that Nigeria’s interest in African affairs derails from meeting the national interest which conveys influence without power, and accounts for frequent exasperation of Nigerian policymakers with their country’s inability to draw leverage from the country’s perceptions and role in African affairs. The ideal of regionalization goes hand in hand with institutional strategies or cognitive blueprints that aspire to reconcile with domestic political economy and security concerns with international pressure for adjustment. However, in stark contrast with Bach assertion that Nigeria failed to reconcile domestic and external interest, Nigeria’s lead role during the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone was determined by both regime survival problems, which is domestic and regional interest.

The issue of “messianic pretensions” formed part of the weakness of the policy process at the time (Bach, 2007). For instance, petroleum which should be a source of foreign policy strength and profitable national roles for Nigeria did not just lubricate the foreign policy making, but it also corrupted it (Arhewe, 2011). The oil boom in Nigeria engenders endemic corruption in high places with government monies meant for projects, financial, technical and humanitarian assistance diverted (Odularu, 2004; Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2008; Smith, 2004). Government officials go into collaboration with foreign or multinational companies to embark on jumbo contracts and “white elephant” projects in Nigeria and successive political leaderships undo old agreements to start new bilateral agreements, commence outlandish projects that are wasteful, capital intensive or inflated out of proportions (Meier, 2002; Shaw, 1987).

The situation thus becomes that of a resource-curse (Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2008; Shaw, 1987). Shaw (1987) observes that the challenges of Nigeria’s foreign policy included its inability to balance capabilities with targets, the degeneration of the economy into a real tailspin, corruption, internal divisiveness that has rather become a source of weakness than strength which from independence has made Nigeria not move beyond ‘a potential super- state’.

Nigeria has everything it takes to be a continental hegemonic in terms of current power rankings by major indicators such as international visibility and interactions, willingness and ability to project power internationally (international peacekeeping), economic wellbeing, especially now that Nigeria is the largest economy in Africa after the country’s ‘rebased’ its gross domestic product (GDP) data to 80.3trillion Naira (£307.6bn: $509.9bn), which pushed Nigeria above South Africa’s GDP of $370.3bn at the end of 2013 as the

67 continent’s biggest economy (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2014). Nigeria is almost better than everything else in Africa, with exception of its military spending where Algeria is ahead of the country (Perlo-Freeman, Fleurant, Wezeman & Wezeman, 2015; Ward, 2014). Also in terms of prospects, the future lies with Nigeria in all respect.

A country like Nigeria, with its large and dynamic population, endowed natural resources, and a conducive geography (Falola & Heaton, 2008) could be in a better stead to play important roles in the international system and maintain good image.

2.2.5(c) Nigeria African Policy in Perspective: Security and Global Peacekeeping Efforts

Nigeria-Africa policy can also be understood against the background of the growing regional and continental security problem. Onwuka (2013) describes security as a scarce and sensitive commodity hence, Africa’s huge security problems have been Nigeria’s burden. Nigeria considers African security as germane to its foreign policy pursuits. Indeed, the security demands of states interact, overlap or conflict in international relations. It is evident that Nigeria is stabilizing democratically but the government has not overcome internal security problems despite concerted efforts. This is a contradiction or irony compare to what Nigerian army have done to maintain peace in other African countries in the past. Adeniji (2000) highlights Nigeria’s consistency in African security.

The areas outlined include: its role in the antiapartheid movement in Southern Africa, liberation movements in Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, resolution of regional conflicts and disputes, and Nigeria’s politics of harmonization through primary regional integration and security. In fact, the Nigerian Army and police were massively deployed on peace keeping missions in different parts of Africa all in a bid to help bring peace and security in Africa. Asobie (2005) highlights that in the 2000 the sum of N1.8 billion was approved for a contract to supply equipment and facilities to the Nigerian soldiers in Sierra Leon and the Democratic Republic of Congo, while only the sum of N0.95 billion was proposed by the Federal Military of Finance for all the three arms of the Nigerian armed forces. These efforts did not reverberate the interest of the citizen.

Extant literature such as (Amao & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015; Dumbuya, 2008; Mailafia, 2010; Obi, 2008; Saliu 2000a; 2000b; Sesay & Ukeje, 1997) has identified more military intervention by Nigerian soldiers in the affairs of her neighbours than might have been supposed. These interventions can be categorized as regime supportive, regime opposing or state supportive. As revealed in Somalia, Angola, Namibia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and South 68

Africa among others, Nigeria has committed considerable human and financial resources not only to maintaining peace, but also to fight the evils of colonization and apartheid afflicting Africa continent.

Nigeria's participation in peacekeeping efforts and operations, both in Africa and across the globe predates the country's independence in 1960. The Congo crisis was the first operation that attracted Nigeria's participation, the UN's request for troops anticipating formal independence and ever since, the country has been a major donor of troops for peacekeeping operations at both bilateral and multilateral levels (Saliu, 2000a; 2000b). After the demise of the Cold War, wide-ranging participation in foreign operations has been a consistent strand in the country's foreign policy (Adeniji, 2004).

As important and desirable it is to bring peace and stability to the West African sub-region and Africa as a continent, the venture in the past had cost Nigeria enormous financial resources and unspecified number of troops who lost their lives. It is arguable if Nigeria’s investments in Africa have not yielded good returns. This is why Mailafia (2010) refers to Nigeria’s bilateral and multilateral assistance since independence as “Prometheus as Good Samaritan” (p.160). According to Saliu (2010), Nigeria contributed about 90 per cent of the cost of maintaining the Economic Community of West African States' Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and also shouldered much of the burden, as the hegemonic power, in the Sierra Leone operation.

On the other hand, Ibrahim Gambari calculation of the cost of peace maintenance and stability as over 200,000 personnel and a financial outlay of billions of US dollars had been committed up to January 1997 (Gambari, 1997; Saliu, 2000b). It could be recalled that about 44 Nigerian soldiers, who were just returning from peace-keeping operations in Darfur had a ghastly motor accident along Gombe-Potiskum road in 2009 apart from the lives killed at the battle field (Nwanolue & Iwuoha, 2012). This caused Nigeria a national tragedy to keep peace in a sister African country.

The wave of xenophobic attacks on Nigeria by South Africans in 2008 caused diplomatic spat between the two countries (Charman & Piper, 2012). Also, the rows of yellow fever vaccine cards for which many Nigerians were denied entry and deported from the airport in South Africa on March 2, 2012, was another ‘diplomatic-punch’ to Nigeria’s image and foreign policy (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2012). Do Nigerians deserve such brutality taking into consideration the fundamental role played by the country against

69 apartheid. Nigeria’s loss of competitive posts at the AU and ADB elections because of connivance of some African countries against Nigeria, despite the huge amount sum of 800million US dollars of Nigeria Trust Fund contributed to ADB, as soft loan, to assist African countries; the tense competition for UN security Council seat and so on. In fact, Ambassador George F. Kennan concisely captured the unprofitable Nigeria’s Afrocentric posture.

George (1990) cited in Nwanolue and Iwuoha (2012) avers that: The historic contributions of Nigeria to regional peace missions in Liberia and Sierra-Leone which cost the country the whooping sum of US$ 10 billion, not to mention the gallant men and women of Nigerian Armed Forces who paid the supreme sacrifice in the cause of peace, are hardly acknowledged by the international community... this does include the sum of about US$ 90 billion that Nigeria single-handedly incurred in the OAU Peace Keeping Force that was deployed to Chad in 1980s. This is in addition to the sum of US$ 800 million Nigeria Trust Fund established under African Development Bank, ADB, to assist African countries obtain soft loan to execute vital projects (p. 82).

To put all Nigeria’s involvement in peacekeeping and conflict resolution into proper perspective, bearing in mind all the significant role it has played, the below tabular illustration shows Nigeria’s commitment towards facilitating peace and stability in the west Africa, Africa and in the rest of the world. Table 1: Nigeria’s Participation in Africa/Global Peacekeeping Operations, 1960 – 2015 S/N Mission Name Acronym Country State Date End Date 1. United Nations Operation in Congo ONUC Congo July 1960 June 1964 2. United Nations Security Force in West New UNSF Guinea Oct. 1962 April 1963 Guinea 3. United Nations India-Pakistan Observation UNIPOM India- Sept. 1965 March 1966 Mission Pakistan 4. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon UNIFIL Lebanon March 1978 Present 5. Nigerian Neutral Force, Chad (Bilateral) Operation Chad 1979 Harmony I 6. OAU Peacekeeping Force, Chad Chad 1981 1982 7. United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer UNIIMOG Iran-Iraq Aug. 1988 Feb. 1991 Group 8. United Nations Angola Verification UNAVEM I Angola Jan. 1989 June 1991 Mission1 9. United Nations Transition Assistance Group UNTAG Namibia April 1989 March 1990 10. United Nations Angola Verification Mission UNAVEM II Angola June 1991 Feb. 1995 II 11 Bilateral Special Protection Force in Sierra- Sierra-Leone 1991 1997 Leone 12. United Nations Protection Force UNPROFO Yugoslavia Feb. 1992 March 1995 R 13. United Nations Transitional Authority in UNTAC Cambodia March 1992 Sept. 1993 Cambodia 14. United Nations Operation in Somalia I UNOSOM I Somalia April 1992 March 1993 15. United Nations Operation Mozambique ONUMOZ Mozambique Dec. 1992 Dec. 1994

16. United Nations Operation in Somalia II UNOSOM II Somalia March 1993 March 1995 17. United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia UNOMIL Liberia Sept. 1993 Sept. 1997 18. United Nations Assistance Mission for UNAMIR Rwanda Oct. 1993 March 1996 Rwanda 19. United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer UNASOG Ouzo Strip May 1994 June 1994 Group 20. United Nations Angola Verification Mission III UNAVEM III Angola Feb. 1995 June 1997 21. ECOMOG Task Force in Sierra-Leone Sierra-Leone 1997 1999 22. United Nations Mission in Sierra-Leone UNAMSIL Sierra-Leone Oct. 1999 Dec. 2005 23. United Nations Organization Mission in the MONUC Congo Nov. 1999 June 2010 DR Congo 24. LIBERIA ECOMIL Liberia 2003 25. United Nations Mission in Liberia UNMIL Liberia Sept. 2003 Present 26. African Union Mission in Dafur AMIS Sudan 2004 2008 27. United Nations Mission in the Sudan UNMIS Sudan March 2005 July 2011 28. African Union- United Nations Hybrid UNAMID Sudan July 2007 Present Operation in Dafur 29. United Nations mission in the Central MINURCAT Chad Sept. 2007 Dec. 2010 African Republic and Chad 30. United Nations Mission in the Republic of UNMISS South Sudan July 2011 Present South Sudan 31. United Nations Multidimensional Integrated MINUSMA Mali April 2013 Present Stabilization Mission in Mali 32. United Nations Multidimensional Integrated MINUSCA CAR April 2014 Present Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic Source: Compiled by the Researcher with references from the List of Peacekeeping Operations from 1948-2013. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/ operationlist.pdf

Table 2: Nigeria’s Contribution of Force Commanders/Chief Military Observers, 1960 -2015 S/N Name of Commanders Operation Code Organisation Country Period 1. Maj. Gen. J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi ONUC United Nation Congo 1960 – 1964 2. Brig. Gen. S. Ademulegun Bilateral Tanzania 1964 3. Col. J. Dongoyaro Harmony I Bilateral Chad 1979 4. Col. M. Magoro Harmony I Bilateral Chad 1979 5. Maj. Gen. G. Ejiga Harmony II OAU Chad` 1981 – 1982 6. Maj. Gen. J. Dongoyaro ECOMOG ECOWAS Liberia 1990 – 1991 7. Maj. Gen. E. Unimna UNAVEM I UN Angola 1991 8. Maj. Gen. C.A. Garuba UNAVEM II&III UN Angola 1991 – 1995 9. Maj. Gen. R. Kupolati ECOMOG ECOWAS Liberia 1992 10. Maj. Gen. E. Opaleye UNAMIR UN Rwanda 1993 11. Maj. Gen. I. Bakut ECOMOG ECOWAS Liberia 1993 12. Maj. Gen. A. Olurin ECOMOG ECOWAS Liberia 1994 13. Maj. Gen. J.M. Inienger ECOMOG ECOWAS Liberia 1995 14. Maj. Gen. S.L. Malu ECOMOG ECOWAS Liberia 1996 – 1997 15. Maj. Gen. T. Shelpidi ECOMOG ECOWAS Liberia 1998 – 1999 16. Maj. Gen. F.A. Mujakperuo ECOMOG ECOWAS Liberia 1999 17. Maj. Gen. G.A. Akpamber ECOMOG ECOWAS Liberia 1999 – 2000 18. Maj. Gen. S. Iliya MONUC UN DR Congo 2003 – 2005 19. Maj. Gen. J.O. Owonibi UNMIL UN Liberia 2003 – 2005 20. Maj. Gen. F. Okonkwo AMIS AU Sudan 2005 – 2006 21. Maj. Gen. C.R.U Ihekire AMIS AU` Sudan 2006 – 2007 22. Maj. Gen. C.I. Obiakor UNMIL UN Liberia 2006 – 2009 23. Maj. Gen. M.I. Agwai UNAMIS UN/AU Sudan 2007 – 2009 24. Maj. Gen. M.B. Obi UNAMIS UN/AU Sudan 2010 – Date 71

Source: Adopted from Okeke-Uzodike et al (2013) and Updated by the Researcher.

It is clear from the above tables, that Nigeria aggressive pursuit of peace and stability in Africa and in the World, cannot be underestimated. In fact, as clearly demonstrated in the tables above, the role of Nigeria in African peacekeeping is much more than most (if not all) of all other African countries in the continent. Nigeria is equally a pride in the global record as the country with the highest number of female peacekeepers that have been deployed to serve in several peacekeeping operations, and the country is also ranked the fourth out of a total of 118 UN troop contributing countries in the world (Oluyemi-Kusa, 2007). However, an interesting question related to this study is that at what cost are all these interventions to Nigeria and its people?

With the economic and prevalent security crisis that Nigeria has faced during the period of the scope of this study, one will consider it logical for the country to discontinue with the externally-oriented and costly interventions to focus more on the internal and citizen- oriented approach, although, public and foreign policy analysts would suggest that the conduct of foreign policy gains as it relates with peacekeeping are not usually measured in monetary or actual terms (Odunfa, 2013; Okeke-Uzodike et’al, 2013). Yet, foreign policy is not also for charity, it is seen as an instrument of negation for the purpose of national interest in which economic interest is part of the consideration. Saliu (2010) concludes that all these efforts did not yield good returns to the country, yet, Nigeria insistence on Afrocentric mentality. It, therefore, brought about, and intensifies, the debate and division on the nature of Nigeria’s African policy scholars into two opposite and mutually exclusive groups

2.2.6 The Dichotomy in Nigerian Africa Policy

Usman (2016) argues that the domestic factors in a country are considerably significant and may be dominant on some issues of foreign policy. Foreign policy springs from domestic sources for the betterment of the domestic interest groups and good image building both at domestic and external (Ripsman, 2009). Since the attainment of independence by Nigeria, its leadership role in African affairs has been a major policy thrust of Nigeria’s foreign policy. However, literature on Nigeria’s African policy is replete on whether the policy thrust is justifiable or not (Coker, 2003; Dumbuya, 2008).

While the policy of Afrocentric was discernible as a guiding principle of Nigeria’s relations towards other African countries, no consensus ever emerged as whether the enterprise is

72 profitable when Nigeria’s image building in considered. Instead scholars and analysts, even, policymakers alike, shared two perspectives. Those in favour and against the policy have clarified and articulated their arguments, and have developed a framework of analysis, as reviewed below, through which the outputs of Nigeria’s domestic and foreign policy decisions can be explained.

2.2.6(a) The Anti-Afrocentricism School

The first group of scholars (Akinboye, 2013; Akinterinwa, 2007; Coker, 2003; Dumbuya, 2008; Gambari, 2008; Ifidon, 2007; Maduekwe, 2009; West, 1993; Saliu, 2013), referred to as noninterventionists in the internal affairs of other African states, posits that the Nigeria’s Afrocentric policy focus is unwarranted. The arguments of these scholars are subsumed under three categories.

Firstly, they argue that the country is challenged with numerous flaws that should attract the attention of the ruling class rather than dissipating energy and committing huge resources to African affairs (Akinboye, 2013; Usman, 2016). These internal contradictions and contingencies, which all the Fourth Republic administration have their share in, include pervasive poverty and economic crisis, security challenges, divisions along ethnic and religious lines, and poor democratic profile, among others (Omilusi, 2016; Otobo & Obaze, 2015; Owen & Usman, 2015; Usman, 2016). The Obasanjo’s administration was overwhelmed with structural maladjustment bequeathed to Nigeria by the military junta such as the image crisis, huge debts and economic mess, and poor democratic profile. Yar’Adua/Jonathan between 2007 and 2011 was faced with the issue of rule of law, ethno- religious crisis among other political and social vices. Jonathan administration between 2011 and 2015, was overwhelmed by security challenges of Boko Haram insurgency, and inability to fight corruption.

Secondly, while these internal contradictions raise questions of morality on Nigeria’s presence in foreign lands, the external contradiction (which constitutes the second category) reflects on Nigeria’s intention by other African states (Akinyemi, 2009). The suspicion of some African countries about Nigeria’s real intentions, the country’s leadership legitimacy challenge in regional matters, as well as the failure to back Nigeria at important periods when the country needs them have been well documented (Akujuru & Ruddock, 2016; Ayoade, 2013; Effiong, 2012; Usman, 2016). Thus, Ifidon (2007) describes role in Africa as unity without unification” (p.39). The anti-Afrocentric group asserts that no matter how

73 noble and altruistic Nigeria’s intentions are, it has been misunderstood as sheer expansionism and an inordinate attempt to dominate other African states.

And thirdly, the issue of benefits is very crucial in Nigeria’s African relations. Where there is an effort there should be a corresponding return. Anti-Afrocentric school argues that Nigeria’s gains from its African policy are not commensurate with the sacrifices. The resources both financial and military personnel that should have been deployed to build a strong economy and quash the security challenges at home have been committed to African neighbours (Adebajo, 2015; Nwammuo et al, 2013). On this ground, they have dismissed Nigeria’s Afrocentric efforts and questioned the rationale for Nigeria’s African policy.

Given the above circumstances (internal contradictions at home, external perception and suspicion, financial and human sacrifices) accompanied by little gains, one may not but be sympathetic with this group of thinkers. When this remains the situation for a long time without serious efforts at redressing them, which has been the case, the Nigerian citizens may lose conviction in the country’s leadership role in Africa (Folarin, 2013; Maduekwe, 2009). In the face of overwhelming internal challenges and the lack of respect for Nigeria and Nigerians by many countries in the world especially Africa’s that have benefitted from its sacrifices, the ruling elite may become disinterested or less aggressive in pursuing this policy focus (Akinterinwa, 2007).

In fact, West (1993) provides a strong contrast to afrocentricity (and many other analysts of Nigeria’s foreign policy), that there is need for a more idealistic and optimistic view of Nigerian foreign policy. But this group of scholars must be told that in the international system, there is no state of autarchy where absolute sovereignty reigns. Thereby, states need to interact for certain purpose(s) especially, for socio-economic development (Adebajo, 2015; Agbu et al, 2013). Also, with the high rate of terrorism in the global scene, a state cannot stand aloof because security is everybody’s business. The presence and impressive achievements of Joint Task Force which comprises of soldiers from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Benin to fight the wanton Boko Haram insurgency is a good testament to counteract the position of anti-afrocentrism school. In other words, the efforts of Nigeria in Africa have been regarded as enlighten self-interest.

2.2.6(b) The Pro-Afrocentrism School

The arguments of the pro-Afrocentric school which could also be referred to as interventionists in the internal affairs of other African states, centres on Nigeria’s indices of

74 national greatness which has positioned the country as a natural leader to bear the burden of the ‘Blackman’ with manifest destiny in Africa (Akiba, 1998; Akindele, 1986; Akinyemi, 2007; Balewa, 1964; Garba, 1991; Magbadelo, 2012). Garba (1991) put forward fascinating memoirs and advocates for pan-Africanism. These indices of national power include Nigeria’s diverse economic resources, military strength, huge and vibrant population, and huge territorial size among others. If effectively mobilized, these indices of strength would not only ensure that Nigeria remains a continental power in Africa, but will also guarantee the country’s relevance in global politics.

Pro-afrocentric school also argues that the measures of power have placed on Nigeria a great leadership responsibility in Africa (Adebajo, 2015; Akinyemi, 2007). African countries look unto Nigeria for direction in world affairs and for assisting them in addressing some of their internal problems (Agbu, et al, 2013). Nigeria has played this role impressively. The list of achievement in support of the Nigeria’s African policy include commitment to decolonization and liberation struggles, commitment to peace support operations, commitment to regional integration and development, among others cannot be swiftly thrown in the dustbin of history.

In truth, a giant of Nigeria’s stature in Africa is needed to promote regional stability. Nigeria’s efforts at promoting peace, for instance, are geared towards maintaining stability. These altruistic concerns make Nigeria’s African policy a noble goal (Ayodele, Obafemi & Ebong, 2013; Kia, Nwigbo & Ojie, 2016; Sampson, 2016). The prestige that this may win Nigeria in the eyes of the global public may also be a justification for the effort. Again, failure to intervene in some controversially complicated issues in Africa may expose Nigeria and its people to danger (Adebajo & Mustapha, 2008; Adebajo, 2015; Akujuru & Ruddock, 2016).

However, the second group of thinkers need to be informed that the foreign policy behaviours of states are not determined from outside but on the national interest of such state. Also, charity begins at home, the internal dynamics influence external image. Consequently, inter-state relationship with the international community is important in such a way that states complement one another, in the satisfaction of their needs, not simply in their development efforts but particularly for the purposes of maintenance of international peace and security, which is the primary objective of the African Union and United Nations.

Undeniably, Nigeria has a record of achievements and continuity comparable with other African countries with history of conducting foreign policy. Nigeria has become an 75 attractive haven and a regional influential whose future behaviour is an object of research and whose friendship everyone is interested in courting. Its human and material resources are immense and its foreign policy stance cannot be neglected because of its objectivity of purpose. It is in this context that the study discusses Nigeria’s assistance to African countries and the world, as well as seek understanding of how it affects welfare of every Nigerian and image building.

2.3 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

Power in the world politics has been a well-researched concept and as such, it has been developed greatly. Considering the nature of this study, most especially on its involvement in state’s behavior and intricacies on the use of power, the political realist theory, espoused by famous thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Hans Morgenthau (1904- 1980), will form the basic tool of analysis (Williams, 2015). One of the main notions in international relations and world politics since the earliest political writings of Thucydides, Hobbes and Machiavelli has been power and it remains perhaps among the most important and least understood concepts in political theory (Nye, 2002; Parmar & Cox, 2010; Rothman, 2011). According to Dahl (1957), power is the ability for one actor to influence the actions of another actor that would not have occurred otherwise.

In a related term, Nye (2008) sees the attraction and utilization of power as ‘carrots’- inducements and payments, and ‘sticks’- threat of coercion. Hence he asserts further that “power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes you want” (p.94). In international politics, having “power” is having the ability to influence another to act in ways in which that entity would not have acted otherwise. Aware of the variants of realist theory and Nigeria’s state/citizens’ perceptions with power exertion/distribution, the researcher identifies the need for the concept of “Soft Power” and “Neoclassical Realism” as conceptual and theoretical framework respectively to guide the presentation of this study.

2.3.1 Meaning and Relevance of the Concept of Soft Power and Neoclassical Realism (NCR) to the Study

The term ‘neoclassical realism’, explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thought. Its adherents (Dueck, 2006; Kitchen, 2010; Rose, 1998; Taliaferro, Lobell, & Ripsman, 2009) argue that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realists. They argue further, however, that the impact of 76 such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical.

Indeed, the term ‘Neoclassical Realism’ was coined by Gideon Rose in a “1998 World Politics Reviewed Article”, as an approach to foreign policy analysis (Rose, 1998, p.146). It is a theory that fills in the gaps found in other versions of realism, especially with respect to previous failures in explaining and predicting policymaking choices. More recently, it has evolved toward becoming both a “theory of foreign policy” and a “theory of international politics” (Firoozabadi & Ashkezari, 2016). Hence, the grand strategy in NCR demands that the leader of a state/nation must bring together all elements, both military and non-military for the preservation and enhancement of nation best interest be it in wartime and peacetime for the purpose of upholding the actions of a state in the international system which can be explained by domestic, intervening and external variables (Kitchen, 2010; Rose, 1998).

To the supporters of NCR, the systemic variables such as the distribution of power capabilities among states (independent variables), as well as the domestic perception and misperception of systemic pressures from other states’ intentions, or threats (intervening variables) coupled with the decision of State institutions, elites, and societal actors within society (dependent variables) are dynamics that influence the power and freedom of action of the decision-makers in foreign policymaking (Dueck, 2006; Feng & Ruizhuang, 2006; Firoozabadi & Ashkezari, 2016; Juneau, 2010; Stoica & Purdel, 2012; Taliaferro et al, 2009).

The foreign policy of any state towards realizing its national interests involves the participation of the citizen in the processes of formulation, implementation, and evaluation (Brown, 2012; Lam, 2007; Odoh & Nwogbaga, 2014; Parmar & Cox, 2010; Wang, 2006; White & Radic, 2014). Consequently, acknowledging the roles and contributions of people (both the state and the citizens) in a bid to promote positive and credible perceptions of their countries (either spontaneously or intentionally), the NCR which recognises and explains the domestic and external influences, support, and role for the foreign policy to move forward or otherwise (intervening variables), lacks the capacity to explain the Public/Citizen Diplomacy (which is the core unit of analysis cum independent variable of this study) that would give impact to the Nigeria’s image building (dependent variable) within the scope of

Nigeria’s foreign policy, as a way to promote positive perceptions through activities and programmes carried out primarily under the auspices of the Federal Government.

Therefore, to bridge this gap in enhancing and complimenting the viability of NCR to the study, the need to add the concept of “Soft Power”, as coined by Joseph Nye in his book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of America Power, in the framework of this study becomes indispensable (Nye, 1991). To Nye (2004; 2008), ‘Soft Power’, as a staple of democratic politics, rests on the ability of a state to shape the preferences of others and getting them to want the outcomes that such a state want by co-opting the people (others) rather than coercing or paying them. Nye asserts that seduction, appeal and attraction are always more effective in shaping the preferences of others than coercion because many values like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities are deeply seductive (Nye, 2002).

This concept has significantly risen the interest of many scholars, especially scholars from the developed world, with great impact on culture and reputation management to influence opinion of counterparts among the comity of nations and to build integrity and credibility through cultural exchanges (Hong, 2011; Kanji, 2016; Melissen, 2005; Parmar & Cox, 2010; Wang, 2006; White & Radic, 2014). However, despite the prominence reality of ‘Soft Power’ in international politics, the implementation of its tools, does not guarantee absolute success and incredible power or authority as other states can render cultural resistance and unacceptance of imposed norms, values and institutions.

In other words, it is not a comprehensive one-fits-all solution as there are limitations to its application and effectiveness. However, in this study, Soft Power is examined as Nigeria’s national capability and how much of the country’s soft power capabilities does Nigeria actually utilize in its foreign policy towards image building. Indeed, the relationship between image building/reputation management and Citizen/Public Diplomacy is found in the concept of power. Therefore, we can view soft power as Nigeria’s capabilities or resources to affect others through the cooperative or persuasive means to elicit positive attraction and burnishing Nigeria’s international image.

However, Soft Power and Neoclassical realism (NCR) are not only forms of realism but they both believe and see power as the major currency in the international system. This suggests that states must effectively utilize power in driving home their national interests and goals. While Soft Power sees the culture, political values, and foreign policies as major

78 currency of power in the international system, and advocates for its use through attraction, co-option and in non-coercive ways, NCR sees power as the leadership/state’s ability to bring together all elements of power, both military and non-military for the preservation and enhancement of nation’s best interest at any point in time.

The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture, its ideology or political values, and its ability to shape international rules and political agendas. It is a very important theoretical approach to analysing the power position of a country in the world, by focusing on the nonmaterial aspect of power once neglected by many people (Odoh & Nwagbaga, 2014; Parmar & Cox, 2010; Wang, 2008). Thus, the veracity to strengthen Citizen/Public Diplomacy through soft power approach and NCR as a way to improve Nigeria’s image in not in doubt.

2.3.2 The Conceptual Weaknesses of “Soft Power” to the Study

This section attempts to challenge some elements/assumptions of the concept of soft power to the study of Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria’s Image Building. The focus of this study is central to Soft Power approach of demanding more tangible and effective participation of the public or the Nigerian citizens at the domestic and international levels that can be used as a leverage to strengthen image building. However, there are some observable oversights of the conceptual framework of Soft Power to the study which may hinder the impact of Public/Citizen Diplomacy to the Nigerian image building whether it is considered effective or ineffective.

First and foremost, Soft power may be a relevant approach to one society but have exact opposite in another. American values, for example, may be appreciated in Australia and Canada but totally rejected in Iran or Saudi Arabia. Even if soft power is a valid concept, it may still lead to repulsion rather than attraction, because soft power is power and “artistic hegemony” or “cultural imperialism” of the kind of the United States is alleged to practice in the world creates resentment and even rage (Joffe, 2006; Wang, 2017).

In his attempt to defining soft power, Nye (2004) opines that “A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries, admiring values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness, wants to follow it” (p.5). Of course, this is diametrically opposed to the use of hard power, which is predicated on the use of coercion, inducement, and force. But the significant oversight is that not every country will acknowledge this power most especially in a free society. The influence of some powerful 79 countries might not be shaped towards those who wish to use it. And even those who wish to use it can shape it as a means to achieving their ‘selfish’ goals because states at the international system are on self-help.

Second, the impact of Soft Power approach in Nigeria’s diplomatic relations with South Africa, for example, can be challenged by various and incessant killings as a result of periodic xenophobic attacks on Nigerians in South Africa. For states, soft power depends largely on hard power. Nigeria’s relations with other countries through the concept of Citizen/Public Diplomacy is neither rigid (hard) nor flexible (soft) in clear terms. Neither does Nigeria have the paraphernalia (great military strength, economic power, and technological infrastructure) to apply hard power as Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy does suggests in its ‘principle of reciprocity’, nor does the country possess the sociocultural and political will powers to persuade or influence the citizenry or public opinions in other countries. This cannot be more correct because of the environmental conditionings (which escape the conception and assumption of the concept of Soft Power) that might affect state behaviours in utilizing Soft Power.

Third, the proponent of “Soft Power” fails to clarify the application of military participation for humanitarian aid. Military force has been categorised as the hard power approach as coercion (Noya, 2005; Gilboa, 2008). This cannot and should not be seen as such because the use of military force for peace and defence of territorial integrity is for a humanitarianism which is one of the diplomatic instruments of any foreign policy. This is an area the study will cover. For instance, Nigeria’s military roles in peacekeeping efforts and operations, both in Africa and across the globe were not only for humanitarian and security purposes but also an enlightened self-interest which should form part of soft power approach.

Besides, another area of challenge to Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power in this study is that the concept focuses on the influence attempt and/or the outcome rather than considering the state capabilities to influence other states’ behaviour or public opinion. This is a essential area this study will be useful to enhance the concept of Soft Power approach especially in the developing countries that are not politically, economically and technologically buoyant. The approach towards the findings of this study hopes to create a less confusing and more objective measurement to challenge the concept of soft power in Nigeria’s reputation management through Citizen/Public Diplomacy as one of the instruments of Nigeria’s foreign policy.

Lastly (but certainly not the least), in light of the incredible pace of change in global politics and communication (and leveraging from this study as examined below in subsequent chapters), the Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power through Public/Citizen Diplomacy is clearly unattainable in Nigeria’s image building on the theoretical rigor. For instance, Nye (2008) opines that image building through Public Diplomacy and Soft Power has a lot to do with symbol, visual, cultural attractions and sport activities for promoting or strengthening nation’s image branding via people-to-people relations. Unfortunately, the concept of Citizen Diplomacy (Public Diplomacy) in Nigeria gives the orientation and shaping of activities (maltreatment, participation and protection of the citizenry) to the government with little or artificial strategic involvement of the citizens (individual and non-state actors). This is a contradiction to the defining factor of Public Diplomacy.

2.3.3 Justifications of the Conceptual and Theoretical Framework to the Study

On the one hand, Soft Power, although, does not seem to carry the connotation of official government involvement because it can be used in contexts that do not involve official national policy (such as grassroots diplomacy), but as far as diplomatic efforts are concerned, the defining factor of Citizen/Public Diplomacy is the orientation of the government. Citizen/Public Diplomacy may have more practitioners than just government, but more often than not, governments play a role in funding, or administering it. The point we are making here is that the role of government is very crucial in diplomatic actions irrespective of it forms. Therefore, the activities of government in citizen maltreatments and initiative towards reputation building is crucial to the conception of Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy as this study will soon examine

More so, there are three general categories or sources of Soft Power: culture, value and foreign policies. The concept of Citizen/Public Diplomacy in Nigeria captures all because every diplomatic efforts aims at general population, even those done through embassies, are described as Public/Citizen Diplomacy (see Table 3 below). The front line of this approach may be the cultural or diplomatic offices of national embassies in foreign countries, but these offices focus their work on connecting directly with the general populations of these countries. This working definition justifies the both the concept of Soft Power and Neoclassical Realism in the overall discussions of this study (Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria’s Image Building, 1999-2015) with heavy laden on the government or state function and malfunction cum the strategies of individual, non-state actors (NGOs, CSOs) or private roles in promoting or improving on the country’s external image.

Table 3: Soft Power Sources, Referees, and Receivers Sources of Soft Power Referees for Credibility or Legitimacy Receivers of Soft Power Foreign Policies Governments, Media, Nongovernmental Foreign Governments and Organisations (NGOs), Publics Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) Domestic Values and Media, NGOs, IGOs Foreign Governments and Policies Publics Culture Governments, NGOs, IGOs, Media, Foreign Government and Markets Publics, Foreign Public

] Source: Adopted from Nye (2008, p.107) and updated by the Researcher One the other hand, NCR provides a fertile ground for developing theories of foreign policy : behaviourhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:P most especially in the Third World Nations and particularly Africa countries by moving beyond structuralism that concerns itself with the recurring patterns in international politics.opulation_densit_map_of_Nigeria As argued by Schweller (2003) that “whatever useful thing can be said about structural versions of realism has already been said by their founders” (p. 345), and incorporatingn_states_ domestic- _English.png and individual level factors into the analysis. Its focus on the importance of state and other surviving actors in formulating foreign policies of states while taking their relative power and domestic factors into account provides opportunities to benefit from various methodologies on individual decision-making, such as game theory and national role conception analysis (Fenster, 2015).

NCR also provides many opportunities for engaging with various other theoretical foundations and diverse models as exemplified by the realists, system theory, linkage theory, role conception models, concentric circle theory, decision-making theory, and rational choice analysis, among others, in the field of International Politics. Above all, NCR is equally more suitable for developing micro-foundations for realist theorizing particularly those connected to rational choice approaches, as it explicitly focused on the individual political leader in analysing foreign policy choices of states. Domestic politics and ideas are fair game for realism, and neoclassical realists have taken up this mantle (Firoozabadi & Ashkezari, 2016).

NCR reformulates the realist theory efforts to bridge the ‘power’ gaps between domestic and international politics and specifically to relate domestic structures to international structures. More so, NCR explains further the import of non-state actors in the study of international politics most especially in the current globalized world. This does not deemphasize the role of State actors put negates the assumption of the realists that ‘State’ is the only actor in the international system. From this point of view, neoclassical realists argue 82 that States do depends, in one hand, on domestically derived preferences but observe that external dynamics coupled with some powerful non-state actors do, on the other hand, influence state’s behaviour (Dueck, 2014; Griffiths, 2007; Lobell et al, 2009).

This theory development and application that explains what states should achieve in the external realm, when and how to achieve it, has received comparatively little attention in Nigeria’s polity. The choice of this theory is to first, outline a theoretical context, and look at how domestic transformations in Nigeria, both visible and hardly noticeable events, may influence the conception and practical realization of Nigeria’s policymaking principles. More importantly, the theory proffers mean of addressing the problem of high sophisticated concept of power faced by both classical realists and neorealist, by taking into account the domestic and international choices available to the State for changes in its foreign policy and “view policy responses as a product of state-society coordination and, at time, struggle” (Lobell, et al, 2009, p.27).

The application of any approach to any given country requires great but basic understanding of the country in question because it is more scientific to explain specific situations, based on data, rather than making long-term predictions. As Tilley (2014) asserts that there is nothing as practical as a good theory, the researcher’s knowledge (through observation) in Nigerian polity gives strength and lends credence to the viability and application of NCR to the study. This makes the study more attractive and novel in this era of globalization. The analysis of this theory in this research work checkmates the excesses of realist theory and draws the centrality of state actors towards the national interest, to balance the rationale of power distribution in policymaking process (Foulon, 2015; Rose, 1998).

Finally, the context of Nigeria’s relations with the entire World most especially Africa and West Africa could be analysed through neoclassical realist perspectives in a meaningful way, now that the country has the largest economy in Africa; recent political credentials; its security priority on bilateral and multilateral talks to tame Boko Haram; global economic system and globalization; coupled with its human and materials endowments. All these tasks might not be easily achieved by theories like systemic, neoliberalism, neorealism, or some other political or foreign policy theories. Trends in this modern age of globalization suggest that states think globally but first act locally, so as not to be beautiful abroad but ugly at home. It is in this context that the understanding of NCR is necessary and appreciated in analysing this study.

Figure: 2 Conceptual/Theoretical Framework of Analysis

Soft Power Neoclassical Realism

Internal/Domestic External/International Dynamics Dynamics

Determinants of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

Independent Variables i. The People (the Public/Citizens) as the Major Dependent Variables Intervening Variables Elements of National Power/Capabilities The outcome of State and i. Domestic Incentives (Values, ii. The Referees’ Role for Credibility/Legitimacy Citizen/Public behaviour towards Culture, Policies) i.e Power Distribution in the International System reputation management ii. Systemic Pressure (The Role of Federal Government, Private iii. Perception of the State on Power Individuals, NGOs, CSOs, Media) Capabilities

Citizen/Public Diplomacy (i.e. Citizen-Oriented Foreign Policy Thrust)

The Major Parameters/Indicators

Political Environment Socioeconomic Condition National Security Strategy

Nigeria’s Image Building

Source: Initiated by the Researcher with reference from Nye (1991); Rose (1998) 2.4 Concluding Remarks

The literature review of this study establishes that foreign policy is anchored on the calculated steps taken by a state to maximizing the available opportunities outsides its geographical boundaries, while at the same time, minimizing the perils that abound domestically. The link between domestic politics and foreign policy may have been confirmed by various scholars, and foreign policy may be a product of many domestic factors and forces. However, there is an obvious gap on the factors that limit public opinion and citizens’ participation that might have resolve citizen maltreatment and propel credibility and reputation management in Nigeria’s external relations. Also, the concept of Soft Power and theoretical insight of NCR present the neglect of the citizens/public role in Nigeria and world geopolitical events framing the global perception of Nigeria’s image, which draws on core insights regarding the centrality of Nigerian public vis-à-vis external and domestic constraints on leaders’ policy choices and power distribution.

CHAPTER THREE

RELATIVE POWER DISTRIBUTION AND RATIONALE FOR THE ADOPTION OF CITIZEN DIPLOMACY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the basis for a ‘new’ Nigeria’s policy thrust that focuses on the welfare of its citizen both at home and abroad to achieve the first objective of the study. This is done with the view of identifying the similarities and dissimilarities of Nigeria’s power capabilities in Africa and beyond. The study of prediction helps to determine how the present emerged from the past and how it would evolve into the future. Therefore, without recourse to Nigerian history, the picture of its contemporary events will be blurring. To this end, this chapter presents relative power distributions in Nigeria’s foreign policy, underscores a brief background to Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy, and identifies the rationale for the adoption of Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic between 1999 and 2015.

3.1 Relative Power Distributions in Nigeria’s African Policy

The preceding chapter shows a historical relationship between Nigeria and the continent of Africa. Thus, the events that led to the study of Nigeria’s image at the external context are equally historical in nature. Nigeria’s supreme duty, just like any other country in the world, is to satisfy its national interest and compel to get involved in the process of establishing and conducting relations with other countries in the areas such as diplomatic, trade and economic, education, security, socio-cultural and political relations among others (Cox, 1999). Achieving these national interests entails the utilization of the country’s domestic “powers” and harnesses that with international community. This is the essence of foreign policy.

However, every nation wants to be self-reliant in all areas of activity, but no nation can achieve absolute self-reliance and self-sufficiency. Thus, no matter how powerful a state may be there is need to have an eye on the situation in various regions of the world. This situational change in nation’s whims and caprices necessitates modification of the foreign policies of many nations. Hence, foreign policy defines the goals of national interest and tries to secure these through the exercise of national power.

There are two basic concepts in the political processes between Nigeria and other nations adopted in this study, particularly in this chapter. They are; state and power. An 85 understanding of power is very important for the understanding of Nigeria’s image building. Foreign policy analysis involves the values of a state, a peculiar type of social organization. Nevertheless, it also involves power, which is its essential ingredient to achieve these values, as well. Therefore, the political engagement of Nigeria and other nation-states involves a union of state and power relating with another state. This defines the purposes and pursuits of states in the international system, which includes sovereignty, security, autonomy, welfare and status or prestige.

Power is an extroverted and introverted concept in global politics and within the society respectively, which defines the capacity of a state to regulate behaviours of other states and enforce order within its territory (Nnoli, 2003). A close examination of the above and other definitions of power in line with the study theoretical foundation shows that there are various dimensions to the phenomenon of state power. This include: goal, instrumental, influence, situation, relative, need, responsiveness and capability dimensions (Bernstein, 2011; Flemes, 2016; Jackson & Sørensen, 2016; Oğuzlu, 2007; Shaffer, 2012). It is these dimensions that constitute Nigeria’s essential characteristics, which tend to influence its foreign policy for achieving the country’s national interest. The examination of power in all its essentials and ramifications is not our focus here.

However, out of these dimensions of power, the relative and capability dimensions are crucial to this study. These two dimensions explain the difference that exists between the potential (relative) power of a state and the actual power capability (Bernstein, 2011; Flemes, 2016). The relative dimension accounts for the changes in the status of states in the international community while the capabilities dimension (such as geography, economic capability, population and military might, leadership, national moral and the quality of government, among others) enables states to pursue their goals and objectives as defined by their national interests, as well as to protect and possibly promote their values (Weiss & Wilkinson, 2014). However, it is expedient to make some initial observations about the nature of these elements of power before discussing them in turn.

Historically, war and peace have formed the central preoccupation of sovereign states because the international environment in which they exist has no central authority which can make decisions that are binding upon all members of that community (Abrahamsen, 2004; Stritzel, 2007). In the same way, a government of a state usually exercises its authority over its citizens and routinely receives compliance, loyalty and obedience from them. It has been argued for instance that it is only during times of war that the actual military strength

86 of a state can be determined (Oche, 2000; Oğuzlu, 2007; Okereke, Bulkeley & Schroeder, 2009). This is because military machinery of the state in combination with other supportive elements would have been deployed to prosecute the war.

A good example of this point is the case of Nigeria. Whereas, Nigeria is considered a powerful state relative to other less populated and material resource endowed sister African states. Considering the security challenges faced in the Fourth Republic, the elements of Nigeria’s actual power have not been fully developed or exploited to prosecute Boko Haram and other security threats like kidnapping and ethnic militias that threatening the unity of the country. This is why Akinterinwa (2016) observes that Nigeria has less status in Africa today than it did in the country’s first three decades of independence, and South Africa, Ghana and some other ‘weak’ states (like Botswana, Mauritius, and Rwanda) in the continent shared the status of continental force with Nigeria than in the 1960s to early 1990s.

While South Africa is known for highly industrialized country in Africa with concrete evidence of human and national development, Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, and Rwanda have democratic credentials than Nigeria. Algeria is today very strong in Military capability and has the highest military spending in the continent ahead of Nigeria who was once a continental ‘gendarme’. Nigeria hegemony today is on a shoestring, dominance without power and Prometheus as Good Samaritan (Adebajo, 2008; Bach, 2007; Mailafia, 2010; Weiss & Wilkinson, 2014). It would be a mistake to assess the outcome of Nigeria’s African power relationship today based on the situation between the 1960s and 1990s.

Again, when we put an individual basis into consideration, the tangible elements of power may be difficult to calculate and assess. The Nigeria exact population figure has been difficult to arrive at (Akinterinwa, 2010). Figures that are in use are largely estimates based on past projections. This problem reflects on information as age distribution and educational attainment, as well as the calculation of associated elements of state power such as national morale and external image. During the oil boom era, immigration dramatically increased the size of Nigeria population. Conversely, the size of Nigeria’s population has been geometrically reduced because of political crisis, economic doldrums and above all, the seemingly insurmountable security threat in the present day of Nigeria (Alli, 2015).

Certainly, the availability and distribution of natural resources in the era of “oil boom” of the 1970s, which was coincidental with Nigeria’s heralded status as the “giant of Africa” and freedom to scheme in global politics, is no longer with the country (Adeyemo, 2002;

Amusan, 2014; Lafenwa, 2016). The above analysis suggests that elements of state power are dynamic and never static. They are subject to constant change and are always impacted upon by other factors. The continuous relevance of these elements depends on their effective usage and consolidation by the relevant stakeholders

Several scholars and writers have attempted to categorize these elements. For example, while Morgenthau (1978) classifies them into two parts namely permanent and temporary elements (Palmer & Perkins, 2000; Oche, 2000; Nnoli, 2003), and other scholars classified these factors into tangible and intangible elements. On the one hand, tangible elements are quantifiably empirical and can be measured. These include inter alia: geographical location, size and population, natural resources and economic capability, military strength (number of personnel and weapons), the constitution (Nbete & Greene, 2013).

And on the other hand, intangible elements cannot be subjected to empirical measurement and can only be apprehended by judgment. Such elements include quality of leadership, quality of diplomacy, national morale and the quality of government, leadership ideology and organization of government, information, international law and organization, and globalization (Bernstein, 2011; Carpenter, 2011; Flemes, 2016; Shaffer, 2012; Weiss & Wilkinson, 2014). Whichever ways the factors are classified, the elements of Nigeria’s national power, like every other nation-state, is an indication of its image perception which can be assessed in both quantitative and qualitative terms with the domestic and external environments serving as the medium of engagement.

Be that as it may, the capacity dimension examines the availability of certain resource capacities for the exertion of power. In Nigeria’s African relations, Nigeria’s national power is often equated exclusively with this capacity, such as human and material resources at the country’s disposal. This is a mistake because presently, Nigeria’s domestic exigencies weighed down the capacity to exert power in the continent. Based on mere capability and resources, Nigeria should be competing with the developed countries like the USA and China, not to be struggling to maintain leadership status in Africa. Nevertheless, the capability dimension is a crucial attribute of power in a state to exert power domestically and externally. A state cannot exercise control over the bahavioural preferences of others unless it is powerful and have good external image.

Although in terms of current power rankings by major indicators such as international visibility and interactions, willingness, and ability to project power internationally

(international peacekeeping), economic wellbeing, especially now that the country has the largest economy in Africa, Nigeria is almost better than every other country in Africa, except for its military spending where Algeria is ahead of the country. Also in terms of prospects, the future lies with Nigeria in all respect. But one can argue that Nigeria has not harnessed these opportunities to strengthen its image for the benefit of its domestic politico-security and socioeconomic landscapes.

And above all, the power exertion in the recent past before 1999 has inflicted filthy image on Nigeria and Nigerians abroad. Foreign policy exertion is necessarily an extension of the domestic policy. This means that the exertion of power in the foreign policy space is coterminous with the domestic imperatives. This helps us to identify the rationale for power exertion in Nigeria’s external relations that led to the adoption of citizen diplomacy. Thus, there is need to reflect on the rationales for Nigeria’s foreign policy thrusts which are responsible for Nigeria’s strong appeal for citizen-oriented approach in the Fourth Republic

3.2 Background to Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy

For several years, numerous studies have recommended the need for a change in Nigeria’s foreign policy as the reasons for the adoption of Afrocentricism, ab initio, are out of reach with reality in the contemporary World (Adebajo, 2015; Bach, 2007; James, 1999; Saliu, 2014). Indeed, the primary focus of any foreign policy is to entice and pursue the country’s national interest, but Africa has been the focus and major concern of Nigeria’s foreign policy from time immemorial (Agbu et al, 2013; Folarin, 2010; Uduma & Nwosu, 2015 etcetera). This suggests Africa as the cornerstone and centerpiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy.

In fact, throughout the tumultuous post-colonial history, Nigeria’s foreign policy has been consistent with this Afrocentric policy. In furtherance of Nigeria’s external relations, the country did not only establish several foreign missions (which have steadily been increasing) in the British colony of Africa, but also has a natural closeness to Anglophone African countries and the world at large (Saliu, 2014). Fafowora (2008) and Saliu (2015) noted that because of the oil boom in the 1970s, Nigeria’s diplomatic missions abroad expanded greatly from 46 in 1970 to 80 in 1975 and now with over 100 missions.

Undeniably, this was done to give effect to protection of Nigeria’s nationals in the receiving states and accelerate its level of image development to consolidate its global relevance. The country’s political elite shares this sentiment in their speeches and public expressions (Amao & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015). Apart from the widening abyss between the public 89 aspiration for leadership and the real outcomes in terms of how African countries react to those aspirations, there are some issues in the conduct of Nigeria’s external relations.

For instance, the new external/environmental conditionings affect Nigeria’s national sovereignty and individual citizens in international politics. These include among others: the changes in international system has warranted states to re-strategize on policy actions to cope with the increasing fluidity in the international system; responses by the states are occasioned by the power quantum they have acquired like pax-Americana (the Americanization of values that mask the structures of the international system); the grappling of African state with conflicts, democratization and economic woes, which has occasioned for the request of assistance from the Bretton woods institutions; and the domestic exigencies. For illustrative purposes, the international politics is increasingly being impacted upon by individuals that are not recognized by public international law in the conduct and management of international affairs.

The Nigeria’s renewed determination to reposition itself in the global democratic arena; to rebuild its battered image; to address the clutches of economic crisis; poverty; politico- security crunch; and scourge of diseases among other internal vices coupled with the external pressures like the new face of international terrorism, and the deepening implication of globalization gave rise to the clamour for new policy thrust. The immediate implication of all these, without any jot of doubt, is the need for re-articulation of Nigeria’s image building within an acceptable framework that considers, as a matter of priority, the survival of Nigerians as a people.

Sequel to the above, there is no gainsaying that Nigeria’s active role in Africa, the United Nations, Commonwealth of Nations and in world affairs earned her a substantial image and raised the country profile and credentials in the international system most especially before 1990s (Saliu, 1999; Zabadi, 2012). Nigeria was a significant player both in the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which it helped to found in its pursuit of Afrocentric policy. However, the achievements recorded on the diplomatic front were not sustained, and decline set in especially in the 1990s. This is why Osaghae (1998) refers to Nigeria as a cripple giant and places its foreign policy in a specific historical and social environment with an inconspicuous academic approach. Zabadi (2012) opines that “the decade of the 1990s was particularly a period during which Nigeria’s position fell to low levels in world affairs” (p.344).

In fact, Nigeria’s external image became deteriorated from diplomatic influence to isolation between 1993 and 1999 because during the period, Nigeria was ‘cut off’ from the international community (Alli, 2010b). A country that was once celebrated globally suddenly became relegated to a near-pariah status. The apparent or perceived ‘criminalization’ of Nigeria’s compatriots abroad has assumed a worrisome dimension. It has become unacceptable. Therefore, Nigeria’s diplomacy under the Fourth Republic is poised to diligently address the negative image and high mistreatment rate of Nigerian nationals abroad. Indeed, the return of Nigeria into a civilian democratic rule after an uninterrupted sixteen years of military rule, with a renewed hope of salvaging the country from ‘pariah status’ was widely celebrated. This led to the introduction of citizen-oriented diplomacy to correct the negative perception of Nigeria and Nigerians both at home and abroad.

In this regard, it is a legitimate desire for Nigerian state to shape outcomes of contestations in a way that suit its preferences. Hence, the ‘new’ foreign policy approach at the inception of the country’s Fourth Republic with much ado of significant development of rebuilding the country’s messy relationship with the international community, which would be clearly built on citizenship protection and welfare, was introduced. Therefore, citizen-oriented diplomacy is designed to repair the image of Nigeria and promote better living of the citizens (the true custodians of sovereignty) both at home and abroad by increasing the Human Development Index to protect national interest. To avoid oversimplification of the reason for the new foreign policy thrust, the brief background to citizen diplomacy in this analysis will suffice.

Citizen Diplomacy or Track Two Diplomacy as coined by Montville (1991), is more developed in the United States than in any country of the world, hence attention is focused on the US conceptualization in this study. Citizen Diplomacy, in the US, is defined by the word ‘engagement’ or ‘involvement’ (Akinterinwa, 2010). This suggests the involvement of the citizens in official diplomacy in different forms with the objective of completing official diplomatic efforts. It is the nongovernmental, informal and unofficial action by private citizens in such international issues as conflict resolution and prevention, and environmental policies. According to Montville (1991), Tract Two Diplomacy is not a substitute for Track One Diplomacy (official channel of government-to-government ties) but asserts that citizen diplomacy is an “unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, to influence public opinion,

91 organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict” (p.162).

Consequently, Nigeria’s conception of Citizen Diplomacy is not totally in concordance with the US’s. For clarity of purpose, the concept of citizen diplomacy as coined in Nigeria’s foreign policy is more of public diplomacy rather than being called citizen diplomacy. While citizen diplomacy tends to give room for people to people, and allows for citizen diplomats, public diplomacy tends to allow both the state and non-state actors alike to collaborate in actualization of and improving on the country’s image. Therefore, in Nigeria, what is called Citizen Diplomacy is actually Public Diplomacy as it would be analysed in the subsequent chapters of this study because the concept of Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria underscores more of governmental activities rather than the people/citizen involvement as it appears in the US concept.

These governmental activities, as espoused by Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy proponents include: promoting Nigeria’s national interest; protecting the dignity of Nigerian people; and deepening democratic development. Others include; removing taints on Nigeria’s international image, by particularly not accepting the involvement of a few Nigerians in criminal activities as a yardstick to give the generality of the Nigerian people a bad name; enhancing national unity at home and abroad; strengthening the linkages between domestic and foreign policies; and more significantly, making foreign policy more beneficial to all and sundry (see Akinterinwa, 2010, pp.57-64).

What is important to note here is that many countries have their own version of Citizen or Public Diplomacy (Kanji, 2016; Schodde, 2012; White & Radic, 2014). But what is significantly important in these versions wherever Citizen Diplomacy exists, is that it is derived by reasoning from self-evident propositions of the country involved, to resolve conflicts, to make peace and promote better understanding. More importantly, it is required to complement official efforts of Governments because governments are supposed to take a queue from the people, who are considered as ‘Citizen Diplomat’. Thus, citizens are very critical in diplomacy regardless of its type.

This agenda of winning the lost influence and glory of Nigeria back to global reckoning is conducted at the behest of and the benefit of the people during Obasanjo’s administration. This thrust was officially introduced as ‘Citizen Diplomacy’ in 2007 by the Foreign Affairs Minister (Chief Ojo Maduekwe) under President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua administration,

92 and was consolidated by President Goodluck Jonathan administration under his transformation agenda. Citizen Diplomacy is a short way of stating that foreign policy initiative will be driven (in its approach, objective and outcome) by the primary purpose of the Nigerian citizens. This means that Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy is in consonance with the constitutional principles and directives, places priority on the protection of the rights, dignity, privileges and interest of the Nigerian citizens wherever they may be in the entire globe.

This primary purpose which, within the internal dimension, is multilayered and to some extent diffuses in various chapters as constructed in the constitution, from the politico/pseudo legal manifesto among others (Chapter II, III on Citizenship, and IV on Fundamental Human Rights of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution). Its external dimension is regulated by public international law which has increasingly converged in many areas, particularly in those of individual rights and image of the country which are major concerns of this study, with domestic law, thus rendering nearly non-existent the wall between the “monists” and “dualists” (Maduekwe, 2009). Consequently, the foreign policy of a state is primarily determined by its domestic structure and exercised at the external environment (Ambe-Uva & Adegboyega, 2007; Renshon & Renshon, 2008).

Before we identify the rationale (and subsequently analyze the impact) of Citizen Diplomacy, it would not be out of place to highlight the eight major considerations that this concept is predicated upon according to Chief Ojo Maduekwe cited in Akinterinwa (2010): i. Nigeria and Nigerians should be at the centre of Nigeria’s foreign policy; ii. Nigeria’s foreign policy must meet her development aspirations and objectives in a manner that impacts more directly on the lives of the citizenry; iii. Nigeria’s foreign policy must seek a synergy with domestic policy to ensure that the former benefits ordinary Nigerians. Indeed, the boundary between domestic policy and foreign policy has collapsed into national security for collective wellbeing of Nigerians; iv. In line with the Servant-Leadership philosophy of Mr. President, Nigerian Missions abroad must actively engage the Nigerian community and Nigerian Diaspora and render quality consular and other services as a matter of rights, duties and obligations; v. Foreign policy making and implementation must be democratized to involve Nigerians from all levels of society, and not left for a small circle of experts and practitioners alone; 93

vi. Every foreign policy endeavor must meet the litmus test of determining the extent to which it protects and advocates what is best for Nigeria and what will best benefit the Nigerian people; vii. Nigeria should be guided by the principle of reciprocity or ‘diplomacy of consequence’ in its interactions with the rest of the world; and viii. Nigeria and Nigerians will not accept being criminalized by the international community simply based on the despicable conduct of a few of their nationals. Due recognition must be given to the remarkable feats and tremendous contributions of Nigeria and Nigerians to world civilization, socio-economic and scientific development, as well as international peace and security (pp. 63-64).

It is clear from the above eight-point pillars that Citizen Diplomacy is conceived to be an instrument for promoting the national interest of the country; removing the taints on and making the Nigeria’s external image; protecting the dignity of Nigerian people irrespective of where the reside; strengthening the linkages between domestic and foreign policies; making foreign policy more beneficial to every Nigerian; and above all, in line with image making, by not accepting the involvement of a few Nigerians in criminal activities as a yardstick to give the generality of the Nigerian people a bad name and negative image. After all, there is no country in the world that is immune from one criminal act or the other by its citizens. Consequently, citizen diplomacy is a process and technique of relationship, a philosophical guide to the conduct and management of Nigeria’s external relations (Maduekwe, 2009).

Figure 3: Functional Circle of Citizen Diplomacy

Development Aspirations

rendering qualityservices throughNIDO Engagingall Nigerians

Citizen Diplomacy:

Nigerians as Focus in in of Foreign Policy

Protection of all Nigerians and Rejection of every form of Indiscriminate Criminalization

NIDO: Nigerian in Diaspora Organisation

Source: Initiated by the Researcher with Reference from Akinterinwa (2010); Maduekwe (2009)

Viewing from the above, Citizen Diplomacy can be graphically represented in a circular sequence. The analysis here depicts that every component of Citizen Diplomacy is interconnected with one another, which can be linked to a whole part and must function simultaneously. Drawing from systemic approach of analysis, it is expedient to state that every part constitutes to make a whole and any defect in one part will automatically affect the whole. Hence, the application of policy of Citizen Diplomacy is not different because of the functional interconnectivity and any shortfall in one function will certainly affect the whole.

Therefore, for Citizen Diplomacy to be effectively achieved, unconditional exertion of every part is indispensable. Based on this analysis, the focus of the next section is to identify the

95 rationale for the adoption of Citizen Diplomacy in the Nigeria’s Fourth Republic between 1999 and 2015.

3.3 Rationale for the Adoption of Citizen Diplomacy

What determines the international recommendation or commendation of any state is not what the country does abroad but the country’s role at home and how it influences the welfare of its citizens abroad. Indeed, domestic policy ends where foreign policy begins. It is the attitude of the state towards their internal and external factors that determines the kind of credibility and legitimacy the international community will give to any nation. Put differently, Citizen Diplomacy is a technique for the conduct and management of diplomacy using the citizens, which is conceptualized in Nigeria in the context of future scenarios and need.

Inevitably, this is what some countries of the world are currently focusing their energy as official diplomacy now appears to be failing to assist in the maintenance of international peace and security (Akinterinwa, 2016b; Folarin, 2014; Foulan, 2015; Page & Barabas, 2000). The involvement of the people has become indispensable in the quest for global peace as at today and hence, the need for Citizen Diplomacy. Without losing focus on the fundamentals of this chapter, a number of issues might have explained the motivation for the introduction of citizen-oriented approach as Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust in the Fourth Republic. These factors among others are highlighted below

3.3.1 Bad Leadership in Nigeria as Perceived by the International Community

A critical examination of successive leadership roles in Nigeria since independence revealed selfish, mediocre, ethno-religious extremists, and insincerity in handling both internal and external interests of Nigeria (Alli, 2010b; Fawole, 2003; 2016; Saliu, 1999; Zabadi, 2012). The long regimes of military interregnum in Nigeria left a deep scar in the nation’s domestic and external affairs which adversely affected the external image of the country. However, the period of Babangida and Abacha between 1985 and 1998 was the Epoch of Realism in leadership styles towards Nigeria’s external relations. Suffice to say is that Nigeria’s diplomacy was grounded during this era. Infact, the decline in Nigeria’s image and influence in the multilateral, diplomatic fora had become evident at the beginning of the 1990s.

Although, the 1985-1993 era saw the birth of economic diplomacy and succeeded in opening Nigeria economy to external influence through the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) by General Ibrahim Babangida, but the regime “official legalization” of corruption and 96 democratic misdeed led to the breakdown of domestic policies in the country (Fawole, 2016). The body language of Babangida’s regime towards the alleged support for the Advance Fee Fraud (419) by his failure to address it and other corruption related practices was a case to support this fact (Uddoh, 2016). To buttress this claim, Babangida’s regime was tagged as “Maradonic” and evil-genius who stylishly stricken the country with poverty and the country was ranked one of the worst poorest country in the world through his period (Ayagi, 1997). Besides, the regime unwillingness to let go military rule and allow for democratic dispensation in the country further compounded, adversely, the external image of the country and influence in the multilateral, diplomatic fora.

The autocratic regime of Sani Abacha between 1993 and 1998 stands out as a watershed and the darkest years in the history of independent Nigeria (Amuwo et’al, 2001). Specifically, between 1993 and 1998, Nigeria experienced the “Dark Age”. Nigeria’s policymaking during this period has been described as Bazuka foreign policy and a tit-for- tat diplomacy, which played a deciding role in Nigeria’s image destruction in foreign affairs (Inamete, 2001; Okpokpo, 2000). During this period, there was pressure for democratization not only in Nigeria but also in Africa as a whole, supervised by the Western powers and the institution under their control. This pressure began to pay off, and Nigeria was being looked upon to provide a good example (Akinboye, 2015).

Despite the much-awaited hope on Nigeria to steer the democratic ship in Africa by the international community, the presence of pragmatic, charismatic, and selfless leadership remains a mirage. However, it is historically incorrect to put Nigeria’s image destruction only on the shoulder of Abacha regime. Babaginda junta effectively laid the foundation of Nigeria’s filthy image (Saliu, 2007). These categorizations are essentially, but not exclusively, related to the behaviour and perception of the Nigerian leaders towards the changes in the international system and how Nigeria responded to those changes. The analysis that could be drawn from it suggests regime peculiarity of bad leadership on both internal and external factors as perceived by the international community

The foundations for a battered external image of the country were effectively laid by Babangida regime despite all opportunities that came its way to register its name on a golden history book of Nigeria. He blew up the excellent opportunity and failed to return the country to a democratic state by not handing-over power to a democratically elected government as he had promised. The initial self-imposed handing-over date of 1990 was shifted to 1992 and further shifted to 1993. Worst still, the annulment of a globally

97 applauded June 12, 1993 election and subsequent installation of a controversial Interim National Government (which only was permitted for just eighty-two days), instead of announcing and handing-over power to the presumed winner, landed fatal wrath of the international community on Nigeria.

The Babangida regime attainment and its eventual failure to produce democracy took Nigerians and their foreign friends on a long ride. This was quite disappointing and rather unfortunate for a regime that had generously announced an elaborate and most expensive transition programme (Agbu, 2015; Yahya, 2005). The process of transition to democracy which began with Local Government election into the 774 Local Councils in Nigeria was aborted after the Presidential elections. This was a fatal blow to the country’s external relations and sunk Nigeria’s image into troubled diplomatic waters.

This malevolent imagination unmade the Nigeria’s citizens both at home and abroad as un- democrats, notwithstanding the citizens widely condemnation of the failed attempt to democratize the country (Aleyomi, 2012). The interim government created by Babangida junta headed by a political neophyte, Chief Ernest Shonekan, was not only rejected locally but also was condemned globally because the country did not bargain for that besides, it did not meet the democratic standard of the international community. Based on the background of Chief Shonekan, a businessman who did not understand the rhythm of politics, he was incapacitated to discern the image damage created by Babangida to address it.

Expectedly, the interim government was short-lived as Gen. Sani Abacha sacked Chief Shonekan. Abacha’s regime is known as the most notorious one among the military regimes in the memory of every Nigerian (Alli, 2010a; Ayodele & Olu-Adeyemi, 2006; Fawole, 2003; Ichili, 2015). Eventually, Gen. Abdulsalam Abubakar became the Head of State after the death of Gen. Abacha and transited the country into democratic regime headed by Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. Obasanjo acknowledged bad leadership as one of the impasse of Nigeria’s image climate and much needed opportunity to redeem the country’s image, introduced a citizen-oriented policy to bridge the relationship gap between Nigeria and the international community at large

3.3.2 Electoral Malpractices and its International Condemnation

The political legitimacy of a government, democratic stability and the enhancement of external image credentials of any country is sine qua non to the conduct of free, fair, credible and widely acceptable elections by both local and international observers. Flowing from bad 98 leadership in Nigeria, the globally adjudged freest, fairest and detribalized 1993 general elections in the history of Nigeria, was annulled. The immediate reactions to failure to transit the country to democracy brought a long ‘sledgehammer’ of the international community on Nigeria. The cancellation of the 1993 presidential election by Gen Babangida became a local and international concern that some commentators uphold the indivisibility line of demarcation between domestic and international issues (Nbete & Greene, 2013).

There was imposition of various sanctions against Nigeria by individual Western countries such as the European Community. Pressure was applied on economic, political, diplomatic, military, fronts, inter alia to impose suffering on Nigerians so that the government could return to the transition programme (Saliu, 2007). However, the coming of General Sani Abacha to power in November 1993, through a palace coup, only made matters worse. At home, the replacement of the Interim National Government under Chief Ernest Shonekan with the Abacha-led military government further left the image of Nigeria bitterly vulnerable. Though, pro-democracy groups unequivocally rejected this move. Prominent among these groups was the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) which became pronounced in the South-Western region of Nigeria.

Significantly, NADECO declared its opposition to the Abacha military government in 1994 and became the main target which Abacha led government sought to crush. NADECO alongside with similar groups especially the media and Civil society which fought the military government, seem to enjoy the support of the major Western powers and they became a thorn in the flesh of the government (Mustapha, 2001; Ngara & Esebonu, 2012; Olukotun, 2002; Zabadi, 2012). In fact, the civil society also condemned Abacha regime. The role of civil society organisations towards restoration of democratisation process in the country during Babangida and Abacha regimes cannot also be underestimated (Cassani & Carbone, 2016; Ikubaje, 2016; Lafenwa, 2016; Ngara & Esebonu, 2012).

Besides, the electoral malpractices that hinged on the conduct of Nigeria’s 2007 elections were another negative trend that lowers the image of the country. The declaration of President Umaru Yar’Adua as winner of the presidential election held on April 21 2007, amidst several compromises by the electoral body before and during the election cannot in any way close to democratic doctrines. Electoral abnormalities marred the conduct of the elections (National Democratic Institute, 2007). The 2007 presidential election was condemned and widely pronounced flawed by both local and international observers because of various procedural and logistical irregularities. These include, among others:

99 poor election organisation; lack of voter register; paucity of voting materials; ballot stuffing, rigging, lack of transparency; significant evidence of fraud, violence, bias and underage voting (Ashby, 2007; National Democratic Institute, 2007).

President Yar’Adua acknowledged the fact that the election was far to be devoid of malpractices. He recognized that there would be “a very serious challenge both internationally and locally, as regards the outcome of the general election” (Umaru & Odenyi, 2007). Making that ‘challenge’ a reality for the Nigerian government is crucial for the credibility of the stated goal of Western governments to promote democracy on the continent. Without a coherent response to such a flagrant flaunting of the democratic rights of Nigerians, the international perceptions of Nigeria become deteriorated. No doubt, in line with the Chief EU observer Max van den Berg, all these falls below the basic international standard which contributed to Nigeria’s credibility and legitimacy crisis among the international community (The Sydney Morning Herald, 2007).

There is no misgiving that electoral violence remains the greatest challenge to many democratizing societies like Nigeria. A survey of Nigeria’s political history from independence to date with specific reference to the 1993, 2003 and 2007 federal elections has shown that the absence of credible elections threatened the image and democratic sincerity in Nigeria which has marked the period of a New World Order. The worst picture of the general elections under the fourth republic came in 2003 and 2007 (Akinterinwa, 2012a). Critiques and international observers have accused the electoral body (INEC) as non-independent and it remain the worst of all previous electoral bodies, considering the negative roles it plays in all the previous election of 1999, 2003 and 2007 general election (National Democratic Institute, 2007).

Based on this negative perception as a result of marginalization of citizens in democratization processes and the image crisis among other factors which is related to the welfare of the Nigerian citizen, Chief Ojo Maduekwe introduced the concept of Citizen Diplomacy in furtherance of what has been in existence during President Obasanjo administration. It is believed, drawing insight from the theoretical foundation of this study, that foreign policy is effectively pursued by the articulation of both the domestic and external conditions which can be measured by the support of its citizenry

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3.3.3 Corruption and the International Perception of Nigeria.

Nigeria’s policy making and implementations over the years have been quite epileptic to say the least. This is largely due to the myriad effects of corruption. The high rate of corruption has undermined the country’s image and national interest both at home and abroad. It promotes social inequality and hatred. Corruption-induced wealth, in the eyes of those who acquire their wealth through a dint of hard work and honesty, is unacceptable. It is useful here to recall that, in March 1987, it was noted in the report of the J.S. Cookey-led Political Bureau, that corruption and indiscipline was already identified as the bane of Nigerian society, twenty years back, that is, as far back as 1967 (Daudu, 1987). The Report of the Political Bureau, headed by Prof. Samuel J. Cookey was quoted by Akinterinwa (2012a) that: Corruption has become a household word in the Nigerian society. It pervades all strata of the society-from the highest levels of the political and business elites to the ordinary person in the village. Its multifarious manifestations include the inflation of government contracts in return for kickbacks; frauds and falsification of accounts in the public service; examination malpractices…; the taking of bribes and perversion of justice among the police, the judiciary and other organs…; foreign exchange swindling; hoarding and smuggling. At the village level, corruption manifests itself in such forms as adulteration of market goods or denting of measures to reduce their contents with a view to giving advantage to seller…” (pp. 25-26).

From the foregoing, the report was made in 1987 and it dated the existence of the problem of corruption as fashionable bane in Nigeria to 1967. Then, if in between 1967 and 1987 the problem which covers, according to Cookey’s report, every facet of life in the country could not be nipped in the bud, the explanation of the inability to solve the problem twelve years later, which is in 1999, and even beyond is much daunting (Akinterinwa, 2012a).

Transparency International (TI) in 1997 perceived Nigeria as intentionally dishonest. Corruption is a global phenomenon but the degree of severity in Nigeria between 1985 and 1998 during the regimes of Babangida and Abacha attracted global concerns. Alli (2015) argues that military junta with the attribute of bad governance are key evaluations of corruption in Nigeria. This argument may not hold water because even after the military rule since 1999, Nigeria is still known as one of the most corrupt nations in the world. President Buhari, attesting to this fact during his presidential campaigns early 2015, before he was elected, had said that if Nigeria failed to kill corruption, corruption will kill the country. This was a statement made after an uninterrupted 16 years of democracy in the country (Adejumobi, 2016).

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However, the regime of General Babangida is particularly remembered for blowing US$12.4billion Gulf oil windfall accruing to Nigeria through the so-called “dedicated and special account” in extra-budgetary expenditures over a period of about six years (Nbete & Greene, 2013). Transparency International estimates the Gen. Abacha and his associates loot between US$2billion and US$5billion from the Nigerian treasury, and ranked him among the top five political looters of all time (Uddoh, 2016). Between 1995 and February 1998 in what the former Chairman of Economic and Financial Crime Commission, Malam Nuhu Ribadu, described as the single biggest advanced fee fraud (which is known as 419 in Nigeria’s parlance) case in the world, four Nigerian nationals: Christian Anajemba, Amaka Anajemba, Emmanuel Nwude, and Nzeribe Okoli defrauded Banco Noroeste S.A of brazil of a total of US$242 million on the pretext of securing contracts for the construction of a second international airport in Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory-FCT (Ridadu, 2006).

The impact of negative Nigeria’s global image and reputation for corruption was felt on Nigerians living or traveling abroad including African countries, as many of them were subjected to unnecessary harassment by such foreign agencies as immigration, customs, and the police. Some respondents shared their personal experience and ordeal with the researcher to buttress the high level of harassment meted on innocent Nigerians during the draconian and corrupt period of Abacha regime. In many instances, Nigerians were singled out from queues at international airports and kept waiting for hours unattended to or subjected to humiliating bodily searches (Akinterinwa, 2010). Even members of the Nigerian diplomatic corps were not spared. The humiliation and unfriendly treatments were clearly in breach of their diplomatic immunity and privileges. Without doubt, corruption poses severe and profound challenges on the image of the country.

The pathetic aspect of corruption in Nigeria that threaten the acceptability of Nigeria and Nigerians outside the shores of the country, especially in Europe, America and Asia, is the conscious and general acquiescence glorification of the corrupt figures by the people, and worse still, the limitation of the war against corruption to public officials. The perception of Nigeria as one of the corrupt countries in the world is documented by Transparency International. Nigeria has for years battled with a serious image setback because of this, and in order to clean up the nation’s image both at home and abroad, the Fourth Republic which began in 1999 introduced citizen-oriented diplomacy to tackle the vices of corruption which stands at the very top of the ladder from the bottom up.

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3.3.4 Human Rights Abuses and its External Response

Under General Abacha, foreign policy was crudely mishandled. The fact that Nigerians were so much desirous of reclaiming political power from the military, they subdued all their differences and built one of the most sophisticated political machines ever assembled in Nigeria and struggle for the validation of the sanctity of the June 12 1993 presidential elections (Agbu, 2015; Omotola, 2010a). The military juntas deployed the much-dreaded Sgt. Rogers and the other apparatchiks to snipe out opposition or appearance of any form of opposition (Sanni, 2016). The regime unjustly imprisoned many people, including Obasanjo, who later became Nigeria’s president. These led Nigeria into more troubles with the international community and their agencies on the issues of violation of human rights and lack of democracy.

The international community accused Nigeria of human rights abuses. In fact, the government of Gen. Abacha hit back hard by indiscriminate arrest, state sponsored assassination squad and detention of some of these opposition groups and individuals, including Chief M.K.O. Abiola, the presumed winner of the annulled election (Dickson, 2013). Those who were more fortunate fled into exile, like Chief Anthony Enahoro, while others who were less fortunate were killed by persons suspected to be agents of the state (Amuwo et al, 2001; Ichili, 2015; Zabadi, 2012). For example, one can conclude from our interaction with some major individuals who participated in the June 12 validation mantra, some of the civil society organizations, (non) Nigerian diplomats, public analysts and copious literature that agents of the Abacha government were responsible for the killings of Chief Alfred Rewane, who was the major financial of the struggle for the validation of June 12; Mrs Kudirat Abiola (the well-outspoken wife to Chief MKO Abiola); and Bagauda Kaltho, among others.

As the government reign of terror increased, so did the effort of the Western powers and the International Community to isolate Nigeria at major multilateral fora, such as the UN and its system, in a reversal of fortunes from the era of dynamism. Some commentators observe that the US government reacted to the indiscriminate arrest and detention of people as a result of the annulment of June 12 election, by suspending non-humanitarian assistance to Nigeria, reduced the level of military personnel exchange between the two countries, reviewed all new application for exports of defence articles and services to Nigeria, imposed restrictions on the issuance of American diplomatic visas to Nigerian officials, and advised prospective American visitors to avoid Nigeria. Chief among these was that Dr. Ovona 103

Goro, the Foreign Affair Minister under Abacha’s regime, was denied visa to travel abroad because of the attitude of the Head of State he was working with (KI2, 2015).

Indeed, the climax of Nigeria’s rapid loss of diplomatic clout and relegated to a pariah status came when the country was barred from the Commonwealth of Nations at its meeting in Auckland, New Zealand in November 1995. The Abacha regime had one of the worst understanding of the new world order and committed unprecedented violations of international norms and principles, including huge human rights violations. A prominent example was his failure to genuinely democratize the country, opting instead to pursue a self-succession agenda (Alli, 2010b; Zabadi, 2012).

Closely related was the extra-judicial hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa, an acclaimed international human rights crusader and environmentalist, together with eight of his Ogoni activists, despite international plea for clemency, in November 1995. This was seen as an act of defiance of international community, including the Commonwealth, by Nigeria. These adversely affected Nigeria’s image in the outside world and led to Nigeria’s suspension in some of the international organizations. Nigeria was equally treated with disdain and harshest criticism came from African leaders like Nelson Mandela of South Africa (Oko, 2015; KI2, 2015). The international perception of the human rights policies of the ruling military regimes in Nigeria, among other factors, evoked external image crisis and increase strained relationship with Nigeria.

Despite immense efforts by diplomats and other officials in the Babangida and Abacha years to explain Nigeria’s stance to countries outside Africa, Okpokpo (2000) argues that “their efforts were fruitless because Nigeria maintained an obsolete definition of national sovereignty” (p.34). These regimes never saw anything wrong in abusing human right. A respondent who worked closely with Abacha confirmed that human rights and related issues by the regime were seen as Nigerian internal affairs about which outsiders had no say. Since countries in the international system relate with one another to co-exist, mishandling of self- citizens by any government will receive international sanction. Human right in the recent past unlike before is considered in international law as purely external affairs which have become important determinants in foreign policy.

Also, the embarrassing situation over Bakassi Peninsula cannot be misjudged. Military hangover effect can be sufficiently linked to the Bakassi imbroglio. This situation embroiled Nigeria and Cameroon in a border conflict, which has left tense relations with neighbouring

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Cameroon, a former French colony (Fawole, 2008; Mustapha, 2008; Osita, 2016). This and other issues explain the current state of Nigeria’s foreign relations and how Nigeria has slowly lost global influence, whereby, in regional affairs, and other African countries have gained ground. A major consequence of this development was that Nigeria government officials could not visit the western countries freely and could not secure support easily even on issues that some powers were not opposed to. The inability of Nigeria to clinch the leadership of AU at the expense of South Africa and frustration it got, as the main force behind the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), in the quest to end the Liberian conflict speedily were major testament (Zabadi, 2012).

Since there is hardly any way domestic issues can be tackled separately from external one, Nigeria was compelled to adopt a new style of diplomacy in the Forth Republic that will enhance political, economic, and social respect of Nigerians and Nigeria in its pursuit of foreign policy objective within the African continent and outside the shores of Africa. By constructively engaging the outside world, solutions are also being sought for problems at home.

3.3.5 Niger-Delta Militancy and International Perception of Nigeria

The militancy in the Niger-Delta region, as a result of government insensibility to the region’s plights, served as another reason for image crisis that led to the adoption of citizen diplomacy. Niger-Delta is central to the economic development of Nigeria because it is the region where oil is exploited. Members of the African Union (AU), worldwide trading partners and key allies need oil and gas for their development (Badom, 2008). Unfortunately, over seventy percent of Nigerians live on less than a dollar per day. The huge earnings from the petro-dollar have not been able to translate into good living conditions for Nigerians in general and the Niger-Deltas in particular. It is for these reasons that the Niger- Delta people came to see the Nigerian state as a failed state that they could no longer count on to ensure their socio-economic well-being and the security of their persons and property (Ichili, 2015; Owugah, 2009).

The 1957 discovery of oil in Oloibiri in the present Bayelsa State and the subsequent exploitation of oil resources in other parts of the Niger-Delta area have brought mixed blessings to the people. While the Niger-Deltas see the discovery as the genesis of their abject poverty, marginalization, as well as environmental degradation, the Nigerian state regards the discovery as the beginning of her national wealth as well as improved ego in the

105 comity of nations (Ekanem, 2016; Ikelegbe, 2005; Suberu, 1996). As rightly put by the Guardian (Feb. 21, 2008): Nigeria earned over $600 billion in its forty-five years (1960-2005) of oil export. In 2007 alone, Nigeria reportedly earned 55 billion, making it the fourth highest earner among the member states of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). It ranked behind Saudi Arabia with $189 billion, United Arab Emirate $63 billion and Iraq, $57 billion (cited in Owugah, 2010, 188).

The Nigerian successive government has attempted to alleviate the suffering of the people of Niger-Delta, but none has yielded positive result. This is not our focus here but just for emphasis. The condition of the people remains the same. This situation is not surprising, in the view of the fact that the development strategies to alleviate the yearnings of the Niger- Deltans by the government have been cosmetic, hence distorting the genuine development aspirations of the people. The only option left for the people of Niger-Delta was to embark on peaceful demand for compensation by Movement for Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) led by Ken Saro-Wiwa, which unfortunately resulted in violent protest in view of the refusal of the Federal Government and Oil Multi-Nationals to yield to their demands. As rightly observed by Omotola (2010b) that: Until recently, the protests were limited to disruption of oil production, outright stoppage of work, blockages, seizure and sabotage of flow stations and installations. But at the moment it has taken a dramatic and uncontrollable dimension; involving the use of armed struggle, kidnapping of oil company personnel, particularly expatriate staff, and insurrection against the state (p.26).

MOSOP was the only ethnic based organization in the Niger-Delta which intimated the entire world of the plight of the Ogoni people and their environment. Under the energetic leadership of Ken Saro-Wiwa, MOSOP had made representations to such international institutions, as the United Nations (UN), the United Nations Committee for Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UN-CERD), the World Conference of Indigenous People (WCIP), the Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organization (UNPO), The British Parliamentary Human Rights Group (BHRG), Amnesty International, the Green Peace Organization, and the London Rain Forest Action Group (Suberu 1996, p.34). Conflicts and threats to peace and security have been about governance, participation, justice, fairness, environment, identity and cultural values. Though Niger-Delta conflict is still an internal one, the dynamics of great power politics because of Saro-Wiwa’s arrest and subsequent execution, after international plea for clemency, have internationalized it.

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Nigeria’s external relation in West Africa, is guided by a policy of good neighbourliness and commitment to peace and stability in the sub-region. Evidence of this is well demonstrated in Nigeria’s investments in the management and resolution of conflict in Liberia, Sierra-Leone and Guinea-Bissau. However, despite Nigeria’s valuable contributions to development of the sub-region, internal crisis in the Niger-Delta coupled with border security with each of its neighbours are constant concern for Nigeria and hence, tainted the country’s image abroad (Adetula, 2008, p.79). The global perception of Nigeria immediately after independence was that of a nation that had been destined to lead the black race (Saliu, 2006). Unfortunately, Nigeria’s image because of uncontrollable Niger-Delta crisis has been brought to disrepute among the civilized countries of the world and even among its African counterparts. In fact, the contemporary Niger-Delta crisis that threatened the corporate existence of this nation is some of the points that portray the giant of Africa in bad light (Saliu, 2006).

Indeed, until recently, the Niger-Delta crisis was presumed to be an internal affair of Nigerian state that required an internal solution. The international condemnation as a result of the unjust killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa alongside with the eight Ogoni human right activists in November 1995 by the Abacha regime, externalized the Niger Delta crisis beyond the shores of Nigeria (Ojakorotu, 2008; Osita, 2016). Even Garuba (2011) opines further that “the world is becoming a global village, and the development in communication and computer technology has made state behaviour to be subjected to global scrutiny” (p.33).

Again, the strategic importance of Nigerian oil to energy security of the United States of America and other member states of the Western world cannot be overemphasized. So, in the bid to address the plight of the people of the Niger-Delta, which has been exposed to the international community, the Fourth Republic government introduced citizen-oriented foreign policy approach.

3.3.6 Dwindling Economy that Triggers International Condemnation of Nigeria Abroad The possession of economy power like minerals, natural resources and raw materials is meaningless if, in its application, unable to bring results which enhance and meet the minimum satisfaction of the people. The stage of industrial, technological and economic development which a state has attained is incontrovertibly a prominent index of power. Natural resources, raw materials and economic capacity are crucial tripartite elements of power, which are closely linked to the element of geography because their availabilities are

107 primarily a consequence of geographical location. Natural resources and raw materials are very central to industrialization and technological development. The economic capacity is the “backbone” of any state in the contemporary world. State power is related to state economic viability. The most powerful nations in the world today are almost economically advanced, industrially developed, and technologically superior.

The dominant role which G-7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and China have been able to play in recent years is largely due to excellent industrialization, technological advancement and economic development that these countries possess (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010). It is well known that United States which continued to pursue policy of isolation till the beginning of the present century got deeply involved in the international arena in the present century mainly due to tremendous increase in her national capacity due to rapid economic development. Similarly, the foreign policy of Britain underwent great transformation in the post-World War II period, mainly due to decline in her national capacity (Carlsnaes, 2002).

The presence of oil as one of the economic capacity is an important element of Nigeria’s power and influential source of wealth. These developments make Nigeria, in many respects, one of the toasts and most attractive business environments in the world, a fact demonstrated by its substantial trade relationships with the major economies in the world, China, US, Japan, the Middle East and among other African states. However, one paradox of economic capacity is the fact that quite a number of states that have developed economies tend to have little or no raw materials and minerals. Singapore is a good example. While Nigeria with abundance of raw materials and minerals has very weak economies as far as development is concerned.

Oil is the major driving force of Nigeria’s foreign policy because about 95% of the country’s revenue comes from oil. Nigeria earned an enviable image in the continent and global scenes as a result of oil and the universal importance of petroleum (Folarin, 2010). States without oil still need oil and so cannot do without the oil producers, which has accorded the former with a lot of bargaining power and leverage to influence political decisions (Soremekun, 2003). Nigeria possesses the economic power and raw materials to run an ambitious foreign policy due to its endowment with oil, coupled with its agricultural richness and its huge market potentials for the world.

Ironically, Nigeria lost this glory prior the Fourth Republic and the country was perceived as lack and poor amid plenty. The economic situation during this period was so bad that 108

Nigeria was ranked as one of the poorest country by the Transparency International (Akinterinwa, 2012a; Ichili, 2015). A hostile external environment intensively dominated by the worldwide economic recession of the 1980s coupled with the international condemnation on dwindling economy further plunged the image of the country, which instances are documented here. Divestment from Nigeria became the narratives during the Babangida and Abacha regimes.

There was massive exodus of MNCs from Nigeria. A commentator observes that an estimate of over 150 Multinational Corporations (MNCs) divested from Nigeria between 1985 and June 1999, while over 65 per cent of indigenous businesses, typically Small Scale Enterprises crumpled when Babangida regime introduced the SAP (Ichili, 2015; Uddoh, 2016). Some MNCs that reduced their holdings in Nigeria during this period include Standard Chartered Bank, the Welcome Foundation, and Unilever plc. among others. Also, during Abacha’s period, Nigeria earned over US$200billion from oil production, but has nothing to show for it, except a very low per capital and huge foreign debt. All these hampered significantly on the country’s economy.

The international community condemned the high rate of unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, child labour/trafficking, and debt crisis among others. The economy of the nation during the period was quite pathetic and Nigeria became slave because of high level of indebtedness to almost all the world’s financial institutions and developed countries such as IMF and Paris Club. The problem lingered because of lackadaisical attitude of the leaders towards industrialization and high level of corruption. Worse still, there was no encouraging environment (as a result of high security tension most especially in the Niger-Delta region) for foreign investors to invest in the country. This further strangulates the country’s economy whereby relegated the country’s image among the comity of nations

The economic power or potential of a state, no doubt, influences the state image in the comity of nations and enhance its bargaining power or even earn for it enviable role in the international system (Henderson, 2005). The power of oil, for instance, in the Middle East has strengthened the foreign policies of the states and given them a loud voice and a big stature in the international system. The United States (US) for instance redefined its policy in the Persian Gulf because of the enormity of oil resources that have two symbolisms for the US: its major source of energy and the threat or potential of the Gulf countries to convert oil wealth (power) to unbearable military power (Folarin, 2010).

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Unarguably, the blessing of oil in Nigeria, should give the country economic power that should be reflected on its citizens both at home and abroad. This necessitated the diplomatic move on revamping the internal economy situation and environmental conditionings that would reduce the rate of debts and encourage foreign investor to raise the standard of living of Nigerians both at home and abroad.

3.3.7 Globalisation and Nigeria’s Image Abroad

Another complementary rationale that hampered the image of Nigeria abroad is the essence of globalization and internalization of capital in the present epoch of neoliberalism. Universally, there is no satisfactory definition of globalization, as the concept is multidimensional and has various values for understanding. Omotola (2010b) gives a succinct meaning to globalization in underdeveloped countries, as nothing but a re- colonization of the economy, new phase of capitalism, exploitation, inequality and polarisation. This suggests that in every economy (domestic as well as international), the external sector gains prominence over all the other sectors.

Indeed, this is the reason external sectors are always vibrant in foreign policy decision making. It is only the branch of political elites that is connected to the external sector that will gain considerable and sufficient level of prominence that will enable the control of the machinery of government, and when such happens, the political elites will orchestrate the mentality of the state in that direction - towards externalization of policies which is a product of globalization. Nigeria is not immune from this evil of imperialism without a major colonial empire, which subjects the country to undue preponderant towards the external. Citizen Diplomacy was therefore introduced in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic to respond to the challenges of globalization to protect the Nigerian interest in global politics.

Globalization has not only impacted on the problem of definition of Nigeria’s African roles in its policy towards Africa but also hindered domestic development and plummets national image. This analysis applies in every ramification of Nigeria sociopolitical and economic sectors (Cox & Sinclair, 1999). There is no sector in Nigeria that has no level of internationalization. For instance, the oil sector is a dominant sector in Nigeria. Meanwhile, oil is an internationalized commodity. The finance sector especially with the influx of international finance capital and its coherency with domestic capital as junior partners is another good example. Even sector that seems distant and removed from the process like culture and tourism in the era of globalization has become highly internationalized and become a distinct. 110

An understanding of the global political economy in an era of globalization, most especially in the Third World Countries, gives an idea of why countries has necessarily becomes extraverted in their policies and development agenda (Aran, 2011). There is significant degree of de-emphasis to the potency of state actor as the main actor in the international system by the realist school of thought. Although not written off, but there are other contenders of power that have also emerged (Foyle, 2003; Sampson, 2016). Due to globalization, there is systematization of different actors in world politics. There are substantial non-state actors who are playing very vital roles. The state has been joined on the international arena by these significant non-state actors that defining the trajectory of global affairs.

In fact, this understanding is made clearer by the ascendency of neoliberalism as the hegemonic mainstream narrative. For instance, the Al Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram, and other terrorist groups are defining the security architecture and trajectory of security policies and concerns globally. Beyond that, the notion of interest has been significantly altered especially in the era of globalization (Hermann et al, 2001; Obadan, 2003; Ota & Ecoma, 2015; Pham, 2007). Other social forces have also emerged which have ossified around the state and define the orientations and contents of state policies because these social forces are tied with certain interest. Therefore, what constitutes national interest is defined by these social forces. National interest is in consternation of so many issues which are driven by the kind of social forces behind them.

One main thrust of globalization is to seek the integration of regional and national economies of the developing countries into global economy. Nigerian economy is not only one of them but a particularly targeted one. Nigeria has a big market and many of the raw materials which the developed economies are seriously running after. Globalization preaches removal of all barriers to free trade. Nigeria is required to open all her commercial frontiers to allow for free inflow of international products. In other words, there should be no protectionism. As much as everyone appreciates globalization, especially its ICT components, it is sufficed to say that, it is not in the interest of any country that does not have any product to give in exchange for whatever that country imports.

Explained differently, Akinterinwa (2013c) argues that “when the commercial the commercial frontiers are opened and a country becomes a dumping ground for all sorts of goods, and the country does not have any product to export, even if all the Euro-American frontiers are left open without formality, it is meaningless” (p.46). Ichili (2015) buttresses

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Akinterinwa’s view when he eloquently opines that “Africa’s contribution to the global economy is just about two percent, and consequently, Nigeria does not have much to export or contribute to the world economy”. The challenge before the government of the Fourth Republic especially President Obasanjo when he assumed office in 1999 was how Nigeria will survive when the raw materials would have been exhausted. With this, foreign policy was prioritised using a concentric approach and made to directly benefit the Nigerian people in respective of where they reside (Lawal & Aluko, 2016).

Another identifiable factor that has underlined Nigeria’s external bahaviour closely related to the essence of globalization is capitalism. The entrenchment of market forces in Nigeria during colonialism was to have a long-standing impact on Nigeria’s foreign policy. Colonial legacy, one of the crises of development in Africa, is a vampire that threatens the foreign policy of African states in general and Nigeria’s relations with its contiguous states in particular (Folarin, 2010) Capitalism thus manifested the exploitative and greedy nature of colonialism. Although capitalism was cruel, its principles of individual freedom, and non- interference by government which were contradictory to its cruel manifestations were utilized by Nigeria to oppose colonialism and apartheid.

It is instructive to note that the French-Speaking states surround Nigeria, except for Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome Principe that have Spanish and Portuguese as their official and national language respectively. The geo-political implications of this are enormous for the survival of Nigeria as a sovereign state. This, according to Amusan (2014), affects the state in its foreign policy positions, where the influence of France upon its former colonies continually shapes their relations with Nigeria.

Apart from threats to security caused by internal conflicts, certain global issues, well beyond the control of any state, arose. These form very potent external factors that pose serious threats to security globally. These transnational changes include easy trans-border movement of small arms and light weapons, organized crimes, terrorism and most serious, HIV/AIDS pandemic. It is true that section 19(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) situates the core objective of Nigeria’s foreign policy, among others, in the promotion and protection of the national interest. However, this objective cannot be self- actualized without external relations. It is based on this background Nigeria employs a re- orientation of Nigeria’s diplomatic policy initiative towards beneficial economic and political engagement to enhance national development and citizen welfare in its pursuit of external relations for regaining positive image.

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Comparatively, Nigeria has the highest number of Diaspora in Africa if not in the world. Over 20million Nigerians are living all over the world both in Africa and outside the continent (Statistics from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015; Lawal & Aluko, 2016). And there is a need for Nigeria to protect the interest of Nigerians abroad. Again, another fundamental issue that confronts Nigeria in the 21st century, with the deepening of globalization and the emergence of the Fourth Republic with renew interest on focusing attention on the welfare of its’ citizenry, is how to re-conceptualize the country’s national interest. This provides the mechanism

3.4 Conclusion

The period between 1985 and May 1999 is described as constituting an interesting watershed for the present and future of Nigeria’s external relations (Lawal & Aluko, 2016). A combination of prolonged military juntas with attendant human right abuse and disregard for the rule of law, leadership high-handedness and autocratic in policy making, endemic corruption, electoral malpractices and its international condemnation, rampant poverty and high level of illiteracy in Nigeria as perceived by the international community; militancy in the Niger-Delta region; effects of globalization and dwindling economy and adverse effects on Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings that triggered international condemnations of Nigeria abroad among other maladies combined to deteriorate the drive and efficiency of Nigeria and its international image.

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CHAPTER FOUR

IMPACT ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN DIPLOMACY ON NIGERIA’S IMAGE BUILDING

4.0 Introduction

This chapter addresses the central theme of the research, which is examination of the impact of Citizen Diplomacy on Nigeria’s Image Building between 1999 and 2015. In other words, the crux of this chapter, which is aimed at achieving the second objective of the study, analyses how Nigerian citizens are treated at home and abroad. Citizen/Public Diplomacy is intended to create an environment in which the positions of a country will be favourably achieved among the comity of nation-states. It is based on this intention that this chapter attempts to analyse the position of Nigerian State and citizens towards the treatment of Nigerians both abroad and at home.

There is, in principle, a distinction between foreign policy as substantive and legislative; and diplomacy as procedural and executive. But in practice, both are complementary. From the strength of this complementarity, this chapter examines the impact of the Citizen/Public Diplomacy (procedure) on Nigeria’s image building (substantive) which is ventilated through the crafting and execution of Nigeria’s politico-security and socioeconomic landscapes focused on two operational areas of both internal and external phases.

4.1 Impact of Citizen Diplomacy on Nigerians in Nigeria

Drawing from the theoretical foundation of this study, the domestic forces and dynamics, which reflect on the citizenry, also influence the country’s image building. These forces are crucial and sacrosanct to our analysis. While responding to one of the interview questions, Osita (2016) maintains that: Nigeria rightly considers her foreign policy exertions as necessary extensions of the domestic policy. This means that the distribution of power in the foreign policy space is co-terminus with the domestic imperatives. The emphasis on Citizen Diplomacy in between 1999 and 2015 then meant that the domestic policy should also prioritise citizens’ welfare and engagement at the domestic level, all within the context of making the most impact using available resources. In the same vein, the citizen is put not only at the epicentre of Nigeria’s foreign policy activities, but also considered as the ultimate beneficiary and stakeholders of the foreign policy endeavours. Put differently, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, who was Nigeria’s

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Minister of Foreign Affairs between 2003 and 2006 emphasises the articulation of the interests to be protected in each concentric circle. Adeniji (2012) explains that: As originally conceived, the concentric circles theory in Nigeria’s foreign policy placed the greatest emphasis on Africa. Though Nigeria was in the innermost circle, the line between that geographical placement in theory and in practice is almost blurred. The single-mind concentration on the struggle against colonialism and apartheid translated into “Africa’s interest being also Nigeria’s interest” … while being consistent, foreign policy must take account of changes in the international and national levels, especially as it concerns a vital determinant such as the country’s economy. Otherwise, such foreign policy might be construed as putting in jeopardy the national interest (p. 424).

Two points are noteworthy in this explanation. First, the fact that ‘the line between the geographical placement in theory and in practice’ being blurred, and second, the need for foreign policy to respond to changes in national and international affairs.

Interestingly, these points are part of the dynamics and operational areas of Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy, with a commitment to make the basic needs and welfare of Nigerian citizens the lodestars of foreign policy. According to Abati (2009), placing the citizen at the centre of the national programme reinforces the original purpose of the government and when those in power provide necessary leadership, they will without much effort secure the trust of the general populace and create centres of national solidarity and more agents for national progress. Hence, responding to the distressed calls of citizens and asking relevant questions on cases of mistreatment or harassment of Nigerians are all hallmarks of citizen-centred diplomacy.

Being people-centred, it is valid to assert that both national and international actions will be driven primarily by the need to promote the welfare and security of the citizen. In order words, domestic and international laws are crucial determinants on how every Nigerian is treated irrespective of where they live. This provides a measure of assessment of the country’s level development, image making and capacity to meet international standards. Viewing the significant of Citizen Diplomacy from a legal perspective, Osita Eze, a Professor of Law and former Director-General of Nigerian Institute of International Affairs appreciates Citizen Diplomacy from two legal viewpoints: State duty and pacta sunt servanda (sanctity of pacts or agreements). From the point of view of state duty, Eze (2009) suggests that: The primary function of the state is to ensure that every Nigerian citizen, no matter where located, is free from fear and want. And how this is to be achieved internally/domestically is enshrined in our constitution: democracy

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and social justice; guarantee of participatory rights, as well as other fundamental rights and freedoms contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution; the centrality of the non-derogatible right to the dignity of the human person, equality of all before the law and equal protection; the law (the supremacy of the Rule of Law), not rule by law or rule by man, and non- discrimination; the acknowledgement that Nigerians have needs, material and social, that need to be met (pp.32-33). On the sanctity of pacts or agreements, it is agreed upon by the International Community that member states should carefully treat their citizens in a way that does not result into abuse of human rights of the citizens in line with the Charter of the United Nations and many other International Organisations. Based on the International Law on human rights abuse, Eze (2009) opines thus: …these rights have been elaborated in so many landmark instruments, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two Covenants of 1966, and with increasing specialisation and targeting these rights have been further developed, extended and deepened to deal with various interests, children, women, categories of persons in both international and non-international armed conflicts (p.33).

From the foregoing, the treatment of citizens is no longer the exclusive right or laws of the individual state alone rather state performs a complementary role with the international laws. However, in the current Fourth Republic, serious attention is not paid to the conduct and behaviour of Nigeria’s foreign relations and public policymaking. A foreign policy is fully domesticated when it is maximally related to domestic policies. Therefore, state has primary welfare role to seek benefits to existing and planned domestic agenda, and hence, secure and protect its citizens irrespective of where these citizens are located, within or without the shores of the country.

Importantly however, these conceptual and functional explications are cardinal here to showcase the scope and ramifications of the study. The concept of ‘Citizen Diplomacy, deals with every conceivable role of Nigerian government towards its citizenry. There is no limitation as to what it covers in terms of issues. The ‘new’ foreign policy thrust applies to all human (citizen) endeavours. The whole essence is therefore, to analyse if Citizen Diplomacy has yielded the envisaged dividend. The most important factor affecting Nigeria’s policy thrust (Citizen Diplomacy), and the decline in its global influence, is the domestic challenge with which it is faced.

Essentially, this decline involves the political, socioeconomic and security uncertainties in the country. In most value-judgement, paramount to this study, the perception and consideration of Nigeria’s image building is analysed through the assessment of, but not 116 limited to, three crucial parameters, political, socioeconomic and security, to determine what level of success can be ascribed to it and in the process to identify those factors that have limited its fecundity between 1999 and 2015. Based on this, the dynamics in the operational areas (i.e. domestic and international) before Nigerian government in executing this ‘new’ diplomatic policy approach is indispensable. Hence, it is analysed in the succeeding sections of this chapter.

4.1.1 Citizen Diplomacy and Nigeria’s Political Environments

The whole essence of any government is the deliberately recourse to the calculi of the basic needs, human rights, socioeconomic, and security wellbeing of its citizen in steering the bilateral and multilateral engagements with other nations. As it has been frequently mentioned in this study, Citizen Diplomacy seeks to underscore the Nigerianness in public policymaking, depicting the involvement of every Nigerian. Therefore, several issues cannot but be involved especially in terms of nation building, economic development, national security and wellbeing. Questions are indeed being asked on issues that affect the citizens of Nigeria living in other parts of the world (Adeola & Ogunnoiki, 2015; Akinterinwa, 2014a). But it is also necessary to reiterate issues that concerns Nigerians in Nigeria. Therefore, this section analyses the impact of Citizen Diplomacy on the welfare of Nigerians living in Nigeria.

Indeed, domestic variables influence the external relations of any country. Therefore, Nigeria’s political system has a significant influence on the viability of the Citizen Diplomacy. The advent of the yet unbroken democratic process in Nigeria created an opportunity, among the comity of other nations, to better the image of the country that has been politically and economically battered by the military juntas. As a result of the country returns to democratic dispensation, Nigeria was enlisted ‘member’ of the comity of democratic nations in 1999. As noted earlier, Nigeria had a pariah status and its image was more negative than positive before 1999. The country was slammed with heavy sanctions of various descriptions and ostracized from the mainstream of international interaction of a vestige of the recent past.

Nigeria and Nigerians who had hitherto been treated with respect and dignity in major capitals of the world began to be treated with contempt and became a subject of scorn and disdain (Saliu, 2007). The country was then seen as a non-conformist and a threat to efforts at globalization, democratization and maintenance of world peace and security. Although

117 this situation according to Akinterinwa (2012b) provided an opportunity to correct the anomaly and strengthen Nigeria’s relationship with non-Western countries like China. However, there was not much of inflow of good image and development resources into Nigeria from the newly found allies, a situation that raised the level of domestic hostility regarding Abacha administration.

Democracy is at the heart of the relationship between the people and the government. The collapse of the military regime in Nigeria on May 29, 1999 signaled a change in basic assumptions and scopes in Nigeria’s foreign policy and its diplomatic relations. Positive image-building has become a realistically desirable political strategy whose goal is to move Nigeria away from the latter’s post-1993 international pariah status into a proactive and respected member of and actor in the international community of states. One essential instrument for realizing this goal of positive image-building is undoubtedly effort at consolidating democracy at home, which has, become an imperative of Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy.

Consequently, the inauguration of the Obasanjo civilian government in 1999 ushered in a new era in Nigeria’s public policymaking totally different from the preceding military era. In fact, the subsequent civilian governments of Yar’Adua in 2007 and Jonathan in 2010 further buttress this view to make valuable impacts on the image of the country through domestic political sagacity. There was political will, at least to some extent, to combat the image crisis and uncivil treatment meted at Nigerians. For illustrative purposes, Nigerian government established an agency saddled with the responsibility of discouraging Nigerian girls from being lured mostly to Italy to engage in prostitution. This effort not only premised to attract positive image in the international community but also ensure the protection and upholding the welfare of Nigerian girls, which constitutes part of the intentions of Citizen Diplomacy

Another significant pointer to political consolidation in Nigeria and the country’s efforts at meeting the international standards on democratic principles is the fact that there has been democratic transition of a civilian government to another civilian government which allows for citizens’ civil participation in their government. Although, this point may not look so attractive to some scholars, due to the fact that not all democracies are socially egalitarians, but it is a valid reality that is not far-fetched in Nigeria’s bid for image building, at least politically.

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In an organized special National Democracy Workshop on ‘strengthening Democratic Transition in Nigeria’ held in Abuja between April 17 and 18, 2013, Akinterinwa (2013a) affirms that without any jolt of doubt, the democratization process in Nigeria since 1999 has furtherance the rising profile of Nigeria in global politics and sees Citizen Diplomacy as the basis for this rising profile. Commenting further on the future of Nigeria amidst the leading democracies in the world, he observes that “…much interest is placed on how to strengthen democracy and its institutions, how to evolve a democratic culture and how to make democracy an instrument of national development, national unity, and national security” (Akinterinwa, 2013a).

Nevertheless, it can be rightly posited that a well strengthened democracy, due to periodic elections, in Nigeria since 1999 has informed the choice of Nigeria to preside over the affairs of the Community of Democracies, which is based in Warsaw, Poland, in the period from 2015 to 2017 (Thisday Newspaper, April 21, 2015, p.24). The belief that foreign policy can be used to enhance and expedite democratic consolidation in Nigeria may have informed Nigerian leaders in the Fourth Republic to practically appreciate the essential connection between their foreign and domestic policies. The dividend of democracy and good governance, correctly but occasionally perceived by these administrations, constitute a prerequisite, necessary for the conduct of an effective reputation management or image rebranding. The forgoing suggests that there is democracy in place but still needs considerable improvement and its own transformation.

However, our understanding of democratic consolidation to manage Nigeria’s image would be inadequate without appreciating the cost of negative image for the country. As a major player in African affairs, the perception and association of negative image with Nigeria have been making some countries in Africa to contest the leadership position with the country. For every available position in which Nigeria has interest, there are usually some other countries which compete with the country and, in some instances, defeating Nigeria due to image problem. On two occasions, 1995 and 2006, Morocco and Rwanda had respectively defeated Nigeria for the African Development Bank’s Presidency (Agbu, 2015; Fafowora, 2009; KI1, 2016; KI2, 2015).

While one might understand, the defeat recorded in 1995 under General Abacha, the 2006 defeat remains a puzzle to the informed public despite the entrenchment of democracy in the country and pursuit of citizen-oriented thrust. Saliu (2007) maintains that the global contempt and disdain for the country and her citizens cannot be divorced from the image

119 climate of the country. Some important appointments have been denied qualified Nigerians because of global perception that they could be cheats (KI1, 2016).

More significantly, in the corpus resourcefulness of the ardent supporters of Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy, its adoption was informed by the mantra of a servant leadership with believe that any President of Nigeria should be the servant and not master of the country (Maduekwe, 2009). Citizen Diplomacy has created the awareness among political organs of Nigerian foreign policy about the need to get more Nigerians involved in the conduct of the country’s policymaking towards positive image. The Foreign Missions of Nigeria are really gearing up to meeting the expectations of Nigerians in diaspora (Saliu, 2010; KI2, 2015). The performance of response to question bordering on harassment of Nigerians by security agencies in their host countries may look unsatisfactory but the temperament of Nigerian government is being made to realize its responsibilities towards Nigerians welfares. This suggests a proactive political environment towards image building.

In fact, Saliu (2016) in a personal communication observes that though government responsibilities may not have recorded expected results, but other countries that Nigeria relates with are beginning to get the consciousness on how to respect Nigerians living in their countries. Vanguard newspaper, one of the Nigeria’s national dailies, reports in 2008 that on few occasions the Nigerian authorities had intervened to save the lives of some Nigerians and in freeing Nigerian citizens from unfair treatment in foreign lands. As part of its ingrained political awareness and ‘come to stay’ pattern, the importance of Citizen Diplomacy became a recurrent decimal during the 2014 Nigeria’s National Conference (Akinterinwa, 2014a). This suggests that rebuilding Nigeria’s image is getting momentum through the full application of Citizen Diplomacy when political sphere is considered.

However, the profile of successes painted above should not suggest that all is well with the pursuit of Citizen Diplomacy by Nigerian state. Some obvious limitations face its implementation which must be removed before the decision to continue with it can meet the expectation of Nigerians. The internal political environment, no doubt, shapes the outcomes of Nigeria’s public policymaking. Politically, Nigeria is the biggest democracy in Africa. This ought to serve as a perquisite for citizens’ participation and fulcrum for the actualization of Citizen Diplomacy. However, the twenty-first century governance environment in Nigeria remains a tragic reality and constant threat to democratization and political right of Nigerians because of weak democratic institutions and citizens’ alienation from the government.

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Much as the Fourth Republic governments have tried, the country recorded some flaws and not freed from some negativities in the pursuit of image-building through the application of Citizen Diplomacy in this area. While Saliu (2010) observes poorly conceptualized Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria, when he posits that: …it has not struck Nigerians in the right way to make it a good companion in navigating through the complex international system… A thrust meant to expand the participation of Nigerians in the conduct of their country’s foreign policy and which seeks to offer protection to them is pulling away Nigerians from its pursuit. If anything, the new plank is enjoying a bad press and negative image among Nigerians (p.326).

KI2 (2016) affirms that “the under–valued nature of Nigeria internationally is not unconnected with lack of pragmatic and dynamic political environment plaguing Nigeria and inability of state actors to re-invent Nigeria’s policymaking institutions over the years for national development”. True to Saliu and KI2’s observations, a combination of widespread corruption and indiscipline; bad leadership; electoral malpractices and violence; disrespect for the rule of law and high level of impunity undermined the fight against poor image perception of Nigeria.

The increasing demands on Nigeria to accept the challenge of leadership in resolution of some major international questions, legislative marginalization in the making of Nigeria’s public policy, among other ugly governmental and political conducts, do not only undermine the success of and support for Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy, but also cripple the move for Nigeria’s external image making. The concept of Citizen Diplomacy anticipates an environment for its implementation to be democratic, and that leaders are elected by the people, and they therefore see themselves as the servants of the people because the actual possessor of sovereignty is the people. Conversely, in the words of Saliu (2010): The Nigerian environment is not totally democratic to the extent that the people have the sovereignty. Elections have been flawed, leading to the assumption of office by leaders not desired by the people. Politics is seen as ‘a do or die’ affair in which all means are fair…What seems to matter to Nigerian politicians is the prospect of engaging in primitive accumulation not the expansion of welfare space of Nigerians… a lip service is paid to the concern of ordinary Nigerians as exemplified in governments’ policies over the years (pp. 326-327).

From the foregoing, the impact of Citizen Diplomacy has not been felt in Nigeria’s electoral history especially in the Fourth Republic. Many critics have lampooned the period as far from free and fair, which Citizen Diplomacy seeks to achieve, because of indescribable irregularities. For instance, President Obasanjo bequeathed his successor, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, with an election that was reported by both domestic and international observers 121 as fraught with procedural irregularities, electoral fraud, and voter disenfranchisement. At the international fora, Yar’Adua was not accepted ab initio until he acknowledged to the fact that the election that brought him in as the president was fraudulent (Jonathan, 2014).

This political immoral depravity has adversely impacted Nigeria’s image making in the Fourth Republic. The electoral process of every developed democracy and well respected country like the United States is always generally competitive nevertheless violent and openly rigged. Acquisition of power to the service of the citizenry should not relate to violence that will take lives and/or trampled on the welfare of the same citizens purportedly claim to serve. Unfortunately, this has not been the case in Nigeria especially in the Fourth Republic. Violence of all kinds like killings; assassinations; open rigging; be it manually or scientifically, where ballot boxes are stuffed and result written to favour a particular candidate among others.

Indeed, Daniel (2015) observes that: The problem facing Nigeria emanated from many fronts, which includes: irrational behaviors (actions) of the political elites, politics of division and politics that are devoid of ideology. Other factors are corruption and poverty, lack of distributive justice, regional and religious differences. All these combined to electoral crisis (riots and conflicts) in the polity culminating in a public desperation and insecurity, politics of assassination, decampments (carpet crossing), money bags and public protests (p.24).

Thus, having periodic elections cannot be alone self-sufficient to meeting the international standards on democratic principles most especially when they are widely adjudged with irregularities, not free and fair of malpractices, stashed with killings, and the citizen are not allowed to freely choose their preferred leaders. Consequently, seeking to strengthen democracy at home which is a fulcrum of Citizen Diplomacy has been hampered as a result of Nigerian political system that is surrounded with crisis. The so called political leaders cannot handle the affairs of the country in a legitimate and constitutional way, they choose to jeopardize and intimidate the poor masses, thereby turning everything against the wish of the constitution.

The concomitant effect of this is not only leading to protracted electoral court cases due to litigations, but relegates the image of the country because citizen at home, in the process, are disappointed and consequently alienated from government. Above all, electoral litigation leads to distractions of the ruling government to ‘settle down’ for good governance that will benefit the interest of the citizenry at home let alone allows citizens living in other

122 parts of the world to feel the much impact of the country. In a way, the image of Nigeria has worsened due to electoral flaws.

Closely related to poor political environment is the incessant disrespect for rule of law and flagrant flouting of court orders. The consensus view of the researcher’s respondents reveals that the Fourth Republic leaders in Nigeria do not show respect to the rule of law, especially, judicial decisions. Specifically, Osita (2016), Baiyeshia (2016) and Gbodi (2016) lament that apart from sabotaging the judiciary effectiveness in discharging its duties as the last hope of a common man (the citizen), Nigerian citizens are been deprived of justice (FGDs, 2016).

Undeniably, the predictability and independent of the judiciary is not yet a reality in Nigeria. The political executives still undermine the independence of the judiciary through patronage appointments, bribery, and disappointedly, weak enforcement capacity characterizes the judicial administration. How can a government who fails to give or allow justice for a ‘common citizen’ at home guarantee justice for its innocent citizens abroad when they are illegally punished or ill-treated? It is a common parlance that ‘you cannot give what you do not have’. If this saying is correct, then, impact of Citizen Diplomacy has not been felt, hence hamper the international perception of Nigeria towards the rule of law in Nigeria’s political environment.

Another related crisis of Nigeria’s political environment is the infrastructural challenge. This has hindered the success is Nigeria’s policymaking in furtherance domestic priorities talk more of the actualization of the foreign policy thrust. Some scholars maintain that infrastructure as a concern in foreign policy is not being addressed in Nigeria. Issues relating to bad road, epileptic power supply, security challenge, inadequate water supply, and substandard quality of telecommunication services, though on the increase, are some of the negative political impact on the successful implementation of Citizen Diplomacy (Falola & Heaton, 2008; Fawole, 2016; Osita, 2016; Saliu, 2015). This problem to these scholars can be partly put on the shoulder of the country’s colonial masters.

Indeed, Ichili (2016) argues that Nigeria state is a product and contraction of colonialism and at the end of colonialism, the character of a state that was bequeathed to the nation was essentially extroverted, externally oriented and internationally focused and so post-colonial Nigerian leaders have been externally conscious rather than furtherance domestic priorities. On the other hand, Emmanuel (2014) asserts that “Nigeria is a fractured state” (p. 22). By

123 this he meant that Nigeria is a product of force which lacks internal cohesion and a national consensus on its foreign policy objectives hitherto weakened by a combination of colonial factors such as absence of social contract before the country was amalgamated and named Nigeria. Our contrast observation to this school of thought is that Nigeria’s woes should not be continuously blamed on colonialism when countries like Malaysia who got independence along with Nigeria are counting their developmental blessings.

More so, it can be argued that with the country’s history of political evolution, the state should have matured significantly with time and domestic political elites should have come and grown into its own, seizing the machinery of governance and driving it in the direction that would essentially leave them in the control of the trappings or paraphernalia of governance. However, this scenario is not so in Nigeria because it could not be said by any stretch of imagination that the country is completely indigenous and autonomous of external forces. Worse still, the elite that took over the machinery of governance during the period under review were even less so because a lot of them were not prepared for governance.

As observed by (KI2, 2016) during a follow-up interview while responding to a similar question, on political factor that affect Citizen Diplomacy, KI2 opines that “it is not possible to get clean water from a dirty glass cup” and hence observes further thus: All, except President Obasanjo who has high level of preparedness of about 70%, of Nigerian leaders most especially in the Fourth Republic are not prepared at all for the job. The appointment is based on “long-legism”, patronage. Instead of the citizens to look at some acceptable characteristics and qualities, Nigerians will vote for you because of religion you practice (your faith) or the tribe you come from. There is no issue oriented programmes. We are too emotional when it comes to the issue of religion and tribe. That is why Nigeria counter-productivity of governmental accountability is due to the mismanagement of operators. The operators here are the leaders because they are not well prepared.

KI2 clarifies further that as a University teacher, former President Goodluck Jonathan was appointed deputy governor of Bayelsa State, one of the states in the South-South region of Nigeria. The appointment, argued by a respondent, was giving to his wife ab initio but was forced on him by the same wife. He was a deputy governor before he was rerouted governor after his boss (then governor Alamesighia) was impeached from office when he was found guilty of a corruption charge. From there he was single handedly picked by the then President, Olusegun Obasanjo as the vice president to Musa Yar’Adua and after the controversial and untimely demise of Yar’Adua, he became President.

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Hence, it can be deduced from the above that there are a lot of failed programmes, government of proposal, government on billboard, free education on billboard, free healthcare on the pages on newspapers as a result of leadership unpreparedness. The issues of godfatherism, tribalism and religious cleavages are obvious from most of the commentator’s view. All these marginalization, tribalism are social construct by the politicians. By no means recommending here, it is quintessential to briefly posits here that the era of the end justifies the means and “politics of godfathers” should be put aside and embrace consociational politics because Nigeria is backward and it becomes sacrosanct for everyone to come together to build the nation and move Nigeria forward. Politician alone cannot do it nor the president but a collective responsibility of all Nigerians.

In addition to poor democratic environment, there is growing lack of professionalism in the conduct of Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy which is a major constraint in achieving its domestic and foreign policy goals. Foreign Service Personnel and legislative organ of government do have many things to complain about. While the Foreign Service Personnel complain about their number that gets appointed as Ambassador or High Commissioners is increasingly low because of the phenomenon of political or ‘quark’ ambassadors, the National Assembly (the Parliament) or the Legislatures accuse the Executives of marginalization and not carrying them along in executive policymaking and implementation (Daily Independent, 2014; Fafowora, 2009; KI2, 2016; Saliu, 2010). This trend will be discussed separately.

On the first hand, the issue raised by the Foreign Service Personnel on the appointment of diplomats does not confirm with the principle of meritocracy. Some of the appointees of government as Minister for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassadors or High Commissioners are not appointed on excellence with requisite diplomatic knowledge. Majority are not career diplomats rather they are politicians. While a few of these political appointees as ambassadors have served the nation well, most of them have plainly absurd and sometimes disastrous (Emmanuel, 2014). Worse still, the appointment of foreign officers is worrisomely politicized. Politics has crept into the service and waxing strong on the fiber of federal character principle, which is based on nepotism and causing ethno- religious cleavages.

With more political ambassadors, frustration and disappointment have combined to lower the morale of diplomatic staff and high appetite for graft is known (Saliu, 2015; KI1 & KI2, 2016). The appointment sometimes cannot be said to have passed through democratic

125 processes, hence, hamper popular involvement of the citizens. Although, the executive nominates candidates and send to the parliament for confirmation, but the ability to deny approval to presidential nominations for some key appointments such as ministers and ambassadors, has always been difficult unlike what obtains in other democracies, for various reason such as weak institution and inefficient democratic culture. There is an unconfirmed report that in 2008 nomination of non-career ambassador to a key foreign country was embarrassingly turned down by the host government (Akinterinwa, 2010).

On the second pointer, the National Assembly has also alleged legislative role marginalization. The primary responsibility of any legislature is law making. But there is a broad range of activities, responsibilities and functions performed by any legislature in the context of Western democratic tradition. Arguably, foremost among them is representation. As an institutional link between the people and the state, legislature constitutes the eyes, the ears, and voice of the people (citizen). Historically, the legislative organ has always claimed to have an oversight function vis-à-vis the Executives. The doctrine of oversight function quite legitimately and logically flows from the power of appropriation, which exclusively belongs to the legislature. Akindele (2012) observes that: …the role and vital powers of the legislature, particularly the oversight function it performs…over a vital national issue, the legislature cannot be seen as an adjunct of, and a junior partner to, the executive in the conduct of public affairs in a truly democratic polity. As an institution, it must be conscious of the cruciality of its role in any structure and process of democratic policy making and control, including foreign policy making, implementation, control, and monitoring (p.259).

However, the Chairs of both the Senate and the House of Representatives Committees on Foreign Affairs agree that National Assembly are relegated when it comes to the issue of foreign policy by the Executive most especially by the Minister. They observe that they are supposed to play crucial roles in shaping Nigerian foreign policy by taking both political and scientific look, evaluate the technicality in foreign matters, and make necessary recommendations to their respective hallowed chambers before there is a verdict on and what becomes of a foreign policy bill, but this has not happened in the Fourth Republic (Elendu-Ukeje, 2015; Sunmonu, 2016).

In fact, Honourable Nnanna Elendu-Ukeje, Chairperson, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, further succinctly captures the situation thus: We have stringent oversight measures on ministries, departments and agencies in the areas of appropriations, policies and laws… but I believe our missions are grossly underfunded… less than one percent of the nation’s budget (Elendu-Ukeji, 2015). 126

The tendency to treat legislative enquiries with disdain is quite unfortunate because it negates the principle of Citizen Diplomacy. Judging from the above analysis, the influence of political environment on the welfare or treatment of Nigerians living in Nigeria towards image building is out of touch with reality.

4.1.2 Citizen Diplomacy and Nigeria’s Economic Conditions

The organic linkage between the domestic and foreign policies of nations and their economic development is not in doubt. Arguably, the backbone of any nation is the economy. However, the extent to which a country’s external transactions can be used to advance its domestic economic goals depends on the nature and economic power of the state. With respect to an underdeveloped country like Nigeria, the ability to apply foreign policy instruments for the precise purpose of achieving its domestic economic goal of self- reliance is limited by its weakness in the international system.

On the Economic aspect, Nigeria has the strongest and largest economy in Africa. This has been the foundation basically on which Nigeria’s African policy is built since independence. Nigeria’s Afrocentric policy recorded enormous successes because of Nigeria’s vast and cheering economy. Nigeria’s support and defense for African states was vigorously displayed as a result of ‘economic prosperity’ via oil boom. Nigeria was a toast of many states seeking either its influence or support on global issues or financial assistance. In 2014, the country became the largest economy of Africa going by the 2013 economic rebasing in the continent. The presence of the oil reserves in the country has contributed in its growing economy.

Accordingly, the CIA World Factbook (2015) estimates Nigeria as the Africa’s biggest and the twelfth World largest producers of oil with 2,525,000 million barrels produced every day. Not only is the country Africa’s largest producer, but Nigeria is the fifth highest exporter of oil in the World. As with other nations, Nigeria’s role on the international stage has been inseparable from its economic progress or otherwise. The essence of the economic profile of Nigeria suggests that the country has the economic absorbers, domestically, to pursue the cardinal tenets that Citizen Diplomacy is predicated upon. Hence, it is necessary to assess the conduct of Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy when the economy is considered in the Fourth Republic and how it fundamentally serves as a reflection of the governance system prevailing in the country towards image building.

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Since the dawn of the Fourth Republic, a major trend in the economic arena is clearly discernible in Nigeria’s policymaking. This is the desire to establish and maintain friendships with countries that have historically shaped global economic diplomacy in a way to ensuring that external relations assist in domestic economic development and vice versa, especially through strategic cooperation with traditional and emerging global economic actors (Akinboye, 2013). The domestic imperative of Nigeria’s policy thrust towards the welfare and economic development of every Nigerian in the last sixteen years (1999-2015), has seem to be the promotion and attraction of foreign investment, realizing that foreign investment is an instrument for expediting economic development and industrialization in the country.

Between 1999 and 2003, the country elevated the issue of debt and debt burden reduction, cancellation, or forgiveness to the high pedestal in Nigeria’s foreign economic policy agenda. More important, the Fourth Republic has engaged in a serious move towards debt relief/forgiveness, attracting foreign investors, and the repatriation of money stashed all- over the banks in the world. It must be noted that where the image is negative, the quantity and quality of foreign investment desired would be greatly affected. One cannot but reckon with the laborious and generous incentives regime put in place by the Fourth Republic governments between 1999 and 2015 to attract foreign investors, but as Saliu (2015) puts it: Every regime in the country has given attention to attract foreign investors. But the only explanation one can offer for the wide gap that exists between the stated objectives and accomplishments has to do with the image of the country which is not aiding the various efforts at attracting foreign investment into Nigeria. Usually, international investment decisions are based on the perceived image of the host nations (p.402).

Godwin Ichili, an expert in International Economic Relations and a Political Economist Research Fellow of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, while identifying the impact of Citizen Diplomacy in the Fourth Republic observes that “debt relief through forgiveness or reduction has become absolutely imperative to freeze a large chunk of Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings for use for social welfare and economic development of every Nigerian”. The campaign for foreign investment in the country’s economy, conducted along with other vigorously pursued strategies, like poverty alleviation, can hardly be possible under a situation of oppressive and intimidating debt over-hang. Ichili (2016) maintains further that: While a few creditor countries and non-governmental creditor agencies responded positively, many remained adamant, arguing that Nigeria does not

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deserve debt forgiveness and cancellation because it was not just poor economic management, but more importantly, many years of institutionalized corruption and systematic looting of public treasury that have been responsible for the predicament in which Nigeria find itself today with a debt burden of over US$30billion. Besides, some commentators identify the impact of Citizen Diplomacy to include economy growth of Nigeria and Nigerians through the introduction of Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA). This effort is introduced to encourage the Nigerians at home (local producers) to partner with foreign investors by giving the latter tax holiday by the government of the former and vice versa in order to open windows for Nigerians to go into foreign countries and start their own business and also allow foreign investors to invest in Nigeria. For instance, Nigeria controls 78% of West Africa economy not because Nigeria is demographic advantage but because of its new policy of Citizen Diplomacy. KI2 (2016) in an in-depth conversation succinctly put the impact of Citizen Diplomacy on the country’s economy thus: Nigerians are all over Africa doing business and enhancing domestic economy. There is Dangote cement industry/plant in Lusaka; Uganda; Niger Republic (through Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission). There is EcoBank and Guarantee Trust Bank (Nigerian’s banks) all over Africa. The interplay is that diplomacy is all about give and take, and thereby Nigerian Citizen Diplomacy provides synergy for domestic and foreign policies. A country must open its boarder for people to come in and take same boarder for people to go out. Therefore, domestic policy must allow foreigners to come in before your people can also go out and Nigeria has been trying to do that… Nigeria position within the international community is not only friendly but is accommodating. Any nation can come into Nigeria and establish. For instance, MTN a South Africa telecommunication company is in Nigeria providing employment for Nigerians, others include chevron, Total, Mobil, Union Bank, First Bank are all multinationals. They are in Nigeria because Nigeria provides enabling environment for them to strive. For instance, an Indomie noodle is from Indonesia and has created a lot of opportunity for Nigeria and Nigerians. There is also what we call Technical Cooperation which is all about selecting certain Nigerians for training abroad which some of our colleague here in Foreign Affairs have benefited.

The benefit of all these to Nigeria and Nigerians is enormous. In 2012 alone as per CBN report, Nigerians living abroad sent home US$22.8billion as a remittance received. According to the record, it was the largest Foreign Direct Investment in the history of Africa. This is pointing to the fact that Diaspora is the most integral part of the economy. The money sent back home is to keep their family and more importantly to start business. Any Plastics seen in Freetown are made in Nigeria. Through bi-national commission, in which Nigeria enters agreement with various countries like South Africa, Egypt, Ukraine, among other countries has increase the domestic economy stability 129

Comparatively, Nigeria has the highest number of Diaspora in the world. KI2 (2016) affirms that Nigeria has 114 Mission with over 20million Nigerians living all over the world both in Africa and outside the continent. And there is a need for Nigeria to protect the interest of Nigerians both at home and abroad, hence the impact of Citizen Diplomacy. However, a combination of factors (corruption, globalization, among others) affects the domestic gloomy economy and hence hinders Citizen Diplomacy to effectively perform its enviable role to the Nigerian citizenry. Nigeria lacks the sound economic base necessary for it to project its power abroad (Emmanuel, 2014). This reflects a few increasing economic difficulties encumber Citizen Diplomacy.

First, Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy is not sufficiently being funded (Nigeria’s Budget Office, 2016; Kayode, 2016; Saliu, 2010; ThisDay, 2014). According to Honourable Nnanna Elendu-Ukeje, the financial appropriation for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been less than one per cent of the nation’s budget since 1999 up till 2015. This is quite unfortunate for a nation that wants to ensure that Nigeria and Nigerians are at the receiving end of any foreign policy calculation, and makes Nigeria’s diplomatic missions abroad to engage the Nigerian communities in their host countries reflecting the rising profile of the country in world affairs (Saliu, 2015; Uhomoibhi, 2015).

Foreign policy initiative in this twenty-first century requires adequate funding both at home and its large diplomatic missions abroad. To remain visible in the world, with over 100 Missions, and to maintain good external image is to be prepared to spend more money. Nigeria is perceived as a regional power or a leader in Africa coupled with the global mandate of protecting the rights, welfare and the involvement of every Nigerian in its diplomatic enterprise across the globe. Less than one per cent of the total annual budget appropriated for this herculean task is grossly inadequate and ridiculous.

Second, it also reflects on the large number of Nigerians emigrating abroad in search of better economic opportunities, and to escape from crushing poverty at home. Saliu (2016) observes that the continuous migration of Nigerians to other part of the world most times under inhuman conditions is attributable to government mismanagement and not expanding economy to absorb every Nigerian. This development though started before the Fourth Republic, its inability to arrest it to the extent that Libyan authorities have been resisting the influx of Nigerians to their country on their way to Europe through arrest, deportation and outright killing, has not returned a positive verdict to the state, Nigeria. Emmanuel (2014) opines that “some of his émigrés are highly trained professionals, including medical doctors

130 and engineers, whose skills, though highly needed here at home to enhance domestic economic stability, are being exported” (p.22).

These professionals do credits to Nigeria abroad. But regrettably, many émigrés have little or no skills and resort to financial scams and other transnational crimes to make a living. It is these ‘bad eggs’ among numerous Nigerians that give the country a negative image and bad name abroad. These are the Nigerians that most foreigners encounter abroad, and from whose criminal activities they draw their negative impressions about Nigeria. The government, through Citizen Diplomacy, is yet to effectively address this scourge of domestic economic crisis that leads to migration of Nigerians abroad and negative image. It must be recognized that any government that is not properly connected to the people is a government for its own sake.

Third, global economic crisis (globalization) is another economic difficulty impedes Citizen Diplomacy and the country’s economic potentials to achieve Nigeria’s foreign policy goal. The essence of globalization and internalization of capital in the present epoch of neoliberalism which insinuates that in every economy, domestic as well as international, the external sector gains prominence over all the other sectors (Cox, 1999). The understanding of these two forces (globalization and internalization) bequeath Nigeria, like any underdeveloped countries, with weak economic base and undue preponderant towards the external. Seeking to project national power from such a weak economic base poses problems of effectiveness and sustainability.

The political elites lack what is required to pursue quintessentially independent economic policy, and a major problem from their appendages to colonial framework is that, they lack the material power or basis to engage in political economy contestation and to seize eco- political power (Emmanuel, 2014). Therefore, lacking in economic resources for political contestation, most of the political elites rely significantly on international sector or foreign capital. This is one of the factors that hinder, by extension, the political elites when they come into power to completely disengage from the international.

Although, scholars have argued that colonial framework for analysis in this context is no longer relevant and besides, it is over five decades Nigeria got independent and yet economic dependent and externally focused foreign policy still persists. The counter to this argument is that the structural nature of the colonial state that was bequeathed by colonialism has not significantly changed. Ichili (2015) succinctly puts it thus:

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The quintessential nature of the colonial state not-minding the observable growth and development has remained relatively unchanged. That is why the character of politics as well as the economic despite of all the changes that kept occurring remains the same. For instance, the political class is very weak, quiescent, and lacks the legitimate basis for authoritative allocation of values without relying on external compliment to be able to gain control of the machinery of power. Otherwise, what factor necessitates the continuous resort to violence, continuous rigging during election, the zero-sum game approach to politics and many other vices?

These questions point to the fact that Nigeria political class lacks legitimacy and exhibit politics of exclusion once they take on to power. These further indicate why Nigeria still has unbridled corruption as a means of accumulation, what the radical critical economics especially the Marxist orientation will call primitive accumulation of wealth. Since the country’s political class rely significantly on the foreign compliments, it is therefore expedient that their policy, most especially economic policy will be essentially externally oriented.

This analysis applies in every ramification of Nigeria socio-political and economic sectors. For instance, the oil sector is a dominant sector in Nigeria meanwhile, oil is an internationalized commodity. The finance sector especially with the influx of international finance capital and its coherency with domestic capital as junior partners is another good example. There is no sector in Nigeria that has no level of internationalization. Even sector that seems distant and removed from the process like culture and tourism in the era of globalization has become highly internationalized and become distinct.

An understanding of the global political economy in an era of globalization gives an idea of why countries has necessarily becomes extraverted in their policies and development agenda. This understanding is made clearer by the fact that neoliberalism on the ascendency is the hegemonic mainstream narrative and every other thing that is inconsistent with it is declared null and void or very dysfunctional.

Fourth, besides poor and weak economic base, corruption is another factor if not the foremost, that is responsible for Nigeria’s declining global influence and hampers functional reactions to Citizen Diplomacy. That corruption is the bane of Nigeria’s socio-economic development is asserting the obvious. There is a consensus among well-meaning individuals, foreign policy scholars and foreign nations/organisations that corruption has inevitably become a major clog in the wheel of Nigeria’s policymaking and implementation, which has affected sustainable growth and development of citizenry (Ajie & Oyegun, 2015).

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Corruption has undermined the purpose of Nigerian state on the welfare of its citizen as well as impacting negatively on the country’s external image.

Corruption has been blamed for the series of military coups and political instability in Nigeria, as well as the country’s economic backwardness and poverty on a massive scale “in the midst of plenty”. This suggests in line with the neoclassical realists that the material capacity of a state does not translate necessarily into a specific foreign policy behaviour, because, the process is determined by the political leaders and elites whose perceptions of relative power matter even more than the actual quantities of resources or forces of a state (Rose, 1998).

However, the impact of corruption is not lost on Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy. Isah and Bello (2014) observes that corruption inhibits economic growth and development in Nigeria thereby constrains its economic and political reach regionally and internationally. No matter the level of altruism a government displays without anchoring itself on people, such a government is only marking time. As a result of corruption, the responsibility of political leaders and public officials to their citizenry is directly undermined. Nigerians are simply unbothered about what the government does and does not do. This view is strong among Nigerians that the government does not exist for the masses. People have pointed at high cost of pro-poor items such as kerosene, garri and others upon which the government has not been able to reform in favour of the poor.

The alienation level of people from the public policymaking is so high that every average Nigerian citizen can feel it. Both national and international reports have continued to indict the Fourth Republic government on its observance of Citizen Diplomacy (Kayode, 2016; MacLean, 2015). More so, the allowances of foreign officers are not paid as at when due and if paid at all, they may not be competitive. The willingness of Nigerian National Assembly to challenge the foreign policymaking of the Executive Branch remains relatively lukewarm, and when it does occur, it is largely restricted to the country’s economy (Balogun, 2014; Elendu-Ukeje, 2015).

Besides, the impact of corruption on Nigeria’s domestic and foreign policy includes loss of image; lack of foreign direct investment/divestment; depletion of external reserves/accumulation of both domestic/foreign debts; and harassment of Nigerians abroad. In fact, the recurrent ethnic militias and religious conflicts, the lack of internal stability and cohesion, and the fragility of the state institutions and government ineptitude to control them

133 have been given as weak points to fight the war against negative image (Mudashir, 2016). Cumulatively, corruption robbed Nigeria of a strong and virile foreign policy. Corruption weakened the thrust and effectiveness of Nigerian Citizen Diplomacy, and undermined the influence and respectability that ought to have been accrued to the country’s foreign policy undertakings (Jega, 2010; Uddoh, 2016).

Many members of the National Assembly were involved and are still involving in official malpractices. Most of them have been indicted but no regret for formal accusation (Akinterinwa, 2012b; 2013b). There cannot be citizen loyalty to Citizen Diplomacy and the image of the country cannot be good when the National Assembly members and even the Executives are indicted in all manner of corrupt practices are swept under the carpet in the name of immunity clause in the constitution.

Worse still, many of these indicted and some convicted are ‘celebrity’ in the street of Nigeria. Some were installed with chieftaincy titles while some are given national awards. This is quite unfortunate in a country that seeks image making and to make every Nigerian as an ‘ambassador’ of the country. Another embarrassing impact of corruption is in the concept of “looting the loot”. This is a situation where government officials are looting the recovered loots from previous public official. This cannot improve international confidence on Nigeria, particularly the nations or international financial institutions that released that loot ab initio.

For instance, by May 2009, there was an established fact that some US$1.9 billion and another US$700million had been released from late Abacha loot from his family, unfortunately, its whereabouts cannot be established (Iliffe, 2011; Uddoh, 2016). This shows that government has not been sincere with the utilization of the recovered loot. This is quite demeaning and put question mark on the external image of the country. The impact of Citizen Diplomacy cannot be adequately said to have been on the citizen because those monies, which are collective commonwealth of the citizens, were never used to benefit the citizenry. All these run contraries to the purpose of the state which is basically consists of the security and welfare of Nigerian citizen.

Some factors may have been responsible for ingrained corruption and indiscipline to reign supreme in Nigeria. These include, inter alia, weak governmental institutions that encourage indolence and dishonesty in many ways; the mentality that public office is an avenue for primitive accumulation of wealth, and subordinates cannot contradict their

134 superiors, a situation which does not allow for truth telling and adoption of objectivity of purpose in the public service; lack of federal temperament; Dysfunctional legal system culminating to various forms of injustice by public and civil servant; high rate of poverty, unemployment and poor working conditions; and lack of transparency.

The release of Corruption Perception Index by the Transparency international between 1999 and 2015 as shown in the table 4 below reveals that Nigeria has relatively maintained high rate of corruption as one of the top ten leading countries on corruption. The Corruption Perception Index ranks countries based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived on scale 0-10, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 10 means that a country is perceived as very clean. On sectoral distribution, virtually every segment in Nigeria is infected with systemic corruption (Ajie & oyegun, 2015). From this revelation, however, it would not be a mistake to allude that there is significant relationship between corruption and policymaking and implementation, which has seriously affected the polity of Nigeria and the functionality of Citizen Diplomacy which has a negative effect on image building.

Table 4: Nigeria’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 1999 – 2015 Year Corruption Index Corruption Rank/No of Countries Score % 1999 1.6 98/99 16 2000 1.2 90/90 12 2001 1.0 90/91 10 2002 1.6 101/102 16 2003 1.4 132/133 14 2004 1.6 144/146 16 2005 1.9 152/159 19 2006 2.2 142/163 22 2007 2.2 147/180 22 2008 2.7 121/180 27 2009 2.5 130/180 25 2010 2.4 134/178 24 2011 2.4 143/183 24 2012 2.7 139/176 27 2013 2.5 144/177 25 2014 2.7 136/175 27 2015 2.6 136/168 26 Source: Compiled by the Researcher with references from CPI, Transparency International

As we have observed previously that Citizen Diplomacy is an offshoot of official diplomacy, the impact of Citizen Diplomacy has not been adequately felt in the area of the campaign for the repatriation of money stolen from the national treasury and lodged in foreign banks all over the world by Nigeria’s corrupt leaders, government functionaries and their 135 associates. This is an important component of the grand anti-corruption drive pursued by the Fourth Republic governments. Despite some limited successes and indications of cooperation by a few governments and banks that have already frozen huge sums of money in specific accounts of the major alleged culprits, there is still a long battle in this area of Nigeria’s economic environment towards policy implementation that will encourage positive image building.

Without any doubt, it is on record that Nigerian leader has proposed the drawing up of an international convention which will facilitate the repatriation of money proven to have been stolen and illegally transferred abroad into private bank accounts. Some of course, have linked the repatriation of money stolen from the national coffers and deposited in foreign banks with improved capacity for Nigeria to meet the challenges and obligations of its huge debt burden.

When an impact of a deep-seated economic corruption such as poverty, unemployment, hunger and poor nutrition or malnutrition, or authoritarian leadership is added to the bad governance environment, the result on the citizen both at home and abroad is better imagined than experienced. For the above reasons as they are obvious in Nigeria, every citizen wants to experience or have a way out either by hook or by crook. Hence, result into crime and the formation of militancy/terrorist groups like we have the Boko Haram, Niger- Delta Militancy, inter and intra ethno-religious crisis, human/drug trafficking, prostitution among other social maladies that have caused national security threats, which not only affect the citizens but also undermine the country’s external image.

4.1.3 Citizen Diplomacy and Nigeria’s National Security

National security as one of the relative power capabilities of Nigeria’s foreign policy (which is also the country’s strength and structure that possess a great significance in this study i.e. protection of all Nigerians) determines in a crucial way its external relations strategy towards the international community, particularly towards its neighbouring West Africa States and Africa in general. Drawing from the study theoretical foundation, security is a basic parameter of a country’s foreign policy in the sense that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (Rose, 1998, 153).

Based on this assumption, the security of Nigerian state is chief to protecting life and property of every Nigerian and Nigeria from internal insurrections and external attacks. Among other component issues of Nigeria’s involvement when Africa or the world is 136 considered the centrepiece of its foreign policy is essentially the maintenance of regional or sub-regional peace and security without relegating Nigeria and Nigerians to the background. This suggests that Nigeria has been on the ride of peace and security. With Citizen Diplomacy, Nigeria’s citizen is considered the epicentre of its “peacekeeping operations” depending on the issue of priority. The ultimate destination of any foreign policy calculations is the citizen.

Akinterinwa (2010) succinctly captures that Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy is more concern about the survival of the Nigerian when he asserts thus: …development of the Nigerian, food security, physical safety, free movement within and abroad, prevention of any form of denial of justice abroad, prevention of any form of mistreatment of the nigerian abroad, shaping the global views of the Nigerian in light of current situational realities, orientating the Citizen towards protection of national values, especially patriotism, the defense at all costs and in all circumstances of Nigeria’s territorial integrity and independence, and generally speaking, the satisfaction of the needs of the Citizen (p.179).

The above implies a holistic security function of the Citizen Diplomacy, presumably in the firm belief that peace and development are two complementary sides of the security coin in any country or region in the international system. It includes the state’s security roles on the citizen both at home and abroad. This section captures the domestic imperatives of Citizen Diplomacy on national security while on the other hand the subsequent sections will examine the security impact of Citizen Diplomacy on Nigerians residing abroad.

This notwithstanding, the unofficial introduction of Citizen Diplomacy in 1999 and its official pronouncement by Chief Ojo Maduekwe in 2007 behoves on the government that the defense of every Nigerian and territorial integrity becomes the concentration and priority of every successive government in the Fourth Republic. Therefore, even when Nigeria seek peace in any African country, the country has been factoring in what will be the gain for the ordinary Nigerian in all these security enterprises in African since independence with a particular emphasis ever since the country returned to democracy in 1999.

Citizen Diplomacy is simply the art of promoting the welfare, defending the integrity, re- orientating and empowering the Nigerian, as well as building a new Nigeria. Explaining the role of Nigeria towards ensuring the country and its citizen security, Fawole (2016) in an in-depth interview observes that: Making and keeping peace in Africa is also to the interest of Nigeria. When Chad had security problem and civil war, Chadians were flee to Nigeria in droves (in their large numbers) causing problems and havoc in the whole of

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Borno State, a state in the northern part of Nigeria. Nigeria helping them in the problem was to the interest of Nigeria because if there is peace, there would not be refugee’s influx flooding the country. In West Africa sub region, when Liberia imploded in violence, Liberians were getting all kinds of racketing boots as means to escape into Nigeria. Nigeria had to establish a refugee settlement in Oru Ijebu, Ogun State, a state in the western part of Nigeria. This is because a Liberia problem has become part of Nigeria’s concern. If Liberia combusted and engulf Sierra Leone, which it did almost engulfing Guinea, it meant that Nigeria was not safe because if every country around it is collapsing, Nigeria will eventually collapse. Helping our neighbour to put off the fire engulfing their house is also in our interest. That is what we called enlighten self-interest.

The above assertions could not be more correct because any discourse on the new foreign policy thrust (Citizen Diplomacy) for Nigeria without adequate consideration for Nigeria’s policy on Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, IDPs, is incomplete. Refugees are persons forced to leave their home countries as a result of conflicts or any other problems. While that IDPs are displaced persons within their home countries. Refugees and IDPs are usually products of conflicts, natural/environmental disasters and politico-economic problems. Nigeria and many other countries in the West African region have had their fair share of these problems.

The conception of Citizen Diplomacy, among others, is predicated on the fact that Nigeria and indeed Nigerians should be the beneficiaries of the country’s foreign policy calculation. This suggests that every foreign policy objective must be protection-oriented in terms of what will best benefit the Nigerian people. The domestic security environment has serve as a fulcrum for waging war against Nigeria’s negative image climate through extensive participation in conflict resolution activities. The country’s impressive peacekeeping record has painstakingly built up over five decades.

Since 1999, there has been a clear indication and investment of interest in conflict prevention, management and resolution, particularly in West Africa. Nigeria is generally perceived to be a mediator in many conflicts in the world. If Nigeria’s image had not improved security wise, the international community would not have asked the country to be discharging some responsibilities on its behalf. Nigeria is practically allowed and supported to resolve numerous conflict spots that international system is afflicted with. This is more manifest in Africa where all major conflicts are demanding the time and energy of all successive governments in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic (Akindele, 2000; Akinterinwa, 2014a; Emmanuel, 2014; Okeke-Uzodike et’al, 2013; Saliu, 2007; Sampson, 2016).

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Every domestic and foreign policy endeavour must be beneficial to the citizenry. Be that as it may, the main functional role of Citizen Diplomacy in its quest for national security cannot but be to serve as an enabler and a catalytic agent in the process. As security component, Citizen Diplomacy should be built on a multi-dimensional framework. The first is built on the prevention of assaults (unnecessary mistreatment) on the Nigerian person at home and abroad. The second is constructed upon the need to focus on the promotion of neighbourhood watch. Thirdly, Citizen Diplomacy is predicated upon the fact that citizen should be more concerned with good police-community relations and intelligence gathering should be a major responsibility of every patriotic citizen of Nigeria.

As part of the security impact of Citizen Diplomacy on Nigeria and Nigerians, it gives consciousness to the Nigeria state on how the interest of the people of Nigeria will be affected positively or otherwise before final decision is arrived at. Therefore, the impact analysis of these three cardinal points of Citizen Diplomacy on national security can be analysed domestically and internationally. Since this section is designed to underscore the domestic aspect, the analyses therein are on the domestic empirical exegesis, which include the following. i. Prevention of Assault

One major impact of citizen-oriented diplomacy is the consciousness of every citizen towards his/her fundamental human rights. There is, to some extent, relatively high level of civility in people-to-people relationship. Arguably, one may not fully attribute it to the introduction of Citizen Diplomacy, because it is doubtful if the Nigerian government, despite the establishment of National Human Rights Commission in 1995 with 2010 Amendment Act, has ever been more concerned about its people, notwithstanding the introduction and drive of Citizen Diplomacy.

But the high presence of democratic rule with the doctrine of rule of law coupled with membership of Civil Society Organizations and increase in numbers of Non-Governmental Organisations that see themselves as Citizen Diplomats in Nigeria and championing the cause of citizen’s interest has been so helpful in curtailing and bringing to justice case of assault on the citizens most especially the Nigeria feminine gender and youngsters, and perhaps, as a result of democratic rule with the doctrine of rule of law (Lafenwa, 2016).

However, some commentators observe that there are still pockets of assaults and ill- treatments of Nigerians happening in Nigeria, on the people’s home soil. Worse still, most 139 often, these mistreatments come from the security agents, who are primarily expected to protect the life and property of every Nigerian. A situation that could be called ‘state versus citizen’ where Nigerians (security agents or political elites, ‘highly placed’) working against Nigerians (civilians or ordinary, ‘less privileged’ citizen) at home. In fact, Akinterinwa (2010) describes this situation as “citizen’s self-destruction” (p.169), where Nigerians in several respects, consciously or otherwise engage in activities that work against Nigerians.

This development is most unfortunate and one would be tempted to ask what kind of Citizen Diplomacy is operational in Nigeria. It is quite impracticable and unconceivable for the American, British or any government committed to the well-being and the protection of the larger interest of its people will allow self-maltreatment to be meted out to its citizens at home or anywhere in the world. Nigerian has the biggest Military personnel and Police Force in Africa but pulling the weakest impact when it comes to domestic security, such as Niger-Delta Militancy, Boko Haram Insurgency, the continuous feud between the Fulani Herdsmen and local farmers or rural dwellers, among other pockets of weaker security attacks on lives and properties of Nigerian citizens (MacLean, 2015). While analysing the role of security agencies on Nigerians at home, Dickson (2010) observes that: Reconnecting the state with the citizen and vice versa is a major area of needed intervention for all Nigerians. Back home, the average Nigerian is treated badly by the authorities. For instance, the Nigerian Police Force vested with the responsibility of maintaining internal peace and security have in all ramifications become agents of terrorism engaging in extra-judicial killing, arrest, and detention of innocent citizens, extortion of multifarious dimensions, and brutality (p.7).

In view of the above and many more observations from various commentators, one may be cynically assumed that Nigerian government has ever been more security concerned about the protection of wellbeing of every Nigerian at home let alone those outside the shore of the country, despite the introduction of Citizen Diplomacy. On Sunday January 3, 2009, The Nation Newspaper (one of the Nigeria’s national dailies) reports that some Police Officers who were allegedly said to have been on routine patrol in Ilorin, the Kwara State capital (one of the states in the north-central geopolitical zone of Nigeria) gunned down a taxicab when the driver allegedly failed to stop for check. The stray bullet that was ab initio targeted at the driver of the taxicab hit on and killed a nursing mother, Titilayo Olutunde, who was 20 years and her eight months old baby, Anuoluwa.

When the victim’s father, Mr. Jimoh Olatunde, was recounting the ordeal, he confirmed that the Police killed his daughter and his grandchild because the taxicab refused to give them

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(Police) money as extortion (Dickson, 2010). In a similar manner, on September 18, 2014, the Amnesty International launched the released of a report accusing some security operatives of extra-judicial killings in some parts of the North-East, where the Army is battling with insurgency. The Amnesty International shared their findings on conflict torture, an incommunicado detention centres, and other inhuman and degrading treatments on Nigerian citizens (National Human Rights Commission, 2016).

The disturbing aspect of the foregoing scenarios, which are just few among several other cases of citizen ill-treatment by the Nigerian security agents, is the lackadaisical attitude of the government. The government seems not to have come to terms with the domestic content of Nigerian Citizen Diplomacy. Under an ideal situation, Citizen Diplomacy, through the officials conducting Nigerian policymaking and implementation which represents the state and the people, is to galvanize the domestic environment which does not seem to be excited about the policy. Meanwhile, as the governmental institutions seem to be weak in the services of citizen welfarism and protection, cases where the citizens are also retaliating by engaging in an unholy and unpatriotic activities are abound (FGDs with some Respondents in 2016).

The point trying to make here is not farfetched. The ‘chop and clean mouth’ stylish way of milking or stealing the commonwealth, and physical assault of some government officials by the citizens are also well documented (Adeola & Ogunnoiki, 2015; Akinterinwa, 2010; 2013b; Sampson, 2016). The implication is that for Citizen Diplomacy to succeed, the concept may have to be put in the context of the people’s conscious engagement in self- destruction. Seeking to build on the one hand, and to destroy on the other hand, is working against one-self and this cannot be in the national interest.

For instance, on Monday March 9, 2009, the late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua was reportedly assaulted when his convoy was pelted with stones and bottles by some youths around the Masalacin Juma’at area of Jos, Plateau State (North-Central region of Nigeria). According to Akinterinwa (2010): President Yar’Adua had gone to Jos to commiserate with the people on the passing on of the Gbong Gwom Jos, Da Victor Dung, at the age of 73. Some of the cars in the convoy were badly damaged. Some policemen manning the roads were hit by missiles. In shut, the Presidents convey was embarrassed and ashamed. Even though Governor Jonah Jang of plateau State was also part of the assaulted convoy and had promised that ‘the Plateau Government (would) investigate and get to the root of it to determine perpetrators of the act’, the problem involved is deep-seated (p.172).

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The analysis that can be drawn from the foregoing is that, Nigerian President is an entity and an emblem of the entire nation irrespective of such as individual comes from. The vested interest of every Nigerian is on such individual because he/she is the legitimate President of the whole people of Nigeria. Consequently, his allegiance is not, and cannot, be to any sectional group in Nigeria or any part of the world. Therefore, assaulting his person by any individual or group of individuals publicly or otherwise is also an assault on the other people of Nigeria.

It is not unlikely for an individual or group of individuals to have quarrel with Mr President on any issue but publicly pelting stones and throwing missiles at the president is unacceptable, uncivilised, demonising, and relegating the image of the country. Without doubt, the attackers are aggrieved and they want to show their grievances. But assaulting is not and cannot be an enduring solution rather worsens the situation. Since Citizen Diplomacy has its domestic and external dimension, if Nigerians treat themselves inhumanly, then of what moral justification would the ‘outsiders’ have to treat them humanly. This suggests that the ill-treatments of Nigerians outside with poor image building may have moral backings and momentums from incidences at home

In addition, political violence, kidnapping of innocent citizens, pervasive inhuman condition and other related rate of intolerance are means through which assault on citizens is pronounced. The case of mistreatment on one Mr. Boye Adegbemisoye by hoodlums in Ajilo area of Ondo State (South-West region) on Wednesday March 11, 2009 is another testament (Akinterinwa, 2010; Gbodi, 2016; KI2, 2015). In the context of Citizen Diplomacy, how does government protect people who break bottles and use them to attack political opponents? Should people who even take up arms to fight themselves be entitled to protection?

In a most disturbing manner, when citizens are kidnapped, the perpetrators announced ransom to be paid before the victims could be released. Instead of the government through its security agents (Police Force) to rise to the occasion, they often asked the relatives of the victim to negotiate with the hoodlums (kidnappers) and to pay such ransom as may be demanded. Based on these cases, many public commentators have queried the role of government in the security of its citizen and conceptual relevance of Citizen Diplomacy as a ‘new’ approach in Nigeria. Without doubt, from the genuineness of purpose and intent, many things are new provided the concept is in the interest of the general populace of Nigeria in the entire gamut of domestic and foreign policymaking.

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No doubt also, the issue attached to Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy is complex. A trip to both the Lagos and Abuja offices of the High Commissions and Embassies of major Asian, American and European countries shows a picture of the anguish and ill-treatment Nigerians undergo, simply because they (Nigerian) want to visit some countries. Nigerians are treated with disdain and disrespect. Most of these embassies do not have waiting rooms for visitors or even entry visa applicants. At times, the applicants who are mostly Nigerians are subjected to stay under the sun and in the rain for merely seeking visa to visit some of these countries.

Some genuine Nigerians applicants are beaten up in the process by security agencies and eventually denied entry visas for what the ‘officers’, some of who are also Nigerians, call “non-compliance with protocol”. The reasons for refusal of visa are generally vague and Embassies are not obliged to furnish the exact reasons for granting or refusing visas (Field Survey, 2016). Hence, Nigerians must condone any form of mistreatment meted out to them even on their soil.

On Tuesday August 23, 2016, one Mr Okoro Chukwudi, among many others, whose application for entry visa to one of these European countries was denied, bitterly narrated his torment received from the embassy’s officers: “I have been coming to this embassy since last week unattended to, today that they attend to me the official said ‘you are not successful try again later’. This is quite frustrating. They have wasted my time and resources for the past 6 days” (Field Survey, 2016). While justifying, the ill-treatment meted on Nigerians by some Embassies in Nigeria, Akinterinwa (2010) succinctly observes the case of one European embassy in Abuja, Nigeria that: A Nigerian was refused a student visa after having met all required visa and college conditions. The Nigerian complained to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which took the matter up with the Embassy. Enquiries later showed that the Embassy was simply not happy that it had sent letters to some Ministers for many months without response. Consequently, when officials from the offending Ministries apply for visas, they refused regardless of the urgency and importance of the official visits to be embarked upon. Any visa applicant who also makes the mistake of choosing public official that are not on the good book of some embassies as referees, is also made to suffer from the offence of his guarantors (p.104).

The point stressing here is not to query the denial of entry visa as the foreign Mission reserve every right to accept or reject such application but the high rate of mistreatment is the major concern. Unfortunately, the Nigerian government has not in the recent time, particularly after the commencement of Citizen Diplomacy, risen to strongly condemn these

143 mistreatments on its people or taken any diplomatic measure to tame the monster of inhumane and callous treatment meted on its people, despite several petitions to the National Human Rights Commission (Akinterinwa, 2010; Field Survey, 2016). ii. Promotion of Neighbourhood Watch

Promotion of neighbourhood watch implies that citizens should be encouraged to group themselves into voluntary or commissioned vigilante groups for purposes of security watch, and particularly for intelligence gathering. There is no reason why every Nigerian and institution should not be security conscious with requisite security knowledge. One of the operational routes of the terrorist is through bank. Bola Sanni and one other security experts interviewed (in their various houses in Abuja on July 18, 2016 and in Lokoja on July 13, 2016 respectively) by the researcher unanimously posit and maintain that banks are the main dynamic instruments of terrorist operations and hence, assert that the institution encourages terrorism in Nigeria.

They argue that it is not possible for a terrorist group, like the dreaded Boko Haram in Nigeria, to operate without going through banking processes because they have to pay for weapons to be acquired. Payments for whatever terrorist actions are necessarily enabled by banks. Although, the sources of funding Boko Haram heinous acts are multifarious. He observes that the Boko Haram’s main source of funding is ransoms from its kidnapping activities. Akinterinwa (2014a) backs up his claim and concisely identifies that “it is reported that the Boko Haram received the equivalent of $3.15 million from the French to secure the release of Mr Tanguy Moulin-Fournier, his wife and four children and his brother, all of whom were abducted near the Waza National Park in Cameroon” (p.23).

To understand who Boko Haram terrorist group are, its impact on Nigeria security and how citizen engages in promoting security as mentioned above, there is need to briefly historicise the activities of Boko Haram. It is not exactly known when the Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad popularly referred to as Boko Haram (led by Mohammad Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau who took over after the death of the former) was formed, but its root can be traced to November 2002, when a Miss World beauty pageant that was to hold in Abuja, Nigeria capital, was cancelled because some Muslim youths protested which claimed over 100 lives (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012). The following year, 2003, Boko Haram became known loosely modelled on the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

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The activities of the group are concentrated mainly in Nigeria’s North-East region. The group was initially focused on opposing Western education. Boko Haram means ‘Western Education is forbidden or evil’ in Hausa language (one of the major ethnic languages in Nigeria). It regards those who do not follow its ideology strictly as infidels, whether Christians or Muslims. Thus, it would be an indictment on the Muslims to say Boko Haram is an Islamic terror group, as it is widely perceived (Emmanuel, 2014; MacLean, 2015). However, the group’s mode of operations and high rate of Quran knowledge/Islamic related doctrine, and above all, their agitations to create Islamic state in a ‘secular’ state, Nigeria, may have lend credence to Boko Haram as an Islamic terror group (Sampson, 2016; International Crisis Group, 2016).

Boko Haram who has ravaged north eastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region for about seven years, launched its nefarious operations on July 26-29 2009, when it participated actively in the sectarian violence that occurred throughout northern Nigeria with over 1,000 people killed, and since then, its dastardly activities have been tenacious and notorious (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012). The insurrection of Boko Haram group has killed more than 20,000 people, and rendered over 2.7 million Nigerians homeless and displaced with about 220,000 Nigerian refuges to neighbouring countries (Oduah, 2016).

Indeed, the United State declared Boko Haram a terrorist group in 2013. Though the northern parts of the country have been the major target and theatre of Boko Haram terrorist operations, but in 2010, there was a failed attempt by a young Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, to detonate plastic explosives while on board Northwest Airlines Flight 253, en route from Amsterdam to Michigan on December 25, 2009. Thus, Nigeria was not only listed a terrorist state but the country’s external image became punctured.

Some of the activities and human rights abuses of this group, include but not limited to: kidnapping, arbitrary detention and mistreatment of detainees; attack, suicide bombing and extrajudicial killings; jailbreak; assault (torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, sexual and gender-based violence (rape), use of children in hostilities); destruction of governmental institutions like schools, health centres, Police stations, Army barracks etc.; and destruction of religious houses; and above all, seizure of some Nigeria’s territories (communities and Local Government Areas) in 2014 and 2015 (UN Human Right Council Report, 2015; U.S. Department of State Report, 2016). In shut, Boko Haram is a terrorist group in Nigeria which has local roots and international implications.

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Table 5: Some Important Timelines of Boko Haram Activities between 2009 and 2015 DATE EVENTS/TERRORIST ACTIVITIES July 26-29, 2009 Boko Haram launched sectarian violence with over 1,000 people killed Sept. 7, 2010 *Jailbreak: Boko Haram gunmen free over 700 inmates in a Bauchi prison Dec. 24&27, 2010 A series of attacks claimed by Boko Haram in Jos and Maiduguri kill 86 people Dec. 31, 2010 Multiple bomb attacks outside a barrack in Abuja April 22, 2011 *The Yola prison jailbreak. Boko Haram freed 14 sect members May 29, 2011 Multiple bombings in different locations in Abuja (FCT) and Bauchi, June 16, 2011 *Bombing of the Nigerian Police Headquarters, Abuja August 12, 2011 Murder of prominent Muslim Cleric, Liman Bana by Boko Haram August 26, 2011 Suicide bombing attack on Abuja United Nations complex killing 21 people Nov. 4, 2011 Damaturu Attacks with over 150 died in a series of coordinated assaults February 8, 2012 *Suicide bombing at the Army Headquarters in Kaduna June 8&12, 2012 15 church-goers killed in Bauchi & suicide bombing attack on 3 churches in Kaduna January 19, 2013 Major attack in Kano where Emir of Kano, as the target, narrowly escaped death April 16, 2013 Baga (Borno State) Massacre, 187 people are killed June 9, 2013 13 students and teachers are killed in Damaturu and 9 children killed in Maiduguri July 6, 2013 Over 42 people killed in Yobe State School shooting by Boko Haram August 12, 2013 56 people are killed by Boko Haram in a Maiduguri Mosque while praying Sept. 12-18, 2013 An offensive by Nigerian Army leaves 150 sects member and 16 soldiers dead Feb. 14, 2014 Borno Massacre 121 Christian villagers killed by sects members in Konduga, Borno April 14, 2014 A twin bombing attack in Abuja, over 88 people killed April 14, 2014 276 Chibok school girls in Borno state were kidnapped by Boko Haram January 2, 2015 Attack on a bus in Waza, Cameroon, killing 0ver 11 people and injuring six people Source: Compiled by the Researcher with references from Field Trip (2016); The Guardian (2012); The Nation (2014) *some of the attacked Security Agencies

Flowing from the above timelines of nefarious activities by the Boko Haram terrorism, the government and the citizens have made relentless efforts to tackle the insurgents. In line with the Citizen Diplomacy towards promoting neighbourhood watch, volunteer local vigilante groups were enlisted to guard communities from attacks by Boko Haram. In May 2013, the Borno State government officially adopted the vigilante group of about 2,000 men following the declaration of ‘partial’ state of emergency in the northeast (International Crisis Group, 2016).

The local vigilantes were named Civilian Joint Task Force (Civilian JTF) and were equipped with military training, armed with guns, and paid some stipends, to complement the effort of the Nigerian military in combating Boko Haram. In 2014, the Adamawa State government enlisted over 10, 000 local hunters and vigilantes to liberate communities captured by the Boko Haram insurgents. Expectedly, there effort has occasionally credited with having greater success than the military at driving the militant group from their bases, as the Boko Haram activities has relatively reduced in the later part of 2015 (Fulani, 2014; Muhammad & Kay, 2014; UN Human Rights Council, 2015; Sanni, 2016).

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A leader of the Borno State Elders Forum, Bulama Mali Gubio, has acknowledged that: The Civilian JTF is the saving grace for us in Borno State, in fact in northeast Nigeria. Without their efforts, the Boko Haram insurgency wouldn’t have been put down by now. They organised themselves from each ward from the city and some of the major towns and started fighting their own friends, their own colleagues who were members of the Boko Haram (Oduah, 2016). On July 5, 2016, a 32-year-old Umar Muhammed, member of the Civilian JTF explains that he caught a suspected Boko Haram member with a bomb in the north-eastern city of Maiduguri, Borno State. Another member of the Civilian JTF, Tijjani Mohammed, confirmed to Will Ross a BBC News reporter in Yola that “when we are on the battlefront we are focused on the job, we are patriotic, we want to save people from Boko Haram attacks and avenge what they are doing to our people”. All the above testimonies are pointers to the efficacy of the concept of Citizen Diplomacy in neighbourhood watch. But Theophilus Ilevbare cited in Okeke-Uzodike et al (2013) situates the odd efficacy of Nigerian Citizen Diplomacy vis-à-vis government and the people thus: It is now habitual and priority for Nigerian government to solve crisis in neighbouring African countries faster than the insurgency at home. If the federal government had responded in a similar manner to the Boko Haram menace during its formative years, their activities would have been insuperable, extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses are now the hallmark of the Joint Task Force (JTF) on duty in the troubled northern states of Nigeria. The “brilliant record” of Nigeria’s participation in peace mission in neighbouring African countries counts for nothing when compared to the insurmountable security challenges at home. There is nothing ‘responsible’ about being proactive in regional conflicts when Boko Haram menace has claimed over 3,000 lives and counting. The present security challenges at home does not warrant any form of peace-keeping outside the shores of the country (p.22).

Though the responsibility of the state is to respect and protect every life of the citizen from any form of attack, there seem to be dereliction of duty on the part of the Nigerian State. However, there are some difficulties like adequate funding by the state governments in the ‘warring state’ to the people and the Civilian JTF coupled with the problems of delivering aid in the Northeast by the Federal Government. In fact, cases of human right violations in the context of counter-insurgency operations have been well documented (UN Human Right Council Report, 2015). These include inter alia: Arrest, detention and ill-treatment of innocent citizens allegedly suspected to be Boko Haram by the military; Lack of adequate protection of civilians most especially those that were used as Civilian JTF.

On the aspects of immigration, the impact of Citizen Diplomacy has not adequately been felt to promote security and detect people who are terrorists or those who could serve as

147 threat to the citizen in a particular locality of the country. The ECOWAS Protocols on Free Movement and Rights of Establishment are major sources of infractions culminating into various crimes in Nigeria.

The former President Chief Olusegun Obasanjo was not unmindful of these infractions, he directed the Nigeria Immigration Service to establish its presence in the 774 Local Government Areas of the country. The purpose for this directive was to be able to monitor arrival and movement of foreigners in the country. In this case, the citizens are the most suitable to assist the Nigeria Immigration Service. This is where Citizen Diplomacy has also become a necessity. The challenge of placing ethno-religion sentiments over and above national interest reveals the momentous rate of book haram terrorism (Emmanuel, 2014; Sampson, 2016). iii. Community Policing and Intelligence Gathering

Among the Civilian JTF, there is native intelligence gathering unit as operations team, which gather information/intelligence about the action plan of the insurgents and share with the army. According to Oduah (2016), “the Civilian JTF has an intelligence unit made up of about 100 undercover agents stationed across the country”. In fact, this group seems to know Boko Haram antics more than the army. One respondent, while contributing to the discourse on how Nigeria can intervene in conflicts within the limits of its available resources at no heavy cost mention that, “most of the failed attacks of the Boko Haram were leaked by the intelligence unit of Civilian JTF and claims that Boko Haram is more afraid of the Civilian JTF than it is of the Nigerian army” (KI1, 2016).

Community policing cannot but be another major focus of Citizen Diplomacy at the domestic level. Citizen should adopt the principle of being the brother of one another. When stranger arrives in each community, it will be easy to monitor, and any intruder would be easily identified and reported to the Police or security agents, and by so doing it will prevent unnecessary crimes. If proper monitoring is collectively done, it then goes with the saying that national insecurity will be effectively controlled at the domestic level.

However, one critical challenge under which other challenges can be explicated is the gap in communication between the Civilian and Military. Retired Army Colonel, Mohammed Sambo Dasuki, the ex-National Security Adviser to former President Goodluck Jonathan, cited in ThisDay, July 7 2013, noted thus:

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It will be tragic to have wide communication gaps between the military and the civilian population in our struggle against insurgency and terrorism, not to mention criminal acts of kidnapping, armed robbery and others …while it is the function of the military to assist civilian authority to handle civil disobedience, it is assumed that such roles would be carried out only when the capacity of the police is overwhelmed…policing the domestic arena is not the duty of the military, whose training is directed against external enemies of the State (p.18)

Col. Dasuki cannot be more correct with the above position. The main problem is that the Nigerian military appears to be gradually engaged in non-traditional roles of the military. Indisputably, the Military Force has the responsibility to protect national sovereignty, territorial integrity and prevent all forms of external threats to the wellbeing of the nation. However, the situational reality as it reflects in Nigeria under the scope of this study reveals that the military is involved in checking armed robbery and other crimes on inter-state road which is primarily the role of the Police Force.

From mere intervention to assisting the police to quell domestic violence, the military is now fighting the new scourge of insurgency and terrorism (Akinterinwa, 2014b). Hence, the repetitive presence of the military in Nigeria society has raised high level of suspicions and mutual distrust in Nigeria’s civil-military relations. This notwithstanding, there should be mutual understanding and partnership, most especially in information sharing, between the military and civilian for nation-building and to deepen the principle of Citizen Diplomacy

Another major challenge militating against the people’s readiness to cooperate with the police, particularly in divulging information, is police orientation. When good Nigerians have information about crime and report to the police, the police often turn the reporter into an accused. Informants are asked to prove their information before the police can take decisive action (FGDs, 2016). This attitude is most unfortunate. The police force needs a complete re-orientation in this regards.

More so, it is indispensable for the government to monitor the sources of funding of terrorist group in a country. Meanwhile, most of the terrorist activities in Nigeria relating to Boko Haram are funded by some ‘powerful’ people without going through back doors (Akinterinwa, 2014a). Daily Independent of Wednesday, July 2, 2014 reported that the United State had not been able to track Boko Haram’s funding, especially because “Boko Haram uses primarily a system of couriers to move cash around inside Nigeria and across the porous borders from neighbouring African states…to fund its networks”. This is a

149 serious lacuna in information gathering. It is on record that much of the Boko Haram hardware was not bought but they stole from the Nigerian army (Akinterinwa, 2014a).

In fact, some military officers have been allegedly responsible for revealing information to the rebels. This is a shared act of wickedness which contradicts the tenets of Citizen Diplomacy. More importantly, the mother of all challenges is how to remove the irritants in the relationship between the civilians and the military, as well as fostering a better entente between them. Akinterinwa (2014b) observes that “An entente between the military and the people is more of a desideratum than of patriotism” (p.43).

People are not aware of who resides in the next compound to them, so as to be security conscious. Even when they are aware, it is problematic if not much more daunting to report any strange and suspicious movement of any individual or group of individuals in their environment to the security operatives. Intelligence gathering should be a major responsibility of every Nigerian citizen. Citizen Diplomacy should be aimed at strengthening understanding between the intelligence community and the public. However, it has been observed that security of information cannot be guaranteed at the level of the intelligence community, because it has been proven that Boko Haram insurgents have stoolpigeons among the Nigeria’s security agencies.

Worse still, there are no emergency centres for over 59% Nigerian that is said to be carrying smart-phones, to coordinate the flow of information and relationship between the military and the people unlike in the developed countries where there are active and efficient 911 Emergency Centres. Even the Nigeria’s telecommunication operators are not effective, thus hinders passage of information to the appropriate quarters about threats to national security or any act of crime/mistreatment when such occasion arises. If Citizen Diplomacy is to be meaningful, the Citizen diplomatic stakeholders will need to be specifically trained and exposed to the challenges of maintenance of national peace and security.

One interesting aspect towards this is the negative reportage of the media. No doubt, press reports constitute the major source of intelligence gathering. Unfortunately, there is lack of media professionalism in Nigeria. Some of the media houses are not doing enough in the quest for national security. Some of their reports tend to portray Nigeria’s image in a negative way. It is claimed that they reveal data that should not have been, perhaps, for political reasons contrary to the country’s constitutional role provided in Article 21 of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria to include the protection of national/Government’s interest. For

150 if a ‘report’ does not undermine national security in its modern conception of it, there can be no problem for image building (Akinterinwa, 2014b). This is hardly the case with the Nigerian press.

4.2 Impact of Citizen Diplomacy on Nigerians Abroad

This section is designed to analyze the impact of Citizen Diplomacy on Nigerians abroad vis-à-vis image building. This would be done by considering the cases of maltreatments of Nigerians abroad and the examination of the application of principle of reciprocity. Treatment and welfares are the key operative principles of citizen diplomacy. Nigerians abroad could be simply referred to as Nigerian citizens who reside outside the shores of Nigeria, for different purposes ranging from businesses, education, career opportunities or for official diplomatic means among other legitimate reasons. The principle of reciprocity is held in high esteem in inter-state relations. It states how a country should always base its relations with other countries on what such country stands to gain either in kind or ‘diplomatic retaliation’ in the case of harsh/ill-treatment towards its citizens. Hence, it is not a one-action phenomenon. One action begets another.

4.2.1 Citizen Diplomacy and Nigerians in Nigeria’s Immediate Neighbours

Sequel to the Nigeria’s principle of concentricism, one major irritant and challenge to Nigeria’s foreign policy making is how to address the issue of mistreatment of and unfairness often meted out to Nigerians in foreign countries. It is, therefore, expedient to analyse how Nigeria responds to the treatment of its citizens in its immediate neighbouring states before extending to other African states and beyond. Nigeria’s immediate neighbours could be referred to as those countries that share international borders with Nigeria.

Indeed, Nigeria is in West Africa and shares land borders with the Republic of Benin in the West, Chad and Niger in the North, as well as Cameroun and Equatorial Guinea in the East. All of which, except Equatorial Guinea, were colonised by the French while Equatorial Guinea was colonised by the Portuguese. Nigeria’s coast lies on the Atlantic Ocean (Adetula, 2014; Omede, 2006). Nigeria’s external relations in West Africa generally and its immediate neighbours is guided by a policy of good neighbourliness and commitment to peace and stability in the entire sub-region.

In view of the above, Nigeria’s foreign policy towards its immediate neighbours since independence in 1960, is aimed at sovereign equality of all African states, respect for

151 independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of every African state, non-interference in the internal affairs of other African countries, and above all, commitment to functional cooperation as a means of promoting African unity (Amusan, 2014). Unfortunately, the experience of contemporary hostility, majorly on boundary crisis, is somewhat ironic and disturbing feature of Nigeria’s relations with its contiguous neighbours. Threats to Nigeria’s security from her neighbours have remained a major concern (Adetula, 2014).

There are widespread reported attacks on Nigerian citizen in these countries despite the good hand of fellowship extended to them since independence which have constituted a breach to Citizen Diplomacy. Cultural affinity in these Nigeria’s immediate neighbours, for instance, does not translate into mutual-cooperation, but mostly engenders competition, conflict and occasional cooperation on some selected issues. Our focus here is not to extensively analyse the features (like politico-security, economic, historical connections, ethno-cultural, and geographical locations) that bind and strain the relationship between Nigeria and its five immediate neighbours, but to analyse how Nigeria responds to the treatment of her citizens in these states.

4.2.1(a) Nigerians in Benin Republic (formerly Dahomey)

The western international boundary separates Nigeria from a French speaking neighbour, Republic of Benin. The Republic of Benin, which had her independence on August 1 1960 with an estimated population of about 10.88 million people in 2015, is the smallest and nearest neighbour to Nigeria (Ekanem, 2016; Omede, 2006). Nigeria maintains cordial relations with Benin in several areas of cooperation within the framework of the ECOWAS and the AU. The existence of a Joint Nigerian/Benin Commission to promote trades has facilitated cordiality among Nigerians and Benin Republic to pursue legitimate business. This has attracted the establishment of some Nigeria’s financial institutions such as United Bank of Africa, Diamond Bank, ECO Bank and others in the Republic of Benin. Indeed, Benin Republic could be referred to as the Nigeria’s 37th state.

Corroborating the cordiality between the two countries, the Nigerian Ambassador to the Republic of Benin, Mr Lawrence Olufemi Obisakin affirms that: “Nigerians are very proud of their heritage anywhere they are and they demonstrate this here… We have what you call Citizen Diplomacy which teaches that people must always protect human rights. We ensure that no Nigerian is detained unnecessarily for minor crimes. Nigerians are quite happy here I must tell you”. He explains further that some Nigerians in Benin Republic are doing

152 extremely well and quite comfortable. But he observes pockets of problem because the people of Benin are envious of the success story of most Nigerians in the country.

Indeed, the relationship between Nigeria and Benin Republic has been marred over the years with the frequent occurrences of border clashes, assaults and ill-treatments, unlawful arrest and imprisonments, extra-judicial killings of Nigerians and among others, which have been compounded by the activities of Beninese gendarmes i.e. police officers. This constitutes a serious threat to Nigeria’s external relations with Benin Republic. The Beninese gendarmes often collect taxes from Nigerian neighbouring villages and often replace the Nigerian flag at the border with that of Benin (Omede, 2006; Tijani, 2010). Tracing the historical antecedent of Nigeria and Benin Republic, Ate and Akinteriwa (1992) maintain that: The security relations between Nigeria and Benin have always centered on two issue areas – boundary and military relations. The two overlaps… This setting is further compounded by the activities of smugglers and the actions of overzealous functionaries who attempt to enforce legislation beyond their areas of jurisdiction … Besides boundary relations, political instability especially in Benin Republic has been important for their security relations (p.12).

This eventuality alluded above can easily be surmised from the nature and character of the Nigeria-Benin border. Nigeria relations with Benin Republic cannot be said under any fragment of imagination but it is made easy with the introduction of the concept of Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria’s policy calculations. This notwithstanding, there are cases of infringements on the welfare of Nigerian citizens residing in this French speaking State.

One bizarre case in point, which will remain indelible in the diplomatic history of Nigeria with Benin, is the mysterious death of Messrs Emeka John, Samuel Eyinnaya and Mathew Okorie in Cotonou, Benin Republic in July 2009. Emeka was a successful businessman who had lived in Benin Republic for more than 10 years (doing legitimate business) before he relocated to Nigeria. Mr Victor Chimela Benson, Emeka’s principal host in Benin Republic, explains that Emeka came to Cotonou on Sunday July 12 2009 to buy goods without the premonition that he was embarking on a journey of ‘no return’.

Mr Victor explains how a barrage of stern looking armed security operatives hit his door at about 7:00am on that doomsday just immediately after their morning devotion on Wednesday July 15 asking for Emeka’s whereabouts. In his words “with confidence, Emeka came out to voluntarily surrender himself. Meanwhile, the security operatives had ordered all occupants of the compound (largely Nigerians) out of their homes. They were made to lie down in the open with their faces covered. Not even a pregnant woman, Mrs Catherine 153

Enyinnaya was spared. It took the fervent plea of a ‘neighbour’ before she was allowed to sit on a bench” (Daily Sun Editorial, July 28 2009). During this scenario, Emeka was taking to the back of the building by some policemen and was gunshot to death.

A story by Mrs Catherine Enyinnaya, whose husband was also killed in the heinous act of that day lend credence to the above ordeal narrated by Mr Victor. Mrs Enyinnaya explained this bizarre experience to Daily Sun newspaper reporters when they went to confirm the story (Daily Sun Editorial, 2009). According to Daily Sun Editorial (2009), Mrs Catherine Enyinnaya explains thus: On that day, we’ve just ended our morning devotion when my husband went to the toilet. At about the same time he entered the toilet, a man came knocking on our door, asking for a certain unidentified man. I told him I don’t know the man and suggested he should ask a Beninese woman (our neighbour). I then shut my door. Within ten minutes, the man ran back, knocking and asking us to open the door, shouting the man was in the compound. At this point, another man came and asked me: ‘where is your husband? Before I could say a word, he just walked in…brought out a gun… dragged my husband out naked. He only allowed my husband to wear another dress I brought from the room after I had exchanged hot words with him. When I opened the door, the compound was already full of policemen and soldiers. They ordered us (the tenants) to lie down. It took the intervention of one man (a Beninese) who pleaded for me to sit on a bench.

A Beninese eyewitness and a tenant of the compound who observed the abnormal situation of things told Daily Sun that “…the body of Emeka had already been brought to the compound. They ordered Victor and the other Nigerian tenants to carry Emeka’s body into the vehicle they brought. They took away both the body of Emeka and his kinsmen…” He also confirms that Victor Chimela Benson had lived in the compound for about eleven years and he had never been associated with criminal activities. It is still left inquisitive that these Nigerians were not given the opportunity to consult a lawyer.

More disturbing, one respondent while confirming this incidence during one of the FGDs affirms that these three Nigerians that were murdered by the Beninese gendarme were not given interpreters, as they are not fluent in French language (KI2, 2016). This negates the international standard practice. Sad enough, Nigerian Embassy in Benin Republic was not proactive to the case. The Beninese policemen searched the people’s apartment without any search warrant and they were not allowed to observe the exercise, which affords them to take-away money and other personal belongings of these Nigerians (Daily Sun Editorial, 2009).

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Another extra-judicial killing that sent shock down the spine of Nigerians in Benin on the implementation of Citizen Diplomacy was the death of Mr. Mathew Okorie, a businessman and philanthropist who was popular among his Nigerians, on July 28, 2009 by the Beninese gendarme. According to Emeozor (2010), the police stopped him and asked him for his vehicle particulars, an order he obeyed without resistance. It was reported that “as soon as he handed the documents to his interrogators, they drove from the spot in their car while Mathew drove behind in his vehicle. Midway along the road, the police stopped, disembarked. Mathew also stopped and disembarked”. Apparently not satisfied with Mathew’s response to their request for ‘settlement’ for an offence he had not committed, the police tear gassed him to death (Emeozor, 2010).

Ibrahim Yakubu and Innocent Iwu’s death are other classic cases of mistreatment on Nigerians by Benin Republic gendarmerie at the slightest provocation. While Innocent was brutally murdered by a soldier who shot him in broad daylight at a car park for his effrontery in asking for his balance of 500 Benin CFA (85 US Cents) after he bought and paid for a GSM credit card which ensued some misunderstandings, Ibrahim was mysteriously killed under very strange circumstances at Dassa town without the Benin authorities responded to queries made by Nigerian community (Emeozor, 2010).

More so, another case of pathetic treatment of Nigerians in Benin Republic is the incessant incarceration of Nigerians in Benin prisons. Quite a number of Nigerians are wickedly detained and ill-treated in Beninese cell, which is popularly known as ‘battlement’ in Beninese local parlance. Many of Nigerians detainees in Abomey, Cotonou, Lokossa, Parakou and Porto Novo as well as other Beninese towns hosting a detention centre are awaiting trial and few others are convicts. While some of Nigerians deserve to be jailed due to cumulative number of crime cases of drug trafficking, robbery, kidnaping and financial frauds, which negates the local laws. Tolorunshagba (2016) affirms that several Nigerians behind the bars in Benin Republic really have no business being there.

A substantial number of these innocent Nigerians who are illegally detained have no hope of being charged to court or at least getting police bail. A Nigerian independent researcher, Maurice Archibong on his blog, mauricearchibongtravels.blogspot.com on Tuesday June 19 2012 reveals that thousands of Nigerians are ‘rotting away’ at various Beninese prisons. Achibong (2012) asserts thus: After months-long investigations that required dozens of visits to former Dahomey, it has come to light that (thousands of) Nigerians, one of them a baby-girl the entered Prison Civile Cotonou (PCC), when she was only a 155

month old, account for a staggering number of all inmates in jailhouses across Republique du Benin (p.4).

The story of two released Nigerians, Ogbonna Ikechukwu Igwe and Kalu Dimgba Onwuka, who spent almost a year inside Cotonou’s premier jailhouse coupled with Madam Grace Igwe’s tales of her experience when she went to visit her son (Ogbonna Igwe) in detention, lends veracity to the plenitude of Nigerian detainees in Benin’s gulags. Sad enough, some of these Nigerian detainees have spent more years in detentions than when they are to serve the jail term of the purported crime they had said to have committed. This unwarranted incessant incarceration has lent credence to some Nigerians to have become ‘landlords’ and ignobly giving titles in jailhouses because they were neither allowed to be bailed nor charged to court (Archibong, 2012; KI2, 2016).

On the 15th of December 2015, one Sikiru Yusuf Joseph a student from Benin, while contributing to the discourse on the treatment of Nigerians in Benin at the Nigerian’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explains that his landlord threatened him and illegally ejected him from his apartment without prior notice or court order before the expiration of the agreement he signed with his landlord. He confirms that he went to the Nigerian embassy in Benin Republic for assistance due to his distress situation. According to Sikiru Joseph: After much persistence in the next day, the Nigerian Consul to Benin, Mr. Badmus reluctantly accompanied me to the police station at Epe Carrefour. To my surprise the consul when he wanted to introduce me at the police station in Yoruba dialect said ‘awon ti Buhari ni eleyi’ which means I was an emissary of Buhari this portrayed me as a whistle blower of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. That careless comment by the consul made them place me on surveillance in that country (Personal communication with Sikiru Joseph during an Interview with Oko, 2015).

Indeed, in view of the foregoing, it is doubtful if the Nigerian government and its representatives in Benin have ever been more concerned about its people despite the introduction of Citizen Diplomacy. Meanwhile, Mr. Lawrence Olufemi Obisakin, the Nigerian Ambassador to Benin Republic on January 24 2015 while speaking to Elizabeth Archibong on the historical ties between Nigeria and Benin Republic, the challenge of managing Nigeria/Benin relations and other issues was quoted thus: Nigerians are well rated here. Several Nigerians have been commended by the government of Benin Republic for their outstanding performances and contributions to the country’s economy… we have a Nigerian who recently won multiple awards for his contributions to the economy; a Reverend gentleman, Geoffrey Izemojo, who is the Managing Director of Songhai Center of Excellence. He has been involved in the training of Nigerians and other citizens of Benin Republic in integrated farming, fishery, aquaculture, all kinds of animal breeding… As we speak, I can tell you that there is a 156

struggle between Nigeria and Benin on whom should lay claim to the man… so many Africans have benefited from his poverty elimination projects … The heads of state of both countries have also resolved that any dispute which may arise must be resolved amicably rather than resort to external bodies for adjudications. We have accepted the fact that we are brothers and this is the guiding philosophy of all our actions (cited in http://www.nairaland.com/591988/benin-republic-nigerias-37th-state).

While the above statements by the Nigerian Ambassador to Benin cannot justify the ill- treatment of Nigerians in the hand of Benin gendarme and other security operatives, a Nigeria embassy Consular Officer, Mr. Olumide Folarin Ajayi confirmed that Nigerians are having it very rough in Benin Republic and are becoming victims of hate syndrome. According to Mr. Ajayi, he acknowledges the unfair treatment meted on Nigerians in Benin thus: We are aware of all these happenings, molestation by security agents of Benin Republic … I will personally attribute the situation to ‘hate syndrome’. Benin Republic is a small country to Nigeria, so there is a tendency for them to suspect everything Nigerian does, especially they are always scared that Nigeria wants to exert authority upon them. But they are wrong in their thinking because such an ambition had never been in Nigeria’s agenda. Nigeria recognizes Benin Republic as a sovereign state, just like itself. I can tell you that sizeable Nigerians here are not criminally minded. One thing I can tell you is that our people are intrepid… The people here see Nigerians as very rich people … we receive calls from time to time from Nigerians complaining and seeking our intervention (Cited in Emeozor, 2010).

Without any iota of doubt, the Nigerian Embassy in Cotonou, Benin Republic is handicap in safeguarding the welfare and interest of Nigerians in the country. Consequently, one would wonder why the Federal Government is not able to dialogue with the Beninese government over the pockets of ill-treatments the Beninese citizens/security operatives meted on the Nigerian citizens.

It would be recalled that the government and people of Benin Republic realized the importance of Nigeria to their economy when former President Olusegun Obasanjo closed the Nigeria’s border to Benin during border disputes between the two countries. Why responding to the ‘unproductive’ actions of Nigerian government and its Mission to deploy a result-oriented and rapid response approach to the problem facing Nigerian citizens in Benin, Mr. Ajayi blamed it on the country’s (Benin Republic) complex bureaucratic system. According to him, he observes that: We write ‘Note Verbal’ to the Benin’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the bureaucracy here is very cumbersome. The system here is different from that of Nigeria. Here, the system is very slow… What we try to do here (at the

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Nigerian embassy) is to sometimes adopt unofficial approaches when there are serious problems like. The Ambassador goes as far as visiting officers who ordinarily he should not visit because of his position. I can assure you the Ambassador is on top of all the cases brought to the embassy’s attention (cited in Emeozor, 2010).

Flowing from the analysis above, the domestic and international perceptions that thus emanate from these occurrences underscores the kind of Citizen Diplomacy adopted by the government in Nigeria’s relations with Benin Republic, when the policy thrust cannot address the various issues confronting its people in the neighbouring State.

4.2.1(b) Citizen Diplomacy and Nigerian’s Residents in Cameroon

The impact of Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy on the welfare of the Nigerian citizens and the country’s image has resurfaced in Cameroon-Nigeria relations. The ordeal of Mr. Eloka Mbaneme, a Nigerian residing in Douala (a city in Littoral, Cameroon) is a first testament in this regard. Akinterinwa (2010) confirms that: Mr. Eloka Mbaneme got official permission from the Local Council Authority to build a kiosk/shop at the Mboppi Market in Douala. He built the shop in 1998 and has been promptly and regularly paying the official bills/charges to the Council since then. However, Mrs Georgette Mmagnestotso, with the help of the same Local Council Authority, later claimed ownership of the shop/kiosk. When Mr. Eloka Mbaneme protested to the council, he was arrested and detained. Mrs. Mmagnestotso was allowed to take effective possession of the shop in 2004 (p.106).

This is not because Cameroon is only the most powerful of all Nigeria’s five neighbours but the countries’ relations is obviously the most engaging among other Nigeria’s neighbours due to claims and counter-claims over the ownership of Bakassi Peninsula between Nigeria and Cameroon.

Indeed, Nigeria-Cameroon relationship is often characterized by mutual distrust, friction and a continuous source of conflict (Adetula, 2014; Konings, 2005; Omeje, 2004; Tijani, 2010). Bakassi is located at the South-Eastern tip of Nigeria where the peninsula pushes southward into the Gulf of Guinea. It is a low-lying region that is bordered on the West by the estuary of the Akpa Yafe (also known as Akpa Ikang) on the East by the Rio del estuary, and on the South by the Gulf of Guinea (Ekanem, 2016). It consists of several islands of about 50 square kilometres that have been occupied by Efiks (a tribe in the Southern part of Cross-River State, Nigeria). Okereke et al (2009) confirm thus: The indigenes of the peninsula have always emphasized their cultural affinity to the Efik people of Southern Nigeria… they have always denounced any effort to cede their territory to Cameroon. However, their discovery of crude 158

oil deposits within the peninsula has proved a motif force for the border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over the territory (p.62).

Historically, the Cameroonian claims over Bakassi peninsula is based on the 1913 Anglo- German Treaty and the 1975 Maroua Declaration, while Nigeria’s claim was based on the effective occupation of the peninsula by the Efik people over centuries. Prominent leaders of Africa like Omar Bongo of Gabon (1993) Eyadema of Togo (1994) Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (1981) attempted to mediate between Nigeria and Cameroon over the ownership of Bakassi Peninsula but that ended in futility. Republic of Cameroon under the leadership of President Paul Biya initiated the case against Nigeria at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague on March 29, 1994.

The oil-rich peninsula, which was in the Nigerian territory, was ceded to the neighbouring Cameroon by the former President Olusegun Obasanjo’s government in respect of the 2002 International Court of Justice’s verdict. However, the problem has only been addressed legally, not politically. Despite the award of the peninsula to Cameroon, that axis knows no peace. The Bakassi Peninsula has been a theatre of war between the Cameroon gendarmes and the Niger-Delta militants from Nigeria with huge resultant brunt on Nigerian citizens.

The political problem is just beginning to rear its ugly head, especially now that the people of Bakassi, with the establishment of Bakassi Self-Determination Front, are refusing to become Cameroonians. The fact remains that the Southern part of Cameroon (mostly Nigerians) that share the Bakassi axis with the Southern part of Nigeria has been demanding for self-determination, since the regime of the former President of Cameroon, Ahmadou Ahidjo (even before Cameroon initiates the international court case against Nigeria over Bakassi Peninsula imbroglio in 2002) till this era of President Paul Biya. This problem goes beyond the problem of non-domestication of the Green Tree Agreement by Nigerian Government.

On Monday 23rd November 2009, it was reported that Cameroonian gendarmes killed six Nigerians, and took away their money, fish and other valuable items in the Bakassi Peninsula (Guardian Newspaper, 2009, p.27). The paper further reported that ten days later, in retaliation move, the militants (Movement for the Emancipation of Niger-Delta) confronted the gendarmes, over-powered them and took away their weapons. The Cameroonian gendarmes did not surrender but went back to Cameroon re-enforced themselves, came back and attacked Abana and Atabong villages where Nigerian fishermen were living. They killed the fishermen and burnt down their settlements.

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Elias Edet, one of the villagers reported that he witnessed the torture of others with lethal weapons. According to him “each time such weapons were used blood gushed out of the victims’ bodies causing … death. The villagers appealed to the Federal Government to consider the issue with seriousness in other to protect the Nigerians living in Bakassi as the area was no longer safe…” (cited in Ogbeidi, 2012, p.6). These frequent attacks warranted the Brigade Commander of the 13 Brigade of Nigerian Army, Brigader General Okwudili Azunta to organise a press conference on 9th April, 2013 at Calabar. He disclosed that: …during a meeting of the military high command recently, a decision was taken to the effect that the army should establish their Forward Operation Base (FOB) at Ikang while the Navy should have same at Dayspring Island I... By the establishment of the two bases ...the Army and Navy authorities would deploy their troops and armament to the Nigerian–Cameroonian borders (Daily Sun, Wednesday, April 10, 2013).

In addition, it is remarkable to note that since the International Court of Justice (ICJ) verdict and the subsequent signing of the Green Tree Treaty in New York which aims at permanently transferring the territory to Cameroon, the indigenes of Bakassi have vehemently rejected any attempt to force them out of their “traditional home” (Nigeria) into Cameroon. More disturbing and potentially dangerous, is the fact that the Bakassi people who opted to migrate to Nigeria rather than stay under the yoke of Cameroon, had not been properly catered for by Nigeria. This development has given birth to a new wave of nationalism within the territory (Konings, 2005; Okereke et al, 2009; Tijani, 2010).

In an in-depth interview with Chief Ene Cobham, the youth leader of Ikang Clan in Akpabuyo Local Government of Cross River State on July 15, 2016 in Calabar, he maintained that the militants are from the Efik extraction who are angry over the manner the Bakassi issue was handled by Chief Olusegun Obasanjo and the subsequent administrations, even when they (Presidents Yar’Adua and Jonathan) had opportunity to appeal the ICJ judgment on Bakassi Peninsula.

Indeed, militants operating in the Bakassi axis are mainly of Efik extractions that see their mission as a nationalist obligation to save their people from the barbaric acts of the Cameroonian gendarmes (Konings, 2005; Omeje, 2004). Although, Cameroonian authorities have always disowned such gendarmes and have, many times, offered apologies to Nigeria, while the Government of Nigeria had always taken such attacks with kid gloves. Despite pressure from many Nigerians on the government not only to retaliate but to actually declare war on Cameroon, Nigeria’s authority has not only resisted the pressure but always opted to thread the path of good neighbourliness (Akinterinwa, 2013b).

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One good illustration of this point was when Ebi Dari, the Spokesperson of Niger-Delta Defence and Security Council (NDDSC) claimed in July 2009, that his fighters were responsible for some of the clashes with Cameroon and maintained further that the underlying issue was the dissatisfaction at the settlement of the Bakassi dispute. According to Ebi Dari “we want Paul Biya (Cameroon’s President) and Nigeria’s President (Yar’Adua) to come together to renegotiate the Bakassi problem” (Crisis Group, 2009, p.6). This confirms Ezeani’s assertion cited in Okereke et al (2008) that “common language, value system, religion and political creed, common government, historical traditions, symbols and experiences, conflict and common enemies facilitate the formation of group awareness and consciousness for nationalism” (p.48).

Similarly, on 15th November, 2007, the Movement for Emancipation of Niger-Delta (MEND) encroached Cameroonian territory, through Bakassi axis, and killed 20 Cameroonian gendarmes who were on high sea patrol. Nigerian government quickly admitted the action of the non-state actors and apologized accordingly (Ekanem, 2016). This apology was in line with international obligation which civilized nation-states must comply with. Likewise, in an in-depth interview with Etinyin Etim Okon Edet, the Paramount Ruler of Bakassi Local Government Area of Cross River State in Calabar on July 13, 2016, he maintained that the militancy has spilled to the Cameroonian waters. “Most traders from Cameroon that used to buy from Ikang market in Bakassi Local Government Area are no longer coming, due to robbery on the high sea, by the militants”.

It could equally be recalled that on 23rd January 2010, a group of militants (MEND) operating as pirates in Nigerian territorial water near Bakassi in Cross-River State attacked three vessels carrying traders from Cameroon to Nigeria. According to Human Right Report (2011), this group ‘stole’ cash and goods worth over N70 million from the vessel, and the passengers who were heading to Ikang in Akpabuyo Local Government Area of Cross-River State were inflicted with grievous injuries.

On Sunday October 11, 2015, Hon. Samuel Ufuo, a member representing Mbo State Constituency of Akwa Ibom State House of Assembly, observes that Cameroon is on ‘illegal trip’ to annex and occupy 16 Nigerian islands. According to him “it is pathetic the Akwa Ibom people, who are still living in their villages, established before there was Nigeria or Cameroon, were being terrorised, dehumanised, maltreated and deprived of their rights and privileges by Cameroon government security agencies” (cited in Sampson, 2016, p.132). Significant numbers of Nigerians in Bakassi peninsula have been displaced from Bakassi

161 following the ceding of the peninsula to Cameroon on October 10 2002. Majority of whom are yet to be resettled, while some are camped for which they are presently settled, some want a location that will be opened to the sea since they are basically riverine people in order to continue with their fishing occupation (Ekanem, 2016).

Omede (2006) only stated the obvious when she said “Cameroon also constitutes the greatest threat to Nigeria because of the dispute over (and the arms build-up in and around) the Bakassi Penisula” (p.16). The worst of all is that Nigeria had to give up Bakassi (its own citizens) to Cameroon even when the ICJ verdict was regarded by many local and international observers (like Konings, 2005; Tijani, 2010) as controversial, and, in accordance with the international protocol, the people of Bakassi were never consulted for their own choice in the matter.

In spite the harassment and maltreatment of Nigerians by Cameroon security operatives, coupled with the fact that Nigeria’s government protested and expressed its concern over the harassment meted on Nigerians in Bakassi at a meeting of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed- Commission in Abuja in 2012 (The Nation, Friday December 14, 2012), and above all the readiness of Bakassi people to belong to Nigeria, the Federal Government of Nigeria is yet to take a decisive diplomatic measure in order to defend her territorial integrity and its nationals. Majority of Nigerians who courageously chose to belong to Nigeria are still refugees in their own country, Nigeria.

Instead, Nigeria is busy playing Big Brother politics with Cameroon, which Cameroon spun (Tijani, 2010). Although the present border skirmishes between the militants in the Niger- Delta and the Cameroon Security operatives might not have constituted a major diplomatic strain between the two neighbouring states, the effect of this has profoundly impacted the level of public confidence between the Nigerian Government and its citizens.

4.2.1(c) Ill-treatments of Nigerians in Chad

Nigeria’s relation with Chad, a northern immediate neigbhour of Nigeria to the East of about 76 kilometre joining the Republic of Niger tri-point at latitude 13.050 N and longitude 14.050 E, is both puzzling and disconcerting. Tijani (2010) observes that “even though Chad shared common history and culture with Nigeria more intimately than with any of Nigeria’s other neighbours, it is with Chad that Nigeria’s relationship is most horrific” (p.200). Indeed, the

162 most tenacious hazard to Nigeria’s national security is the recurrent boundary clashes with Chad, which had assumed a military dimension, and the continual ethno-religious crisis and military conflicts among various warring factions in Chad which is noted by Omede (2006) to have been posed by external forces.

Basically, as it can be appreciated that the dispute between Nigeria and Chad is on the account of Chadians’ interest in the invaluable waters of the majestic Lake Chad (reputed to be the 8th largest lake in the world, which is located at the southern fringes of one of the largest deserts of the world, Sahara Desert) and other mineral rich settlements and isles bordering Nigeria and Chad. These problems have not only had serious implications for Nigeria’s security and politico-economic stability, but have increasingly contributing to some pockets of ill-treatments of Nigerians residents in the country.

For better appreciation of Chadian’s incivility and hostility towards Nigerians, underscoring a brief historiography of the country’s (Chad) civil war between 1978 and 1983 will not be out of place. The civil war which nearly implodes Chad posed serious pressure on Nigeria as a result of displaced Chadians that trooped into Nigeria as refugees. Also, Omede (2006) noted that “the presence of foreign military troops and militarization of the warring factions in Chad generated grave concern for the Nigerian authorities, hence the call by subsequent Nigerian leaders for a quick resolution of the Chadian crisis” (p.13).

Nigeria took serious diplomatic measures coupled with the deployment of human and financial resources not only to contain the conflict but also to stop the Chadian civil war. Had the civil war not ended at the time it did, the conflict could have had a spill-over effects on Nigeria and particularly the northern states that are closer with Chad. Therefore, Nigeria cannot remain indifferent to conflicts occurring in neigbhouring countries.

However, it is puzzling for Nigeria and Nigerians to experience some levels of maltreatment in the hand of Chad because of border dispute and the control of the islands in the Lake Chad to which the humans in the area, populated by Nigerians whose occupation are predominantly fishing following the receding water are migrating into, led to a shooting war between Chad and Nigeria. Chief among these ill-treatments meted on Nigerians is the problem of fishing rights on the Lake Chad Basin and the incessant harassment of Nigerian fishermen by Chadian soldiers and fishermen.

According to one respondent in one of the FGDs for this study on August 19 2016, the incidence of Chadian armed incursions into the North-Eastern parts of Nigeria in the recent 163 years is so rife and ominous that lots of lives and property were lost to the criminal activities of the bandits. The Chadians who initiated the incursion were beaten back at a place called Kenassarra (successful). Without any fear of contradiction, one would not be wrong to aver that apart from the fact that Nigeria’s borders with its neigbhours are very porous, the country lacks decisive defence policies not only to protect its territorial integrity from external encroachments but also diplomatically weak in the protection of its citizens outside the borderline of Nigeria.

More worrisome and discourteously, KI1 (2016) in an in-depth interview reveals that the “Nigerian Embassy in Chad rented a building in February 2008 for residential purposes for the staff of the Embassy. When the staff moved into the house, some private Chadians threatened to assault the diplomatic personnel of the embassy if the residential quarter is not vacated immediately”. The officials left in the protection of their lives. This is an indication of hatred and assault not only on “ordinary” Nigerians but on the diplomatic corps contrary to the international standard practice. In the rhetoric’s of African diplomacy, this is an assault between brothers. Nigeria would say, with a junior brother. But the rapture, if anything, is a failure of Citizen Diplomacy, and it is a wake-up call for more robust Nigeria’s foreign policy posture and more effective Citizen Diplomacy.

4.2.1(d) Citizen Diplomacy and Nigerians Welfare in Equatorial Guinea

Equatorial Guinea, formerly known as Fernando Po, is located along Atlantic Ocean at about 63 miles away off the south-east of the Nigerian coast. It has mainland borders with Cameroun, Gabon and São Tomé and Príncipe. Indeed, the country is closer to Cameroun than Nigeria but is strategically located with a greater proximity to the Bights of Benin and Biafra, Nigeria (Oshuntokun 1978, cited in Omede, 2006). The island is important to Nigerian security especially when a threat comes from the Atlantic axis. Nigeria, mostly Igbo tribe, constitutes about 85% of the total population of the people on the island. Hence, Nigeria is always interested in economic, political and social happenings on that island (Fernando Po).

Economically, some cocoa farmers and contract immigrant labourers from Nigeria settled on the island of Bioko (Fernando Po Island) since 19th century (Amusan, 2014). To promote political cooperation, Nigeria built a Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea International School for Cultural Development at the country’s capital, Malabo and trained their military staff, and donated a Fokker 27 plane to its President. It is on record that Nigeria also built a 30-bed

164 space hospital, rehabilitated Malabo Supreme Court, and donated N10 million (about US$100,000) credit line to buy Nigerian goods without interest (Amusan, 2014).

More so, on 21 February 2001, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea signed a treaty to explore oil along common borders on 60-40 basis respectively among other agreements (BBC News Africa, April 3 2002). Despite Nigeria’s acclaimed contributions towards Equatorial Guinea as highlighted above and export earnings from cocoa and fruit plantations, Nigerians face series of harassments, unabated assaults and sometimes repatriation, which has raised public opinion to query the efficacy of the introduction of Citizen Diplomacy in the Nigeria’s foreign policy (Amusan, 2014; The Guardian, October 11, 2002, pp.1-2). While commenting on the previous happenings between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea on the Fernando Po Island Omede (2006) observes that: …during the Nigeria’s civil war of 1967-1970, the inhuman treatments meted out to Nigerians in that country and the presence of foreigners during the 80s, particularly the Chinese and South Africans (under the guise of experts) constituted threats to Nigeria’s territorial integrity (p.11).

Expectedly, with the globalisation of democracy, the two states ought to strengthen their cooperation because of economic linkage and the importance of oil in international relations, unfortunately, the fear of not understanding the importance of Nigeria’s new foreign policy calculation towards the welfare of its citizens’ residents on the island attracts hostile forces from Equatorial Guinea (Amusan, 2014; Fawole, 2016; Osita, 2016). Excruciating this dilemma, Tijani’s submission is crucial. According to him it would have been the David and Goliath allegoric story “if Nigeria had not shown its legendary, but much misunderstood restraint, in foreign policy managements, if, as Equatorial Guinea persistently poked its finger into Nigeria’s red eye, over the years, Nigeria had not exercised patience, and chosen the line of caution by wooing Equatorial Guinea” (Tijani, 2010, p.208).

Horrendous were the accounts of what this little island state of Equatorial Guinea was reported to have meted out to Nigerians who had trooped out to that island in search of jobs as labourers on the plantation farms the Portuguese had established on the island. Nigeria, for reason that relates to its ambitions of leading Africa and significantly for its own security that can be threatened by Equatorial Guinea’s powerful friends (like the united force of Europe and the USA who are determined to use Equatorial Guinea as a stepping stone to rich hinterland of Africa), decided to soft-pedal the provocation of Equatorial Guinea without retaliating.

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Thereby, confirming Tijani’s assertion. The summary of the unanimous opinion of all respondents, when questions relating to the welfare of Nigerians in Equatorial Guinea were asked during the researcher’s field survey is that Nigeria government has not shown any will to safeguard its citizens especially those in Equatorial Guinea. When Equatorial Guinea’s repression of Nigerians became unbearable and Nigeria planned orderly withdrawal of its citizens, the Equatorial Guinea authorities subjected the departing Nigerians to senseless brutalisation. Nigeria’s response was an epitome of its well-known inclination for restraint and compromise in matters of diplomacy and international affairs.

Specifically, during one of the FGDs held at the Conference hall of Nigerian Institute of International Affairs on July 4, 2016, Wapmuk (2016) confirmed that “Nigeria declined military option against Equatorial Guinea when aggrieved Nigerians and families of those trapped in the state urged for military action to save and evacuate the Nigerian citizens affected”. The wisdom that informed Nigeria declined of the military option was considered Solomonic (KI1, 2016), arguing to the fact that military intervention would contradict Nigeria’s vaunted foreign policy stand. Again, this position by Nigeria government not to launch military attack on Equatorial Guinea attests to Omede’s position that such action “might make the other neighbouring countries in particular and African countries in general fearful, threatened and insecure” (Omede, 2006, p.11).

No doubt, this ‘cowardice act’, to a great extent is not definite but logically tenable. The non-definite position raises serious implications and concerns about the demeanour of Nigerians and Nigeria’s international image, especially on the functional pillar of the principle of reciprocity (diplomacy of consequence) and Citizen Diplomacy in general.

4.2.1(e) Nigeria’s Relationship with Niger Republic

Geographically, the border between Nigeria and Niger, which is about 15000 kilometres, is in the north-western part of Nigeria. Niger and Nigeria are substantially made up of the same people, the Hausa/Fulani. Even though the border between the two countries is more extensive, the relationship between Nigeria and Niger Republic can be said to be more cordial, with virtually no rapture or in the past resorted to the use of arms in settling boarder disputes than any of Nigeria’s neighbours.

Indeed, Niger was (and up till the present) a signatory to all the multilateral and bilateral agreements that had integrated the two countries in continental African Organisations; together and separately, as partners cooperating on matters of commerce, continental 166 politics or simply managing their common border (Tijani, 2010). It is relatively less to be decided whether the brutality of Nigerian citizens in Niger Republic is more than other Nigeria’s neigbouring countries. While good neighbourly relations did exist in spirit, it however breached in practice with varying frequency. Hence, in terms of intensity, one might acknowledge that such incursion is minimal when compared with those of other neighbouring countries.

Undeniably, KI1 (2016) observes some cases of mistreatment of Nigerians in Niger Republic. According to him, one Mr. Ali Umar, a Nigerian, was arrested allegedly for raping his own wife and has since 2004 awaiting trial. Corroborating the above, Akinterinwa (2010) also observes that “some Nigerians were arrested, beaten up, and detained by host Nigerien security agents allegedly for involvement in the disappearance of sexual organs of some Nigeriens” (p.105). This assault was meted on Nigerian residents in Niger without any prove or evidence to such allegations. In another scenario, Mr. Sani Tudun from Kaduna, one of the northern states of Nigeria, had his car stolen in Kaduna. When he went to Niger Republic, he came across the vehicle. He lodged official compliant to the host security official but was harassed and mistreated for lodging complaints.

Worrisomely, the persistent internal crisis of drought of water, food scarcity and trying times in Niger have made Nigerien refugees to flood Nigeria, which has not only caused security threat to Nigeria and turned the northern highways into killing zones, but also adversely impacted the political and economic calculations of the distressed states and the entire country. Omede (2006), points out that “Sophisticated weapons such as the submachine guns and Berretta rifles, bows and arrows are being used to perpetuate these violent acts” (p.15). The rapture, no matter how minimal it may be, is a failure of Nigeria’s ‘new’ diplomatic thrust. These notwithstanding, there exist a relatively warm diplomatic relationship between Nigeria and Niger Republic.

4.2.2 Citizen Diplomacy and Nigerians in other African Countries

The nexus between Citizen Diplomacy and the treatment of Nigerians as it impacts national interest is also noticeable in other African states apart from the foregoing neighbouring countries. Some empirical cases and events of mistreatment of Nigerians by other Africans which are quite helpful to the conceptualization of Citizen Diplomacy are indispensable

167 here. The ill-treatments of Nigerians in the following selected African countries are testaments, which raise the issue on the protection of Nigeria’s image.

In the Central African Republic (CAR) according to KI1 (2016), one Mr. Fabian Odigbo, a Nigerian, on 17 March 2000 was reportedly detained for about one month for refusing to offer bribe demanded by some police gendarmes. Also, the consular officer that was sent by Nigeria’s Embassy in CAR to resolve the matter, was allegedly detained by the police. It took the intervention of Nigeria Ambassador coupled with possible threat of diplomatic row that they were released. The case of Mr. Ifenna Samson, a Nigerian dealer in automobile’s spare parts in CAR, is equally noteworthy. In October 2002, Mr. Samson was assaulted and locked in the boot of a public taxi cab and driven into a police station simply because he refused to give goods on credit to Lt. Bedia N’jader, a military police officer in Bangui, CAR.

Akinterinwa (2010) confirms that Lt. N’jader was in the habit of collecting goods from Mr. Samson but without paying. Mr. Samson was released a day after his illegal incarceration. In the same vein, in September 2003, Messrs. Barry O. Nnason and Jerome Akata were brutally maltreated because they refused to give bribe at a checkpoint in Bangui. They were arrested and forcefully took away four million CFA (US$7000) on them and tried to execute them. Mr. Akata managed to survive the attack and reported to the Embassy of Nigeria. The Embassy took up the case in written to CAR government. Unfortunately, there is no evidence to suggest that the government has shown much interest in the matter

In Gabon, some Nigerians were imprisoned for eight years and were denied food during the same period of incarceration (Akinterinwa, 2010). One would ask if this was an indication of discrimination against Nigerian prisoners. The case of brutalization of Nigerians in Gabon is well documented. A respondent in an in-depth interview confirms that Mr. Tammy Sun, a Nigerian working with a Chinese company in Gabo, had his hands severed on 28th July, 2001, during official hours and in his place of work (Fawole, 2016). Mr. Sun asked for compensation for the injuries he suffered but the Gabonese government failed to compel the Chinese company to compensate Mr. Sun.

An unpublished official gazette at the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs equally confirms the above observations raised by Fawole (2016) and additionally affirms that Mr. Donatus Ihuoma was imprisoned from June 2006 to February 2007 in Franceville, Gabon for an offence he did not commit and worse still, without a prior trial. Again, the torture that Mr.

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Adumekwe, a Nigerian, underwent in the hand of Gabonese security agents, when they were said to have set his back on fire for 20 minutes is condemnable and indeed a slap to Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy (Nwanolue & Iwuoha, 2012). The foregoing is not just to show the brutalization to which Nigerians have been subjected but to also show that Citizen Diplomacy has not been deployed in addressing the problems.

The assault on the person of Nigeria in Guinea Bissau could be seen as direct and indirect. According to a press reports, the Nigerian Embassy in Bissau (the capital city of Guinea Bissau) was attacked on Tuesday, 8th October, 2013. According to Thisday Newspaper, Nigeria’s Principal Representative, Ahmed Adams, took refuge in a police station as a result of the attack (ThisDay, October 13, 2013, p.19). Akinterinwa’s accounts lend credence to ThisDay’s report when he concludes that “the assault was not only Manu militari but also took the commando style, thus attacking everyone in sight and eventually causing the closure of the Nigerian sovereign post” (Akinterinwa, 2014b, p.77). This is a direct assault on the whole people of Nigeria and the entire international community because apart from the fact that the attack negates the universally accepted principle of non-violation of accredited diplomatic missions, the principle of ex-territoriality of the Embassy of Nigeria does not allow for the Bissau Guinean type of attack on the Government and people of Nigeria.

On the indirect character, there was a mob action against three Nigerians which eventually led to their lynching to death because they were reportedly alleged attempted kidnapping of some children, without allowed self-defense (Akinterinwa, 2010). This is again pure violation of conventional legal wisdom that an accused person is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved in the law court. The Guineans turning themselves to a law court by inflicting jungle justice on the alleged kidnappers is illegal and uncivilized in approach.

These scenarios, not minding the apologies sent by the Government of Guinea Bissau to Nigeria on Wednesday 9th October 2013, are ungratefully counter-productive and hostile to the people of Nigeria whom Akinterinwa describes as “the Rock of Gibraltar that stood behind all the Bissau Guineans in their quest for political stability, economic survival, and national cohesion” (Akinterinwa, 2014b, p.78). The foregoing also has not indicated that Nigeria is sending the right signals and ensuring respect for Nigerians at home and abroad, which Citizen Diplomacy claims to uphold

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The impact of Citizen Diplomacy on Nigerian traders in Ghana is another empirical test case in this study. On the 28th day of November 2007, it was reported that the shops owned by Nigerian traders in Ghana were sealed up by a task force set up by the Ghanaian government. KI2 (2016) corroborating Akinterinwa (2014b) position, in an in-depth interview, confirms the event on the basis that Ghanaian government had asked the Nigerian traders to pay three hundred thousand US dollars ($300,000) to the Ghana Investment Promotion Center before they could continue to do business in Ghana.

To get the order reversed, the Association of Nigerian traders made concerted efforts but to no avail. The Nigerian traders in Ghana, by the virtue of Nigeria’s membership of the ECOWAS, are Community Citizens, and therefore, have the right to reside and establish businesses in the country (Akinterinwa, 2016b). Even though this does not mean they should not respect the business code of the country, their host country does not also have the right to make discriminatory and self- protective regulations to the detriment of ECOWAS supranational regulations. This is an area that should be of serious concern for Citizen Diplomacy, the foundations of which are yet to be laid at the level of the Nigerian people.

Hence, the Nigerian traders in Ghana wrote a petition to the Federal House of Representatives of Nigeria. Responding to the petition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the representatives of the traders were at the National Assembly on Wednesday 21st February 2008 to brief a House committee on the matter (ThisDay, February 24, 2008, p.23). Does the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of People and Goods conflict with the Ghanaian law on commerce? Is the payment discriminatory and limited only to Nigerian traders? Is the sum to be paid by individual Nigerian traders or collectively settled by the Association of Nigerian traders in Ghana? These are some of the yet unclear questions about the assault of Nigerian traders in Ghana (Akinterinwa, 2010).

According to Stanley Nkwazema of ThisDay on February 21 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, represented by Professor S.U. Ahmed, could not give satisfactory answer on what had been done to address the plight of Nigerians in Ghana. Professor Ahmed revealed that the law about which the Nigerian traders are complaining about was enacted in 1994. This suggests that the law has general application and could not have been specifically or restrictedly meant for Nigerians doing business in Ghana. Any responsible government, like Ghana, would ensure compliance with its laws.

According to Hon. Nnenna Elendu-Ukeje (Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs) in an interview with her, confirmed that the Committee was ‘piqued’ because the Ministry 170 was not proactive in protecting the interest of Nigerians outside the country. Nigerian government owes it a duty to protect all its citizens wherever they may be, if they are law abiding where they live most especially countries where there is presence of Nigeria’s diplomatic mission.

Unfortunately, as Akinterinwa (2013b) puts it: …more often than not, most Nigerians living abroad to transact one business or the other, do not always and promptly inform Nigerian missions abroad about their arrival and eventual settlement in their host countries. It is either when they need travel documents or when they run into unnecessary trouble with the local authorities, and especially when they are found in irregular situations that they do not have any other option than to run to Nigerian embassies. Again, in most cases, even when complaints are made known to Nigeria’s missions abroad, and the relevant home ministries are informed by the embassies, response to requests by the missions were not always promptly forthcoming… (p. 50).

Why there has not been a visible proactive effort of the Foreign Ministry in protecting the interest of Nigerian traders in Ghana since the enactment of the Ghanaian law in 1994? This Lend credence to Akinterinwa’s position stated above. More so, the Nigerian Mission in Ghana went on dead silence about the matter. This is why Garba Shehu, a veteran journalist and former newspaper editor, now Senior Special Assistant (Media and Publicity) to Nigeria President Muhammodu Buhari, defines a diplomat as an official sent abroad to lie on behalf of his/her nation (Nigerian Tribune, February 19, 2014, p.56).

Some of the Nigerian diplomats are representing themselves and the host countries, instead of representing Nigeria and Nigerians. Shehu (2014) maintains that some Nigeria’s diplomats, instead of projecting the positive image of Nigeria and speak up for the welfare of its ordinary citizen from ill-treatments or when his (citizen) rights are trampled upon in foreign territories, are found wanting in discharging their duties to the Nigerian citizen because they receive freebees from the host government. It is difficult to eat and talk at the same time.

However, there is a notable contradiction. Although, most of the problems suffered by Nigerians at home and abroad are man-made and systemic-induced, no single state or non- state actor can be held responsible. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nigeria, when compared with others, even with the less endowed countries in Africa, appears to be the least funded. Those who want assistance abroad are also those who argue against better funding of the Ministry. Those who want leadership roles for Nigeria are also those who do

171 not place emphasis on the need for a strong military and well-funded foreign ministry. Elendu-Ukeje (2015) submits thus: I believe our missions are grossly underfunded. Now, of course Nigeria has a very ambitious foreign policy. We are trying to sell our Nigerianness around the world, we are trying to gain respect around the world, we are trying for people to take us seriously, we are trying for us to interact on trade, but I think that our missions abroad are seriously under-funded, grossly under-funded.

These are some of the internal contradictions that partly explain some of the mistreatments of Nigerians abroad. The important point we are raising here is the determination of the place of Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy in these issues most especially as it affects the face- off between the Nigerian traders and the Ghanaian authorities. The relationship between Nigeria and Ghana is on the strategic grade level of national interest of each country. However, the sealing up of Nigerian trading shops should not have been allowed to exist.

The maltreatment of Nigerians in Togo is worth another empirical exegesis in the study of Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy. Togo was historically considered from time immemorial as a special ‘friend’ of Nigeria built on honesty of purpose, oneness in cooperation and common interest in protection (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Akinterinwa (2014b, pp. 300-304) traced Nigeria-Togo ties to 1963 when Togolese President Sylvanus Olympio was assassinated in 1963, Nigeria had to declare to the world, through its Foreign Affair Minister by then, Dr. Jaja Wachuckwu, that there must be an exception to Article 2, paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter which stipulates the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, particularly domestic affairs over which the countries have exclusive competence. For Jaja Wachukwu, the welfare of President Olympio, the entire Togolese, and indeed all other Africa countries are Nigeria’s concerns and must be protected. Therefore, Nigeria could not simply fold its arms and be a spectator in the commission of atrocities in its backyard.

From the foregoing and in the light of the fact that Nigeria and Togo are the ‘torch bearers’ in the quest to protect Community Citizens within the framework of the ECOWAS, its most unfortunate that Nigerians are being flagrantly mistreated in Togo. Ujara and Ibietan (2014) affirm that “some Nigerians in Togo were detained unjustly and treated with harsh and severe inhuman conditions for offences they did not commit except for being Nigerians” (p.15). Chioma Igbokwe reported in Saturday Sun (November 6, 2010, p.3) that some Nigerian prisoners and detainees suffer inhuman treatment in Togo. This was corroborated by Akinterinwa in ThisDay (November 14, 2010, pp.20-21) when he x-rayed a letter sent to

172 the President and people of Nigeria by one of the detainees, Chief Kalu Jabes, asking for help and intervention.

Akinterinwa (2010) draws his conclusion from the letter that Nigerians are unnecessarily incarcerated and clamped into detention not because they have committed any offence, but because they have always vehemently refused to be extorted. In many cases, they have protested violently. It is this aspect of violence that the police or gendarmes now capitalize on to frame new offences that are not related to the initial refusal to be extorted. And most unfortunate, they are left without help coming from anywhere, not even from Nigeria.

Undoubtedly, in an interview conducted at the Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the researcher was privileged to speak with one of the ex-detainees, Chuckwudi, who shared his ordeal thus: “we have seen many other nationals released from this prison over some serious cases, even some of the newspaper in Togo carried the news due to their government’s intervention but in our own case, we experienced the reverse”. It is imperative to quote a relevant aspect of the letter sent by Chief Jabes to support Chuckwudi’s experience. Chief Jabes said: …there was a case of rape, which involved a French national, one Mr. Rovers. He was accused of raping two under-aged sisters (8 and 12 years), they brought him to the prison on August 28, 2010 and released him the following month (September 15). There was also a case of one Mr. Tony, an American national who was arrested at the Lome Airport over a drug case and after four days, he was released to the American Ambassador and was taken back home… Even Radio France International confirmed that Nigerians in Togo prison are suffering. Red Cross International, which visited this place sometime, last month, also confirmed the situation in this prison (cited in Akinterinwa, 2014b, pp.305-306)

At this juncture, the premise of maltreatment of Nigerians in Togo, as presented above, has raised significant questions about the tenacity of the mistreatment and applicability of Citizen Diplomacy. The national and international responsibility of the Government of Nigeria has not only been raised, the allegation has also insinuated and indicted the Embassy of Nigeria in Togo, and by implication, the Government of Nigeria. Most importantly, it raises the essence of where and when Citizen Diplomacy applies. Meanwhile, Citizen Diplomacy, as conceived by Chief Ojo Maduekwe, is about the protection of Nigerians wherever they may find themselves.

Without any iota of doubt, a second illustration of the exception to the rule of non- interference was the apartheid argument. Jaja Wachukwu had it that under no circumstance should apartheid or the subjugation of an African or black man in South Africa be 173 considered as an internal affair of South Africa. In fact, it should be recalled here that it was clearly stated in the inner cover of the back page of Nigeria’s passport in the 1960s and 1970s that every holder of the then Nigerian passport should fight apartheid with whatever means available to him or her wherever he or she may be (Akinterinwa, 2016b). This means that apartheid was fought tooth and nail without due regard to the principle of non- intervention. However, Nigeria’s relationship with South Africa merits attention. Some scholars see Nigeria and South Africa as partners in development. Some others see them as rivals. Indeed, Nigeria-South Africa relations have vacillated between cooperation and conflict, necessitated by each country’s foreign policy, regime type, domestic intricacies and international diplomacy.

The collaborative effort by Nigeria and South Africa in promoting continental renaissance was the facilitation of the diplomatic process that transformed the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) in 1999. Nigeria and South Africa were also instrumental to the formation of Africa’s new development initiative, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001, and its governance tool; African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in 2003. The expectations by the international community, since the year 2000 is that Africans and the continental political leadership should look inwards to solve their problems made these initiatives very important and timely (Ujara & Ibietan, 2014).

Another major unifying force is in light with the increasing, strong economic presence of South African companies in Nigeria, the first group of scholars might be right. For instance, there are several South African companies operating in Nigeria such as: MTN, Shoprite, Stanbic Merchant Bank of Nigeria, South African Airways, South African Breweries (SAB miller), Multichoice (DSTV), PEP Retail Stores, LTA Construction, Protea Hotels, South African-Nigeria Communications, Airtime, among others, with the biggest investment being in the telecommunications sector (Amao & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015). The increasing numbers of South African companies in Nigeria relate to availability of enabling environment, unlike in South Africa where very few Nigerians companies exist. There are active laws of protectionism in South Africa but it is free market in Nigeria, government encourages Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nigeria.

The position of the second schools of thought may not be out of place when we consider the stringent conditions for Nigerian investment in South Africa (KI1, 2016). There is no enabling environment and more importantly Nigerian companies have no much to offer to

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South Africa because there is virtually no sector of South African economy that Nigeria could exploit except in education and securing job opportunities. From the foregoing, there is no reason Nigeria should not have and maintain good relationship with South Africa, or any other country for that matter. Unfortunately, there are over 409 Nigerians in various prisons in South Africa (Balogun, 2014). Consequently, our emphasis here is on maltreatment of Nigerians in South Africa and the response of Nigerian Government within the whims and caprices of Citizen Diplomacy.

In the recent years, Nigeria-South Africa diplomatic relations has deteriorated on many fronts. First, there are reported cases of harassment of Nigerian travelers arriving at the Oliver Thambo Airport. One notable case of disrespect was the treatment of Africa’s first Nobel winner, Professor Wole Soyinka. He was, in 2005, denied entry into South Africa. It took the last-minute intervention of Graça Machel, the wife of the ‘liberation hero’ and former South African President, Nelson Mandela, before the Nobel Laureate could be allowed entry into the country. Soyinka’s trip to South Africa which was in response to an invitation to deliver a lecture in honour of Nelson Mandela drew national and international focus to the country, both because of Mandela, whose birthday Soyinka was attending and Soyinka who was the guest speaker (Olupohunda, 2013).

In a related development, the second points worthy of note is the rows of yellow fever vaccine cards for which about 125 Nigerians (including a law-maker) were denied entry and deported from the airport in South Africa on March 2, 2012. The card is a certificate for immunization against yellow fever. The repatriation of these Nigerians who have valid South Africa visa is another ‘diplomatic-punch’ to Nigeria’s image and the potency of Citizen Diplomacy. As noted in an editorial opinion of The Guardian on March 5, 2012, “75 Nigerians who aboard South African Airways and 50 that aboard Arik Airways were all denied entry for allegedly possessing fake yellow fever vaccination cards” (The Guardian, 2012, p. 3).

Applying the principle of reciprocity as espoused in Citizen Diplomacy, the Nigerian government had immediately retaliated what was generally perceived as unfair treatment of Nigerians, indeed an affront to diplomatic norms, by deporting a total of 128 South Africans within two days, citing ‘lack of proper documentation’ as reasons for shutting them out (The News Editorials, March 19, 2012, p.50). Besides, the row of the alleged forged immunization certificate saga and the concomitant effects on the tenets of Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy prompted a visit of Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan, to South Africa

175 where he addressed the South African’s joint parliament. The impact of the visit seems not to have yielded good seeds, as the threat to lives of Nigerian nationals is South Africa continue to gain momentum (Amao & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015).

Third, the manifestation of the tenacious and notoriety threat of xenophobic attitudes, especially towards Nigerians by South Africa is unexpectedly being seen as very unfriendly. Xenophobia as it is prevalent in South Africa is not a white versus black people problem as it is used to be but essentially a problem between black South Africans (who are poor and unemployed) and other black Africans, particularly Nigerians (Alexander, 2010; Neocosmos, 2008). In the understanding of the concept of xenophobia, the xenophobic attack in South Africa against Black Africans could be called ‘Afrophobia’ or ‘Afrophobic’ attack.

There are numerous cases of Afrophobic attacks in South Africa but those in May 2008 and March 2015 were horrendous and noteworthy. The attack in 2008 was targeted on Nigeria’s citizens and their businesses, which claimed over 62 lives and displaced several others (Ashaver, 2014). Many lost their properties and their shops were looted, an indication of an orchestrated attack on the businesses of Nigerians in South Africa (Alli, 2008; Charman & Piper, 2012). In fact, South Africans harboured morbid hatred for other Africans, particularly Nigerians. Just as Okeke-Uzodike et al (2013) would believe that the agony Nigerian people face was baseless, “just by being citizens of the most populous Black nation in the world” (p. 26).

Similarly, in March 2015 another incident of massive xenophobic attack was recorded in South Africa. Though, it was noted that in the 2015 attack, Nigerians were not the major target rather the entire African nationals were targeted and duly bombarded and mistreated (Amao & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015). As reported in the Vanguard editorial view of April 24, 2015, at least five people were reportedly killed on March 5, 2015 and hundreds Nigerian nationals were maimed and some got their properties destroyed. The President of the Nigerian Union in South Africa, Ikechukwu Anyene, explains that: We met about 300 Nigerians in Jeppes town, near Johannesburg, who fled for their safety and about 50 of them do not have any place to stay. We are making arrangements with the Nigerian mission in South Africa to get them a place to stay for their safety. The Nigerian union has also presented relief materials to those affected by the attacks and we are in touch with various branch chapters of the union in the provinces on their safety and security (Premium Times, April 18, 2015).

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A Nigerian PhD Student studying in KwaZulu Natal University, South Africa, in one of the interactions with the researcher held on Friday August 19, 2016, explained that the entire period and days for 2015 xenophobic attack in South Africa were nightmares for him as a student. Narrating his ordeal according to him “I embarked on compulsory self-house arrest to prevent being attacked by the xenophobic attackers”. He explained that he rented an apartment own by a popular Nigerian in South Africa situated in the heart of the attack. “I refused to come out for about 10 days between March 8 and 18, 2015 without food”.

Worse still, the Black South Africans who carried out this act coupled with looting of some Nigerians’ shops and restaurants got the support of the law enforcement agents showing unwillingness to act and assure the attackers that they would be immune from punishment. Failure on the part of Nigerian government to send serious ‘diplomatic warning’ to condemn this act in 2008 might necessitated the repeat of xenophobic attack on Nigerians in 2015.

Several times had South African government publicly says it appreciates Nigeria’s role during its trying times, most especially putting an end to apartheid (New24 Nigeria, March 8, 2016), but it is doubtful if it has substantially educated its people on how African countries liberated them from the obnoxious policies of apartheid. The Nigeria’s role must be told endlessly to the present and future generations of South Africans. Besides, there is nothing to suggest that the South African government has not been aiding and abetting the xenophobic perpetrators and using media in campaigns of calumny against Nigerians and Nigeria respectively.

Indisputably however, some of the perpetrators of the May 2008 xenophobic attacks had alleged that foreigners were responsible for taking their jobs, which some media had reported that foreigners are the ones engaging in crime and corruption (Alexander, 2010; Charman & Piper, 2012; Matunhu, 2011). Eke (2009) confirms that “many Nigerians were killed in the 2007 extra-judicial circumstances, besides cases of harassment, intimidation and brutalization by South Africa police and security agencies” (p. 138).

More disturbing is the internal contradictions in Nigeria towards the drive of Citizen Diplomacy, which are contributing factors for ill-treatment, Nigerians are getting from South Africa. The consensus opinion of our respondents, on the high rate of humiliation and maltreatment of Nigerian citizens in their various host countries, generally agrees to the fact that high rate of unemployment, poverty, educational pursuit and seeking for better life, which are obviously major problems for the teeming population of Nigerians at home, are

177 some of the reasons for traveling abroad, particularly South Africa. Corroborating this position, Oluwaseyi Bangudu cited in Premium Times June 12, 2013, reported that the World Bank had indicted Nigerian government of killing Nigerians because of massive poverty and unemployment (Bangudu, 2013).

Even if Nigerian government asked its nationals to come home (Nigeria) in the face of mistreatment, what would they come to do, when it is obvious that the teeming population at home are unemployed in a poverty-stricken environment? How would they survive? These are some of the questions begging for answers. Meanwhile, Nigerian government demanded for compensation for the affected victims, and issued a threat of dire consequences if the South African government refused to comply. However, the intention of demanding compensation from the government of South Africa by the government of Nigeria after assessing the damage incurred by its nationals was a ludicrous ultimatum. The rest has been thrown into the dustbin of history.

There is no disputing the fact that, in many countries of Africa, enterprising Nigerians are essentially suffering from envy. For instance, Charles Taylor's of Liberia had portrayed Nigeria as an aggressor that wanted to use its enormous oil wealth to create an empire in the West African sub-region, had resonance among other leaders in the sub-region, especially in Francophone countries. According to Saliu (2010), “Taylor and Francophone in West Africa are direct challenges to Nigeria's leadership in the sub-region” (p. 111). For instance, in 2008, ten Nigerians were travelling from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, in a super tug- boat, named Yenagoa Ocean, back home to Nigeria, but were attacked in the international waters by some militant groups in Somalia.

Akinterinwa (2016b) citing the Captain of the ship, Graham Egbegi, affirms that: …he (Captain) and his crew went to Dubai to take delivery of the Yenagoa Ocean via the Pacific route. On their way back, one of the crew members fell ill and had to be rushed to the nearest port for medical assistance. Mogadishu was the nearest port and permission was granted to berthe the vessel there. It was when the vessel was heading towards the Mogadishu port that the vessel was attacked, and that the ten Nigerians were abducted and taken into unknown destination for several weeks. The roles specifically played by Ojo Maduekwe were noteworthy, especially in securing their safety and their vessel. The factor of people-to-people was critical in the effort.

Akinterinwa further observes that: We should also not quickly forget the case of another Nigerian vessel, Ocean King 1, a fishing trawler owned by Mr. Kunle Kuteyi of the Ocean King Nigeria Limited. The vessel was sailing from the United States to Nigeria 178

but was in distress in the international waters close to Senegalese territorial waters. Another vessel, owned by a Spanish company, Euskalduna de Pesca of Call Santamane 3-Baj-48370 Bermeo, came to its aid and towed it to the Senegalese port (Akinterinwa, 2016b). Drawing from the theoretical foundation of state behaviour, it was quite clear that the Senegalese authorities were simply interested in acquiring the Ocean King 1 and therefore hid under spurious arguments that the vessel was abandoned on the high seas and not that the vessel was brought to the Senegalese port by a third party. If the vessel had been found by the Senegalese naval men and towed to the Senegalese port by them, the story and the position of the Senegalese maritime authority would have been quite understandable. In any case, the Senegalese smartly took over ownership of Ocean King 1 thus leaving Mr. Kunle Kuteyi to an unprotected fate in Nigeria.

Another illustration of unfairness and maltreatment of Nigerians in Africa was the execution of some Nigerians in Libya in 2010 allegedly for various offences (Daily Trust, Tuesday March 20, 2010; Nwankwo, 2013). If people commit offences and were found guilty after a fair trial, there should not be any qualms about it. However, when what is considered a fair trial is largely predicated on official unfairness, then there cannot but be a fundamental issue to address (Tijani, 2010; Vanquard Editorial, 2015).

Indeed, Libya legal proceedings, investigations, as well as prosecutions are all carried out in Arabic language, which most of the accused people standing trial do not understand. Interpretations and translations are not allowed and several international civil society groups, especially many members of the Amnesty International have been complaining about this issue for a long time but to no avail (Akinterinwa, 2016b). As we do know, citizen diplomacy is essentially about the protection of the citizens in all ramifications at home and abroad. However, citizen diplomacy is yet to be given the institutional boost it deserves. It is within the framework of citizen diplomacy that problems of mistreatment of Nigerians can best be treated at the level of people-to-people.

Consequently also, in the mid-March 2010, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, while addressing some students in his country, pessimistically advocated the partitioning of Nigeria into two new countries, on the basis of ethnicity and religion, North-Muslim and South-Christian, as a possible antidote to the sectarian violence in the Northern part of the country (Akinterinwa, 2013b; Daily Trust, Tuesday March 20, 2010; Nwankwo, 2013). This not only shows the

179 hatred for Nigeria but also diminished Nigeria’s status and credibility. All these are attributes of envy and external contradictions towards Nigeria image building

4.2.3 Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy and the International Community (Beyond Africa)

The brutalization of Nigerians is not limited to African states. The maltreatment of Nigerians in some European, Americans and Asian countries is more notorious. This is not to suggest that Nigerians have become unwanted persons in all countries of the world, but to empirically justify our motivations and curiosities in the theoretical framework as a tool for analyzing this study. In some countries outside Africa, where Nigeria have ties with or frequently go to, there are no known (at least before and during the period of this study) reported cases of ill-treatment of Nigerians. These countries include inter alia: Australia, New Zealand, Syria, Lebanon, Philippines, Kingdom of Cambodia, and Vietnam. Several thousands of Nigerians live in these countries.

Albeit, there are pockets of problems of Nigerians in these countries, which are associated with violation of immigration laws, involvement in one crime or the other, lackadaisical attitudes of Nigeria’s diplomats in those missions relating to renewal of passport and other diplomatic issues, reports of mistreatment, as it is the case in countries, like the United Kingdom (UK), the United States of America (USA), France, China, Poland, and Indonesia to mention but few.

In some specific cases, the ill-treatment of Nigerians is ridiculous and unexplained. The global contempt and disdain for the country and its citizens cannot be divorced from the image climate of the country. Nigerians are specially searched at many gateways and even upon being cleared they are usually trailed and monitored. On April 28 2008, a former state governor of Ogun, one of the states in Nigeria, Commodore Kayode Olofin-Moyin, was humiliated at the Heathrow Airport in the United Kingdom. According to KI1 (2016), the Navy Officer Olofin-Moyin was accosted by the British Customs Officials, handcuffed and taken to the Red Zone where he had his chest and stomach x-rayed.

Worse still, he was not only ridiculed but also detained for two days on suspicions that he was concealing drugs in his body. At the long run, nothing incriminating was discovered on and in his body. This act was barbaric and inhumane to humankind let alone a former military governor. One would have believed he would have been compensated for human right violation, unfortunately, that was not the case. He was released and simply told that

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“there was insufficient evidence for prosecution as there was nothing incriminating found on him” (KI1, 2016). Mr. Emmanuel Namah, a Nigerian diplomat in the UK, confirmed the incident. Though he said he was new at the Embassy but according to him, there was no record of follow up on the matter when Commodore Olofin-Moyin lodged the complaint.

Indeed, there is no age limit to the mistreatments of Nigerians. On 27 November, 2000, a Nigerian teenager, Damilola Taylor was stabbed to death in London by two English brothers who were also teenagers, Danny and Ricky Preddie (Laville & Foster, 2000; Ujara & Ibietan, 2014). This can only be done to a Nigerian. Despite the duo were convicted of manslaughter, this kind of molestation cannot be meted on a Briton or American without diplomatic row. It was equally perplexing that the Nigeria’s Embassy in the UK could not do anything to address the abuse of human rights on the Nigerian nationals (Ujara & Ibietan, 2014). It took the efforts of the 10-year old Damilola’s parents to get Danny and Ricky convicted in a youth prison for 10years imprisonment.

Empirical cases of maltreatment are equally recorded in America. Particularly noteworthy in this mistreatment is the stringent conditions for Nigerians to travel to the US let alone getting residence permit. In Canada for instance, efforts are officially being made to limit the presence of Nigerians in the country. The conditions of residence permit are being made difficult for Nigerian-Canadian citizens than for others. It was confirmed from one of the focus group discussions conducted in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that those who choose to marry from home and those who invite their relations to visit them in Canada are subjected to DNA tests.

In fact, passports of Nigerians are sometimes declared to have been lost in transit when they apply for renewal of their re-entry visa into the country. When Nigerian High Commission issues new passport, the Canadian authorities particularly claimed non-genuineness of the passport. This is one of the calculated attempts to humiliate Nigerians in Canada. Some Nigerians living in the US and Canada are in prison not because of ‘genuine’ reasons but because the American police or immigration officers alleged some of them to have forged their papers most especially their passport. According to Akinterinwa (2010), in May 1999, Mr. Marcus Omofuma was gagged to death during deportation from Austria, while Mr. Dada Alex was jailed ten years without evidence.

Nigerians, including government officials (diplomats), suffer, from time to time various acts of disdain as result of racism and humiliation at airports in Poland and Czech Republic. As KI1 (2016) rightly puts it: 181

In Czechoslovakia, a Czech citizen, who allegedly duped by some Nigerians in a 419 scam (advance fee fraud), went to the Embassy of Nigeria in Prague, and shot Mr. Wayi, a Nigerian diplomat, dead. He also wounded the Embassy’s security guard. Also, in Czechoslovakia, like in Poland, the presence of Nigerians seems to be resented in government offices and in public transport due to racism against blacks and Nigerians in particular. Akinterinwa (2016b) noted for instance, that there was no outcome of Nigeria’s protest letter when the Mexican authorities deported the Nigerian delegation who went to Mexico to cheer to victory Nigeria’s heavyweight champion, Mr. Samuel Peter. While citing some empirical cases of mistreatment of Nigerians in foreign land, Akinterinwa (2016b) mentioned the case of a 31-year old Nigerian married to a Belgian, Mrs. Evelyn Uche Amarim, who was strangled to death by her husband, Wim Vanackner, in Bredene in Belgium, even though Evelyn had children for the husband, she was brutally killed and dumped at the Franco- German border where the French authorities found her dead. If it is difficult to seek diplomatic protection at the level of official diplomacy, especially considering the fact of dual nationality of the couple, what about the roles to be played at the level of people-to- people to ensure that the implications of such wicked killings are brought to stay on the discerning minds of the generality of the people?

In fact, the case of ill-treatment is not different in the Asian continent, and China is noteworthy. The rate of maltreatment of Nigerians in China is very high and its coloration could otherwise be referred to as ‘official hostility’. The reflection of official complexity in most of these cases is worrisome. On Friday, 26th September 2008, a 28-year old Nigerian, Mr. John Ekene Ojide, was molested and was hit on the head with heavy iron battens by four Chinese security men when he attempted to urinate beside of shopping mall, Dragon Plaza, in Guangzhou (Emeozor, 2008). His skull was seriously fractured which led to his death on the 8th of October, 2008.

Seeking to urinate near the shopping mall may be wrong and uncivilized enough, but nothing can be most uncivilized than the brutality meted out to Mr. Ojide. While confirming this incident, Mr. Sheriff Oyedele, a Foreign Affair Diplomat who incidentally was also posted to Guangzhou during that time, confirms that Mr. Ojide had complied with the instruction not to urinate near the shopping mall. True, there ensued a minor argument between the security guards and Mr. Ojide who reportedly explained that it was the force of nature that compelled him to quickly want to urinate there.

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Akinterinwa (2010) confirms that “the Embassy of Nigeria protested the incident in a Note Verbale to the host Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The employers of the four security guards showed sympathy, according to Emmanuel Ojukwu, the acting President of the Nigerian Community in Guangzhou” (p.155). Despite this situational reality, a day after the death of Mr. Ojide, precisely on October 9, 2008, another Nigerian was mysteriously killed. The Guangzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau gave a diplomatic coloration and cover to the incident by sending a note to the Embassy of Nigeria in which the mission was informed that “one person suspected as a Nigerian national was dead”.

Akinterinwa reported again that the mission protested the lackadaisical manner the Chinese authorities were handling the welfare of Nigerians. What is particularly worthy of note in the brutality meted out to Mr. Ojide could be said to be an outcome of official hostility. The Chinese authorities were on record to have been refusing to extend resident permits (renewal of visa) of Nigerians. The implication of this was official harassment. Legally residing Nigerians, who were well-to-do, were ordered to leave the country at very short notices, without reasons (Akinterinwa, 2010; Amao & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015).

The question of official complexity is also obvious in the detention of Nigerians who have been allegedly committed one crime of the other. In February 2008, Mr. Bello Mohammed, a business partner of Mr. Douglas, an employee of Gaomi Xinyi Textile Company in China owned by Ms. Wang. Mr. Bello in company of his brother, Mukhtari Mohammed, went to China on business trip. Unfortunately, on arrival, the two of them were incarcerated within the premises of Ms. Wang’s company. In October 2014, Messrs. Suleiman Abdulkadir and Co (a firm of lawyers) was illegal detained. It took the intervention of the Embassy before they could be released and helped them to return to Nigeria. Again, what is noteworthy here is not the incarceration per se but the act of illegality that informed it.

Similarly, arriving in Lagos after being deported on January 20, 2016, Messrs. Chukwuemeka Diobi and Jones Ebuka narrated their ordeals in Chinese prison where they served for 10 years and 20 months respectively. As a witness of what Nigerians are going through in Chinese prisons, Mr. Jones, said: What is happening there is really scary. I never pray for anyone to experience it, because it is hell on earth. What we read in the news is different from how the Chinese treat Nigerians there. They treat the black people like animal. They trade human organs. They subject people to hard labour. If you don’t work hard enough, your sentence will not be commuted…

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All the deportees claimed innocent in one way or the other of the allegations to which they were convicted and eventually deported. This may be questionable and unbelievable but what is unique and consistent in their tale is that they were not giving free hearing for them to prove their innocence. More than 80 Nigerians died in Chinese prisons in 2015 as a result of torture and ill-treatment and over 700 Nigerians are still in Chinese jails, without allowing them to exercise full judicial processes of free and fair hearing. Again, what particularly noteworthy here is the obnoxious conditions Nigerians were subjected to in the Chinese prisons, which is against the international law on human rights.

More so, it is condemnable and unlawful for an accused person to be imprisoned without following due process in accordance with the international law and a ‘commonsensical’ law of ‘accused remain innocent until he/she proven otherwise by a competent law court’. Without doubt, the engagement of a few Nigerians in criminal activities in foreign countries, and in this case China, have dent the external image of the entire Nigeria and other Nigerians. While those who have been arrested, jailed and deported have continued to claim innocence of the charges, many are also guilty of fraud in foreign lands. Many Nigerians who were arrested in foreign countries and jailed have been accused of circumventing the laws of those countries. The commonest of all these criminal charges is trafficking in narcotics across borders.

For instance, in Indonesia after an unofficial moratorium on the death penalty between 2008 and 2012, the country resumed executions in 2013. In April 2015, four Nigerians convicted of drug trafficking were executed along with other nationals by Indonesian authorities via firing squad. The Public Communications Division of the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave the names of the executed Nigerians as Martin Anderson, Okwudili Oyatanze, Jaminu Abashin and Sylvester Obiekwe (Although, the nationality of Martin Anderson could not be ascertained). Pleas for clemency by Nigeria, the United Nations and Amnesty International were reportedly downplayed by the Indonesian government partly because “at that point, seven fresh cases of drug trafficking involving Nigerians had just emerged in Indonesia” (ThisDay, 2016).

Thus, on Friday July 29, 2016 in Indonesia, three Nigerian convicted of drug trafficking were put to death along with one Indonesian by firing squad. It is quite perplexing at the level of the Nigerian convicts themselves. Most Asian countries have zero tolerance for drug trafficking. Besides, in Malaysia for instance, it is boldly writing in ‘red’ on the visa to

184 would be emigrant that trafficking of illegal drug carries death penalty. It amounts to suicidal for anyone caught.

In some specific cases, almost 300 Nigerians were currently on death row in prisons across Asian countries. A human rights organisation by the name Legal Defence and Assistance Project (LEDAP) revealed that 120 Nigerians faced the prospects of death in Chinese prisons, and over 170 in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and five in Qatar, United Arab Emirate, and Saudi Arabia. The then Chair, Nigerian House of Representatives’ Committee on Diaspora, Hon Abike Dabiri, in 2014, in an interview commented that there are over 9,000 Nigerians that are languishing in various foreign prisons in different parts of the world. Hon. Dabiri observes that there are a lot of Nigerians in prisons in other countries of the world like India, Brazil, and China. There are more than 1,000 in China. In all, of course, they are uncountable because we are talking of thousands… (cited in Balogun, 2014).

According to Mr. Chinonye Obiagwu cited in ThisDay Editorial Report on May 19, 2016, an overall estimated of about 16,500 Nigerians were being held abroad while most of those on death row were convicted of drug-related crimes. The Nigerian Senate in its sitting on March 1, 2016 also raised serious worry by the huge numbers of Nigerians on death row in China, Indonesia, and Malaysia, among other Asian countries. Ismail Mudashir reported the motion moved by Senator Gbenga Ashafa in Daily Trust on Tuesday March 1, 2016 that: “A total 158 Nigerians are waiting to be executed over drugs related offences in China, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia” (Mudashir, 2016).

What is particularly unexciting is that despite this huge number of Nigerians in foreign prisons, the Nigerian government most especially the office of the Attorney General of the Federation (AGF) has not shown any serious political or diplomatic willingness to address the issue (Adeola & Ogunnoiki, 2015). Without doubt, the over 9,000 Nigerians in various prisons abroad, some of them on death row, is not only heart-rending if not damning, it is indeed pathetic. Fundamentally, this is yet, another blight on the toga of the country’s battered international image and it speaks directly to the domestic pervasive corruption and criminality, which has been exported abroad. Besides the image problem created for the country, Nigerian nationals are viewed with suspicion and subjected to demeaning treatment at airports across the world because of this negative perception.

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Without any jot of doubt, the relegation of the dignity and image of Nigeria was also a recurrent decimal and a major concern to the well-meaning Nigerians both at home and abroad during the say no to Nigerians, say no to drugs saga in Goa, a major town in India in 2013. During this period, Indians displayed banners and bill boards with an inscription ‘say no to Nigerians, say no to drugs’ to protest the incessant rate of drug peddlers and barons, allegedly Nigerians, in India. The trafficking of drugs by some Nigerians in Goa and India generally put a social stigma on majority of Nigerians who are lawfully residing within the tourist centre of Goa and in India as a whole.

Indeed, they were subjected to all manner of humiliation and mistreatment. Meanwhile, some of these narcotics and other related crime offenders, who are mostly black, are not Nigerians. Some claim Nigeria’s identity to perpetrate crime because of the popularity (either good or bad) of the country as the largest in the continent of Africa and with the largest concentration of Black people on earth. The case of Martin Anderson, one of the eight people executed by Indonesia in April 29, 2015, who claimed he was a Ghanaian but Nigeria’s Passport was found on him, is a testament (Azmi, 2015; Bush, 2016; Putri, 2016, p.74). Indeed, Nigeria has no database to determine its citizens’ identity.

Consequently, while recognizing the power and rights of other countries, based on their domestic and international laws, to apprehend any foreign nationals and indeed Nigerians residing in their countries, for interrogation, it is not out of place to expect the Nigerian nation particularly, the government, even without the formal adoption of Citizen Diplomacy, to rise to the occasion by interceding on behalf of the distressed Nigerians.

4.3 Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy and International Organizations

The impact of Citizen Diplomacy on Nigeria and Nigerians can also be examined in the country’s membership of key International Organizations like ECOWAS, African Union (AU), Commonwealth of Nations and United Nations among others. Our emphases here is on the manifestations of ill-treatment meted on Nigeria and Nigerians when seeking appointment or election in some of the positions and how Nigeria has been able to lobby for Nigerian citizens in these key organization. Lobbying by Nigerian government for Nigerian citizens in key positions is manifest both by external and internal contradictions.

A practical example that is worthy of note here is a scenario of a Nigerian woman, Dr. Ugo Ngozi, who got nominated on merit for UN Ombudsman’s position in 2007, and needed to be endorsed by Nigeria’s government, her country. Unfortunately, Dr. Ngozi lost out, as she 186 was unable to get the diplomatic approval from the Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its counterpart, Federal Ministry of Justice. Dickson (2010) captures it thus: …on three different occasions including under the present government of Barak Obama from 2007 to date, she has been nominated for the position of UN Ombudsman, deputy special representative of the secretary-general etc, all equivalent to the position of assistant secretary-general, a position that required the endorsement of her home government Nigeria. But between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the utterly discredited office of the Attorney- General of the Federation, they kept dribbling her until she lost (p. 8).

No doubt, this development undermined Citizen Diplomacy and a reflection on the kind of Nigeria’s citizen-centered diplomacy that cannot fend for the overall interest the country let alone the interest of its citizenry as evidenced in the case of Dr. Ugo Ngozi. The ‘self- inflicted’ loss of Nigeria in the case of Dr. Ngozi is quite ironic to Citizen Diplomacy. Mahmood Abubakar cited in Okeke-Uzodike et al (2013) summed it up this way: Dr. Ugo’s presence in the UN System would have enhanced Nigeria’s position for the UN permanent seat. Other more serious countries campaign for their citizens and that is why the highest ranking African in the UN system is a Tanzanian woman. Go to the Commonwealth Secretariat in London you may think you are in India’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs because of the number of Indians there. And this is where our own Chief Anyaoku served for almost four decades. When is Nigeria going to stand, and recognize its own? It is sad, unfortunate, and indeed painful (pp. 24-25).

Indeed, some observers and commentators believe that what Nigeria government did to Dr. Ngozi Ugo is tantamount to a general saying of good radiance to bad rubbish simply because of her political and ethno-religious affiliations. A person who was nominated for the UN Ombudsman’s position coupled with other strategic positions at the UN cannot be said to as of poor quality. But because of sentiment, she lost out. When Nigerians seeking appointive or elective positions in the International Organizations could not get support from their government, how would they get support from outside, like in the case of Nigeria struggling with other countries in Africa for the position of a permanent seat in the UN Security Council? It would not be out of place to ask whither the dividend and initiative of introducing Citizen Diplomacy?

Therefore, the holding of the 19th Summit of the African Union in Addis Ababa, between July 9 and 16, 2012 provided another empirical platform to examine the diplomatic strength of Nigeria on the one hand, and the drive for Citizen Diplomacy on the other. There were two important electoral contests: election of the Chairperson, African Union Commission (AUC) and election of Commissioner for Political Affairs, which is the most juicy and strategic of all positions. The AUC electoral contest was between Dr. Jean Ping, a Gabonese,

187 and Dr. Nkosazana Clarice Dlamini-Zuma, who was then the Interior Minister of South Africa.

Generally, the contest was not seen as a contest between the two candidates rather it was perceived as a contest between Nigeria and South Africa. As Akinterinwa (2013c) has alluded that “the immediate rationale for the perception is the disagreement on the unwritten rule that none of the five leading countries in Africa (Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Egypt and South Africa) should contest for the position of leadership of the OAU secretariat or AU Commission” (p.150). Nigeria is the chief proponent of the need to uphold this rule while South Africa argues to the contrary.

Truly, the second electoral contest was a test case in the determination of the extent of acceptability of Nigeria’s candidate, Ambassador Aisha Laraba Abdulahi, who was seeking election as AU Commissioner for Political Affairs. Expectedly, Southern African Development Community (SADC) voted against Nigeria’s candidate because Nigeria took a principled position against the candidature of Dr. Dlamini-Zuma, who the SADC appeared to have been coerced to support. Though Dr. Dlamini-Zuma could contest and eventually won the election but it became tough for Nigeria to emerge victorious for the position of Commissionership (Akinterinwa, 2013c; Fawole, 2016). It is important to briefly highlight why Dr. Dlamini-Zuma won at the level of the presidency of the AUC and why Nigeria’s candidate got the position of Commissioner for Political Affairs.

Meanwhile, it took cooperative diplomacy (pleas during the day, consultations all night, reassurances in the morning) to convince four of the five regions to see reason with Nigeria before the eventual election of Nigeria’s candidate with two thirds majority vote required, precisely Nigeria got 35 votes as against 34 required votes in that election. South Africa’s blatant disregard for the non-written principle at the consternation of Nigeria portends greater dangers and African disunity. As for Dr. Dlamini-Zuma, South Africa expended a considerable amount of money, ‘settling’ or paying for anticipated votes (Akinterinwa, 2013c). KI1 (2016) in an in-depth interview confirms that “South Africa sent official delegations to most of the African countries. The delegation has a special or chartered aircraft and went around seeking support. Truly the support was given but each vote came with its price”. What this suggests is that South African government can do anything to protect their interest and citizenry.

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In all, Nigerians have been appointed to hold so many key and strategic international positions like in Africa Development Bank (AfDB), World Bank, ECOWAS, AU, Commonwealth of Nations, OPEC and United Nations among others. To a greater extent, these appointments or elections have come as a result of an individual skills and dints of hard work in their various chosen academic and professional endeavours, not necessarily as a result of government lobby or because of the natural position Nigeria is occupying, or ‘love’ some countries have for Nigerians particularly in Africa. In fact, some important appointments have been denied qualified Nigerians because of the global perception that they could be cheats.

4.4 Conclusion

Quintessentially, the analysis of the impact of Citizen Diplomacy on Nigeria’s Image Building has clearly established the connection between Nigeria’s foreign policy and domestic environment; and how a synergy between the external and internal variables in foreign policy-making can conduce to Nigeria’s image building/management (national interest), especially in terms of politico-security and socioeconomic growth not only in consolidating its African leadership position in the continent of Africa, but also as a major force in the global affairs. What is pertinent to this analysis is that it is sometimes domestically difficult for the government to support presentation of views that are critical of its policies. Yet, such criticism is often the most effective way of establishing credibility among the comity of States

Indeed, various allegations of transnational crimes have always been levied against Nigerians before violation of their persons. These allegations vary from engagement in armed robberies or possession of fire-arms, violation of immigration laws, harbouring of stolen goods, invalid travel documents, drug trafficking, illegal residence and holding Nigerian community meetings without prior permission. These have plummets the positive image of Nigeria and every Nigerian is seen as potential drug peddler or scammer in most countries. When the attention of host countries is drawn to the ill-treatment of Nigerians, it has not been decisively handled. At best, Nigerian Mission would be informed that the matter was under investigation. However, most of these investigations have been without end. This then gives impression that Nigerian government is insensitive to the plights of its citizenry and hence Citizen Diplomacy is worthless.

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CHAPTER FIVE

STATE RESPONSE TOWARDS IMPROVING NIGERIA’S IMAGE ABROAD

5.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the various governments’ initiatives in responding to Nigeria’s external image crisis and reactions to cases of mistreatment of Nigerians both at home and abroad for the period of sixteen years (1999 - 2015). This period, which is Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, covers three administrations. This chapter is substantially concerned with x- raying the new image climate which the Fourth Republic has brought about for the country. To be more specific, the chapter evaluates the pursuance of Nigeria’s internal and external initiatives under the Chief Olusegun Obasanjo’s Personality Traits on Nigeria’s Reintegration into Global Relevance (1999-2007), the Alhaji Musa Yar’adua’s Doctrine on Reputation Management (2007-2010), and Dr. Goodluck Jonathan’s Transformation Agenda (2010-2015).

5.1 Chief Olusegun Obasanjo’s Administration and Nigeria’s Reintegration, 1999 – 2007

The official sworn in of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and as the Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces on May 29, 1999 marked the beginning of the country’s Fourth Republic and as a much-needed opportunity for Nigeria to reclaim its lost glory within the comity of nations and rid the vestiges of pariah status. Upon receiving the presidential mandate, the first indication that the Obasanjo government would combat the forces (such as corruption, domestic political suppression, debt, domestic and regional security crises, among others) that have brought about the incidence of negative image for Nigeria was given.

During his inaugural speech, Obasanjo made emphatic statements that he was going to step on toes in his war against corruption, which he considered to be the major drawback in efforts to re-invent the country democracy. According to him: “We shall leave no stone unturned to ensure sustenance of democracy, because it is good for us. It is good for Africa and it is good for the world” (Obasanjo, 1999). This suggests that he understood the enormous task ahead of him on how to put an end to Nigeria’s poor image, how to change the pariah status of Nigeria and how to regain the lost glory and bounce back to reckoning.

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He also made some foreign policy declarations, that the Nigeria’s external relations would be anchored towards benefiting the Nigerian citizens both at home and abroad. Obasanjo declared that: We shall pursue a dynamic foreign policy to promote friendly relations with all nations and will continue to play a constructive role in the UN and the OAU and other international bodies. We shall continue to honour existing agreements between Nigeria and other countries. It is our firm resolve to restore the dignity of every Nigerian fully to the prestigious position of eminence in the comity of nations (Obasanjo, 1999).

True to his words, Obasanjo embarked on several initiatives and promulgation of policies to combat internal and external forces that have been obstructing the good image of the country abroad. Indeed, the desire to balance the domestic and external contexts necessitated an initial foreign policy that required extensive outreach diplomacy during the early years of Obasanjo administration. Regarding the new direction of Nigerian’s diplomacy, the National Security Adviser and a key member of President Obasanjo’s cabinet, retired Lieutenant General Aliyu Mohammed, during the Presidential Retreat on National Security, Abuja on August 10-12, 2001 was quoted to have set the tune for citizen-oriented diplomacy. Cited in Zabadi (2012), Aliyu Mohammed noted that: The current thrust of Nigeria’s foreign policy is to regain respectability and relevance in the international community… The grand strategy seeks the conversion of foreign policy activities into concrete achievements which are of direct benefit to Nigeria. The main objective is “peace, security and prosperity through friendship”. The goals to be achieved are as follows: (a) Economic integration of ECOWAS; (b) Responsibilities in Multilateral Organisations – UN, AU, the Commonwealth, OPEC, NAM, and G-77; (c) Cooperation with the Far East; (d) Promotion of foreign investment and trade; (e) Debt reduction (p.348)

The above statement clearly captures the essence of public policy direction of the Obasanjo government in May 1999. True to this, the President had relentlessly pursued the above goals at every multilateral organization. This was demonstrated in the number of trips he undertook especially during his first 4-year term in office.

Chief Olusegun Obasanjo came into office with a solid credential as he had created a larger than life image and good reputation for himself when he was the Nigerian Military Head of State between 1976 and 1979 (Alli, 2010a). Obasanjo’s image became boosted when he, as a military Head of State, peacefully handed over power to a democratically elected president in 1979. Also, when Obasanjo retired as a military leader, he was fraternizing himself on friendly personal terms with foreign leaders, past and present leaders, like the former

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German Chancellor, former British Prime Minister John Major, former American President, Jimmy Carter, Ambassador Andrew Young and so many other leaders around the world.

Indeed, on the account of Obasanjo’s personality traits, he played very prominent roles in international affairs due to his ‘gigantic’ image. He was put on board of governors/trustees on several organizations like Transparency International (TI), co-chairman of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group on Apartheid South Africa among others. Because of Obasanjo’s towering image, there was a global outcry when General Sani Abacha, imprisoned him (Fawole, 2016). When he was released and eventually became president, there was much expectation from both domestic and international observers that he would significantly improve the image and socio-economic status of Nigeria since he did not need any or much introduction anywhere he will go in the world (Aleyomi & Abu Bakar, 2015).

5.1.1 Obasanjo’s Initiatives on Image Recovery at the International Level

In the bid to reunite Nigeria with the global community and to rebuild the country’s image in international politics, Obasanjo embarked on several reconciliatory voyages. He travelled to quite a number of countries to redefine and redeem the image of Nigeria that has been dented by the military junta. Thus, Obasanjo had the opportunity of meeting with the various world leaders. Specifically, KI2 (2016) confirmed that “it is on record that Obasanjo travelled abroad 1200 times as president between 1999 and 2007”. While corroborating KI2’s figure, Fawole (2016) and Adeola and Ogunnoiki (2015) affirm that Obasanjo was the most widely travelled president in the history of Nigeria, who in a giant stride visited international and regional institutions such as the UN, the Commonwealth, the European Union (EU), AU, ECOWAS, the Group of 8 (G-8), Group of 77 (G-77) and numerous countries.

In fact, in his intervention to some of the questions asked by the researcher, Fawole (2016) affirms that: Even before he was sworn-in as President on May 29 1999, Obasanjo undertook trips abroad particularly to France, Britain and the United States as a signal to what was to come as a very active engagement of the international community by Nigeria. After he was sworn-in, He travelled around the world remaking Nigeria image, reintegrating Nigeria into global relevance again. Obasanjo also benefited from his own previous experience. Whether people remember or not, he had created a larger than life image of himself. When Obasanjo handed over power peacefully to a democratically elected president in 1979, it boosted his image (Personal conversation with Prof. Alade Fawole on July 11, 2016).

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Indeed, there was a need for the country to be reintegrated and reach out to the rest of the world. Hence, Obasanjo presented himself as the chief marketer and image maker. He believed that one-on-one dialogue or what Obasanjo himself calls “tete-a-tete” meaning face-to-face diplomacy is desirable in his pursuit of reintegrating Nigeria into global relevance again. Considerable amount of time and resources was expended by the Obasanjo government between 1999 and 2007 to redeem the image of the country which had been battered by successive military administrations due to their opportunistic style of administration and insincerity in handling both internal and external interests of Nigeria. When commenting on his global tour, Obasanjo affirmed that: I have much time and energy journeying virtually all corners of the globe in my personal effort to positively reintegrate our country into the international community and attract investment. We are happy to report that the results from these trips have been encouraging enough to confirm my personal belief and the advice of marketing experts namely that personal contact is the best way to market your product. And my product is Nigeria (Obasanjo cited in Adeola & Ogunnaiki, 2015).

More so, apart from reintegrating the Nigeria into global reckoning, some other reasons for Obasanjo’s global tour included but not limited to: aggressive campaign for debt relief or pardon; attract foreign investors through a strengthened and diversified bilateral and multilateral relations with the global community; campaigned for assistance and deal from industrialized nations for poor nations of Africa, the Caribbean, Asia. Saliu (2005) observes that the frequent trips of the President constitute a drain to the national economy. But, how much influence a nation can muster depends on the qualitative and quantitative global visibility. Expectedly, in no distance time, Obasanjo reconciliatory voyage began to yield interest. On the international scene, there were several visits that resulted into politico- security and socio-economic boost in the country.

On April 14, 2002, the Chinese President on official visit to Nigeria made declaration towards renewing China-Nigeria bilateral relations. Subsequently, in August 2002, the then President of the US, Bill Clinton visited Nigeria on his four-day African tour. He addressed a joint session of the National Assembly. In December 2003, Nigeria got a widely recognition by hosting the Commonwealth’s Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Abuja, with Queen Elizabeth II of England in attendance. During the Chinese foreign minister’s visit in 2006, both countries signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on establishing a ‘strategic partnership’ featuring mutual political trust, economic benefits, and support in international affairs, among several other foreign leaders that visited the country.

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What is particular noteworthy in these ‘reintegration’ visits is that it opens Nigeria’s economic and socio-political landscape to rebirth among the comity of nations. However, as powerful the south-south alliance of China and Nigeria might be, the conundrum in this rendezvous is partly a reflection of reductionist and lopsided conceptions of development in Nigeria that are employed by both internal and external dynamics (Agubamah, 2014; Ayoola, 2013; Gubak & Maiwada, 2015). While Nigeria stands to gain profusely from the China’s win-win model of economic growth and manufacturing expertise, Nigeria’s government especially under Obasanjo’s administration did not carefully scrutinize the numbers of Memorandum of Understandings that emanate as a result of China-Nigeria ties to ascertain if those memorandums are to the interest of Nigerians. This negates the underlying motivation of neoclassical realism which underscores the states’ behaviour in their external relations.

Again, one cannot but reckon with the laborious foreign trips on addressing the country’s debt with International Financial Institutions. Obasanjo government realized the damaging dimension of debt crisis in the country, having burdened with an unimaginable accumulated debt, entered a protracted negotiation with the Paris Club of creditors. The huge Nigeria’s debt, of about US$27.008 billion, as at 1997 according to CBN reports (cited in Adeola & Ogunnaiki, 2015, p.437; Ajetunmobi et al, 2011, p.313), was connected with years of official corruption and personal aggrandizement of the leadership. In October 2000, the President introduced a Debt Management Office (DMO) headed by Hon. Martin Kuye, the then Minister of State for Finance, with the mandate of getting and managing the total debt the country owed the international community. It was quite embarrassing that Nigeria could not ascertain the whereabouts of its debt file.

According to KI2 (2016) in an in-depth interview: The first problem we had during Obasanjo was that it was so funny and embarrassing that our debt file got missing. We had to negotiate on the money borrowed from international community and a committee was set up chaired by Martin Kuye, the then minister for state for finance, and at the end of the day, we could not even find our debt file. We had to set up another panel going to Paris club, London club asking them how much we owe you. This is quite embarrassing and ridiculous. As a result of that, Obasanjo was incapacitated to negotiate. The position of MFA was different from that of Ministry of finance and the findings of the chairman committee on debt. Three of them had different position and figures. This is due to lack of record keeping and other administrative lapses.

In July 2005, upon the renewal of its mandate in 2003, the seemingly unending negotiations of Obasanjo’s government with the international financial institutions on debt forgiveness, 194 paid off. The Club, against all permutations, granted Nigeria a debt relief of 60% out of the total US$31 billion that was agreed upon (Adeola & Ogunnaiki, 2015). Throughout the Obasanjo’s administration, a respondent confirms that Nigeria exited from the Paris Club by paying back about US$12 billion, which represented about 40% of the total external debt of the country. According to Saliu (2007), the government was able to think highly of its efforts in this regard because “the money that will be saved from financial commitments to Paris Club can be used to attend to problems in the social sector of the economy such as infrastructures, education, health, etc (p.405). This formed part of remarkable achievements of Obasanjo’s administration.

Meanwhile, some informed commentators during focus group discussions argued that Obasanjo government should not have withdrawn the huge money it had used to pay off the Club because of its impact on the national economy. The argument is that such mobilization should have been towards addressing the irritations in the economy in view of their multiplier effect. They hold the view that proper utilization of the funds on meeting local needs would have made much impact, while the nation reschedules the debt to a certain date when the sectors would be able to assist it in paying back the debt without stress (KI2, 2015).

As informative the above position, nevertheless, the Nigerian citizens could not witness or see the much-promised investment in critical sectors of the economy arising from the savings made from debt servicing obligations to the Paris Club, because the Obasanjo government was not faithful enough in carrying out the interventions. This negatively impacted the economy and in turn rubs on the country’s external image the government ab initio wanted to protect. This notwithstanding, it must be reiterated that Obasanjo government has elevated the status of political shuttle diplomacy in the country’s foreign policy, for which motivation was the unenviable image environment into which the government was born.

More so, Nigeria also sought to defeat global isolation through active participation in international organizations and headed the Commonwealth, the African Union and remains the power house behind ECOWAS and its activities across the globe (Obi, 2008). In fact, Obasanjo utilized the UN platform to register more presence of Nigeria in the global system. The Obasanjo’s administration trips and glamourizing the external image of Nigeria also reflected on the continental region of Africa. This reveals itself in the number of conferences and meetings which the President hosted and chaired both in Nigeria and outside. Obasanjo’s administration played significant role in the transformation of Organization of

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African Unity (OAU) into a more effective African Union (AU) on May 26, 2001. The formation of the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) on October 3, 2001 and its fate is intricately tied to Nigeria’s.

The country waged war against negative image climate through extensive participation in conflict resolutions activities. Obasanjo’s administration did not waiver in Nigeria’s efforts towards conflict resolution and peace initiatives in West Africa, Africa and the World at the platforms of AU and UN respectively (Obi, 2008; Williams, 2007). To pave way for relative peace in Liberia, Nigeria volunteered to grant Charles Taylor on political asylum in the country despite Taylor’s hostility to Nigerians while he was Liberian president (Bach, 2013). This act by Obasanjo’s administration was heavily criticized by some respondents during one of the focus group discussions.

Some respondents observe that Charles Taylor, while he was the President of Liberia, was very hostile to Nigeria and Nigerians because Taylor wanted an ECOMOG without Nigeria’s leadership. Some say he was only against General Sani Abacha and not against Nigerians, since he was always interested in frustrating Nigeria’s efforts during the war in Sierra Leone. In fact, it is on record that Taylor supported the Revolutionary United front and the Jonny Koromah junta against the Kabbah-ECOWAS coalition in the unrest in Sierra Leone (Bach, 2013; ThisDay, October 3, 1998, p.10). The point they are making here is that Nigeria incurred a lot of money and shed the precious blood of Nigerians to restore peace and order in Liberia, but this effort does not seem to exist in Liberia’s book of recognition.

Probably, they are correct in their opinions. However, giving Charles Taylor asylum in Nigeria by President Obasanjo ventilates the Liberian and some other African countries, peace process towards democracy and the subsequent inauguration of the first female president in Africa, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, as the president of Liberia on January 16, 2006 (Bach, 2013; Saliu, 2007). When the government of President Fradique de Menezes of Sao Tome was toppled in a coup led by Major Fernando Pereira, Obasanjo, among other world leaders, did not only condemned the coup but also called on the coup leaders, via telephone, to restore power to the government. Major Pereira, without further hesitation, returned power to President Menezes after seizing it for a day (BBC, 2003; Yanana, 2003). This effort of institutionalizing democratic ethos in Africa, without doubt, rejuvenates positive résumés on Nigeria’s external image.

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More so, Obasanjo administration came up with a new consular policy regarding the welfare of Nigerians to guide as a framework for Nigerian Missions in dealing with ill-treatment cases of Nigerian citizens abroad. The policy instructs the Nigerian Diplomatic Missions abroad to articulate the respect for the dignity of every Nigerian in their host countries irrespective of where they reside or the circumstances of their departure from the country. According to Bankole (2014) “Nigeria’s diplomatic missions abroad emphasized to their host countries that the dignity of Nigerians must be respected; migrant workers of Nigerian origin protected and those trafficked be recognized as victims who must be assisted rather than be dehumanized” (p.60).

With this effort, Obasanjo government made some frameworks for cooperation on mutual and bilateral assistance on labour with Italy, Ireland and Spain (Bankole, 2014). The government facilitated the establishment of the Nigerians in the Diaspora Organization (NIDO) and the Nigerian National Volunteer Service (NNVS). Both NIDO and NNVS were saddled with responsibility of creating institutional frameworks not only for attracting Nigerians in the diaspora to contribute to the nation building and development efforts, but also to cater for the welfare of Nigerians abroad. Even though the media criticized the institutional framework (Nigerian Tribune, February 20, 2006), there is no denying the need for greater cooperation with the economically significant Nigerians in diaspora.

However, there was a debate among some respondents towards Obasanjo’s effort on the welfare of Nigerians outside the shores of the country. Some affirm that the impression that has been ingrained in the minds of Nigerians, especially those in diaspora was that Nigerian state did not care about the plight of its citizens abroad, while some contend this position. These positions could not be out of place. However, what borne out of it appeared that Obasanjo administration paid inadequate attention to many Nigerian nationals abroad rather concentrates much effort of recouping the Nigeria’s lost glory among the comity of nations (Alli, 2010a). This is where the government negates the underlying principle of neoclassical realism, because, the state’s behaviour towards internal and external issues determines the impact it has on it citizens which could be measured in terms of image and/or treatment (Rose, 1998).

Meanwhile, cases involving Nigerians abroad were perceived to have been left unattended (Akinterinwa, 2010; Saliu, 2007). In fact, Eze (2009) alludes that “Nigerians in difficulty abroad were almost seen as sheep without shepherds” (p.5). The average Nigerian at home was also alleged to be ignorant of how the country’s diplomacy was conducted. There

197 appeared to be no involvement of Nigerians, as the domestic environment was not seen to be conducive for such. Yet, section 14(2a) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended unambiguously makes it clear that sovereignty belongs to the people, from whom the government derives its power (1999 Nigeria’s Constitution).

5.1.2 Obasanjo’s Initiatives on Image Recovery at the Domestic Level

5.1.2(a) The Anti-Graft War and Civil Service Reforms

On the domestic scene, the Nigerian state under Obasanjo was not also inactive about the image problem. On assumption of office in May 1999, President Obasanjo did not mince words in recognising corruption as a ‘cancer’ that has eaten deep to the plummeting fabrics of the country’s positive image. He acknowledged to the fact that the cancer must be operated out of the fabrics of Nigeria’s politico-economic system within the governance of the nation. To put the instrument in proper perspective for its arduous task, Obasanjo stressed the need for proper civil service reforms in combating the cankerworms of corruption. According to him cited in Abdullah (2007): Public offices are the shopping floors of government business. Regrettably, Nigerians have too long been feeling short-changed by the quality of public service delivery by which decisions are not made without undue outside influence, and files do not move without being pushed with inducements. Our public offices have too long been showcases for the combined evils of inefficiency and corruption, whilst being impediments to effective implementation of government policies, Nigerians deserve better. And we will ensure they get what is better (p.349).

At another forum, President Olusegun Obasanjo was quoted thus:

…let me state right from the outset that I strongly believe that without an efficient, effective, dedicated, well-informed and technology-powered Civil Service, the goals of stability, growth and development could be easily compromised. Any dedicated and forward-looking Public Service must, always, identify with service delivery, innovation, transparency, accountability, and development (KI2, 2015).

During his Democracy Day Broadcast on May 29, 2005, President Olusegun Obasanjo also reaffirmed that: Corruption brings a nation and peoples no good. Rather, it kills innovation and creativity, compromises public morality, contaminates individual and collective dignity, distorts national plans, and erodes commitment to hard work and the dignity of labour (Ali, 2007, p.511)

Sequel from the above, the administration of Obasanjo believes that corruption is one of the major banes to Nigeria’s development and negative image. Hence, he frontally attacked it 198 with all sense of alacrity it deserves. In support, some respondents observe that Obasanjo made it clear that he would not condone corruption at any level and demanded the Civil Service to operate under the broad ‘zero tolerance for corruption’ philosophy of his government. Significantly, in addition to the Code of Conduct Bureau and its executioner - the tribunal - that has been in existence since 1990, he initiates Anti-Graft War bill in 2000. This bill establishes Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences (ICPC) Act of 2002.

In furtherance, the Money Laundering Prohibition Act of 2004 was initiated and established the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) as another mechanism to tackle corruption (Brown, 2016). We must quickly observe here that the rationale for the establishment of two institutions on the same problem (corruption) was not clearly identified by the administration. The overlapping of duties or otherwise and, of course, the problem associated with EFCC’s operation were major drawbacks to the fight against corruption. In a seemingly unending attack on corruption towards enhancing positive image, Obasanjo in addition to ICPC and EFCC, created some bureaucratic institutions which include the following:

The Due Process Office (DPO) to tackle various aspects of corruption; the Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit of the Presidency to enforce standards in public sector procurement in addition to the institution of a Steering Committee and Procurement Reform Implementation Unit to prepare the ground for the establishment and take-off of the Public Procurement Commission (PPC); Anti-Corruption and Transparency Units (ACTUs) in the entire 145 Nigeria’s Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and 44 public sector organisations was established to identify dysfunctional and corruptive tendencies; and the Federal and Departmental Tenders Boards, being bastions of corruption, was abolished and replaced by the time-tested and strengthened Ministerial Tenders Board (Brown, 2016).

In addition, National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) that was established by Decree 15 of 1993 and amended by Decree 19 of 1999 was equally strengthened by Obasanjo administration under NAFDAC Act Cap N1 Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004. This agency is saddled with the responsibility of regulating and controlling the manufacture, importation, exportation, distribution, advertisement, sale and use of food, drugs, cosmetics, chemicals, detergents, medical devices, and packaged water

199 in other to address and correct Nigeria’s image of being a dumping ground of fake drugs (Oviasogie & Shodipo, 2013).

With the view of a common knowledge that ignorance of the law excuses no one (Ignorantia legis neminem excusat), the Anti-Corruption Acts that established ICPC and EFCC provided for offences and penalties. For instance sections 8 to 26 of the ICPC Act, which seeks to prohibit and prescribe punishment for corrupt practices and other related offences in Nigeria, underscore the penalties for offences like: accepting gratification or gift; corrupt offers to Public Officers and corrupt demand by persons; fraudulent acquisition and receipt of property; deliberate frustration of investigation and making false statement or returns; bribery of Public Officer and using office or position for gratification; bribery in relation to auction and for rendering assistance; award of contract without budgetary provision; inter alia (Brown, 2016; KI1, 2016).

The impact of the implementation of these laws and the activities of the anti-corruption agencies like EFCC under a honest but gonzo individual, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu as the first Chairman, have witnessed many highly-placed corrupt officials, including governors, ministers, permanent secretaries, and key functionaries of the legislature and the judiciary to be investigated and made to go through the rigours of judicial trails (Oladipo, 2007; Uddoh, 2016; Brown, 2016). This sent positive signals that the era of sacred cows and unabashed compromise of ethical standards is fast vanishing from the nation’s shores. And that the fear of EFCC is the beginning of wisdom. Indeed, these cases of fight against grand corruption under Obasanjo administration captured the attention of both domestic and international audience. It has not only resulted in the ignominious exit from office of some of them, but also, some have been convicted.

For instance the former Nigeria’s Inspector-General of Police, Tafa Balogun, was convicted on an 8-count charge of money laundering and forfeiture of assests totalling US$150 million; conviction of Governor Diepreye Alamieyesegha of Bayelsa Stae on a 6-count charge of false declaration of assets and a 23-count charge by his companies of money laundering; conviction of the then Deputy National Chairman of PDP (the ruling party that produces Obasanjo as President) and Chairman, Nigerian Ports Authority, Chief Olabode George and five others on a 35-count charge of contract inflation by about one hundred million naira (N100 million); and also facilitates the conviction of James Ibori (the former Delta State Governor) by a London court on a 10-count charge of conspiracy to defraud and

200 money laundering estimated at US$250 million; among others (Unpublished Official Gazette from Ministries of Justice and Information, 2016; Uddoh, 2016).

Impressive as these achievements are, they are not without their nuances of apprehension. First, nothing could have been more humiliating for Nigeria as a nation, than the image of its governors, symbols of the country’s sovereignty and political leadership, being paraded in foreign courts on corruption-related charges. Second, some commentators raise fear (not only peculiar with Obasanjo administration but also have it fair share under Yar’Adua and Jonathan’s administrations) that the anti-corruption agencies are, or have the tendency of, being used as political weapon of mass destruction. Though, this position was vehemently refuted by some respondents. Third, the claim that there are no sacred cows is better imagined by the alleged third term bid of Obasanjo.

A full-blown meaning of corruption should find culpable anyone involved in immorality and unconstitutionality, which was reflected in the third term agenda of President Obasanjo which was allegedly initiated in late 2005. Notwithstanding, his successive transition to Yar’Adua in 2007 after expiration of his two-term in office entrenched democratization process in the political history of Nigeria. For the first time in Nigeria’s political lexicon, Obasanjo’s administration facilitated and handed power to another civilian government

5.1.2(b) Economic Initiatives and Poverty Alleviation Programmes

In 1999, the Obasanjo administration drafted an interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in response to criteria set by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to qualify the country from a debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiatives, as was to provide the basis for accessing funds and concessional lending. This policy framework did not only aim at reducing poverty but to also improve the lives of Nigerian citizens, thus, to ensure that attaining positive image is in sight of the worldview. The policy framework which according to Obiyan and Adeogun (2013) includes: …to be country driven; promote national ownership of strategies through broad-based participation of civil societies; be result oriented and focused on outcomes that will benefit the poor; comprehensive in recognising the multidimensional nature of poverty; partnership oriented i.e. involving co- coordinated participation of development partners (government, domestic stakeholders and external donors); and be based on a long-term perspective for poverty reduction (p.281).

However, some Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) faulted the government PRSPs initiative (Akujuru & Ruddock, 2016; Dada, 2013; The Observatory-Front Line, 2010).

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They believed that many of the strategic documents were hurriedly prepared just to meet the criteria of IMF and World Bank without considering or consulting various stakeholders that should be involved in the participatory process within and outside the country, and that even where stakeholders were involved, only selected few were represented and their opinions not reflected in the strategic paper. Thus, the document presents mostly the interest of the national government only and not the collective interest of the Nigerian citizens.

In a similar vein, due to dire need to fully sensitize the bureaucracy and stakeholders towards the new orientation for efficient governance of the country, at the instance of President Obasanjo, a 3-day retreat (from February 23 to 25, 2001) was organised at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), Kuru, Jos. The retreat was designed for the political office-holders (such as the Ministers, Special Advisers, Personal Assistance, inter alia) and the Permanent Secretaries to envision the development of Nigeria and how the country can be a reckoning force in the World before the middle of 21st century. The outcome of that retreat brought about the popular “Kuru Declaration” which contains commitments embodying a new national ideology of Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme (PRSP) to a well-conceived and articulated National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS).

Indeed, Nigeria’s image is pruned with the common metaphoric phrase of “poverty amid affluence”, which is the nation’s greatest challenge that Nigerians are living in poverty amidst of plenty. The Obasanjo administration in 2001 was not impassive to passionately fight the scourge of poverty in Nigeria, hence, set out to implement all the strategies and policy thrusts of NEEDS, whose targets are according to (Obiyan & Adeogun, 2013) to: “Achieve a Sustainable Poverty Reduction; Create Employment and Health; and Re- orientate Values in Citizens” (p. 282). The programmes in the strategy document, which is not the first proposal of Nigerian government to fight hunger and alleviate poverty in Nigeria, are set to be pursued over several years by the national government to promote economic growth and development with a periodic review of policies.

Upon the renewal of Obasanjo’s mandate in 2003, the scope of NEEDS was extended to the States and Local Governments. NEEDS is a nationally coordinated framework of action in close collaboration with the State and Local governments (with their State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy, SEEDS and Local Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy, LEEDS) and other stakeholders to consolidate on the achievements of the last four years (1999- 2003) and build a solid foundation for the attainment of

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Nigeria’s long-term vision of becoming the largest and strongest African economy and a key player in the world economy. Indeed, NEEDS is aimed at making the economy market- oriented, highly competitive both internally and globally particularly in the area of comparable advantage (Kanayo, 2014; Kwanashie, 2007; National Planning Commission, 2011)

Unarguably, NEEDS is distinguished from some other development approaches of previous successive government to tackle poverty issues which have become a global phenomenon. In fact, NEEDS is participatory, country-driven and relies on holistic view of the socioeconomic challenges facing Nigeria and offers a multi-pronged approach to tackling them. The programmes under NEEDS paved way for the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) which has been the most comprehensive government programme for poverty eradication most especially under Obasanjo’s administration with Nigerians having access to the basic needs of life like steady source of real income, food, education, roads, and conducive environments for productive activities (Kpakol, 2007). These basic needs were achieved through Youth Empowerment Scheme (YES); Mandatory Attachment Programme (MAP); Capacity Acquisition Programme (CAP); Intervention by Direct Credit Delivery and Private Partnership among others.

As helpful the Obasanjo’s economic initiative is, the government seems not to put the external pressure into consideration. With the collapse of Soviet Union and the emergence of a unipolar world order, the pressure to conform to a western vision of the world has been great on most developing countries like Nigeria. Standard behavioural pattern and ideas as determined by the dominant forces within the world order are expected from virtually all countries, especially from the dependent Third World countries. International organisations responsible for seeing through a global economic agenda ensures that Third World countries adopt policies that are inconsistent with this global agenda even where they might not be the best, given the peculiar circumstances of these countries (Bach, 2013). The point we are trying to make here is that, the dependent nature of Nigeria’s economy has made resistance to these laudable initiatives impossible.

The International Monetary Fund and World Bank, for instance, have over the years played critical role in ensuring that enough pressure is placed on Nigeria, and other developing countries as well, to conform to policies and practices deemed necessary for the emergence and sustenance of a world economic order. Their famous conditionality is not only familiar to Obasanjo administration but also apply to the successive governments after him. Nigeria

203 has experienced these pressures in every ramification of the country’s socio-political and economic sectors (Bach, 2013; Kanayo, 2014; Obi, 2008). This analysis implies the essence of globalization and internalization of capital which insinuates that in every economy, the external sector gains prominence over all other sectors.

Consequently, it is only the branch of political elites that is connected to the external sector that will gain considerable and sufficient level of prominence that will enable the control of the machinery of government, and when such happens, the political elites will orchestrate the mentality of the state in that direction - towards externalization of policies which is a product of globalization (Cox & Sinclair, 1999).

The international pressure for change, during Obasanjo administration, was palpable because Nigeria was just coming out of a pariah state, facing threats of international isolation on many fronts. What is noteworthy in this analysis is that in a globalized environment, external pressure would always play a role in shaping domestic policies. Hence, state’s behaviour explains political outcomes (Dueck, 2009). The reality is therefore, state cannot properly initiate policy without considering external forces. It is these developments that determine the level of success.

Equally important to note is that despite the much ado on infrastructural development and economic boost, there was insignificant level of improvement. While many federal roads were remained dilapidated, and became death traps for commuters and farmers to convey their farm produce to the markets, public electric power supply remained a daunting task for the administration to achieve. In fact, instead of reviving the country’s oil refineries to an optimal use, they became incapacitated when he left office in 2007 and their production capacity was lower than when he was elected in 1999 (Adebajo, 2008).

However, through its generous incentive regime to attract foreign investors, the administration foreign reserve was raised from US$2 billion in 1999 to US$43 billion at the end of his tenure in 2007 (Adeola & Ogunnaiki, 2015; Saliu, 2007). His dynamic leadership style whittles down economic hardship, poverty alleviation, and food security.

5.1.2(c) Internal Security and Niger-Delta Militancy

Chief Obasanjo on assumption of office in 1999 inherited Niger-Delta crisis. The conflict in the Niger Delta region, particularly the Ogoni and Ijaw who feel they are being exploited, arose in the early 1990s (Aghalino, 2009; Fentiman & Zabbey, 2015; Omotola, 2010; Ite,

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2004). Being cognizant of the festering crisis, ill-fated mood of Niger-Delta people and having requisite information that the region is very strategic to the economic survival of the country (being the region that has highest concentration of oil and gas with about 90% export earnings from oil), Obasanjo promised to offer a lasting solution to the socioeconomic difficulties of the Niger Delta region during his inaugural address in May 1999. Obasanjo in his May 29, 1999 address assured that: A bill will be forwarded within weeks of the inception of the administration to the national Assembly, for a law providing for 13% derivation in Revenue Allocation to be used for ecological, rehabilitation, infrastructural and other developments. A competent group will be set up immediately to prepare a comprehensive Development Plan for the Niger-Delta Area. Dialogue will be held at all levels with the great representatives of all sections of the oil producing communities to improve communication and better mutual understanding. The responsibility and initiative for resolving the crisis rests with the Government (cited in Ojameruaye, 2007).

True to his promise, a Bill was sent (shortly after he assumed office) to the National Assembly for the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). This bill was to replace and assuage the sordid and corruptly-moribund Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Fund Committee (OMPADEC) of decree No. 23, which was established on July 19, 1992 (Aghalino, 2009). On December 21, 2000, this Bill was passed as NDDC Act 2000. The NDDC is established to facilitate the rapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta into a region that is economically prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful (NDDC, 2006; Ngerebo-A, 2013). According to Sam Edem, the former Chairman of NDDC Board: ... NDDC has made a mark in every Local Government Area in the region, in the area of infrastructure, skills acquisition, provision of free medical services and education. On the last count, we have executed over 2300 projects in the nine states, including shore protection, sand filling, road construction, cottage hospitals and other projects. I believe the NDDC has impacted positively on the lives of our people given our very meagre resources when compared to the quantum of work we have done, you will agree with me that the NDDC has done very well (Akujuru & Ruddock, 2016:245). Even a staunch critic of NDDC, and a community leader in Delta State, Prof. Ekpebu, observes that: …when NDDC was set up, I was skeptical. A number of articles I wrote indicated that NDDC has come too little, too late, because the problems of the region have been allowed to accumulate to a point where the approach to it was not this piece-meal called interventionist something. But over the period, I realized that if you cannot manage a small amount of money, you cannot manage big one. So far, they in NDDC, have shown competence in

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managing the resources, no matter how little… NDDC has done well so far and will continue to do well (cited in Fentiman & Zabbey, 2015, p.619).

In an in-depth interview, Mr Thomas Nte, a Port Harcourt based business man in Port Harcourt in June 28, 2016, expressed his appreciation to Chief Olusegun Obasanjo for establishing NDDC. He further maintained that NDDC has achieved a lot in road construction than its predecessor OMPADEC.

Despite the above commendations from the management of the organization as well as public spirited individuals, regrettably, the Commission was starved of funding and could not quell the quest for resource control due to issues of transparency and accountability in addressing the Offshore/Onshore dichotomy (The Guardian, 19th October 2007). Ntufam Ekpo Okon explained further that inadequate funding constitutes major hindrance to effective implementation of NDDC programmes. Confirming this point, the former Chairman of NDDC Governing Board, Sam Edem on 26th August, 2007 lamented that: …even though the law says we will get three percent of all monies from the Federation Account, we don’t get that, we get arbitrary allocation of 24 billion, 27 billion from the nine states for twelve months. We are barely scratching our skin to make sure things are done (cited in Odu, 2008, p.105).

In a similar vein, the Director of Planning, Research and Statistics in the NDDC, Mrs. Okorodudu, confirmed that oil and gas companies operating in the region were not remitting their contributions to the Commission as stipulated in the NDDC Act 2000.

More worrisome, a commentator observes that, the promise made by Obasanjo administration to present a bill for 13% derivation was wrong, deceptive and misleading because the 1999 Constitution which preceding military government bequeathed to Obasanjo’s administration had already provided for a minimum 13% derivation (see Section 162(2) of the 1999 Constitution as amended). Worse still, President Obasanjo refused to implement the 13% derivation formula rather in April, 2002 he obtained a ruling from the Supreme Court in favour of the Offshore and Onshore contradiction which indicates that the oil producing states are no more entitle to revenue from offshore oil exploitation. Obasanjo’s action was seen as a high level of insincerity to his promise and the judgment further intensified the quest for resource control from the region (Ojameruaye, 2007; Aghalino, 2009; Ngerebo-A, 2013; Peel, 2005).

As a plausible conciliatory offer to the Niger Delta ethnic nationality, on April 18, 2006, Chief Obasanjo inaugurated the Council on Socioeconomic Development of Coastal States of the Niger Delta with himself as the Chairman. According to Ojameruaye (2007) Obasanjo 206 outlined a 9-point agenda for the region in an attempt to douse the tension in the region which includes: The creation of 20,000 new jobs in the Armed Forces, Police, NNPC and Teaching for indigenes of the region within three months; commencement of N230 billion for the construction of the long-abandoned East– West (Warri-Mbiama-Port Harcourt-Eket-Oron) road; commencement of the dredging of the river Niger; upgrading of the Petroleum Training Institute (PTI) Effurun, Warri to a degree-awarding institution; establishment a federal polytechnic in Bayelsa State by September; rural electrification for 396 communities; water supply for over 600 communities; and the appointment of an officer in the office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation to coordinate the various intervention programmes by all the tiers of government as well as those of oil companies and development partners.

Again, this promise turned out to be another subterfuge just for Obasanjo’s administration to have a safe ending in 2007. The point worthy of note is that under Obasanjo’s watch the Niger Delta crisis metamorphosed into a “serious-crisis” but with a low-level rebellion due to his ‘trickeries’ styles and contradictions (Akujuru & Ruddock, 2016; Peel, 2005). The insurgency in the region has reached a frightening dimension, especially during last quarter of Obasanjo’s administration, with increased level of hostage taking and attacks on oil facilities. Worse still, the increase in the price of fuel by Chief Obasanjo at the last-minute of his administration, which was not consistent with the rule of law, precipitated much hostility vis-à-vis plummeting the country’s external image.

Fundamentally, the ‘garrulous’ personality of Obasanjo, contrary to the positive opinion about his leadership style, could also be described as authoritarian in tendencies and undemocratic in decision making (Aleyomi & Abu Bakar, 2015). This noticeable syndrome was manifested when he unilaterally ceded Bakasi Peninsula to Cameroon in respect to the ICJ verdict without consulting the National Assembly (Ojameruaye, 2007; Okereke et al, 2009; Oviasogie & Shodipo, 2013). This deed, like others, was not only regarded as disrespects for structures and institutions put in place for policymaking and implementation but also impacted negatively on the protection of Nigeria’s territory, life and property which he sworn to uphold. Indeed, quite a few showdowns between the presidency and the National Assembly ensued and are well-documented during Obasanjo’s administration.

Nevertheless, the common credits of the Obasanjo administration including the reduction in foreign debt; the introduction of GSM mobile phone networks in the country; establishment of viable anti-corruption agencies; as well as the economic and political dynamics of the time are notable. More importantly, the initiatives that were brought to bear during

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Obasanjo’s administration are quite timely and all-encompassing. Other sectors like Education, Health, Labour, Banking, Capital Market, Judiciary, Gender and other related issues of national interest were vehemently touched in Obasanjo’s reform programmes for the growth and development of Nigerian nation (Saliu, Amali & Olawepo, 2007).

5.2 Alhaji Musa Yar’adua’s Doctrine on Reputation Management, 2007-2010

At the time Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’Adua took over power on May 29, 2007, Nigeria has been reunited to the global community by his predecessor, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. In fact, to a considerable extent, Nigeria’s foreign policy environment was conducive and more clement than it was before 1999 for various reasons. For instance, at the political environment level, for the first time in the annals of Nigeria’s existence, there was a transition from one civilian government to another in May 2007. Yar’Adua was relatively unknown person in Nigeria’s politics despite he was a governor of Katsina State for eight years. Worse still, his coming to power was tagged controversial and vehemently criticized at both the domestic and international levels, because the election was rigged. In effect, Yar’Adua visibly adopted easing of tension approach (détente) in building a new Nigeria (Akinterinwa, 2013c).

Unlike Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, Yar’Adua was so insular and geographically limited in world view. Notwithstanding, he was an altruistic leader who needed to ride on the crest wave of Nigeria’s relevance and popularity in the world. However, the dying days of the Obasanjo administration bequeathed many unresolved domestic and international crisis to the ‘new’ President, especially the area of democratization process, oil and gas sectors, treatment of Nigerians among other internal and external environmental challenges of Nigeria’s image (Joseph & Kew, 2008).

Undeniably, when Yar’Adua and his second-in-command (Goodluck Jonathan) took over power in 2007, there was emerging signs of pervasive doubt of confidence in Nigeria’s electoral system, especially within the civil society and the opposition parties (Adebayo & Omotola, 2007; Lafenwa, 2016; Omotola, 2011). The political/electoral image of the country was far from being free, fair and trustworthy compare with the international standard. “Over the years, Nigerian elections have offered the electorate little or no genuine choice, leading a consistent student of Nigerian politics to conclude that the history of elections in the country is one of ‘electoral fraud and competitive rigging’” (Omotola, 2011, p.188).

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Hence, it was imperative beyond debate that Nigeria needs electoral reform. Therefore, to enhance the credibility and integrity of Nigeria’s elections to meeting international standards in line with the Nigerian Constitution and the Electoral Act, some measures and reforms were introduced. To kick-start the reform process, on August 28, 2007 the Yar’Adua led government inaugurated a 23-person Electoral Reform Committee, led by the former Chief Justice Muhammed Uwais and other notable and credible Nigerians drawn from diverse interest groups, with a holistic mandate (Omotola, 2011; Yar’Adua, 2007).

Similarly, President Yar’Adua displayed firmness, commitment, sense of probity, sensitivity to the feelings of Nigerian masses and respect for their rights when he promptly engaged in a constructive dialogue with the Niger-Delta militancy groups and the striking labour unions, and reached a compromise on the fuel price, which was unconditionally increased at the last minute of Obasanjo administration (Adeola & Ogunnoiki, 2015; Egwemi, 2010; Oviasogie & Shodipo, 2013). This provided a basis for new perception on Mr. President as determined to address the problem of Nigerian citizens irrespective of where they live, and hence the manifestation of the people’s determination to actively support the Government.

President Yar’Adua’s own principles for good governance in Nigeria are noteworthy traits. He became the chief advocate of ‘zero tolerance for corruption’, the application of dialogue in the management of domestic terrorism, unconditional respect for the rule of law, electoral reforms, unflinching displayed of integrity as the first Nigerian president to publicly declared his asset and also acknowledged the shortcomings in the elections that brought him to power (which necessitated the constitution of Justice Uwais led Electoral Reforms Committee), peaceful approach to solving problems, among other evidences (Akinterinwa, 2013c; Alli, 2011; Ndagi, 2012). According to Joseph and Kew (2008), “Yar’Adua, though came to power under a cloud, has plaudits for his modest demeanor, for his frankness regarding the conduct of the 2007 elections, and for his accommodating approach (so different from Obasanjo’s autocratic style)” (p.167).

Testifying to the good and important legacy of President Yar’Adua traits, a respondent sums up Yar’Adua’s qualities this way: At a slippery point in time in Nigeria’s history and indeed the history of Africa, where decent leadership is elusive and desperation triumphs; where the people have given up on integrity and the possibility of upright anti corrupt leadership. A time where many ask, what can be better, and is it possible to deliver more for the people and less for the cabal; … Looking not too far into the past, in fact in this very Fourth Republic, … the much 209

overlooked, abbreviated regime of late President Umaru Yar’adua comes to the fore (KI1 in an in-depth interview on Tuesday, July 19, 2016).

What is noteworthy is that in the strategic initiative of Yar’Adua, his government was poised to maintain the macroeconomic stability (against dropping oil prices and decreased production as a result of Niger-Delta terror) and confidence in the Nigerian economy on the basis of the key economic reform values, political and electoral reforms upholding the Constitution, respect for rule of law, public transparency and accountability, national integrity, inter alia that would culminate into positive image management of Nigeria.

5.2.1 Yar’Adua’s Initiatives on Image Management and the Treatment of Nigerians

Nigeria’s global perception has not been totally changed from negative descriptions as scammers, criminals, narcotic merchants, and corrupt people when Yar’Adua became President. So, in the bid to consolidate on the effort of his predecessor to correct the bad image of Nigeria abroad, the Yar’Adua’s administration introduced the Rebrand Nigeria Project (RNP) initiative on March 17, 2009. The project was anchored on attitudinal change, re-orientation, revival of the country’s beautiful old cultural values and instilling a renewed spirit of patriotism and hope in all Nigerians against negative perception that ‘Brand’ Nigeria and its people. It was conceived to protest the maltreatment of Nigerians and as an instrument for attainment of the objectives of the Seven-Point Agenda of the President Yar’Adua administration (detailed below). The rationale for seeking to rebrand Nigeria and for introducing Citizen Diplomacy is quite interesting for various reasons.

First, the focus of rebranding is similar to that of Citizen Diplomacy. As opined by Akinterinwa (2013c) that “rebranding Nigeria and Citizen Diplomacy are two complimentary philosophical approaches that can compel a change in the negative perception of Nigeria” (p.759). In fact, both are conceptually designed to respond to the taints in Nigeria’s image at home and abroad. Secondly, the chief apostles of ‘Rebranding Nigeria’ – Prof. Dora Akunyili (who was then the Information and Communications Minister) and ‘Citizen Diplomacy’ - Chief Ojo Maduekwe (the then Foreign Affairs Minister) strongly believed in Nigeria’s image building. While Prof. Akunyili posits that ‘Nigeria is a country conceived in greatness’, her counterpart Chief Maduekwe wants a Nigeria of only one nation, not at all many nations (Akunyili, 2009; Maduekwe, 2009).

The point we are trying to make from the above is to put the initiative of rebranding the Nigeria’s image abroad, by the Yar’Adua administration, in proper perspective. There

210 cannot be any rebranding of Nigeria without having the citizen at the centre of it. The citizen is the object and subject of Nigeria which is considered as a brand. In whatever manner, the re-branding will be, the citizen cannot but be the architect and the technician. In effect, the citizen is the first ‘brand’ to be ‘rebranded’ and on the other hand, there is no Nigeria without Nigerian people. Consequently, rebranding Nigeria should be taken with kid-gloves as it does not only involve the ‘panel beating’ of the Nigerian but also the preservation of the Nigerianness, which must be polished considering the exigencies of a globalizing world.

While some observers and commentators jettison the rebranding mantra as suggested by Prof. Dora Akunyili, who Nigerians see as the Chief Image Maker, some believe in the mantra as one possible way out of image crisis. The former group asserts that Nigeria was before 1999 given a pariah status under the military regimes and 16 years later, it is generally believed that the country’s image, especially abroad, is not good. Many Nigerians believed it was all about advertisement because of the ‘Rebranding’ nomenclature; they simply imagined it was the same as the previous similar projects. However, some apostles of Rebrand Nigeria Project suggest otherwise. They share this perspective as a social mobilization programme for obvious reasons.

First, rebranding is a good hypothesis that is testable (Anholt, 2002; Jenes & Malota, 2013). This group of respondents maintains that it is wrong to suggest that something cannot work when it has not been put to test or experimented. Indeed, any effort made to right a wrong cannot be wrong ab initio. Secondly, they observe that the fact that there have been similar suggestions in the past (Green Revolution, Vision 2010, Development Plans, etc.) and they have not succeeded does not mean that a new suggestion will not work. Apart from the fact that the environmental conditionings of previous suggestions are quite different from the contemporary, the proponents and architects of previous suggestions are different from those of today, among other factors.

From the foregoing, the citizen cannot but be required to play an active role in any rebranding effort. This was made clearer when Akunyili (2009) noted: A country’s greatness is measured not only in terms of its resources and economic advancement, but also in terms of the patriotic spirit of its people. Above all, the image of any country, at home and abroad, especially how it is perceived, is critical to its survival as a country (cited in Akinterinwa, 2013c, p.762).

Also, Mr. Sunday Dare, Senior Special Assistant to the Minister of Information and Communications who was a member of the technical committee of the rebranding project,

211 affirms that “Nigerians have demonstrated support for this exercise through the thousands of entries received by the ministry during the call for logo and slogan submissions” (cited in Nworah, 2009, p.11). Thus, rebranding Nigeria is primarily aimed at repositioning Nigeria’s national image, rekindle the passion, and generating a new spirit of patriotism in its people, and making the country’s image positive, which has Nigeria: Good People Great Nation as its logo and slogan. Although the resulting information is interesting, yet the method is far from perfect.

Unarguably however, Akunyili’s formula at rebranding Nigeria validates Simeon Anholt’s Nation Brand Hexagon (Anholt, 2002; Jenes & Malota, 2013) and Randall Frost’s model (Frost, 2004) as a step forward in measuring Nigeria’s image and brand value. An important point worthy of note in this analysis is that, it is the actions and inactions of a country that determine its image. For instance, some worldview may not like the US arrogance or some of its policies but the entire world cannot totally do away without America because of its political, economic and security realities. Therefore, it was unanimously consented during one of the FGDs of the researcher that the failure of efforts at rebranding Nigeria is traced to value deficit and the inability of successive administrations to articulate a strategic national vision and calibrate institutional realities to match the vision.

While the image of the country is not entirely good but generally not bad, the criticism and failure of Rebrand Nigeria Project (RNP) mantra relates to the fact that Nigeria is in a situation whereby the right of the citizenry is not protected, where almost all the organs of the government are tilted against the citizen save the judiciary (not totally immune from undue compromises) which is always the last resort. Where monstrous corruption persists and the right to earn a meaningful living is not guaranteed. Where government makes little or no efforts to ensure graduates are gainfully employed. Where public wealth of the country has been privatized and resides in the hand of few (Brimah, 2014), and expatriates are afraid to invest in the country for the fear of security of lives and hostage taking.

Also, in furtherance to image making and to acquire global status, notwithstanding Nigeria’s signatory to major international human rights instruments, Yar’Adua administration put tremendous recognition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 both in conception and content to address the large scale human rights abuses in the country. He displayed this commitment while he was addressing the 44th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights held in Abuja on November 10, 2008. According to the President:

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I wish to assure you that Nigeria’s commitment to the goals of human rights protection and promotion within our borders and across the whole world remains unshaken and non-negotiable. As a Government, we have committed ourselves since assumption of office on May 29, 2007, to the absolute subservience of all Governmental authorities and persons to the Rule of Law and due process, which we believe is the highest guarantee for the protection of human rights (excerpt from President Yar’Adua’s Speech, Monday, November 10, 2008).

The founding philosophy of the above is that the welfare of the Nigerian citizens within and outside the shores of Nigeria, and the guarantee of their security and prosperity should be the primary responsibility of Government, which the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has provided a firm foundation for. To achieve this however, the government realized that societies essentially are about people and their empowerment to alter their material conditions. The rights of the people must therefore be respected if we are to expect them to contribute maximally to the crusade for Nigeria’s economic and social rebirth.

True to the foregoing of seeking visibility in international fora, Yar’Adua administration established an environment where human rights defenders operate relatively freely. Indeed, most of the human rights defenders (especially Non-Governmental Organizations) interviewed acknowledged that, generally, Nigerian citizens became outspoken and criticized some ‘obnoxious’ government policies. They affirm that human rights are present in the public debate in the current Nigeria’s Forth Republic, especially during President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua administration. Lending credence to the foregoing, The Observatory-Front Line (2010) claims that: In 1999 Nigeria was ranked the most corrupt nation by Transparency International. According to the 2008 Corruption Perception Index it now ranks 121st out of 180 countries. The widespread corruption in Nigeria is central to the violation of socio-economic rights, with emerging facts proving that over 80% of the annual budgets of the three tiers of Governments in Nigeria (Federal, State and Local) went into private pockets (p.6).

At the international level, Nigeria ratified several human rights instruments including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its Optional Protocol on individual communications; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and its Optional Protocol; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). It is party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 213

Rights, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, and the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa.

Interestingly, Nigeria is the only country in Africa that has domesticated the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. Sequel to this, on June 19, 2008, a Nigerian, Ambassador Martin Ihoeghian Uhomoibhi, was elected the President of the Human Right Council of the UN. While in office, until June 2009, he reiterated further the Nigeria’s commitment to human rights, and observed thus: Failure to advance the aims and objectives of the Human Rights Council collectively by all nations, all peoples and all institutions will be a colossal failure of humanity to protect its own dignity and rights under the rule of law and agreed norms and practices (cited in The Observatory-Front Line, 2010, p. 8).

Furthermore, in line with the commitment of Yar’Adua administration to rid the vestiges of human rights abuse and to put in place an enduring mechanism for the protection of Nigerians in distress abroad, the minister of Foreign Affairs, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, empanelled a committee to organize a two-day seminar on irregular migration in April 2009, which was held at the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja. As expected, it was a welcome development most especially for Nigerians that were humiliated abroad and witnessing untold hardship.

Again, the administration established a Committee on Maltreatment of Nigerians Abroad. This committee was setup to address the widespread reported attack and ill-treatment of Nigerians in different countries, especially when there are legitimate complaints by Nigerians. Yar’Adua seized the seriousness of the problem following the reported humiliation of Nigerians by the British Airways on London-Lagos flights (Akinterinwa, 2010); the xenophobic attacks on foreigners, and particularly Nigerians in South Africa (Bach, 2007); among other maltreatments. A respondent confirms that the stabbing to death of a professional Nigerian in Ukraine indeed, broke the camel’s back on the patience of the Nigeria and the Federal Government.

The committee was given a four-point mandate thus:

1. To identify the cases and causes of ill-treatment of Nigerians abroad; 2. To assess the nature of the ill-treatment and its dynamics; 3. To identify the perpetrators, especially within the context of the role(s) of Nigerians in Diaspora if any, the host security agencies and host hoodlums; and

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4. To suggest solutions to the problem in terms of responsibilities of the Federal Government, Nigerian Mission abroad, and Nigerians themselves (Akinterinwa, 2010, p.101).

After several meetings to consider the nature of ill-treatment as distinct from legal sanctions for offences and crimes committed by Nigerians abroad, it was considered as a matter of concern the way and manner Nigerians have been handled or treated in the enforcement of law and order in the host countries irrespective of the offences or crimes Nigerians might have committed. This becomes incongruent with the stance of Yar’Adua administration towards human right abuses. Consequently, the committee was of the view that ill-treatment of Nigerians constituted any act of treatment that is contrary to the universal standard practice.

Specifically, a nexus between ill-treatment of Nigerians abroad and ‘Citizen Diplomacy’ was identified. The wellbeing of the citizen, his protection and defence, as well as survival is the crux of Citizen Diplomacy. Consequently, it is left undecided how does Citizen Diplomacy addresses the problem of ill-treatment of Nigerians at home and abroad, without threatening the sovereignty of countries where Nigerians are allegedly mistreated?

5.2.2 Yar’Adua’s Initiatives on Image Management at the Domestic Environment

Upon assumption of office, Umaru Yar’Adua, aimed at addressing politico-security and socioeconomic issues bordering on the Nigerians and the country’s image at the domestic level and its effects in the world, announced his administration’s Seven-Point Agenda initiative. This seven-point agenda, which includes the following, was declared by Yar’Adua administration to meeting the Millennium (now Sustainable) Development Goals (MDGs) and also to herald the requisite development embedded in the domestic priorities to attain the envisioned 20:2020 which are global initiative.

1. Education: This initiative is to achieve a strategic educational development plan with minimum acceptable international standards of education for all, and to ensure excellence in both the teaching and learning of skills in science and technology by students who will be seen as the future innovators and industrialists of Nigeria. It should be noted, however, that the administration achieved little in this sector.

2. Power and Energy: This would involve giving adequate attention to power supply to facilitate industrialization so as to ensure Nigeria’s ability to develop as a modern economy

215 by the year 2015. Unfortunately, the priority of Yar’Adua administration never emphasized on how much energy Nigeria really needs to facilitate industrialization.

3. Niger Delta and National Security: At the domestic level, Nigeria has confronted desperate security challenges, particularly, the Niger Delta militancy and religious extremism. By this initiative, the government would overhaul the unfriendly security climate especially at the Niger Delta (the oil producing region) which hinders both external and internal investment into the nation.

4. Transportation Sector: With the goal of a modernized and industrialized Nigeria’s economy, the government plan to reform and develop other critical infrastructural sectors like Rail, Road, Air and Water transportation to facilitate movement of persons, goods and services was also empaneled.

5. Land Reforms: This reform is focused to optimize Nigeria’s growth through the review of land tenure system and home ownership laws for commercialized farming and other large scale business by the private sector to facilitate proper use of the Nation’s land assets for socio-economic development; and citizens’ access to mortgage facilities. This led to the evolution of the current National Policy on Urban Development and Housing that provides for a private sector-led housing policy with the government providing the enabling operating environment.

6. Food Security: Through this vision, the administration has declared interest in enhancing agricultural and water resources to ensure adequate food supply for local consumption and export. To achieve this, Yar’Adua government embarked on a comprehensive National Food Sector Plan (NFSP), which seeks to collaborate with all significant stakeholders in the Food Sector.

7. Wealth Creation: This aspect focuses on diversification of the country’s economy, revenue base, and increased production in the agricultural and solid mineral sector to provide jobs. Unfortunately, this agenda became a mere wishful-thinking because most factories that were supposed to employ people folded up due to lack of power and the high cost of running generators (Sources: Adeola & Ogunnoiki, 2015, p.439; Dode, 2010, p.4; Ola, 2009; Ubi & Akinkuotu, 2014, p.426; Official Gazette from the Federal Ministries of Information and Communication).

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Hence, the following are the major initiatives of Yar’Adua administration in line with the parameters (socioeconomic and politico-security) of the study towards promoting national development and enhancing the country’s image building.

5.2.2(a) National Security and Niger-Delta Amnesty

To fulfill the vision and mission of the Niger Delta Development Commission, Yar’Adua government upon assumption of office in 2007 included Niger-Delta region as one of the policy initiatives. The Niger-Delta Master Plan which was abandoned during the previous regime was revisited and found to be a good ingredient for proper and long term development of the region. Speaking at a meeting with the Governors of the region and the Board Members of NDDC on 28th September, 2007 in Abuja, late Yar’adua said, “we believe that if the Master Plan is implemented, it will completely transform the region and will remove all issues that brought about contentions and agitations” (cited in Amaraegbu, 2011, p.210). However, in line with its mission, the Commission embarked on massive development of both human and infrastructure in the region during Yar’Adua’s administration (Akujuru & Ruddock, 2016).

Niger-Delta is central to the economic development of Nigeria. Therefore, it was no mistake for President Yar’adua in including the area in his Seven-Point Agenda. The Nigerian State has historically leveraged on the use of military force as a preferred strategy for managing security issues, particularly, the militant campaign that was personified by the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) and a retinue of poorly organised and ill- defined militia groups, that challenged, or had the potential of challenging the legitimacy and authority of the State and its means of economic sustenance. Yet, the perennial military campaigns in the oil-producing region over the decades, hopelessly failed until Yar’Adua government resorted to political and legal approaches, by (invoking Section 175 of Nigeria’s Constitution) granting amnesty and unconditional pardon to the militants on Thursday June 25, 2009 (Egwemi, 2010; Sampson, 2014).

The government implements a Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration and Rehabilitation (DDRR) programme in the region. This programme primarily consisted of a declaration of Amnesty for all Niger Delta Militants was in exchange to surrender of their arms and ammunitions within a 60-day period (from August 6th – October 4th 2009). The declaration promised that all militants that complied with this policy would not be prosecuted for the crimes committed during the agitation that was capable of crippling

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Nigeria’s oil industry. The government promised trainings on various vocational skills both at home and abroad and also to secure gainful employments for them on completion of the trainings and become reintegrated into the society, coupled with payment of a monthly stipend of N65,000 to each ex-militant (Davidheiser & Nyiayaana, 2011; Dode, 2010; Editorial Comment National Mirror, Friday, June 17, 2011).

By official account, about 15,260 militants surrendered their arms at the various disarmament centres and on the whole, a total of 26,760 guns of different types, 287,445 rounds of ammunitions, 18 gun-boats and 1090 dynamite caps were surrendered (Daily Champion, October 27, 2009). Table 6 below represents the names of some militants and date of accepting amnesty programme as well as estimated arms and ammunitions surrendered to Federal Government.

Table 6: Synopsis of Key Militants that accepted the Presidential Amnesty in 2009 S/No Names Date of Acceptance Estimated Arms and Ammunitions Surrendered 1. Solomon June 26, 2009 Gave up 11 arms and 1,000 ammunitions Ndigbara 2. Henry Okah July 13, 2009 Though the supposed leader of MEND, Okah, who was standing trial for treasonably felony did not surrender any arm because he had been arrested in Angola and extradited to Nigeria in February 2008. Due to the Amnesty programme, his 62 count charges were dropped and was released 3. Victor Ben August 7, 2009 Surrendered an assortment of arms totaling 520, Ebikabowei and ammunitions valued at 95,970 round and 16 31other militants gunboats 4. Soboma George August 13, 2009 Surrendered 36 assorted weapons and his outlaw’s cult group 5. Kile Selky September 5, 2009 Gave up an assortment of arms totaling 100 Torughedi weapons, ammunition worth 100,000 rounds and 3 gunboats. 6. Ateke Tom of October 1, 2009 Exact number is unknown but it included; anti- NDV aircraft launchers, GPMG, AK47 rifles, Mark 4 rifles, piston and loads of ammunition. 7. Fara Dagogo of October 2, 2009 Exact number is unknown but it also included: NDSF anti-craft launchers, GPMG, AK-$7, Mark 4 rifles, pistons and loads ammunition 8. Mafimisebi October 3, 2009 Surrendered different weapons, such as; sub- Othello and the machines guns, AK-47 rifles, hundreds of live Gwama Boys of ammunition arrows. Illaje. 9. Biibo Ajube, October 3, 2009 Surrendered several Ak-47 rifles, heaps of second in ammunition, hand grenades, rockets launchers and command to explosives. Tompolo 10. Government October 3, 2009 Surrendered over 117 assorted weapon, 20 bullet Ekpemupolo proof jackets, numerous boxes of ammunition 26 (aka Tompolo), 218

one of the camouflage uniform, loads of dynamites, tear gases Ringleaders of on 4th October 2009; the last day of the amnesty MEND Source: Compiled by the Researcher with reference from Akujuru & Ruddock (2016) and Gilbert (2010, p.62).

Indeed, this was a success story during Yar’Adua administration (Davidheiser & Nyiayaana, 2011). ECOWAS Commission wrote and congratulated the Nigerian government for its magnanimity and also thanked the militants for their courage to lay down their arms (Vanguard, 12 October 2009). Reacting to this, the then Nigerian Minister for Information and Communications, Dora Akunyili, maintained that “the success of the offer represents a major breakthrough in government efforts to bring peace and development to the region” (The Guardian, 28 October 2009, p.28).

5.2.2(b) Anti-Graft War

Another significant hallmark of Yar’Adua government inescapable in the analysis is how he handled the issue of corruption and privatization agenda of his predecessor. It would be recalled that during the dying days of Obasanjo led government, some observers opined that he handed chunks of Nigeria assets to some cabals and private cronies (who were Obasanjo’s friends) in privatization frenzy, allegedly ‘skewed’ use of the EFCC against his political enemies, and government nontransparent disbursement of funds allocated for repairing power plants among other notable corrupt practices (Brimah, 2014; Brown, 2016; Joseph & Kew, 2008). Specifically, Joseph and Kew (2008) opined that “the Obasanjo legacy is a paradoxical one of both far-reaching reforms and anti-reformist actions” (p.169).

Consequent upon the above, barely two months into office in July 2007, Yar’Adua did not only summon the Bureau for Public Enterprise (BPE) to query the sale of Nigeria’s refineries and some other assets but also overturned these privatizations for being corrupt. More so, on June 15, 2009, President Yar’Adua gave a clear executive directive that Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) should stop subsidy claim on kerosene subsidy scam, through which huge amount of money that are supposed to be used for the welfare of Nigerian masses are being stolen (siphoned) by some selected few. According to the then Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) governor, Lamido Sanusi: The government spent/spends millions of dollars every day, subsidizing kerosene that was/is sold to the masses at unsubsidized prices in an elaborate, cheap scam. In this scheme Yar’Adua met on the ground, and that is by all means one of the most gigantic fraud scams in recent world history, the government states that it imports 10 million liters of kerosene every day at the cost of N156/liter. It then claims to subsidize this to N40.9/liter to be sold 219

at N50/liter to the masses. The NNPC now sells the kerosene to a handful of cabal portfolio marketers at the N40.9/liter and allows them sell it at N150+/liter to the masses, an unsubsidized price, raking in a whooping N100 on the liter for 10 million liters a day and billions of dollars a year (cited in Brimah, 2014)

Indeed, according to Joseph and Kew (2008), “Nigeria needs more than the false peace of corrupt patronage politics, which has enabled it to survive as a nation-state but has impoverished its people” (p.171). So, in another instance of Yar’Adua’s stunning and committed actions in total war against corruption, he further gave executive orders to the EFCC to go after anyone alleged to be corrupt to rid the vestiges of corruption in the entire system and Nigeria polity. However, as commendable, the foregoing will suggest, chronic allergic disorder and intermittent kidney failure which eventually took his life on Wednesday May 5, 2010, stalled the ‘plant’ of Yar’Adua’s anti-graft initiative to yield ‘sweet fruits’. More so, State hostility towards public criticism of Government policies in certain sensitive areas is a noticeable element during the Yar’Adua led government (Lafenwa, 2016; The Observatory - Front Line, 2010, p.22).

5.2.2(c) Establishment of National Human Right Commission

In furtherance of the World Programme for Human Rights Education, at the domestic level, the Alhaji Umaru Yar’Adua led government deposited the establishment of National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and Nigeria’s commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights in Geneva in 2009, to fight any form of human right violations in conformity with the international standard. The National Human Rights Commission was established to create an environment for the extrajudicial recognition, promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights.

However, the government effort on upholding human rights, though well appreciated, was not enough for when Chapters two and four (Article 33-46) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria’s are not recognized or when citizens’ rights remain a privilege (Dada, 2013). This altruistic but unassertive stride further cast aspersion on the image and integrity of Nigeria within the international community.

Worse still, the administration directed that a special desk for Citizen Diplomacy be created in all Nigerian Police Stations, Diplomatic Missions abroad and Coordinating Desk at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to document and report any complaint of mistreatment of Nigerians at home and abroad (Dada, 2013; The Observatory-Front Line, 2010). No doubt

220 this inventiveness further abuses the Act that establishes National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). While such initiative may be a welcome idea in all Nigeria’s Diplomatic Missions abroad, creating a desk in all Police stations other than the use of NHRC to monitor human rights violation is not only a duplication of function but renders NHRC redundant. This effort could have been a laudable one if the special desk is created as a delegated function (to other agencies) by NHRC.

Besides, the doggedness of Yar’Adua on anti-human rights violation came under huge interrogation and attack. The human rights organizations, both within and outside Nigeria, widely condemned the passage of the bill that prohibits ‘Same Gender Marriage’ in Nigeria. In a letter sent to President Yar’Adua in 2009 (which the Principal Officials of the Nigeria’s National Assembly were duly copied), the Africa Director of Human Right Watch, Georgette Gagnon, argued that such law negates the basic freedoms of expression, association, and assembly and has criminalized any advocacy on behalf of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) people by human rights organizations and defenders (Gagnon, 2009).

While wearing the mask of a more limited purpose, truly the bill perpetuates the same potential for serious human rights abuses. However, the socio-cultural affinities and widespread religious antagonisms towards the LGBT proposal, notwithstanding the secularism of Nigeria, justify the passage of the bill. In fact, majority of Nigerians and commentators justified the passage of the bill by liking LGBT as ‘sodomy’, which some existing laws in Nigeria like Article 214 of the Nigerian Criminal Code Act, 1962 already provides up to 14 years of imprisonment for. So, rejecting same gender marriage in Nigeria is in consonance with the criminal code, which is a Victorian-era provision that remained after the end of British colonial rule.

5.2.2(d) National Economic Development and Nigeria Vision 20:2020

Nigeria’s image building, in the form of national economic development plan, has been part of the country’s political lexicon from time immemorial. Nigeria Vision 20:2020 (NV20:2020) is one of these developmental plans, which Yar’Adua administration adopted as a cardinal objective in achieving its economic blue-print. Efforts at enhancing economic development in order to maintain good image amidst the global community, became a concerted attention of Yar’Adua administration through his government’s pursuit of NV20:2020. The vision is a dream statement that Nigeria will become one of the first 20

221 economies in the world by the year 2020. The vision captures the road map and blue print to achieving national economic development and an innovative strategy of rebranding Nigeria’s image.

The dream statement presupposes that by year 2020, Nigeria will be one of the first 20 United Nations, with a confident Nigerian society, infused by strong moral and ethical values, living in a society that is democratic, liberal and tolerant, caring, economically just and equitable, progressive and prosperous, and in full possession of an economy that is competitive, dynamic, robust and resilient (Ayodele, Obafemi & Ebong, 2013; Eneh, 2011; Nigeria Vision 20:2020, 2009). NV20:2020 encapsulates the key principles and thrusts of the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) and the Seven Point Agenda of the Yar’Adua administration. The imperatives for Nigeria’s Economic Transformation is among other things the burning platform for change, domestic constraints to growth and development, and the challenge of growth in the emerging global landscape (Nigeria Vision 20:2020, 2009).

Indeed, the NV20:2020 document, which was submitted to the Federal Executive Council on October 14, 2009 by a Steering Committee inaugurated by President Yar’Adua in April, 2008, offers an overview of Nigeria’s foreign policy indicating its response to the changing dynamics of the global system. It was embraced as a form of improving and diversifying the economy of the country. Though, Nigeria articulated this vision during the dying days of Obasanjo administration, but was vigorously pursued by Yar’Adua administration, in collaboration with National Planning Commission in Nigeria. President Yar’Adua intensified on this vision and set up National Council on Vision 2020 on assumption of office in May, 2007. But he was humbled by a protracted health challenge which eventually claimed his life on May 5, 2010. Thereby, Yar’Adua led government could not achieve much regarding his much articulated NV20:2020.

5.3 Dr. Goodluck Jonathan’s Transformation Agenda, 2010-2015

The “sudden” death of President Umaru Yar’Adua midway through his tenure on May 5, 2010, paved the way for Dr. Goodluck Jonathan who was the Vice President to assume the Nigeria’s choicest political office to complete Yar’Adua’s tenure. Jonathan was relatively known in the domestic and international politics. He was a deputy governor, and governor of Bayelsa state between 1999 and 2007. He was the running mate to Umaru Yar’Adua in 2007 election and became ‘Acting’ President in a heated constitutional controversy along

222 ethno-political divides in 2009 upon Yar’Adua ill-health (Akinterinwa, 2013b; Nwankwo, 2013; Omotola, 2011). He was sworn-in as President on May 6, 2010 (in compliance with section 136(1) of the 1999 Nigeria’s Constitution) after Yar’Adua had passed away on May 5, 2010. Upon his election in 2011 after the expiration of Yar’Adua’s mandate, he was sworn in as an elected President on May 29, 2011.

In a bid to ensure that all Nigerians walk shoulder-high among the comity of nations, Dr. Jonathan inaugurated an Inter-Ministerial Committee on February 17, 2011 to produce what he termed “Transformation Agenda, 2011-2015” (National Planning Commission, 2011). The transformation project required the full participation of the citizens, particularly the youths who constituted a large proportion of the country’s human capital, and hence, focuses on three key areas which include strong, inclusive and non-inflationary growth; employment generation and poverty alleviation; and value re-orientation of the citizenry. According to Ayoade (2013), the intention of Jonathan’s transformation agenda is “similar to Lee Kuan Yew’s Transformation Agenda for Singapore, which is to make Nigeria from poverty to plenty” (p.7). What is particular important about Jonathan’s initiative is that, the transformation agenda which symbolizes image building, draws its inspiration from the NV 20:2020.

However, President Jonathan’s policy style was a combination of deliberate silence and peremptory action. Indeed, Akinterinwa (2013b) opines that Jonathan’s foreign policy assertion was “soul searching in focus, rich in events, controversial in direction but, so far, self-reassuring in outcome” (p.258). In the words of the Indian preeminent leader, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, we must become the change we want to see. Transformation cannot be imposed from above. It can only be generated by exemplary leadership which not only elicits emulation but inspires the conviction that the proposed path of change is the right road (Wong, 2012).

Similarly, testing Jonathan’s leadership quality in line with the words of Gandhi, on January 1, 2012, fuel subsidy was removed, raising the price of Premium Motor Spirit (PMS) to N145 from N65 per litre. The result was widespread protest, the type of which had not been since the killings of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the annulment of June 12 1993 presidential elections. The protests forced a partial reinstatement of subsidy leaving the price of fuel at N97 per litre. The policy reversal showed the entire world inadequate preparation and ill- research on the part of the administration. Such policy reversal is prone to do significant

223 damage to a government that should have test-run or simulated before implementation, irrespective of any caveat.

Dr. Jonathan’s level of unpreparedness for good governance, economic development and image building was brought to fore during his pre-inaugural lecture on May 26, 2011, where he complained that a 4-year term is too short to realize the dream of transforming Nigeria. This is however, comical. Analysts condemned this opinion as lack of political will and readiness on the part of the yet to be sworn-in President to deliver on his campaign promises (Channels Television, 2013; Gyong, 2012; Premium Times, November 5, 2014). Consequent upon this, the international community perceived Nigeria as unserious in the business of development and the effect replete Jonathan’s administration (Otobo & Obaze, 2015; Usman, 2016).

Throughout his tenure especially with the kidnapping of 276 Chibok schoolgirls by the Boko Haram terrorist, Nigeria’s relationship with the international community was faltered (Schmitt, 2014). The failure of countries like the US, France, UK and some African countries to genuinely assist Nigeria in fighting the scourge of Boko Haram terrorism, and some other international ridicule on the government officials and Nigerians who traveled abroad during his tenure are also testaments (Akujuru & Ruddock, 2016; Ayoade, 2013; Usman, 2016). The culminating effect has been growth and development of the Nigerian economy without a concomitant improvement in the overall welfare of Nigerian citizens.

5.3.1 Jonathan’s Initiatives on Image Building

5.3.1(a) Electoral Reform and Democratic Consolidation

On assumption of office in 2011, Dr. Jonathan reconstituted the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), which is the body saddled with the responsibility of electoral management in Nigeria. The appointment of Attahiru Jega as the Chairman of INEC, who is believed by every length and breadth of Nigeria’s academia, CSOs and political circle of having astute integrity with dint of handwork and honesty, was seen as a pointer to Jonathan’s steadfastness to reforming the political and electoral system that has been hitherto described as a sham.

True to the virtuous perception of the ‘new’ INEC Chairman, Jega introduced some significant innovation in the country’s electoral system. This includes among other things: the introduction of Card Reader-CR (an electronic machine for voters’ accreditation) and

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Permanent Voter’s Card-PVC (Omilusi, 2016; Omotola & Nyuykonge, 2015). The reform allows for all citizens to assert their position as the real employers of those in powers, and on whose behalf and benefits power should only be exercised. Omotola (2011) sums up the import of electoral reforms thus: “Generally, the reforms have been targeted at instituting a strong election management body with substantial administrative and financial autonomy and at promoting a democratic political culture within parties and the populace” (p.187).

Indeed, the electoral reform was geared towards the attainment of institutional and administrative autonomy for the INEC. The institutional designs may be indispensable for effective electoral governance but institutional reengineering without corresponding attitudinal and behavioural reform is not sufficient. This was evidence during the preliminaries towards the 2015 elections which were very controversial and presumptively the most divisive, drawn Nigerians into a devious web of mudslinging and ethno-religious chauvinism among politicians and ordinary Nigerian (Omotola & Nyuykonge, 2015).

However, despite considerable criticism at every stage of the reform process, the aftermath of the election by the INEC turned out to be largely successful with appreciable results. Truly, a review of some ‘local’ elections conducted before the general election reflects, a positive impact on the overall administration of the elections with few notable reservations (Udumebraye, 2014). The 2015 general election in Nigeria was unique for engendering alternation of power. For the first time in the history of Nigeria, an incumbent president was not only defeated but also accepted defeat even before the election results were officially announced. What a record of national and international ecstasy and democratic plus courtesy Jonathan electoral reforms initiative.

What is particularly noteworthy is that, the Jonathan electoral reforms initiative made the 2015 general elections not only historic, but was fought-and-won by Nigerian citizens. The lesson of who truly wields power and whose interests should really matter in a democracy was clearly affirmed. Some commentators affirm that this unprecedented feat has been globally eulogized as possibly indicative of the final arrival of democracy in the country (Otobo & Obaze, 2015; Owen & Usman, 2015).

The democratization effort of President Jonathan was also seen at the continental stage. Nigeria’s support for the promotion and consolidation of democracy, good governance and human rights in Africa is not in doubt. Nigeria, under the leadership of Jonathan made strenuous efforts to lead democratic electoral processes in Cote d’Iviore, Ghana, Guinea

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Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Republic of Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and other African countries (Akinterinwa, 2013b). Nigeria prevented a bloodbath as an aftermath to the election of Ivorian President, Alassane Quattara in 2011. In line with the AU and ECOWAS zero tolerance policy for unconstitutional change of government in Africa, Nigeria condemned the undemocratic change of government in Guinea Bissau, Libya and Mali, and ensure peaceful resolution of the crisis. All these interventions give further approval to Nigeria’s leadership in Africa (Akinterinwa, 2013b; Ota & Ecoma, 2015; Ward, 2014).

5.3.1(b) Diasporas Involvement/Protection and Foreign Direct Investment

At the international scene, the recognition of the Nigerians in Diaspora as a foreign policy resource and as important stakeholders in the Nigerian project, constituting the human capital necessary for Nigeria’s development, sets in review motion of the Jonathan’s foreign policy to be foreign direct investment oriented (Tell Special Edition, June, 2012, p.9; The Punch, Tuesday July 26, 2011, p.33). Speaking at a dinner organized in his honour by the Corporate Council on Africa in September 2012, President Jonathan affirmed his administration’s commitment to promoting the development of a knowledge-economy that will enhance the security of lives and property, thereby accelerating growth to provide more employment and reduce youth restiveness (Akinterinwa, 2013b; Usman, 2012).

Sequel from the above, Jonathan’s affirmative action shown the government commitment to citizen centred focus of Nigeria’s policymaking thrust. One other commentator sums up Jonathan’s move to protecting Nigeria’s image and defending its citizens both at home and abroad this way: His prompt response to the denigrating deportation of Nigerians by South Africa quid pro quo sent a very strong signal that Nigeria “has come of age” and that any attempt to denigrate her will have consequences. His diplomacy of consequence is one with visible actions. The diplomatic way he was able to manage the said Nigeria-South Africa face-off was highly welcomed by Nigerians. He was also quick to order the evacuation of Nigerians trapped in the crisis torn countries like Libya in 2011 and Egypt in January 2012. In fact Nigeria was the first to airlift her citizens from Egypt (Nwankwo, 2013, p.216).

Furthermore, in 2011 the principle of reciprocity embedded in Citizen Diplomacy, was emphasized by President Jonathan initiatives on the economy. In a bid to encourage and promote the country’s inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), the government reviewed and renegotiated (brokered new) bilateral agreements with several countries in the areas of trade, technological cooperation, ICT, education, culture/tourism etcetera (Akinterinwa,

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2013b; Kia, Nwigbo & Ojie, 2016; Nwankwo, 2013). Indeed, once there is a political will there will always be a political way to establish and actualize a recognized and an accepted idea. In 2012 alone according to the UN World Investment report, Nigerians living abroad sent home over US$8.9bn as a remittance. That was the largest FDI in the history of Africa. In fact, Nigeria becoming Africa’s largest economy in 2014 is a pointer to the fact that Diaspora is indeed an integral part of the economy.

The economy improvement coupled with leadership role in both regional and global arena won Nigeria recognition by the international community. The country was elected to key positions in world bodies. Suffice it to mention its election to hold the presidency of the group of eight developing countries (D8); the Executive Board of UNESCO in November 2011; the Governing Board of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP); and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (Alao, 2011; Nwankwo, 2013). Some observers confirm that a number of Nigerians were elected into key positions in international organizations. This facilitates the doggedness of Nigeria and its citizens to make impact in global affairs.

However, as impactful as Jonathan’s policies may be, they were not free from some deficiencies. Despite the growing influence of non-governmental organizations in Nigeria’s economy (International Monetary Fund, 2012), the NGOs were not accorded any appreciable role in the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy strategy. Besides, there was low participation of Nigeria in World Trade Organization of which Nigeria is signatory to, hence, hindered the country from influencing the process of international economic policymaking. More so, there was no genuine commitment on the part of the government to rapid infrastructural development and diversification of the economy towards industrialization, despite its importance to the enhancement of the country’s domestic productive capacity (Akinterinwa, 2013b).

According to a report released by Global Investment Trends Monitor of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the FDI inflows to Nigeria declined to US$3.4bn at the end of Jonathan administration in 2015, due to the fragility of the global economy and weak domestic commitment in strategic policy like in the field of science and technology which is the main source of innovations (Akinterinwa, 2013b; Alade, 2016). Besides, Jonathan administration was ‘plagued’ with the act of terrorism arising from the Boko Haram insurgents, which negatively reflects on the domestic economic growth, via its several attacks on religious houses, public buildings including the Police and the UN

227 headquarters in Abuja, among other dastardly activities (MacLean, 2015; Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012; Ubi & Akinkuotu, 2014).

5.3.1(c) Amnesty Programme and War Against Boko Haram Insurrections

On security matters, the Jonathan administration also continued with the Amnesty programme that was instituted by his erstwhile boss, Yar’Adua. On one hand, while the Amnesty programme recorded enormous success including notable ‘militant generals’ surrendering themselves to the amnesty programme, there was a relatively decorum of threats to oil exploration and intensified insecurity was witnessed in the region. On the other hand, some observers have opined that the other recommendations of the Niger Delta technical committee were sacrificed on the altar of the amnesty programme particularly during Jonathan administration. A situation they consider as purchasing peace with the added threat that armed insurgency would resume if the payments dried up (Onukwugha, Eke-Ogiugo & Okhomina, 2014).

Since the declaration of the Amnesty programme, an estimated two hundred and thirty-four billion naira (N234billion) has been reportedly spent on the programme between 2009 and 2014 as stated by the Special Adviser to the President Jonathan on Niger Delta, Hon Kingsley Kuku (Daniel, 2014). Allegations of lack of transparency and corruption in the process have been made by analysts who argue that militants of lower cadres were short changed (Dikibo, 2013). Although Jonathan administration justified (as expedient) the pay offs made to former militant generals in the form of multi-billion-dollar security contracts to guard the oil pipelines that they once destroyed. This has instigated perceptions that the Amnesty programme may have succeeded in enriching a powerful class of ex-militant generals that are primary beneficiaries of a war economy; and that violence is the only way to echo one’s disapproval and marginalization.

In a press release directed to President Jonathan in November 2013, the Leader of the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, vociferously declared that the Amnesty Programme was a fraud and accused the Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta & Chairman of the Presidential Amnesty Programme, Mr. Kingsley Kuku of incompetent and corrupt. According to him: Some of the new PDP legislators who today seek to undermine you are even beneficiaries of the Kingsley Kuku Amnesty largesse. This should not be so. Mr. President, there is enough evidence to show that your Special Adviser on Niger Delta engineered the agitation by a group of Niger Delta youths to campaign for a Third Phase of the Amnesty Programme even when it is clear 228

and beyond any doubts that these young men have never belonged to any militant camp in the Niger Delta (Dikibo, 2013).

What the above suggests is that, the government who on one hand preaching peace in the Niger-Delta region (and by extension national security) by voting huge amount of money for amnesty programme is on the other hand, siphoning the funds for selfish political scheming and personal economic enrichment of some cabals in the government.

Indeed, this is consistent with a metaphoric parlance of a case of ‘robbing Peter to pay Paul’, which by no means quelling the internal intrigues and security challenges. In the light of this, analysts have argued that the influence of these cabals has grown given the resources they now control, wielding enough political power to influence political appointments of officials (Aleyomi, 2012; Odunlami, 2012; Otobo & Obaze, 2015; Owen & Usman, 2015; Usman, 2016). Undeniably, some commentators during interviews also confirmed this as one of the factors that worked against the reelection bid of Goodluck Jonathan in 2015 presidential elections, hence, led some militants to go back to the creeks to resume their illegal activities of hostage taking, pipeline vandalism, shutting down of oil platforms and flow stations resulting in reduction of oil production.

While there was a brief cessation of violence in the Niger-Delta region and increase in oil production and economic ‘boom’ because of the recorded success of amnesty programme, Boko Haram however sprang, disturbed the national peace with destruction of lives and property in the Northern region, only possible in warfare. The government inept and inertia to good governance and preparation for the scale and scope of national security as in the case of Boko Haram operations, was reflected in the uncoordinated approach to solving the problem (Alao, 2011). Although, some analysts have argued that Jonathan’s election to office in 2011 against the wishes of some ethno-religious cabals further aggravated the hitherto non-violent religious sects, Boko Haram (Owen & Usman, 2015). However, faith- based conflict in Nigeria tends to have a life of its own, and it becomes worsen when it inclines towards ethno-political-religious mix.

Be that as it may, state response to the Boko Haram terrorism, just like the other security challenges, has been the application of suppressive force interlaced with some counter- insurgency strategies. Suffice is to say that President Jonathan’s ‘military/police’ approach to fighting Boko Haram generated retaliatory violence from the sect. The security agencies became the primary target of the sect (see Table 4 in the preceding chapter). In 2011 however, the Jonathan led government transformed from its ad hoc approach, to establishing

229 a more strategic and enduring ‘Special Joint Military Task Force’ (SJMTF), known as “Operation Restore Order-ORO” (Sampson, 2014, p.62). The task force comprised of ranks and files of the Nigerian Army, Navy, Airforce, Police and the State Security Service (SSS), with the mandate to neutralize the Boko Haram threat.

However, due to its military tactics in prosecuting the insurgency of the Boko Haram sects, the SJMTF was utterly criticized by the leaders and people of Borno State (who were the victims of Boko Haram attack), as the collateral damage from their operation was adjudged disproportionately. Thus, in 2011, the National Assembly of Nigeria enacted the twin anti- terrorism and money laundering bills known as ‘Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011’ and ‘Money Laundering (Prohibition) Bill 2011’ to combat any act of domestic terrorism (not only Boko Haram) and to fight any form of criminal justice. The passage of the Acts helped in the arrest and trial of many high-profile members and foot soldiers of the Boko Haram sect (Sampson, 2014).

Another initiative taken by the government to counter domestic terrorism and ensure the protection of property and lives of the citizens is to leverage on multilateral approach by collaborating with regional, continental and global inter-governmental organizations. Nigeria have multilateral collaborations with the UN (Integrated Assistance on Counter- Terrorism – I-ACT), the European Union (EU), the US, France, South Korea, Israel, the International Civil Aviation Organisation among others (Omonodi, 2012; Sampson, 2016). The government also signed a security pact with Nigeria’s neighbouring countries (Cameroon, Chad and Niger) where the terrorist allegedly imports arms and sometimes recruits foot soldiers (Sampson, 2014).

In addition to strategic external collaborations, on Tuesday May 14, 2013, President Jonathan declared a ‘partial’ state of emergency in the three most affected states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe and ordered more troops to be sent to the north-eastern states to quell the quagmires of the insurgents. The land borders of the affected states were also closed to curtail the cross-border activities of the sect. The Jonathan led government also embarked on rigorous training of the armed and security forces on counter-terrorism both within and outside the country. According to Sampson (2014) “the Chief of Army Staff, Lt- Gen Azubuike Ihejirika, recently said that 2,000 soldiers were undergoing terrorism training in Jaji and Kachia to combat the security challenges facing the country (p.63).

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More so, the government considered the idea of dialoguing with the sects beyond the suppressive approach. This motion produced two distinctive views, pro-dialogue, and anti- dialogue with Boko Haram. While pro-dialogue commentators including the government believe that the idea will result to a lasting solution since the sect swiftly responded by handing down some conditions for its engagement with government, among such conditions is the implementation of Sharia Islamic law in the Muslim-dominated states and unconditional release of all detained sect members (Sampson, 2014; 2016), the anti-dialogue group argued that such attempt is dead on arrival. They challenged government intention to dialogue with a ‘faceless’ group whose identities are not known and their demand not reveal unlike the Niger-Delta militants (Aleyomi, 2012; Otobo & Obaze, 2015; Usman, 2016).

Flowing from the above, it is plausibly to resolve the dilemma over the adoption of military and non-military approaches to countering domestic terrorism. In fact, countering domestic terrorism requires but not limited to criminal justice approach, negotiation/engagement, intelligence gathering, profiling and de-redicalisation. However, Amoda (2012), NBF News (2012) and Sampson (2016) cited insincerity on the part of government and the sects to honour the agreement. Given the ‘unique’ Nigeria’s context, a genuine engagement by government with the underlying conditions that generate dissent and predispose people to violence is very critical for containing incidences of terrorist violence in the country.

5.4 Conclusion

Concisely, the above investigations suggest that Nigeria does not lack good and standardised initiatives that are compatible with the global standard towards positive image-making, but it is obvious from the analysis that what Nigeria lacks is the political will to implement the initiatives. The expectation of a better life following the democratization of the country means that initiatives which would make the politico-security and socioeconomic strengths able to deliver better life are imperative. Nigeria has responded to these pressures with the articulation of NEEDS, NAPEP, Nigeria’s Reform Programme, 7-Point Agenda, Millennium (Sustainable) Development Goals, vision 20:2020, Rebranding Nigeria, Operation Due Process in all sectors, the Transformation Agenda and many other political, economic and security initiatives in the Fourth Republic (Uduma & Nwosu, 2015).

Unfortunately, these acumens and ingenuities that were put in place to address the country’s image crisis have not yielded major enviable successes. Some significant challenges still remain: a meaningful response to decades and mismanagement; mistreatment of Nigerians

231 both at home and abroad; national security challenge especially Boko Haram terrorism and Niger-Delta militancy; effect of globalisation; dwindling economy; disregard for the rule of law and abuse of human rights among others, have been recognised as notable impediment for image building notwithstanding the introduction of Citizen Diplomacy as a way of enhancing the welfare of Nigerian citizens both at home and abroad.

The impact of all these on Nigeria’s international influence and sub-regional, continental and global power as a hegemon in Africa continent has sharply dwindled despite all the enormously endowed human and materials resources/capacity. This is why Adebajo (2008) sees Nigeria as a police officer in Africa, and has yet to possess the political, economic and military capabilities to become a sub-regional hegemon.

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CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.0 Introduction

This chapter contains the general summary of the findings of the study based on the parameters of politico-security and socioeconomic aspect of the impact of Citizen Diplomacy on Nigeria’s Image Building. The chapter also gives the scholarly position of this study as the conclusion based on the findings of the study. And finally, chapter six provides some recommendations arising from the identified gaps from the research work in order to address the internal and external deficiencies in the application of Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria’s Image Building and domestic politics in general.

6.1 Summary of the Findings

This study on “Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria’s Image Building” has adopted a qualitative approach to examine in detail the impact of Citizen Diplomacy on Nigeria’s image building when politico-security and socioeconomic capabilities are taken into consideration. It is an intellectual position of the common opinion on public policymaking in nation-building. The findings validate the perception of most respected scholars that the policy of a sovereign state in its interaction with other sovereign states is a reflection of domestic undercurrents influencing external perceptions and vice versa. The study, therefore, reveals that the image perception of Nigeria both at home and abroad is a reflection of its internal and external policy dynamics. The impact of Citizen Diplomacy on the plight of Nigerians (when socioeconomic and politico-security factors are examined) has not only been felt at home and abroad, but has greatly influenced the Nigeria’s image and its position among the comity of nations.

From the data presented and analyzed in this study, it was found that there are positive and negative sides to Nigeria’s image with a greater prevalence of the latter. On the positive side, Nigeria is rich in agriculture and ambience, oil and gas, and mineral resources. Nigeria is endowed with large population of enterprising, intelligent and resourceful people making significant impact all over the world in the area of sports; communication and entertainment industries; science and technology with great discoveries and inventions; known as winners of Nobel Laurel in Literature, Poetry and Science and Technology; holding ‘juicy’ positions in some International Organizations (like World Bank, UN, AU, Commonwealth of Nations,

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OPEC etc.); with successful business tycoons in every ramification. In addition, Nigeria is a major military and economic force in the West African sub-region and Africa as a whole.

On the negative side, Nigeria is perceived with bad leadership and lack of good governance where culture of commitment, integrity and excellence at all levels of government exits. Indeed, failure of leadership was a chief trouble with Nigeria, which did not only lead to the country’s image crisis before 1999, but also brought about the introduction of Citizen Diplomacy. Unfortunately, the analyses from this study reveal that the leadership crisis still prevail and the potentiality of Nigeria citizens, as a major instrument for reputation building, in creating understanding and cooperation among people of different nations through direct, personal contact and interactions has not been adequately utilized or leverage upon.

Other negative perception from the study shows a high degree of graft and inflation of contracts; high incidences of advance fee and credit cards fraud (notoriously known in Nigeria parlance as ‘419’) both at home and abroad; prevalence involvement in drug trafficking; lack of infrastructural facilities and basic social amenities like industries and power supply; over dependence on the oil sector and dwindling economy; lack of national cohesion and general insecurity of life and property; disparity in the distribution of wealth among social groups and regions; a perceived insensitivity to diplomatic relations and representation; a reactive rather than proactive conduct of foreign policy; weak institution, abuse of human rights and limited respect for the rule of law.

Again, the impact of Citizen/Public Diplomacy on Nigeria’s Image Building under the administrations of Obasanjo (1999-2007), Yar’Adua (2007-2010) and Jonathan (2010- 2015), reveals that Nigeria’s domestic and foreign policies lack a form of dynamism and assertiveness. There is lack of wherewithal on how to evolve a common strategy in rebuilding Nigeria as a technique of new image-making, as well as advancing Citizen Diplomacy as an instrument of protection of national interest and development. Indeed, the impact analysis of the study reveals that the ill-treatment of Nigerians, where it occurred, has been sadistic in perpetration, deliberate in design, unprovoked in most of the cases, and very secretive and unreciprocated in handling.

Furthermore, the mistreatment has also been illegal and Citizen/Public Diplomacy is currently in a state of comatose. This situation lends credence to the need for effective application of Citizen Diplomacy as a thrust designed to refocus Nigeria’s diplomatic image and ensure the interests of all Nigerians both at home and abroad. As noted earlier in this

234 work, a country’s image is the perception of a nation by others. Though, it is not measurable but can be assessed through expression of feelings, responses, actions or inactions of people especially by the outside world. Thus, the study has revealed that the operationalization of Citizen Diplomacy as it is presently conceived, has brought little or no improvement to Nigeria’s battered image except it is redesigned to allow co-optiveness that will involve the functionalities of both the State, private individuals and NGOs/IGOs at national and international levels.

Consequently, it is evident from this study that Citizen/Public Diplomacy does not seek to prevent Nigerians from been punished for offences truly committed but to ensure that Nigerians are not framed up for punishment of offences they never committed. While significant progress on the part of the government is yet to be logically ascertained in this regard, the study also reveals laxity in the interface between internal and external dynamics. Thus, the study shows that the ripple effect of the country’s inability to address its internal exigencies coupled with ineffective utilization of Citizen/Public Diplomacy in power capabilities is the bad external image and highhandedness in the treatment melted to Nigerians by most foreign countries.

The significant efforts being made by the Federal Government of Nigeria to address the blight on Nigeria’s image have been clearly identified and explicated in this work. However, the evidence from this study clearly shows that Nigeria’s failure to own a productive economy that can fend for its people towards a good condition of living and discourage voyage illusion are responsible for the exodus of high quality manpower and its low rating in the comity of nations. Additionally, the demeanour of Nigerians at home is exemplified by gross indiscipline which is condoned as a cultural norm. Nigerians carry some of their cultural habits abroad and do not readily conform to the cultural way of life in their host countries, thus, often attract animosity of the host people. Similarly, from the analysis of data in this study, it is evidenced that Nigeria porous border also permits the influx of terrorists from the neighbouring countries.

From the foregoing, the nature of diplomacy has been completely altered by the confluence and influence of globalization and instantaneous communication including the advent of social media. While government-to-government encounters are still an important part of diplomacy, the role of public opinion, and the involvement of the citizens and nongovernmental entities in foreign policy formation cannot be underestimated. However, the study exposes lack of patriotism and a very serious gap between the citizens (most especially 235 non-state’s actors like the NGOs, CSOs and the private individuals) and their government (leadership/elites) vis-à-vis domestic and foreign priorities. This affects the various efforts by both the state and the public (citizens) towards effective image building through Citizen/Public Diplomacy which Nye’s concept of Soft Power did not envisaged or addressed.

Despite it is protective in objective, preventive in design and beneficial to all and sundry, Citizen Diplomacy is not well understood and has not been adequately implemented to meet its envisaged purpose. The plights of Nigerian Diasporas who seek consular assistance are not sufficiently receiving timely attention. Evidently, this reveals high rate of mistreatments of Nigerians abroad. This negates the foundational principles of Nigeria’s Citizen Diplomacy and hinders the country’s efforts image rebranding.

Apart from lack of confidence by Nigerians in diaspora, in the country’s missions abroad to rescue them in times of need, without any iota of doubt some Nigerians do commit offences that they hardly own up to, such as drug trafficking, and advance fee fraud. The study reveals that these few Nigerians collaborate with some ‘locals’ of the host country to carry out their heinous and unlawful acts. In most cases, these people volunteer their bank accounts and other personal details to be used for fraud. Ignorance about the law and lackadaisical attitudes towards the culture of the host countries largely explain the many forms of mistreatment of Nigerians abroad. Most times, many innocent Nigerians have been unjustifiably given bad name and treated with scorn because of the few ‘bad eggs’.

The seemingly unending ‘cancerous’ man-made and systemic-induced corruption; leadership ineptitude and decline confidence in the government; political tension and electoral malpractices; judicial compromise and high incidence of perverting the course of justice; ingrained poverty; overreliance on importation, decline flow of foreign direct investment; high-risk of business environment; divestment from Nigeria; increase rate of foreign debts and inability to service the existing ones; national insecurity and terrorism; unwarranted suspicion and unjust harassment of Nigerian citizens in foreign countries by local agencies such as immigration, customs and police; failure to realign Nigeria’s foreign policy with the realities of a changing World Order; devaluation of Nigeria’s hegemonic power in Africa; loss of prestige and respect in international community; and ‘ugliness’ of globalisation among other maladies are still serious contributing factors (outcome) to Nigeria’s image crisis and preventing citizen-centricity efforts.

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Above all on the rigor of theoretical insights, the study found out that NCR only applies to the developed countries where there is tiny or no line of demarcation between the state and the citizens as against the developing countries, like Nigeria, where there is a wide gulf of delineation and discrimination between the leaders and the led. Also, the concept of soft power is found unrealistic and impractical for reputation management in Nigeria because the country lacks the wherewithal. This is an area the study has covered and serves as significant contribution to the concept of Nye’s Soft Power and Rose’s Neoclassical Realism.

6.2 Conclusion

Citizen Diplomacy, as conceived and conceptualized in the Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, is not simple to understand. It is holistic in scope, very challenging in implementation but remain an indispensible tool in the arsenal of diplomatic relations for a reputation management, image building and national development of Nigeria in an increasingly globalizing world. However, Nigeria has not clearly distributed its powers (human and material endowments) and wherewithal (socioeconomic and politico-security) to meet the challenges that bedeviled the country’s image

Consequently, Nigeria’s image between 1999 and 2015 is less than satisfactory to say the least. Though the pariah status was reverted and Nigeria was reintegrated into global reckoning and nonetheless government initiatives towards healthy unilateral, bilateral and multilateral reforms, which inter alia include: ‘concerted’ effort to fighting corruption and convicting of some corrupt official; increase in the Foreign Direct Investment which made Nigeria Africa’s largest economy in 2014; debt pardon; granting of amnesty with relative peace in the Niger-Delta region; establishment of Nigerians in Diaspora Organization for effective interaction with one another; and establishment of committee on maltreatment of Nigerians abroad. All these notwithstanding, the essence of Citizen Diplomacy in image building has not been significantly achieved.

In fact, there exists a culture of privatization of public wealth and ‘official’ corruption without consequence. The risk areas of corruption in Nigeria are clearly manifest in political, financial, personnel, operational and procurement. All these have contributed to high level of unpatriotic activities of Nigerians both at home and abroad. Thus, based on the three resources of Soft Power, Nigeria’s socioeconomic culture is not attractive; there is

237 failure of leadership to improve political values both abroad and at home; and the Citizen/Public Diplomacy lacks legitimacy and moral authority.

Again, Nigeria’s foreign policy is still driven by leadership idiosyncrasies, with no significant deviation from the cardinal principles of Afrocentrism laid down by Prime Minister, Alhaji (Sir) Tafawa Balewa, in 1960, despite a purported shift in emphasis to the welfare of the Nigerian citizens and how the private individuals can assist government to make a difference by changing the negative naratives and perceptions of Nigeria in world affairs. Nigeria is still grappling with ingenuity and institutional issues relating to image building. Nigeria is yet to be able to make any significant technological breakthrough. The Human Development Index is still very low. Access to basic needs of life is yet to be generally assured despite its endowed human, material and mineral resources. A justification of the metaphoric poverty amidst plenty. This situation gives an image of self- contradiction abroad.

Indeed, corruption engulfs every facet of Nigeria like a cyclone. Thus, the Fourth Republic governments have been inflicted with inability to be specific on what they want to achieve and have them prioritized. This is why Nigeria’s leaderships, between 1999 and 2015, have come to office with an all-conquering aura to solving the entire problem of Nigeria at once and they have ended up doing everything but completing nothing. This scenario has put the country into a dramatic euphoria of one-step-forward and two-steps-backward. Hence, made the country worse than they have met it. Nigeria can thereby be described as a shambling giant living in a ‘dormant cocoon’ with no clear idea of how to build an enviable image among the comity of sovereign states.

By extension, the study shows that Nigeria’s image building reflects its internal and external policy dynamics. But there is State-inflicting poverty on the citizens; pain sting unemployment of employable graduates; injustice, and disparity in the distribution of public wealth because of protracted corruption. The ensuing effect is that Nigerian citizens opt for self-help and unflinching lack of patriotism which is the recipe for chaos, aggression and terrorism at the domestic level, and huge desire for migration (at all costs). These in most cases necessitate high rate of drug trafficking, defrauding and other social maladies. Though this should not be taken as an excuse, but some innocent Nigerian citizens fall victim in the hand of narcotic-trafficker kingpins, because of uncertain ‘breakthrough’ at home, which has seriously influenced and still influencing the perception of Nigeria and Nigerians at the international level. 238

More importantly, the international system is a global village of self-help with pronounced asymmetries. No country will come to assist Nigeria to build its image. Therefore, based on this individualistic race, Nigeria must pursue and promote a dynamic and assertive policy under the paraphernalia of Citizen/Public Diplomacy, one that will promote Nigeria’s positive image and protect Nigerians both at home and abroad. The effective assertion and application of Citizen Diplomacy will rekindle positive image making. This depends on leadership commitment, consistency, and continuity in implementing socioeconomic and politico-security (image-making) initiatives and on the readiness of all Nigerians to pay the price of loyalty and obedience to the laws and order.

Above all, Nigeria must first get its domestic priorities right without separating the interface and dynamics between domestic and international politics. The deep-seated cancer of corruption in the fabrics of Nigeria’s polity must be collectively fought to an unattractive level in tandem with the state powers. Enlightened self-interest as an operative principle in foreign affairs is nothing to blow the trumpet about as suggests by ‘diplomacy of consequence’ which is a major plank on which Citizen Diplomacy is built. Nigerians at home and abroad would like to witness a healthy and balanced policymaking that is distinquished by quality action rather than mere talk. What Nigeria’s Government needs is a strong and progressive domestic policies as a way of telling the world that it cares for its citizens. Whatever policy direction Nigeria intends to emphasize can be part of the Charter to its Ambassadors and High Commissioners, rather than a subject of needless grandstanding.

Sequel from the above, the study posits that the approaches by the government towards image building are not only impractical and unconvincing but also bedeviled with propaganda and cloudy processes. Most image building initiatives in Nigeria are only addressing the symptoms of image crisis but not the root causes. With the benefit of hindsight, it is sufficed to conclude that the Nigeria’s biggest problem of image building and effective application of Citizen/Public Diplomacy is unfocused, unprepared ad libitum leadership and unpatriotic followership that are ‘decorated’ with chronic scourge of corruption.

Conclusively, to ascertain the perception of Nigeria’s external image based on the conceptual and theoretical framework, the neoclassical realists should reconcile and incorporate the pattern of outcomes of state’s interaction with its behaviours while the combination of hard and soft power should be encouraged in Nigeria’s external relations. 239

Without which, the effort for Nigeria’s positive image, which include to command and enjoy the respect and acceptance of the international community; plays a leading and responsible role in the world affairs, and is consulted on all major African affairs as before; sustaining the leading economy in Africa; and respected for its professional and effective foreign service, will be a mirage. Based on this position, the multidimensional of politico-security, socioeconomic and diplomatic blueprints, as the study recommends below, are timely.

6.3 Recommendations

A proper and proactive image building programme is subject to a proper understanding and implementation of Citizen/Public Diplomacy towards Nigeria project (nation/image building). Therefore, the main solution to Nigeria’s image debacle, however, lies with its politico-security, socioeconomic and diplomatic plans. Nigeria should utilize both competitive and cooperative Citizen/Public Diplomacy (competitive: to promote political influence, military cooperation, trade investment, tourism, coalitions in IGOs policy exchange, while, cooperative: to promite democratic values, good governance, human right and regional stability) through the collaborative efforts of every individual citizen, all stakeholders, NGOs and CSOs, Diasporal, government agencies and the private sector at bilateral and multilateral levels, and engage in self-criticism for role credibility rather than degenerating into propaganda.

More significantly, the perception of Nigeria as a bad country escalates overtime because Nigerians have allowed outsiders to tell the country’s story and evaluate Nigeria’s image for them. Therefore, in discussing the strategies for restoring, sustaining a positive image for Nigeria in conviencing the African neighbours, regional and international entities of the rich culture of integrity and resources, there is need for a concerted effort from the government, the private, NGOs as well as individuals and combination of legal, eco-political and diplomatic solutions as recommended below: -

6.3.1 Diplomatic Strategies a. Establishment of Citizen Training Centre on Citizen/Public Diplomacy: - Image building through Citizen/Public Diplomacy must adopt an audience-centered approach. Nigeria needs to set the right course of promoting new image formula as conducted before by other countries including USA, Canada, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Germany, and Japan among others (case studies discussed above in section 2.1.6 of this study). The strategies

240 include improving the domestic conditions (issues and struggles) as ongoing and continuous to gain public and global recognition; also a strategic approach through cultural and sport activities, tourism, which can be materialized through media technology of symbol and visual to promote these activities respectively. Some of the audience-centred approaches include but not limited to the following: i. There should be centres where youthful citizens will be trained (by seasoned career professionals and political ambassadors) on citizen diplomacy, across the 774 Local Government Areas, so that when they grow up they will not only be “ambassadors” of Nigeria but they will also be patriotic to follow and uphold the country’s diplomatic practice with passion. Besides, the centre can serve as a meeting, relaxation and tête-à-tête rendezvous point for the diplomatic community and the people of Nigeria. This will attract people and commensurate with Nigeria’s giant role in Africa. ii. There is need for Nigeria to communicate not only with other international governments, but directly to people in other countries through internet technologies like the social media (like Youtube, twitter, Facebook page, apart from the official website) that transcend national borders and distribute information about the positive aspect of the country. Social media, which can be access by both the State and the citizens alike, can help Citizen/Public Diplomacy become a more collaborative process. This will not only enhance the strategies of advocacy and promotion via public participation but will disabuse the foreign publics’ perceptions from the negative awareness of the country. iii. Every available means within the ambit of the law should be used to explain Citizen/Public Diplomacy and emphasis should be placed on citizens’ obligations in the national and international diplomatic arena vis-à-vis government responsibilities. Since Nigerians are increasingly becoming addicted to using social media platforms, watching Nigerian movies and quite a number are football fans, audio Compact Discs (CDs) and Digital Video Discs (DVDs) advertorials on immigration rules and regulations in Africa, Asia, and some part of America and Europe should be produced and disseminated online.

The CDs and DVDs can also be sold to the public at subsidized rates. By so doing, Nigeria’s image will not only be greatly enhanced through public participation but also fascilitate the reductions of crimes and increased understanding of international life and its challenges. What Nigeria needs now is not a reactive foreign policy but a very proactive policy of grandeur, leadership by example and, more importantly, a people-driven policymaking

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(Nigerianness), which means that Nigerian public should be given more attention in foreign policy formulation. b. Establishment of Diaspora Commission: - A constitutional entity that would be responsible for managing the nationals in the diaspora is urgently needed. The executive should sign into law a bill for the establishment of Nigerian Citizens in Diaspora Commission which was sponsored by Senator Annie Okonkwo in 2008 and passed by the Nigeria’s Seventh Senate in 2015 but still awaits the President’s assent. The commission will not only help to protect Nigerians proactively and effectively in the diaspora, but also harness the diaspora resources that will encourage foreign direct investment. It will equally promote and facilitate their (Nigerian Citizens) effective participation in economic, political, and social development of the nation and for other related matters.

It is based on this that the existing committee on maltreatment of Nigerians abroad should be more proactive and effective. While the mistreatment and infringement of the rights of Nigerians abroad should not be condoned in any shape or fashion, Nigerian nationals should respect themselves as an individual and be patriotic to the country. International laws especially laws of the host countries must be respected at all time. c. Introduction of a Special Unit for Migration Affairs: - There should a special unit for migration affairs, to be hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which should educate Nigerians on the dangers and perils of irregular migration as well as involvement in transnational crimes, especially drug trafficking and advance fee fraud. The special unit should also checkmate the attitudinal disposition of Nigerian diplomats towards Nigerian nationals. As a watchdog to Nigeria’s Diplomatic Missions, it will facilitate Nigerian diplomats to be more sufficiently proactive in the protection and defense of Nigerians. d. Strong and Workable Bilateral Agreement with the Host Government on Mistreatment: - Nigerian government should negotiate or renegotiate agreements with countries to which Nigerians frequently go to. Such agreement should define the conditions of arrest, incarceration, or detention as well as deportation to Nigeria. Closely related is that the host countries should create an environment that will discourage their citizens from collaborating with few Nigerians that engage in transnational crimes, like credit cards frauds. e. Implementation of Principles of Reciprocity: - African brotherliness or good neighbourliness should be of general application subject to the rule of reciprocity through 242 the combination of both “Soft Power” (carrot) and “Hard Power” (stick). The foreign policy of a “Good Samaritan” must be replaced with “diplomacy of consequence” as it is contained as one of the cardinal pillars of Citizen Diplomacy. Nigeria must give, but at the same time be resolute in making sure all nations that receive its support and friendship behave themselves and do same for Nigeria when the need arises. When states are patriotic to one another, there will be no room for prejudices or mistreatments f. The Need for Database on Nigerians: - The Nigeria’s Diplomatic Mission abroad should develop a special entente with the various chapters of NIDO to ensure a functional database that contains every detail of Nigerians living abroad and must be updated on a regular basis. At the domestic level, computerization of Nigeria’s database should be effectively introduced through the National Population Commission. National Identity cards with numbers should be made available to all Nigerians to checkmate the fraudulent issuance of International Passport to non-Nigerians who in turns use it for transnational crimes. g. Diaspora’s Meetings: - Also, there should be serial and regular NIDO’s briefings about developmental efforts of the government back home and the welfare of national in their respective counties. This will encourage feedback mechanisms between the commission, diplomatic mission and the Nigerian nationals which will form collaboration between Nigerians at home and abroad on government activities. h. Retention of Afrocentrism and Citizencentrism Policy: - above all, Nigeria should maintain Afrocentric and Citizencentric policy thrusts to establish a synergy with the domestic environment in order to address the country’s socioeconomic and politico-security problems and restore to true citizenship that will reduce conflict between groups and nations and improve citizen-to-citizen communication and understanding. In this complementarity, the Nigeria’s national interest towards a viable and positive image will be realized.

6.3.2 Socioeconomic Strategies a. Stabilizing Domestic Economy: - The Government should provide an environment that is conducive for ensuring the security of life and property and provision of domestic infrastructure for genuine investors to come and invest in the economy. This will not only alleviate poverty and unemployment but also will reduce youth restiveness that has been a major fulcrum for violence and militancy. b. Fairer and Just Redistribution of Wealth: - Nigerian State must be economically secured and ensure that the ill-gotten wealth recovered from corrupt officials is exclusively 243 devoted to infrastructural reconstruction and development that will benefit every Nigerian. The NGOs, CSOs and key human right activists must be enabled to participate in the management of this activity. Besides, there must be mutual legal policy of sound laws to discourage public official from having foreign account(s). Public official must have faith in saving their money in Nigeria banks. c. Avoiding Culture of White-Elephant Projects: - Nigeria government must be creative to ‘kill’ the culture of abandoning project (white-elephant projects) which has proven to inflicting poverty on the people. To achieve social justice for every Nigerian, there is urgency in waging and winning the war against poverty and corruption. President Kennedy Johnson of America once said: “If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich” (Burns & Siracusa, 2015, p.369). Thus, the only logical step to Nigeria’s image building is to intensify efforts in pursuing fairness in development agenda that is broad-based, all-inclusive, and sustainable. d. Economy Diversification: - To achieve rapid and sustained economic growth and image development, the state must acquire political will to diversify the economic base from oil and gas by developing other economic sectors like agriculture, solid mineral and manufacturing industry. In diversifying the economy, government should embark on people-oriented policies and providing conducive and secure environment that would encourage farmers to produce by granting soft loans, free seeds and subsidize prices of fertilizers to the farmers. In addition, the Land Use Act should be reviewed to allow easy access to farmland by the farmers.

Notwithstanding the paradoxes of economy diversification, the government should ensure economy deregulation, especially on power and energy sector to give room for private investors. This would increase competition and spur to a greater efficiency, leading to lower costs and prices for consumers, as government regulation often involves excessive costs of bureaucracy. Nigeria needs oil revenue to build and develop agricultural sectors, mining of solid mineral and manufacturing industries. e. Enabling Environment for both domestic and Foreign Direct Investments: - The government should create an enabling environment that will simplify the procedure and establishing stability and consistency in economic policies for healthy competition in attracting Foreign Direct and Portfolio Investments. In short, the economic sector should be liberalized to encourage competition that will improve the socioeconomic wellbeing of Nigerians at home and abroad. There should be functional domestic infrastrures like 244 constant electricity/power supply, good roads, and friendly economic policies. This will not only discourage divestments but encourage new investments that will boost economic productivity and increase jobs opportunity and wealth creation.

6.3.3 Politico-Security Strategies a. Mutual Understanding of Globalization Realities: - There is need for the Government and people of Nigeria to seek an understanding of the current global strategic calculations of the major powers in Africa and situate the country’s image and expectations of the world players in the context of the emerging policy obligation that all countries are being asked to accept. Consequently, care must be taken to adopt broadly enlighten self-interest and international accepted criteria aimed at seeking joint solutions to global problems, especially in the multilateral efforts at peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-building. b. Strengthening of Institutions: - The institutions such as executive, legislature and judiciary must collaborate in the fight against corruption. There is need to strengthen both the institutional capacity of the legislature and the executive for the performance of the complementary role to bridge the historic gap between the two major partners in the management of public affairs, to redress the disequilibrium and asymmetry in the relative weight of influence that both of them command and wield in governance. The independence of the judiciary and rule of law must be guaranteed.

More so, there must be raft of laws which ensure that anyone who engages in graft or things that are detrimental to the rights and privileges of others are punished in accordance of the law and not allowed to be unleashed to the unsuspecting public. Additionally, there is need for harmonization of the anti-graft agencies. The existence of ICPC and EFCC on the same problem is mere duplication. The two institutions should be merged as one to discontinue the problem of overlapping of duties and further strengthening anti-graft war. c. Funding of Research Institutes and Ministry of Foreign Affairs: -

The bodies that are responsible for researching, forming, and executing Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust or deliberately involved in understanding of international affairs and the circumstances and attitudes of foreign countries and their people, should not be underfunded. To pursue its ambitious foreign policy, adequate funds should be voted to NIIA, NIPSS, IPCR, and the National War College for robust research in their specialized areas. This would enhance the building of Nigeria’s image and ensure foundation for continuity and greater sustainable successes in Nigeria’s external relations. 245

More importantly, the Foreign Affairs Ministry and Nigerian Missions abroad should be adequately funded financially and materially. In the same vein, the services of seasoned career personalities should not only be engaged but the appointment should not be politicized, rather the top-notched personality should be appointed instead of mediocre or diplomatic neophyte. d. Introduction of Systemic Hygiene: - Nigeria must introduce hygiene in its polity so that politicians, who seek public offices, do so with high level of integrity and finance their campaigns in a clean manner. The day Nigeria introduces hygiene in its politics that is the day the Government will begin to sanitize the country of corruption and that is the day Nigeria will begin to be a great country. More importantly, Government would be able to garner sufficient domestic support in its efforts to once again, take its rightful leadership position in the comity of nations. This will enhance positive attitudes towards the actualization of vision 20:2020 and Nigeria’s external image climate. e. Reforming the Security Sector: - The Nigerian Police and other paramilitary are widely seen as competent but grossly corrupt. There is dire need to reform the curriculum of the police and other paramilitary training institutions to accommodate modern methods of law enforcement. Once the police and other security agencies are sanitized of corruption and adequately fortified, they will intensify the war against organized crime such as advance fee fraud, armed robberies, money laundering, drug trafficking, falsification of accounts, contract inflation and so on. Nigerians will build confidence in its ability to contain domestic security challenges and be willing to divulge security hints to the intelligence unit of the police or Directorate of State Security Service. The government should have accelerated needs to address the security of people whose human rights are violated, particularly through the phenomenon of terrorism. f. Need for Constitutional Review: - The government should genuinely address the vagueness in the Nigeria’s Constitution especially in the area of the country’s national interests and ensure the Nigerian Criminal Policy and Criminal Justice Administration show equity in administration of justice. ‘Big thieves’ should not be left controlling the affairs of the country while ‘small ones’ are rotten in the prison without any insight of rehabilitation. The Nigeria’s national conference of 2014 should not be a cosmetic exercise but its reports should be adopted and implemented. g. Good Governance and Political Stability: - Above all, the main solution to Nigeria’s image problem is good governance and political stability. The Government must create an 246 environment that upholds the principle of rule of law, fair sharing of wealth, application of value for money in public expenditure, socioeconomic and politico-security accountability through periodic free, fair, and credible elections where votes casted and also weighted. Now that the use of PVC and CR has been introduced into the electoral system and relatively proven to be successful in the 2015 elections and in some states election in 2016, there is need to institutionalized electronic-voting mechanism.

This system will drastically reduce electoral violence, increase credibility, and allow for diaspora voting. It is when the internal environment is cleansed and citizens are rejuvenated, that they (the Nigerian citizens) would individually and collectively aspire to be patriotic, ensure the protection of its unity, and uphold the honour and glory of Nigeria.

6.4 Direction for Future Research

Sequel from the study, it is obvious that there is insistence of Nigeria’s African policy despite the introduction of Citizen Diplomacy. Hence, future study should concentrate efforts on periodically accessing the politico-security and socioeconomic gains cum relationship of the two policy thrusts comparatively, on Nigeria’s national interest and its image climate among the comity of nations.

It is not clear whether Nigeria has a policy of placement of Nigerians in international organizations. Therefore, future study should focus attention on this blurred area but of a major fulcrum for perception of Nigeria’s external image. In addition, the study highlighted the importance of the media in reputation management through Soft Power approach, but was not discussed in detail. Having recognized the role of media, future study should holistically focused on the roles of media, as one of the referees for credibility and legitimacy, in projecting Nigeria’s image climate under this current Fourth Republic. Future study should focus on the strategic Public Diplomacy in relations to Media because modern media are the key channel of communication to the public.

Similarly, there is need for concerted effort on how Nigeria can garner courage in confronting external environment most especially as it relates with the efficacy and instrumentality of the application of the principle of reciprocity. This will allay the unpleasant outcomes that have trailed Nigeria’s foreign policy because some countries often forget Nigeria’s diplomatic kid gloves treatments to them and/or over celebrations of the glorious days of Nigeria’s external relations by some people.

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Finally, the direction of future studies should be concentrated on how to develop a model that would help Nigeria to reduce its high level of dependence on foreign assistance and chronic cankerworm of corruption. Besides, future studies should examine the theory and practice of Nigeria’s role and behaviour vis-à-vis its outcomes on ethno-religious trappings in framing both domestic and foreign policy of the country to bridge the gap between Nigeria’s leaders and followers, and environmental security challenges.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A List of Selected/Consulted Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and National Non- Governmental Organizations (NNGOs) S/N NAME ACTIVITIES/PROJECTS 1. Center for National Unity and Advocacy for Good Governance and Rebranding Representative Democracy, Lagos 2. Center for Peace Building and Socio Governance and Security Intervention Programme Economic Resources Development, Abuja 3. Centre for Peace & Conflict Studies, Advocate of Conflict Resolution and Peaceful Ibadan Coexistence among Nigerians 4. Civil Society Coalition for Poverty Enlightenment on Self-Dependence Initiative Eradication, Abuja Programmes, and Facilitation of Economic Empowerment 5. Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Initiatives on Good Governance and Effective Center (CISLAC), Abuja Legislation 6. Global Network for Peace and Advocacy in Anticorruption and Global Peace Anticorruption Initiative, Port Harcourt 7. IMPROVED Action for Community Advocacy on Governance; Capacity Building of Transformation, Abuja NGO/CSOs; and Economic Empowerment 8. Initiative for Basic Rights of Nigeria Facilitation of Social & Political Development; Citizens (IBRONC), Abuja Research/Documentation; Legal Services/Access to Justice (Human Rights and Humanitarian Law); Economic Empowerment, Governance, Democracy and Human Rights etc. 9. Initiators of Awareness and Development Awareness Creation and Social Enlightenment (IAD), Abuja 10. Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta Socio-Economic Empowerment and Development (PIND), Abuja and Warri 11. Positive Action for Treatment Access Advocacy for Positive Action against Maltreatments (PATA), Lagos of Nigerians 12. Social Action/Social Development Advocacy on Environment and Democracy Issues; Integrated Centre, Ilorin Organization of Citizen/Representative Interactive Sessions; and Building Solidarity among Groups on Governance, Democracy, Environment etc.

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Appendix B List of Key Informants and Respondents S/N NAME AFFILIATION/BRIEF DESCRIPTION 1. Prof. Willie Alade Professor at Department of International Relations. Interview Fawole Conducted in his office at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile Ife, Nigeria on July 11, 2016 2. Prof. Oshita O. Professor of Political Science and expert in Governance, Peace and Oshita Conflict Studies. He is the Director-General, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution and former Honourable Member Federal House of Representative and Director of Research and Policy Analysis. Interview responses received via email on July 13, 2016 3. Prof. Osita Agbu Professor at the Research and Studies Department, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. He is the Head, Division of International Politics of the institute. Interview conducted in His office on December 3, 2015 4. Prof. Solomon O. Professor at Department of Political Science and Dean, Institute of Akinboye Postgraduate Studies, University of Lagos, Nigeria. He is a seasoned scholar and an expert on Nigerian Foreign Policy and Public Policy Analysis. Interview conducted in His office on December 3, 2015 5. Prof. Hassan A. Professor at Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin, Saliu Ilorin, Nigeria. He is a seasoned scholar and an expert on Nigerian Foreign Policy. Interview conducted in His office on June 13, 2015 6. Prof. Rotimi Ajayi Professor of Political Science who was the Pioneer Vice Chancellor, Landmark University, Omu-Aran. Interview responses received via email on January 24, 2016 7. Prof. Shola J. Professor of Political Science, Federal University, Oye-Ekiti and an Omotola expert in Comparative Studies. A consultant at the Institute of Legislative Studies, Abuja, Nigeria. 8. Dr. Ekanem Lectures at the Department of Political Science and International Asukwo Ekanem Relations, Federal University Wukari. Interview conducted in his house at Wukari, Taraba State on December 16, 2015 9. Dr. Godwin Ichili He is a Research Fellow, NIIA and an expert in Political Economy. Interview conducted in His office on December 4, 2015 10. Dr. Sharkdam Research Fellow, NIIA (Political Economy and Development Wapmuk Studies). Interview responses received via email on July 12, 2016 11. Senator Munirat Distinguished Senator of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Chair, Sunmonu Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Nigeria’s National Assembly, Abuja. Interviewd in her office on January 26, 2016 12. Hon. Nnena Honourable Member, Federal House of Representatives and Chair, Elendu-Ukeju House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Nigeria’s National Assembly, Abuja. Interviewed in her office on December 15, 2015 13. Hon Abike Dabiri- She is the Senior Special Assistant on Foreign Affairs & Diaspora Erewa to Nigerian President and a former member of House of Representatives and Chair, House Committee On Diaspora. Interviewed in her house, Ikorodu. June 4, 2016 14. Commodore Bola He is a surgeon and retired Military Officer. He is also a renowned Sanni Business Man and Philanthropist. Interviewed in his house at Gwarinpa, Abuja on December 14, 2015 15. Commodore Jerry Retired Naval Officer and Special Adviser of Security Matters, K. Omodara Kogi State, Nigeria. Interview received on July 13, 2016

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16. Mr. Oyedele Sheriff Secretary to the Director, Foreign Service Academy of Nigeria. Interviewed in his office, Abuja on December 15, 2015 17. Mr. A. Kadiri The Director, Permanent Secretary Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja, Nigeria. Interviewed in his office on December 14, 2015 18. Mr. Emmanuel Principal Consular Officer, Nigeria Mission, United Kingdom. Namah Phone interviewed on July 11 & 15, 2016 19. Mr. Charles Oko Second Secretary to the Director, Policy Planning Division, Ministry of Foreign Affair, Abuja, Nigeria. Interviwed in his office, Abuja on December 15, 2015 20. Ms. Grace Akinola Protocol officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja, Nigeria. Interviewed in her office, Abuja on December 15, 2015 21. Mr. Rotimi Olawale Co-founder, Youth Hub Africa, NGO, Abuja, Nigeria. Interviewed in his office on June 6, 2016 22. Mr. Ikubaje John Political Officer (Governance and Human Rights), Department of Gbodi Political Affairs, African Union Commission. Interviewed in his office, Abuja on june 6, 2016 23. Mr. John Simeon Research Officer, National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru-Jos. Phone interviewed on June 8, 2016 24. Diepreye Jackson Spokesman, Ex-Militant Leaders Forum and Publicity Secretary, Dikibo Niger Delta Awareness Coalition. Interviewed in Calabar on December 17, 2015 25. Chief Ene Cobham Community Chief and Youth Leader, Ikang Clan in Akpa Buyo LGA, Cross River State. Interviewed in Calabar, July 25, 2016 26. Chief Okon Edet Paramount Ruler, Bakassi LGA, Cross River State. Interviewed in Igwe palace, Calabar on July 25, 2016 27. Mr. Olaniyi Director Legal Services and Enforcement, National Human Rights Omodara Commission. Interviewed in his office July 28, 2016 28. Mrs. Rebecca Director, Planning Research and Statistics, Niger Delta C. Okorodudu Development Commission. Interviewed in her office, Abuja on July 28, 2016

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Appendix C List of Respondents for Focused Group Discussions Group 1 (Conference Room, Foreign Service Academy Lagos on December 14, 2015) S/N Name Address/Affiliation 1. Mr. James Oginni Banker and Member, Center for Peace Building and Socio Economic Resources Development, Abuja 2. Mr. Sanni Tudun Member, Initiative for Basic Rights of Nigeria Citizens (IBRONC) 3. Mr. Abdulwahab Head, Council Secretariat National Human Right Commission Oyedokun 4. Mr. Olaniyi Awe Member, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center (CISLAC), Abuja 5. Mr. Martins Ayinla Federal Ministry of Information, Abuja Group 2 (Ebitimi Bamigo Hall, University of Port Harcourt on June 27, 2016) 1. Chief Ene Cobham Youth Leader and Member, Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND), Abuja and Warri 2. Chief Apata Origa Retired Naval Officer and Member, Global Network for Peace and Anticorruption Initiative, Port Harcourt 3. Mr. Segun Aringbe Independent Researcher and Foreign Policy Analysts 4. Mr. Thomas Nte Businessman and Member, Civil Society Coalition for Poverty Eradication, Abuja 5. Miss Ojo Franca Ministry of Internal Affairs Group 3 (International Conference Hall, NIIA Lagos on July 4, 2016) 1. Prof. Osita C. Eze Professor of Law and Member, Positive Action for Treatment Access (PATA), Lagos 2. Mr. Edna Ekpo Banker and Member, Civil Society Coalition for Poverty Eradication, Abuja 3. Mr. Rotimi Member, Center for National Unity and Representative Democracy, Olawale Lagos 4. Dr. Bakut T. Bakut Director, External Conflict, Prevention and Resolution-Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution 5. Madam Felicia Member, Positive Action for Treatment Access (PATA), Lagos Okon Group 4 (Multipurpose Hall, FSS University of Ilorin on August 19, 2016) 1. Mr. John Bayeshea Lawyer, Social Action/Social Development Integrated Centre, Ilorin 2. Tunde Ajayi Student, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Ibadan 3. Dr. Nelson Femi Civil Society Coalition for Poverty Eradication, Abuja 4. Mrs. M. Fapounda Businesswoman & Member, Initiators of Awareness and Development 5. Dr. Kay Ariyo Initiative for Basic Rights of Nigeria Citizens (IBRONC), Abuja 6. Mr. Oni Ajayi Center for National Unity and Representative Democracy, Lagos Group 5 (Permanent Secretary Office, MFA Abuja on September 7, 2016) 1. Mr. Victor C Positive Action for Treatment Access (PATA), Lagos Benson 2. Mr. Sikiru Y. Initiative for Basic Rights of Nigeria Citizens (IBRONC), Abuja Joseph 3. Olufemi Olafeso Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Member, IMPROVED Action for Community Transformation, Abuja 4. Mr. Olu Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja Mustapha 5. Chukwudi Okoro Businessman and Tourist 6. Mrs Emily Director, Planning Statistics and Documentation, National Human Rights Herbert Commission

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Appendix D Invitation and Covering Letters Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang.

November 13, 2015

TO IT MAY CONCERN

Dear Sir/Madam,

REQUEST TO CONDUCT A RESEARCH INTERVIEW

I am Michael B. Aleyomi a PhD candidate of the Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia. I also teach Political Science and International Relations at Landmark University, Omu-Aran, Nigeria. I am writing my PhD dissertation on Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria’s Image Building, 1999-2015.

I write to seek your permission and time out of your tight schedule to interview you (your organization) as an active scholar, actor, business tycoon, civil society organization, Non- governmental Organization, and as a Nigerian participant in Nigeria’s Policymaking on Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria’s Image Building, to fulfill part of the requirements for the award of degree of Doctor of Philosophy. I have no doubt that your contributions, as a result of your wealth of experience in Nigeria’s policymaking, would be of great significance and give strength to my research findings.

The information expected to gather would be judiciously used only for academic purposes. Attached is a copy of letter of introduction from my school to further ascertain the above claims

Thank you for your anticipated and kind response

Yours faithfully,

Michael Babatunde ALEYOMI Researcher

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Appendix E Participation Information Sheet

Thesis Title: Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria’s Image Building, 1999-2015

Research Candidate: Michael B. ALEYOMI Department of Political Science, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia

Thesis Concept Note

The perception that every sovereign state exists and operates within a much larger community of states, and has to relate with the other sovereign members of that community is globally incontestable and one of long history. Foreign policy is the primary instrument for the conduct and management of that relationship, and its goal is to protect and promote the national interest of the country. It is based on this perception that the protection of citizens regardless of where they reside and Image building/management has been the enduring components of Nigeria’s policymaking in the Fourth Republic.

Afrocentric policy and citizen diplomacy have been ventilated by the crafting and execution of several laudable programs that have impacted on Nigeria’s socio-political, economic and security landscapes. While not discarding Nigeria’s diplomatic gains with other African countries, avid reader of Nigeria foreign policy will notice an obvious politico-security and socio-economic gaps in these analyses. One would wondered whether sustaining the country’s foreign policy thrusts has been in the overall interest every Nigerian and how it has enhanced Nigeria’s image building particularly given Nigeria’s dynamic fortunes in prosecuting Afrocentric policy thrust and the Citizen Diplomacy simultaneously.

To clarify the purpose, dynamism and direction of Nigeria’s policymaking in several ways, there are questions as to whether Citizen Diplomacy has yielded any tangible and measurable benefits (protection) to Nigeria and Nigerians both at home and abroad. Thus, this study examines how Citizen Diplomacy has responded to the treatments of Nigerians and its national interest for the purpose(s) of Nigeria’s image building. Hence, the study aims to underscore: the rationale for the introduction of Citizen Diplomacy; impact of Citizen Diplomacy on Nigerians and Nigeria’s image building; and the initiatives of the Fourth Republic governments towards the country’s image building. Above all, the research is designed to ‘probe’ the impacts of “Citizen Diplomacy on Nigeria’s Image Building” in the Fourth Republic, 1999-2015.

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Appendix F Semi-Structured Interview Questions

1. What would you ascribe to as the rationale for the introduction of Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria?

2. How would you view the distributions of ‘power’ (focus of government) between external exigencies and domestic constraints in Nigeria’s policymaking thrusts?

3. How would you rate government promptness or intervention in some cases of ill- treatment of Nigerians both at home and abroad? Is there any experience or information you would like to share?

4. How would you explain the leadership status of Nigeria in the comity of African states?

5. What would you say were/are factors responsible for some African countries not to support Nigeria when the latter vie for international positions like in ECOWAS, AU, and UN? Any examples?

6. What would you say were the governments (Obasanjo, Yar’Adua and Jonathan administrations) initiatives towards image management and citizen-centred diplomacy?

7. What would you consider as the factors inhibiting Nigeria’s from image building and the protection of citizens both at home and abroad? How can these inhibiting factors be ameliorated?

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Appendix G Participation Consent Form Instructions √. Please read this form carefully and thick (√) your preferences where indicated. Your signature below means that you have accepted all statements below and you are voluntarily agreed to participate in this research study. √. Please ask the researcher for further questions regarding this form.

I have been asked to take part voluntarily in this study. I have read the Thesis Concept Note, and I have received an explanation of the nature and purpose of this study. My enquiries have been answered satisfactorily.

I, ______hereby consent to participate in this study.

I am aware that:

 The interview on Citizen Diplomacy in Nigeria’s Image Building, 1999-2015 is conducted by Michael B. Aleyomi as his PhD thesis.  My participation in this study is voluntary, and I will incur no costs for doing so.  I can stop participating in this study at any time without giving any reason and without there being any negative consequences.  I am free not to answer any question(s). Moreover, the researcher will answer any questions I have about the study.  The information that will be collected from this interview is for research purposes only, and it will be treated as confidential (except otherwise)  The interview will be tape recorded only if I agree. I can state that I don’t want the interview to be taped and it will not be. I can ask that the tape be turned off at any time.  I have the right to full anonymity except upon request, and that per this request the researcher will omit all identifying information.  I will not receive any form of payment for participation in this study.  I [do/do not] give the researcher the right to mention my name, position and affiliation in the final study.  I [do/do not] give the researcher the right to use the data collected in this interview in a subsequent study (except on request).  I [do/do not] agree to be audio taped.

Participant’s Name: ______

Participant’s Signature: ______Date: ___/___/20___

Researcher’s Name: Michael B. Aleyomi

Researcher’s signature:

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