THE TASK of the TRANSLATOR, OR, HOW to SPEAK to MARTIN HEIDEGGER’S TEXTS Eric D

THE TASK OF THE TRANSLATOR, OR, HOW TO SPEAK TO MARTIN HEIDEGGER’S TEXTS Eric D. Meyer

There’s no muse of philosophy; and there’s texts! even in the twentieth century German no muse of translation, either. original in which they are written (which is ob- naturlich Walter Benjamin,“The Task of the Translator” viously not Goethe’s German! !). And an English translation of Martin Heidegger’s difficult texts is bound to be as Why are Martin Heidegger’s texts so diffi- challenging, as difficult (and, sometimes, as cult to translate? Several complicated answers obscure) as Martin Heidegger’s texts them- might be given to this simple-seeming ques- selves. Which doesn’t mean that the contem- tion. (1) Because Martin Heidegger’s texts em- porary translator should simply give up on the ploy a quirky, highly eccentric, idiosyncratic difficult texts as incomprehensible or un-trans- German dialect (Swabian? Friesian?Or latable. But the translator should realize, in maybe just Heideggerian?) that can’t easily be translating these difficult texts, it’s probably imitated (without risk of travesty or parody) in a comparable English dialect. (2) Because not possible to reduce them to a simple, Martin Heidegger’s texts frequently rely on straightforward, unequivocal translation; to a elaborate etymological word-play and elusive simple-minded crib or definitive gloss; or to esoteric punning on Old High German words what’s called, in the Western tradition of (Wahren, Walten, Wesen, etc.) or even contem- “Great Authors,” an authorized translation; porary German expressions (like the even when that translation is authorized by the quintessentially Heideggerian Dasein/das twentieth century’s Greatest Philosopher: Sein/das Sein des Seienden, etc.) which can’t Martin Heidegger himself. be duplicated in the English lexicon. (3) Be- And so, because Martin Heidegger’s texts cause Martin Heidegger’s texts frequently pro- are difficult (beyond most texts) to translate, ceed by breaking down (“de-construct-ing,” it’s maybe uncharitable to find fault with An- ab-bauen) even the simplest German words drew J. Mitchell’s translation of Martin (for example: bauen: Old High German buan, Heidegger’s Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: buri, buren, beuren, beuron, etc.)1 and twisting Insight Into That Which Is and Basic Princi- and distorting them (the essential meaning of ples of Thinking.3 This is one of Heidegger’s one of Martin Heidegger’s favorite verbs: most difficult collections because it contains verwinden) to make them disclose strange some of his most inscrutable, elusive texts meanings and obscure, unfamiliar senses pre- (like “Das Ding”) which carry his cryptical, el- viously un-heard of in those German words. liptical word-play to strange heights (or After the controversy surrounding Parvis depths?) of paradoxical simplicity and Emad and Kenneth Maly’s notoriously un- abstrusity (simple example: Das Ding dingt: readable translation of the Beiträge zur the thing things)4 and, at the same time, also Philosophie,2 the contemporary translator contains some of Martin Heidegger’s most di- might do well to contemplate these difficulties rectly political texts (like “Die Gefahr”), before embarking on the task of translating wherein Martin Heidegger (for maybe the only Martin’s Heidegger’s difficult texts. But the time after his brief controversial endorsement simple answer is: Martin Heidegger’s texts are of the German National Socialist Party and its difficult to translate because they’re difficult Führer, Adolf Hitler, in 1933) discusses diffi- PHILOSOPHY TODAY FALL 2013 323 © DePaul University 2013 cult issues like the Nazi holocaust and the Jew- ated portmanteau words) that provokes accu- ish Shoah (“the production of corpses in the sations, among Martin Heidegger’s critics, of gas chambers and the extermination camps”) persiflage and obscurantism; and probably which he’s frequently been accused, by French causes many neophyte readers to simply throw and American critics like Philippe Lacoue- up their hands (and throw down the book!) in Labarthe, Jean-Francois Lyotard, or Jacques despair of ever penetrating the superficially Derrida, during “The Heidegger Controversy” impenetrable jargon. For example: “In-flash- of the 1980s, of disguising, repressing, ignor- ing is the disclosing coming-to-pass within ing, or evading altogether.5 And it’s that Being itself. Disclosing coming-to-pass strange combination of esoteric, almost mysti- (Ereignis) is bringing to sight that brings into cal texts (like “Die Kehre”) with scathingly di- its own (eignende Eraugnis)” (24 English rect political texts (like “Das Gestell”) that words).11 Which translates: “Einblitz ist makes Einblick in das, was ist (along with, say, Ereignis im Sein selbst. Ereignis ist eignende “Überwindung der Metaphysik” and “Zur Eraugnis” (10 German words).12 Andrew J. Seinsfrage”) among the most important (and Mitchell disposes of this passage as follows: most neglected) of Martin Heidegger’s post- “Flashing entry is the event of appropriation in Kehre texts. And also among the most difficult beyng itself” (10 English words!).13 Whether to translate. something gets glossed over or lost in translation here is a further question that might still be * * * * * asked. Still, the translation is, by comparison, Translations prove untranslatable not be- clarity and simplicity itself. cause of the difficulty, but because of the all- But, as has been said of T. W. Adorno’s dia- too-great fleetingness of the sense that clings lectical style in some of his more difficult to them . . . texts, what Fredric Jameson calls “the practice Walter Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator” of style” is often crucial to the text itself; and its difficulty and density essential to whatever In this respect, it’s difficult to find fault with “sense” or “meaning” the diligent reader Andrew J. Mitchell’s translation of, for exam- might extract from it. And if the diligent reader ple, “Das Ding”6 which is a model of simplic- takes time to study the Mitchell translation and ity and clarity even when tracking Martin the Lovitt translation of “The Turn” or “The Heidegger’s attempts to pin down “the Turning” and to compare them with Martin thingliness of the thing” (Das Dinghafte des Heidegger’s German text of “Die Kehre,” the Dinges, das Dingliche am Ding, etc.), through scrupulous reader will probably notice that the Old High German, Greek, Latin, and Indo- something does get lost in reducing the Ger- Germanic languages; and thus to disclose, be- man text to a simple, straightforward English hind the scientific observation or objective translation; and that, sometimes, the off-putt- representation of the thing, the Neo-Kantian ing style of the Lovitt translation is actually to “thing-in-itself”(das Ding an sich).7 The critic be preferred to the Mitchell version (despite or might quibble, for example, with Mitchell’s even because of its difficulty); because it more translation of “ein Stellen” (“a placement, pre- closely approximates the difficulty of Martin sentation, positioning,” etc.) as “a posing”8 but Heidegger’s original text. Or maybe (better that’s a minor point. And certainly, Andrew J. yet!), the reader might conclude, a third trans- Mitchell’s translation of “Die Kehre”9 com- lation!(or a fourth? or a fifth? etc.) might still pares favorably, for simplicity and clarity, with be necessary before Martin Heidegger’s text its previous translation by William Lovitt as has been made accessible in an English ver- “The Turning”10 which is admittedly prone to nacular that neither distracts from the text by that convoluted language (characterized by an its excessively complicated jargon; nor de- excessively clotted style and multiply-hyphen- tracts from the text by reducing it to a decep- PHILOSOPHY TODAY 324 © DePaul University 2013 tively simple, straightforward translation, at And now the Mitchell: the cost of diminishing “the essential more- The essence of positionality is the collected posi- than-meaningfulness” (die wesenhafte Mehr- tioning that pursues its own essential truth with deutigkeit)14 of the multiplicitous, polysemous forgetfulness, a pursuit disguised in that it unfolds German original. in the requisitioning of everything that presences For example, the critic might compare the as standing reserve, establishing itself in this and opening paragraphs of William Lovett’s “The 16 ruling as this. (41 words) Turning” and Andrew J. Mitchell’s “The Turn” with the first paragraph of Martin Heidegger’s “Die Kehre” and ask whether either of the Well, now! The Mitchell version is obviously available translations really captures the com- simpler, clearer, and more economical than the plexity and economy of the original German Lovitt! (Isn’t it?) And yet, is it really any more text, which, despite its difficulty, really says comprehensible? Whether to the astute critic much more with fewer words than either of the or to the common reader? And is there any less English versions. First, the Lovitt: necessity for a gloss or crib to explain the obscure words (“positionality,” “collected posi- The essence of Enframing is that setting-upon tioning,” “requisitioning,” “standing reserve” gathered into itself which entraps the truth of its etc.),17 which, however simple and clear, ap- own coming to presence with oblivion. This en- pear somehow disconnected from their con- trapping disguises itself, in that it develops into the text and disjoined from their “sense” and setting in order of everything that presences as “meaning”: like words floating in a void of ab- standing-reserve, establishes itself in the standing straction and indeterminacy. If “Enframing” reserve and rules as that standing reserve. 15 was vague, “positionality” is even vaguer. (At (55 words) least “Enframing” was vivid and active! And The critic might be forgiven for remarking also menacing . . .) And although “requisition- that, absent some gloss or crib that explains ing” is a strong verb that somehow connects certain key words and phrases (“Enframing,” with “standing reserve,” it’s still not clear “setting-upon gathered into itself,” “coming to what’s being “requisitioned” (“everything that presence,” “standing reserve,” etc.), even the presences”?). Or what a “standing reserve” fairly erudite reader might find this passage might be (a sanctuary for bystanders and loi- well-nigh incomprehensible. And, in fact, terers?). Again, the critic might object, that, William Lovett (probably anticipating this dif- absent extensive background and further ex- ficulty) does supply a somewhat lengthy foot- plication (which, to be fair, are also supplied note that again translates the passage back into by other essays in the collection), this passage German! (For example: Wesen =“coming to too, borders on incomprehensibility. And, as presence”; das Ge-Stell =“Enframing”; the opening paragraph of a difficult essay, it Stellen =“challenging setting-upon,” etc.); leaves the scrupulous reader adrift and strug- and still another footnote that translates gling to find his moorings; or simply clueless “oblivion” both into German (Vergessenheit) as to exactly what this difficult essay might ac- and into Greek!(aletheia). Which finally tually be about . . . leaves the diligent reader floundering in diffi- And now, Martin Heidegger’s admittedly culties which are not in the original text; but difficult German text: actually represent the translator’s attempts to Das Wesen des Gestells ist das in sich gesammelte impose an interpretation on it that may (or may Stellen, das seiner eigen Wesenswahrheit mit der not?) correspond to “the author’s intention” or Vergessenheit nachstellt, welches Nachstellen sich “the authoritative interpretation,” as discerned dadurch verstellt das es sich in das Bestellen alles by a sympathetic reading of the German origi- Anwesenden als dem Bestand entfaltet, sich in nal. diesem einrichtet und als dieser herrscht.18 THE TASK OF THE TRANSLATOR 325 © DePaul University 2013 And, yes, the German text is difficult, too! (If When insight happens by itself (sich ereignet), the not quite incomprehensible . . .) Even to a “na- human being is stricken in essence by the flash of tive” German speaker! Because Martin being. Human beings are caught in the flash of in- Heidegger uses a whole string of German sight . . . (Heidegger, “Die Kehre”)20 words (das Gestell, Stellen, Nachstellen, Bestellen, Bestand, etc.) in abstruse senses of- But is the “sense” and “meaning” of this dif- ten distant from their basic dictionary defini- ficult passage really accessible to the reader tions, which demand interpretation by the (or translatable by the translator) without ref- critic or reader. But, still, the German (or Eng- erence to Martin Heidegger’s contemporane- lish?) reader who pays close attention to the ous texts? And without reference to its world- German text immediately notices that these historical context? Probably not . . . Because, difficult words form semantic links in a signi- whatever Martin Heidegger’s attempts to fying chain (as nominalized forms of the Ger- make the text accessible to contemporary read- man verb stellen: “to set, place, position,” ers (or, maybe, by contrast, to make it inscruta- etc.), which guides the reader through the pas- ble and inaccessible to certain readers . . .); and sage and provides clues to its “sense” or whatever the efforts of contemporary readers “meaning.” (E.g.: It’s about something that’s to sympathetically hermeneutically recover “set” or “placed” [stellen]ormaybe“in- the “authoritative meaning” of the pristine stalled” [einrichtet] within existent beings “original” text; Heidegger’s essay, “Die [Anwesenden, “presences”] which somehow Kehre,” like the entire text of Einblick in das, “pursues” (nachstellt) them and yet “disguises was ist; and like the closely related texts, itself” [sich . . . verstellt] in “forgetfulness” “Überwindung der Metaphysik” and “Zur [Vergessenheit] even as it “dominates” Seinsfrage,” is (in addition to being a strictly [herrscht] them. And so on . . .) And if the dili- philosophical text) a cleverly coded political gent bilingual reader is able to follow the elab- commentary (that is, what’s called an orate twists and turns (tropes) of this signify- “Aesopian allegory”), which cryptically, ellip- ing chain through the various slippages and tically, obliquely (but sometimes scathingly slidings of its significations, the sympathetic directly) refers to the horrifying political reader can finally discern a coherent “mean- events of the World War II and Post War/Cold ing” (even a surplus or excess of “meaning”!) War era; with certain crucially placed refer- within the German text; which actually ences (like, for example, the references, in emerges from the text itself, instead of being “Das Ding,” to “der Explosion der Atom- imposed or extrapolated from the text by the bombe” and “einen Wasserstoffbombe” as “the translator or reader. Or so this translator and greatest horror” [das Entsetzliche]21 to con- interpreter might like to think . . . temporary humanity), which key the attentive reader in (in characteristically cryptic * * * * * Heideggerian fashion) to the scarcely “dis- concealed” (un-verborgene) or “un-veiled” A white flash! A white flash sparkled! 19 (ent-hullt) subtext behind the superficial text. Tatsuichiro Akizuki, Concentric Circles of Death Which is also, I’d argue, what’s behind the ap- The turning of the danger happens (ereignet) sud- parent obliquity and incomprehensibility of denly. In the turning, the lighting of the essence of this first paragraph from “Die Kehre.” And the being lights up. This sudden lighting-up is the cryptic key to this particular Aesopian allegory lightning-flash (das Blitzen). When it lights up, it is contained within that simple-seeming (but brings its own brightness with it. When the truth of actually most difficult) quintessentially being flashes in the turning of the danger, the es- Heideggerian word: Das Gestell or Das Ge- sence of being lights up. Then the truth of the es- Stell . . . sence of being turns in . . . When Martin Heidegger elsewhere refers to PHILOSOPHY TODAY 326 © DePaul University 2013 Das Gestell (in, for example, “Zur Gestell”or“das Ge-Stell” so completely Seinsfrage”), he’s describing what he calls changes the way contemporary human beings “the subjectity of the subject” or “the perceive themselves as subjects/objects that it subjecticity (not subjectivity) of the essence of supersedes and replaces their wholistic human man”22 that’s “in-stalled” or “im-planted” (by configuration (die Gestalt) with a technologi- a species of Althusserian interpellation) within cal simulacrum of the human type (das contemporary human beings as an effect of Gestell),27 which is “the most extreme their “im-place-ment” (“en-framing”) within [außerste] subjectivity that comes forth in the gridworks and networks of technological sur- fulfillment of modern metaphysics”;28 and veillance and control, which view all present which is in-stalled or im-planted within the existences and all human beings as simply dis- brain, nerves, and body of the human being at posable, expendable (human?) resources for such a profoundly subconscious or uncon- use in what Ernst Junger (Martin Heidegger’s scious level that it becomes something like a correspondent in “Zur Seinsfrage”) calls the technological prosthesis within the physical “total mobilization” (Totale Mobilmachung)23 body of contemporary humanity. “Western of the World War II (and subsequent Post-War/ technology” then also becomes something like Cold War) militarization effort. In this a congenital disease or post-traumatic disorder dystopian world (Stalinist Russia, Nazi Ger- within the biological and metaphysical human many, etc.), “Western technology” as “com- organism (the Cartesian animal rationale),29 pleted metaphysics” or “completed nihilism” which can’t be simply “overcome” has so completely replaced what previously (überwinden) by contemporary human beings, was called “nature” (fusi") and “culture” but must be somehow “recuperated” (from) or (nomo") and even what Martin Heidegger calls “gotten over” (verwinden) in that “confronta- “being” (das Sein) that it has effectively be- tion between technology and modern man” come “being” for contemporary humanity;24 whose final result exceeds human knowledge and so completely dominates contemporary or control. “Does this mean,” Martin human beings that it appears as a “destiny” or Heidegger asks, “that the human [being] is “fate” (Geschick)25 which compels human be- powerless against technology and delivered ings (through what Martin Heidegger, in over to it for better or worse? No,” he immedi- “Überwindung der Metaphysik” calls the “will ately answers; “it says the exact opposite.”30 to will”)26 without their being aware of this And yet, in a difficult passage whose “more- profoundly subconscious compulsion. What than-meaning-fullness” (or simply ambigu- William Lovitt translates as “Enframing” and ity?) causes problems for translators and inter- Andrew J. Mitchell as “positionality” (that is, preters, Martin Heidegger goes on to contra- das Gestell) is this terrible compulsion exerted dict himself again by insisting that upon contemporary human beings by the out- “Technology, whose essence is being itself, of-control technology of the Stalinist Commu- can never be overcome [überwunden] by the nist state or the Nazi military regime and its human [being]. That would indeed mean that Post-World War II counterparts; which is why the human [being] would be the master of be- it presents itself as what Martin Heidegger (cit- ing.”31 So how can it be (the translator or inter- ing Friedrich Hölderlin’s “Patmos“) calls “the preter must ask) that technology can’t be danger” (die Gefahr) to contemporary human- “overcome” (überwinden: “conquered, mas- ity. tered, surmounted,” etc.) by man, but still must What does it mean, then, to say that for Mar- be brought “spiritually in hand” (geistig in die tin Heidegger, Western technology “installs it- Hand)32 by human beings? As Martin self” or “implants itself” in contemporary hu- Heidegger explains in this crucially difficult manity? It means that, in Martin Heidegger’s passage from “Die Kehre” (as translated by post-Kehre texts, Western technology as “das Andrew J. Mitchell): THE TASK OF THE TRANSLATOR 327 © DePaul University 2013 Thereby technology is not humanly overcome; sages in comparable texts; when sometimes a much to the contrary, the essence of technology is single key-word or catch-phrase (verwunden!) converted [?] into its still-concealed truth. This will make the translation “work” and open the conversion is similar to what occurs when, in the text to a whole different interpretation. These human realm, a pain is converted.33 simple guidelines for translators and interpret- The astute reader is here left asking: Con- ers of Martin Heidegger’s difficult texts might verted? How can “a pain” be “converted”? then also help the interpreter and translator to Fortunately, William Lovitt’s translation gets arrive at a simpler, clearer, and more accessible closer to capturing the “sense” or “meaning” translation of the first paragraph from “Die of this difficult passage; as follows: Kehre”; as follows: The essence of the in-stall-ation (Das Gestell)is technology will not be overcome (überwunden)by the emplacement which gathers within itself and men. On the contrary, the coming to presence of implants its own truth within forgetting. But this technology will be surmounted (verwunden)ina emplacement disguises itself in that it unfolds way that restores it into its yet concealed truth. within the requisitioning of all present existences This restoring surmounting is similar to what hap- for stockpiling as standing reserves, installs itself pens when, in the human realm, one gets over grief 34 within them and dominates them. or pain. The parenthetical note conveys to the critical Well, okay. Yes, the passage is still obscure! reader that the key to this difficult passage is a But maybe not quite incomprehensible. Espe- correct translation of that favorite Heideg- cially if the diligent reader remembers that the gerian verb: verwinden. Unfortunately, this in-stall-ation or im-plant-ation (das Ge-stell) translation still obscures the simple, plain within “the subjectity of the [human] subject,” “meaning” of this crucially important passage which installs the human subject within tech- by misconstruing that crucial verb (whose nocratic gridworks and computer networks of “meaning” is admittedly ambiguous even in surveillance and control, is also what allows the German original). But it also allows the dil- “all present existences” (beings, things) to be igent reader to arrive at a workable translation, tracked and traced through their “requisition- which only requires changing a single key ing” by the military-corporate authorities; and word (verwunden: recuperated!); as follows: stockpiled in stockyards and warehouses (or in slave labor camps and concentration camps?) Technology will not be overcome by human be- as simply expendable war-materials and dis- ings. After all, that would mean human beings posable human resources for employment in were the masters of being. ...Technology will not the “total mobilization” of the technological be overcome by human beings. Instead, the es- military-industrial state. This is what Martin sence of technology will be recuperated in a way Heidegger, in “Überwindung der Meta- that restores it to its still hidden truth. This recuper- physik,” calls “the consumption of beings for ation is similar to what happens when a human be- the manufacturing of technology” (der ing “gets over” grief or pain. Verbrauch des Seienden für das Machen der This translation is, hopefully, simpler, Technik);35 which culminates in the reduction clearer, and more comprehensible than the pre- of the metaphysical human being (the Carte- viously available translations. (And, besides sian animal rationale) to “the most important that, it even makes sense!). There’s still no sub- raw material” (der wichtigste Rohstoff), “the stitute for old-fashioned “close reading” to subject of all consumption” (das Subjekt alles catch the subtleties and nuances of certain key Vernutzen)36; or simply to “a laboring animal” words (especially the überwinden/verwinden (arbeitenden Tier)37 in the Stalinist slave labor coupling) and compare them to other, equally camps and the Nazi concentration camps of difficult (but, finally, more accessible) pas- World War II. PHILOSOPHY TODAY 328 © DePaul University 2013 Martin Heidegger’s “Die Kehre,” then, be- ily readable as possible? Or is it, instead, to be sides being a difficult philosophical text, also completely faithful to the subtleties and nu- proves to be a cleverly allegorically coded ances of the pristine, original text? And to analysis of the technological infrastructure spare no circumlocution or multi-hyphenated (surveillance systems and computer networks, word, to eschew no excess verbiage (and to etc.) of the contemporary totalitarian state and fear no criticism or parody!), to bring the diffi- their effects on human subjects; which can be cult text into the contemporary vernacular, as translated and interpreted (“read”) as a pre- completely whole and intact as possible? Al- scient critique, not only of the Stalinist Soviet though there’s probably no simple, straight- Communist state or the German National So- forward answer to this simple question; none- cialist military regime; but of the Post War/ theless, two preliminary points might be tenta- Cold War national security state and its con- tively made before simply giving up on Martin temporary counterparts in the twenty-first cen- Heidegger’s more difficult texts. Or before fi- tury Post-Cold War world. To translate and in- nally settling for contemporary translations, terpret this text, it’s helpful to have some which (despite the best intentions) often ob- background both in Martin Heidegger’s con- scure and occlude (instead of clarifying) the temporaneous works (“Überwindung der complex, multifaceted “meaning(s)” of the Metaphysik,” “Zur Seinsfrage,” etc.); and in difficult text. the world-historical context of Stalinist Russia (1) Given that Saussurean linguistics and and Nazi Germany and the Post World War II/ French post-structuralist criticism have estab- Cold War world. Because Martin Heidegger’s lished that there’s no straightforward, one-to- texts (like all texts?) are not just scholarly, aca- one correspondence between “signifier” and demic texts; but political texts-in-the world; “signified” (or “signifier” and “referent”) in a whose “sense” and “meaning” is inescapably particular language; much less between differ- caught up in the cataclysmic events of their ent words (even etymologically related words) world-historical situation. Martin Heidegger’s in diverse different languages; the old-fash- texts are “worldly” and “histori[c]al” texts, ioned ideal of a straightforward, one-to-one both in their own world and ours. But Martin translation of even a comparatively simple Heidegger’s texts (again, like all texts) are also “original” text into a “foreign” language is es- subject to those catastrophic irruptions of con- sentially (thankfully!) obsolete (whether it temporary events (World War II, the Nazi Ho- ever was really practicable or workable, or locaust and Jewish Shoah, or the atomic bomb- not). And yet . . . ing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki)38 into our (2) It’s still probably preferable to strive, mortal human lives; which inexplicable events wherever possible, for a simple, clear, and di- subtend the “sense” and “meaning” of that rect translation; to avoid confusing the reader most difficult (and most un-translatable?) with unreadable circumlocutions; to avoid Heideggerian word: Ereignis . . . projecting or imposing a “foreign” interpretation on the text; and, especially, to seek, when- * * * * * ever possible, the best word (le mot juste) for The task of the translator consists in find- each “original” word (which isn’t always the ing, in the peculiar intention of the trans- same word, every time!); since sometimes a lated language, something in which an single word or simple phrase can make the dif- echo of the original is awakened . . . ference between rendering the whole passage Walter Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator” incomprehensible; or suddenly disclosing its cryptic, allegorically coded “meaning,” its What, then, is the task of the translator? Is it profoundly multifaceted “sense,” in that brief simply to supply a simple, clear, and accessi- lightning-like moment of “clearing” or “light- ble translation of the foreign text that’s as eas- ing” (“the lightning-flash of the truth of be- THE TASK OF THE TRANSLATOR 329 © DePaul University 2013 ing”)39 which is one of the greatest pleasures of Samen) of “pure speech” (reine Sprache)or Martin Heidegger’s texts. “true speech” (wahre Sprache) in every lan- If the contemporary translator were to fol- guage that allows their kinship (Verwandt- low Martin Heidegger’s own example in trans- schaft) and convergence (Konvergenz) in a per- lating, for example, Pre-Socratic Greek texts fect transparency and internal coherency of (“Der Spruch des Anaximander,” or the mystical intention: which is “what they want to Heraclitus fragments) into that peculiar dialect say”(was sie wollen sagen) . . . Still, every text of German metaphysics sometimes called is always changed in translation; and there’s “Heideggerian” (or “Heidegger-ese”?), the never a strict one-to-one correspondence contemporary translator might well decide (what Benjamin calls Ahnlichkeit) between the that the most obscure, esoteric, abstruse, and words and phrases of the original text; and the verbose translation was the best translation corresponding words and phrases in the trans- possible; since Martin Heidegger seldom em- lation.40 ploys simply one German word for one Greek It could even be said that all texts (whether word where three or four! might be (argu- simple or difficult) are simply untranslatable; ably?) better. But the Parvis Emad and Ken- because it’s never possible to write or speak neth Maly translation of the Contributions to (“say“) exactly the same thing in a different Philosophy (Of Enowning) has made contem- language. And especially with difficult texts, porary translators wary (and with good rea- it’s impossible to duplicate, in translation, the son!) of excessive devotion to “the master’s” complicated etymological word-play and mor- elaborate word-play and abstruse neologisms, phological and phonetic changes worked by his complex portmanteau words and multi-hy- the difficult text in the original language. But, phenations; which may finally render a text, still, in the final analysis, the proof of the suc- not simply difficult, but finally un-readable, cess (or un-success?) of the translation is not whether in English translation or in the Ger- whether it’s “faithful to” or “identical with” man original. the original; but whether it “works” in the In “Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers,” Walter translated language; whether it “speaks to” the Benjamin argues (if I read him aright) that the reader; and whether it awakens in the reader an translatability or un-translatability (Über- echo of the original text, despite being setzbarkeit or Un-Übersetzbarkeit)ofan translated into a strange, “foreign” language. “original” text depends not just upon whether Which isn’t to say that translation and inter- it finds its sympathetic reader or perfect trans- pretation are a matter of mystical illumination, lator in future generations; and whether it lets as Walter Benjamin (and Martin Heidegger?) itself (or demands to?) be translated; but also sometime seem to suggest. The task of the upon whether it “speaks to” the reader in the translator is still work. But when it works,it translated language. Because, despite what should still feel like mystical illumination. Benjamin believes is a certain seed (Kern, Both to the translator; and to the reader.

NOTES

1. Martin Heidegger,“Building Dwelling Thinking,” 3. Martin Heidegger’s Einblick in das, was ist (Insight trans. Albert Hofstadter, in Basic Works (New York: Into What Is) was first delivered as a cycle of four lec- Harper & Row, 1977), 324–25. tures at the Bremen Club in 1949. At that time, Mar- 2. Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy tin Heidegger was still recuperating from the Post- (From Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth War de-Nazification hearings and was barred from Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, teaching at university. For the circumstances behind 2000). the lectures, see “Ruckfall ins Gestell,” Der Spiegel PHILOSOPHY TODAY 330 © DePaul University 2013 14 (June 4, 1950). www.spiegel.de/print/d- 13. Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 70. 44447837.html. 14. Martin Heidegger, The Question of Being, trans. Wil- 4. German text from Martin Heidegger, Vorträge und liam Kluback and Jean T. Wilde (New Haven: Col- Aufsätze (Tübingen: Gunter Neske Pfullingen, lege and University Press, 1958), 104. 1954), 172; Englist translation: Bremen and 15. “The Turning,” in The Question Concerning Tech- Freiburg Lectures: Insight Into That Which Is and nology and Other Essays, 36–37. Basic Principles of Thinking, trans. Andrew J. 16. Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 64. Mitchell (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 17. In fact, Mitchell’s translation of The Bremen and 2012), 12. Freiburg Lectures does contain a “Translators’s 5. See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, “Doing Wrong,” in Foreword,” an “Editor’s Afterword,” and both a Heidegger, Art and Politics, trans. Chris Turner (Ox- “German-English Glossary” and an “English-Ger- ford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 34; Jean-François man Glossary.” But besides wondering if this “dan- Lyotard, Heidegger and “the jews,” trans. Andreas gerous supplement” doesn’t unnecessarily impose a Michel and Mark Roberts (Minneapolis: University translator’s interpretation on the reader, the critic of Minnesota Press, 1990); and Jacques Derrida, Of might also question whether the Heideggerian lexi- Spirit, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel con can be “nailed down” by the strict one-to-one Bowlby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, correspondence between German and English words 1989). “The Heidegger Controversy” has recently Mitchell’s textual apparatus prescribes for it. For ex- been revived by publication of Emmanuel Faye’s ample, the German word, “Verwindung,” which Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philoso- Mitchell translates as “conversion,” can mean “sur- phy in Light of the Unpublished Seminars of mounting” (Lovitt), “restoration” (Kluback and 1933–1935, trans. Michael B. Smith (New Haven: Wilde), “distortion” (Langenschiedt’s Dictionary), Yale University Press, 2009). For responses to Faye, “recuperation” (my translation), or “to get over” see Carlin Romano, “Heil Heidegger!” in The (Klett’s Dictionary), and other things, besides! de- Chronicle of Higher Education (October 18, 2009) pending on subtleties and nuances of context. (http:/chronicle.com/article/Heil-Heidegger-/ 18. Die Technik und die Kehre, (Tübingen: Gunter Neske 48806/); Peter E. Gordon’s review in Notre Dame Pfullingen, 1962), 37. Philosophical Reviews (March 13, 2010) (http:/ 19. Cited in Galway Kinnell, “The Fundamental Project ndpr.nd.edu/news/24316); Gregory Fried, “A Letter of Technology,” in The Past (Boston: Houghton to Emmanuel Faye,” Philosophy Today 55 (Fall Mifflin, 1985), 47. 2011): 219–52; Johannes Fritsche, “Heidegger’s Be- 20. Martin Heidegger, “Die Kehre,” in Die Technik und ing and Time and National Socialism,” Philosophy Die Kehre, 43, 45. Translation mine. Today 59 (Fall 2012): 255–84; and “Braucht die 21. Vorträge und Aufsätze, 164. This passage is deleted Philosophie den Nazi Heidegger?” Die Welt (De- from the Mitchell translation. cember 15, 2009) (http:/www.welt.de/kultur/ 22. The Question of Being, 55. article5528827). 23. Ibid., 40, 41. 6. Translated as “The Thing,” Bremen and Freiburg 24. Cf. “The Turning,” 44; “The Turn,” 68–69. Lectures, 5–22. 25. Cp. “The Turning,” 37 and n. 3; “The Turn,” 64–65. 7. Martin Heidegger, “Das Ding,” in Vorträge und Martin Heidegger’s employment of the German Aufsätze (Tubingen: Gunter Neske Pfullingen, words, Geschick (sometimes translated “destiny”) or 1954), 165, 166; Englist translation in Mitchell, Bre- Schicksal (“fate”) is often criticized for the fatalistic men and Freiburg Lectures, 6. (“Nazi”?) implications of those words. See, for ex- 8. Ibid. ample, Fritsche, “Heidegger’s Being and Time and 9. “The Turn,” Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 64–73. National Socialism,” 255, 269. I’d argue, by contrast, 10. Martin Heidegger, “The Turning,” trans. William that by repeatedly twisting and bending the semantic Lovitt, in The Question Concerning Technology and “meaning” of those words, Martin Heidegger is actu- Other Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), ally trying to wrestle them out of their “Nazi” context 36–49. and employ them in entirely different senses. But I’m 11. Ibid., 45. not sure that’s made clear by Mitchell’s “dispensa- 12. Heidegger, “Die Kehre,” 44. tion.” THE TASK OF THE TRANSLATOR 331 © DePaul University 2013 26. Vorträge und Aufsätze, 87–89. which I comment on at greater length in my forth- 27. Cf. The Question of Being, 31–69; esp. 63. coming book, Questioning Martin Heidegger: On 28. Ibid., 55. Western Metaphysics, Bhuddhist Ethics, and the 29. Cf. Vorträge und Aufsätze, 75–76. Fate of the Sentient Earth (Lanham, MD: University 30. “The Turn,” 64. Press of America, 2013). It suffices to observe that 31. Ibid, 65. the Der Spiegel reporter who attended Martin 32. Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Tech- Heidegger’s first presentation of the lecture “Die nology,” in The Question Concerning Technology Kehre” noted that: “Er [Heidegger] vergaß nicht die and Other Essays , 5; “Die Frage nach der Technik,” Atombombe zu erwahnen als einen Gestell, in dem in Die Technik und die Kehre, 7. sich alle Damonie des Technischen zusamendrangt.” 33. “The Turn,” 45. On the current reception of Martin Heidegger’s “Die 34. “The Turning,” 37. Kehre” in the German anti-nuclear movement, see 35. “Overcoming Metaphysics,” in The End of Philoso- phy, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & “Heidegger’s ‘Kehre’ und die Gefahren der Atom- Row, 1973), 103; Vortrage und Aufatze, 91. kraft,” Die Welt (June 3, 2011). http:/www.welt.de/ 36. “Overcoming Metaphysics,” 86, 104; Vorträge und kultur/article-13405347. Aufsätze, 72, 90. 39. “The Turn,” 70. 37. Ibid, 72. 40. Walter Benjamin, “Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers,” in 38. This is not the place to discuss the irruptions of con- Illuminationen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp temporary events into Martin Heidegger’s texts, Verlag,1955), 56–69. Translations mine.

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