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THE TASK of the TRANSLATOR, OR, HOW to SPEAK to MARTIN HEIDEGGER’S TEXTS Eric D THE TASK OF THE TRANSLATOR, OR, HOW TO SPEAK TO MARTIN HEIDEGGER’S TEXTS Eric D. Meyer There’s no muse of philosophy; and there’s texts! even in the twentieth century German no muse of translation, either. original in which they are written (which is ob- naturlich Walter Benjamin,“The Task of the Translator” viously not Goethe’s German! !). And an English translation of Martin Heidegger’s difficult texts is bound to be as Why are Martin Heidegger’s texts so diffi- challenging, as difficult (and, sometimes, as cult to translate? Several complicated answers obscure) as Martin Heidegger’s texts them- might be given to this simple-seeming ques- selves. Which doesn’t mean that the contem- tion. (1) Because Martin Heidegger’s texts em- porary translator should simply give up on the ploy a quirky, highly eccentric, idiosyncratic difficult texts as incomprehensible or un-trans- German dialect (Swabian? Friesian?Or latable. But the translator should realize, in maybe just Heideggerian?) that can’t easily be translating these difficult texts, it’s probably imitated (without risk of travesty or parody) in a comparable English dialect. (2) Because not possible to reduce them to a simple, Martin Heidegger’s texts frequently rely on straightforward, unequivocal translation; to a elaborate etymological word-play and elusive simple-minded crib or definitive gloss; or to esoteric punning on Old High German words what’s called, in the Western tradition of (Wahren, Walten, Wesen, etc.) or even contem- “Great Authors,” an authorized translation; porary German expressions (like the even when that translation is authorized by the quintessentially Heideggerian Dasein/das twentieth century’s Greatest Philosopher: Sein/das Sein des Seienden, etc.) which can’t Martin Heidegger himself. be duplicated in the English lexicon. (3) Be- And so, because Martin Heidegger’s texts cause Martin Heidegger’s texts frequently pro- are difficult (beyond most texts) to translate, ceed by breaking down (“de-construct-ing,” it’s maybe uncharitable to find fault with An- ab-bauen) even the simplest German words drew J. Mitchell’s translation of Martin (for example: bauen: Old High German buan, Heidegger’s Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: buri, buren, beuren, beuron, etc.)1 and twisting Insight Into That Which Is and Basic Princi- and distorting them (the essential meaning of ples of Thinking.3 This is one of Heidegger’s one of Martin Heidegger’s favorite verbs: most difficult collections because it contains verwinden) to make them disclose strange some of his most inscrutable, elusive texts meanings and obscure, unfamiliar senses pre- (like “Das Ding”) which carry his cryptical, el- viously un-heard of in those German words. liptical word-play to strange heights (or After the controversy surrounding Parvis depths?) of paradoxical simplicity and Emad and Kenneth Maly’s notoriously un- abstrusity (simple example: Das Ding dingt: readable translation of the Beiträge zur the thing things)4 and, at the same time, also Philosophie,2 the contemporary translator contains some of Martin Heidegger’s most di- might do well to contemplate these difficulties rectly political texts (like “Die Gefahr”), before embarking on the task of translating wherein Martin Heidegger (for maybe the only Martin’s Heidegger’s difficult texts. But the time after his brief controversial endorsement simple answer is: Martin Heidegger’s texts are of the German National Socialist Party and its difficult to translate because they’re difficult Führer, Adolf Hitler, in 1933) discusses diffi- PHILOSOPHY TODAY FALL 2013 323 © DePaul University 2013 cult issues like the Nazi holocaust and the Jew- ated portmanteau words) that provokes accu- ish Shoah (“the production of corpses in the sations, among Martin Heidegger’s critics, of gas chambers and the extermination camps”) persiflage and obscurantism; and probably which he’s frequently been accused, by French causes many neophyte readers to simply throw and American critics like Philippe Lacoue- up their hands (and throw down the book!) in Labarthe, Jean-Francois Lyotard, or Jacques despair of ever penetrating the superficially Derrida, during “The Heidegger Controversy” impenetrable jargon. For example: “In-flash- of the 1980s, of disguising, repressing, ignor- ing is the disclosing coming-to-pass within ing, or evading altogether.5 And it’s that Being itself. Disclosing coming-to-pass strange combination of esoteric, almost mysti- (Ereignis) is bringing to sight that brings into cal texts (like “Die Kehre”) with scathingly di- its own (eignende Eraugnis)” (24 English rect political texts (like “Das Gestell”) that words).11 Which translates: “Einblitz ist makes Einblick in das, was ist (along with, say, Ereignis im Sein selbst. Ereignis ist eignende “Überwindung der Metaphysik” and “Zur Eraugnis” (10 German words).12 Andrew J. Seinsfrage”) among the most important (and Mitchell disposes of this passage as follows: most neglected) of Martin Heidegger’s post- “Flashing entry is the event of appropriation in Kehre texts. And also among the most difficult beyng itself” (10 English words!).13 Whether to translate. something gets glossed over or lost in transla- tion here is a further question that might still be * * * * * asked. Still, the translation is, by comparison, Translations prove untranslatable not be- clarity and simplicity itself. cause of the difficulty, but because of the all- But, as has been said of T. W. Adorno’s dia- too-great fleetingness of the sense that clings lectical style in some of his more difficult to them . texts, what Fredric Jameson calls “the practice Walter Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator” of style” is often crucial to the text itself; and its difficulty and density essential to whatever In this respect, it’s difficult to find fault with “sense” or “meaning” the diligent reader Andrew J. Mitchell’s translation of, for exam- might extract from it. And if the diligent reader ple, “Das Ding”6 which is a model of simplic- takes time to study the Mitchell translation and ity and clarity even when tracking Martin the Lovitt translation of “The Turn” or “The Heidegger’s attempts to pin down “the Turning” and to compare them with Martin thingliness of the thing” (Das Dinghafte des Heidegger’s German text of “Die Kehre,” the Dinges, das Dingliche am Ding, etc.), through scrupulous reader will probably notice that the Old High German, Greek, Latin, and Indo- something does get lost in reducing the Ger- Germanic languages; and thus to disclose, be- man text to a simple, straightforward English hind the scientific observation or objective translation; and that, sometimes, the off-putt- representation of the thing, the Neo-Kantian ing style of the Lovitt translation is actually to “thing-in-itself”(das Ding an sich).7 The critic be preferred to the Mitchell version (despite or might quibble, for example, with Mitchell’s even because of its difficulty); because it more translation of “ein Stellen” (“a placement, pre- closely approximates the difficulty of Martin sentation, positioning,” etc.) as “a posing”8 but Heidegger’s original text. Or maybe (better that’s a minor point. And certainly, Andrew J. yet!), the reader might conclude, a third trans- Mitchell’s translation of “Die Kehre”9 com- lation!(or a fourth? or a fifth? etc.) might still pares favorably, for simplicity and clarity, with be necessary before Martin Heidegger’s text its previous translation by William Lovitt as has been made accessible in an English ver- “The Turning”10 which is admittedly prone to nacular that neither distracts from the text by that convoluted language (characterized by an its excessively complicated jargon; nor de- excessively clotted style and multiply-hyphen- tracts from the text by reducing it to a decep- PHILOSOPHY TODAY 324 © DePaul University 2013 tively simple, straightforward translation, at And now the Mitchell: the cost of diminishing “the essential more- The essence of positionality is the collected posi- than-meaningfulness” (die wesenhafte Mehr- tioning that pursues its own essential truth with deutigkeit)14 of the multiplicitous, polysemous forgetfulness, a pursuit disguised in that it unfolds German original. in the requisitioning of everything that presences For example, the critic might compare the as standing reserve, establishing itself in this and opening paragraphs of William Lovett’s “The 16 ruling as this. (41 words) Turning” and Andrew J. Mitchell’s “The Turn” with the first paragraph of Martin Heidegger’s “Die Kehre” and ask whether either of the Well, now! The Mitchell version is obviously available translations really captures the com- simpler, clearer, and more economical than the plexity and economy of the original German Lovitt! (Isn’t it?) And yet, is it really any more text, which, despite its difficulty, really says comprehensible? Whether to the astute critic much more with fewer words than either of the or to the common reader? And is there any less English versions. First, the Lovitt: necessity for a gloss or crib to explain the ob- scure words (“positionality,” “collected posi- The essence of Enframing is that setting-upon tioning,” “requisitioning,” “standing reserve” gathered into itself which entraps the truth of its etc.),17 which, however simple and clear, ap- own coming to presence with oblivion. This en- pear somehow disconnected from their con- trapping disguises itself, in that it develops into the text and disjoined from their “sense” and setting in order of everything that presences as “meaning”: like words floating in a void of ab- standing-reserve, establishes itself in the standing straction and indeterminacy. If “Enframing” reserve and rules as that standing reserve. 15 was vague, “positionality” is even vaguer. (At (55 words) least “Enframing” was vivid and active! And The critic might be forgiven for remarking also menacing . .) And although “requisition- that, absent some gloss or crib that explains ing” is a strong verb that somehow connects certain key words and phrases (“Enframing,” with “standing reserve,” it’s still not clear “setting-upon gathered into itself,” “coming to what’s being “requisitioned” (“everything that presence,” “standing reserve,” etc.), even the presences”?).
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