DOCSLIB.ORG

The Making of Economic Policy in the White House

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

The Making of Economic Policy in the White House Spring 2020 Simon Bowmaker Tuesdays and Thursdays [email protected] 11:00 am - 12:15 pm Office: KMEC 8-58 Office Hours: Wednesdays 2:00 pm - 4:00 pm Telephone: (212) 998-0478 Course Description This course shows students how economic policy gets made, and should get made, at the highest levels of federal government. It draws upon almost fifty years of economic policymaking, and the challenges that have confronted the men and women who have sat in positions of power in the Treasury, the Office of Management and Budget, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the National Economic Council. These challenges include the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the transition to a predominantly floating exchange rate world, the era of rampant inflation, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition to market economies, the shock of 9/11, the financial crisis of 2008 and the Great Recession that followed, as well as the trade war of 2018/2019. Lectures and discussions will lead to in-class exercises, in which students will role-play as advisors to US presidents. What is it like to sit in the Oval Office and discuss policy with the president? To know that your input into his decisions will impact millions of people? To know that the wrong advice could be calamitous? Students will learn how to analyze policy problems and design solutions, taking into account the multi-dimensional aspects of making federal policy and the many constraints upon those decisions, including those of Congress. As part of the learning process, students will also have the opportunity to hear from guest speakers who have worked at the very top of economic policymaking in the executive branch of government. Pre-requisites Microeconomics Economics of Global Business Reading Simon W. Bowmaker, When the President Calls: Conversations with Economic Policymakers, MIT Press (2019) The schedule below also contains additional recommended readings to supplement this text. Assessment Class participation: 35% Midterm: 40% Group role play: 25% Course Website I will maintain a website for the course using NYU Classes. The website will include announcements and downloadable files with the class lectures. Classroom Norms Laptops, cell phones, Smartphones and other electronic devices are a disturbance to both students and professors. All electronic devices must be turned off prior to the start of each class meeting. Moreover, all electronic devices must be out of sight when we have a guest speaker in class. Class participation I strongly encourage students to participate in class by answering questions that I pose and by posing questions of their own. In the evaluation, quality is more important than quantity. In addition, the evaluation of class participation could be affected adversely by lack of attendance or creating negative classroom externalities (see Classroom Norms above). Ethical Guidelines All students are expected to follow the Stern Code of Conduct: (http://www.stern.nyu.edu/uc/codeofconduct) A student’s responsibilities include, but are not limited to, the following: 1. A duty to acknowledge the work and efforts of others when submitting work as one’s own. Ideas, data, direct quotations, paraphrasing, creative expression, or any other incorporation of the work of others must be clearly referenced. 2. A duty to exercise the utmost integrity when preparing for and completing examinations, including an obligation to report any observed violations. Students with Disabilities Students whose class performance may be affected due to a disability should notify me immediately so that arrangements can be made in consultation with the Henry and Lucy Moses Center for Students with Disabilities http://www.nyu.edu/csd/ to accommodate their needs. Course Schedule and Readings (to be completed before class) Tuesday, January 28: Introduction Bowmaker, Simon W. (2019), ‘Introduction,’ When the President Calls: Conversations with Economic Policymakers, MIT Press, pp. 1-6. Thursday, January 30: The Presidential Establishment Brianne Gorod (2019), ‘The Need for Congressional Oversight Goes Far Beyond Impeachment,’ The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/future-congressional-oversight-risk/598996/ Tuesday, February 4: The Treasury, CEA, OMB, and NEC Porter, Roger B. (1997), ‘Presidents and Economists: The Council of Economic Advisers,’ American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 87, No. 2 (May), pp. 103-106. Porter, Roger B. (2017), Remarks from “The Council of Economic Advisers: 70 years of advising the president.” https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/remarks-from-the-council-of-economic-advisers-70-years- of-advising-the-president/ Thursday, February 6: The Evolution of the American Presidency John Dickerson (2018), ‘The hardest job in the world,’ The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/05/a-broken-office/556883/ Tuesday, February 11: Guest Speaker (Brad Setser) Brad W. Setser is the Steven A. Tananbaum senior fellow for international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations. His expertise includes macroeconomics, global capital flows, financial vulnerability analysis, sovereign debt restructuring, and the management of financial crises. Dr. Setser served as the deputy assistant secretary for international economic analysis in the U.S. Treasury from 2011 to 2015, where he worked on Europe’s financial crisis, currency policy, financial sanctions, commodity shocks, and Puerto Rico’s debt crisis. He was previously the director for international economics, serving jointly on the staff of the National Economic Council and the National Security Council. Dr. Setser was an international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in 2003, and a fellow from 2007 to 2009. He also has been the director of global research for Roubini Global Economics and a visiting scholar at the International Monetary Fund. He holds a BA from Harvard University, a master’s from Sciences-Po, and an MA and PhD in international relations from Oxford University. Thursday, February 13: The Presidency of Richard Nixon Bowmaker, Simon W. (2019), ‘Richard Nixon Administration,’ When the President Calls: Conversations with Economic Policymakers, MIT Press, pp. 9-39. McCracken, Paul W. (1996), ‘Economic Policy in the Nixon Years,’ Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 165-177. Tuesday, February 18: The Presidency of Gerald Ford Bowmaker, Simon W. (2019), ‘Gerald Ford Administration,’ When the President Calls: Conversations with Economic Policymakers, MIT Press, pp. 41-57. Moran, Andrew D. (2011), ‘More than a Caretaker: The Economic Policy of Gerald R. Ford,’ Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 39-63. Thursday, February 20: Guest Speaker (Amias Gerety) Amias Gerety is a Partner at QED Investors. Most recently, he served as President Obama’s nominee and as Acting Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions at the Department of the Treasury. In that role, he was the lead advisor to the Secretary on policies affecting financial institutions. He also oversaw a number of programs focused on supporting small business lending and community development. He previously served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Financial Stability Oversight Council, an interagency group of financial regulators charged with monitoring and mitigating potential threats to financial stability. Prior to his eight-year career at the Treasury, Mr. Gerety was a management consultant at Oliver Wyman. He also served in a number of policy roles and worked in East Africa for Save the Children. Mr. Gerety is a recipient of the Alexander Hamilton award, the Treasury’s highest honor. He graduated Magna Cum Laude from Harvard University with a BA in Social Studies. Tuesday, February 25: Role Play (Nixon and Ford) Thursday, February 27: The Presidency of Jimmy Carter Bowmaker, Simon W. (2019), ‘Jimmy Carter Administration,’ When the President Calls: Conversations with Economic Policymakers, MIT Press, pp. 59-111. Tuesday, March 3: Guest Speaker (Steve Hanke) Steve H. Hanke is a Professor of Applied Economics at The Johns Hopkins University. He is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Troubled Currencies Project at the Cato Institute, a Senior Advisor at the Renmin University of China’s International Monetary Research Institute in Beijing, a Special Counselor to the Center for Financial Stability in New York, a contributing editor at Central Banking in London, and a contributor at Forbes. In the past, Professor Hanke taught economics at the Colorado School of Mines and at the University of California, Berkeley. He served as a Member of the Governor’s Council of Economic Advisers in Maryland in 1976 – 77, as a Senior Economist on President Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers in 1981 – 82, and as a Senior Advisor to the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress in 1984 – 88. Professor Hanke served as a State Counselor to both the Republic of Lithuania in 1994 – 96 and the Republic of Montenegro in 1999 – 2003. He was also an Advisor to the Presidents of Bulgaria in 1997 – 2002, Venezuela in 1995 – 96, and Indonesia in 1998. He played an important role in establishing new currency regimes in Argentina, Estonia, Bulgaria, Bosnia‐Herzegovina, Ecuador, Lithuania, and Montenegro. Professor Hanke has also held senior appointments in the governments of many other countries, including Albania, Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates, and Yugoslavia. Thursday, March 5: Guest Speakers (David Kamin and Michael Pyle) David Kamin is Professor of Law at New York University School of Law. His scholarship focuses on budget and tax policy. Prior to joining NYU, Kamin worked in President Obama’s administration from 2009 to 2012. There, he served as Special Assistant to the President for Economic Policy at the White House, working to coordinate tax and budget policy. Prior to that, Professor Kamin worked as special assistant, and later adviser, to the Director of the US Office of Management and Budget. He has also worked at the Committee for Economic Development and the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, focusing on deficit projections, tax legislation and social security reform in those positions.
Recommended publications
  • COVID-19 and Economic Policy Toward the New Normal: a Monetary-Fiscal Nexus After the Crisis?

    COVID-19 and Economic Policy Toward the New Normal: a Monetary-Fiscal Nexus After the Crisis?

    IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS Requested by the ECON committee Monetar y Dialogue Papers, November 2020 COVID-19 and Economic Policy Toward the New Normal: A Monetary-Fiscal Nexus after the Crisis? Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies Directorate-General for Internal Policies Author: Thomas MARMEFELT EN PE 658.193 - November 2020 COVID-19 and Economic Policy Toward the New Normal: A Monetary-Fiscal Nexus after the Crisis? Monetary Dialogue Papers, November 2020 Abstract Current developments during the COVID-19 pandemic involve strongly complementary monetary and fiscal policy, but both as responses to COVID-19 and not the outcome of an emergent monetary-fiscal nexus. Therefore, the ECB maintains its independence by using unconventional monetary policy measures to reach price stability, according to its mandate. This document was provided by the Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) ahead of the Monetary Dialogue with the ECB President on 19 November 2020. This document was requested by the European Parliament's committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON). AUTHOR Thomas MARMEFELT, CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research (Warsaw, Poland) and University of Södertörn (Huddinge, Sweden) ADMINISTRATOR RESPONSIBLE Drazen RAKIC EDITORIAL ASSISTANT Janetta CUJKOVA LINGUISTIC VERSIONS Original: EN ABOUT THE EDITOR Policy departments provide in-house and external expertise to support European Parliament committees
  • Uncertainty and Hyperinflation: European Inflation Dynamics After World War I

    Uncertainty and Hyperinflation: European Inflation Dynamics After World War I

    FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO WORKING PAPER SERIES Uncertainty and Hyperinflation: European Inflation Dynamics after World War I Jose A. Lopez Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Kris James Mitchener Santa Clara University CAGE, CEPR, CES-ifo & NBER June 2018 Working Paper 2018-06 https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/working-papers/2018/06/ Suggested citation: Lopez, Jose A., Kris James Mitchener. 2018. “Uncertainty and Hyperinflation: European Inflation Dynamics after World War I,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2018-06. https://doi.org/10.24148/wp2018-06 The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Uncertainty and Hyperinflation: European Inflation Dynamics after World War I Jose A. Lopez Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Kris James Mitchener Santa Clara University CAGE, CEPR, CES-ifo & NBER* May 9, 2018 ABSTRACT. Fiscal deficits, elevated debt-to-GDP ratios, and high inflation rates suggest hyperinflation could have potentially emerged in many European countries after World War I. We demonstrate that economic policy uncertainty was instrumental in pushing a subset of European countries into hyperinflation shortly after the end of the war. Germany, Austria, Poland, and Hungary (GAPH) suffered from frequent uncertainty shocks – and correspondingly high levels of uncertainty – caused by protracted political negotiations over reparations payments, the apportionment of the Austro-Hungarian debt, and border disputes. In contrast, other European countries exhibited lower levels of measured uncertainty between 1919 and 1925, allowing them more capacity with which to implement credible commitments to their fiscal and monetary policies.
  • Estimating the Effects of Fiscal Policy in OECD Countries

    Estimating the Effects of Fiscal Policy in OECD Countries

    Estimating the e®ects of ¯scal policy in OECD countries Roberto Perotti¤ This version: November 2004 Abstract This paper studies the e®ects of ¯scal policy on GDP, in°ation and interest rates in 5 OECD countries, using a structural Vector Autoregression approach. Its main results can be summarized as follows: 1) The e®ects of ¯scal policy on GDP tend to be small: government spending multipliers larger than 1 can be estimated only in the US in the pre-1980 period. 2) There is no evidence that tax cuts work faster or more e®ectively than spending increases. 3) The e®ects of government spending shocks and tax cuts on GDP and its components have become substantially weaker over time; in the post-1980 period these e®ects are mostly negative, particularly on private investment. 4) Only in the post-1980 period is there evidence of positive e®ects of government spending on long interest rates. In fact, when the real interest rate is held constant in the impulse responses, much of the decline in the response of GDP in the post-1980 period in the US and UK disappears. 5) Under plausible values of its price elasticity, government spending typically has small e®ects on in°ation. 6) Both the decline in the variance of the ¯scal shocks and the change in their transmission mechanism contribute to the decline in the variance of GDP after 1980. ¤IGIER - Universitµa Bocconi and Centre for Economic Policy Research. I thank Alberto Alesina, Olivier Blanchard, Fabio Canova, Zvi Eckstein, Jon Faust, Carlo Favero, Jordi Gal¶³, Daniel Gros, Bruce Hansen, Fumio Hayashi, Ilian Mihov, Chris Sims, Jim Stock and Mark Watson for helpful comments and suggestions.
  • The Economic Policy Response to the Covid-19 Crisis Note for Discussion April 9, 2020 *

    The Economic Policy Response to the Covid-19 Crisis Note for Discussion April 9, 2020 *

    The economic policy response to the Covid-19 crisis Note for discussion April 9, 2020 * The dramatic social distancing measures that were needed to contain the Covid-19 outbreak and save lives have resulted in a major economic crisis. The magnitude and spread of the global decline in output exceeds that triggered by the Global Financial Crisis, if not the Great Depression. But the very nature of the crisis is unprecedented. As in previous major downturns, developing countries are facing a decline in foreign demand and a drop of commodity prices. They are also being locked out from global financial markets, suffer capital outflows and experience a fall of remittances. But in addition to the demand shortfall and the financial stress, this new crisis involves a major supply shock. Domestically, social distancing measures drastically reduce labor supply and increase transaction costs. Internationally, supply chains break down, which may result in shortages of key inputs and potentially in higher food prices. Another important difference with previous crises is the potential, recurrent return of the supply shock until a vaccine is developed, weighing on the prospects for recovery. A crisis of this magnitude and nature is not going to be reverted quickly. Even once the crisis bottoms out, widespread bankruptcies, increased unemployment and under-employment, and a depressed investment climate will make its effects persist. Moreover, developing countries are confronting this crisis from a weaker position compared to the Global Financial Crisis. Some financial sectors are vulnerable, corporate debt is generally high, and sovereign debt levels often constrain the fiscal space available to governments.
  • On Israel's "Hyperinflation"

    On Israel's "Hyperinflation"

    SAE./No.127/September 2018 Studies in Applied Economics ON ISRAEL'S "HYPERINFLATION" Tal Boger Johns Hopkins Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business Enterprise On Israel's \Hyperinflation” Tal Boger∗ Johns Hopkins University Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business Enterprise. September 2018. Abstract Affected by the worldwide ”Stagflation” of the 1970s caused by sharp oil price rises in 1973 and 1979, Israel experienced elevated inflation rates in the 1970s. These inflation rates not only continued but also accelerated into the 1980s, as Israel saw its inflation hit triple digits at the turn of the decade. This inflation worsened, and peaked in 1984 and 1985. Noticing the sharply rising in- flation rates in Israel, many journalists and academics dubbed Israel's bout of inflation a hyperinflation, and have questioned its exclusion from the Hanke-Krus World Hyperinfla- tion Table. However, an analysis of Israel's CPI data - as reported by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics - shows that Israel's inflation rates fell short of hyperinflation by a sizable margin. Analyzing Israel's primary CPI data, we find conclusive evidence that Israel did not hyperinflate in the 1980s, despite many credible analyses to the contrary. Keywords: Hyperinflation, Israeli inflation 1. Introduction On October 14, 1984, Hobart Rowen wrote an article for The Washington Post titled \Israel's Hyperinflation: Ravaged State of Economy a Threat to Israel's Survival." In the article, Rowen writes that \[Israel] now must deal with the reality of a hyperinflation that is running over 400 percent, and in a few days may be measured at the incomprehensible level ∗Tal Boger is a senior at Beth Tfiloh Dahan Community High School.
  • CURRICULUM VITAE SHERRY A. GLIED September 7, 2012 Harvard University, Ph.D., Economics, 1990 Dissertation: the Economics of He

    CURRICULUM VITAE SHERRY A. GLIED September 7, 2012 Harvard University, Ph.D., Economics, 1990 Dissertation: the Economics of He

    Glied CURRICULUM VITAE SHERRY A. GLIED September 7, 2012 ACADEMIC TRAINING Harvard University, Ph.D., Economics, 1990 Dissertation: The Economics of Health Status and Labor Market Outcomes. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1991. Sponsor: David E. Bloom University of Toronto, M.A., Economics, 1985 Yale University, B.A., Economics, 1982 ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL APPOINTMENTS August 2012 - current Professor Department of Health Policy and Management Mailman School of Public Health Columbia University July 2010 – August 2012 Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation Office of the Secretary U.S. Department of Health & Human Services July 2002-June 2010 Professor and Chair (through September 2009) (currently on leave) Department of Health Policy and Management Mailman School of Public Health Columbia University July 1998-July 2002 Associate Professor and Chair Department of Health Policy and Management Joseph L. Mailman School of Public Health Columbia University 1 Glied September 2000 Visiting Faculty University of Toronto Law School January 1991-June 1998 Assistant Professor of Public Health Division of Health Policy and Management Columbia School of Public Health July 1991 – June 1998 Assistant Professor of Economics Columbia University August 1996 – July 1997 Visiting Assistant Professor Department of Health Care Policy Harvard Medical School September 1989 – December 1990 Associate in Public Health Division of Health Policy and Management Columbia School of Public Health PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIETIES American College of Healthcare Executives American Economics Association AcademyHealth American Public Health Association Association for Public Policy and Management Professional Appointments January 1999-September 2009: Member, MacArthur Foundation Initiative on Mental Health Policy Research February 1993 – May 1993: Co-Chair, Global Budgets and Economic Impacts Working Groups, The President’s Health Care Task Force, Washington, D.C.
  • Monetary Policy and the Long Boom

    Monetary Policy and the Long Boom

    NOVEMBER/DECEMBER1998 John B. Taylor is a professor of economics at Stanford University. The article that follows is a reprint of The Homer Jones Lecture delivered at Southern Illinois University-Edwardsville on April 16, 1998. Kent Koch provided research assistance. this lecture. This month (April 1998) the Monetary Policy United States economy celebrates seven years of economic expansion. By definition and The Long an economic expansion is the period between recessions; that is, a period of con- Boom tinued growth without a recession. The last recession in the United States ended in April 1991, so as of this April we have had seven John B. Taylor years of expansion and we are still going. This current expansion is a record breaker: regret that I never had the opportunity to to be exact it is the second longest peacetime work or study with Homer Jones. But I expansion in American history. Iknow people who worked and studied with But what is more unusual is that this him, and I have enjoyed talking with them and current expansion was preceded by the reading about their recollections of Homer first longest peacetime expansion in Amer- Jones. What is most striking to me, of all that ican history. That expansion began in has been said and written about Homer Jones, November 1982 and continued through is his incessant striving to learn more about August 1990. It lasted seven years and economics and his use of rigorous economic eight months. Although the 1980s expansion research to improve the practical operation of was the first longest peacetime expansion in economic policy.
  • Economic Integration, Macroeconomic Policy and Micro Markets*

    Economic Integration, Macroeconomic Policy and Micro Markets*

    Economic integration, macroeconomic policy and micro markets¤ Christopher Loewald South African National Treasury ABSTRACT: The New Partnership For Africa’s Development (NEPAD) has been established to provide a substantive platform for African countries to initiate a series of policy steps toward more rapid economic growth and poverty reduction. Critics have argued that some of the policies, especially regional integration, will do more harm than good, and have cast the debate as a binary choice between the open and closed economy. Neither a fully closed nor a fully open economy is likely to maximize welfare and growth. In contrast to the notion of policy autonomy in the closed economy, the closed economy requires far more stringent application of price controls, monetary, …scal, and competition policies than do more open economies to prevent rising in‡ation and worsening income distribution. On balance, more open trade and capital relationships are preferred, because they help to ensure consistency between macroeconomic policy and microeconomic behaviour and are more conducive to improving income distribution. ¤Dr Christopher Loewald is Chief Director of International Economics in the National Treasury. The views and opinions in this paper are solely those of the author. They should not be attributed to the National Treasury. The author thanks Kevin Fletcher, Johann Fedderke, Adam Schwartzman and John Luiz for their helpful comments. Economic integration, macroeconomic policy and micro markets 1 1 Introduction Over the past year, NEPAD has emerged as the primary vehicle for bringing African countries into what might be described as the ‘reformist’ wing of the world’s economic and political community.
  • Venezuela's Tragic Meltdown Hearing

    Venezuela's Tragic Meltdown Hearing

    VENEZUELA’S TRAGIC MELTDOWN HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION MARCH 28, 2017 Serial No. 115–13 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 24–831PDF WASHINGTON : 2017 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:45 May 02, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 F:\WORK\_WH\032817\24831 SHIRL COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina AMI BERA, California MO BROOKS, Alabama LOIS FRANKEL, Florida PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas RON DESANTIS, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania TED S. YOHO, Florida DINA TITUS, Nevada ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois NORMA J.
  • The Economic Decline of Zimbabwe Has Mainly Been Caused by Poor Monetary Policies and Failure of Fiscal Policies to Control the Budget Deficit

    The Economic Decline of Zimbabwe Has Mainly Been Caused by Poor Monetary Policies and Failure of Fiscal Policies to Control the Budget Deficit

    Volume 3 Article 9 2009 The conomicE Decline of Zimbabwe Chidochashe L. Munangagwa Gettysburg College Class of 2011 Follow this and additional works at: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/ger Part of the African Studies Commons, International Economics Commons, Public Economics Commons, and the Regional Economics Commons Share feedback about the accessibility of this item. Munangagwa, Chidochashe L. (2009) "The cE onomic Decline of Zimbabwe," Gettysburg Economic Review: Vol. 3 , Article 9. Available at: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/ger/vol3/iss1/9 This open access article is brought to you by The uC pola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College. It has been accepted for inclusion by an authorized administrator of The uC pola. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The conomicE Decline of Zimbabwe Abstract For the past decade, Zimbabwe has been experiencing an economic decline that has resulted in an inflation rate of 231 million percent and an unemployment rate of over 90 percent. Past research has concluded that the economic decline of Zimbabwe has mainly been caused by poor monetary policies and failure of fiscal policies to control the budget deficit. This research aimed to closely examine some of these policies that the Zimbabwean government implemented, the effects of these policies on economic activity, employment and inflation levels in the country. By interviewing many economic analysts in Zimbabwe, I managed to gather the main causes of the country’s decline. In an effort to understand the effects of inflation on a country, I looked at other developing countries that have survived similar economic challenges and assessed some of the steps they took to overcome the challenges.
  • CHAPTER 18 Economic Policy

    CHAPTER 18 Economic Policy

    CHAPTER 18 Economic Policy REVIEWING THE CHAPTER CHAPTER FOCUS The purpose of this chapter is to introduce you to an area of public policy that affects everyone in one way or another: economic policy. The chapter covers both the divided attitudes that voters have toward a “good” economy and the competing theories that economists offer on how to obtain a good economy. The various agencies that participate in formulating government economic policy are reviewed, along with the many stages of producing and implementing the annual federal budget. Finally, the controversial areas of government spending and tax reform are discussed. After reading and reviewing the material in this chapter, you should be able to do each of the following: 1. Show how voters have contradictory attitudes regarding their own and others’ economic benefits. 2. List and briefly explain the four competing economic theories discussed in the chapter. 3. Assess the nature and effect of Reaganomics. 4. List the four major federal government agencies involved in setting economic policy, and explain the role of each. 5. Analyze federal fiscal policy in terms of the text’s four categories of politics. 6. Trace the history of federal government budgeting practices up to the present day. 7. Comment on the prospects and the desirability of lowering federal spending and reforming the income tax. STUDY OUTLINE I. Introduction A. Deficit spending, a feature of the government since 1960 B. National debt is the total of all deficits C. Explanations 1. Economic reason a) Debt is a concern only if payments cannot be met b) Or the currency is no longer regarded as stable and valuable c) Interest on the debt is affordable—8 percent of all federal expenditures d) Future economic demands on the government may create a problem 2.
  • “Wrong Way” Krugman Flies Again, and Again

    “Wrong Way” Krugman Flies Again, and Again

    Perspective “Wrong Way” Krugman Flies Again, and Again sequiturs. When the big guns sound off, they are heard. In the political sphere, the fiscal factoid is catching on. France has just dumped an economically incoherent Nicolas Sarkozy and replaced him with François Hollande, who is the first Socialist to reside in the Élysée Palace since François Mitterrand did 17 years ago. Not surprisingly, President Hollande is proudly flying the fiscal stimulus flag. And that’s not all. Greece has just announced that a government couldn’t be cobbled together after the 6 May 2012 elections, and that new elections would be held on 17 June 2012. In the wake of the May elections, the fly in the ointment has been the surge in support for the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA), which is lead by Alexis Tsipras. Where does SYRIZA stand? A top adviser to he infamous pilot Douglas Corrigan was dubbed “Wrong Mr. Tsipras, Prof. Euclid Tsakalotos couldn’t have Way” in 1938, after he filed a flight plan that would have taken been clearer when he recently rejected fiscal him on a transcontinental flight from New York to Long austerity and embraced the fiscal factoid. To Beach, California. Instead, Wrong Way took a transoceanic finance more government spending, he asserted: flight from New York to Dublin, Ireland. “We need a central bank that prints money, euro Corrigan’s “Wrong Way” attribution should be applied to the fiscalists bonds, and a system that transfers money from led by Nobelist, Princeton professor and hyper-productive New York Times rich countries to poor countries.” It looks like columnist Paul Krugman.