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Home , Douglas Hurd, John Major, John Major (philosopher), Michael Ancram

The Conservative Party's Approach to Devolution in 1997-1998

I

The Conservative Party’s approach to devolution in 1997-1998 had three strands: a vindication of existing governance, support for limited reform, and antipathy to devolved institutions. Each relied, in turn, on three concepts: the status quo, the Union, and parliamentary sovereignty.

The focus of this paper is the first strand: vindication of existing governance. After setting out its methodology, the paper considers the contribution of the three concepts to this defence. It then briefly indicates how these concepts informed the remaining strands: support for limited reform and antipathy to devolved institutions.

II

John Major rivalled his predecessor, , in fervent advocacy of the Union and firm opposition to devolution.1 He confessed to a deep worry about separatism and resolved to confront it at the General Election in 1992.2 After an unexpected victory, Major was convinced that the dual strategy advocated by his Scottish Secretary, Ian Lang – a trenchant defence of present arrangements, while ‘taking stock’ of governance – had electoral appeal; accordingly, the two elements remained leitmotifs of Major’s second term and, ultimately, the election campaign in 1997.3 It failed: the Conservative Party suffered its worst defeat for ninety years.

Moreover, in opposition for the first time in eighteen years, the Party had few resources to assist in its new role: half the parliamentary party had been lost, with no representation outside England; the Shadow Cabinet lacked key figures, such as willing spokesmen for and Wales; Major had announced his resignation, leaving Conservatives rudderless and distracted; many staff had left for the private sector or one of the five leadership campaigns; and there was little personal, and no institutional, memory of opposition. Within two weeks, the frontbench had to respond to the Queen’s Speech and the very first piece of legislation: the Referendum (Scotland and Wales) Bill, paving the way for devolution.4

However, the Party had at least one asset on which to draw: the conservative tradition. Policy developed through what Levi-Strauss called bricolage: the creation of something new from existing resources.5 This meant that Conservatives enjoyed situated agency rather than autonomy; traditions simultaneously facilitated and constrained innovation.6 Nonetheless, the 1 existence of several inheritances within, let alone beyond, the conservative family – notably Whig and Liberal Unionist alongside Tory – afforded space for radical choice between, as well as grounded preference within, such ‘webs of significance’.7

Tradition was abridged as ideology, offering a balance of intellectual rigour, on the one hand, and practical application, on the other; it occupied the point at which the square blueprint of ideas met the crooked timber of humanity.8 Such a Politische Weltanschauung should not be dismissed as a partisan view of reality; it was, in fact, an essential device that offered prejudice, therapy, and cynosures.9

Prejudice guided the Party through their engagement with devolution; the challenge, of course, was to ensure the policy was reasonable not only in their frame but also that of the electorate.10 Figurative accounts, rather than critical thought, were a typical expedient.11 First, metonyms introduced novel connotations.12 Conservatives referred to ‘nationalists’ (never ‘patriots’) who pursued ‘separation’ (rather than ‘independence’); equally, the new legislatures were ‘talking shops’ and the accompanying executives ‘bureaucracy’. Second, metaphors emphasised some aspects of experience and discounted others.13 The Party envisaged a ‘slippery slope’ to independence, feared the ‘break up’ of the country, and embarked upon a ‘Battle for Britain’. Third, narratives organised, connected, and explained facts by allusion; as such, they were related to myth.14 Conservatives accused opponents of wanting to create a ‘Bundesrepublik Britannien’ within a ‘Europe of the Regions’, basing this part of their offensive on supposition, rather than evidence.

Therapy addressed strains between centre and periphery.15 First, it offered catharsis in portraying a symbolic opponent: for Conservatives, the enemy was the nationalist seeking to break up the .16 Second, it boosted morale by denying or legitimising any disequilibrium: the Party denied there was any demand for self-government before the referendum and then disputed the proposals, rather than principle, after the poll.17 Third, it generated solidarity by claiming the entire polity was under threat: Conservatives sought to protect the interests of all four nations – and, above all, the United Kingdom.18 Fourth, it provided advocacy of neglected issues: the Party focused on the instability of devolution and consequent danger of separation.19 Fifth, it dispensed closure by painting the contingent as necessary: for Conservatives, union governance from Westminster was the only viable settlement.20 2

Cynosures were rallying points.21 First, they reinforced loyalty by attracting supporters who shared one attitude before using group reinforcement to extend this to a wider outlook.22 As the lone challenger to devolution, the Party courted unionists who might then endorse its wider manifesto. Second, they encouraged unity with a narrative outwith the dominant political culture that ideally featured a menacing ‘other’.23 Conservatives portrayed devolution as neither self-government nor local patriotism, but as a halfway house to the divorce vaunted by separatists. Third, they legitimated authority through structure, myth, and intimation.24 With no MPs and lost referendums in Scotland and Wales, the frontbench invited rational-legal authority by locating sovereignty at Westminster, where they were Her Majesty’s Opposition; sought traditional authority by portraying themselves as historic defenders of the nation; and pursued charismatic authority by occupying the role of statesmen acting in the national, rather than party, interest.

Ideology was comprised of concepts; as Freeden shows, they mutually constituted, intersected, and clustered.25 Hence, even a nuanced change in meaning or a subtle variation in structure could yield fundamentally different results.26 Freeden offers a categorisation: core concepts were jointly, but not severally, essential to an ideology; adjacent concepts were secondary, but finessed and anchored the core; peripheral concepts were concrete and adapted frequently to the environment.27 Conservative policy placed the status quo, the Union, and parliamentary sovereignty at the core; accumulated wisdom, civic patriotism, and equal membership were adjacent; common law, needs allocation, and West Lothian were peripheral.

Concepts were reformulated to address, rather than ignore, dilemmas.28 Facing the reality of devolution, the Party had to update its understanding of the status quo, the Union, and parliamentary sovereignty – as well as accommodate others, such as concordats. Scope for creativity flowed from the essential contestability, of concepts; this effect was multiplied by several clustering together as super-concepts.29 A good example is the way in which Conservatives built a civic patriotism around a normative retelling of the Whig history of England.

Ambiguity occurred where an expression might be read in several ways, which the Party sometimes intended in order to secure a broad range of support.30 Did needs-based funding, for instance, improve or worsen the situation in Scotland and Wales? Vagueness resulted from boundary issues, which could not be solved if concepts were multi-dimensional.31 The West 3

Lothian Question brought this into particular focus: could a reduction in the number of MPs from Scotland and Wales somehow address the asymmetry of devolution?

Decontestation of concepts was essential, since their manipulation and prioritisation settled issues.32 The Party intervened in debates by providing substantive conceptions to occupy the formal concepts, thereby seeking mastery of political vocabulary by legitimising some interpretations and delegitimising others. 33 Conservatives seized patriotism as their own, juxtaposing a nationalism that encompassed obsessed separatists and foolhardy devolutionists. Yet equilibria were always incomplete, momentary, and unstable; political discourse was on a quest for finality that it could never complete.34 The Party sought a constitutional settlement to halt the journey to separation, yet feared a ratchet as powers were stripped from .

Skinner identifies three sorts of knowledge required to employ a term.35 The sense comprises the criteria for its use; the range of reference is, accordingly, the universe of things to which it applied; the speech act potential is the variety of attitudes it might express.36 Consequently, an ‘innovating ideologist’, which was a fair description of the Party at times, could derive significant advantage from theory politics.37 The first tactic was to coin new terms; however, this was as hard as it sounds and did not feature in the Conservative response. The second was to modify the sense of an existing term; this was much easier and there was a concerted effort by the Party to speak of devolution with respect to individual choice exercised by tenants, patients, and parents.38 The third was to challenge the range of reference: Conservatives tried to focus on local, rather than national, politics such that devolution meant empowering unitary authorities in Scotland and Wales. The fourth was to amend the speech act potential. As devolution inevitably came to describe an Edinburgh Parliament and Cardiff Assembly, some in the Party deployed the term pejoratively, albeit with little success.

Finally, emotion also guided choice – a non-rational, but reasonable approach in a plural, indeterminate world.39 It provoked cleavage, organised politics, and decontested concepts; for its stickiness upheld opposition, its possessiveness enclosed issues, and its volatility led to negotiation.40 Conservative attachment to the Union was a sine qua non; their role in its defence jealously guarded; and its reformulation after devolution essential. Furthermore, intensity, as well as intention, was an important aspect of political expression.41 Conservatives used several techniques: modulators such as ‘profound’; discourse styled in the national, rather than party, interest; proposals contextualised as misleading and disappointing; and closure through the innate power of terms such as ‘fairness’, ‘equality’, and ‘needs’.42 4

Having set out a methodology, the remainder of this paper deploys it to consider how the first strand of the Conservative approach – a vindication of existing governance – is supported by the three core concepts of the status quo, the Union, and parliamentary sovereignty.

III

David Willetts, former head of the Centre for Policy Studies and the Party’s de facto intellectual, offered a general defence of the status quo, since existing institutions – principal among which was the constitution – ‘hold our nation together’.43 , the , suggested the archetypal question for conservatives was how to reinforce them.44 A tradition entitled ‘conservative’ could hardly do otherwise, but it offered rather more. For participants identified an opponent to promise catharsis, discovered a threat to generate solidarity, and guarded institutions to attract loyalty; in 1997-98, Conservatives recognised separatists as the ‘other’, devolution as the hazard, and unionists as the allies.

The status quo was supported by two adjacent ideas. First, affection for the familiar was reinforced by the notion of a still point in a changing world. The manifesto – significantly entitled You Can Only Be Sure With The Conservatives – highlighted the need to preserve ‘a constitution that binds our nation together and the institutions that bring us stability’.45 Andrew Lansley & Richard Wilson, in a contemporary pamphlet, similarly praised the existing system of governance for its sense of belonging and a feeling of security.46 Willetts noted the relationship was symbiotic: such attitudes engendered loyalty to our institutions.47

He also offered the peripheral idea that constitutional stability was a prerequisite for economic dynamism, using metaphor to describe the status quo as a vital anchor in the rough seas of commerce.48 When faced with ‘vertiginous change’ in the economy, it was essential to have a still point in a moving world.49 William Waldegrave, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, and Hywel Williams, former Special Adviser to at the Welsh Office, echoed the point, as did the Conservative Research Department (CRD): ‘at a time of great global economic change and uncertainty and increasing competition, our constitutional arrangements provide a sure foundation for stability in our nation’.50 Major reminded the that this amalgam of political solidity and economic vitality derived from his party’s unique history, as heirs to the Whig confidence in liberty and markets, on the one hand, and the Tory faith in community and tradition, on the other; curiously, his appeal to traditional authority neglected the merger with Liberal Unionists.51 5

The main argument for the status quo, however, was cognitive. The manifesto described the constitution as the ‘product of hundreds of years of knowledge, experience and history’ – a phrase lifted from Major’s speech to the Centre for Policy Studies a year earlier.52 , Party Chairman, also highlighted ‘the experience of generations, the accumulation of wisdom’, while CRD referred to the ‘wisdom of the ages’ throughout its work.53

Although much was intimated, spokesmen did elaborate. The intellectual resources of a single individual, or a single population, were vastly inferior to the collective reasoning of successive generations – so long as there was a peripheral explanation of how the findings of one cohort reached the next.54 Tradition, convention, commentary, judgement, and statute provided such a mechanism – and, since these constituted the unwritten constitution, there was no finer application of the cognitive account.55 Roger Scruton, called to the Bar while at Birkbeck, was one of many to identify common law as the paradigm for accumulated experience.56

Willetts used the metaphor of Darwinian evolution to suggest that institutions with a long history had proven value; moreover, he contended, the survival of the fittest was an invaluable test since no individual could fully comprehend the functions of complex institutions.57 This point was echoed by Lansley & Wilson: ‘institutions which have survived the vicissitudes of time deserve support’.58

After all, the constitution had delivered what , the Foreign Secretary, was to describe as ‘more peace, stability and prosperity over almost 300 years than any other part of Europe, or indeed the world, has known’.59 The manifesto echoed his exceptionalism:

Alone in Europe, the history of the United Kingdom has been one of stability and security. We owe much of that to the strength and stability of our constitution - the institutions, laws and traditions that bind us together as a nation.60

Major remarked pithily: ‘unity brought stability. And stability brought prosperity’.61

IV

Indeed, it is hard to overstate the importance of the Union as a core concept to Conservatives.62 The Campaign Guide insisted its ‘commitment to the Union has been, and remains, rock solid’, while the Working Group on the Constitution argued the case was ‘overwhelming’; indeed, Cranborne, Leader of the Party in the Lords, maintained that its defence was ‘ultimately what the Tory party is for’.63 Jonathan Evans, yet to join the Welsh Office from the Department for 6

Trade and Industry (DTI), declared himself ‘a Unionist first and a Conservative second’; his future , Hague, remarked that ‘nothing can be more important than the future existence of the United Kingdom itself’.64 Consequently, the manifesto included a commitment to maintain this ‘confident, united and sovereign nation’.65

The Party frequently portrayed defence of the Union as its exclusive calling; emotion guaranteed a possessiveness that meant Conservatives alone recognised threats from an ‘other’ that the dominant political culture did not.66 The Campaign Guide held that no other party could be ‘relied on to maintain Scotland’s partnership with the three other nations’; similar comments appeared in the Welsh manifesto, Opportunity and Prosperity for Wales, and its counterpart, Fighting for Scotland – the latter claiming that ‘we alone recognise the immense benefits gained by our nation as a full and equal partner in the United Kingdom’.67 Cranborne wrote of the Party’s historic task, while Hague insisted that it alone stood ‘unambiguously for the Union’.68

However sincere their advocacy of the Union, spokesmen also needed to justify it to those who did not share their instinctive attachment; accordingly, they outlined benefits for Scotland and Wales, the United Kingdom as a whole, and the wider world. Electoral strategy highlighted the former.69 First, the economy benefited from the single market, overseas trade, and inward investment; these were often the initially volley.70 Second, there was increased spending in the territories – the result of a higher baseline to begin with, the absorption of ad hoc increases, and a reluctance to update Barnett in line with population changes.71 Third, the periphery enjoyed significant influence, domestically and internationally, through the Secretaries of State.72 Fourth, the Union did not merely protect the interests of Scotland and Wales, but was fundamental to their way of life; unlike earlier points, this claim inevitably rested on allusion rather than hard facts.73

Benefits accrued to the United Kingdom as well.74 First, the country’s international role drew upon the unique contributions of its constituent nations.75 Second, global influence depended on size – of economy, population, territory – and hence was bolstered by Scotland and Wales.76

Some points even spoke to the world. First, the country held the , United Nations, and World Trade Organisation to account.77 Second, the experience, character, and talent of the constituent nations shaped international organisations for the better.78 Third, the country provided an ‘anchor of security in an uncertain and unchanging world’.79 7

Two adjacent notions also informed the conservative position. Diversity was supported by the existence of different institutions, histories, needs, and contributions; unity brought the population together as ‘one nation’ regardless of faction, class, or region. Territorial ministers had started to issue a mea culpa with regard to neglecting diversity in the final years of the Thatcher administration; non-territorial ministers were confident to do the same under Major. Hurd is exemplary:

What the Tory Party has not always realised, particularly the Tory Party in England, is that our Scots and Welsh fellow countrymen take pride in the difference between England and Scotland, and England and Wales.80

He concluded that ‘we stand for the Union, but union does not mean uniformity’.81 Similarly, the incoming Prime Minister argued that a commitment to the United Kingdom did not entail ‘ignoring the distinctive individuality’ of each nation.82 Ancram, now at Northern Ireland, advocated ‘strength through diversity’; Forsyth insisted that ‘Scottish identity is secure’; Hailsham proposed the familiar ‘diversity in unity’; and, looking back, Lang noted that uniformity did not follow from the Union.83

Continuing Thatcher’s practice of granting territorial Secretaries of State freedom to manage could never suffice for Major.84 The restoration of union, rather than unitary, governance was discernible: his government had greater respect for national diversity and, perhaps, recognised this as a better fit with the conservative tradition.85 The manifesto spelled it out:

The Conservative commitment to the United Kingdom does not mean ignoring the distinctive individuality of the different nations. On the contrary, we have gone further in recognising that diversity than any previous government.86

V

The notions of unity and diversity were shaped by another core concept: parliamentary sovereignty. However, it differed from the status quo and the Union in being fundamental but not foundational. For the starting point was instead a civic patriotism, drawing upon the Whig inheritance, that rested on institutions: the courts, , and Parliament. The latter did more than formally define the United Kingdom: shared decisions – and, in fact, the act of reaching those share decisions – substantively fashioned the country.

Major described the constitution as the ‘lifeblood’ of the United Kingdom and, without pause, wrote of the need to ‘protect our constitution and unity as a nation’.87 They were inseparable 8 since, as Willetts explained, ‘conservative patriotism’ was different to continental nationalism; in these islands, love of country stemmed from affection for its ‘institutions and the way of life they sustain’, rather than from blood and soil.88 Accordingly, the constitution provided the sense of identity necessary to feel part of a wider whole.89 The manifesto identified three important elements and, furthermore, suggested that one was basic:

Parliament – alongside the Crown and our legal system – is one of the three key institutions that uphold our constitution. The supremacy of parliament is fundamental to our democracy, and the guarantee of our freedoms.90

The monarch was a source of unity and focus of allegiance for country (if no longer empire); the courts were the guarantor of individual liberties and the repository of wisdom; and the Houses of Parliament, especially the Commons, were forums for national debate and principal advocates for the people.91

Poisonous nationalism, which subjugated the individual to the state, was juxtaposed with healthy patriotism, which brought the closest of allies together to tackle problems at home and foster interests abroad.92 First, Conservatives chose the ranges of reference for nationalism and patriotism to adapt the sense and speech-act potential of the terms. Second, they used allusion, in place of reasoning, to link ‘continental nationalism’ with subjugation of the individual and ‘British patriotism’ with co-operation between neighbours. The Party was on stronger, and more familiar, ground in contending that British citizenship was expansive, adding membership of a ‘wider, liberating constitutional entity’ to existing national identities rather than suppressing these allegiances.93 Eleanor Laing worked with the Shadow Constitutional Affairs team:

I see no conflict between being a citizen of the United Kingdom, being British, being the representative of the constituency of Epping Forest in Essex, where I live and work, and having been born in Scotland of Scottish parents and brought up and educated there.94

For Willetts, the Union could only be sustained ‘if no one country pushes its own values and institutions too forcefully on to the others’.95 Naturally, Parliament was the forum to express union and to reconcile difference. For Major, it was:

… the cement that holds together the countries of the United Kingdom; countries with distinct traditions, culture, history and ; but countries which have remained one nation because it was in their own interests to do so.96 9

Many in his party argued that it was, in fact, rather more. For what was once artificial ceased to be so: shared decisions in Parliament created a new society with a shared history, a shared character, and shared values.97 The Working Group was clear: ‘the nations that form the Union have been so bound together over the centuries that it would be artificial now to draw lines between them’.98 Here was the most important reason to support local patriotism but oppose devolution or, worse, independence: it would tear asunder not merely a polity, but what was now a country in its own right.99

Furthermore, parliamentary sovereignty was no constitutional nicety; it both justified and circumscribed reform in 1997-98. Partnership for Good recognised scope for improving governance, but insisted that ‘the ultimate authority of Parliament’ remain paramount; similarly, ministers wished to increase accountability without diminishing Scotland’s privileges within the ‘Parliament of the Union’.100 Subsequently, the manifesto was clear that powers given to the Grand Committees had maintained ‘the role of parliament at the centre of the Union’. For its supremacy was ‘fundamental to our democracy’; substantive votes, for instance, were never taken away from the floor of the House.101

Nonetheless, a popular mandate could still trump parliamentary sovereignty. However, the concept of diversity alongside unity was central to its interpretation. For while ministers shared (what they argued was) the will of the people to remain united, the decision was for each of the four nations.102 Ancram hastened to point out that ‘we wish to see the Union endure for as long as that is the will of the constituent parts’, but emphasised that if a majority of any country wished to secede, ‘it would be wrong to impede that choice’.103 Partnership for Good made clear that willingness to share sovereignty ‘must never be taken for granted’. 104 Major simply wrote that ‘the decision is for Scotland’.105

VI

Conservatives thus relied on three core concepts in vindicating existing governance: the status quo, the Union, and parliamentary sovereignty. Moreover, the same concepts also underpinned the two remaining strands: support for limited reform and antipathy to devolved institutions.

First, the Party did not advocate keeping institutions in aspic in 1997-98.106 CRD declared that Conservatives had implemented ‘far-reaching changes to the system of government’ and evidenced a catholic list of measures.107 Opportunity for Wales averred support for reform where it was needed; Major described the Party as a ‘powerful force for change’, as well as 10 continuity; Lang promised to examine every aspect of the Union in a continual quest for improvements; and Mawhinney enumerated reforms undertaken by previous Conservative administrations – such as franchise extension in 1867, universal suffrage in 1928, and life peerages in 1958.108 Ancram reaffirmed this commitment in opposition, insisting that the Party did not ‘fear reform of the constitution’ and had the record to prove it.109

Conservatives went out of their way to attach the idea of limited reform to their core concept of the status quo. Some interpreted reform as retaining the good and discarding the bad, which provided ambiguity and vagueness. An a priori case may be inferred from the idea of evolution (since adaptation required change) but this was not voiced by spokesmen; instead, they relied on the a posteriori argument that change was necessary in order to preserve. Adjacent concepts of changing circumstances and changing priorities explained why, allowing the Party to label these cases ‘reform’ and contrast them with change for its own sake. Accordingly, it could reconcile its defence of existing governance with support for constitutional reform.

Specific proposals for devolution took place within the framework of institutions that preserved the Union and parliamentary sovereignty: administrative reform saw powers transferred to the territorial ministries, while deliberative reform enhanced the role of the Grand Committees. Moreover, the Party contested the very concept of devolution with its civic conception: the real meaning of the term, they argued, was decentralisation beyond Edinburgh and Cardiff. There were two kinds. The first was political and increased the powers of local government; this addressed the core concepts of the Union and parliamentary sovereignty, by allowing for diversity at a level subordinate to the four nations and thereby preventing the accrual of political authority to Scotland and Wales. Neither the United Kingdom nor Parliament were challenged. This was still more evident in the second, apolitical type of civic devolution. More radical than its counterpart, it was a key element of policy under both Thatcher and, in the garb of the Citizen’s Charter, Major.110 Both claimed to entrust decision making to individuals – whether the consumers of services (such as parents, patients, and tenants) or the producers (such as doctors, teachers, and estate managers). Forsyth considered that reforms across health, education, housing and so forth meant ‘this Government has a devolution policy’ that was – using terms sprinkled across ministerial statements – ‘real’, ‘practical’ and ‘mattered’.111

Second, the Party’s critique of a Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly in 1997-98 was also informed by the core concepts of the status quo, the Union, and parliamentary sovereignty. 11

Together, these ideas enabled the Party to warn of threats that the dominant political culture had neglected: instability and potential separation.

Labour’s plans were portrayed as extensive and, as such, a danger to the status quo. The adjacent concept of cognitive imperfection explained why, using the familiar argument that it was hubris for a single generation, let alone a single individual, to think it could do better than history or, indeed, even predict the outcome of its actions. Reliance on theory, rather than practice, was bad enough – but Labour’s plans were informed by a variety of abstract principles sponsored by various pressure groups, such that the end result had not been thought out at all.

Conservatives also maintained that devolution was fatal to the Union. Campaigners had raised expectations; the new institutions would fail to deliver; and disappointment was inevitable.112 Such anger would be projected on London as Edinburgh and Cardiff held it responsible for any shortcomings.113 Devolution would hence lead to separation, as Major had long warned.114

Moreover, as the Union was built upon a civic patriotism, rather than ethnic nationalism, it relied upon institutions – and the centrepiece, of course, was Parliament. The practical threat was clear: could the supremacy of Westminster withstand pressure from alternative conceptions of sovereignty, expressed through the new institutions? The existential threat was more subtle: could the House of Commons retain the egalitarianism required for parliamentary union after the transfer of responsibilities to the new assemblies?

Conservative opposition to a Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly was, by and large, the mirror image of its case for existing governance and careful reform. The core concepts of the status quo, the Union, and parliamentary sovereignty provided direction for each strand. Yet the Party faced a difficulty when, and if, it returned to office. Devolution was reversible in law, but surely not in practice. Consequently, Hague soon proclaimed the need, for the first time in decades, to advocate reform in order to restore stability and balance to the constitution.115

The Conservative Party has always been the part of the United Kingdom, its traditions and its constitution. In the past, we always have had a healthy scepticism of change. ’s constitutional vandalism has upset the balance and democratic accountability of our institutions. A future Conservative Government cannot accept the status quo we inherit; nor can we turn the clock back.116 12

Twelve years later, he would negotiate a coalition agreement to bring the Party back into office – however, while it included some proposals for constitutional reform, English Votes for English Laws had a little longer to wait.

Justin Jackson King’s College, Cambridge Paper delivered to the PSA Annual International Conference, Cardiff, March 2018

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