Roundtable Summary

The Georgian Challenge and the New US Administration, Europe and Russia

Salomé Zourabichvili Associate Professor at , , and former Foreign Minister of

21 January 2009

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Roundtable Summary: The Georgian Challenge and the New US Administration, Europe and Russia

The opposition in Georgia is in a very difficult position. This is partly because the country has grown progressively less democratic, and also because, as a result of the war, it is uncertain what can be said that will not undermine Georgia’s interests. This has prevented the opposition from speaking freely for some time. The opposition now considers that moratorium to have ended, because silence is now detrimental to Georgia.

Many of the major global issues touch Georgia directly or indirectly. There is a new US administration, there is an ongoing energy crisis in Europe, and the EU is involved in analysing the causes and consequences of the war between Russia and Georgia. This is a time to reflect on Georgia’s significance for the US, the EU, and for Russia.

Despite its size, Georgia is a challenge for the US: what happens to the policy of democracy promotion after democratic failure? Georgia was one of the countries which promised most, and failed most clearly. The last US administration carries some responsibility for the crisis of democracy in Georgia. It supported individuals more than institutions; it put stability above democratic change. The US did not press the authorities enough over its democratic and human rights record. It allowed the regime to get away with two fraudulent elections, on both occasions sending congratulations before the results had been collated and confirmed. There was no reaction on the part of the US to the overspending on military armaments, even though Georgia’s official policy was that the territorial disputes in South Ossetia and Abkhazia must be resolved by peaceful means. A third of the military budget was being directed towards arms procurement. It was obvious what was going on and something should have been said.

The responsibility of the US was one of omission. What it did not say was crucial. As a result, two non-democratic regimes went to war, because they viewed this as the most expedient route out of the situation. If Georgia had been encouraged to work on its democratic values, if there had been a representative parliament with proper powers of oversight, had the media been free, and popular opinion been given a voice, then Georgia might not now be in the situation it finds itself.

This, however, does not diminish the responsibility of Russia for the crisis and conflict.

The US was not responsible for the war. There was no US ‘green light’ given to Saakashvili. The US was aware of Saakashvili’s increasingly bellicose rhetoric, and the military build-up, but it certainly did not encourage Georgia.

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Condoleezza Rice came to Georgia in early July for one reason only – to tell the leadership not to go to war because Georgia has everything to lose. This explains the silence of the US administration in the first three days of the conflict. It also explains what happened when Russia moved beyond the ‘borders’ of South Ossetia and Abkhazia into what is now being called ‘Georgia proper’. Russia expected the US to tell it to stop. It expected a clear red line. Military commanders have their own dynamic, and when they did not hear any objection from the US, the Russian leadership saw no reason to halt at the borders.

The US should study this. Obama’s remark in his inauguration speech that ‘those who cling to power through corruption and deceit are on the wrong side of history’ could be directed at Saakaskhvili. The Georgian President is not capable of making concessions. He will not reform, even to hold on to power. The US, therefore, has to look at its Georgia policy. Georgia still offers a great opportunity. It remains true that Georgia is the one country in the post-Soviet space where democratic transformation can occur.

The biggest risk to Georgia is the rhetoric of war and military solutions. The leadership argues that they have not lost the war because Georgia survived, and it must still seek to regain the territories. There have been attempts to buy new arms. A regime with no other resources and failing legitimacy might be tempted to go to war again.

Any new US policy must be shared with the EU. Until now, the has been seen as almost exclusively US-inspired. Europe can and should take more of a role in the region. There should be no competition between Europe and the US in the . The US must also define what it means to support democracy and the media. The Georgian population is very disappointed that US support seems to focus on a narrow group of elites. A dangerous trend is developing amongst the population; a sense of the inevitability of submission to Russian hegemony is gathering strength.

Georgia is also a challenge for Russia. Russia has gained only a pyrrhic victory. They have scored a military victory, they have gained some territory, but it has had an extremely negative impact on relations with the outside world. Having recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia does not know how to proceed, and it is unclear what the medium- and long-term implications will be. The decision to recognise was not endorsed by all elites, and that creates anxiety. Armaments continue to flow across the Caucasus, and there are low level conflicts in Ingushetia and Dagestan which have been fanned by the August war. Despite Russia’s victory, there is still a US

www.chathamhouse.org.uk 3 Roundtable Summary: The Georgian Challenge and the New US Administration, Europe and Russia presence in the region, and this won’t decrease. There is also now a ‘soft military’ EU presence. This is precisely what Russia did not want. Its zone of exclusivity has been diminished. NATO and EU integration has been delayed, but will not die – and the delay is as much the result of internal failures as the war. If Georgia’s internal situation were more favourable, then it is possible the August war would have accelerated integration. One could ask what, exactly, has changed. Abkhazia and South Ossetia were de facto independent before the war. Now we have a ‘ de facto plus’ situation: the territories are recognised by Russia, but no other state except Nicaragua and Venezuela.

The challenge for the EU is to stabilise the borders of the conflict zone. The answer to the Georgia problem is not more money. Too much has already been given and it went into the wrong pockets. The EU has to clarify what democracy means, and not leave democracy promotion to the US alone. Now that the prospect of membership is very distant, the EU has to clarify what it means by its ‘neighbourhood’. It needs to answer this question not just for the sake of Georgia, but also for Turkey. Turkey is concerned about stability, if the EU does not take a clear lead on this issue and collaborate with Turkey, Turkey will pursue its own path.

Ultimately, Georgia has to save itself. Recovery must come from Georgia’s own efforts, it must not always depend on outsiders. If Georgia doesn’t undertake this, no one else will. Internal consolidation is the best way for Georgia to defend itself from Russia.

Discussion Why did Russo-Georgian relations worsen so dramatically, when they had cooperated over Adjaria? What changed? Was it simply Georgia’s NATO aspirations, or a cycle of provocations?

I was Foreign Minister for some time after the Adjaria settlement and a participant in the negotiations. It was evident to me that there was a chance for Russia and Georgia to move forward to more normal relations. But Russian foreign policy oscillates between a desire to advance relations, and a tendency to fall back on old imperialist thinking. The withdrawal of Russian military bases was a signal that Russia was contemplating a different approach. The discussion on NATO was also very frank. Russian officials said that they could not stop Georgia joining the Alliance, but they had two

www.chathamhouse.org.uk 4 Roundtable Summary: The Georgian Challenge and the New US Administration, Europe and Russia concerns: firstly that NATO membership should not be a hostile act, and secondly that no new military bases would be built on Georgian territory. At that time, Georgia felt it could satisfy those two issues without them being expressed as preconditions by the Russian side. There was also discussion of possible trilateral cooperation with NATO and Russia in the Black Sea region. The atmosphere was quite relaxed. This changed over the years. Georgia started to adopt a harsher rhetoric because they believed they could get more from the US by being confrontational with Russia. There was a total misunderstanding of how to manage relations. I couldn’t convince my colleagues that we cannot afford to be in confrontation with Russia.

Russia also bears some responsibility. It indicated a willingness to normalise relations, but didn’t stop the ‘passportization’ process and acquisition of key economic assets in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia rightly saw these as provocative measures. Russia’s policy has always been ambivalent. Both sides contributed to the deterioration in relations, just as in the run up to the war, both sides did exactly what the other wanted in order to escalate the situation.

What solution does the opposition in Georgia propose to the problem of Abkhazia and South Ossetia? How can Georgia’s sovereignty be retained?

Georgia has to abandon its policy of returning the breakaway territories, and pursue a policy of returning confidence between peoples. If South Ossetia is part of Georgia, nothing can excuse the bombing of Tsinkhvali, one of our own cities. I wouldn’t mind a relationship with the territories similar to that of and Monaco. The most disastrous outcome would be for the Abkhaz nation to dissolve into Russia.

Present Georgian policy is again overlooking the interests of the Abkhaz and South Ossetians themselves. For example, the recent agreement by Moscow and to co-manage the Inguri Dam is symbolically disastrous. Georgia is effectively saying to the Abkhaz that they must go to Moscow to get electricity that, in part, belongs to the people of Abkhazia.

What is the opposition’s strategy given that there are no elections scheduled for the coming year? How do you plan to change government policy?

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This is a major dilemma. The opposition has behaved very responsibly. We have held 11 mass demonstrations, and half of these were attended by over 100,000 people - a huge number for a city the size of Tbilisi. There were no incidents of violent or anti-constitutional acts committed by the protestors. But the demonstrations have brought no results. It’s true, there are no elections planned for 2009, but the opposition coalition is demanding that Saakashvili go. He can’t survive the spring. The government has lost the confidence of the population, and a sizeable part of the military. Every day someone leaves the government to join the opposition. The question is not when and how the president will quit office, but when and how the elections will be conducted. Holding free and fair elections will be a major test for the country.

How has Saakashvili performed since August? Has the conflict hardened him? Has his character changed?

I’ve not met the President nor any other member of government since I left office. That gives you a sense of the way Georgian politics operates at the moment. There is no contact in Georgia between the opposition and government, not even at a time of war, when I proposed a coalition should be formed. The war can only reinforce existing character traits. Saakashvili is not crazy, but he has an unstable personality. He is very adept at talking to the West, and he’s very good at manipulating and reaching out to certain people. Saakashvili heads a government which might still contemplate a war, because it sees it as the only way out of the situation. Saakashvili is not listening to anyone, but he has three or four confidantes: Vano Merabishvili, the Minister of Interior, , the Mayor of Tbilisi, and Zurab Adeishvili, the Minister of Justice.

What are the prospects of increasing cooperation within the opposition? Would you exclude the possibility of the leadership reaching out to form a coalition?

The opposition should be united in its demand for a change of government. We have a strong coalition on certain issues, such as the Inguri Dam Project and the need for more transparency in the dispersal of international donations. But there should not be a united front in the elections. We don’t want a one-party system. must be offered a real choice between left and right. The best result would be a coalition government that reflects the

www.chathamhouse.org.uk 6 Roundtable Summary: The Georgian Challenge and the New US Administration, Europe and Russia range of popular opinion. It is too late for the government to reach out to the opposition.

What do you believe were Russia’s objectives in the August war?

Russia didn’t know what it wanted at the start of the conflict. It is difficult to say exactly what Russia’s war aims were. It wanted to teach Georgia a lesson and destroy its military capacity and facilities. Russia’s actions were clearly targeted; there was no indiscriminate destruction of economic and civilian infrastructure. This is understandable, given that Russian capital has a significant stake in Georgia’s economy, including the energy sector, telecommunications, hotels, property, and even wine factories. The BTC was not targeted. Russia deliberately dropped bombs either side to show it knew where the pipeline was, but did not hit it.

This was a classic 20 th century military operation. The use of tanks was militarily completely unnecessary - it had a purely symbolic and psychological value. It sent a clear message to the other post-Soviet states. But Georgia is the only place Russia could conduct such a Soviet-style military operation. No one doubted the outcome of a Russian conflict with Georgia, but that doesn’t mean Russia can do the same thing in . Russia acted as it did in Georgia in part so it doesn’t have to do so in Ukraine. This war was the last of a certain kind of military operation, not the start of a new era. The configuration of forces has not changed in the Caucasus. Nothing fundamental has been altered in the region. What was de facto lost before, remains lost. One could reproach Georgia for not using the Geneva process to try to reclaim the Kodori Gorge. There was no , so there is no ‘legitimacy’ for the seizure of the Kodori Gorge. A case could be made for claiming it back.

How concerned are you that parts of the opposition could be co-opted by Russia?

The government has used the ‘Russia card’ to try to discredit the opposition. I’m probably the only member of the opposition who has not been accused of being a Russian agent. It is not possible for there to be a pro-Russia party in Georgia. But the opposition wants to normalise relations. If that makes us pro- Russian then so be it. We have to normalise relations and sign a treaty with Russia. If we don’t do this, how can we have a proper perspective on the EU

www.chathamhouse.org.uk 7 Roundtable Summary: The Georgian Challenge and the New US Administration, Europe and Russia or NATO? This does not mean we accept the status quo in Abkhazia and South Ossetia; this must be negotiated in a multilateral format.

What is the future for Georgia’s relations with the United States? What is Georgia’s current policy on NATO?

Saakashvili’s agreement with Bush was a foolish piece of diplomacy. It liberates the US from having to take any decisive steps. It means Obama can avoid making substantive promises to the Georgian leadership on the grounds that they already have an agreement.

Saakashvili twice undermined Georgia’s NATO prospects, on 7 November 2007, and 7 August 2008. Georgia would be best advised to pursue EU integration. It should concentrate on internal reform, and the detail of political, economic and military transformation and integration.

What are the economic and political consequences of the global financial crisis for Georgia?

The crisis is serious, and will not be ameliorated by financial aid. Georgia has a very small financial sector, so it is not as exposed as other countries. Unemployment is high. There is a lack of development of internal production. The economy is too dependent on foreign direct investment; many assets have been bought up by foreign speculators, who have not provided investment.

The OSCE supports the claims of the opposition regarding electoral fraud and weaknesses in Georgia’s political system, but it also stated that in the last election these failings were not sufficient to change the outcome. Will the opposition only regard Georgia as democratic when they get rid of Saakashvili?

The opposition won the right to a second round, and this was taken away from us by Matthew Bryza, who made a declaration acknowledging Saakashvili as the victor before all the results were in or officially tabulated. After the serious fraud which took place, this declaration had a very serious impact. This is where the US failed. It’s not clear who would have won a second round, but at least the population would not have felt cheated. If

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Saakashvili had won, it would have been a different Saakashvili, perhaps one who would not have gone to war.

In your discussion of war aims, you neglected to mention that Russia acted to prevent a massacre in Tsinkhvali.

We must be precise. The bombing of Tsinkhvali was not coherent with the stated policy of peace. But the bombing followed the evacuation of the city, so the claim that Russia acted to prevent the massacre of civilians is not credible. Russia clearly prepared for war as much as Georgia.

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