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Roundtable Summary The Georgian Challenge and the New US Administration, Europe and Russia Salomé Zourabichvili Associate Professor at Sciences Po, Paris, and former Foreign Minister of Georgia 21 January 2009 Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to government or to any political body. It does not hold opinions of its own; the views expressed in this text are the responsibility of the speaker. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the speaker and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the event. Roundtable Summary: The Georgian Challenge and the New US Administration, Europe and Russia The opposition in Georgia is in a very difficult position. This is partly because the country has grown progressively less democratic, and also because, as a result of the war, it is uncertain what can be said that will not undermine Georgia’s interests. This has prevented the opposition from speaking freely for some time. The opposition now considers that moratorium to have ended, because silence is now detrimental to Georgia. Many of the major global issues touch Georgia directly or indirectly. There is a new US administration, there is an ongoing energy crisis in Europe, and the EU is involved in analysing the causes and consequences of the war between Russia and Georgia. This is a time to reflect on Georgia’s significance for the US, the EU, and for Russia. Despite its size, Georgia is a challenge for the US: what happens to the policy of democracy promotion after democratic failure? Georgia was one of the countries which promised most, and failed most clearly. The last US administration carries some responsibility for the crisis of democracy in Georgia. It supported individuals more than institutions; it put stability above democratic change. The US did not press the authorities enough over its democratic and human rights record. It allowed the regime to get away with two fraudulent elections, on both occasions sending congratulations before the results had been collated and confirmed. There was no reaction on the part of the US to the overspending on military armaments, even though Georgia’s official policy was that the territorial disputes in South Ossetia and Abkhazia must be resolved by peaceful means. A third of the military budget was being directed towards arms procurement. It was obvious what was going on and something should have been said. The responsibility of the US was one of omission. What it did not say was crucial. As a result, two non-democratic regimes went to war, because they viewed this as the most expedient route out of the situation. If Georgia had been encouraged to work on its democratic values, if there had been a representative parliament with proper powers of oversight, had the media been free, and popular opinion been given a voice, then Georgia might not now be in the situation it finds itself. This, however, does not diminish the responsibility of Russia for the crisis and conflict. The US was not responsible for the war. There was no US ‘green light’ given to Saakashvili. The US was aware of Saakashvili’s increasingly bellicose rhetoric, and the military build-up, but it certainly did not encourage Georgia. www.chathamhouse.org.uk 2 Roundtable Summary: The Georgian Challenge and the New US Administration, Europe and Russia Condoleezza Rice came to Georgia in early July for one reason only – to tell the leadership not to go to war because Georgia has everything to lose. This explains the silence of the US administration in the first three days of the conflict. It also explains what happened when Russia moved beyond the ‘borders’ of South Ossetia and Abkhazia into what is now being called ‘Georgia proper’. Russia expected the US to tell it to stop. It expected a clear red line. Military commanders have their own dynamic, and when they did not hear any objection from the US, the Russian leadership saw no reason to halt at the borders. The US should study this. Obama’s remark in his inauguration speech that ‘those who cling to power through corruption and deceit are on the wrong side of history’ could be directed at Saakaskhvili. The Georgian President is not capable of making concessions. He will not reform, even to hold on to power. The US, therefore, has to look at its Georgia policy. Georgia still offers a great opportunity. It remains true that Georgia is the one country in the post-Soviet space where democratic transformation can occur. The biggest risk to Georgia is the rhetoric of war and military solutions. The leadership argues that they have not lost the war because Georgia survived, and it must still seek to regain the territories. There have been attempts to buy new arms. A regime with no other resources and failing legitimacy might be tempted to go to war again. Any new US policy must be shared with the EU. Until now, the Rose Revolution has been seen as almost exclusively US-inspired. Europe can and should take more of a role in the region. There should be no competition between Europe and the US in the Caucasus. The US must also define what it means to support democracy and the media. The Georgian population is very disappointed that US support seems to focus on a narrow group of elites. A dangerous trend is developing amongst the population; a sense of the inevitability of submission to Russian hegemony is gathering strength. Georgia is also a challenge for Russia. Russia has gained only a pyrrhic victory. They have scored a military victory, they have gained some territory, but it has had an extremely negative impact on relations with the outside world. Having recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia does not know how to proceed, and it is unclear what the medium- and long-term implications will be. The decision to recognise was not endorsed by all elites, and that creates anxiety. Armaments continue to flow across the Caucasus, and there are low level conflicts in Ingushetia and Dagestan which have been fanned by the August war. Despite Russia’s victory, there is still a US www.chathamhouse.org.uk 3 Roundtable Summary: The Georgian Challenge and the New US Administration, Europe and Russia presence in the region, and this won’t decrease. There is also now a ‘soft military’ EU presence. This is precisely what Russia did not want. Its zone of exclusivity has been diminished. NATO and EU integration has been delayed, but will not die – and the delay is as much the result of internal failures as the war. If Georgia’s internal situation were more favourable, then it is possible the August war would have accelerated integration. One could ask what, exactly, has changed. Abkhazia and South Ossetia were de facto independent before the war. Now we have a ‘ de facto plus’ situation: the territories are recognised by Russia, but no other state except Nicaragua and Venezuela. The challenge for the EU is to stabilise the borders of the conflict zone. The answer to the Georgia problem is not more money. Too much has already been given and it went into the wrong pockets. The EU has to clarify what democracy means, and not leave democracy promotion to the US alone. Now that the prospect of membership is very distant, the EU has to clarify what it means by its ‘neighbourhood’. It needs to answer this question not just for the sake of Georgia, but also for Turkey. Turkey is concerned about stability, if the EU does not take a clear lead on this issue and collaborate with Turkey, Turkey will pursue its own path. Ultimately, Georgia has to save itself. Recovery must come from Georgia’s own efforts, it must not always depend on outsiders. If Georgia doesn’t undertake this, no one else will. Internal consolidation is the best way for Georgia to defend itself from Russia. Discussion Why did Russo-Georgian relations worsen so dramatically, when they had cooperated over Adjaria? What changed? Was it simply Georgia’s NATO aspirations, or a cycle of provocations? I was Foreign Minister for some time after the Adjaria settlement and a participant in the negotiations. It was evident to me that there was a chance for Russia and Georgia to move forward to more normal relations. But Russian foreign policy oscillates between a desire to advance relations, and a tendency to fall back on old imperialist thinking. The withdrawal of Russian military bases was a signal that Russia was contemplating a different approach. The discussion on NATO was also very frank. Russian officials said that they could not stop Georgia joining the Alliance, but they had two www.chathamhouse.org.uk 4 Roundtable Summary: The Georgian Challenge and the New US Administration, Europe and Russia concerns: firstly that NATO membership should not be a hostile act, and secondly that no new military bases would be built on Georgian territory. At that time, Georgia felt it could satisfy those two issues without them being expressed as preconditions by the Russian side. There was also discussion of possible trilateral cooperation with NATO and Russia in the Black Sea region. The atmosphere was quite relaxed. This changed over the years. Georgia started to adopt a harsher rhetoric because they believed they could get more from the US by being confrontational with Russia. There was a total misunderstanding of how to manage relations. I couldn’t convince my colleagues that we cannot afford to be in confrontation with Russia. Russia also bears some responsibility. It indicated a willingness to normalise relations, but didn’t stop the ‘passportization’ process and acquisition of key economic assets in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

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