A Critique of Benny Morris Author(S): Nur Masalha Reviewed Work(S): Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol
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A Critique of Benny Morris Author(s): Nur Masalha Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Autumn, 1991), pp. 90-97 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537367 . Accessed: 22/09/2012 03:39 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. University of California Press and Institute for Palestine Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Palestine Studies. http://www.jstor.org A CRITIQUE OF BENNYMORRIS NUR MASALHA Since thepublication in 1988 of TheBirth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, BennyMorris has cometo be seenas theultimate authority on thePalestin- ian exodusof 1948. Andindeed, his workhas contributedto demolishing someof thelong-held (at leastin Israeland in theWest) misconceptions surroundingIsrael's birth. His newlypublished collection of essays,1948 and After:Israel and the Palestinians,revisits the groundcovered in Birth, bringingto light new material he discoveredor which became available only aftercompletion of the first book. Morris'swork belongs to whathe calls the "New Historiography."He does notlike the term "revisionist" historiography, in part because it "con- juresup" imagesof theRevisionist Movement in Zionism,and thuscauses "confusion."He furthereschews the term because "Israel's old historians, byand large, were not really historians, and didnot produce real history. In realitythey were chroniclers, and oftenapologetic." (1948, p. 6) Morrisex- aminesthis "old"-orthodox and official-historiography in the opening es- sayof his new volume, referring to the historians who produced it over three decadessince 1948 as "less candid,""deceitful," and "misleading."(p. 2) As examples,he citesthe accountsprovided by Lieutenant-Colonel(ret.) ElhananOrren, a formerofficer at theIsrael Defense Force (IDF) History Branch,in hisBaderckh el Ha'ir (On theRoad to theCity), a detailedaccount Nur Masalha, who holds an M.A. fromthe HebrewUniversity in Jerusalem and a Ph.D. in politicalscience from the Universityof London,is the author of the forthcomingbook Expulsionof the Palestinians: The Conceptof "Trans- fer"in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948 (Institutefor Palestine Studies, Au- tumn1991). Journalof Palestine Studies XXI, no. 1 (Autumn1991), pp. 90-97. DEBATE ON THE 1948 EXODUS: MASALHA 91 of OperationDani, publishedby the IDF Pressin 1976, and ToldotMilhemet Hakomemiyut(History of the War of Independence),produced by theGeneral Staff/HistoryBranch, as well as Ben-Gurion'sown "histories"Mideinat Yis- raelHamehudeshet and BehilahemYisrael. (pp. 2-5) The "new" histories,on the otherhand, include the works of Avi Shlaim,Ilan Pappe, Simha Flapan, Uri Milstein,Michael Cohen, AnitaShapira, Uri Bar-Joseph,and others.(p. 8) Clearlythose historiesthoroughly demolished a varietyof assumptions whichformed the core of the "old" history.And althoughthose who argue the case of "revisionism"are a fringegroup in Israel,they are an important one. Two remarksare in orderin this regard;first, having myself examined manyof the "old" and officialHebrew chronicles, it is quiteclear that Morris does notalways live up to his claimof using this material in a criticalmanner and as a resultthis casts doubtson his conclusions. For instance,in Birth, Morrisquotes uncritically the "majorpolitical conclusion" Ben-Gurion drew fromthe Arab departurefrom Haifa and makes littleeffort to reconcilethe "deceitfulness"of such a chroniclewith uncritical reliance on it. And,gener- ally speaking,having based himselfpredominantly, and frequentlyuncriti- cally, on official Israeli archival and non-archivalmaterial, Morris's descriptionand analysisof such a controversialsubject as the Palestinian exodushave seriousshortcomings. Second, Morris's description of the works by the "new" Israeli historians-whileignoring the recentworks by non- Zionistscholars on 1948-gives rise to the impressionthat these discourses are basicallythe outcomeof a debate among Zionistswhich unfortunately has littleto do withthe Palestiniansthemselves. Morriscentral thesis, as firstexpounded in Birth,is summedup in the followingpassage fromhis new collection: Whatoccurred in 1948 lies somewherein betweenthe Jewish "robber state"[i.e., a statewhich had "systematicallyand forcibly expelled the Arab population"]and the "Araborder" explanations. While from the mid- 1930'smost of the Yishuv's leaders, including Ben-Gurion, wanted to es- tablisha Jewishstate without an Arabminority, or withas smallan Arab minorityas possible,and supporteda "transfersolution" to thisminority problem,the Yishuv did notenter the 1948 War witha masterplan for expellingthe Arabs, nor did its political or military leaders ever adopt such a masterplan. Whathappened was largelyhaphazard and a resultof the War. Therewere Haganah/IDF expulsions of Arab communities, some of themat theinitiative or withthe post facto approval of the cabinet or the defenseminister, and mostwith General Staff sanctions. Butthere was no granddesign, no blanketpolicy of expulsion. (p. 17) In otherwords, only in "smallerpart" were Haganah/IDFexpulsions car- riedout and thesewere impromptu, ad hoc measuresdictated by themilitary circumstances,a conclusionthat deflects serious responsibility for the 1948 exodus fromthe Zionistleadership. But can his claim that therewas no transferdesign and expulsionpolicy in 1948 be sustained?Does thefact that therewas no "masterplan" forexpelling the Palestiniansabsolve the Zionist 92 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES leadershipof responsibility,given, inter alia, its campaignof psychological warfare(documented by Morris)designed to precipitateArab evacuation? How can Morrisbe so categoricalthat there was no Israeliexpulsion policy when his own work restson carefullyreleased partialdocumentation and when muchof the Israelifiles and documentsrelating to the subjectare still classifiedand remainclosed to researchers?Is it inconceivablethat such a "transfer"policy was based on an understandingbetween Ben-Gurion and his lieutenantsrather than on a blueprint?Morris himself writes in an article in HaAretz,(entitled "The New Historyand the Old Propagandists,"9 May 1989) in which he discusses the transfernotion and Ben-Gurion'srole in 1948: "One of the hallmarksof Ben Gurion'sgreatness was thatthe man knewwhat to say and what not to say in certaincircumstances; what is al- lowed to be recordedon paper and whatis preferableto conveyorally or in hint." Ben-Gurion'sadmiring biographer Michael Bar-Zoharstates: "In in- ternaldiscussions, in instructionsto his men [in 1948] the Old Man [Ben- Gurion]demonstrated a clear position: It would be betterthat as few a numberas possible of Arabs should remainin the territoryof the [Jewish] state."(Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion [in Hebrew],vol. 2, p. 703) Morrisclaims (1948, p. 16) thatit "was the Arab contention.. thatthe Yishuvhad alwaysintended forcible 'transfer'." Is thismerely an "Arab con- tention,"or perhaps,a figmentof Arab imagination? Yet theevidence Morris adducespoints to a completelydifferent picture. In his 9 May 1989 articlein HaAretz, Morristraces "the growthof the transferidea in Ben-Gurion's thinking"from the second half of the 1930s. "There is no doubt," Morris writes, thatfrom the moment [the Peel proposal was submittedi.. .the problem of theArab minority, supposed to residein that[prospective Jewish] state, beganto preoccupythe Yishuv's leadership obsessively. They were justi- fiedin seeingthe future minority as a greatdanger to theprospective Jew- ish state-a fifthpolitical, or even military,column. The transfer idea.. .wasviewed by the majority of the Yishuv leaders in thosedays as thebest solution to theproblem. In Birth(p. 25) Morris shows that Ben-Gurionadvocated "compulsory" transferin 1937. In his HaAretzarticle he writesof "thegrowth of thetrans- feridea in Ben-Gurion'sthinking" and thatin November1947, a fewdays beforethe UN GeneralAssembly's partition resolution, a consensusemerged at the meetingof the JewishAgency Executive in favorof givingas many Arabsin theJewish state as possiblecitizenship of theprospective Arab state ratherthan of the Jewishstate where theywould be living. Accordingto Morris,Ben-Gurion explained the rationalein the followingterms: Ifa warbreaks out between the Jewish state and thePalestine Arab state, theArab minority in theJewish state would be a "FifthColumn"; hence, it waspreferable that they be citizensof the Palestine Arab state so that,if the Warbreaks out and, if hostile, they "would be expelled"to the Arab state. Andif they were citizens of the Jewish state "it would (only) be possibleto imprisonthem." DEBATE ON THE 1948 EXODUS: MASALHA 93 Does not this show thatthe Yishuv'sleaders entered the 1948 war at least witha transferdesire or mindset? Morrisargues thata new approach emergedin 1948 among the ruling Mapai Partyleaders, presided over by Ben-Gurion,in supportof a transfer "solution"to the "Arab demographicproblem." Ben-Gurion....understood that war changed everything; a different set of "rules"had