COMMENTARY YAHIA H. ZOUBIR

COMMENTARIES

The Protracted Civil War in : The Role of Turkey’s Role in the Reconstruction of Libya Outside Powers GUMA EL-GAMATY YAHIA H. ZOUBIR From Zero-Sum to Positive Sum: Cultivating EU Policy towards Libya Political Settlement and Reform in Libya TAREK MEGERISI SHATHA SBETA and MOHAMED ABUFALGHA Turkey’s Libya Policy: Achievements and Peace Negotiations Cannot Be Held Forever: Challenges Breaking the Deadlock in the Armenia- İSMAİL NUMAN TELCİ Azerbaijan Conflict FARID SHAFIYEV and VASIF HUSEYNOV Strange Bedfellows: Why France’s Emmanuel Macron and His Autocratic Friends Are Attempting to Impose Another Strongman in the MENA Region TIMOTHY REID

10 Insight Turkey COMMENTARY THE PROTRACTED CIVIL WAR IN LIBYA: THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE POWERS

The Protracted Civil War in Libya: The Role of Outside Powers

YAHIA H. ZOUBIR

KEDGE Business School, France Brookings Doha Center, Qatar ORCID No: 0000-0003-4234-6862

ABSTRACT The collapse of the Muammar Qaddafi regime was ostensibly the prelude to a democratic Libya. The 2012 election elicited much optimism. By 2014, the domestic situation had taken an unexpected turn for the worse, resulting in two governments, one in the east and one in the west, each supported by numerous militias. While the civil war has pitted Libyans against Libyans, foreign interventions on be- half of opposite side in the conflict have hindered the end of the civil war. Indisputably, foreign interference had begun well before the civil war; however, the military backing to the protagonists has become more pronounced since 2014. The foreign powers involved in the Lib- yan conflict aim to fulfill specific interests, some of which deriving from the rivalries between those countries. Unless those foreign pow- ers have achieved their goals in Libya, an end to the civil war any- time soon remains unlikely, occasional ceasefires notwithstanding.

Keywords: Libya, Civil War, , Turkey, UAE, , France, , Govern- ment of National Accord

Insight Turkey 2020 Vol. 22 / No. 4 / pp. 11-27

Received Date: 05/10/2020 • Accepted Date: 10/11/2020 • DOI: 10.25253/99.2020224.01

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Introduction 2014, Libya had two governments, each claiming electoral legitimacy he 42-year dictatorship in and authority over this substantial Libya ended in October 2011 and potentially rich North African Twith the inhumane assassi- country. Fourth largest in Africa by nation of Muammar Qaddafi and landmass with a relatively small pop- massive destruction; it took the ulation of merely 6.2 million, Libya Western-backed armed uprising boasts the ninth-largest proven oil eight months of intensive fighting reserves3 and the 21st natural gas re- to defeat Qaddafi’s loyalist forces. serves in the world.4 Naturally, both The fall of the Qaddafi regime was domestic forces and foreign powers a welcome development for some in covet this wealth. the region and in the West because of Libya’s often unconventional, an- tagonistic foreign policies. For the The Role of Foreign Powers in Libyans, who rejected his authori- Libya’s Destabilization tarian domestic policies, the hope was to see change and a transition The Qaddafi regime had tenuous re- to a representative order. However, lations, particularly with the United unlike Tunisia or Egypt, Qaddafi’s States5 but also with Europe, with its Jamahiriya did not leave behind a neighbors (Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, standing army nor a reliable poten- and ), and with the Gulf states. tial force that could bring the neces- However, from 1999 until 2011, sary stability for a political, let alone the Qaddafi regime seemed to have democratic transition. The region- mended relations with most foes and alist and tribal nature of Libya and had even been rehabilitated once it the difficulty of disarming the rebels had abandoned the program for the (dozens of militias) and other groups production of weapons of mass de- (Islamist militants), coupled with the struction in December 2003. Domes- lack of viable institutions, have gen- tically, the regime had shown some erated unsurmountable challenges to signs of change, at least in rhetoric, the post-conflict reconstruction of particularly after 2009 when it sought the country.1 Already in 2011, it was to craft a new constitution. During apparent that, because of the politi- that same period, Qaddafi thought cal system and the nature of the so- that he was beloved by his people and cial structures, the transition would deluded himself about the legitimacy be uncertain.2 The interregnum be- and popularity of his rule. Therefore, tween 2011 and 2014 had shown a the rebellion came as a real surprise few signs of a promising democratic to the regime. transition, illustrated by first free elections in 2012; however, numer- Foreign intervention in Qaddafi’s ous domestic and geopolitical factors Libya occurred in the guise of re- have kept the collapsed Libyan state peated bombings by the in a chaotic situation. Indeed, by and weighty sanctions imposed by the

12 Insight Turkey THE PROTRACTED CIVIL WAR IN LIBYA: THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE POWERS

U.S. and the United Nations. But the most fateful intervention occurred in The successful overthrow 2011. The United Kingdom, France, the United States, and many mem- of the regime did not mean bers of the Arab League, primarily the end of foreign presence the and Saudi nor the alliances between Arabia, sought regime change includ- ing the removal of Qaddafi himself domestic forces and outside regardless of the mending of relations powers that had occurred prior to the upris- ing. They thus supported the rebel- lion not only diplomatically but also militarily. In breach of UN resolution eign presence nor the alliances be- 1973, France, the UK, and the United tween domestic forces and outside States militarily aided the rebels, powers. While NATO bombings had sending advisors to assist them in the stopped, the chaotic situation that fight against government troops and ensued facilitated the presence of the toppling of Qaddafi. Although the so-called ISIS and other terrorist the insurgents played unquestionably groups like al-Qaeda in the Islamic an important role in combating the Maghreb (AQIM); this in turn served regime, their fight would have failed as justification for continued West- had it not been for NATO’s special ern intervention in Libya. This time, operations forces on the ground tar- terrorism and the potential terrorist geting for airstrikes, training Libyan threat to Europe, as well as illegal rebels, handling the logistics, oper- migration across the Mediterranean ating communications and planning served as the new rationale for this as well as organizing and leading the interference. Thus, the United States, Libyan insurgents in battle. The Cen- whose embassy had been attacked tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) and in September 2014 –causing the British Secret Intelligence (MI6) op- death of the ambassador and three eratives, too, played a critical role in personnel– began in 2015 to launch helping the insurgents. Unquestion- airstrikes against ISIS targets.6 , ably, arming insurgents in the con- which was favorable to military in- flict against loyalist forces not only tervention in Libya, had given the intensified the first civil war but it United States permission to use Ital- also dissuaded the insurgents from ian airfields to launch armed drone accepting a negotiated agreement, as flights over Libya.7 In 2018, the U.S. was encouraged by the African Union air force launched strikes against and countries, such as , Russia, AQIM in Libya, killing two notorious and others, which had opposed NA- militants;8 another strike occurred TO’s military intervention. in September 2019 killing eight sus- pected ISIS combatants.9 The United The successful overthrow of the re- States also sent Special Operations gime did not mean the end of for- Forces to Libya under the new con-

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Forces loyal to Libya’s UN-recognised GNA parade a Russian-made Pantsir air defense system truck in the capital after its capture at al-Watiya airbase from forces loyal to , May 20, 2020. MAHMUD TURKIA / Getty Images

cept of “low visibility operations,”10 post-Qaddafi crisis exacerbated divi- which consist ostensibly of helping sions among Libyans. Not only that, local forces fight terrorism. The U.S. but this also resulted in new alliances also established two outposts in East- between him and foreign powers that ern and Western Libya in late 2015. supported him for different reasons The task of those outposts was to line regardless of the existence of the up local partners ahead of a possible United Nations-recognized Govern- ground attack against ISIS.11 ment of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, which emanated from the The U.S. intervention was comforted Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in not only by the presence of ISIS and 2015. However, the House of Repre- other militant groups but also by the sentatives in , which has sup- domestic ideological battles among ported Haftar ever since, has refused Libyans (, Mad- to recognize the GNA. khalists, Salafists, etc.). Indeed, in 2014, renegade self-proclaimed Mar- In sum, since the uprising of Febru- shall Khalifa Haftar entered the po- ary 2011 against the Qaddafi regime, litical scene in Libya; he gathered foreign involvement in the Libyan militias loyal to his vision. In May civil war has not abated; in fact, this 2014, they assaulted the bases of involvement has become more prom- other Islamist, Salafist militia groups, inent, thus hindering the prospects such as Ansar al-Sharia or the 17th of Libya’s national reconciliation and February Brigade, in .12 The post-reconstruction. An analysis of operation, codenamed, “Operation the roles that various powers have Dignity [karama],” marked the be- played in Libya demonstrates that the ginning of the still ongoing second main objectives have been to serve civil war. Haftar’s involvement in the discrete interests whose objective is

14 Insight Turkey THE PROTRACTED CIVIL WAR IN LIBYA: THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE POWERS

not to end hostilities. In this conflict, foreign powers supported either the Before Qaddafi’s overthrow, GNA, led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, or the Libyan National nearly one hundred Turkish Army (LNA) led by Marshall Khalifa construction companies had Haftar. Turkey, Qatar, and, to a lesser contracts in Libya. Because of degree, Italy, have been the GNA’s main supporters, while Russia, Egypt, the 2011 uprising, they had the UAE, , Jordan, and to abandon their projects France have provided their backing to Haftar,13 whose objective all along incomplete, losing $19 billion has been to take full control of Libya –which he could have succeeded in achieving had it not been for Turkey’s Undoubtedly, unlike the other pow- intervention on behalf of the GNA in ers’ involvement in Libya, Turkey’s early 2020.14 This has transformed the is legitimate simply because the Libyan civil war (essentially a strug- UN-recognized government, GNA, gle for power and resources between had called on the Turkish govern- locally armed factions) into a proxy ment to come to its rescue. France, war in which the contending Libyan which had intervened in Mali in 2013 sides rely on foreign military support to defend the government against the to offset the other. advance of terrorist groups on the capital Bamako, condemned Turkish intervention in Libya. President Em- Turkey’s Interests and Role in manuel Macron, whose government Libya is supporting Haftar, stated that, “We won’t tolerate the role that Turkey is In April 2019, Haftar began his of- playing in Libya.”16 The Arab League, fensive to capture Tripoli; although some of whose members are deeply it resisted the assault for a while, involved in Libya’s civil war, con- the GNA did not have any mili- demned Turkey for its use of funded tary backing that could halt the ad- from Syria associated to vance of Haftar whose troops were factions close to jihadist terrorism.17 well equipped by Russia, Egypt, the UAE, France, and others. The Turk- Turkey’s intervention begs the ques- ish-supported GNA’s counter-of- tion as to its interests and objectives fensive proved effective not only in there. Undoubtedly, Turkey has geo- defeating Haftar’s troops but also in strategic interests in Libya. Before pushing them eastward to the edges the crisis in Libya and the latter’s of the strategic city of , which direct intervention in 2020, Tur- boasts al-Jufra airbase used by the key had, since the 1970s, extensive Russian air force to support Russian economic interests in the country; mercenaries of the indeed, many Turkish construction fighting alongside Haftar’s LNA.15 companies had been quite active in

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UAE, on the one hand, and Haftar’s While the fall of Qaddafi decision to seek to conquer Tripoli, on the other hand, prompted Ankara was a welcome event for the to become more implicated in the autocratic regime in Egypt, conflict. Thus, it decided to increase the prospect of a Muslim its military supplies and training to the GNA, making public its support Brotherhood-inspired to the GNA. Undoubtedly, Turkey’s government in Libya has been backing of the GNA aimed to offset the balance in favor of Haftar due unacceptable to Egypt to the patronage he received from Egypt, the UAE, Russia and others. But the involvement in Libya per- Libya. According to some reports, tains to Turkey’s broader objectives from 1972 onward, the contracts that related to the Eastern Mediterra- Turkish firms have signed amounted nean, which boasts considerable oil to nearly $40 billion in Libya’s con- and gas resources. struction sector.18 Before Qadda- fi’s overthrow, nearly one hundred Indeed, the amount of natural gas Turkish construction companies had available in the Eastern Mediterra- contracts in Libya. Because of the nean is considerable. In 2010, the 2011 uprising, they had to abandon United States Geological Survey their projects incomplete, losing $19 (USGS) estimated the deposits at 1.7 billion.19 The destructive civil wars billion barrels of oil and 3.45 tril- (2011, 2014, and 2019) have resulted lion cubic meters of natural gas in in massive economic losses. Because the area,21 worth $700 billion.22 Un- of the instability, Libya has failed to doubtedly, Turkey sought, like the pay to Turkey approximately $15 neighboring Eastern Mediterranean billion in unpaid contractual obli- states to have access to a portion of gations.20 The cost of reconstruction these deposits, which, clearly, could is currently estimated at $50 billion; decide Turkey’s geostrategic role in obviously, Turkey would like to par- the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey take in that post-conflict reconstruc- felt isolated in the region because of tion which partly justifies its involve- the economic zone involving Greece, ment in the country. However, those Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt which was economic interests are not limited initiated in 2017 the East Mediterra- to investment and participation in nean Energy Forum. That coopera- rebuilding of the country. Turkey tion culminated in the establishment has more important geopolitical of the East Mediterranean Gas Fo- and geo-economic interests which rum (EMGF) in January 2020. The explain its support for the GNA. membership of the EMGF is made up Haftar’s involvement in the conflict of Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, and the growing support from Tur- Jordan, and the Palestinian Author- key’s foes, namely, Egypt and the ity.23 As an analyst correctly pointed

16 Insight Turkey THE PROTRACTED CIVIL WAR IN LIBYA: THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE POWERS

out before the Turkey-Libya agree- of the objectives of the agreement ment of November 2019: signed with Libya and the drilling in the Eastern Mediterranean: allowing Turkey’s provocative action of send- Ankara to break its isolation.28 ing two drilling ships into Cypriot waters to explore for natural gas is Prior to the agreement with Turkey, a response to a grander provoca- the GNA was desperate, especially tion coming from the Republic of since neither the Europeans nor the Cyprus, Greece, Egypt and Israel to United States had shown any willing- exclude Turkey from the marketing ness to come to the GNA’s rescue. This of Eastern Mediterranean gas. This provided Turkey with an opportunity common front, composed of inter- to secure its position in the Libya chess linked security partnerships among game and induce Tripoli to align with the region’s current natural gas pro- Ankara. Owing to the deployment of ducers and Greece, has been increas- Turkish troops (along with air defense ingly supported by the United States, systems and artillery) and air support, France and Italy, each of whom has the GNA was now able to drive back significant economic investments in Haftar’s troops compelling them to this gas. For Ankara, its NATO allies’ retreat to the East,29 thus compelling support of this common front is tan- Haftar’s backers to seek alternatives. tamount to a policy of soft contain- Turkey’s use of Unmanned Aerial Ve- ment against Turkey.24 hicles (UAV) was extremely success- ful and turned, without a doubt, the There was genuine anxiety among tide of the LNA’s offensive. Turkish policymakers which prompted Ankara to sign a memo- Beyond the important geopolitical randum of understanding on Medi- and geo-economic interests, there terranean maritime sovereignty with are also some ideological reasons for the GNA.25 One of the objectives was Turkey’s involvement in Libya. An- to break the unity of that group. In- kara has apparently coordinated with deed, after the signing of the agree- Qatar to support the Muslim Broth- ment, President Erdoğan stated that, erhood government in Libya;30 these “Egypt, Greek Cyprus, Greece and attempts are obviously at loggerheads Israel all try at different times to im- with Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Ara- pose their sovereignty over the region bia.31 Egypt, in particular, which in isolation from Turkey,” and that forcibly removed in 2013 the dem- the memorandum “has foiled certain ocratically-elected Muslim Brother- conspiracies against [Turkey].”26 In hood government, was incensed with a speech, Erdoğan emphasized that Turkey’s support for the GNA. Egypt thanks to the agreements with Libya, never forgot that Turkey had been “the projects aimed at entirely exclud- one of the countries that condemned ing Turkey from the Mediterranean unequivocally the coup,32 which until have thus been wholly thwarted with now has poisoned relations between our recent steps.”27 Turkey met some Ankara and Cairo.

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Egypt’s Role in the Libyan War the GNA and the fear that the branch could launch attacks against Egypt. Egypt has strategic reasons to be in- Thus, Cairo supplied Haftar with volved in Libya. Geographically, the weapons in violation of the UN arms two countries share a 700-mile bor- embargo on Libya,35 and assisted in der. After the passing of President the renewal of Libya’s erstwhile in- Gamal Abdul-Nassar, relations with telligence services to ensure the se- Qaddafi, who was imbued with Nas- curity of the common border and serite and Arab nationalist ideas, thwart the penetration of terrorists. soured. While the fall of Qaddafi Undoubtedly, Egypt (with backing was a welcome event for the auto- from the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Russia, cratic regime in Egypt, the prospect and France) was hopeful that Haftar of a Muslim Brotherhood-inspired would become strong enough and government in Libya has been unac- take full control over Libya. Had it ceptable to Egypt. Since 2013, Abdel not been for Turkey’s intervention Fattah el-Sisi’s Egypt has conducted a on behalf of the GNA, this scenario resolute, unrelenting battle against Is- would have certainly materialized. lamism, including the Muslim Broth- Failure of Haftar to seize Tripoli and erhood, which it considers as a terror- his retreat compelled Cairo to seek ist organization. Thus, when Haftar a diplomatic solution to temporize claimed to have come to back to Libya until Haftar’s forces could reorga- to rid the country of terrorism, Egypt nize. Thus, Egypt announced in June extended its full and steadfast sup- 2020 the Cairo Declaration, which port to him. Like, Haftar, el-Sisi has called for a ceasefire.36 While the deep hostility toward Islamist move- Arab League, dominated by the Gulf ments; the Egyptian government has countries and their regional allies thus provided him with military and welcomed the Declaration, the GNA diplomatic support.33 More impor- and Turkey rejected it.37 As correctly tantly, Cairo saw in Haftar a man they pointed out, the call for withdrawal could use to serve Egypt’s economic of all foreign forces from Libya was (obtaining Libyan oil at discounted aimed at Turkey, not at Haftar’s sup- prices, which Cairo had obtained be- porters.38 The Egyptian threat to in- fore, for its ailing economy), ideolog- tervene in Libya39 –with approval on ical (fighting Islamism), and security July 13 from Libya’s House of Rep- (protecting borders) interests and to resentatives40– would have resulted bring about stability to Libya, thus in direct conflict between Egyptian preventing the fallouts from its cur- and Turkish forces, especially since rent instability without having to in- Egypt also sought support from the tervene directly militarily.34 Libyan tribes.41 Neither the United States nor Russia would have ap- Egypt sided with Haftar from the proved of such Egyptian interven- outset because of the close ties that tion. However, the alliance between the Libyan branch of the Muslim el-Sisi and Libya’s powerful speaker Brotherhood had established with of parliament, Aguila Saleh, proved

18 Insight Turkey THE PROTRACTED CIVIL WAR IN LIBYA: THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE POWERS

that Haftar was expendable in Cairo’s eyes42 and that the defeat he had suf- The UAE has also recruited fered was not without consequences. Egypt’s direct military intervention Sudanese mercenaries to fight in Libya would have been a danger- alongside Haftar’s forces, 43 ous gamble. A victory, unlikely, luring them through lucrative would have strengthened el-Sisi with his patrons (the UAE and Saudi security jobs in the Emirates, Arabia). An entrapment in Libya, but then dispatching them to due to the difficulties in logistics, and a defeat on the ground or even fight in Libya’s civil war a stalemate would delegitimize his presidency and aggravate an already challenging socioeconomic situation relenting determination to prevent in Egypt. the establishment of non-autocratic regimes, using as one of its tools.46 This largely explains the The UAE: Maintaining the Status support that it has provided, with Quo in MENA Region Saudi financial support, to el-Sisi and Haftar, two autocratic individ- Despite the distance that separates it uals claiming to preserve stability. from Libya, the United Arab Emir- Because of the financial dependence ates (UAE) has for years intervened of these two individuals on outside in the country. With its gigantic support, their manipulation by the wealth the UAE has provided con- UAE is made easier. If Russia uses siderable weaponry to Haftar and the private armed group purportedly has launched many air strikes against an autonomous force as a stratagem the GNA forces.44 Abu Dhabi wishes for its actions in Libya, the UAE has ostensibly to ascertain its regional used, at least in the beginning of domination and to suppress any the conflict in 2011, humanitarian democratic movements and Isla- aid as justification for its interven- mist forces in the Arab world, prin- tion in Libya.47 Later, the UAE pro- cipally the Muslim Brotherhood. To vided military assistance openly and counter the Muslim Brotherhood, it in violation of the United Nations’ has sought to increase the influence arms embargo. Haftar admitted that of Madkhali-Salafism, a very conser- he received weapons from the UAE vative Sunni doctrine that originated and so did the pro-Haftar speaker in Saudi Arabia. As correctly pointed of the House of Representatives in out, Madhalism has “intolerant ac- Tobruk. 48 In 2016, the UAE opened tions and anti-democratic agenda. an air base in al-Marj in the Eastern Their presence in powerful armed part of Libya.49 The UAE has also re- groups makes them central actors in cruited Sudanese mercenaries to fight Libya’s conflict.45 The UAE has dis- alongside Haftar’s forces, luring them played since the Arab uprisings un- through lucrative security jobs in the

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bers in the Arab League who sought The presence of foreign to curtail Qaddafi’s power –in reality, to remove him. The other explanation forces has exacerbated the is that UNSC resolution 1973 allowed rivalries among outside it to protect Libyans against Qaddafi; powers regardless of the many the resolution did not intimate re- gime change, but in fact this is exactly conferences, like the one in what happened to Moscow’s exas- Berlin in January 2020 peration. Nevertheless, the Kremlin found a way to become a key player in post-Qaddafi’s Libya. Regardless of the real reasons, the fall of Qaddafi Emirates, but then dispatching them cost Moscow its ally and a loss of in- to fight in Libya’s civil war.50 fluence; therefore, it has endeavored to make a weighty comeback through It seems that the UAE’s primary ob- playing a role in the post-Qaddafi era jective is to prevent the emergence and influence the course of events. of a sovereign and stable Libya be- Moscow’s direct role in Libya started cause an independent, self-sufficient in summer 2016 when it asked Haftar Libya with its vast hydrocarbons to discuss Russian support for his wealth would not only compete with troops to fight ostensibly Islamist ex- the UAE, but would also threaten its tremists in the country. The interest bid to impose its hegemony in the in and motivation to support Haftar’s North African region and preserve LNA derived from a desire to guar- the type of regime that it favors; in antee that Russia would receive priv- other words, the UAE would repeat ileged access to Libya’s hydrocarbons what it did in Egypt in 2013, when it, reserves. To achieve that goal, in and Saudi Arabia, supported al-Sisi 2017, the Russian oil company Ros- to conduct its coup. neft signed a contract on energy with the Libyan to help revitalize Libya’s oilfields.51 Russia: Securing a Presence in the Clearly, Russia has economic inter- Mediterranean ests in Libya, some of which it had lost due to the 2011 uprising, and During the 2011 uprising, Moscow’s would thus like to regain them. abstention in the United Nations Se- curity Council (UNSC) vote signaled Fighting global jihadism (al-Qaeda a tacit approval of NATO and other or ISIS) and economic interests are actors’ intervention in Libya despite among Russia’s main interests in the relatively good ties it had main- Libya. But, more importantly, yet an- tained with the Qaddafi regime. One other salient objective is having an can surmise that among the main influential presence in the Mediterra- reasons for the vote was to avoid nean. While it has two bases in Syria alienating the majority of the mem- and easy stopovers in Egypt,52 Mos-

20 Insight Turkey THE PROTRACTED CIVIL WAR IN LIBYA: THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE POWERS

Following the Berlin Libya cow never succeeded in obtaining a ou s l y.” 56 Thus, supporting Haftar mil- Conference in January, naval base in the North African Med- itarily increases its geopolitical influ- politicians iterranean littoral. During the Cold ence in the areas controlled by Haftar and diplomats War, Moscow sought vainly to obtain and his forces, while its engagement gathered for access to the naval base of Mers-el- in the Western part allows it to be another Libya Kébir in Western Algeria;53 the Lib- seen as a diplomatic mediator, high- conference during the yan crisis has now offered a golden light its great power status, and safe- Munich Security opportunity to potentially establish guard profitable reconstruction con- Conference on one. Undoubtedly, despite denials,54 tracts once peace and stability return February 16, Russia would be keen on having a to Libya.57 The Kremlin has sought to 2020. base on NATO’s Southern Flank and broker ceasefires between the GNA JOHANNES SIMON / Getty Images being close to Europe. and the LNA. In January 2020, while the war was raging between Haftar’s Interestingly, though it has supported forces backed by Egypt, the UAE, Haftar, a military man preferred by France, and the Wagner private mil- Russia’s ministry of defense,55 the itary,58 which had made their first Kremlin has maintained good rela- appearance in Benghazi in March tions with al-Sarraj and the GNA. As 2019, on the one hand, and the GNA observed rightly, Moscow “hopes that forces backed by Turkey and Qatar, Haftar’s snowballing failures in West- on the other hand, Moscow and An- ern Libya will make him tamer and kara sought to broker a ceasefire. The more cooperative and that a cornered two protagonists, Haftar and Sarraj, Tripoli would take engagement with went to Moscow but never met face the Russian government more seri- to face; though there was agreement

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of its special operations soldiers were While Southern Mediterranean killed in the country. This forced the government to admit its military in- states worry about an unlikely volvement.61 Despite its indisputable influx of refugees from Libya, involvement on behalf of Haftar to Libya’s immediate neighbors, whom France supplied weapons both directly62 and through the UAE and Algeria and Tunisia, which Egypt –in violation of the arms em- have been neutral in the bargo– it has condemned Turkey’s as- sistance to the GNA in harsh terms.63 conflict and offered to mediate It also supported Haftar diplomati- between the warring factions, cally; indeed, President Emmanuel fear incursions of extremist Macron invited him to summits, in- ternational conferences, and private jihadists into their own meetings and welcomed him with all territories, intrusions that honors due to a head of state. could destabilize the entire The obvious question is why France region believes it has the right to intervene in Libya on the side of a renegade sol- dier and condemn the legal Turkish intervention on behalf of a govern- on a ceasefire, Haftar declined to sign ment recognized by the United Na- it.59 In sum, Russia’s game in Libya is tions. As correctly pointed out: to guarantee its presence, sustain its economic interests, and, while pro- French interventionism and inter- viding continuous support to the ference in domestic Libyan affairs government in Tobruk, seek to safe- goes [sic] back decades–to the 1940s, guard its role by keeping its channels when France tried to take and keep of communication with the GNA. control of the southern Libyan prov- ince of , where it had eco- nomic and military interests. Kept at France: Playing in the Shadows bay by the regime of Moammar Gad- hafi for more than forty years, France, France, which was instrumental in in 2011 under President Nicolas Sar- the overthrow of the regime and the kozy, seized the chance offered by the assassination of Qaddafi in 2011, has first revolts in Benghazi to recover its played since then a double game in long-lost position in Libya by imme- the post- Qaddafi conflict. Officially, diately siding with the rebels.64 France supports the UN-recognized GNA; however, though it had acted Like Russia, Egypt, and the UAE, secretly for some time, its support for France considers that Haftar could Haftar since 2014 became an open serve its interests; thus, it assisted him “secret” in 2016,60 especially after 3 in all his actions, including his failed

22 Insight Turkey THE PROTRACTED CIVIL WAR IN LIBYA: THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE POWERS

attempts to seize Tripoli. Haftar’s announced their resignations, deci- defeat in Western Libya has forced sions which might widen the politi- to revise its policy, increasing cal vacuum and thus permit greater its rhetoric about finding a political extremist activity in the country. If solution.65 However, France is per- this was not enough, the European ceived as an impediment to peace in Union which was divided on Libya Libya66 rather than an honest broker (e.g., France against Italy),68 has con- in the conflict. sidered options for sending troops to Libya, ostensibly to bolster a cease- fire.69 While Southern Mediterranean Conclusion states worry about an unlikely influx of refugees from Libya, Libya’s imme- The Libyan crisis is far from being diate neighbors, Algeria and Tunisia, over. The numerous foreign interven- which have been neutral in the con- tions, the alignments of local militias flict and offered to mediate between and their manipulations by foreign the warring factions, fear incursions powers, the incapacity of the local of extremist jihadists into their own governments to come to agreement territories, intrusions that could de- for a peaceful resolution are the main stabilize the entire region. The irres- impediment to end the civil war and olution of the conflict will also cer- to initiate a peaceful reconstruction tainly exacerbate the already volatile of Libya. The presence of foreign situation in the Sahelian neighbor- forces has exacerbated the rivalries hood, particularly, Chad, Niger, and among outside powers regardless Mali. Thus, resolving the Libyan cri- of the many conferences, like the sis is crucial to avoid unpredictable, one in Berlin in January 2020.67 The wider regional and international con- ideological antagonisms (Salafism sequences. against Muslim Brotherhood) and geopolitical considerations account Endnotes for the prolongation of the fratri- 1. For detailed analyses of the Libyan political cidal war among Libyans. The con- system under Qaddafi, see, Jacob Mundy, Libya flict threatens to undermine Libya’s (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018); Bruce Ronald St. territorial integrity and sovereignty. John, Libya: Continuity and Change, Revised edi- Furthermore, while the oil wealth is a tion, (New York: Routledge, 2015). blessing that could help Libya rebuild 2. Yahia H. Zoubir and Erzsébet N. Róza, “The End of the Libyan Dictatorship: The Uncertain Transi- and prosper, it is also a curse because tion,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 7 (2012), outside forces covet that wealth. As if pp. 1267-1283. For a recent account of the role this was not enough, the population, of militias, see, Ulf Laessing, Understanding Libya weary of this long-lasting civil war since Gaddafi, (London: Hurst & Company, 2020), pp. 37-53. and suffering from socioeconomic 3. “Libya Oil Reserves,” Worldometer, retrieved from woes, has risen in protest compli- https://www.worldometers.info/oil/libya-oil/. cating an already unstable situation. 4. “Libya Natural Gas,” Worldometer, retrieved from Both al-Sarraj (West) and Prime https://www.worldometers.info/gas/libya-natu- Minister Abdullah al-Thani (East) ral-gas/.

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5. Yahia H. Zoubir, “The United States and Libya: 2020), retrieved from https://rusi.org/sites/de- The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,” Journal of fault/files/ramani_web.pdf. North African Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 2011), 15. “‘Dangerous Adventure’: Turkey Warns Egypt pp. 275-297. over Libya Invasion,” , (July 22, 2020), 6. “Islamic State Leader in Libya ‘Killed in US retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/ Airstrike,’” , (November 14, 2015), 2020/7/22/dangerous-adventure-turkey-warns- retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/ egypt-over-libya-invasion. world/2015/nov/14/us-airstrike-isis-leader-libya. 16. John Irish and Marine Pennetier, “France 7. “Italy Would Consider Any U.S. Request to ‘Will Not Tolerate’ Turkey’s Role in Libya, Macron Use Sicily Air Base for Libya Strikes,” , Says,” Reuters, (June 22, 2020), retrieved from (August 2, 2016), retrieved from https://www. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-securi- reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-italy-usa- ty-france-turkey-idUSKBN23T2US. idUSKCN10D1JD. 17. Raúl Redondo, “The Arab League Delegiti- 8. Ryan Browne, “US Conducts First Airstrike mizes Turkey’s Intervention in Libya,” Atalayar, against al Qaeda in Libya,” CNN, (March 28, (June 24, 2020), retrieved from https://atalayar. 2018), retrieved from https://edition.cnn. com/en/content/arab-league-delegitimizes-tur- com/2018/03/28/politics/us-airstrike-al-qaeda- keys-intervention-libya. libya/index.html. 18. “Turkey’s Strategic Play in Libya to Help 9. Ayman Salhi and Ulf Laessing, “U.S. Air Strike Reap Economic Gains,” DW, (July 3, 2020), re- Kills Eight Militants in Southern Libya: U.S. mil- trieved from https://www.dw.com/en/turkeys- itary,” Reuters, (September 20, 2019), retrieved strategic-play-in-libya-to-help-reap-economic- from https://www.reuters.com/article/amp/idUS gains/a-54037623. KBN1W51O2. 19. Ezel Sahinkaya, “Why Is Turkey Involved in Lib- 10. Missy Ryan and Sudarsan Raghavan, “US yan Conflict?” Voice of America, (June 4, 2020), re- Special Operations Providing Direct, On-the- trieved from https://www.voanews.com/extrem- Ground Support in Libya,” Stars and Stripes, ism-watch/why-turkey-involved-libyan-conflict. (August 9, 2016), retrieved from https://www. 20. “Turkey’s Growing Role in Libya: Motives, stripes.com/us-special-operations-providing- Background, and Responses,” Arab Center for direct-on-the-ground-support-in-libya1.4231 Research and Policy Studies, (January 9, 2020), 48#:~:text=The%20new%20American%20oper- retrieved from http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_ ation%20in%20Sirte%20is%20the,of%20the%20 analyses/turkeys-growing-role-in-libya-motives- complexities%20of%20political%20and%20mili- background-and-responses/. tia%20factions. 21. “The Underbelly of Eastern Mediterranean 11. Missy Ryan, “US Establishes Libyan Outposts Gas,” Journal of Energy Security, (August 13, 2013), with Eye Toward Islamic State Offensive,” Stars retrieved from http://www.ensec.org/index.php? and Stripes, (May 12, 2016), retrieved from https:// option=com_content&view=article&id=445:the- www.stripes.com/news/africa/us-establishes-lib- under-belly-of-eastern-mediterranean-gas&- yan-outposts-with-eye-toward-islamic-state-of- catid=137:issue-content&Itemid=422. fensive-1.409346. 22. Sahinkaya, “Why Is Turkey Involved in Libyan 12. Chris Stephen, Ian Black, and Spencer Acker- Conflict?” man, “Khalifa Haftar: Renegade General Causing Upheaval in Libya,” The Guardian, (May 22, 2014), 23. “East Mediterranean States Formally Establish retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/ Egypt-based Gas Forum,” Reuters, (September 22, world/2014/may/22/libya-renegade-general-up- 2020), retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/ heaval. article/us-mideast-energy-idUSKCN26D14D. 13. Frederic Wehrey, “‘Our Hearts Are Dead’ After 24. Michael Tanchum, “A Dangerous Policy of 9 Years of Civil War, Libyans Are Tired of Being Turkish Containment in The Eastern Mediterra- Pawns in a Geopolitical Game of Chess,” Time, nean,” Jerusalem Post, (July 10, 2019), retrieved (February 12, 2020), retrieved from https://time. from https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/A-danger- com/5779348/war-libya-global-conflict/. ous-policy-of-Turkish-containment-in-the-East- ern-Mediterranean-595269. 14. Samuel Ramani, “Turkey’s Military Interven- tion in Libya: A Surprise Triumph for Erdoğan,” 25. “The Libya-Turkey Memorandum of Under- Royal United Services Institute, Vol. 40, No. 5 (June standing: Local and Regional Repercussions,”

24 Insight Turkey THE PROTRACTED CIVIL WAR IN LIBYA: THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE POWERS

Libya Tribune, (December 30, 2019), retrieved en/pubblicazione/two-pronged-egyptian-strate- from https://en.minbarlibya.org/2019/12/30/the- gy-deal-libyan-chaos-27488. libya-turkey-memorandum-of-understanding-lo- 36. “Cairo Declaration: Sisi Launches Initiative cal-and-regional-repercussions/. for a Comprehensive Solution to Libya Conflict,” 26. Cited in, “The Libya-Turkey Memorandum of Al-Marsad, (June 6, 2020), retrieved from https:// Understanding: Local and Regional Repercus- almarsad.co/en/2020/06/06/cairo-declaration-si- sions.” si-launches-initiative-for-a-comprehensive-solu- 27. “New Year Message by President Erdoğan,” tion-to-libya-conflict/. Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, (December 37. “Tripoli Slams Arab League Statement on For- 31, 2019), retrieved from https://tccb.gov.tr/en/ eign Intervention in Libya,” The New Arab, (June speeches-statements/558/114145/new-year- 24, 2020), retrieved from https://english.alaraby. message-by-president-erdogan. co.uk/english/news/2020/6/24/tripoli-slams-ar- 28. Murat Yeşiltaş, “Turkey Looks to Libya to Break ab-league-statement-on-libya. Its Growing Isolation in the Region,” Middle East 38. Karim Mezran and Alessia Melcangi, “The Eye, (January 6, 2020), retrieved from https:// Cairo Declaration Is a False Resolution to Libya’s www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/what-turkeys- Conflict,” Libya Tribune, (June 15, 2020), retrieved endgame-libya. from http://en.minbarlibya.org/2020/06/15/the- 29. Tarek Megerisi, “Geostrategic Dimensions cairo-declaration-is-a-false-resolution-to-lib- of Libya’s Civil War,” Africa Security Brief, No. 37 yas-conflict/. (May 2020), retrieved https://africacenter.org/ 39. Nora el-Tawil, “Egypt Would Intervene in Libya wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ASB37EN-Geostra- to Maintain Military Status Quo: FM,” Egypt Today, tegic-Dimensions-of-Libyas-Civil-War-by-Tarek- (September 13, 2020), retrieved from https:// Megerisi.pdf. www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/91904/Egypt- 30. “Libya: Turkey and Qatar Want to Train Mus- would-intervene-in-Libya-to-maintain-military- lim Brotherhood Troops,” ANF News, (August 19, status-quo. 2020), retrieved from https://anfenglish.com/ 40. “Averting an Egyptian Military Intervention in news/libya-turkey-and-qatar-want-to-train-mus- Libya,” International Crisis Group, (July 27, 2020), lim-brotherhood-troops-46058. retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/mid- 31. Ahmet S. Yayla, “Erdogan’s Libyan Adventure: dle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/avert- Turkey, Russia, Gas Pipelines and Missiles,” The ing-egyptian-military-intervention-libya. Investigative Journal, (January 13, 2020), retrieved 41. “Egypt Seeks Support of Libya Tribes amid from https://investigativejournal.org/erdogans- Threat of Intervention,” Al Jazeera, (August 20, libyan-adventure-turkey-russia-gas-pipelines- 2020), retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/ and-missiles/. news/2020/08/20/egypt-seeks-support-of-libya- 32. Mustafa Akyol, “Turkey Condemns Egypt’s tribes-amid-threat-of-intervention/. Coup,” Al-Monitor, (August 21, 2013), retrieved 42. Melcangi, “A Two-Proged Egyptian Strategy.” from https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/orig- 43. “Egypt’s Military Limitations: Cairo’s Options inals/2013/08/reasons-turkey-against-egypt- to Defend Eastern Libya” Foreign Policy Research coup.html. Institute, (July 13, 2020), retrieved from https:// 33. Karim Mezran and Arturo Varvelli, “Libyan Cri- www.fpri.org/article/2020/07/egypts-mili- sis: International Actors at Play,” in Karim Mezran tary-limitations-cairos-options-to-defend-east- and Arturo Varvelli (eds.), Foreign Actors in Libya’s ern-libya/. Crisis, (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council and 44. “Russia, UAE Are Operating Land and Air At- ISPI, 2017), retrieved from https://www.ispion- tacks in Tripoli Battle, Pro-Haftar Pilot Says,” Libya line.it/it/pubblicazione/foreign-actors-libyas-cri- Observer, (December 15, 2019), retrieved from sis-17224, p. 19. https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/russia-uae- 34. Tarek Megerisi, “Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia. Neigh- are-operating-land-and-air-attacks-tripoli-battle- boring States - Diverging Approaches,” in Mezran pro-haftar-pilot-says. and Varvelli, Foreign Actors in Libya’s Crisis, p. 25. 45. “Addressing the Rise of Libya’s Madkhali-Sala­ 35. Alessia Melcangi, “A Two-Pronged Egyptian fis,”International Crisis Group, Report No. 20, (April Strategy to Deal with the Libyan Chaos,” Institute 25, 2019), https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle- for International Political Studies, (September 24, east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/address- 2020), retrieved from https://www.ispionline.it/ ing-rise-libyas-madkhali-salafis; see, also, Fred-

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26 Insight Turkey THE PROTRACTED CIVIL WAR IN LIBYA: THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE POWERS

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