The International Response to the Belt and Road Initiative

The School for Ethics and Global Leadership, Spring 2021

April 28, 2021

Table of Contents

Executive Summary 3 Historical Background 6 The United States 10 India 16 The European Union 22 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 27

The African Union (AU) 32

Introduction

This is the work of 24 high school juniors who attended the School for Ethics and Global Leadership, a semester-long program, in Washington D.C. for the spring semester of 2021. The School for Ethics and Global Leadership aims to provide intellectually motivated high school juniors who represent the diversity of the United States with the best possible opportunity to shape themselves into ethical leaders who create positive change in our world. Students begin the semester by investigating international conflicts in order to enhance their international awareness. Ethics and leadership are integrated throughout the school’s curriculum. Students go on to write a collaborative policy document, in which they create a realistic policy to resolve an international issue, to be shared with the public after its completion. This year, the spring semester students chose to write a policy document to address the international response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

We would like to thank Dr. David Ettinger at the Gelman Library of George Washington University, as well as other professionals that have helped us in our research.

Authors and Contributors

Executive Summary Alexander Chan, Alicja Farber, Abigail Krenz, Sofia Lake, Mary Elizabeth Sprouse, Theodore Stravin

Formatting Willa Battey, Asalahtu Khalid, Sydney Morrison, Tenzin Gund-Morrow, Ananya Randeria, Olivia Yun

Expert Witness Benjamin Ghatan, Leo Koerner, Sophia Monaco, Casey Powell, Reyna-Leyah Solomon, Asher Zemmel

Publicity Jackie Araujo, Sylvia Myers, Zane Nagel, Max Weidhorn, K ate Willey, Tasia Young

Historical Background Jackie Araujo, Leo Koerner, Theodore Stravin, Olivia Yun

The United States Alicja Farber, Asalahtu Khalid, Zane Nagel, Reyna-Leyah Solomon

India Tenzin Gund-Morrow, Sophia Monaco, Sylvia Myers, Mary Elizabeth Sprouse

The European Union Benjamin Ghatan, Abigail Krenz, Ananya Randeria, Katherine Willey

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Willa Battey, Alexander Chan, Casey Powell, Tasia Young

The African Union Sofia Lake, Sydney Morrison, Max Weidhorn, Asher Zemmel

Executive Summary

Xi Jinping introduced the BRI in 2013 to vastly expand China’s global economic and political power. Through this initiative’s maritime and land trade routes, China has broadened its influence in the global market. While the BRI also aids developing countries by implementing infrastructure projects and introducing modernized technology, the loans create debt that some countries struggle to pay off. It is up to other global powers to respond to this initiative, check China’s growing global influence, and ensure that developing countries that sign on to the BRI are not left worse off than before.

As the largest economy in the world, with over $1 trillion of Chinese debt, the United States (U.S.) has a unique position when addressing the BRI and Chinese economic expansion. Because of the power China has over the U.S. economy, it has been difficult for the U.S. government to directly oppose the BRI in its actions. The BRI poses a threat to the U.S. because it expands Chinese military presence, provokes instability in the Asia-Pacific region, and promotes the use of unsustainable energy, offsetting the positives of infrastructure in developing nations. To address China’s growing sphere of influence, and challenge unethical infrastructure projects, the U.S. should re-enter into a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and continue its involvement in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). Next, the U.S. should allocate money and resources to the Blue Dot Network (BDN) and encourage other nations to join. Third, the U.S. should collaborate with leaders of developing nations to spread information about the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and diversify the location of DFC’s projects. Through these various governmental initiatives, the U.S. will promote transparency and attract increased foreign investment regarding infrastructure projects in BRI-affected countries. Lastly, in early 2021, China embarked on its “vaccine diplomacy” initiative by donating vaccines to strategically selected countries. As a response, the U.S. should continue working with Quad to dramatically increase the supply of coronavirus vaccines across Asia in the future.

Despite the widespread power of China’s BRI in Southeast Asia, India remains the only country in the region that has not partnered with China for BRI investment projects. India sees the BRI as a threat to its national security and sovereignty because of its efforts to gain more control over maritime trade in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, China’s acknowledgment of Pakistan’s claim to the disputed Kashmir region has only served to antagonize India. In an effort to combat the BRI’s influence, New Delhi uses its strong allyships with both Japan and the U.S. within the Quad. However, India should advocate for the Quad to establish a commitment to the Indian vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) to protect their control over the entrance to the South China Sea. India should also create the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) with the help of Japan to promote development, connectivity, and cooperation between Africa and Asia. In recent years, the BRI’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) has gained immense power in the tech sphere, posing a threat to India’s economy. Despite the DSR’s success, many tech companies announced their recent investments in India and potential shifts away from Chinese production and development. New Delhi should incentivize more tech companies to relocate by promising tech-trained professionals, a similar strategy to their agreement with Japan. India has partnered with Japan to develop 5G within their own borders rather than invest in deals with China’s Huawei, which is regarded as a risk to national security and intelligence by the other three Quad members. India should publicize their success with

Japanese 5G to incentivize other Southeast Asian countries to follow its lead and limit the influence of the DSR.

Although Chinese infrastructure investment has remained minimal within the European Union (EU), with projects concentrated in Central and Eastern European countries, unchecked Chinese investment presents a threat to the environment, businesses, and European unity. To limit Chinese influence and combat Euroscepticism, the EU should discourage engagement with the BRI and enforce strict regulation to ensure that Chinese investment is beneficial for EU member states that choose to participate. The EU should create anti-dumping protocols to ensure transparent bidding practices, establish quotas for the percentage of local workers in China-backed projects, and establish strict environmental standards for infrastructure as a prerequisite for membership in the EU. To ensure that countries follow these regulations, the EU should ban closed-door, bilateral investment agreements between China and individual member states, and provide expert economic analysis of infrastructure investment to ensure that deals remain safe and beneficial to the EU. Finally, the EU should encourage participation in less invasive infrastructure such as the China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor.

To limit the growing influence of China in Southeast Asia, countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) must take steps to decrease their dependency on China. Currently, ASEAN countries often accept ineffective infrastructure projects from China with unfair terms that detriment their economies. ASEAN relies on China as its primary economic partner; however, to gain leverage over China, they should consider using Japan, the U.S., and the EU as alternative sources for infrastructure funding. Furthermore, if ASEAN countries are unable to negotiate fair agreements, they should cancel these disadvantageous infrastructure projects. For ASEAN nations, infrastructure expansion is desirable when agreements employ local workers instead of foreign Chinese workers and are funded through public-private partnerships (PPPs), a method of outsourcing government debt to corporations. Solely accepting projects that meet these conditions would enable ASEAN countries to repay their debt more effectively.

The BRI has opened up international opportunities for the African Union (AU) by linking Africa to Europe, the Middle East, and other non-governmental actors. In addition, the BRI provides much-needed funding and infrastructure projects to help stimulate the African economy. Consequently, many African countries are struggling with immense debt, which prevents further economic development within the continent and gives China more leverage in negotiations. Despite these negative impacts, there has yet to be an AU summit about China, BRI, and the threat they pose to African economies. However, the AU has created a trade agreement for the African Continental Free Trade Area, which aims to promote intracontinental trade by eliminating almost all intracontinental tariffs. The AU also suspends countries that experience political conflict and governmental instability. This provides an incentive for AU countries to maintain their political stability, which encourages foreign investment outside of China. Moving forward, the AU should organize a summit of financial leaders to create a strategy for reducing debt-servicing costs. Regulations between public and private sectors should be made compatible, and the AU should encourage the linkage of small and medium-sized enterprises with multinational corporations to help improve African economies. AU countries should also be suspended if their governments do not allow for effective AU election monitoring and fail to meet political stability benchmarks.

Since its inception in 2013, BRI has only increased China’s international influence. If China is not held accountable, the initiative will create harmful environmental impacts and unsustainable debt. China’s lack of transparency leaves recipient nations with unfavorable deals, giving more power to China. Given BRI’s impact on the global economy, the U.S., India, the EU, ASEAN, and the AU, should use their influence and resources to reduce China’s growing authority while continuing to invest in the growth of developing countries.

Historical Background

Overview

The BRI, officially known as the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road Development Strategy, is a project that was launched by Xi Jinping in 2013 to “expand China’s economic and political influence.” 1 This initiative is a “revival of China’s Han Dynasty Silk Road,” which linked Eurasia and allowed trading amongst states through 206 B.C.- 220 A.D. The BRI has three main trade branches: the overland Silk Economic Belt, the Digital Silk Road, and the Maritime Silk Road.2 Through these trade routes, China intends to create regional free trade and economic growth in developing nations, which will in turn benefit their own manufacturing economy.3

The overland Silk Economic Belt is the continental trade aspect of the BRI. Through the creation of railways and new roads that go into Southwest Asia, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia, China seeks to develop stronger trade relations and aid in the development of Eurasian countries.4 There are three direct land routes used in the BRI, which run through six economic corridors: the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM), Chino-Indochina Peninsula (ICP), China-Central-West Asia (CAWA), New Eurasian Land Bridge (NELB), China-Mongolia-Russia (CMR), and China-Pakistan (CP) corridors.5 The creation of the Silk Economic Belt and the use of these corridors has opened up China’s access to over 60 countries, leading to rapid economic growth for China.6

The Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) consists of three routes that connect Eurasia, Africa, Oceania, amongst other states to encourage trade, communication, economic and cultural integration.7 Since trading plays such an important role in the economy and Xi’s desire to grow economically, China has expressed the desire to “invest in port development.”8 While China maintains that the MSRI is for integration, experts suggest China is trying to use it to grow its defense presence. 9

In order to further expand the BRI beyond these trade routes, China announced in 2015 that the initiative will expand to a more digital sphere with the creation of the DSR. This new DSR has quickly spread to

1 Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified January 28, 2020, accessed April 11, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Yose Rizal Damuri, Vidhyandika Perkasa, Raymond Atje, and Fajar Hirawan, P erceptions And Readiness Of Indonesia Towards The Belt And Road Initiative: Understanding Local Perspectives, Capacity, And Governance, Center for Strategic and International Studies, accessed April 28, 2021, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25409.4. 6 Chatzky and McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative.” 7 Michael J Green,“China’s Maritime Silk Road: Strategic and Economic Implications for the Indo-Pacific Region,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, accessed April 21, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-maritime-silk-road. 8 Chatzky and McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative.” 9 Green, “China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative: Economic Drivers.”

6 over a third of the countries currently participating in the BRI. 10 The principles guiding DSR are to provide adequate resources for these BRI nations to improve their network communications, artificial intelligence (AI), digital currency, and other technological advancements.1 1 In doing so, China has not only succeeded in aiding the development of these countries, but they have also expanded the global power of their biggest leading tech companies, most notably Huawei and ZTE.1 2

Although the BRI fills an important gap in world infrastructure, it has brought many uncertainties such as China-centric world trade and significant debt to participating countries.

China’s Intentions

BRI projects are spread practically across the globe, with a critical mass in Africa and Asia. There are particular ties to countries China has historical relations with such as Mongolia and Russia. Similarly, countries that are desperate for infrastructure have a large amount of their GDP in the BRI.1 3 While there is data for some projects, and a list of countries that have signed on, a definitive list of projects or costs is not public.1 4 Some major projects include the China-Belarus Industrial park, the Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge railway, and the Maputo-Katembe Bridge. The Belarusian project was an early, ambitious project that was intended to create a city around industry and advanced technology. Funded largely by China, the park was hailed by Xi as the “model project” of the BRI. Factories, roads, and a hotel were built in an area that desperately needs infrastructure.1 5 This is a similar story to the Mombasa-Nairobi Railroad. Faced with outdated tracks and no help from Western governments, China agreed to build a $3.8 billion railroad that will connect five East-African Countries. Speeding up rides and modernizing the infrastructure, the railway is needed and China was the only one who stepped up to the plate.1 6 Lastly, the Maputo-Katembe bridge connects two major cities in Mozambique and costs $750 million. While it charges a toll to cross, the Chinese government built and funded it, as the country was unable to afford it.1 7 Through that investment, movement from South to North has become easier and solved a real problem. The basis of BRI is to facilitate trade and develop global relationships with the People’s Republic of China. But, in the process, projects like these have filled desperate needs; what needs to be weighed is the risk of the debt, and a possible Chinese influence.

10 “Assessing China’s Digital Silk Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified 2020, accessed April 12, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/china-digital-silk-road/. 11 Ibid. 12 Peter Cai, “Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Lowy Institute for International Policy, last modified 2017, accessed April 21, 2021, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10136. 13 David Sacks, “Countries in China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Who’s In And Who’s Out,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified March 24, 2021, accessed April 21, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/blog/countries-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-whos-and-whos-out. 14 Ibid. 15 Andrew Higgins, “Shunned by West and Wary of Russia, Belarus Gets Help From China,” N ew York Times, last modified July 20, 2019, accessed April 21, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/20/world/europe/china-belarus-battery-protests.html. 16 Jack Moore, “China Railway to Link Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan,” International Business Times, last modified May 12, 2014, accessed April 21, 2021, https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/china-railway-link-kenya-uganda-rwanda-burundi-south-sudan-1448216. 17 “New Bridge Spans Mozambique Capital Maputo,” BBC News, last modified November 10, 2018, accessed April 21, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46165902.

Complications of BRI

China has spent an estimated $200 billion worth of contracts and invested over $1 trillion in this initiative.1 8 Countries in BRI participate through a memorandum of understanding (MoU), which entail provisions for developing projects.1 9 Despite providing modern infrastructure to receiving countries, these massive loans and projects leverage significant political power to China’s growing sphere of influence. Many countries involved with the BRI are developing nations that cannot pay for infrastructure and rely on Chinese loans for these projects. In Laos, China implemented a railway project equivalent to almost half the country’s GDP, raising concerns about the country’s debt to China.2 0 Furthermore, China’s lack of transparency in these financial transactions leaves receiving countries susceptible to default and unsustainable debt. 21

Despite focusing on building infrastructure that will bring economic prosperity, the BRI harms habitats and surrounding environments, and most importantly falls short of the Paris Agreement. 22 The Paris Agreement’s goal is to “reduce global greenhouse emissions” with the ultimate goal to reduce global warming to at least 1.5 degrees Celsius.2 3 These problems are especially concerning considering that China has not addressed them and actively fails to meet the Paris Agreement by implementing BRI projects. Not only does the BRI fail to follow the Paris Agreement, but it also disturbs the ecosystem and harms people’s homes and land.2 4 Additionally, while China has been using the BRI to promote renewable energy, there has been an increase in fossil-fuel-based projects, which could lead to more environmental problems down the road, impacting long-term goals with the Paris Agreement.2 5

18 Chatzky and McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative.” 19 Jack Nolan and Wendy Leutert, “Signing up or Standing aside: Disaggregating Participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Brookings Institute, last modified October 2020, accessed April 21, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/signing-up-or-standing-aside-disaggregating-participation-in-chinas-belt-and-road-initiativ /. 20 Peter Janssen, “Land-Locked Laos on Track for Controversial China Rail Link,” N ikkei Asia, last modified June 24, 2017, accessed April 21, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Land-locked-Laos-on-track-for-controversial-China-rail-link. 21 Dylan Gerstel, “It’s a (Debt) Trap! Managing China-IMF Cooperation Across the Belt and Road,” accessed April 14, 2021. https://www.csis.org/npfp/its-debt-trap-managing-china-imf-cooperation-across-belt-and-road. 22 “The Paris Agreement,” United Nations, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/paris-agreement. 23 “The Paris Agreement,” U nited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, accessed April 19, 2021, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement. 24 “Exploring the Environmental Repercussions of China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Environmental and Energy Study Institute, last modified October 30, 2018, accessed April 7, 2021, https://www.eesi.org/articles/view/exploring-the-environmental-repercussions-of-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative. 25 “UN Chief Calls for Immediate Global Action to Phase Out Coal,” U nited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, last modified March 2, 2021, accessed April 19, 2021, https://unfccc.int/news/un-chief-calls-for-immediate-global-action-to-phase-out-coal.

International Responses

As the BRI has grown, some countries have begun to develop their own networks to counteract China's actions. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was a trade partnership between the U.S. and 11 other countries (i.e. Australia, Canada, Mexico, Japan, Singapore) that encouraged online custom papers and planned to set rules for e-commerce, intellectual property, buyer protection, and security, to significantly help small businesses thrive. 26 The TPP also took actions against environmental harm that the expansion of the BRI caused by establishing guidelines on environmental impact, transparency, labor standards, and monopolies. Another agreement, the Quad, began in 2007 between India, the U.S., Australia, and Japan to discuss and enact the security and BRI.2 7 Lastly, the BDN is an infrastructure project created in 2019 by the U.S., Japan, and Australia to combat the rising power of the Chinese due to the BRI. The BDN aims to counter the BRI through infrastructure investment that is “inclusive, transparent, viable, and environmentally and socially sustainable.” 28 All three of these partnerships and networks have had their successes and failures, but nevertheless have helped to slow the rising power of China’s BRI.

PPPs ,and the U.S. International DFC have also emerged as viable alternatives to the BRI that allow countries choice while reducing capital outlay. A PPP involves companies partnering with a governmental organization to finance and build a project. This allows projects to be built in greater numbers as the upfront payment from a government is minimal.2 9 U.S. groups have partnered with the federal government to fund overseas infrastructure. The DFC offers political risk assurance and allows companies to feel more confident in investing. 30 On the other end, countries in ASEAN have partnered with their own companies to complete large infrastructure projects with little addition to debt through the traditional long-term use of the infrastructure as negotiated between the company and government.3 1

The BRI is an analogous and complicated program, with unclear operations and objectives. What we do know is the scale and reach is impossible to ignore and the BRI is certainly focusing world trade toward China. The U.S., India, the EU, ASEAN, and the AU all have a stake in the matter and in response, the international community is turning to solutions to decrease their dependency on China.

26 “Overview of TPP,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, accessed April 21, 2021, https://ustr.gov/tpp/overview-of-the-TPP. 27 “Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, accessed April 28, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-present-and-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue. 28 “Blue Dot Network,” U.S. Department of State, accessed April 21, 2021, https://www.state.gov/blue-dot-network/. 29 Graeme Hodge and Carsten Greve, “Public-Private Partnerships: An International Performance Review," P ublic Administration Review 67, no. 3: 545–58, accessed April 28, 2021, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4624596. 30 “Equity Investments,” U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.dfc.gov/what-we-offer-our-products/equity-investments. 31 Fauziah Zen, “Public-Private Partnership Development in Southeast Asia,” A DB Economics Working Paper Series, no. 553 (August 2018): 1-24, accessed, April 21, 2021, http://dx.doi.org/10.22617/WPS189496-2.

United States

United States’s Stance and Response to BRI

As one of the U.S.’s top trading partners and the nation that owns more than $1 trillion of U.S. debt, China has an enormous amount of power over the U.S. and its government.3 2 Because of this, the U.S. has historically been reluctant to directly release statements condemning China and BRI. However, it has become clear throughout the past two and current administrations that the U.S. generally opposes China’s economic policy. In 2015, then-President Obama declared that his “top priority as President is making sure… the U.S. -- and not countries like China -- is the one writing this century’s rules for the world's economy.”3 3 This attitude signifies that President Obama thought of China’s economic policies, including BRI, as competitive and unethical. Further, through this instance, it becomes clear that the U.S. has been in opposition to BRI since the beginning of the project. Next, during the Trump administration, the 2018 National Defense Strategy stated that “China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to ... reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage.” 34 Even though, as stated earlier, the U.S. has trouble outwardly addressing China, by including this sentence in an official foreign policy and defense document, Trump’s administration implicitly opposes BRI. The Biden administration shared these sentiments when it called China’s President Xi Jinping in February of this year. The White House Briefing Room report stated that “President Biden underscored his fundamental concerns about Beijing’s coercive and unfair economic practices” during the call, potentially alluding to BRI. 35

The BRI has positives and negatives for countries that participate. Infrastructure in impoverished areas is, at its core, a positive thing. New roads, bridges, and job opportunities that lift civilians out of poverty benefit society as a whole and should be applauded. However, BRI is not without negative effects. China is using BRI to expand its military, provoking instability in the Asia-Pacific region. Chinese projects also, in many cases, are promoting the use of unsustainable and environmentally harmful energy production, such

32 Top US Trading Partners - February 2021, US Census Bureau, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/toppartners.html; Memorandum by White House Briefing Room, “Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Call with President Xi Jinping of China,” February 10, 2021, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/02/10/readout-of-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-call-with -president-xi-jinping-of-china/. 33 “Statement by the President on the Signing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” Office of the Press Secretary, February 3, 2015, accessed April 28, 2021, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/03/statement-president-signing-trans-pacific-partnership 34 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Rep. (2018), accessed April 19, 2021. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 35 “President Obama: ‘Writing the Rules for 21st Century Trade,” Briefing Room, White House, Memorandum, last modified February 18, 2015, accessed April 19, 2021, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/02/18/president-obama-writing-rules-21st-century-trade.

10 as coal, in developing nations.3 6 Chinese projects, for example, coal-fired power plants in Pakistan, directly harm the health of the people in the communities where they are located.3 7

Trans-Pacific Partnership

During the Obama administration, the U.S. joined negotiations about the TPP. All TPP participant countries benefited from tariff reductions within the group. 38 Brunei, Chile, Singapore, New Zealand, Australia, Peru, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico, Canada, Japan and the U.S. signed the TPP agreement in 2016. 39 These countries account for 40% of Global GDP and ⅓ of the world’s trade.4 0 Other countries announced interest or intent to join the TPP, including Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, Columbia and Sri Lanka. The geopolitical motives were very clear, as the program gave financial options aside from those offered by Beijing to countries in regions attractive for BRI projects.

After assuming the presidency in 2017, Donald Trump removed the U.S. from the TPP negotiations. The eleven remaining parties (TPP-11) formed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP, with minor changes. U.S. entry into the CPTPP would add significant economic and geopolitical strength to the agreement. With U.S. involvement, the CPTPP will become a powerful tool to help developing countries with infrastructure and development.

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue

The Quad, a continued security and economic dialogue between Australia, Japan, India, and the U.S., promotes global security and the growth of the economic and humanitarian spheres of the U.S. and its partners.4 1 Continued talks with Quad nations and the expansion of the Quad to include more nations will allow the U.S. to successfully limit the expansion of China’s global influence by curbing their aggressive military actions throughout the Asia-Pacific region. 42

36 V.I. Fokin et al., H umanitarian Cooperation Within the Framework of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ PRC Initiative, Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research, Atlantis Press March 30, 2020, accessed April 23, 2021, https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200324.014. 37 I sabel Hilton, “How China's Big Overseas Initiative Threatens Global Climate Progress,” Yale Environment 360, last modified January 3, 2019, accessed April 23, 2021, https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-chinas-big-overseas-initiative-threatens-climate-progress. 38 Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer, “The Economic Effects of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Estimates,” P eterson Institute for International Economics, accessed April 23, 2021, https://www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/economic-effects-trans-pacific-partnership-new-estimates. 39 James McBride, Andrew Chatzy, and Anshu Siripurapu, “What’s Next for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified February 1, 2021, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp. 40 Jeffrey J. Schott, “Understanding the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.piie.com/bookstore/understanding-trans-pacific-partnership. 41 Sumitha Narayanan Kutty, and Rajesh Basrur, “The Quad: What It Is – And What It Is Not,” T he Diplomat, last modified March 24, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/the-quad-what-it-is-and-what-it-is-not/. 42 O riana Skylar Mastro, “Military Confrontation in the South China Sea,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified May 21, 2020, accessed April 23, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/report/military-confrontation-south-china-sea.

Since 2015, China has engaged in a variety of coercive military behavior throughout the region, most notable being their use of naval force in the South China Sea and disputes with Japan over the Senkaku Islands.4 3 Utilizing both the strategic locations and powerful armed forces of the four Quad nations to quell Chinese aggression and to stop attacks on disputed territories is necessary to ensure global security. Likewise, Chinese military and influence expansion is part of the goal of BRI, and the U.S. must use the minds and resources of the Quad in order to not allow China to establish military supremacy in the region.4 4

The Blue Dot Network (BDN)

BDN was established in early November 2019 by the U.S. International DFC as an organization that would do two things: Be a global resource for governments and the private sector to collaborate on infrastructure projects in developing countries, and assess the quality and ethics of projects through BDN certification. BDN aims to do this through collaborating with other countries - so far Japan, Australia and soon India have joined - to pool their budgets allocated to infrastructure (an estimated $14 trillion globally) and use that money to fund infrastructure for developing nations. 45 Through the BDN, countries can ensure that the projects are sourced ethically. According to their infrastructure principles detailed on the Department of State website; the BDN wants to promote and invest in infrastructure that is, “open, inclusive, transparent, and economically viable,” as well as, “financially, environmentally, and socially sustainable and compliant with international standards, laws and regulations.”4 6 This would result in less public debt for emergent nations, which is becoming a pressing ethical issue in infrastructure politics. According to the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) in August 2018, China has addressed the issue of Africa’s increasing public debt by loaning to Africa through about 3000 different infrastructure projects across the continent. 47And although effective in many ways, the issue arises once again when African nations are unable to pay back the loan. With BDN, this issue is eradicated because BDN is a global loan and investment.

United States International Development Finance Corporation

The U.S. must expand the DFC to offer more investment opportunities for international companies and to promote the growth of the private sector, and thus economic stability, in a variety of economically

43 “Situation of the Senkaku Islands,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, last modified April 4, 2014, accessed April 23, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/senkaku/page1we_000010.html#:~:text=In%201992%2C%20China%20enacted%20the,i ncursions%20into%20Japanese%20territorial%20waters. 44 J onathan E Hillman, “Competing with China’s Digital Silk Road,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, last modified February 9, 2021, accessed April 12, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/competing-chinas-digital-silk-road. 45 Robert F Cekuta, “The Blue Dot Network: An Avenue for Increasing Investment,” Caspian Policy Center, last modified September 17, 2020, accessed April 18, 2021, https://www.caspianpolicy.org/the-blue-dot-network-an-avenue-for-increasing-investment/. 46 “Blue Dot Network,” U.S. Department of State, last modified January 8, 2021, accessed April 18, 2021, https://www.state.gov/blue-dot-network/. 47 Anzetse Were, “Debt Trap? Chinese Loans and Africa’s Development Options,” South African Institute of International Affairs, last modified August, 2018, accessed April 12, 2021, https://www.csis.org/npfp/its-debt-trap-managing-china-imf-cooperation-across-belt-and-road.

12 emerging nations. 48 The DFC offers political risk assurance (“coverage of up to $1 billion against losses due to factors such as terrorism, political violence, and government interference”), investment funds, and debt financing for American companies to build critical infrastructure and energy projects in the developing world.4 9 The DFC offers a variety of different ways for American companies, particularly those who are small to medium sized, to assist in the completion of projects such as green energy initiatives and transportation infrastructure and to build partnerships with emerging economies. 50 All DFC projects are thoroughly researched and financially feasible and are a phenomenal way for American companies to invest in safe opportunities that offer meaningful humanitarian benefits. 51

Over one hundred nations, including fifty-plus African nations, are eligible for DFC projects.5 2 However, of the eighty-four projects that were undertaken in 2020, there were only twenty-two on the continent, and of those twenty-two, only eleven unique countries were represented.5 3 In the Middle East, it is much the same story: eleven projects undertaken, but only six nations represented. 54 In the Asia Pacific region, the problem is exasperated even further. Of the twenty-two projects undertaken, only three countries (India, Myanmar, and Indonesia) directly received their benefits.5 5 In India, there were a staggering sixteen projects undertaken.5 6 All these statistics are to say that the U.S. must work, through the use of public and private campaigning to developing nations, to expand the number of nations who receive DFC equity investments and projects in order to create a larger global footprint and to de-emphasize the need for reliance on shadowy Chinese foreign money.5 7

Coronavirus Response

Although infrastructure is a central aspect of BRI, recently China has also been able to spread influence through their new so-called “vaccine diplomacy” in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. According to Airfinity, a predictive science intelligence company, by March of 2021, China had exported 109 million

48 “Who We Are,” U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.dfc.gov/who-we-are. 49 “Political Risk Insurance,” U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.dfc.gov/what-we-offer-our-products/political-risk-insurance. 50 “Who We Are.” 51 I bid. 52 “Where We Work,” U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.dfc.gov/what-we-offer/eligibility/where-we-work. 53 “Active DFC Projects - Map View,” U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, last modified December 31, 2020, accessed April 19, 2021, h ttps://www3.opic.gov/ActiveProjectsMap/Default.aspx. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Dan iel F. Runde, Romina Bandura, and Janina Staguhn, “How Can the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation Effectively Source Deals?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, last modified October 16, 2020, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-can-us-international-development-finance-corporation-effectively-source-deals#:~:text=Th e%20U.S.%20International%20Development%20Finance%20Corporation%20(DFC)%20is%20an%20important,private%20se ctor%20in%20developing%20countries.

13 doses of the 229 million vaccine doses manufactured within its borders.5 8 Furthermore, a statement made by the Mexican foreign ministry claimed that China plans to provide a $1 billion loan in order to make its coronavirus vaccines, Sinovac and Sinopharm, easily available to countries in Latin American and the Caribbean.5 9 Chinese vaccine donations have been strategic, like in Serbia, where Russia and China are fighting for political and economic influence, or aimed toward poorer nations like the Philippines and Ethiopia.6 0

The U.S., by contrast, has been engaging in an “America First” strategy in order to manage the pandemic within the country. According to Airfinity, by March 2021, the U.S. had exported none of the 164 million vaccine doses produced within its borders.6 1 However, this mindset may be quickly changing as China’s vaccine influence becomes too large to ignore. Recently, the Quad pledged to supply up to a billion coronavirus vaccine doses across Asia by the end of 2022. 62 The U.S. has also contributed $2 billion to support the purchase and delivery of COVID-19 vaccines to 92 low- and middle-income countries.6 3 The U.S. must strategically choose when they should begin giving away vaccines and how many to give away, for the duration of the vaccine is unknown and it is possible Americans will need to get revaccinated in the near future.

Recommendations for the United States

● The U.S. should commit to rejoining the TPP/CPTPP. ● The U.S. should commit the $1 Trillion they have set aside for infrastructure (as of February 2020) to start off BDN. ● The U.S. should commit to working with the leaders of developing nations to disseminate information to the general public about the U.S. DFC program and the benefits it brings to communities who need infrastructure and equity investment funding to establish their private sectors. ● The U.S. should diversify where DFC projects take place in order to curb global Chinese influence throughout the Asian and African continents and establish a greater U.S. economic and humanitarian presence.

58 N iall McCarthy, “America First? Covid-19 Vaccine Production and Exports [Infographic],” Forbes, last modified March 31, 2021, accessed April 12, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/america-first-covid-19-vaccine-production--exports-infographic. 59 Diego Oré, “Mexico Says China Plans $1 Billion Loan to Ease Latam Access to Virus Vaccine,” Reuters, last modified July 22, 2020, accessed April 12, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/mexico-china/mexico-says-china-plans-1-billion-loan-to-ease-latam-access-to-virus-vaccine. 60 Huizhong Wu and Kristen Gelineau, “Chinese Vaccines Sweep Much of the World, despite Concerns,” AP News, last modified March 2, 2021, accessed April 12, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/china-vaccines-worldwide-0382aefa52c75b834fbaf6d869808f51. 61 McCarthy, “America First?,” 62 Jeff Mason, David Brunnstrom, and Michael Martina, “U.S., India, Japan and Australia Counter China with Billion-dose Vaccine Pact,” Reuters, last modified March 12, 2021, accessed April 12, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-asia/u-s-india-japan-and-australia-agree-to-provide-a-billion-vaccine-doses-in-asia. 63 “ USAID COVID-19 Response,” U nited States Agency for International Development last modified April 2, 2021, accessed April 12, 2021, h ttps://www.usaid.gov/coronavirus.

● The U.S. should commit to work with QUAD and other allies in the Asia-Pacific region to supply up to a billion coronavirus vaccine doses across Asia by the end of 2022.

India

Sino-Indian Relations Over the Past Century

Today, China is India’s largest trading partner, however, the countries have decades of conflict in their diplomatic histories.6 4 After Indian independence from British colonization in 1947, China and India hoped to form a Sino-Indian “brotherhood” in Asia.6 5 But growing tension over British-drawn borders boiled into the Sino-Indian War of 1962.6 6 Today, the disputed areas in Kashmir continue to be a flashpoint for India and China. Conflicts prevent both countries from forming productive diplomatic relations, and slowly erase all hopes of a Sino-Indian “brotherhood.”

Sino-Pakistani allyship has further prevented Sino-Indian diplomatic relationships. India and Pakistan have had almost a century of nationalist Hindu-Muslim hostility since the Partition of Bengal and the following border conflict. Today, the two countries comprise an international high tension zone, with escalating nuclear capacities on both sides. In the past half-century, China and Pakistan strengthened military and economic ties. 67 Chinese cooperation in Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs positioned the two countries as allies. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), an agreement on future infrastructure cooperation, strengthened China and Pakistan’s economic ties in the last decade.6 8 Sino-Pakistani trade grew by $14 billion between 1998 and 2015.6 9 The Indian government, however, sees this Sino-Pakistani alliance as a threat to Indian national security. 70

China included CPEC in BRI, implicitly acknowledging a part of Kashmir as Pakistani that is also claimed by India.7 1 The move made Sino-Indian relations even worse because Pakistani Indian conflict in Kashmir has been contentious and violent since the original partition of Bengal. 72 In 2019, Indian legislation also

64 Jabin T. Jacob, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Perspectives from India,” China & World Economy 25, no. 5 (2017): accessed April 19, 2021, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/cwe.12215. 65 Ibid. 66 Reed Chervin,“‘Cartographic Aggression’: Media Politics, Propaganda, and the Sino-Indian Border Dispute,” Journal of Cold War Studies 22, no. 3 (2020): 225-247, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343673258_Cartographic_Aggression_Media_Politics_Propaganda_and_the_Sino-I ndian_Border_Dispute. 67 Harsh V. Pant, “The Pakistan Thorn in China–India–U.S. Relations,” The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 1 (December 16, 2011): accessed April 19, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2020.1871300. 68 Shakeel Ahmad Ramay, “China Pakistan economic corridor: A Chinese dream being materialized through Pakistan,” Sustainable Development Policy Institute: Islamabad, Pakistan, 2016, https://think-asia.org/bitstream/handle/11540/6694/ChinaPakistan.pdf?sequence=1. 69 Ibid. 70 Sayedur Rahman and Shakila Tul Kubra, “Economic Dimension of China’s Foreign Policy towards Pakistan: Late 20th- Early 21st Century,” Pakistan Languages and Humanities Review 4, no. II (December 2020): accessed April 19, 2021, http://doi.org/10.47205/plhr.2020(4-II)2.2. 71 Jacob, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Perspectives from India.” 72 Claire Parker, “India’s clampdown on Kashmir continues. Here’s what you need to know.,” T he W ashington Post, l ast modified August 13, 2019, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/08/05/india-revoked-kashmirs-special-status-heres-what-you-need-know-abou t-contested-province/.

16 took away many of Indian-administered Kashmir’s autonomous powers, and sparked a new round of Pakistani-backed violent protests in the region. 73 Because of this conflict, there is little hope for Sino-Indian cooperation moving forward, and thus India must find alternative infrastructure investment than the BRI.

Securing Trade in the Indian Ocean Region

China’s threat to India’s security and sovereignty exists not only in Kashmir; it also extends into the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is key to India’s economy. The region provides trade routes, and islands that serve as global naval communication hubs. 74 In a continuation of the BRI ethos, China has begun increasing its presence in and around the IOR as a way to expand its influence over Southeast Asia and streamline maritime trade routes with Africa.7 5 Control of the IOR is vitally important to India, all other Southeast Asian nations, and China because over 30% of the world’s maritime crude oil supply, and roughly 80% of Chinese oil that comes from the Middle East and Africa travels through the Indian controlled Malacca Strait into the South China Sea.7 6 Despite India’s resource deficit in comparison to China, the IOR is one place where it has the strategic upper hand. 77 Bases all along the Ocean provide India’s navy with the advantage of geographic proximity to the mainland. Meanwhile, China is at a disadvantage, with their logistics and bases farther away from their trade routes, thus having less control over the region than they would like. Part of China’s BRI has focused on building seaports in neighboring countries such as Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka that connect through the CPEC.7 8 This is a clear example of how China has used the BRI to further its own strategic and political agenda underneath the vague umbrella of economic connectivity. India has attempted to mitigate China’s effort to control the IOR through initiatives such as Project Mausam and the Cotton Route. Both initiatives have focused on maintaining regional dominance over the Indian Ocean by binding countries together both culturally and diplomatically through maritime trade.7 9 India also relies on the Quad alliance, especially the

73 “Kashmir: Why India and Pakistan fight over it,” BBC News, last modified August 8, 2019, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/10537286. 74 P riyanjoli Gosh, “India’s Indian Ocean Region Strategy,” U.S. Department of Defense, last modified August 31, 2020, accessed April 19, 2021, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Aug/31/2002488089/-1/-1/1/GHOSH.PDF. 75 Naren Chitty, Dalbir Ahlawat, Mei Li, and D. Gopal, “The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and the Indian Ocean Region: Sentiment towards Economic Prosperity and Security implications,” The Indian Journal of Politics Vol. 52, No. 1-2, 2018:1-20 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329707944_The_Chinese_Belt_and_Road_Initiative_and_the_Indian_Ocean_Regio n_Sentiment_towards_Economic_Prosperity_and_Security_implications. 76 Ibid; U.S. Energy Information Administration, “More than 30% of global maritime crude oil trade moves through the South China Sea,” last modified August 27, 2018, accessed April 28, 2021, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36952. 77 Peter Cai, “Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Sydney Australia, Lowy Institute, 2017 https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/india-china-conflict-move-himalayas-high-seas. 78 Chitty, Ahlawat, Li, and Gopal, “The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and the Indian Ocean Region: Sentiment towards Economic Prosperity and Security implications.” 79 Sachin Parachar, “Narendra Modi’s ‘Mausam’ manoeuvre to check China’s maritime,” T imes of India, last modified September 26, 2014, accessed April 28, 2021, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Narendra-Modis-Mausam-manoeuvre-to-check-Chinas-maritime-might/articleshow /42562085.cms; “To counter China’s Silk Road, India is working on the Cotton Route,” E conomic Times, last modified March 23, 2015, accessed April 28, 2021, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/to-counter-chinas-silk-road-india-is-working-on-cotton-route /articleshow/46655130.cms?from=mdr.

17 maritime presence of Japan and the U.S., to help solidify their control over the entrance to the South China Sea.

Outside of the Quad, India and Japan have focused on creating more multilateral partnerships, especially with Africa. In an effort to promote “quality infrastructure,” “digital and regulatory connectivity,” and the security of trade routes, India and Japan introduced the AAGC in 2017 at the 52nd annual African Bank Development Bank summit.8 0 The summit outlined four pillars: “1) development and cooperation; 2) quality infrastructure and digital and institutional connectivity; 3) enhancing capabilities and skills, and 4) establishing people-to-people partnerships.”8 1 While the AAGC was never implemented, it indicates a clear desire to combat the threat that China’s growing influence poses on trade between Africa and the IOR by creating multilateral alliances.

Financing Domestic Infrastructure

China has marketed the BRI as a method of utilizing their own vast amounts of foreign currencies to connect the rural and disjointed economies of neighboring countries to stimulate trade across their borders. 82 While India suffers from a similar disconnected and inconsistently industrialized economy, it has resisted the BRI on the grounds that it threatens India’s sovereignty and security.8 3 India has looked toward Japan to help finance domestic infrastructure and compete with the BRI through their Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI), underneath their vision for a FOIP.8 4 Japan, through the PQI, has been one of the most important investors in the infrastructure of the underdeveloped, yet geopolitically important northeastern region of India.8 5 Some examples of infrastructure initiatives have been the expansion of Highway No.54 and No.51, the creation of the Umiam Hydropower Station, and the Dhubri Bridge.8 6 While these domestic infrastructure projects are vitally important to the industrialization-fueled modernization of India’s economy, there still is more to do. India has planned, but not implemented, five growth corridors within the country: Delhi-Mumbai, Chennai-Bangalore, Bangalore-Mumbai,

80 Jagannath Panda, “The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor: An India-Japan Arch in the Making?” Institute for Security and Development Policy, N o. 21, August, 2017, https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2017/08/2017-focus-asia-jagannath-panda.pdf; Takuya Taniguchi, “Should We Forget about the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor?” French Institute of International Relations, No. 87, October 19, 2020, https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/editoriaux-de-lifri/lettre-centre-asie/should-we-forget-about-asia-africa-growth. 81 Ibid. 82 Cai, “Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” 83 McKinsey Global Institute, “India’s turning point: An economic agenda to spur growth and jobs” A ugust 26, 2020, https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/india/indias-turning-point-an-economic-agenda-to-spur-growth-and-jobs. 84 Tomoo Kikuchi and Sayaka Unzaki, “Japanese Infrastructure Investment in Southeast Asia,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, May 2019, https://think-asia.org/bitstream/handle/11540/10170/PR190503_Japanese-Infrastructure-Investmentin-in-SEA.pdf?sequence =1; Saori N. Katada; “Partnership for Quality Infrastructure: Developmentalism or New Liberal Order?,” University of Southern California, last modified February 16th, 2020, accessed April 19th, 2021, https://sppga.ubc.ca/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2020/07/Katada_revised-UBC-Partnership-for-Quality-Infrastructure.pdf; Feng Libing, “India-Japan Infrastructure Cooperation:Progress and Challenges,” International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, published October 2019, accessed April 21st, 2020, http://www.ciisjournal.com/Admin/UploadFile/Issue/cjswomu5.pdf. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid.

Chennai-Calcutta, and Amritsar-Calcutta.8 7 These corridors link India’s urban centers together, creating a more interconnected and efficient economy.

Not only has Japan aided India in funding domestic infrastructure projects, but they also have collaborated on key projects around the IOR and extending through Southeast Asia. Some examples include: the creation of the Mekong-India Corridor, India-Myanmar-Thailand Highway, ports along the IOR, and the development of resource-rich states in Myanmar.8 8 These projects are investments into the region to create more economic, political, and cultural connectivity: all combat China’s growing influence. India and Japan have created alternative options to finance infrastructure, which is so desperately needed both domestically and regionally, hoping to diminish the need for the BRI.8 9

Competition in Technological Development

In 2015, Beijing announced its newest expansion of BRI, the DSR.9 0 Due to high demand around the world for improved communication technology to control the spread of COVID-19 and complete contract tracing, the influence of the DSR has only expanded during the recent pandemic.9 1 Considering India’s own monumental role in the technological sphere, China’s accumulation of power in the same field poses a threat to India’s economic strength and international position.9 2 However, despite China’s successful DSR, India could potentially grasp a larger role within the tech world.9 3 President Biden advocates for a “China-free” supply chain and most firms from the U.S., EU, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea are all looking for a new location to move aspects of their production line. 94 China also created new bans on foreign tech companies during the COVID-19 pandemic. In just this past year, Amazon and Facebook invested $1 billion and $5.7 billion into India respectively.9 5 These investments improve India’s

87 Hariharan Ramachandran, “Review of Industrial and Development Corridors in India,” I nstitute for Studies in Industrial Development, New Delhi, December 2019, http://isid.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/WP217.pdf. 88 Feng Libing, “India-Japan Infrastructure Cooperation:Progress and Challenges”, International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, last modified October 2019, accessed April 21st, 2020, http://www.ciisjournal.com/Admin/UploadFile/Issue/cjswomu5.pdf. 89 Ibid. 90 “Assessing China’s Digital Silk Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified 2020, accessed April 12, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/china-digital-silk-road/. 91 Lee Dong Gyu, "The Belt and Road Initiative after COVID: The Rise of Health and Digital Silk Roads," The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, last modified March 15, 2021, accessed April 26, 2021, http://en.asaninst.org/contents/the-belt-and-road-initiative-after-covid-the-rise-of-health-and-digital-silk-roads/. 92 Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University press, 2003), accessed April 28, 2021, https://books.google.com/books?id=0jDobsZatW0C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage &q&f=false. 93 “How India Can Become a Major Tech Hub amid US-China Tensions,” T imes of India, last modified March 20, 2021, accessed April 12, 2021, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/how-india-can-become-a-major-tech-hub/articleshow/81764046. cms. 94 I bid. 95 John Koetsier, “China’s Closed. So Google Invests $10 Billion in India, following Facebook, Amazon, Apple,” Forbes, last modified July 13, 2020, accessed April 20, 2021,

19 economic stability and also limit the DSR’s expansion. However, India struggles to combat the DSR’s newfound ability to gain intel on nearby governments with 5G. 96

China has committed itself to becoming the main contributor in developing 5G, which is largely possible because of China’s Huawei firm. 97 Huawei remains the only existing company that can provide all platforms necessary for 5G access. China’s ability to further develop 5G will also be a powerful tool to expand DSR, and many countries are already considering potential partnerships with Huawei to access 5G. All India’s neighboring countries— none of which currently have 5G access — are partners with the BRI and will likely participate in developing 5G with BRI investment. India currently has no prospect of accessing any significant benefits of 5G for many years to come, largely because of India’s lack of fiber connectivity, the infrastructure necessary to connect homes with entrenched cables. 98 However, Indian officials announced in July of 2020 that they will not be completing a trial of Huawei as they have for other 5G providers. 99 The U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the Czech Republic have also implemented restrictions on Huawei 5G for concerns regarding national security. 100 Instead, India’s IT and Telecommunications Minister, Ravi Shankar Prasad, officially announced their partnership with Japan in the expansion of 5G. In return, India will assist in training professionals in digital technology.1 01 Their partnership not only prevented DSR’s initiative from gaining power through Huawei, but it could also encourage neighboring countries to partner with Indo-Japanese 5G in the future.

Recommendations for India

● India and Japan should create the AAGC. The AAGC should be implemented in accordance with the four pillars and the vision the document outlined in 2017. ● The Quad should adopt the Indian vision of the FOIP. This includes Africa, America, the Gulf, and ASEAN countries, a far more inclusive view than the U.S. or Japanese proposed FOIP vision. ● India should negotiate with Japan to put their five domestic growth corridors underneath the PQI in hopes of receiving the financing and expertise needed to implement them. https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2020/07/13/chinas-closed-so-google-invests-10-billion-in-india-following-facebo ok-amazon-apple/?sh=7e0dab392b01. 96 C han Jia Hao and Deepakshi Rawat, “India Struggles to Compete with China’s Digital Silk Road,” T he Diplomat, last modified November 29, 2018, accessed April 20, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/india-struggles-to-compete-with-chinas-digital-silk-road/. 97 Scott Kennedy, China's Uneven High-Tech Drive: Implications for the United States, February 27, 2020, accessed April 26, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-uneven-high-tech-drive-implications-united-states. 98 Akhil George, “5G in India,” T imes of India, last modified August 26, 2020, accessed April 20, 2021, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/no-spectrum-not-enough-fibre-5g-is-still-a-long-way-off/articleshow/77763289.cmc . 99 A akriti Sharma, “Japan to Assist India with 5G Technology to Counter China’s Mounting Dominance,” The EurAsian Times, last modified November 20, 2020, accessed April 12, 2021, https://eurasiantimes.com/japan-to-assist-india-with-5g-technology-to-counter-chinas-mounting-influence-global-dominance/. 100 K adri Kaska, Henrik Beckvard, and Tomáš Minárik, “Huawei, 5G and China as a Security Threat,” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, last modified 2019, accessed April 21, 2021, https://www.ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/03/CCDCOE-Huawei-2019-03-28-FINAL.pdf. 101 Sharma, “Japan to Assist.”

● India should incentivize tech hub relocation by subsidizing the training of tech professionals, similarly to their agreement with Japanese 5G companies. The creation of these tech hubs would expand India’s control over the tech sphere and limit the DSR’s influence. ● India should publicize the positive impacts of Japanese-developed 5G that they have accessed, which will set a precedent for other Southeast Asian countries to use other 5G providers than Huawei.

The European Union

BRI Involvement in the EU

While the EU and China are important trade partners, the EU should urge member states to avoid participation in China’s BRI to limit Chinese influence in Europe. If member nations choose to join BRI, they should adhere to strict procedures to ensure that their relationship remains mutually beneficial. The EU should also establish regular dialogues with member states about BRI to ensure a unified approach to Chinese investment. China is using massive amounts of credit, free-trade agreements, state-subsidized companies, and infrastructure projects to gain economic influence in Europe.1 02 In 2012, China formed a coalition with seventeen Central and Eastern European countries, including eleven EU member states, to expand BRI to Europe. The China-CEEC, also known as 17+1, has largely become a platform for China to make bilateral agreements with member nations.1 03

China has invested primarily in European countries that are not in the EU, including Serbia and Montenegro, to avoid strict EU investment regulations.1 04 Major projects within the EU include the Budapest-Belgrade railway and the Peljesac Bridge in Croatia. Chinese construction companies offered projects at far lower prices than European competitors, suggesting that the Chinese government subsidized the companies.1 05 However, some projects became more costly than expected and had to be re-negotiated or never finished.1 06 The reception to the BRI has been mixed with some countries welcoming much-needed investment and others criticizing the lack of transparency and organization. In March, Lithuania left China-CEEC, claiming it brought “almost no benefits.”1 07

Environmental Challenges with BRI

With the BRI posing environmental risk, the EU needs to regulate involvement with the BRI to keep environmental damages minimal and meet the Paris Climate Goals. A main focus of BRI investment is energy, composing 44% of spending. As of 2019, China committed €16.6 billion to fund coal plants

102 Jonathan Holslag, “How China’s New Silk Road Threatens European Trade,” T he International Spectator 52, no. 1 (2017)], accessed April 12, 2021, http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/holslag.pdf. 103 Jonathan E. Hillman and Maesea McCalpin, “Will China’s ‘16+1’ Format Divide Europe?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, last modified April 11, 2019, accessed April 12, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/will-chinas-161-format-divide-europe. 104 Ibid. 105 Frans-Paul van der Putten and Mirela Petkova, “Building the ‘Belt and Road’ in Europe?: Chinese construction companies and transport infrastructure in the European Union,” Clingendael China Centre, last modified April 2020, accessed April 21, 2021, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/Policy_brief_Building_Belt_and_Road_in_Europe_April_2020.pdf. 106 I bid. 107 “Lithuania mulls leaving China’s 17+1 forum, expanding links with Taiwan,” LRT English, last modified March 2, 2021, accessed April 12, 2021, h ttps://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1356107/lithuania-mulls-leaving-china-s-17plus1 -forum-expanding-links-with-taiwan.

22 around the world. 108 However, coal must be phased out completely by 2040 to meet Paris Climate Accord goals.1 09 Although China has promised to make BRI investments “open, green and clean,” coal accounts for around 40% of all Chinese overseas power plant capacity.1 10 In Europe, China built and financed two coal power plants in potential EU member states Serbia and Bosnia. 111 These two examples of the Tuzla 7 plant and the Kostolac B3 power station, infrastructure that supports the Serbian and Bosnian economy, show China’s involvement in “dirty” energy projects.1 12 Currently, the EU conducts Environmental Impact Assessments on all potential member states, but doesn’t have a set guideline or requirement for sustainability. As Serbia and Bosnia are both seeking EU membership, the EU needs to create strict environmental standards expected of all EU potential member states to incentivize them to limit environmentally harmful energy infrastructure from BRI.

Chinese Price Dumping

Chinese economic development in the EU is a threat to European business. Not only do the Chinese companies offer a lower price for projects, but they also strip European citizens of employment opportunities. In 2018, Croatia rejected an offer from European companies to build a bridge connecting Southeast Croatia to the mainland, but six months later they commissioned China Road and Bridge (CRBC), a state-owned Chinese construction company, to build it instead. Austrian company Strabag, which also put in a bid for the project, criticized that CRBC price dumped, offering a lower price in their bid than was actually needed. 113 When the Austrian company took the matter to court on the grounds of it violating the EU’s existing anti-dumping laws, the claim was dismissed.1 14 CRBC made the price €279 million, while the offer from Strabag was €351 million. The discrepancy in pricing for items was extreme, raising concerns as to the legitimacy of the offer; the Chinese company set the price of hydro isolation and asphalt as €428,000, while Strabag set the price as nearly €3.1 million.1 15 This situation is not only specific to construction in Croatia, though; Chinese companies have price dropped to win bids in other EU countries, including Poland and Hungary. 116 European companies can’t compete with the low prices that

108Jennifer Hillman and Alex Tippett, “The Climate Challenge and China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified March 31, 2021, accessed April 12, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/blog/climate-challenge-and-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative. 109 “ UN Chief Calls for Immediate Global Action.” 110 Catherine Trautwein, “All Roads Lead to China: The Belt and Road Initiative Explained,” Frontline, last modified June 26, 2019, accessed April 12, 2021, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/all-roads-lead-to-china-the-belt-and-road-initiative-explained/; Hillman and Tippett, “The Climate.” 111 “Candidate Countries and Potential Candidates,” European Commission Environment, accessed April 12, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/candidates.htm; Jonathan Watts, “Belt and Road Summit Puts Spotlight on Chinese Coal Funding,” T he Guardian, last modified April 25, 2019, accessed April 12, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/25/belt-and-road-summit-puts-spotlight-on-chinese-coal-funding. 112 “ BiH Sees Opportunities from Belt and Road Initiative,” X inhuanet News (blog), entry posted September 13, 2018, accessed April 19, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/13/c_137463978.htm. 113 Jelena Prtoric, “In Croatia, China’s Building Its Bridge to Europe,” China Dialogue, last modified May 11, 2020, accessed April 21, 2021, https://chinadialogue.net/en/transport/12005-in-croatia-china-s-building-its-bridge-to-europe/. 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid. 116 Van der Putten and Petkova, “Building the Belt.”

23 the Chinese state-owned companies offer, creating an unfair basis for competition. Chinese companies are often bigger than European companies and are subsidized by the government, allowing them to take more investment risks, such as not needing to make a profit if they’re spreading their soft power over the region. The costs of Chinese companies’ offers are less expensive too because of the cheap labor that they can supply. Almost all of the people working on the Peljesac Bridge project were from China, not Croatia. Authorities in Croatia neglected to comment on the living conditions of the Chinese workers, raising concerns about their humanitarian conditions. 117 Regardless of the reasoning for inexpensive offers, the Chinese bid prices have created an uneven playing field for European companies and prevent them from acquiring business in the region.

Chinese Soft Power & Euroscepticism

Strong European economic ties with China may lead to stronger Chinese cultural influence in the region and exacerbate Euroscepticism. Many EU member states and stakeholders are becoming increasingly distrustful of the EU and question whether it is worth being part of. In Italy, some blame their economic stagnation on the EU because of the introduction of the euro.1 18 China’s investment there could bring the country out of its stagnation and cause many Italians to switch their loyalties and identify strongly with China as an ally. The two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding in March 2019, and have since then worked closely on the BRI.1 19 Similarly, Chinese-funded infrastructure projects could offer China a way to come in and sway Eastern European countries into aligning more with Chinese interests. 120 China is targeting investments in Eastern European countries, which are less attached to the EU, because China knows it is feasible to assert their soft power there. However, restricting Chinese development entirely in Europe could close China --a key exporter of European goods-- off from European companies. Following the German government’s calls in 2019 to tighten guidelines surrounding Chinese economic intervention in their country, companies like Volkswagen and Siemens faced tension because China was an important market for them.1 21 Economic involvement with China must proceed carefully so as to avoid the uncontrolled growth of Chinese soft power in the region, which could potentially increase tensions within EU member states.

117 Marc Santora and Barbara Surk, “For China, a Bridge over the Adriatic Is a Road into Europe,” T he New York Times, last modified October 11, 2018, accessed April 11, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/world/europe/china-croatia-bridge-adriatic-sea.html?searchResultPosition=4. 118 N aomi O’Leary, “How Italy Turned Eurosceptic,” Politico, last modified December 19, 2017, accessed April 21, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-euroskeptic-surge-migration-crisis-eu/. 119 V ictor De Dector, “To BRI or Not to BRI? Europe’s Warring Member States,” Italian Institute for International Political Studies, last modified April 8, 2019, accessed April 21, 2021, https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/bri-or-not-bri-europes-warring-member-states-22786. 120 H olslag, “How China’s.” 121 Erik Brattberg, “The EU and China in 2020: More Competition Ahead,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, last modified February 19, 2020, accessed April 11, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/02/19/eu-and-china-in-2020-more-competition-ahead-pub-81096.

China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor

The EU may benefit from cautious involvement with the Silk Road Economic Plan. As of 2019, roughly 45% of EU-27 exports and over 55% of EU-27 imports came from maritime trade.1 22 BRI has proposed a maritime route to run from the Sea of Japan to the Mediterranean Sea, with access to major trading hubs such as Singaporean ports, the Bay of Bengal, and the Gulf of Aden.1 23 Encouraging cooperation within this economic corridor would provide efficient, low-cost access to maritime trade across Asia. Conversely, free trade with China’s maritime routes opens the door for Chinese investments in port cities. Thus, it is critical to protect European development by proposing checkpoints to monitor Chinese soft power in Europe: once Chinese-owned companies purchase more than 5% of the infrastructure projects or pre-existing infrastructure in a port city, that city should accept no further loans from Chinese foreign investors into its infrastructure. By encouraging member states to cautiously participate in this major maritime route, the EU will benefit from low-cost maritime exchange stretching as far as Southeast Russia.

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

Maintaining strong diplomatic relations with fellow EU member states, potential member states, the U.S., and Asia will be essential towards productive and safe engagement with the BRI. An example of this is the June 2017 Belt and Road Forum in Beijing. EU leaders at the Forum pushed the narrative that China must adhere “to principles such as openness, interoperability, transparency, and sustainability.”1 24 Although some member states have clear disagreements about the BRI, this front of unity came as a surprise to many Chinese leaders.

Accordingly, the EU must establish a collective body of analysts who can evaluate the equity of proposed investments between European and Chinese corporations. The experts should go to European countries participating in BRI to help with risk-cost analysis of Chinese offers, thereby increasing transparency and providing individualized advice to countries as they would analyze the trades that each country makes and assert the stance of the EU. Lastly, although the EU must stress limited, safe, and productive engagement with the BRI, cooperation with China must not be shut down completely. As of 2020, trade between China and the EU amounted to €588.6 billion, surpassing that between the U.S. and the EU. Europe and Asia are both in need of infrastructure, and both bodies combined make up 60% of the world’s GDP. 1 25 Furthermore, in the

122 “ International trade in goods by mode of transport,” Eurostat, last modified 2019, accessed April 12, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/International_trade_in_goods_by_mode_of_transport. 123Alicia Garcia Herrero and Jianwei Xu, “ China’s Belt and Road initiative: can Europe expect trade gains?,” Bruegel, last modified 2016, accessed April 12, 2021, https://www.bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/WP-05-2016.pdf. 124 E rik Brattberg and Etienne Soula, “Europe’s Emerging Approach to China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, last modified October 19, 2018, accessed April 18, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/19/europe-s-emerging-approach-to-china-s-belt-and-road-initiative-pub-77536. 125 “ The European Way to Connectivity- a New Strategy on How to Better Connect Europe and Asia,” European EU Headquarters, last modified September 9, 2018, accessed April 12, 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/50752/european-way-connectivity-%E2%80%93-new-strategy- how-better-connect-europe-and-asia_en.

EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, both nations agreed that they are “important actors in a multipolar world” and “share responsibility for promoting peace, prosperity and sustainable development for the benefit of all.”1 26 Careful connectivity between these two global actors can promote sustainable development and fair competition for businesses abiding to EU values.

Recommendations for the EU

● The EU should establish strict environmental standards for infrastructure, consistent with Paris Climate Accord goals, as a prerequisite for EU membership. ● The EU should improve upon existing anti-dumping and anti-subsidy protocols to effectively ensure that Chinese companies engage in fair, transparent bidding practices. ● The EU should enforce quotas for the percentage of native workers hired for China-backed projects. ● The EU should encourage participation in the China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor that does not exceed Chinese investment in 5% of European port city infrastructure. ● The EU should ban closed-door, bilateral investment agreements between China and EU member states, and send experts to countries to help them evaluate BRI offers. ● The EU should establish regular conferences between all EU member states addressing the BRI to ensure a unified policy approach for BRI investments.

126 Eu-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, [Page #], 2020, accessed April 12, 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/eu-china_2020_strategic_agenda_en.pdf.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

BRI Involvement in ASEAN

ASEAN is an economic union of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.1 27 ASEAN countries strive to promote regional stability.1 28 In cooperation with each other, these nations coordinate economic activity in southeast Asia.1 29

Considering their proximity to China, ASEAN countries are strongly affected by China’s policies and depend on it for economic support; as a result, all ASEAN member countries are currently indebted to China.1 30 ASEAN countries need infrastructure construction, which often comes through China’s BRI.1 31 However, they lack the capacity to repay Chinese loans, leaving them with crippling debt and no leverage over China’s initiatives.1 32 Without leverage over BRI implementation, ASEAN countries often accept disadvantageous infrastructure projects.1 33 Therefore, it is critical that these countries decrease their dependency on China and only accept economically beneficial infrastructure projects.1 34

Methods of Decreasing Dependency on China

Considering that BRI expansion can potentially trap ASEAN countries in immense debt, it is evident that these nations need a method to compel China to offer more affordable projects. To achieve bargaining power over China, these countries should threaten to accept loans from international allies. Infrastructure development funding from the U.S., EU, and Japan have recently become available over the past couple of years and present new alternatives to China’s BRI. 135 Additionally, in all cases of infrastructure construction, ASEAN nations should cancel projects with harmful terms.

ASEAN countries possess many options for funding infrastructure projects other than Chinese loans.1 36 Even if an ASEAN member country ultimately plans to use China as their primary partner, threatening to

127 L indsay Maizland and Eleanor Albert, “What is ASEAN?” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified November 24, 2020, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-asean. 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid. 130 Balazs Ujvari. “The Belt and Road Initiative — the ASEAN Perspective,” E gmont Institute, no. 107 (March 2019): 1-4, accessed April 11, 2021, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep21387.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A34a744d3424bb1cf9700964b867592d2. 131 Ibid. 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid. 134 I bid. 135 D aniel F. Runde and Bandura Romina, “The BUILD Act Has Passed: What’s Next?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, last modified October 12, 2018, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/build-act-has-passed-whats-next; William Pesek, “EU-Japan axis emerges to counter China’s BRI,” Asia Times, last modified October 9, 2019, accessed April 19, 2021, https://asiatimes.com/2019/10/eu-japan-axis-emerges-to-counter-chinas-bri/. 136 Pesek, “EU-Japan axis emerges to counter China’s BRI.”

27 accept loans from other countries would provide them leverage in negotiating affordable deals; ASEAN is China’s largest trade partner, so the threat of losing this partnership would encourage China to meet ASEAN’s demands for lowering the cost of infrastructure projects.1 37 These alternative options have recently become accessible to ASEAN; for example, at the end of 2019, the EU partnered with Japan to offer infrastructure construction in Europe and Asia.1 38 This development is backed by a $367 billion fund.1 39 Furthermore, the U.S. offers similar funding for infrastructure projects through their Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development (BUILD) Act which provides billions of dollars in loans to fund development projects in other countries.1 40 ASEAN nations, primarily Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines, have accepted substantial infrastructure support from Japan which has provided them increased leverage over China. 141 As such, other ASEAN member countries should threaten to turn towards these alternative funds to pressure China to improve their BRI infrastructure project offers.1 42

If an ASEAN member country deems a certain BRI project unfair, they should cancel it to influence China to improve the conditions. Canceling an individual initiative is both feasible and effective because when a country cancels a project, China still desires to build infrastructure in that territory, so it likely will meet the requests of the canceling nation.1 43 A few countries, including Malaysia, have already taken advantage of this tactic. 144 The Malaysian president canceled three unfeasibly expensive BRI projects, including the East Coast Rail Link.1 45 As a result, China reduced the cost of the East Coast Rail Link from $19.9 billion to $10.7 billion, and construction was resumed less than a year after it was canceled.1 46 China’s complete compliance with Malaysia’s demands exemplifies the effectiveness of canceling projects as a tactic to negotiate better terms and conditions; other ASEAN nations can easily use the same technique.

137 “ ASEAN becomes China’s largest trading partner in 2020, with 7% growth,” Global Times, last modified January 14, 2021, accessed April 21, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1212785.shtml. 138 Pesek, “EU-Japan axis emerges to counter China’s BRI.” 139 I bid. 140 Daniel F. Runde and Bandura Romina, “The BUILD Act Has Passed: What’s Next?” Center for Strategic & International Studies, last modified October 12, 2018, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/build-act-has-passed-whats-next. 141 Michelle Jamrisko, “China No Match for Japan in Southeast Asia Infrastructure Race,” Bloomberg Quint, last modified June 25, 2019, accessed April 23, 2021, https://www.bloombergquint.com/china/china-no-match-for-japan-in-southeast-asia-infrastructure-race. 142 Christopher Woody, “Countries in Asia are looking for ways to counter China’s growing power — with and without the US's help,” Business Insider, last modified May 26, 2018, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.businessinsider.com/ways-countries-in-asia-are-responding-to-china-2018-5#hugging-america-1. 143 Angus Lam, “Domestic Politics in Southeast Asia and Local Backlash against the Belt and Road Initiative,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, last modified October 15, 2020, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/10/domestic-politics-in-southeast-asia-and-local-backlash-against-the-belt-and-road-initiativ e/#:~:text=By%0August%202018%2C%20however%2C%20a,funds%20plagued%20the%20three%20projects. 144 I bid. 145 I bid. 146 Ibid.

Conditions that Benefit ASEAN Nations (When Infrastructure Expansion is Favorable)

ASEAN nations fear owing China huge amounts of money and lacking sovereignty in making decisions about BRI projects. Therefore, they should only accept projects from foreign sources that meet certain conditions: infrastructure projects ought to employ local workers in their construction and be funded through PPPs. By rejecting projects that fail to meet these terms, ASEAN countries can maintain prosperous economies.

A key aspect of infrastructure projects is that they should employ local workers under safe working conditions. Hiring more workers stimulates a country’s economy which allows ASEAN members to more effectively repay their debt. 147 Additionally, increased local employment garners community support for projects which reduces country backlash and promotes trust in the projects, thereby improving long-term sustainability. 148

However, China often utilizes its own workers when constructing infrastructure, even though most of these jobs require minimal training; this usage of Chinese workers is economically disadvantageous to ASEAN countries.1 49 Therefore, ASEAN nations should only accept infrastructure projects that exhaust options for locally sourced labor and, when possible, provide training for the small number of skilled jobs. 150 Chinese infrastructure companies should be held accountable for protecting workers’ rights and ensuring that they receive fair wages, and if they fail to do so, ASEAN countries should cancel these harmful projects. 151

Furthermore, PPPs offer an alternative form of infrastructure funding; they outsource debt to corporations that are more incentivized than political bodies to finish projects cheaply and promptly. 152 PPPs are agreements between the public and private sectors to accomplish an infrastructural project.1 53 The government provides public assets while the private corporation funds and constructs the project. 154 They uniquely overcome a lack of funding by using private corporations to provide the capital needed to

147 Joseph Minarik, “More workers need to join the labor force to keep the economy growing,” T he Hill, last modified February 11, 2020, accessed April 28, 2021 https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/482527-more-workers-need-to-join-the-labor-force-to-keep-the-economy-growing. 148 Daniel R. Russel and Blake Berger, “Navigating the Belt and Road Initiative,” Asia Society, last modified June 2019, accessed April 19, 2021, https://asiasociety.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/Navigating%20the%20Belt%20and%20Road%20Initiative_0.pdf. 149 I bid. 150 Ibid. 151 I bid. 152 “Government Objectives: Benefits and Risks of PPPs,” The World Bank, last modified 2021, accessed April 23, 2021, https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/overview/ppp-objectives. 153 Shahla Tabassum, “Public Private Partnership: An Overview,” T he Indian Journal of Political Science 74, no. 3 (September 2013): 479-488, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24701058?seq=1. 154 Ibid.

29 afford them.1 55 In exchange for completing the project, private companies control the asset for a set amount of time to make a profit from their partnership.1 56 When that period ends, the company hands the asset over to the government.1 57

When ASEAN countries partner with private corporations, they can complete massive infrastructure projects. 158 For example, the YTL Corporation in Malaysia constructed much of the country’s power grid through private sector PPPs.1 59 This funding mechanism has allowed for infrastructure construction while simultaneously alleviating government debt. Therefore, ASEAN governments should push for more PPP deals that operate similarly.

It is critical that PPPs are formed with private sector companies. In the past, Indonesia formed PPPs with state-owned corporations to complete massive highway projects.1 60 The goal was to outsource government debt to the monopoly, but when these companies took on too much debt, they had to be bailed out by the government.1 61 To solve this problem, ASEAN countries should only form PPPs with privately owned corporations. This way, businesses will only accept profitable projects instead of governments outsourcing debt to overburdened state-owned corporations.1 62

China has already made several PPP deals with ASEAN countries.1 63 However, ASEAN governments could negotiate PPPs with foreign corporations to provide an alternative for BRI loans, an option that provides leverage over China. Organizations like the U.S. International Development and Finance Corporation (USIDFC), established through the BUILD Act, offer investments in critical infrastructure in developing countries through PPPs.1 64 In general, infrastructure projects that do not use PPPs have the potential to economically harm ASEAN countries and should not be accepted.1 65

155 F auziah Zen, “Public-Private Partnership Development in Southeast Asia,” A sian Development Bank Economics Working Paper Series, no. 553 (August 2018): 1-24, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/444631/ewp-553-ppp-development-southeast-asia.pdf. 156 Ibid. 157 Ibid. 158 Ibid. 159 "PPP Projects in Infrastructure,” The World Bank, last modified 2021, accessed April 23, 2021, https://pppknowledgelab.org/countries/malaysia. 160 “Indonesia’s 'Trans-Java Toll Road’ Infrastructural Development Project (2011-2019),” Centre for Public Impact, last modified December 10, 2019, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/indonesias-trans-java-toll-road-infrastructural-development-project-2011-2 019. 161 Shuli Ren, “Indonesia Walks a Fine Line Between Bailouts, Downgrades,” The Washington Post, l ast modified May 12, 2020, accessed April 28, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/indonesia-walks-a-fine-line-between-bailouts-downgrades/2020/05/11/55a18466- 93e4-11ea-87a3-22d324235636_story.html. 162 Ibid. 163 Craig Sugden, “Belt and Road PPPs: Opportunities and Pitfalls,” The Lowy Institute, last modified June 13, 2017, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/belt-and-road-PPPs-opportunities-pitfalls. 164 “ Indo-Pacific,” US International Development Finance Corporation, last modified 2021, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.dfc.gov/our-work/indo-pacific. 165 Zen, “Public-Private Partnership Development.”

Recommendations for ASEAN

● ASEAN countries should consider loans or partnerships from the EU, Japan, and the U.S. as alternatives to China’s BRI or as a means of gaining leverage over China. ● ASEAN countries should cancel BRI projects with harmful terms to negotiate fair agreements. ● ASEAN countries should only accept infrastructure projects that employ local workers. ● ASEAN countries should accept infrastructure projects that are funded through public-private transactions with private companies.

The African Union (AU)

Africa’s Relationship with China

The BRI is attractive to African countries because it funds infrastructure projects to promote African economic growth, linking Africa to other stakeholders such as Europe, the Middle East, and non-governmental actors. 166 African infrastructure remains insufficient, and the vast majority of the continent lacks “secure energy, efficient transport, reliable communication systems, resilient sanitation, and affordable housing.”1 67 The BRI provides funding for those necessities and opens the door to economic and infrastructural development. Although the BRI promises rapid economic growth and valuable infrastructure, there are significant risks. The majority of the financial risk falls on the shoulders of national governments in the form of debt, leading to China possessing nearly all leverage in its relationship and negotiations with Africa. Today, African nations make up half of the 50 most indebted nations to China, with “Djibouti, the Republic of Congo, Niger, and Zambia leading the list in terms of share of GDP.”1 68 Zambia, for example, engaged with China to restructure $11 billion in loans in 2020, and China insisted that all arrears be resolved as a precondition. President Lungu had no power or leverage to counter China’s demands, demonstrating how immense debt to China is directly correlated with decreasing African leverage in loan negotiations.1 69 According to the South African Institute of International Affairs, “the BRI is a tool to eliminate any African power or agency in its relationship with China,” countering efforts to promote intra-continental trade and perpetual economic development because of overwhelming debt.1 70 However, accepting more BRI infrastructure loans from China is a common approach to repaying debt because infrastructure is imperative for economic growth. Without new BRI loans, consistent economic and infrastructural expansion becomes improbable without additional foreign aid or extensive continental economic reform.

Summit on Chinese Debt

In January 2013, the AU adopted Agenda 2063 as the official plan to become “The Africa We Want.”1 71 By 2063, the AU aims to achieve seven aspirations, the first being “[a] prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development.” 172 To meet this goal, the AU plans to implement successful

166 Corbus Van Staden, Chris Alden, and Yu-Shan Wu, “In the Driver's Seat?: African Agency and Chinese Power at FOCAC, the AU and the BRI,” S outh African Institute of International Affairs, September 2018, 19, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25916. 167 “Infrastructure Development,” African Development Bank Group, accessed April 21, 2021, https://www.afdb.org/en/knowledge/publications/tracking-africa%E2%80%99s-progress-in-figures/infrastructure-developm ent#:~:text=Developing%20Infrastructure%20for%20Growth,affordable%20housing%E2%80%94is%20particularly%20appa rent. 168 P aul Nantulya, “Reshaping African Agency in China-Africa Relations,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, last modified March 2, 2021, accessed April 11, 2021, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/reshaping-african-agency-china-africa-relations/. 169 Ibid. 170 V an Staden, Alden, and Wu, “In the Driver’s” 171 “ Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want,” African Union, accessed April 21, 2021, https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview. 172 I bid.

32 strategies to achieve economic prosperity. 173 However, the AU has not formally discussed Chinese debt, nor created a plan to repay all foreign debt in the future, even though BRI projects significantly impact African economies. AU-sponsored summit meetings have historically been successful, especially in regards to issues that affect the entire continent, such as health and security.1 74 The 2020-2021 meetings have been devoted to COVID-19, and the AU, advised by health experts and doctors from the World Health Organization, purchased 270 million vaccine doses to limit the spread of the virus across Africa.1 75 The presence of experts has helped the AU to foster collaboration between all 55 member states and create a unified and structured plan that benefits all African countries.

Free Trade within Africa

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is an agreement signed by fifty-four member states of the AU.1 76 On January 1, 2021, AfCFTA went into effect for Djibouti, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. The agreement is expected to be implemented for all other AU members by 2022 and would eliminate 90% of tariffs on the continent.1 77 While AfCFTA as a trade deal may be agreed upon, methods of implementation are still being determined. Harmonizing regulations, especially within the private sector strategy framework of the agreement, will make it easier to trade freely with the continent. For example, AfCFTA members are working on streamlining the regulation of medical products to create one African medical agency that will in turn make it easier to develop and approve life-saving medical products.1 78 Furthermore, the United Nations’ 2019 report on Africa’s economy states that simple and flexible rules of origin for tariff lines will lead to more rapid growth and development. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) make up around 80% of Africa’s employment, so by reducing 90% of tariffs on African-produced goods, these countries can generate African-led value chains that link SMEs and multinational corporations (MNCs). 179 AfCFTA is expected to bring 30 million Africans out of extreme poverty, raise the wages of men and women by 9.9% and 10.5%, respectively, and promote female entrepreneurship, as

173 Ibid. 174 “ Main successes of the AU in Peace and Security, challenges and mitigation measures in place,” African Union, last modified January 27, 2017, accessed April 12, 2021, “Main successes of the AU in Peace and Security, challenges and mitigation measures in place,” African Union, last modified January 27, 2017, accessed April 12, 2021, https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20170127/main-successes-au-peace-and-security-challenges-and-mitigation-measures-place. 175 O livia Kumwenda-Mtambo, “African Union secures 270 million COVID-19 vaccine doses from manufacturers,” ed. Leslie Adler and Grant McCool, Reuters, last modified January 14, 2021, accessed April 12, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-health-coronavirus-africa/african-union-secures-270-million-covid-19-vaccine-doses-from -manufacturers-idUSKBN29J0OW; S oloman Ayele Dersso, “The 34th summit of the African Union: COVID-19, New Leadership and Africa’s Arts,” ACCORD, last modified February 17, 2021, accessed April 23, 2021, https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/the-34th-summit-of-the-african-union-covid-19-new-leadership-and-africas-arts/. 176 Neil Munshi, “Pan-African trade deal aims to create $3tn single market,” F inancial Times, last modified August 28, 2019, accessed April 11, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/8176b16c-82f4-11e9-a7f0-77d3101896ec. 177 Ibid. 178 “African Medicines Agency (AMA),” African Union, accessed April 28, 2021, https://nepad.org/microsite/african-medicines-agency-ama. 179 World Economic Forum, “Why SMEs are Key to Growth in Africa,” news release, August 4, 2015, accessed April 28, 2021, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/08/why-smes-are-key-to-growth-in-africa/#:~:text=Helping%20African%20SMEs% 20to%20flourish,market%20opportunities%20for%20new%20investors.

33 women represent up to 80% of informal traders in many African nations. 180 Furthermore, intra-continental exports are expected to rise by 81%, and wages for skilled and unskilled laborers are predicted to increase by 9.8% and 10.3% respectively.1 81 A study conducted by the Brookings Institute found that the successful and rapid implementation of the trade agreement will decrease Africa’s projected net drop in GDP by 34.2%.1 82 The coronavirus pandemic caused over $79 billion in losses in Africa in 2020, but AfCFTA is expected to bring over $450 billion to the continent. That increase in revenue, generated by opening the African market for intra-continental free trade, will contribute to an overall reduction in debt-servicing costs for African nations.1 83

Foreign Investment and Political Stability

Foreign investment is essential for members of the AU to promote economic growth, increase productivity and worker skills, generate better wages, and boost small businesses. However, political instability within African countries makes it difficult to convince foreign investors, other than China, to participate in their national economies. According to the World Bank Global Investment Competitiveness Report, foreign investors claim that supportive political environments, stable macroeconomic conditions, and conducive regulatory regimes are their top three investment decision factors.1 84 Although multiple countries within the AU have experienced political unrest, the AU has developed a method to help maintain political stability within the union. Both Mali and South Sudan were temporarily suspended from the AU when their governments were threatened by military usurpers. The suspended countries were required to establish civilian-led authority before their suspensions would be lifted.1 85 In September 2019, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok unveiled a new 18 member cabinet, allowing South Sudan to return to the AU.1 86 As of 2020, South Sudan’s government is actively seeking foreign direct investment and upgraded the South Sudan Investment Authority to the Ministry of Investment.1 87 When Mali was suspended, the AU placed new sanctions, border closures, and a ban on commercial trade and financial flows. However, basic necessities like drugs, fuel, electricity, and equipment to fight COVID-19 were permitted within the country. In October 2020, after two months of suspension, Mali was also allowed to

180 The World Bank, “Trade Pact Could Boost Africa’s Income by $450 Billion, Study Finds,” news release, July 27, 2020, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/07/27/african-continental-free-trade-area. 181 Ibid. 182 Nassim Oulmane, Mustapha Sadni Jallab, and Patrice Rélouendé Zidouemba, “The African Continental Free Trade Area and measures to facilitate trade could significantly mitigate COVID-19’s economic impact in Africa,” Brookings Institute, last modified May 22, 2020, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/05/22/the-african-continental-free-trade-area-and-measures-to-facilitat e-trade-could-significantly-mitigate-covid-19s-economic-impact-in-africa/. 183 Ibid. 184 Vincent Palmade, et al., C WA Monitoring Report, April 8, 2021, accessed April 19, 2021, https://www.compactwithafrica.org/content/dam/Compact%20with%20Africa/reports/CwA%20-%20Monitoring%20Repor t%20-%208%20April%202021.pdf. 185 “A frican Union suspends Sudan over military crackdown,” Al Jazeera, last modified June 7, 2019, accessed April 12, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/6/7/african-union-suspends-sudan-over-military-crackdown. 186 “African Union lifts suspension of Sudan,” Al Jazeera, last modified September 7, 2019, accessed April 12, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/9/7/african-union-lifts-suspension-of-sudan. 187 United States Department of State Economic and Commercial Office, 2 020 Investment Climate Statements: South Sudan, accessed April 21, 2021, https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-investment-climate-statements/south-sudan/.

34 return to the AU after a civilian president and prime minister were selected.1 88 Currently, the government of Mali is encouraging foreign investment from the U.S., especially from the infrastructure, energy, mining, and agricultural industries.1 89

Recommendations for the AU

● To best achieve the 2063 plan, the AU should sponsor a summit and invite financial experts from each member state to discuss Chinese debt and reducing debt servicing costs. ● The AU should promote regulatory harmonization in the public and private sectors. ● The AU should encourage the linkage of small and medium-sized enterprises with multinational corporations by shifting the burden of quality control standards onto the MNCs. ● The AU should suspend member states that do not allow effective AU-led election monitoring or comply with political stability benchmarks.

188 “African Union lifts Mali’s suspension imposed in the wake of coup,” Al Jazeera, last modified October 9, 2020, accessed April 12, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/9/african-union-lifts-malis-suspension-imposed-in-the-wake-of-coup. 189 U nited States Department of State Economic and Commercial Office, 2 020 Investment Climate Statements: Mali, accessed April 21, 2021, https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-investment-climate-statements/mali/.

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