A Study of the Wukan Protest

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A Study of the Wukan Protest Understanding Chinese rural protests through a social movement lens: A study of the Wukan protest Bin Sun MML, LLB A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at The University of Queensland in 2017 School of Social Science Abstract Rapid urbanisation in China has led to large scale land acquisition to support urban growth. As Chinese rural land is owned collectively and administered by the Villagers’ Committee (VC) of each village, rural residents are sometimes excluded from bargaining while governments forcefully acquire land, often with low compensation, compulsory acquisition and corruption among village leaders. These disadvantages have generated discontent in some villages in recent years. With land issues prompting 65 per cent of Chinese rural protests, as well as a host of similar protests around the world, the incidence and forms of rural protest have been a topic of considerable interest among scholars internationally. However, the distinct mechanisms of rural protest induced by land acquisition in China have not been studied thoroughly, as this research aims to do. The Wukan protest is a typical case of a rural protest linked to the transfer of village land to urban land. The village is located in Lufeng City at the Southern coastline of China. Resistance against land acquisition emerged there from 2009 and turned to protest on 21st September 2011 when villagers launched a demonstration. The protest ended three months later, on 21st December 2011. Due to the duration of the protest activities and the large number of people involved, the protest shares some similarities with a social movement. Using the Wukan protest as a case study, this thesis addresses three principal questions: How does local protest in rural China develop and evolve? How effective is local protest in bringing about socio-political change in rural areas? To what extent can local protests be understood as forming part of a broader rural social movement in China? By answering these questions, the causes, process of development and outcomes of rural protest in China will be better understood. Also, connections between rural protest and broader social movements will be explored. Social movement theory is applied to answer the research questions. It is argued that political opportunities, resources and strategies determine the trajectory of collective oppositional actions. The Political Process model of McAdam (1982), which incorporates these elements to analyse social movements, offers a framework for explaining the Wukan protest. McAdam regards conditions such as changing political opportunities that expand protesters’ power; well organised i indigenous organisational strength; and a process of cognitive liberation as three requisites for raising a social movement. This thesis borrows these concepts to explain the outburst of the Wukan protest. Moreover, conceptions of social movements proposed by theorists such as Tilly (2005) and Della Porta and Diani (2009) help to examine the similarities and distinctions between the Wukan protest and a social movement, as does the work of Kolb (2007) on the outcomes of social movements. Data were collected and analysed under the principle of interpretivism which focuses on how people make sense of their social reality and identifies the task of the researcher as that of understanding and interpreting their ideas, feelings and motives about a particular social phenomenon. In following this approach, I travelled to Wukan and stayed there for three months in 2013 to undertake participant observation of villagers’ daily life and a VC meeting, and conduct 21 semi-structured interviews with seven groups of interviewees. These primary data were supplemented with documentary data in the form of newspaper articles and documents issued by governments or provided by protesters. Data were analysed thematically to reveal the meanings and ideas of interviewees. By analyzing these data and using social movement theory as my analytical lens, I find three crucial elements for the emergence of collective action in Wukan. To begin with, people became angry about their current situation because they felt they had been deprived of their land – which the former village cadres sold without their consent – and of the benefits accrued from the land sale. These feelings of relative deprivation were amplified when villagers compared their situation with that of rural residents in other villages and with the former village cadres. Second, expanding access to Information and Communication Technologies, the process of urbanisation, the global financial crisis in 2008 and placatory attitudes from higher level governments toward the local protest constituted favourable political opportunities that facilitated the protest. Further, protest leaders were able to enroll more participants into the protest and expand its scope and influence due to three inter-related elements: the deployment of strategies that aroused villagers’ dissatisfaction towards, and increased their confidence in successfully overturning, former village cadres; the enrolment of indigenous organisations (including family committees and religious committees supported by ii long-established associational networks); and the formation of mobilising groups which helped to mobilise more villagers to participate in the protest. These three elements were not proceeding alone, but interplayed to generate the dynamic process of protest. The Wukan villagers had some significant achievements as a result of the protest: some of the land was retrieved; investments were made in improving infrastructure in the village; new village leaders were selected by open election which was regarded by some as the first ever free, transparent and democratic election in China (Gene, 2012); and village democratic structures in the form of a Villagers’ Assembly and Villagers’ Representative Assembly were installed. However, the protest did not achieve substantive structural or political change in the village: around one half of claimed land is unlikely to be returned to the Wukan villagers; bribery and corruption among village officials continued as a practice, even after the open election; and the Villagers’ Assembly and Villagers’ Representative Assembly did not hold regular meetings as intended. This suggests that a protest aiming at local targets and with specific, local demands cannot alter the political and cultural institutions in a village which are founded on national systems of Chinese land ownership and political institutions. The containment of the protest within the village or, at most the county, suggests it cannot be regarded as a part of a social movement in rural China. Actually, the Wukan protest suggests that a social movement is unlikely to emerge in rural China – at least for the foreseeable future – because rural protesters have neither opportunity nor intention to oppose higher authorities. The importance of this research rests on five findings. First, this research finds that the changing local power dynamics provide political opportunities for the generation of rural protests, suggesting the phenomenon of rural protests in China is set to continue. Second, it shows that these protests, when motivated by land acquisition, are economically rather than politically or culturally targeted, meaning that the preservation of a peasant way of life is not the main priority, but rather a share in the wealth of China’s growth and development. Thirdly, it demonstrates that traditional resources including family clan and religious affiliation assist organisational strength which facilitates a protest. Fourthly, that there is a clear distinction between protest and a social movement, as evident in the Wukan case. While a social movement is collective action targeting central authorities for a iii systematic change, protests aim at rectifying specific local demands or grievances and are confined to a local level of mobilisation. Finally, and not surprisingly, this latter kind of collective action will not lead to broader changes as a social movement is likely to do. iv Declaration by author This thesis is composed of my original work, and contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference has been made in the text. I have clearly stated the contribution by others to jointly-authored works that I have included in my thesis. I have clearly stated the contribution of others to my thesis as a whole, including statistical assistance, survey design, data analysis, significant technical procedures, professional editorial advice, financial support and any other original research work used or reported in my thesis. The content of my thesis is the result of work I have carried out since the commencement of my higher degree by research candidature and does not include a substantial part of work that has been submitted to qualify for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution. I have clearly stated which part of my thesis, if any, have been submitted to qualify for another award. I acknowledge that an electronic copy of my thesis must be lodged with the University Library and, subject to the policy and procedures of The University of Queensland, the thesis be made available for research and study in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968 unless a period of embargo has been approved by the Dean of the Graduate School. I acknowledge that copyright of all material contained in my thesis resides with
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