THE MARCH OF THE BUZZARDS CROOK’S FLANK MARCH AT FISHER’S HILL

23rd Infantry. Part of Col. Rutherford B. Hayes’s brigade in the the Army of West . Courtesy of Rutherford B. Hayes Presidential Center

“THEY ALWAYS STOOD SIDEWAYS” THE ROAD TO THE VALLEY’S “GIBRALTAR" Just days before the Battle of Fisher’s Hill, Union cavalry scouts visited After being decisively defeated by Union Gen. at Third the Barr Farm (on the target property) on Little North Mountain, at Winchester on September 19, 1864, Confederate Gen. the end of what would become the battlefield, just as the fam- withdrew his force some 20 miles ily was sitting down to dinner. Although the family hurriedly hid in south to Fisher’s Hill, the their cellar, leaving their food on the table – food the soldiers quickly “Gibraltar of the Valley.” Fisher’s wolfed down – they eventually felt safe enough to climb back up. The Hill was an imposing, fortified soldiers had disturbing news: a battle would soon be fought here. ridgeline that sat at the narrowest Little did the family suspect that the battle’s pivotal flank march and part of the Valley, stretching just and attack would come right across their farm. four miles from Massanutten Early and Sheridan Mountain on the east to Little North The cavalrymen were likely from Gen. William Mountain (including the target property) on . But Early had Averell’s command, scouting ahead of the several challenges . First, after his heavy losses at Third Winchester, he no Union advance. Averell himself scouted the longer had enough men to adequately man the position. Second, the area on September 21, 1864, and later reported height of Fisher’s Hill lessens as you move westward – making the left of that “A line of rail and earth breastworks was Early’s line more vulnerable. reached, behind which the enemy had a strong The third challenge was of Early’s own making. Believing the greatest line of infantry or dismounted men. I threat was on his right, he put his strongest forces there and in the Gen. William Averell informed [Gen. Philip Sheridan]... that an middle – his strongest defensive positions . For reasons never explained, infantry corps, by hugging the base of the North Mountain, might he put his weakest and most unreliable unit, break around the enemy's left and render his position untenable.” dismounted cavalry under Gen. Lunsford Such an advance would cross rugged, uneven ground. The best Lomax, on his vulnerable left flank – his troops to make such a march would be ones who were used to weakest position.

journeying through mountainous terrain – so used to it that they th Lomax placed the 8 Virginia on his left – the “always stood sidewise, with one foot higher than the other.” Troops extreme left of the Confederate line – on the that were “mostly mountaineers... grown accustomed to service in the slopes of Little North Mountain, (on the mountains, [making] the move through the woods and brush along target property), little suspecting they would the mountain side... entirely practicable.” be right in the path of the Federal advance...

Troops like the – the “Buzzards.” The Buzzards were coming. Gen. Lunsford Lomax

Union Gen. George Crook’s ARMY OF WEST VIRGINIA was largely “LIFTING ITSELF UP MENACINGLY” made up of regiments from West Virginia and Ohio. It was On September 20, the day after Third Winchester, Sheridan’s army nicknamed the “Buzzards” and “The Mountain Creepers,” a tribute to marched south in pursuit of Early. As they approached Strasburg, they its hard marching in the mountainous terrain of the Appalachians and spied the daunting ridgeline of Fisher’s Hill. “We could see the hill the Valley. At Third Winchester, its flank attack had set the stage for lifting itself up menacingly to our advance,” recalled Union Capt. James the Union victory. Within Sheridan’s army, it operated similar to a F. Fitts of the 114th New York. “[The Confederates] now occupied one corps – and was sometimes referred to as the 8th Corps. of the best defensive positions in Virginia.”

“THE SECRET M ARCH” “SO THAT NO NOISE WOULD BE MADE” After conferring with his commanders, At 2 p.m., Sheridan ordered Crook to move his troops, "to the eastern Sheridan ruled out a direct frontal assault slope of [Little] North Mountain, and to pass around the enemy's and agreed to Gen. George Crook’s extreme left and get on his flank and rear and drive him from his suggestion to send Crook’s Army of works." Col. Wildes remembered that, “We threw off and piled up our

West Virginia on a long march around knapsacks, arranged canteens and bayonet scabbards so that no noise the Confederate left flank, along the would be made by them, and in the lightest kind of marching order, base of Little North Mountain. “I started up the steep, thickly wooded side of Little North Mountain. resolved [to] move Crook, unperceived Ascending for a half mile or more, we turned abruptly to the left [on if possible,” he later reported, “Onto the target property], and silently moved south, along the face of the the face of Little North Mountain and mountain, each division in two lines, side by side. About 3 p.m., we got let him strike the left and rear of the squarely on the enemy's flank, with our left past his entrenchments.” enemy's line... To do this required much secrecy, as the enemy had a “IT WAS TOO LATE” signal station on [Massanutten An alarmed Confederate Gen. Bryan Grimes spotted the movement. Mountain], from which he could “About 3 o’clock we perceived two columns moving up the side of the see every movement made by our mountain to our left,” he later wrote. troops; therefore, during the night He reported this to Gen. Stephen of the 20th I concealed Crook Ramseur, his superior, urging him to in the timber north of Cedar shift men to support Lomax’s Creek, where he remained Union Gen. George Crook cavalry, but Ramseur declined until during the 21st.” he communicated with Early. “Alas!”

Grimes said. “It was too late.” Jesse Tyler Sturm of the 14th West Virginia was one of the soldiers marching with Crook. “On the morning of the 20th we started up the As they advanced, Crook’s men valley on ‘The secret march’...” he later wrote. encountered the skirmishers from the “We were placed in camp in a heavy timber 8th Virginia Cavalry that Gen. Lomax near Middletown and were not allowed to had positioned on his left flank (on make light by night nor smoke by day, the target property). Confederate Gen. Bryan Grimes Sheridan intending to conceal Crook as to James D. Sedinger, a member of the deceive the enemy as to his whereabouts. Border Rangers (Company E) in the 8th Virginia Cavalry, recalled, There was many a little fire built and a “...General Crooks [sic] with the 8th Corps and the entire federal blanket held over it to hide the light cavalry struck the left flank...Our regiment being up in the woods on while the boys made their cup of coffee.” the North Mountain dismounted, fighting as infantry. Cook

ordered us to charge which we did, and struck the rear of Crooks corps During the day on September 21, the who about-faced and poured a hot fire into us killing John Beckwith Federals drove the Confederates off Flint and capturing Sedinger [referring to himself] of the old company.” Hill, just north of Fisher’s Hill, giving Jesse Tyler Sturm them a complete view of the Confederate Alerted, Lomax’s men hurried to meet the threat, but their efforts were line – and helping to hide Crook’s movement from the southerners. too little and too late. Although some of the cavalrymen had been That night, Crook moved again, marching his men 5 miles and digging breastworks, at the time of the attack they were only 18 inches concealing them in “a clump of timber” behind Hupp’s Hill. high. Lomax’s gunners “worked like beavers” to turn their cannon and

fire, but with little effect. “The enemy opened on us with shot and “UNDER COVER OF WOODS AND RAVINES” shell,” Col. Wildes remembered. “Too late! The first shot was the About 5:30 am on September 22, Sheridan ordered Crook to march to signal to charge, and before they could make any, even the slightest, a wooded position between the right-rear of the 6th Corps and Little preparations to meet us, we were upon them with the bayonet.” North Mountain. “Crook moved out to the extreme right, out of sight, under cover of woods and ravines,” Crook attacked about 4 pm, the Buzzards hitting the southern line remembered Col. Thomas Wildes “like a thunderbolt.” As Averell and Ricketts joined in, Lomax’s of the 116th Ohio. Crook reached his overmatched defenders were overwhelmed and collapsed. The position, about a mile behind Gen. James Confederate flank crumbled, and – with the entire join- Ricketts’ infantry division, by mid- ing the attack – the seceding positions fell like dominoes, giving way as morning. Meanwhile, to distract the they were hit from multiple directions. Gen. Grimes, on the next hill southerners, the rest of the Federals over, recalled how “[The attack] came like an avalanche. The cavalry demonstrated and probed the center and breaking, my skirmish line presented but a feeble resistance. The right of Early’s line. Although enemy attacked me on my left flank, front and rear at the same time.”

Confederate lookouts reported Federal Early’s entire line disintegrated, his troops retreating southwards in movement to the west, it’s likely that they disarray. Only the growing darkness saving his army from complete were describing the actions of Ricketts’ destruction. Col. Thomas Wildes infantry and Averell’s cavalry.