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Bernard Williams on Ethical Theory Bernard Williams on Ethical Theory A Study of Bernard Williams' Critique of Ethical Theory and its Implications for doing Moral Philosophy Ivo R. Kreft A thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Queen's University Kingston, Ontario, Canada January 1998 copyright 8 Ivo R. Kreft, 1998 National Library Bibliothey nationale d Canada du Cana a Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellkqton Street 395, rue Wellington ûttawaûN K1AOiU4 Onawa ON KIA ON4 Canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence dowing the exclusive permettant a la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distriiute or seLi reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/fïlm, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thése. thesis nor substantial extracts fkom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. Abstract This thesis will evaluate the effect Bernard Williams' critique of ethical theory has on moral philosophy, and defend the view that although Williams has shown the inadequacies of theory, moral philosophy cm still enquire into the nature of ethics and produce substantive results. In his ethical writings Williams develops a picture of ethical life which makes us aware that the very nature of ethics makes theory an impossible enterprise. But even if theory is inadequate as a descriptive and prescriptive device to deal with ethical life, this need not be the end of moral enquiry and moral philosophy. One still can enquire into the nature of ethical life and come up with answers which can both be informative and guiding. Briefly put, Williams' position is that of a theory agnostic: he is sceptical about theory, but does not reject it outright. As he programrnatically says: "... 1 want to Say that we can think in ethics, and in al1 sorts of ways, unless Our histoncal and cultural cirumstances have made it impossible - but that philosophy can do little to determine how we should do so" (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophv, p. 74). Williams' ethical thought shows that one thing that moral philosophy can certainly not do is to give a defensible ethical theory. 1 want to argue that even though Williams has shown ethical theory to be inadequate, it is still legitimate and worthwhile to enquire into the nature of ethical life. In fact, Williams' characterization of ethical life is not merely negative: on the one hand he shows that ethical theory cannot do justice to ethical life. At the same time, he makes positive statements about the ethical. These make us aware of what rnatters in ethics, and from this we cm draw a general framework for proceeding in ethical thinking, evaluating and acting. 1 will conclude that Williams' picture of ethics gives us an outline of what the ethical is about and thereby gives us a framework for ethical thought and practice. Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie, und grün des Lebens goldner Baum. J.W. von Goethe Acknowledgements Queen's was superb, since here 1 found a perfectly open, tolerant, diversified, and supportive academic environment, which made for two fruitful, enriching, and enjoyable academic sessions. The rest of my Canadian experience was rather diverse, as it must be the case when for two years one lives in a society with different values, social conventions and dynamics, historical experiences, and gender relations - in other words, in a society with a different world perspective. There have ken far too many people who were part of rny life during the production of this thesis, and who dl, in their own way, meant support and inspiration. To do justice to them would take the space of an M.A. thesis on its own. Below, I want to thank those who to a particular extent helped me to produce this piece and contributed to my thinking and king during this time. Special thanks to: Dad, for his wisdom, for letting me do what I needed to do, and much else, my mother, for providing the material ground for my philosophy studies, my sister, for al1 her pieces of practical wisdom, Prof. Leighton. for his untiring support, willingness to supervise a thesis even under adverse circumstances, his encouragement, his calm and wise counsel, and his philosophical inspiration, Prof. Macleod, for king a patient second reader, and his abiiity to see what matters, Prof. Bakhurst, for his encouragement and practical guidance, Simone, for king a good friend, Caro, Alex, for the odd game of pool, Hen Baier, for putthg me into gear at the right moment, Hem Bischoff of the ïngenieurbüro Herbert Bischoff & Partner, for smoothing my way into the 'practical worfd' (which non-philosophers, though not he, tend to cal1 the 'real worfd'), Matthias Guterl, Anch Nuetz, and Werner Mourek for general moral support, and for teaching me what 1 needed to survive. Tu Lyn Table of Contents 1. Introduction 2. Positions defined 3. Williams' 'Style' of Critique 4. Williams' Critique 5. The End of Theory 6. Moral Philosophy Thereafter Summary and Conclusion B ibliography Vita 1. Introduction This thesis is about Bernard Williams' critique of ethical theory, and the room it has left for moral philosophy. More specifically, it is about certain observations which Williams makes about ethical life and which imply a criticism of or limitation of theory. 1 want to argue that although Williams' critique has made theory an unfeasible endeavour, moral philosophy can legitimately enquire into the nature of ethical thought and practice and corne up with substantial statements which may facilitate deliberation, aid argumentation and guide action. Even after the demise of theory, philosophical enquiries into ethical life not only are legitirnate, worthwhile and useful, but also can give us a framework for proceeding in ethical deliberation and action. In developing Williams' view of the ethical and critique of theory, 1 will draw from Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (henceforth ELP), where the most extensive critique is to be found, and some of his ideas in other works, notably his essays Moral i ty (M) and A Critique of Utilitarianism (U), and his collection of articles in Moral Luck (ML). The thesis develops as follows. In the second chapter 1 will introduce Wiliiams' position and contrast it with the view 1 want to defend. As an appendage to this (and a preparation to the following chapters), I will comment on Williams' peculiar style of criticizing theory. In the 2. Positions defined Bernard Williams' Position "... 1 want to Say that we can think in ethics, and in dl sorts of ways, unless Our historical and cultural circumstances have made it impossible - but that philosophy can do little to determine how we should do so" (ELP: 74). This claim is at the heart of Bernard Williams' book Ethics and the Limits of Philoso~hv. Bernard Williams shows philosophy its limits: one place philosophy ends is where ethics begins. The reservations which Williams voices against ethical theory, and the picture of the ethical which Williams develops imply that no universal perspective in moral philosophy exists which could tell us what is rîght or wrong, good or bad, or which could discem moral values for us or arrive at ethical judgements. A certain kind of truth has no place in moral philosophy: those which transcend time and cultures when it concems the question of how to reason mordly, e.g. the question of what are legitimate or illegitimate moral reasons, what is a good or bad moral argument, how moral dispute or dilemmas could be solved or in what foundations (if there are any) moral reasons could be grounded. Taken thus far, Williams' analysis of ethics implies that the mord philosopher has nothing to Say in Our quest for an invariable boundary between right and wrong. At first, this standpoint might appeal (except to those who get womed about their salary in moral philosophy departments). Why should cold rational thought have the power to te11 us what is right or wrong, good or bad? In Morality Bernard Williams expresses similar concerns, when he writes: If there were such an activity as deducing substantial moral conclusions from a priori premises, trained philosophers might reasonably be expected to be rather specially good at it; but there is not, and the fact that if there were, then professional philosophers would stand a specially good chance of being informed about morality, is itself one of the good reasons for thinking that there could not be such an activity. (emphasis his, M: x-xi) Leaving the explicit mention of "a priori premises" aside, and interpreted in a more general way, which blends in with the rest of Bernard Williams' thought, this passage expresses scepticism about the idea that philosophy could Say anything substantial about ethics; because if that were the case, then philosophers would be in a privileged position to make substantial moral judgements - a daunting prospect. On the other hand, Williams does emphasize two aspects which fonn a natural part of Our ethical life: confîict and reflectioni. But if there is conflict, we seek to resolve it; and if there is reflection, it has a certain kind of structure rather than another, and a specific conclusion rather than another.
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