Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations In

A THESIS TITLED

Post-Daud Period: Implications for

Pakistan

Submitted to GC University Lahore in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

IN Political Science

By Azhar Javed Siddiqui Registration No. 082-GCU-PHD-PS-2010 SESSION 2010-2013

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE G.C. UNIVERSITY LAHORE

A THESIS TITLED

Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations In

Post-Daud Period: Implications for Pakistan

Azhar Javed Siddiqui

Registration No.

082-GCU-PHD-PS-2010 SESSION 2010-2013

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

GC UNIVERSITY LAHORE

CONTENTS

Pages Declaration ii Plagiarism undertaking iii Research completion certificate iv Certificate of approval v Acknowledgement vi Dedication viii Abstract ix List of contents x Pakistan-Afghanistan Map xx Abbreviations xxi

iii

Acknowledgement Research is a social exercise and it depends, inter alia, on cooperation which a researcher gets at institutional and practical levels. And acknowledgement is the best niche in the thesis where a researcher can offer his thanks to all who have been helpful to him. It has been my privilege that I came into contact with persons who extended maximum possible cooperation and encouragement to me and I owe a debt of gratitude to all of them. I am grateful to the Faculty Members of the Department of Political Science, GCU, for providing me possible assistance in research. I am also thankful to Mr. Shakeel Ahmad Khan, the Librarian of GCU, who has been a constant source of cooperation for providing me material for research whenever I approached him.

I am indeed thankful to the following persons whom I had the privilege to meet and interview during the course of research. They included Mr, Shashad Ahmad Khan, former foreign secretary; Mr. Aziz Ahmad Khan, former ambassador to Afghanistan; Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali, former foreign minister; Mr. Rahimullah Yususfzai, an eminent journalist and commentator on Pakistan-Afghanistan relations; Mr. Rustam Ali Shah Mohmund, former Commissioner of Directorate of Afghan Refugees; Mr. Ahmed Rashid, famous expert on the Taliban and on Central Asian region; Rasul Buksh Rais, famous academician and commentator on Pakistan-Afghanistan relations; Dr. Sarfraz Ahmad Khan, Director Area Study Center, University of Peshawar, Dr. Farooq Hasnat, Forman Christian College, Lahore; Dr. Ilyas Ahmad Chattha, University of Warwick, Mr. Raja Anwar, former chairman Punjab Education Foundation, and Mr. Taufeeq Jillani, former officer in Inter Services Intelligence.

I take this opportunity to express my gratitude to Mr. Tauseef Kamal who arranged my interviews with Rahimullah Yusufzai, Rustum Ali Shah, Sardar Asif Ahmed Ali and Dr. Sarfraz Ahmad Khan. I am equally thankful to Mr. Shabbir Ahmad, Librarian Assistant at Quaid-a-Azam Library, Lahore; Mr. Azhar Jan, Chief Librarian at Government MAO College, Lahore. In particular I am grateful to my class fellow, Miss Sadia Rafiq, whose sound advice stood in good stead to me at some moments during the research.

I believe the present work would not have been completed without the kind and continuous support and benign cooperation of Dr. Khalid Manzoor Butt, Chairperson of the Department of Political Science, Government College University, Lahore. His guidance, whenever I approached him,helped me in all the time of research and writing of this thesis.

AZHAR JAVED SIDDIQUI

vii

Dedication

Dedicated to my (Late) Beloved Parents,

and my Daughter Momo.

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Abstract

Pakistan and Afghanistan, two Muslim neighbors, have never had cordial relations since the beginning in 1947. There were two contentious issues which set the trajectory of their early relations, the issue of Pashtunistan and Afghanistan’s refusal to accord the Durand Line the status of international boundary between the two countries. They continued to be the dominant theme of their relationship till 1970s.Two significant developments that took place in Afghanistan towards the end of the decade further complicated their relations: the Saur Revolution of 1978 and the entry of Soviet forces into Afghanistan in December 1979. The event was a watershed happening because it brought about, inter alia, a qualitative change in Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan. The United States and its allies deciphered the Soviet move an attempt to expand its influence to areas vital for Washington’s interests. America knitted an informal alliance of its allies to put freeze on Moscow’s advance. Pakistan was coopted in as a ‘frontline state’ played a vital role in the eviction of the Soviet forces. This paved the way for broadening of traditional paradigm of Islamabad’s Afghan policy. But after the Soviet military exit Pakistan was unable to capitalize on the situation to its advantage and consequently had to suffer from negative political and strategic implications. The implications are attributed to structural deficits in Pakistan’s Afghan policy during the decade long stay of Red Army on Afghanistan’s soil.

LIST OF CONTENTS

Chapter One: Introduction 1-31

1.1 Quantification and Rationale of the Post-Durand Period 5 1.2 Structural Deficits 6 1.3 Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations in the Post-Daoud Period 6 1.4 Soviet Military Entry into Afghanistan 1979-1988 8 1.5 The Post-Soviet Withdrawal Phase 9 1.6 Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations: Post-Najib Phase 9 1.7 Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations: The Taliban Phase 10 1.8 Implications for Pakistan 10 1.9 Objectives of the Study 11 1.10 Significance of the Study 11 1.11 Hypothesis 13 1.12 Historical Research Methodology 13 1.13 Research Questions 16 1.14 Sources 17 1.14.1 Primary Sources 17 1.14.2 Interviews 17 1.14.3 Secondary Sources 19 1.14.4 Books 20 1.14.4.1 Precedent Literature Review 20 1.14.5 Scholarly Journals 24 1.14.6 Newspapers 25 1.14.7 Online Documentaries 25 1.15 Theoretical Framework 26 1.16 Reference Style 28 1.17 Organization of the Work 29 1.17.1 Chapter Two- Post-The Saur Revolution of 1978 and Changes in Afghanistan 29 xi

1.17.2 Chapter Three-Post-Daoud Period-Phase One 29 1.17.3 Chapter Four-Post-Daoud Period: Phase Two 30 1.17.4 Chapter Five-Pakistan-Afghanistan-India 30 1.17.5 Chapter Six-Strategic Implications for Pakistan 30 1.17.6 Conclusion and Recommendation 31

Chapter Two: The Saur Revolution of 1978 and Changes in Afghanistan 32-62 Part-I

2.1 The Pre-Saur period (1947-1978) 32 2.2 Afghanistan and the United States after the British Departure 34 2.2.1 United States Response-Pragmatic Realism 35 2.2.2. Drivers of American Policy toward Afghanistan 36 2.2.3 Afghanistan's Marginal Relevancy to American Interests 37 2.2.4. United States’ Special Relations with Pakistan 37 2.3 Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations during the Cold war 38 2.3.1 The Decade of 1950s 40 2.3.2 The Interregnum 1963 to 1973- Detente Period 41 2.3.3 Afghanistan from Monarchy to Presidential System 42 2.3.4 President Daoud and Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations 44 2.3.5 New Denouement Phase 45 2.4. Afghanistan and the Soviet Union 46 2.4.1 Economic Cooperation 47 2.4.2 Military Cooperation 48 2.4.3 Political Support on the Issue of Pashtunistan 49 2.5 Post-Premier Daoud Period: 1963-1973 50 2.6 President Daoud and the Soviet Union 50

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Part-II

2.7 Changes in Afghanistan 53 2.8 Afghanistan and the Saur Revolution 53 2.9 Afghanistan's new Ruler 54 2.10 Pakistan and the Political Changes in Afghanistan 55 2.11 Revolutionary Initiatives 56 2.12 Land and Agrarian Initiatives 58 2.12.1 Land Decrees 58 2.13 Pakistan and Afghan Land Initiatives 59 2.14 Soviet Military Entry into Afghanistan 60

Chapter Three: Post-Daoud Period: Phase one 63-114 Part-I

3.1 Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations in the Post-Daoud Period: First Phase (April 1978-December 1979) 65 3.2 Pakistan and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan 65 3.3 Strategic Realism 66 3.3.1 Afghanistan’s Response 67 3.4 First Meeting Between Two Heads of States 68 3.5 Beginning of Deterioration in Relations 69 3.6 Revolutionary Initiatives: Resistance and Repression 70 3.6.1 Implications of the Outcome 72 3.7 Resistance and Pakistan 74 3.8 Afghanistan’s Accusations 75 3.9 Friendship Treaty between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union 1978 75 3.10 Taraki vs. Amin 76 3.11 Amin’s Rise and Fall 77

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Part-II 3.12 Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations: Second Sub-phase 78 3.13 Soviet Forces into Afghanistan 78 3.14 Implications of the Development 79 3.15 Why Soviet Forces in Afghanistan? 79 3.16 Theoretical Explanation 80 3.16.1 Prop-Up Theory 81 3.16.2 Brezhnev Doctrine 82 3.16.3 Offensive Character 82 3.16.4 Warm-Water Theory 83 3.16.5 The Expansionist Theory 83 3.16.6 Contemporary Developments 84 3.16.7 President Amin- A Bete Noire 84 3.16.8 Other Explanation 85 3.16.9 Difficult Decision 86 3.16.10 Possible Explanation 86 3.16.11 Herat Rebellion 87 3.17 Soviet Union’s Point of View 88 3.18 USA’s Reaction 89 3.19 International Response 90 3.20 Pakistan and the Soviet Military In Afghanistan 91 3.20.1 Elimination of Buffer State Status 91 3.20.2 Refugees Problem-Strategic Challenge 93 3.21 Pakistan's Reaction 94 3.22 Pakistan’s Strategic Dilemma and Options 95 3.23 Drivers of Pakistan’s Response: Theoretical Framework: Constructivism. 96 3.23.1 General Zia-ul Haq: The Military Ruler of Pakistan 97 3.23.2 Pakistan’s Nuclear Program 98 3.24. Pakistan: Frontline State 99 3.24.1 National Security Culture 100 xiv

3.24.2 Implications of Frontline State 101 3.25 Military and Economic Assistance 102 3.26 Pakistan: A Funneler 103 3.26.1 Support to Islamic Groups 103 3.27 Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations 1979-1989 104 3.27.1 Nature of their Relations 104 3.27.2 Afghan Charges. 105 3.27.3 Pakistan’s Counter Accusations 106 3.27.4 Relative Position on the Issue 107 3.27.5 Afghan Overtures. 108 3.28 Geneva Negotiations and Accords 108 3.28.1 Proxy Relations 109 3.28.2 Start of Negotiations. 109 3.28.3 Second Round- April 1983. 110 3.28.4 Ascendancy of Mikhail Gorbachev 111 3.28.5 Comments and Critique 112 3.28.6 Soviet Perspective 112 3.28.7 Strategic Implications for Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations 113 3.28.8 Interim Government 114

Chapter Four: Post-Daoud Period-Phase Two 115-175

4.1 Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations 1989-1992 116 4.1.1 First Option: Disengagement 116 4.1.2 Continuous Support 117 4.1.3 Strategic Depth 118 4.1.3.1 What is Strategic Depth 119 4.1.3.2 Genesis of Strategic Depth 119 4.1.3.3. Afghanistan as a Strategic Depth 120 4.1.3.4 Revisit of the Concept 120 4.2 Jalalabad Fiasco 121 xv

4.2.1 Selection of City and Rationale of The Operation 121 4.2.2 Operation and its Failure 122 4.2.3 Implications of Jalalabad Fiasco 123 4.2.4 Pakistan and Afghanistan Relations after Jalalabad Attempt 124 4.3 Collapse of Najibullah Regime 125 4.4 Disintegration of Soviet Union and Exit of Dr. Najib 126 4.4.1 Dilemma of a "Rentier State" 127 4.5 Post-Najib Situation 128 4.5.1 Mujahideen’s Intransigence 129 4.5.2 Issues Involved 129 4.5.3 The Peshawar Accord 131 4.5.4 Afghanistan's Perspective 131 4.5.5 Pakistan's Context 132 4.6. Critique of The Accord 132 4.7 Spoilers vs. Tinkerers 134 4.8 Islamabad Accord 135 4.9 The Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA) 1992-1995 135 4.9.1 Characteristics of New State 136 4.9.2 New Rulers of Afghanistan 136 4.10 Pakistan and the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA) 137 4.11 Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations under Rabbani 138 4.11.1 Pakistan and Hekamatyaar 138 4.11.2. Hekamatyaar's Ideal of Islamic State 139 4.11.3 Hekamatyar and Post-Najib Afghanistan 141 4.12 Rabbani as a Tinkerer 142 4.13 Pakistan and Northern Alliance 143 4.14 Rabbani's Independent Foreign Policy- Defiance of Pakistan’s Chaperone Role 143 4.14.1 Rabbani's Re-election 145 4.14.2 New Beginning but Late 145 4.15 The Taliban Phenomenon 146 xvi

4.15.1 The Rise of The Taliban 147 4.15.2 Afghan Scenario 148 4.15.3 Genesis of The Taliban 148 4.15.4 Pakistan's Role 149 4.15.5 Not Subscribers 149 4.15.6 Why Pakistan Supported the Taliban? 150 4.15.7 Strategic Interests: Friendly Afghanistan 151 4.15.8 Access to Newly Independent Central Asian Republics (CARs) 151 4.15.9 United States key Regional Partner 152 4.16 Pakistan and The Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan (IEA) 152 4.16.1 Nature of Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations 153 4.16.2 Pakistan's Contention 154 4.17 Evaluation of Pakistan’s Policy in Regional Context 156 4.17.1 Regional Dimension: Pakistan, Iran and the Taliban 157 4.17.2 Iran and the Soviet Military Incursions 158 4.17.3 Islamic State of Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran 158 4.17.4 Taliban's Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran 159 4.17.5 Iran's Concerns 160 4.17.6 Taliban's successes and Iran's Reaction 160 4.17.7. Iran's Response 161 4.17.8 Pakistan-Iran Relations 161 4.18 Pakistan-Russia-Afghanistan 162 4.18.1 Emergence of The Taliban 163 4.18.2 Pakistan and Russia 164 4.19 The Taliban and the United States 164 4.19.1 United States Response 165 4.20 The Taliban and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) 166 4.20.1 Pakistan and Central Asian Republics (CARs) 168 4.20.2 Engagement of Taliban Government 168 4.21 After 9/11 169 xvii

4.21.1.. Pakistan's Options 170 4.21.2 President Pervaiz Musharraf 171 4.21.3 Indian Card 172 4.21.4 Hindsight Evaluation of Pakistan’s U-Turn Policy 174

Chapter Five: Pakistan-Afghanistan-India 176-202

5.1 Indian Approach 177 5.2 Pakistan's View 178 5.3 India-Afghanistan Relations 179 5.4 Friendship Treaty 1950 179 5.4.1 Strategic Partnership 181 5.4.2 Pakistan's Concerns 182 5.5 India and the Issue of Pashtunistan 183 5.5.1 Indian Position 184 5.5.2 Moral and Contractual Compulsions 185 5.6 India and the People's Democratic Republic of Afghanistan 185 5.7 India and the Soviet Intervention 186 5.7.1 Indian Response-Ambivalence to Blunt Criticism 187 5.7.2 Middle Phase: Soft Approach 188 5.7.3 Balancing Phase 191 5.7.4 India-Pakistan and the Soviet Intervention 192 5.8 India-Afghanistan Relations during Soviet Stay 194 5.9. Post-Withdrawal 195 5.9.1 Phase 1989-1996 196 5.10 India and the Rabbani Government 196 5.11 India and the Taliban 197 5.11.1 India and Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA): The Taliban Rule 199 5.12 India and Post-Taliban Northern Alliance Nexus 200 xviii

Chapter Six: Implications for Pakistan 202-220

6.1 Negative Implications 204 6.1.1 Negative Strategic Implications 204 6.2 Govt. of National Reconciliation 205 6.3 Post-Withdrawal Political Framework 207 6.4 Friendly Regime in Afghanistan- A Parochial Approach 207 6.5 Pragmatic Approach 209 6.6 Collapse of the Soviet Union 210 6.7 Post-Najib Afghanistan and Structural Deficits 211 6.7.1 Nature of Seven Parties-Not Political Alliance 211 6.7.2 Guerilla Movement 212 6.8 Pakistan and Post-Peshawar Accord Situation 213 6.9 Civil War in Afghanistan: Obstacle to Strategic Interests 214 6.10 Revival of India Influence and Implications 215 6.11 The Taliban and Implications 216 6.12 Negative Social Implications 218 6.12.1 Growth of Madrassas (Religious Seminaries) 219

Conclusions and Recommendations 221-231

1 Afghanistan- A Parentier State 221 2 Pakistan- A Fregoli State 223 3 Recommendations. 225 3.1 Transit-Trade Issue (TTI) 227 3.2 Pakistan Specific: (i) Policy for All Afghans 227 3.3 Pakistan Specific: (ii) Use of Cultural Depth- Pak-Afghan Sufi Conference 228 xix

3.4 Integration by ‘Joint Free Economic Zones’ (JFEZ) 228 4 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: (CPEC) 228 5. Regional Conference 229 5.1 Objectives 230 5.1.1 Neo-Buffer State 230 5.1.2 Afghanistan Pledge 230 5.1.3 Pakistan Pledge 231 5.1.4 Regional Agreement 231 5.15 Regional Monitoring Group 231 Appendices Annexure A-List of Arms Supplied by America in the 1980s Annexure B-The Geneva Accords of 1988 Annexure C-Afghan Refugees in Pakistan Annexure D-Peshawar Accord Bibliography

PAKISTAN AFGHANISTAN MAP

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ABBREVIATIONS

CARs Central Asian Republics

CENTO Central Treaty Organization

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

ECO Economic Cooperation Organization

IEA Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

ISA Islamic State of Afghanistan

NWFP North West Frontier of Afghanistan

PDPA People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.

SEATO Southeast Asian Treaty Organization

TTP Tehreek Taliban Pakistan

UNOCAL Union Oil Company of California

UNSC United Nations Security Council

USA United States of America.

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union

ZAPU Zimbabwe African People’s Union

Chapter One

Introduction

International relations are predominantly a study of politics of powerful states. Smaller or weaker states, by virtue of their status, normally do not have any significant impact on the course of international politics. Therefore, their relations evoke marginal interest of scholars and experts. Such states remain insignificant even if they are strategically located. But the dynamics of international politics is such that “at any particular time in world politics, some regions are considered more important than others. In a 1 geographical context, these regions are called the ‘epicenter of international relations.”

When smaller states become part or situate in proximity to the epicenter, their relations assume importance and scholars and experts study them in depth with a view to evaluating their impact on international politics.

Pakistan and Afghanistan, neighbors and two ‘smaller’ members of South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), must not, as a matter of rule, create any serious stirrings in international politics but they have, as a matter of exception, been twice vitally instrumental in influencing and shaping the course of international politics: first, when the Soviet Union sent its forces into Afghanistan in December 1979 and, later on, when the episode of 9/11 took place in 2001. However, even during the days of Cold War between the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Pakistan and Afghanistan situated in proximity with one of the poles of the ‘epicenter’ of international politics, their acrimony-predicated relationship had been drawing the attention of the America and its regional allies.

______

1. Mehtab A.Shah, The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy (London: Tauris,1997),

8-9

History, culture, geographical continuity and astride ethnicity have so inextricably wedded Pakistan and Afghanistan that Hamid Karzai, the former president of 2 Afghanistan, described the “two countries as conjoined twins.” The epithet represents not simply the nature of their closeness but also the history of of their complex relations and resultant adverse effects their ties have brought. What is more, the geographical contiguity has placed Afghanistan in such a way that the historical direction of changes that take place there has invariably been towards areas that constitute Pakistan. This gives Afghanistan spatial continuity into the subcontinent and added its strategic significance for Pakistan. That is why, Islamabad gives paramount importance to its relations with Kabul as its peace and stability depends upon stable and friendly Afghanistan.

The linkages were further accentuated when the Soviet Union sent its forces into Afghanistan in December 1979 and Pakistan, for the next ten years, facilitated, as a ‘frontline state’*, the provision of external logistical and financial assistance to Afghan Mujahideen** engaged in resisting the presence of foreign forces on the Afghan soil. But it was Islamabad’s humanitarian gesture of providing asylum to more than three million Afghan refugees which had earned it huge goodwill amongst ordinary Afghans. Mujahideen** engaged in resisting the presence of foreign forces on the Afghan soil. But it was Islamabad’s humanitarian gesture of providing asylum to more than three million Afghan refugees which had earned it huge goodwill amongst ordinary Afghans. The presence of such a large number of refugees created tremendous pressure, but generated, in the long-run, dangerous trends in Pakistan. But according to Benazir ______

2.Rahimullah Yusufzai, “ Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations: A Pakistani Narrative,” in PILDAT Report (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, March 2011), 9

*A ‘frontline state’ may be defined “a state which borders another state or area hit by a war or other crisis.

**The word ‘ Mujhahideen’ is a plural of ‘ mujahid’. the word may have different meaning but here it means a Muslim military force of guerilla warriors engaged in the holy jihad . The word also means ‘Soldiers of Allah ’ who fight for Allah in their war against unbelievers.

Bhutto, the late prime minister Pakistan: “The years of jihad* have brought the people of both countries closer and this closeness must not be squandered through myopia Governments come and go. A people are forever.” 3

Notwithstanding their sharing of potent linkages, Pakistan and Afghanistan have not been able to develop a friendly poise in their relations since 1947; the only exception being the brief tenure of the Taliban rule which lasted from 1996-2001. The anomaly in their relationship is primarily ascribed to Kabul’s refusal to accept the Durand Line* as international boundary between the two countries. The Line whose ______

*The Arabic word “jihad” is here taken to mean “holy war” which the followers of Islam have to wage against non-believers. But in a linguistic sense the word means struggle or strive. In a religious sense it is referred to internal and external striving to be a good Muslim. Military jihad is one of its facets which are recourse to protect the faith against others.

3. Dr. Zahid Anwar, “Afghanistan: Peace so near and yet so far,” The Nation December 09. 1995.

*The Durand Line Is the 2640 kilometers long porous international border between Afghanistan and the semiautonomous tribal regions of Pakistan. It was the result of an agreement signed in1893 between Britain and Amir Abdur Rahman Khan of Afghanistan. The British India was represented by Sir Mortimer Durand. The Agreement provided the British to ensure the protection of its military and economic interests in the North-West Frontier Province of the subcontinent. The Line runs through the foothills, leading to Afghanistan’s Suleiman Mountains. It stretches from Chitral in NWFP to Balucnistan and traverses through the tribal belt in Pakistan with no regard to the concern of ethnic communities.

The other objective was to ensure peaceful routes for British trade which was the basic source of income. The routes included the Khyber, the Kurram, and the routes from Ghazni, either by Tochi valley to Bannu or by the Gomal to Dera Ismail Khan, and as a variant from Pashin down to the Lower Derajat and Dera Ghazi Khan. To put Afghanistan’s position on the issue briefly, Kabul’s arguments are more political in nature: It claimed that the Agreement was signed under duress and all the treaties signed between the British India and Afghanistan lapsed with the withdrawal of British. The Afghans also claim that the Durand Line Agreement was valid for hundred years only which means that the legality of the Agreement should have been lapsed in 1993. However, there is absolutely nothing in the Durand Line Agreement or in the subsequent documents between the British and the Afghan Boundary Commission which completed border demarcations until 1896, to indicate that the border was determined for 100 years.

Pakistan’s contentions are, on the other hand, more rooted in law and history: It had responded that Afghanistan itself had remained under Indian control and that the Afghan empire’s control over these areas was short-lived and in fact very weak. Apart from historical argument, Islamabad argues that International Law also supports its position on the issue: Article 2 of the Vienna Convention states that “A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from treaty: (a) if the treaty establishes a boundary.” (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1669, 2005) Likewise Article 11 of Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, 1978 explicitly states that (Next Page)

has been contested by all Afghan regimes, has never assumed the status of a cultural, territorial and political boundary between the two countries. President Hamid Karzai went to the extent of calling the Durand Line as ‘a line of hatred that raised a wall between the two brothers.’ 4

The other issue was Afghanistan’s obsession with its territorial claim on certain Pashtun areas* located on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line. It so poisoned their relations that Afghanistan was the only country to have cast negative vote at the time of Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations. The vote though had been withdrawn later on but it deeply affected the nature of their ties as they “remained fluctuating between barely working relations or explicit hostilities to the level of border skirmishes and diplomatic standstill.” 5 Therefore, the two words that better or appropriately characterize their relations are mistrust and lack of confidence and this state of affairs has not provided the third parties an opportunity to influence the trajectory of their relationship but also produced strategically viable apprehensions for Pakistan.

The conflict forthwith assumed regional dimension when Afghanistan joined hands with India, a much more powerful state on the eastern side of Pakistan and with which it had antagonistic relations, increased Pakistan’s security concerns. Kabul and New Delhi soon developed a kind of ‘quasi alliance’ to put pressure on Karachi, and ______(Previous Page) “A succession of States does not as such affect (a) a boundary established by a treaty; or (b) obligations and rights established by a treaty and relating to the regime of a boundary.”(2005) The above article rejects the view that the treaties signed between the British and Afghan agreement lapsed with the withdrawal of British.

4. Rahimullah Yusufzai, (An eminent journalist and expert on Afghan affairs), in discussion with the author January 2016.

*At the time of partition of the subcontinent in August 1947, Afghanistan claimed certain Pashtun areas of Pakistan. Having failed to win international support for its claim, Afghanistan began espousal for an independent Pashtun state carved out from Pakistan’s Pashtun areas. This state would come into being by detaching the following parts from West Pakistan: the frontier states of Dir, Swat, Chitral, and Amb; Baluchistan and the Baluchistan states of Kalat, Kharan, Makran and Les Bela.

5. Razia Sultana, ”Pak-Afghan Relations: Issues and Propects of Future Rapprochment,” in Pakistan: Dimensions of History, ed. Syed Jaffar Ahmed (Karachi: University of Karachi, 2013),287

ever since this cooperation Pakistan has been wary of Indian presence in Afghanistan and seeking ways to counter it. Even today both countries are engaged in competition for influence in Afghanistan and “the hostility between India and Pakistan lies at the heart of the current war in Afghanistan.” 6

To an extent the colonial mindset of Pakistan’s early political leadership in dealing with Afghanistan immediately in the wake of independence also produced friction between Kabul and Karachi. Realizing the fact that Afghanistan was, being a landlocked country, dependent on Pakistan, and given that both countries are Muslims, Pakistan assumed that Afghanistan would be a natural friend and it never genuinely sought to engage Afghanistan. It ignored her as a poor and backward state with no stable economy. Pakistan’s interest in Afghanistan was limited to political stability, and inasmuch as more than a century old kingship system was enough to provide political stability to a heterogeneous country it never approached Afghanistan in a way to develop stable and friendly relationship. 7

1.1. Quantification and Rationale of the post-Daoud Period

The post-Daoud period (hereinafter will be referred as ‘focal period’), has, for the purpose of this research, been quantified from 1978-2001. It begins with President Daoud’s gory exit from power on 27 April 1978 in consequence of Saur Revolution and snaps with the happening of the fateful event of 9/11. The consideration guiding the selection and quantification of the period is that the phase witnessed Pakistan’s overriding overriding involvement in Afghan affairs which began with the induction of Soviet forces into Afghanistan and collapsed in September 2001. Pakistan’s influence was at the apex point in the wake of the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan in

______

6.William Dalrymple, A Deadly Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (Washington D.C: The Brookings Essay, June,2013) 7. Rustam Ali Shah Mohmund (Expert on Pak-Afghan relations), in discussion with the author September 2016.

1989 and this afforded Pakistan an opportunity to restructure its traditionally strained relations with Afghanistan in the context of new dynamics at regional and international levels. But Islamabad was unable to capitalize on the post-Soviet withdrawal Afghan environment to its advantage. There may have been other explanations but ‘structural deficits’ in Pakistan’s Afghan policy from 1979 to 1989 were, it will be argued, an instrumental factor too to this effect. And, later on, when Pakistan did successfully orchestrated the Taliban’s rise and assumption of power; it was too late for it to positively realize policy benefits.

1.2. Structural Deficits Structural deficits may be defined as ‘in-built limitations in a policy.’ They exist when policy response lacks organic unity. Governments lacking in constitutional legitimacy when confront an international situation affecting them directly tend to view such happening through the prism of their position in the domestic power structure, and ensure that, first, the response to the situation must not affect their position in the internal power paradigm; and secondly, help them in breaking the shackles of international isolation. This policy works well in so far as the realization of their objectives is concerned but they underappreciate the implications involved in their decision: they gained international recognition but loose the initiative to act independently when the situation demands, and, for that matter, their conception of long-term perspective of state’s interests is either vague or entirely missing. Consequently, when the momentum of the development subsides, the structural deficits become pronounced and negatively affect the long-term interests of the country.

1.3. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations in the Post-Daoud Period

The watershed changes that had overwhelmed Afghanistan in the second half of 1970 provide the framework for analyzing Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the post-Daoud period. The first development that uprooted the traditional Afghan political set up in

consequence of the Saur Revolution* brought the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA0 to power. It was, however, seminal in nature as it paved the way for a later change, i.e. the introduction of Soviet forces into Afghanistan. The emerged scenario transformed the western part of South Asia into an arena of contemporary superpowers’ rivalry and Pakistan and Afghanistan became proxies of the United States and the Soviet Union respectively. This had a deep impact in influencing the trajectory of their relations and cannot be evaluated independent of contemporary superpowers’ policies from 1979 to 1989.

Owing to Pakistan’s strained relationship with India in the wake of independence from Great Britain, its relations with Afghanistan in the pre-Daoud phase (1947-1978) were predicated on policy of, first, maintaining and sustaining limited engagement with Afghanistan so as to prevent Kabul from adopting a posture inimical to Islamabad’s interests. The second underpinning was to countervail Indian efforts which were aimed at securing foothold in Afghanistan which Pakistan believed could produce strategic challenges for its security. But the dominant themes of the period remained the Durand Line and the Pashtunistan. However, before the beginning of the focal period, President Daoud of Afghanistan (1973-1978) and his Pakistani counterpart, General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) are reported to have “agreed upon a ‘unique method’ for an honorable solution to the difference between the two countries. 8 This could have been a watershed development in the history of two countries but for the Revolution.

______*The Revolution in Afghanistan took place in the month of April in 1978 which coincided with the month named Saur in the Persian calendar. That is why, it is also called the Saur Revolution, and therefore, the two terms have been used interchangeably.

8. Abdul Samad Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan:An Insider’s Account (Virginia: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988), 147.

1.4. Soviet Military Entry into Afghanistan 1979-1988

The Soviet Union’s sending of military forces into Afghanistan in December 1979 further complicated the nature and direction of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. The development brought about a qualitative modification in the existing paradigm of their relationship, and ushered in a new phase in their ties; political differences relating to the Durand Line continued to exist but slipped in significance inasmuch as the presence of Soviet troops on Afghan soil posed, Islamabad believed so, more immediate, direct and grave threat to its security interests. Pakistan, in line of its policy of opposing foreign military intervention, refused to accord diplomatic recognition to the Soviet propped Kabul regime of Babrak Karmal (1979-1986), and provided a base to Mujahideen who had started resistance against the Soviet military presence in their country.

One upshot of the eventful Soviet step was that it intensified Cold War between America and the Soviet Union and Pakistan and Afghanistan became center of international political gravity for the next decade. Washington’s reaction to the Moscow move was stiff as President Jimmy Carter described it “the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War.” 9 It choreographed an unofficial alliance of allies, western countries and conservative states of the Middle East, in order to put a freeze on USSR’s onward march towards areas vital for American interests. Pakistan was coopted in the partnership as a ‘frontline state’ solely privileged to channelize external military and financial aid and impart training to unlikely allies of Washington- Afghan Islamic fundamentalists. During the decade-long Afghan jihad (1979-1989), Pakistan- Afghanistan relations were touching the nadir point: the two sides continued to accuse each other of interfering in the internal affairs of each other.

______9. Riaz M. Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2005),20-21.

1.5. The Post-Soviet Withdrawal Phase

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan 1989, Pakistan emerged as a principal player on the Afghan scene, carrying the largest responsibility for restoring order and paving the way for the establishment of a new order in Afghanistan. But Pakistan, instead of adjusting the contours of its Afghan policy to new realities, continued its support to the Peshawar-based resistance groups. Buoyed by the ignominious retreat of the Soviet Union, Islamabad believed that the regime of Dr. Najibullah (1986-1992) would not survive, and sought to replace it with a pro-Pakistan Mujahideen in Kabul. The botched- up Jalalabad operation, though supported and consented by the United States, was an attempt in this regard but it proved abortive and the regime in Kabul survived till its final collapse in 1992. Ismail Khan, the famous Mujahideen leader commented that “the battle of Jalalabad lost us the credit won in ten years fighting.” 10

1.6. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations: Post-Najib Phase

The dismantling of the Soviet Union in December 1991 was a watershed development in international politics and the government of President Najibullah, which was heavily dependent on Soviet military and financial assistance for its survival, was a casualty of the liquidation of USSR. Bereaved of the Moscow panoply, Najib resigned in a ‘palace coup’, and his exit paved the way for the installation of the Mujahideen regime in Kabul. The Peshawar Accord-a peace and power sharing agreement in the post-communist Islamic state of Afghanistan-in 1992 brokered by Pakistan eventually formalized the assumption of power by erstwhile resistance groups.

The assumption of power by former resistance leaders, with the political support of Pakistan, was expected to usher in a new phase in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. But Pakistan and Afghanistan relations soon ran into difficulties as Rabbani’s pursuit of so-called independent foreign policy which irked Pakistan inasmuch as it contained ______10. Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending:Afghanistan1979 to the present (London:Hurst, 2005),228-

229

rapprochement with India, Islamabad’s archrival in the region. It was a step amounted to undermining the policy which it had been pursuing since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, i.e. development of engagement with Afghanistan with a view to neutralizing Indian influence in Afghanistan.

1.7. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations: The Taliban* Phase

The Taliban regime in Kabul represented fruition of policy which Pakistan had been striving for since 1992: a broad-based Pashtun-dominated Islamabad-friendly government in Afghanistan. The Taliban were anti-India and shared similar views with Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir. Islamabad found in the Taliban government an ally sensitive of its interests vis-à-vis India in Afghanistan. For the first time in the annals of their relations since 1947, Islamabad-Kabul ties were on a keel where Pakistan felt a degree of security on its north-western border. Its influence was clearly on the rise; on the contrary, Indian presence in Afghanistan and dwindling and it soon reached to a point of non-existence as it pulled out its representative and shut down its embassy. However, there was an irony that pronouncedly marked their relations during this period: even Pakistan-sponsored Taliban regime had not recognized the Durand Line as an international border between the two countries.

1.8. Implications for Pakistan

Spanned little over more than two decades, the focal period was characterized by paradox developments in the sense that they had direct bearings on Pakistan security but they also paved the way for escalation of Islamabad’s influence in Afghanistan which reached an enviable acme in the wake of withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. However, the irony was that Pakistan could not capitalize on the goodwill it had earned during the Afghan jihad and orientate the post-Najib political ambience to

______*The word Taliban is one of the plural forms of talib, which here refers to a student in an Islamic madrasa (school where religious education is imparted free of cost).

restructuring its awry relations with Afghanistan. This produced negative strategic implications for it. Negative implications, stemmed from ‘structural deficits’, meant that Pakistan, on the one hand, lost the initiative to realize its political and strategic objectives in Afghanistan. Secondly, there seemed that the ‘evolved plan’ have never been part of Pakistan’s strategic thinking, i.e. how to manage the situation in the post- withdrawal phase and moderate that fundamentalist religious wave that it had channelized with the active material and financial support of the United States to resist Soviet military presence in Afghanistan.

1.9. Objective of the Study

The objective of any research exercise is to elaborate, or, where required, offer alternate explanation by investigating those aspects which are either unexplored or underexplored. There exists a pile of knowledge on topic under study but there is always a room for further exploration and this provokes a researcher to undertake research. Pakistan and Afghanistan relations have been extensively written about and a heap of material is available on the state of their ties since their inception in 1947. Their relationship has never been cordial due to factors mentioned in the previous lines; however, opportunities did arise but had not been built upon to rectify anomalies. The objective of the exercise is to evaluate one of the opportunities, i.e. Soviet Union’s military incursion into Afghanistan. Islamabad had two decisive leverages: its stock was very high among ordinary Afghans because it had provided refuge to more than three millions war stricken Afghan refugees despite heavy economic odds; secondly, it had tremendous influence on the future political leadership of Afghanistan. The purpose of the research exercise is to find out how and why Islamabad failed to build upon the two leverages and rectify past anomalies in its relations with Afghanistan.

1.10. Significance of the Study

To understand the present it is essential to analyze the past, for the former is but a continuity of the later. The study of the post-Daoud period (1978-2001) is significant because it witnessed changes in the area of Southwest Asia the effects of which are 12

extant. The study is more significant in terms of Islamabad’s perspective. Pakistan reaped immense financial and military benefits as a ‘frontline’ state but managers of its foreign policy appeared more concerned with short-term gains and pushed ‘opportunity- cost’ analyses to second fiddle. The upshot was that Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan has been far from stable since the Saur Revolution in April 1978. Pakistan’s enhanced involvement in Afghan affairs did not yield desired results for it. It wanted a government of national reconciliation in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal, and a friendly government after the implosion of Dr. Najib’s government, in Kabul but failed on both accounts due to structural deficits in its Afghan policy from 1979 to 1989. As a matter of fact, Pakistan’s mal-handling of Afghan situation after 1992 landed the country in civil war and prevented the realization of Islamabad’s second objective, i.e. gaining access to emerging Central Asian markets traversing through Afghanistan.

Two outcomes have added to the significance of the study: first, the crisis that afflicts Pakistan-Afghanistan relations though dates back to 1947 but the present dimension originates from the period under study which is hindering the desired economic direction of Central and South Asian regions. Consequently, the bilateral irritants between the two countries have assumed regional dimension and needs to be studied in the same context. Secondly, the present Islamic fundamentalism inspired wave of terrorism that has changed the very concept of national security had originated during this period. As a matter of fact, the United States and its allies created this Frankenstein of terrorism during the Soviet Union’s decade-long military stay in Afghanistan. They, in pursuance of their policy of putting freeze on Kremlin’s likely advance to sensitive areas of the Persian Gulf and Middle East, encouraged Islamists from regions as far as North Africa to flock Pakistan to participate in the holy jihad against Moscow. They were nurtured during the period by extending financial and military assistance and imparting guerilla training, and dubbed/portrayed as moral equivalents of America’s founding fathers.

1.11. Hypothesis

Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan, its northwestern neighbor, have never been smooth ab initio due to the issues of the Durand Line and Pashtunistan . They remained frigid till late 1970s when Afghanistan underwent cataclysmic developments, the Saur Revolution in April 1978 and the entry of Soviet forces into Afghanistan in December 1979. These happenings were inimical, from Pakistan’s perspective, to its interests; but they also placed Pakistan in a critical position as a ‘frontline state.’ Islamabad earned huge goodwill by channelizing external assistance to Afghan Muhajideen resisting the Soviet military in their country. However, subsequent to the withdrawal of Soviet troops, Islamabad could not be able to capitalize the goodwill to its advantage and streamline its traditional awry relations and protect its strategic interests in Afghanistan. Islamabad strategic interests predicated on the point that Indian influence in Afghanistan should not be strong enough to pose any existential threat. Besides, it was to prevent the recurrence of the Durand Line and Pashtunistan issues. The problem understudy is: How did Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the post-Daoud period affect strategic implications of Pakistan?

1.12. Historical Research Methodology Research is an organic exercise which involves “gathering, processing and interpreting data. It also means intelligently and cogently communicating the results in a report that describes what was discovered from the research.” 11 The core position in research is occupied by methodology which is the most important phase in the conduct of research. It explains the various tools and techniques employed for the data collection, its analyses and interpretation for the purpose of drawing some result. It is the nature of the study problem, the relevant study variables and resources available that determine ______11. David E. McNabb, Research Methods for Political Science. (New Delhi: Princeton Hall, 2005),3

the particular method chosen.

Pakistan and Afghanistan relations are rooted in history. Areas which now constitute Pakistan were once part of the Indian subcontinent with which Afghanistan had historical, cultural and religious connections before the partition of the subcontinent. The trajectory of their relations in the wake of the creation of Pakistan in August 1947 should have represented continuation of old ties but the issues of the Durand Line and Pashtunistan marred the expected propitious beginning of their ties. Secondly, foreign policies are a complicated domain of international politics, and per se cannot be comprehended by applying a single paradigm.

Since information relating to post-Daoud period is still unfolding, there is a need of constantly keeping it abreast with the new revelations. This shortcoming can be overcome by presenting the study in a historical perspective. A group of experts on International Relations advocates the study of world politics in the context of historical methodology arguing that constant unfolding of information dynamics necessitates variations in paradigm. It has been observed that the use of historical method provides “scholars an opportunity to analyze the particular characteristics of state. Likewise, as observed by Max Weber, we can more readily ascertain the main factors of an event from infinity of causal factors’ involved.” 12

The process of learning and understanding the background of a chosen field offers insight into its growth, current trends and possible future scenarios.”Tthe process of critically examining and analyzing the records and survivals of the past is called historical method.” 13 It involves not merely recording or description of past events but entails interpretation and analyses in order to draw a conclusion regarding past ______12. Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan. (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005), 3. 13. Louis, L. Gottschalk, Understanding History, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951):

accounts or predict future direction of events. Political Science research is generally regarded to be applied because it is concerned with either solving practical problems or to help researchers, politicians and administrators to understand past behavior so that they may be able to predict future behavior. Thus, the historical approach is “a means of understanding and assessing the past, historically determined significance of political theories and their present role.”14

Researchers use different layers of sources when they carry out historical research. In line of the practice the present research has been conducted using primary and other evidence such as secondary and tertiary sources. However, technological innovations have opened up a new vista for gaining access to stored data i.e., online documentaries. They are an invaluable source of information because they often contain views of those who were part of the event when it was actually taking place. Therefore, this may be regarded as a very viable source of information.

The primary purpose of historical research is to help a researcher to find out a viable solution to a contemporary problem which traces its origin in the past. This poses another, apart from collecting authentic data, critical challenge for a researcher, i.e. the interpretation of the selected data. The issue becomes complex because the event has already happened and various accounts, often conflictive, are available. A researcher is expected to exercise caution, imagination, ingenuity, insight and scholarliness if the period under study is remote and the record available is sketchy. However, the present research relates to a period which is not too distant in history; and, secondly, some persons who were very much part of the period at some stage were available for oral testimony. Still, the interpretation exercise has been done as objectively as possible.

Primary data drawn from oral testimonies have been used to explain the nature of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the post-Daoud period and its strategic implications ______14. McNabb, Research Methods for Political Science ,372

for Pakistan. There is no doubt that the oral testimony may be susceptible to political affiliations, cultural inclinations and prejudices and ethical issues; therefore, they have been cross-examined and supplemented by documentary sources such as books, newspapers articles, research journal articles and online documentaries. Secondly, the tenor of the work is descriptive; Rizwan Hussain has relied upon the historical methodology in a descriptive way in his work ‘Pakistan and the emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan’ to prove that security concerns were the primary drivers which shaped Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan in the post-1947 period. However, the present descriptive research is different in the sense that it has been precedely supplemented by theorization of decisions by applying variations of realism (Pragmatic Realism 2.2.1 or Strategic Realism 3.3) or offering alternate explanation or stretching explanation(See: See Precedent Literature Review)

1.13. Research Questions

A topic is a starting point and researchers refine and narrow it into questions which are called research questions. A research question may be defined ‘a statement that helps in the identification of the subject to be studied.” Its significance can be gauged from the fact that research projects are designed around research questions as they focus the study and determine the methodology and guide all the stages of the study. The following research questions have been designed for the current study: What was the nature of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations during the post-Daud period? Why did Pakistan opt to be a frontline state against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan? Why did Pakistan prefer Islamists, fundamentalists as well as moderates, to nationalists during the Afghan jihad ? Why did Pakistan fail to capitalize the post-withdrawal situation to its advantage? What had been the nature of Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan during the Taliban regime? 17

Why did Pakistan dump the Taliban regime in the wake of 9/11?

1.14. Sources

Research projects are based upon sources. A source may be defined ‘from which something originates.’ Sources can be divided into two categories: primary sources and secondary sources.

1.14.1. Primary Sources Some research projects are required to be supported by primary sources. A primary source may be defined ‘a source which provides a firsthand or direct knowledge of the event’ or ‘first hand evidence left behind by participants or observers at the time of the event.’ The primary source is very significant as it affords a researcher an opportunity to go to the bottom and collect information, analyze it and construct a reliable and wider picture of the event. It consists of historical and legal documents, results of experiments, eye-witness accounts, interviews, fieldwork and surveys. The following primary source has been used in the study:

1.14.2. Interview One of the primary sources in research, an interview may be defined as a “short-term, social interaction between two strangers with the explicit purpose of one person’s obtaining specific information from the other.” 15 The following persons had been interviewed during the research: Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali, former Foreign Minister of Pakistan (1993-1996) Shamshaad Ahmad Khan, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan (1997-2001) Aziz Ahmad Khan, former Pakistan Ambassador to Afghanistan. (1998-2002) .______15. W. Lawrence Neumann, Social Research Mathods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (Whitewater: University of Wisconsin), 254

Rahimullah Yususufzai, journalist and eminent writer on Pakistan-Afghanistan relations 18

Rustum Ali Shah Mohmund, former Commissioner of Directorate of Afghan Refugees and renowned expert on Pakistan-Afghanistan affairs. (1980-1986) Ahmad Rashid, a renowned journalist and expert on Central Asian affairs. Author of a book “Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia.” Dr. Sartfraz Ahmad Khan, Director Area Study Center, University of Peshawar. (1999- 2005) Rasul Buksh Rais, Political Science academician and a commentator on Pakistan- Afghanistan relations. Author of a book “War without Winners: Afghanistan’s uncertain Future.” Dr. Farooq Hasnat, former Head of Political Science Department, Punjab University, Lahore and currently academician at Foreman Christian College University, Lahore. Ishtiaq Ahmad, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Stockholm University and visiting Professor at Government College University, Lahore, Pakistan. Author of the book “Pakistan: The Garrison State: Origins, Evolution, Consequences 1947-2011.” Raja Anwar. He was a left-leaning intellectual who went to Afghanistan after the Saur Revolution but had been interned; later on, he was released and wrote a book ‘The Tragedy of Afghanistan: A First Hand Account.’ Dr. Ilyas Ahmad Chattha, Research Fellow, University of Southampton, UK. Colonel Taufiq Jillani, former Officer of Inter-Servis Intelligence. (1980-1986)

An interview may be structured, semi-structured and unstructured. In structured interviews, questions to be asked are framed before the interview. Where an interviewer prepares a guide but during the course of conversation follows topical trajectory, it is termed as semi-structured interview. And where an interviewer and a respondent engage in a formal talk and both know that it is an interview, it is called unstructured interview. One of the characteristics is that questions are open-ended. For the present research exercise, all three forms have been used for gleaning material because the topic requires personal insight of those who were either part of the event or were close observers. However, the following questions formed the seminal set:

1. What was the nature of Paki-Afghan relations 1947-1978? 19

2. How did cataclysmic developments affect Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan? 3. Why did Pakistan opt to be a frontline state? 4. Why did Pakistan fail to consolidate gains of the Afghan jihad and streamline its awry relations with Afghanistan? 5. How far Pakistan’s policy in the post-dismemberment of the Soviet Union contributed to the slide of Afghanistan to civil war? 6. To what extent the idea of ‘strategic depth’ workable? 7. Pakistan’s diplomatic and political support to the Taliban government (1996-2001) stabilizes Afghanistan though but it engendered apprehensive environment in the region?

1.14.3. Secondary Sources They are the most widely used way for data collection. Secondary sources are the one that was created later by someone who did not experience first-hand or participate in the events. They are the accounts of the past recorded by people writing about events after they happened. They describe, discuss, interpret, comment upon, analyze, evaluate, summarize, and process primary sources Secondary source materials can be articles in newspapers or popular magazines, book or movie reviews, or articles found in scholarly journals that discuss or evaluate someone else's original research. Secondary sources of research are easily accessible and cost low.

The following libraries had been visited for the collection of secondary material: 1. The Quaid-a-Azam Library, Jinnah Garden Lahore. 2. Dar-us-Salam Library, Jinnah Garden, Lahore. 3. Punjab Public Library, Lahore. 4. Dyal Singh Trust Library, Lahore. 5. Government College University Library, Lahore. 6. Main Library, Punjab University, New Campus, Lahore. 7. Post Graduate Library, Government Dyal Singh College, Lahore.

8. Main Library, Government Angelo Oriental (MAO) College, Lahore. 20

1.14.4. Books

Books are a principal secondary source for research. They may be divided into two broad categories: core books which are authored by principal and observatory participants and they provide direct but not firsthand information. The second category of books are authored by those who later on collect facts and analyze them and present more broadened phenomenon under study. A large number of books have been written on Pakistan-Afghanistan relations since their inception; and they have provided invaluable material for the present research but still there are certain areas in their relations which need to be explored.

1.14.4.1. Precedent Literature Review A literature review is an essential and one of the first steps in any research project and its foundation is built on the dedication of previous researchers. It may be defined a process by which a researcher acquaints himself with “the reported findings of other researchers.” It is based on the assumption that knowledge accumulates and that one learns and builds on what others have done. A researcher not only intends to plug gaps, both principal and auxiliary which exist in the available literature but also discusses, elaborates and provides alternate debates. The present work has been produced by relying upon highly invaluable existing work and is aimed at filling in the principal gap, i.e. why did Pakistan fail to capitalize on the goodwill that it had earned during the Afghan jihad and what were its strategic implications for Pakistan? Filling of the auxiliary gaps, mentioned in the following works, serve to present the work in a more comprehensive manner.

Burke’s work ‘ Pakistan Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis ’(1973) is the first comprehensive account of the development of Pakistan’s foreign policy starting from its independence and leading up to 1972. The book provides a scholarly evaluation of

issues faced by Pakistan in its formative phase. His at length reference to Pakistan’s early relations with Afghanistan and historical analyses of contentious issues which formed the bottleneck in the formulation of friendly ties form the background context for the present research. However, the work contains one conspicuous auxiliary gap: He has not touched upon why Afghanistan raised the issue at a time when Pakistan was facing heap of partition problems. Khurshid Hassan in his article “ Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations,” but the research gives alternate point of view to fill in the gap.(See 2.03 p:40-)

Hussain’s book ‘ Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan ’ (2005) is a compendium of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. He traces and attributes the rise of militancy in contemporary Afghanistan to Pakistan’s security concerns after the British departure from the subcontinent. The work contains accounts which help to understand the dynamics of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the focal period. The author has touched the theme of reforms introduced by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) but it is rather fleeting. Beverly Male too has discussed the reforms (Revolutionary Afghanistan: A Reappraisal ,) but the analysis is limited to Afghan perspective. They should have been discussed because they were critical in influencing Pakistan’s policy towards revolutionary Afghanistan. This theme has been elaborated in Part Two of the Chapter Two.(See 2.13)

Hammond’s argues in the first part of his book ‘ Red Flag over Afghanistan : The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences ’ (1984) that it was Washington’s reluctance to fill in the vacuum produced due to departure of Britain from subcontinent in 1947 and limiting itself to ensuring political independence of Afghanistan which provided Moscow the opportunity to increase its influence in Afghanistan. The work is relevant as it provides insight how the United States viewed Afghanistan in its South Asia policy at the height of Cold War. However, gap exists in his work as he does evaluate how far United States relations with Pakistan affected its policy towards

Afghanistan. The issue of close Pak-US relations in the Cold War era and its impact on Washington-Kabul ties is very vital from the point of the present research and has been discussed in Part One of the Chapter Two.(See 2.2.4, p.37)

Kizilbzsh’s work ‘ Pakistan’s Security and Foreign Policy’ (Year) is a collection of selected speeches and articles by Agha Shahi, former Advisor to military regime of Zia- ul-Haq. The book consists of two parts; however, it is the first part which is important and relevant because it pertains to articles which provide insight into the internal thinking of Pakistan towards developments in Afghanistan in December 1979. However, the author has nowhere pointed why Pakistan decided to opt for a ‘frontline state’ status because it was this decision which, first, made Pakistan earned the position of key player in Afghan affairs; secondly, it hugely impacted Pakistan-Afghanistan relations not only during the Afghan jihad but also subsequently. This point has been elaborated in the Chapter Three. (See 3.24.1)

Yousaf and Adkin’s work ‘ The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story’ (1992) is a compelling account of Pakistan’s role as a ‘conduit state’ that controlled and facilitated the funneling of foreign assistance to Afghan Mujhaideen engaged in resisting the Soviets. The authors though seem to have focused on why Islamabad preferred Islamists over Afghan nationalists and royalists in the initial phase of the Afghan jihad. But they appear to have missed the issue that how far the policy was a hindering factor in the realization of Pakistan’s post-withdrawal objectives. Likewise, Matinuddin’s book ‘Power Struggle in the Hindu Kush: Afghanistan (1978-1991), otherwise an invaluable work on the research topic, makes no mention why Islamabad favored Hekmatyar, a fundamentalist Islamist, over all other religious leaders waging resistance against Soviet presence. Though Sandy Gall has provided answer in his book ‘ War against the Taliban: Why it all went wrong in Afghanistan ” but Matinuddin’s explanation would have carried more weight. The present research discusses the first issue and provides alternate opinion as far as special favor to Hekmatyar was concerned. (See 4.11.2)

Khan’s work ‘ Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance’ is a definitive account of events that had overtaken Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The work is relevant to the present research as the author on account of his being privy to developments mentions instances which furnish fresh perspective: for example, General Zia believed that the formation of government of national reconciliation necessary to prevent bloodshed in Afghanistan in the post-withdrawal period and surprisingly he was prepared to issue a statement for the stay of Soviet forces till its formation. However, Khan gives little explanation how far Pakistan’s policy of having a government of its own choice contributed to Afghanistan’s slide to civil war. This point is vital because what Pakistan failed to achieve after 1989 it could have achieved. Therefore, this aspect has been discussed at length in Chapter Four. Likewise, his second work ‘ Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal’ provides a detailed account of the negotiation process initiated soon after the Soviet military march inti Afghanistan and climaxed in the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1988. However, Khan makes no mention as to why the Accords could not be built upon by Pakistan and Afghanistan to improve their relations. The issue has been evaluated in Chapter Three.(See 3.28.7)

Murshed’s book ‘Afghanistan: The Taliban Years ,’ a core book provides insight into the thinking pattern of Afghan leadership and Afghanistan’s neighbors, particularly of Iran, as well as that of Russia, the United States and the United Nations. The work is relevant in so far as it furnishes detail of the nature and extent of Pakistan’s efforts for the resolution of the Afghan crisis. He touches upon the issue of Pakistan’s influence on the Taliban government which he believes was more apparent than real; this issue of ‘more apparent than real’ needs further explanation and evaluation because it is critically related to Pakistan’s policy of U-turn in the wake of 9/11 episode. (See 4.20.2.)

Rashid’s book ‘ Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia’ is regarded an authoritative account on the Taliban movement which chronicles their origin, rise to power, and discusses their social background, ideological world view and

their modus operandi. The significant and relevant aspect of the work is that it contains references how Islamabad was labeled in the rise of the Taliban but more important was that how Pakistan channelized them financial and logistical assistance so that they could be sustained in power. However, there is one perceptible issue which seems to have been left unanswered by the author: Why regional stakeholders in Afghanistan, apart from Turkmenistan, not engaged Taliban Afghanistan very early so that they could be moderated in their views and style of governance? This theme has been explored in the Fourth Chapter.(See 4.20.)

Musharaf’s work ‘ In the Line of Fire: A Memoir ,’ is the foremost core book on one of the aspects of the present research. The most important and relevant aspect was the U-turn decision he had to make soon after the 9/11. Pakistan orchestrated the rise and sustenance of the Taliban regime in order to achieve its strategic and economic objective and it was very difficult for Islamabad to dump their strategic ally. This is where his work is revealing, that is, how Islamabad initially viewed the post-9/11 situation, what were the considerations that had influenced his decision to join America in its ‘war on terror.’ However, his policy of dumping the Taliban after 9/11 begs more explanation because of the state of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations today. Abdul Sattar, who was Foreign Minister of Pakistan at the time, has discussed considerations which influenced Pakistan’s U-turn decisions but ignored to analyze the fall out of the policy in the context of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in his book ‘ Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2009: Concise History’ written in 2010. This point has been discussed at the end of the Fourth Chapter (Point 4.21.4).

1.14.5. Scholarly Journals Scholarly journals may be described as an anthology of articles written by experts in academia and professional fields. They are meant to perform two functions: they help to find out what has been written or researched on the topic hitherto; and, secondly, they contain bibliographies which may be used for finding out other relevant sources of information.

A number of journals had been consulted but the following were mostly relied upon: 1. Asian Survey, University of California, Press. 2. Regional Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan. 3. Pakistan Horizon, flagship quarterly journal of Pakistan Institute of International Affairs. 4. Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan. 5. Adelphi Papers, International Institute for Strategic Studies.

1.14.6. Newspapers Newspaper articles form an important source of research information. They can be used for primary or secondary means for historical and current events. They also contain commentaries or retrospective articles about events. When experts of a field contribute them they become a valuable tool for research. The following newspapers had been mostly relied upon during the research:

1. The Dawn, Lahore and Karachi. 2. The Frontier Post, Lahore. 3. The Muslim, Islamabad. 4. The Nation, Lahore. 5. The News, Lahore. Frontier Post, Lahore. 6. The Pakistan Times, Lahore.

1.14.7. Online Documentaries Online documentaries are relatively modern means of research reference. Though they provide information retrospective or after the incident by piecing together live images and comments on them by experts, still their research value is immense. Often they are characterized by appearance of those who were either part of the event, or who influenced the trajectory. Their views provide invaluable firsthand information because

those who matter themselves reveal their mind. The following documentaries had been watched: 1. Cold War: Soldiers of God 1977-1988.(CNN Documentary, 2015) 2. Afghanistan: The Squandered Victory: 1989 (BBC Documentary, 1989)

1.15. Theoretical Framework

Theoretical framework provides conceptual understanding of the approach of decision- makers towards an event regarding which they have to make a decision. Foreign policy is a complex phenomenon associated with state’s business. The indispensable factor which determines the trajectory of a state’s external relations is the protection and furtherance of its national interests. It is the process of permutation and correlation of forces which determines how a state pursues its interests. This entails ‘no eternal friend, no eternal enemy’ syndrome. Therefore, there can be no single framework to evaluate its specific response to an international event that has direct bearings on its national interests. Besides, it is the context how a state comes into existence and how its neighbors react to it are significantly instrumental in shaping the corpus of its foreign policy.

Pakistan’s troubled ties with two of its neighbors, India and Afghanistan, have been a defining factor in the evolution of its foreign policy tenor. The response of India, aggressive and many times powerful country, to Pakistan’s creation in August 1947 and, later on, developing a host of territorial and other disputes between the two countries formed the basis of Pakistan’s foreign policy. On the northwestern side, Pakistan’s unstable relationship with Afghanistan due to latter’s contesting of international border status of the Durand Line and irredentist claim on certain Pashtun areas situated on the Pakistan side added to its security worries. The situation produced two corollaries: its foreign policy makers were obliged to give primacy to security concerns in the matrix of external relations. And, secondly, it allowed the defense establishment to play an overriding role in the internal and external politics of the

country. This is pivotal to understanding Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the focal period in the context of changes that had taken place across the Durand Line.

Given the nature of threats which Pakistan believed it was facing at the beginning of its existence, its pursuit of focusing on realism in its foreign relations was understandable. The study has been conducted in the broad framework of political realism which centers upon the principle that survival is principal goal of every state. In a world characterized anarchical environment seeking of power by states is logical. This requires that they constantly make certain the availability of sufficient effective power to defend them and ensure their material interests necessary for survival. Classical realists believed that the internal characteristics of a state had more impact on the trajectory of the state’s foreign policy.

However, the evolution of the state system and the progressive integration of international politics gave birth to a new approach to explaining the behavior of the state within the broad confines of political realism, i.e. neo-realism. Unlike classical realists, neo-realists advocate the view that the system of relative distribution of power at the international level more impacts the behavior of the state. They “regard the state as a ‘black box’ and as such pays scant attention to what is in the ‘black box.’ The nature of the state is less important as the structure compels it to act in certain ways. Thus, the structure determines the actions of the state.” But Pakistan pursued defensive Realism which stresses upon a stable balance of power system where a practical equal distribution of power among states ensure that no state will take risk attacking others. Polarity, i.e. the distribution of power is the central concept in defensive Realism.

But it has already been pointed to in the previous lines, that there can be no single paradigm which fully explains a state’s response to international developments. Sometimes a specific reaction lends itself to be interpreted by application of more than one theory. That is why, critical variation in classical political realism better explains the behavior of states like Pakistan and Afghanistan. Constructivism which regards the 28

social world a human construction and accordingly gives importance to cultural and institutional bearing on states’ behavior is a gap-filling approach.

Proponents of Constructivism contend that domestic sources like elite beliefs, collective norms and social identities do have an impact on the foreign policy of a state. Experts like Edawrd Azar and Chung-in Moon contend that “Domestic factors such as legitimacy, integration, ideology, and power capacity play an equally important role in shaping the national security posture. Security challenges in many parts of the Third World are of endogenous rather than exogenous origin.” 16 The above observation explicitly explains Pakistan’s participation as a ‘frontline’ state in the US sponsored alliance to thwart the Soviet advance and contain it inasmuch as the military regime was internally weak and internationally a pharaoh. By aligning with the United States, the military regime of Zia ul Haq not only managed to revitalize its relations with Washington but also secured international recognition. Endogenously the government by backing the domestic Islamic groups gained a prop up in its unpopular image.

1.16. Reference Style

Referencing is a key to any successful research. It may be defined as ‘a standardized method which a researcher uses regarding citation of others information.’ It is important in two ways: first, it serves a means to cite the source and facilitate a reader to trace it. Secondly, it is a way of acknowledging others work on the related field. As per direction of the Department of Political Science, Government University Lahore, Humanities Citation form for references as specified in The Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition).

______16. Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence, 7

1.17. Organization of the Work

Organization of the work represents its division into different but symbiotic parts, that is, chapters which deal with a different but inter-related issue. The present dissertation has been divided into six chapters.

1.17.1. Chapter Two: The Saur Revolution of 1978 and Changes in Afghanistan.

It has been divided into two parts: the first portion deals with historical factors which became the underlying causes of the developments that had overwhelmed Afghanistan in the second half of 1970s, i.e. Saur Revolution and Soviet military entry into Afghanistan. The second part begins with the focal period and deals with the nature of changes and how Islamabad viewed their likely impact, especially the Moscow related, on its security.

1.17.2. Chapter Three: Post-Daoud Period-Phase One.

Chapter Three along with the next chapter forms the corpus of the thesis. The chapter deals with the phase which may be regarded as an incubation period of ‘structural deficits’ that later on produced negative strategic implications for Pakistan. The chapter deals with, first, Pakistan’s relations with PDPA’s government, their nature and their impact on the subsequent fateful development. The second part of the chapters relates to causes of the Soviet move, USA’s reaction, options available to Pakistan and eventually its role as a ‘font line state’ and its impact on Islamabad- Kabul’s relations from 1979 to 1989, their relative position on the conflict and eventually Geneva Accords in 1988. .

1.17.3. Chapter Four: Post-Daoud Period-Phase Two.

Pakistan earned huge goodwill during the period of 1979-1989 but it was unable to capitalize it for restructuring its awry relations with Afghanistan due to ‘structural deficits’ which came to fore in the post-withdrawal period. The present chapter deals with the operational aspect of the ‘structural deficits,’ that is, how they came to affect Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan during the reign of President Rabbani and how Islamabad drifted towards isolation at the regional level in consequence of its support to the Taliban.

1.17.4. Chapter Five: Pakistan-Afghanistan-India.

The dynamic of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations cannot be evaluated without reference to Indian role in the paradigm of their ties right from 1947. India share historically diverse relationship with Afghanistan, therefore, New Delhi-Kabul nexus is significant in terms of their implications for Islamabad. The chapter Indian deals, briefly, with India efforts to build its ‘soft image’, its policy regarding Soviet step and its implications for Pakistan, from drawing down to zero-presence of its influence in Afghanistan.

1.17.5. Chapter Six: Strategic Implications for Pakistan.

Strategic Implications represent the climax of the buildup of the thesis. The post- withdrawal phase witnessed Pakistan’s emergence as a pivot upon whom depended, to a relatively complete extent, the installation of stable administration and restoration of peace in Afghanistan. The chapter set out Islamabad’s principal objectives in the phase and how it faltered in achieving them, and secondly, the reverse consequences it had to face of that fundamentalist ideology which it had, along with the United States, put into harness against the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan.

1.17.6. Conclusion and Recommendations.

Conclusion represents the finale of the dissertation. The concluding part deals with the nature of the two states and how it has come to affect their foreign policy outlook. Secondly, Political Science research is applied in the sense that it entails not only study of past behavior but also tend to offer political solutions. The second part of the chapter provides recommendations for affecting possible improvement in the future relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Chapter Two The Saur Revolution of 1978 and Changes in Afghanistan

Afghanistan witnessed cataclysmic political developments in the decade of 1970. The first upheaval took place in 1973 when Sardar Daoud, the erstwhile prime minister of Afghanistan (1953-1963) overthrew the monarchy of his cousin, King Zahir Shah (1933- 1973), and, having assumed the reign as president, declared the country a republic. The transformation was relatively bloodless as no more than four people had been killed. Unlike the first, the second change was gory: on 27 April 1978 the Saur Revolution overwhelmed the country when a section of Afghan Army’s officer corps staged a putsch, killed President Daoud, his family members and few confidantes and handed over the reign of government to the leadership of pro-Soviet People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. The new rulers of Afghanistan declared the country Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

What transpired on 27 April 1978 is often referred as a Socialist Revolution but it was not a classical socialist revolution from the Marxist point of view as it was imposed from the above in a revolutionary military uprising; though it had significant support in the urban areas of the country but it lacked strong roots in rural areas where vast majority of Afghans live. The change uprooted the traditional political framework in Afghanistan leading to chaos and bloodshed and served as the catalyst for decades of unrest and bloodshed. The development was significant in the sense that it represented the acme of Moscow’s influence, started in the decade of 1950, in Afghanistan, and made Pakistan uneasy because of its strategic implications.

2.1. The Pre-Saur Period (1947-1978)

The chapter is significant because it provides the historical context of the changes that had overwhelmed Afghanistan. It has been divided into two parts: the first portion posits that what climaxed on 27 April 1978 in Afghanistan in the form of Saur Revolution had

its genesis in the decade of 1950.The United States’ policy of, after the departure of British from the subcontinent, not adequately responding to Afghanistan’s early overtures and limiting its relations only to ensuring its political independence paved the way for broadening of cooperation, by default, between the erstwhile USSR and Afghanistan. This deepening of ties provided the defunct USSR an opportunity to increase its presence in Afghanistan, first, by extending economic cooperation, and, later on, by helping its southern neighbor in the modernization of traditional military. The section also contains an evaluation of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the period which was an important collateral development because progressive deterioration in the relationship of the two neighbors further pushed Afghanistan in the Soviet sphere.

The PDPA leadership wanted to restructure the traditional Afghan society and transformed the country into a modern socialist state. Having assumed power, they introduced initiatives to give effect to their ideals. The second part of the chapter surveys the changes that had overwhelmed Afghanistan in consequence of the Saur Revolution, their nature and their likely impact on Pakistan. They are vital to understanding the dynamics of Islamabad-Kabul relations in the focal period because the two neighbors are so linked that Islamabad cannot remain insulated from developments in the Kabul. Besides, as already mentioned in the introduction, the historical direction of changes in Afghanistan has invariably been towards areas that now form part of Pakistan. The latter believed that changes once institutionally stabilized would pose a challenge to its status quo oriented state framework. That is why, it exhibited uneasiness in response to 1978 and 1979 developments and develop coordination with the anti-Revolution forces in order to reverse the tide of the Revolution.

2.2. Afghanistan and the United States after the British Departure The withdrawal of the British from the subcontinent in August 1947 by dividing it into two asymmetrical states, India and Pakistan, ended the pattern established in the wake of the signing of the Durand Line Agreement in 1893. Two significant implications flowed from the Agreement: first, Afghanistan assumed the status of a ‘buffer state’* between the Czarist Russia and the British India. Secondly, Afghanistan found a balancer in its relations with its northern neighbor. After the departure of the British, Kabul lost the vital support and became devoid of the cushion of the balance in its relationship with the Soviet Union.

In view of the changed circumstances, Afghanistan had two options before it: either to accept the new situation as a fiat accompli and adjust its policy to objective circumstances or seek a new balancer so as to continue its policy of balancing the Soviets. It was the Cold War context characterized by division of the world into two opposing blocs, the Soviet and the American, which influenced Afghan leadership’s eventual decision to go for a new balancer. The ruling elite in Kabul had formulated three foreign policy objectives in the context of new environment: “firstly, securing of alternative transit routes, the second was broadening of international support for Afghanistan’s position in its conflict with Pakistan. And finally, strengthening and modernizing of army.” 1 ______*A buffer state is a mutually agreed upon area lying between two great powers, which is demilitarized in the sense of not hosting the military of either power. In other words, a buffer state is created by two powers as means of defence against each other. Afghanistan owed its existence as a ‘buffer state’ to rivalry between Czarist Russian imperialism and British imperialism during the nineteenth century when the Russian forces advanced deep into Central Asia and British in India felt that the attack on its subcontinental territories from the north was imminent. But, as the circumstances would have it, the Russian military progress halted due to its engagement in other directions towards Europe and Far East. However, British made sure the defence of its vulnerable North-West Frontier of India by the creation of the ‘buffer state’ of Afghanistan.

1. Abdus S. Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider’s Account (Virginia: Pergamon- Brassey’s,1988),74.

The Afghan ruling elite regarded the United States as the logical successor to Britain in South Asia and wanted Washington to fill in the vacuum. However, implicit in the belief was the desire to help Afghanistan in the realization of aforementioned objectives. Shah Mohammad, the Prime Minister of Afghanistan, observed that “he was convinced that the United States could guarantee his country’s security.” 2Kabul’s fervent desire for strengthening its relations with Washington was motivated “to involve the United States in Afghanistan’s economic development but also more importantly, to

obtain U.S. support for the safeguarding of Afghanistan’s political independence.” 3

2.2.1. United States’ Response-Pragmatic Realism

The United States response to Afghan overtures was not encouraging because of its exercise of ‘pragmatic realism’ towards the area of Southwest Asia which demanded Washington ‘not to over-commit itself to Afghanistan.’ Pragmatic realism’ implies that a state’s external relations are governed by principles which are not static in terms of priority; rather, they are subject to permutation depending upon another state can be of helpful in achieving national objectives. That is why, sometimes political relations take precedence of economic but at times its economic interests dictate external ties. Another equally important factor is the cost-benefit analyses of engaging a particular country in the realization of objectives.

Explaining the basis of the ‘pragmatic realism’ American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, believed that given Afghanistan’s “location and poor communications, an enormous logistics effort would have had to be undertaken by the U.S. where the risk of escalating the Cold War would have been high.” 4 At the most, it ______2. Joseph J. Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: A Study in the Use of Force in Soviet Foreign Policy (Massachusetts: Lexington, 1986),18. 3. Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan , 74.

4. R.G.Neumann, “Afghanistan under the Red Flag,” in The Impact of Iranian Events upon Persian Gulf, ed. M.Z. Szaz (Washington D.C.: American Foreign Policy Institute, 1979), 130.

wanted a politically neutral Afghanistan. Therefore, in pursuance of this policy, it adopted a measured approach of limiting itself to extending economic assistance to Kabul. And, as a matter of fact, it did provide modest economic help to Afghanistan under Truman’s Four Point Program. Thus, Washington’s “response to Afghan overtures for political support in pursuit of the Pashtunistan was negligible, and for military assistance utterly negative.” 5

2.2.2. Drivers of American Policy towards Afghanistan

There were, however, three drivers which had influenced the United States early policy of short shrift to Afghanistan: the first was Washington’s implicit admission that Kabul fell within the Soviet sphere. Washington’s policy during the period “recognized tacitly that the Soviet Union had a legitimate interest in stability along its southern border, while US interest was of lesser degree, that is, to help Afghans protect their independence.” 6 Besides, it was Afghanistan’s landlocked position which “had made the United States and its allies accept its tilt towards the Soviet Union during King Zahir Shah’s era.” 7In view of the facts, America apprehended that responding to Afghan requests for military aid in any form could have resulted in the compromise of its political independence. Besides, Washington feared that such a step might provoke Moscow to initiate some kind of move against Afghanistan. Washington primarily wanted Kabul as “neutral, independent, and not overcommitted to the Soviet bloc.” 8

______5. Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan , 76. 6. Thomas T. Hammond, Red Flag over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion and Consequences (Colorado: Westview, 1984),26. 7. Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison. Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal (New York: Oxford, 1995), 15. 8. Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan , 20.

2.2.3. Afghanistan’s Marginal Relevancy to American Interests

The second disincentive that had prohibited the United States from going all out to reciprocate Afghanistan’s friendship gestures was Kabul’s marginal or no immediate importance to its interests. Hammond (1984) writes:

“For the United States, Afghanistan has at the present limited direct interest; it is not an important trading partner; it is not an access route for US trade with others; it is not presently …a source of oil or scarce strategic metals;…there are no treaty ties or defense commitments; and Afghanistan does not provide us with significant defense, intelligence, or scientific facilities…However, Afghanistan has important interests for us which have in large part derived from its strategic location between Central Asia and the Indian

subcontinent.” 9

2.2.4. Unites States’ Special Relations with Pakistan

The third disincentive for the United States was its special relations with Pakistan, an important plank of Washington’s policy during the Cold War. They are cited as the principal explanation of American eschewing of developing a ‘dominant influence’ in Afghanistan. Initially, the United States wanted Indian cooperation in containing communism but only after New Delhi’s nonalignment embrace then Washington realized Pakistan’s strategic value for maintaining a “desirable balance of power in South Asia has increased.” 10 It was Pakistan’s vital geo-strategic location which USA ______9. Hammond, Red Flag over Afghanistan , 26.

10. Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan (Burlington : Ashgate Publishing Company,2005),68.

desired to use for spy purposes “from where it could keep a check on the communist powers, China and the Soviet Union and also safeguard its oil interests in the Persian Gulf.” 11

In view of India’s policy of nonalignment, the United States had no alternative to rise to the imperatives of the Cold War but to overcommit itself and give precedence to its ‘special relations’ with Pakistan over all other considerations. It believed that “regardless of the legitimacy of the Afghan case, the United States could not afford to antagonize the Pakistanis by supporting calls for an independent Pashtunistan.” 12 Later on, America made it explicit during the Korean War in mid-1952 that it was going “to choose Pakistan as one of its trusted partners in its struggle to contain Communist expansion and was going to arm it accordingly.” 13 However, there was one instance when the United States did signal its intent to extend military assistance to Afghanistan provided Kabul joined the Baghdad Pact. But Prime Minister Daoud declined the offer because of “Pakistan’s presence in the Pact. Notwithstanding the fact that President Daoud was anti-communist, he decided to approach the Soviet Union for military

assistance.” 14

2.3. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations during the Cold War

Apart from the United States’ policy of not overcommitting itself in Afghanistan, progressive deterioration in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the 1950s due to Prime Minister Daoud’s (1953-1963) aggressive espousal of Pashtunistan issue was a vital catalyst to help the Soviet Union penetrate its influence in Afghanistan. Moscow took

advantage of the situation and wooed Kabul in its sphere of influence. The growing ______11. Leela Yadave, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Pakistan’s Relations with the United States,’ in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy , ed. Khalid Mahmood Arif (Lahore: Vanguard, 1984), 210. 12. Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective (California: Stanford University Press, 1981), 29. 13. Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan, 76. 14. Raja Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan: A First-Hand Account (London: Verso, 1988), 33.

closeness provided Pakistanis with an opening to exploit the strategic intimacy to their advantage by projecting “a menacing picture of Soviet influence in Afghanistan to bolster their own position as the first line of defence against Soviet expansion into South

Asia.” 15

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations had already taken slide due to Afghan government’s raising of the issue of Pashtunistan soon after the creation of Pakistan. It staked claim on Pashtun territories on Pakistan side “initially on the assumption that Pakistan would not survive as an independent state. In anticipation of such an eventuality, Kabul wished to establish its claim to certain areas which were desired for number of reasons.” 16 it seemed that the Afghan ruling elite had taken myopic view of the implications of the international system that had emerged after the World War II and Pakistan’s place in its context. Later on, though they had realized that Pakistan would come to stay and needed to adjust their policy accordingly but once committed to this position, it was difficult for the Afghan government to withdraw its claim. The exigencies of the domestic politics may have demanded that it continued to raise the issue.

There may have been number of underlying reasons for the Afghan ruling dynasty to continue to raise the issue and for one may have been as Behzan (2014) writes: “external ‘Aunt Sally’ to distract the attention of the educated classes from their internal dissatisfactions, and on the other hand the Pashtun propaganda though ostensibly directed to the Pashtuns in Pakistan, in fact helps to make the Afghan Pashtuns more tractable, and this without greater expenditure

in subsidies to the tribes.” 17 ______15. Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan between Military and Mullah (Lahore: Vanguard, 2005),162 16. Khurshid Hasan, “Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations”, Asian Survey 2, no. 7 (September, 1962):14-24 17. Faridullah Bezhan, “The Pashtunistan Issue and the Politics in Afghanistan,” The Middle East Journal 68, no.2 (Spring 2014): doi:10.1353/mej.2014.0037

The ‘Aunt Sally’ explanation may have some substance but there may be another reason of Afghanistan’s raising the Pashtunistan issue: It is a landlocked country and is dependent upon Pakistan for its transit-trade*. Kabul may have wanted to extract trade and route concessions from Pakistan because it is reported that Sardar Najibullah Khan demanded, while on his official visit to Pakistan in November 1947 as a special envoy of Afghanistan’s ruler, that “Pakistan must give Afghanistan access to the sea either by creation of an Afghan corridor in West Baluchistan or by allotting a free Afghan Zone in Karachi.” 18

2.3.1. The Decade of 1950s

In the decade of 1950, Pakistan and Afghanistan relations were touching the nadir point due to happening of inimical events on the Durand Line. They climaxed, first, in the closure of the transit-trade access to Afghanistan by Pakistan and, later on, breakdown in their diplomatic relations. In one of the incidents an irregular Afghan tribal band “led by the Pashtun leader Wali Khan Afridi, crossed the Durand Line in 1950 and 1951 with the avowed intention of flying ‘ Pashtunistan ’ flag on the Indus River. Pakistan protested, and the first blockade of Afghan in- transit goods occurred.” 19 The severance in diplomatic ties took place when Pakistan’s regular troops clashed Afghan troops and tribesmen who crossed the Durand Line to “assist federatory prince, the Khan of Bajaur against his rival.” 20 Consequently, ambassadors were recalled and Karachi once again resorted to closure of its sea ports to Kabul. By putting freeze on transit-trade facilities to Afghanistan, Pakistan’s ostensible intention may have been to snub Kabul for its overarching misdemeanors across the Durand Line. But Afghanistan, feeling itself spatially handicapped, had no choice but to ______*Afghanistan is a landlocked country and uses Pakistan’s ports for external trade. Under the provisions of the United Nation’s Conventions and Article 5 of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), Pakistan has been providing to Afghanistan the facilities of the transit trade since its existence in 1947.

18. S.M. Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1973) 73. 19. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,1973), 493. 20. Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence , 72. 41

look for alternate trade outlets that would reduce her economic dependence on Pakistan. She had two options: use Iranian port traversing eastern Afghanistan or approach its northern neighbor for transit-trade. But “transport through eastern Afghanistan was extremely poor, so the only alternative outlet was Soviet Central Asia.” 21 Pakistan’s policy may be described a subtle retaliatory leverage which it calculatedly exploited by projecting Afghan-Soviet closeness an ominous development, and thus raised the United States’ stakes in its ‘special relationship’ with Pakistan. But, in the long run, Afghanistan’s quest for ‘alternate route’ strengthened and deepened its ties with USSR.

2.3.2. The Interregnum 1963 to 1973-Détente Period

The interregnum, i.e. the period from Daoud’s resignation in 1963 to his second coming to power in 1973 was regarded as a period of détente between the two neighbors as they sought to streamline their relations. It was significant due to two reasons: first, the contentious issue did remain on the agenda but it was no longer the central plank of Afghanistan’s policy for nearly a decade and was characterized by beginning of softening of Afghanistan’s aggressive Pashtunistan policy as was evident from the statement made by the new Premier that “Afghanistan will continue to support the demand of Pashtunistan in a peaceful manner.” 22 Consequently, the Afghan government began to view Pakistan in a corrective context as was evident from King Zahir Shah’s state visit to Pakistan in 1968 where he was accorded a warm welcome. But the most significant development which further improved the trajectory of their ties

______21. Banett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (Michigan: Book Crafter, 1995), 64. 22. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Policy toward Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan: The Dynamics of Influence (New York: Praegor, 1982), 132.

was the initiative taken by Islamabad when it decided to disband the ‘One Unit’* in 1970.

Secondly, Pakistan fought two wars against its arch enemy, India, during the period in 1965 and 1971 respectively. Given the state of their relations in the 1950s, Afghanistan could have exploited the situation to its advantage but not once did it make any attempt to create stirrings along the Durand line to put Pakistan in a precarious situation. Instead Afghanistan opted to exercise ‘benign neutrality.’ Afghanistan’s ‘benign neutrality’ may be attributed to external and internal factors. Internally nationalists like Daoud had been marginalized and out of power since 1963. Therefore, they were not in a position to influence Afghanistan’s ‘masterly inactivity.’ Had Daoud and his ilk been in power, it could have been expected that Kabul’s policy would have been different. However, Kabul’s refraining of any military adventure seemed to have been more the result of external factors. The changed regional situation on account of adrift in Sino-Soviet relations during the decade lent uncertainty to the political ambience. The Soviet Union was so apprehensive that it wanted stability on its Central Asian borders, and did not favor any likely situation which had the potential to upset the balance prevailed in its Central region because the imbalance might have benefited China. Therefore, it “made known its opposition to any Afghan moves against the beleaguered Pakistanis. The Soviets wanted a stability of the status quo rather than the uncertainty inherent in a possible breakup of Pakistan.” 23

2.3.3. Afghanistan from Monarchy to Presidential System

The erstwhile Afghan prime minister, Mohammed Daoud Khan, successfully mounted putsch for his second coming to power in a bloodless coup in 1973 and overthrew ______* The One Unit was a geopolitical device of the government of Pakistan in 1954 to merge provinces of West Pakistan into a single geographical unit. The purpose of the step was to counterbalance the political and demographic domination of the Bangali population of East Pakistan which was separated from the western part by one thousand miles. It was disbanded in 1970 by the government of General Yahya Khan. The arrangement was resisted inside the country, and outside by Afghanistan who was contesting the Pashtun areas of Pakistan.

23. Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan , 27. 43

monarchy, a symbol of authority and a rallying point for ethnically diverse Afghans. His action was so complete that there was practically no resistance from any quarter, especially the Royalists. The decisive factor was that President Daoud had the support of the Afghan Army. In a country like Afghanistan where society is heterogeneous and traditional ethnic groups serve a bridge between the state and the people, the loyalty of the army, organized on national basis, is fraught with deeper implications. It has two purposes to serve: first, it provides a bulwark against coup succeeding coup and, secondly, to assist, if necessary, in the implementation of reform program.

Notwithstanding the fact that Daoud enjoyed the support of the Afghan Army, it was the combination of domestic disquiet on economic issues and tinkering with the Afghan foreign policy which alienated the influential segments of Afghan society from the King. The estrangement provided Daoud with an opening to capitalize on the situation to his advantage: He was a fervent nationalist who was of the view that “the King had betrayed Afghan interests by agreeing to a treaty giving Iran the extensive access to the waters of the Helmand River, especially during a period of giving Iran the extensive access to the waters of the Helmand River, especially during a prolonged drought in Afghanistan.” 24 On the foreign policy front, the reason that had prompted Daoud to seize power in 1973 was “the fear that the Afghan government, to its detriment, had become too pro-American.” 25 Ironically Daoud was asked to resign in 1963 because he had moved Afghanistan away from its traditional nonalignment and committed to Soviet bloc; ten years later, the King was unseated because he was perilously moving closer to the United States. The Pashtunistan issue had been a dominant factor in influencing the foreign and domestic policies of Afghanistan. Twice it played an important role in the power struggle within the Afghan royal family and on both occasions Daoud was the central figure. The young members of the family believed that the prime minister had little chance of ______24. Cordovez and Harrison. Out of Afghanistan, 14 25. Dupree, Afghanistan, 759

successfully carrying out the Pashtunistan policy and “the King’s cousin and defence minister, Daoud used it [ Pashtunistan issue ] against his uncle, Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan, the prime minister.” 26 In 1973, Daoud was again at the center stage of things and staged a hard putsch exploiting “the Pashtun majority’s dissatisfaction with the King’s failure to retaliate against Islamabad for its repression of Pashtun and Baluch ethnic minorities in Pakistan.” 27

2.3.4. President Daoud and Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations

Daoud’s second tenure as a President of Afghanistan ushered in another phase of ‘accelerated deterioration’ in the ties of Pakistan and Afghanistan; however, it was short and relatively less turbulent than the first phase of Daoud’s premiership. No sooner had Daoud assumed power than he issued a stiff statement pointing that “relations with Pakistan were subject to the peaceful and honorable solution to the problem (Pakhtunistan) in accordance with the hopes and aspirations of the Pashtun and Baluch people and their leaders.” 28 His statement was significant because he had, by including Baluchistan in the list of conflicting issues between the two countries, widened the spectrum of already complex issues.

The turbulent phase was, however, ephemeral because Pakistan achieved a significant breakthrough in its hostile relations with Afghanistan in the mid-1970s when it managed to convince President Daoud that his antagonistic posture towards Pakistan was causing more harm to his government than good. This was due to shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy: Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the first elected prime minister of Pakistan, having assumed power undertook reorientation of country’s foreign policy from pro- Western poise to neutrality, and sought to improve relations with the Soviet Union. ______26. Bezhan, The Pashtunistan Issue and the Politics in Afghanistan ,199. 27. Cordovez and Harrison. Out of Afghanistan, 14.. 28. Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence, 78

Moscow, appreciative of the change, reciprocated the overture and initiated rapprochement with Islamabad.

Afghanistan had been banking on the political support of the Soviet Union for the issue of Pashtunistan, and when Moscow decided to respond to Pakistan’s overtures Daoud began to lose political support of the Moscow and his Pashtunistan policy began to flounder. Besides, the United States too impressed upon Daoud the necessity of improving relations with Pakistan. In November 1974, the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, visited Afghanistan, and in his “meetings with Daud stressed the need for a rapprochement between Kabul and Islamabad.” 29 Consequently, he started a reappraisal of Kabul’s foreign relations with its neighbors and conservative Arab countries and especially, with the People’s Republic of China. This revisiting resulted in new improvement in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.

2.3.5. New Denouement Phase

Subsequent to the beginning of a new friendly phase, the political leadership of both the countries undertook visits and reverse-visits which represented an external symbol of incremental progress in their relations. The Premier of Pakistan, Bhutto, visited Afghanistan in 1976 and held extensive negotiations with President Daoud on resolving differences between the two states. One meaningful aspect of Bhutto-Daoud parleys was shifting of emphasis by Afghan President from territorial issues to safeguarding the cultural and ethnic identity of the Pashtuns living in Pakistan. To further consolidate the ongoing rapprochement, President Daoud paid a reverse visit to Pakistan in August 1975 and “stressed the importance of ‘Islamic brotherhood’ as the basis for future of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.” 30

______29. Hussain, op. cit., 81 30. Hussain, op.cit ., 81.

Even after the exit of Z. A. Bhutto, his military successor, General Zia-ul-Haq, continued to espouse the same ingredients of Afghan policy set forth by his predecessor. Zia visited Afghanistan in October 1977. Later on, President Daoud paid a reverse visit to Pakistan and talks were held regarding further improvement in bilateral relations. At the conclusion of his visit to Pakistan in March 1978, he, in response to a question regarding political difference between the countries, said: “Everything was discussed and with the passage of time everything would fall in its proper place and time would take care of everything.” 31 Notwithstanding that the two countries lacked a proper roadmap for the resolution of the ‘political difference’; it appeared the two countries were moving towards evolving a paradigm for future reconciliation but the Saur Revolution sent the process topsy-turvy.

2.4. Afghanistan and the Soviet Union

It was the Soviet Union which benefitted most in the long-run from American policy of not adequately responding to Kabul’s overtures as it had, unlike the United States, more vital and direct interests in Afghanistan. USSR wanted to secure substantial footprints in Afghanistan because it intended to “prevent Afghanistan from serving a base for a hostile power and thus encourage its policy of nonalignment [ and ] to develop Afghanistan as a showpiece of Soviet developmental assistance.” 32 Therefore, Moscow was more accommodative and was prepared to extend support to Kabul on issues which Washington deemed inconsistent with its South Asia policy. On the other hand, Afghanistan’s coziness with the Soviet Union had been dictated neither by choice nor by ideological orientation but by economic and military considerations. The objective was to offset limitations accrued on account of suspension of transit-trade facilities by Pakistan. The economic cooperation thus began ushered in a military cooperation, a development which was to hugely shape the later political and military developments in Afghanistan. ______31. Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan, 146 32. Rubinstein, Soviet Policy toward Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, 129 47

2.4.1. Economic Cooperation

Afghanistan and the Soviet Union had old ties but their relations began to take specific direction during the 1950s.The first significant development was the signing of a four- year trade agreement as it provided, inter alia, “duty-free transit for Afghan goods and a high currency exchange rate. Moscow also agreed to construct several gasoline storage facilities in the country.” 33 But the point of collaboration which was regarded as watershed was the opening of a Soviet trade office in Kabul “something never permitted by previous Afghan policy makers.” 34 The establishing of the trade mission provided the Soviets with a base to contact with common Afghans, and enhance their presence there.

The pace and momentum in Soviet-Afghan relations got impetus during Premier Daoud’s reign(1953-1963). His tenure witnessed exponential cooperation between two neighbors on development projects related to construction of highways, bridges; the Bagram airport north of Kabul but the most amazing feat was the construction of “an all- weather road linking Kabul with the USSR border that involved the spectacular feat of engineering the construction of the Salang Tunnel that pierced the Hindu Kush for the first time in history.” 35 Relations between them further deepened with the start of collaboration in the field of oil exploration in Afghanistan. The number of Soviet oil surveying teams increased after the 1957 visit of King Zahir Shah to Moscow “at which times the Soviets contributed another $ 15 million for oil exploration in north Afghanistan. Between 1950 and 1955, Afghan transit trade through Pakistan actually increased annually; trade with the Soviet Union mushroomed.” 36

______33. Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence , 69 34. Dupree, Afghanistan , 494. 35. Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History, (London: Taurus, 2003),31 36. Dupree, Afghanistan, 294.

2.4.2. Military Cooperation

The Soviet philosophy appeared to be simple: extend economic assistance and seek penetration for influence in military. In a country like Afghanistan, which is characterized by strong and pervasive ethnicity, the military constitutes virtually the only cementing force and its influence is enormous. It helps in bridging ethnic cleavages in a relatively more institutional way; however, the fundamentally important aspect was that its cushion was indispensable for breaking the Albatross of stagnation around the neck to a “genuine development take off.” 37 The Afghan Army was weak and not modern but Moscow seemed to know that “a virtual Soviet monopoly over its supply and education probably gave the Kremlin confidence that ultimately Moscow would have a free hand in determining Afghanistan’s future.” 38

The military cooperation between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union which proved to be instrumental in enhancing Soviet strategy in Afghanistan began with the signing of treaty in 1956 which made the 1978 Revolution possible. It was pertained to modernization and rearmament of the Afghan arm, including training of the Afghan officers in the Soviet Union.” 39 Consequently, thousands of Afghan army and air force officers were sent to the Soviet Union for training. According to one estimate, “the Soviet Union had trained 100 000 Afghan army and air force personnel.” 40 Apart from receiving military training, they were initiated in Marxist-Leninist indoctrination and procommunist views. It was the Afghan army officers trained in the military academies of USSR who played a central role in the ouster of King Zahir Shah in 1973 by extending support to Daoud and, later on, in the Saur Revolution in 1978.

______37. G.J.Pauker,“Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade,” World Politics, II,no.3 (1959): 38. Anthony Arnold, “The Soviet Threat to Pakistan,” in The Red Army on Pakistan’s Border: Policy 39. Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan , 35. 40. Tahir Amin, Afghan Crisis: Implications and Options for Muslim World, Iran and Pakistan (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1982), 60.

Provision of military weapons and help for re-building Afghan Air Force was the collateral aspect of the Afghan-Soviet military cooperation. Moscow started providing small quantities of military weapons and equipment and “under the Afghan-Soviet pact of 1956 between 1956-1977 the Soviet Union supplied weapons to Afghanistan worth 600 million dollars, and about 3700 Afghan officers, or one-third of the entire officer corps, received training in the Soviet Union.” 41 The first Soviet aircraft to arrive in Kabul was a “batch of 40 MIG-17 fighter planes. By 1960, the AAF [Afghan Air Force] had over 100 Soviet combat aircraft and six helicopters.” 42

2.4.3. Political Support on the Issue of Pashtunistan

The issue of Pashtunistan held not only strategic but for the royal family of Afghanistan it had content which was both “personal as well as national.” 43 It was one of the triumvirate foreign policy objectives which the Afghan leadership had mapped out for securing international support in the wake of British departure from the subcontinent. The Soviet Union extended political support also to Afghanistan on the issue. During the state visit of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union leader Nikita Khruschev and Premier Bulganin to Afghanistan, the latter spoke in favor of allowing Pashtuns residing in the Pakistan side of the Durand Line the right of self-determination and specifically said: “We think the demands of Afghanistan to give the population of bordering ‘Pashtunistan’ an opportunity of freely expressing their will are justified.” 44

Later on, Nikita Khurshchev visited Kabul in 1960 and reaffirmed that “the proper and sensible way to lessen tension and guarantee peace (in the Pashtunistan issue) is to apply to the solution of this problem the principle of self-determination.” 45 Ironically, ______41. Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan, 36. 42. E. O’Ballance, Afghan Wars 1839-1992: What Britain Gave and the Soviet Union Lost (United Kingdom: Brassey’s, 1993), 77-78. 43. M. Aslam K. Khattak, A Pathan Odyssey (UK: Oxford, 2004), 75. 44. Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan , 26. 45. Amin, Afghan Crisis , 56. 50

Moscow’s political support to Afghanistan represented how a superpower applies two different principles for one and the qualitatively same issue: it was prepared to speak in favor of granting right of self-determination to the Pashtun tribesmen but not to the people of Kashmir who were struggling for it in the same period, and even vetoed resolutions when the matter came up for discussion at the United Nations.

2.5. Post-Premier Daoud Period: 1963-973

Premier Daoud’s unstinted pursuit of the Pashtunistan issue and veering away from Afghanistan’s traditional nonalignment policy to exponentially promoting relations with the Soviet Union did not go down well in royal influential circles. The Afghan King apprehended that “Daoud’s intransigent stand on the issue of Pashtunistan could have negative implications for Afghanistan and its traditional neutrality; therefore, he was asked to resign and made way for Dr. Muhammad Yusuf, a moderate and commoner.” 46 But his resignation did not bring about any pronounced shift in the trajectory of Kabul-Moscow relations because “by 1973, total Soviet military and economic aid ($1.5 billion) outweighed U.S. economic aid ($425 billion) by a factor three to one.” 47

2.6. President Daoud and the Soviet Union

Daoud’s second coming to power in consequence of a successful coup was supported by Soviet trained military officers. A major faction of the Afghan Communist Party, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), supported Daoud, and some PDPA members even served in cabinet position. Daoud’s return to power in 1973 provided fresh impetus to Afghan-Soviet which was evident from the fact that “after ascending the office of the president, Daoud started reengagement with the Soviet Union. Within two years of taking power, Daud’s government had signed up seventy new projects ______46. Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence , 73. 47. Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan ,26.

involving Soviet help.” 48 Besides, it was the quantum of development cooperation between the two countries which further enhance Soviet influence in Afghanistan. Moscow, with a view to strengthening its economic stranglehold and protecting its enormous investment in the country, decided to grant “Afghanistan $437 million in economic aid in 1975; while, in the following year, a new Afghan-Soviet trade treaty envisaged a 65 per cent increase in two-way trade by 1980.” 49

The pro-Soviet army officers and PDPA sympathizers in bureaucracy used their positions to increase their penetration in the state apparatus. President Daoud initially used the cushion of the Soviet-trained military officers as “expedient, temporary allies who could easily be controlled and discarded when convenient.” 50 Later on, when he realized that their exponential influence was a threat to his government he decided to dump them and launched an initiative to ferret out and purge communists from his government. His shedding exercise produced two consequences: on the one hand, it so much perturbed Moscow that the Soviet President Nikolai Podogorny paid an immediate visit to Afghanistan “to register mounting Soviet concern.” 51 Secondly, and this was far more significant in terms of late developments, the anti-communist measure facilitated the unification, mediated by the Communist Party of India, of two squabbling factions, the Parcham and the Khalq*, PDPA in 1977.

______48. Haqqani, Pakistan between Military and Mullah , 168. 49. Bhabani S. Gupta, Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society(London: Frances Pinter, 1986), 20 50. 50. Cordovez & Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 14. 51. Cordovez & Harrison, op. cit., 17. * Parcham (banner) and Khalq (people) represented two factions of the PDPA. Their composition was influenced by ethnic, regional, and social considerations. The Parchamis were mainly from cities, with some from the countryside. The Khalqis were almost all from rural areas, with a significant number from ethnic and client minorities integrated among the Pashtuns. Most Khalqis belonged to poor rural groups, and most Parchamis to well-off groups. The Parchamis wanted to cooperate with the establishment, whereas, the Khalqia were against this idea. Both groups came into existence in 1967, barely eighteen months after the PDPA’s coming into existence and this split lasted till 1977. The Parchamis allied themselves with the former Prime Minister, Daoud, and helped him in his coup against King Zahir Shah. They even served in the cabinet of President Daoud. 52

Collateral to crackdown on the communists, President Daoud, in order to curtail the Soviet influence in Afghanistan, decided to reappraise Afghanistan’s relations with its neighbors, especially with the People’s Republic of China, and conservative Arab countries. The purported shift in Afghanistan’s foreign policy was an ominous development from the Soviet perspective. It generated apprehensions in Kremlin that Afghanistan might slide out of its sphere of influence. By the beginning of 1978, his popularity had already plummeted due to his dictatorial style of government and escalation in decline of the Afghan economy. The united PDPA successfully exploited the prevalent discontentment and on 27 April 1978 the President’s regime was ousted in a bloody coup d’etat. 52 ______52. Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence , 94-95

Part II

2.7. Changes in Afghanistan

Commenting upon the nature of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, Hamid Karzai, the former President of Afghanistan, described the “two countries as conjoined twins.” 53 His observation is a theoretical simplification of otherwise complex and inextricable ties of the two countries because whatever happens in Afghanistan has direct implications for Pakistan. Therefore, it is not possible for Pakistan not to take interest in a country which is so close and its people who form part of its tradition and demography. Consequently, any study pertaining to understanding the dynamics of their relationship in the focal phase entails qualitative analyses of changes that had taken place in Afghanistan as a consequence of the Saur Revolution inasmuch as they were momentous and critically instrumental in impacting the trajectory of their future interaction.

2.8. Afghanistan and the Saur Revolution

The Saur Revolution was the ultimate result of the underground struggle by the PDPA against the President Daoud government. It was a phenomenal happening because it took place in a country least prepared for such a development; and secondly, it was inspired by an ideology which was alien to the very genre of Afghan people. Afghanistan is a country where “society at large was religious, conservative and traditional in its values. Foreign influence, let alone the Soviet brand of socialism, generally perceived as atheistic and anti-Islamic was an affront to the cultural sensibilities of a largely peasant society.” 54 Not only the Revolution took place but also triggered changes so momentous that Afghanistan has not been able to recover from their repercussions even after a lapse of more than three decades. ______53.Yusufzai, Pildat Report . 54. Rasul B. Rais, War without winners: Afghanistan’s uncertain future (Karachi:Oxford, 1994), 7

One significant upshot of the Revolution was that it disrupted the traditional relationship between the Afghan state and society. Afghans had never accepted a strong central government at any stage of their history. The central government had not been able to coerce and intimidate the local elites; therefore, it had very carefully developed a delicate balance with them through the strategic distribution of resources and respect for their prerogatives. The development brought into being an “incipient interventionist state” 55 which wanted to accelerate the transformation and modernization of Afghan society. Consequently “the compact between central authority and local power, based on tribal and ethnic identities, broke down, perhaps irreparably.” 56 The early phase of the Afghan problem represented the conflict between traditional groups and the ‘incipient interventionist state’.

Besides being gory, the transformation was more radical in its content as it emphatically sounded the transfer of political power from royal tribal elite to the people of Afghanistan. The Radio Kabul announced in Pashto on 27 April 1978 that the Daoud Government had been overthrown and the Army Chief General Qadir had taken over which had made the Afghans the real power in the country. 57 Later on, General Qadir himself announced on the Radio Afghanistan that “for the first time in the history of Afghanistan an end has been put to the sultanate of Mhammadzai …All power has passed into the hands of the masses.” 58

2.9. Afghanistan’s New Rulers

As a matter of fact, the very coming to power of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan was itself a radical change because it ruptured the control of the Afghan royal family for the first time in country’s history. It has been commented that the new rulers represented a band of people who belonged to middle and lower middle strata of ______55. Raja Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan, xiii.

56. Rashid Rahman, “The Rise and the Rise of the Taliban,” The Nation , April 04, 1998. 57. Daoud Government Overthrown: Army Chief Takes Over,’ Pakistan Times , April 28, 1978, 1. 58. Kamal Matinuddin, Power Struggle in the Hindukush: Afghanistan (1978-1991) (Lahore: Wajidalis, 1991),42 55

Afghan society. They were mostly soldiers and teachers and some were poets and writers and had no hereditary claim to power. 59 More important was the fact that they were dedicated communists who openly professed allegiance to socialism. They believed in the control of power and their objective was, being dedicated communists, to bring social and economic equality and transform their country “from an illiterate, poverty stricken and tribal ridden religious society into a modern socialist state.” 60

2.10. Pakistan and Political Changes in Afghanistan

Before the Saur Revolution, Afghanistan had been ruled by a conservative but nationalist establishment invariably determined to preserve the status quo. Pakistan was accustomed to dealing diplomatically with the traditional Afghan political elite. The leadership in Kabul and Islamabad, having remained engaged in confrontations since 1947, was moving towards developing a paradigm to guide their relations towards a friendly trajectory. It has been reported that before the beginning of the focal period Z.A. Bhutto, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and Daoud, the President of Afghanistan, were close to arriving at some sort of understanding on the issue of Durand Line but they could not finalize due to political problems which Bhutto was facing on the domestic front. 61 But the Revolution put a freeze and brought to a new class of rulers who believed in socialism as the answer to their country’s misery and backwardness; and more important was the fact that they “announced that Afghanistan could not abandon its support to the Pakhtuns .” 62 The new situation presented Pakistan with a diplomatic challenge. ______59. Rahimullah Yusufzai (An eminent journalist and expert on Afghan affairs), in discussion with the author January 2016. 60. Matinuddin, Power struggle in the Hindukush, 30. 61. Shamshaad A. Khan (Former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan), in discussion with the author, November 2015. 62. Azmat H. Khan, The Durand Line-Its Geo-Strategic Importance (Islamabad: Pan Graphics, 2005),

241.

Pakistan viewed ominously the advent of the communism-inspired regime in Afghanistan and believed it to be a Soviet inspired move that impinged upon its national and security interests and had the potential, if allowed to stabilize itself, to pose a terminal challenge to the balance upon which hinged the status quo system in Pakistan and stoke the Pashtunistan issue as well. Besides, this radical political transformation could have given incentive to the leftist and ethno-nationalist forces to challenge the military regime’s frail hold on power. Pakistan’s concerns were not unfounded as President Tarakai, while addressing a meeting with foreign visitors in August 1977, described the Saur Revolution as “part of a chain of international revolutionary forces [and said] we do not believe in the export of revolution, but if Afghanistan succeeds Iran and Pakistan may look at this candle of revolution for inspiration.” 63

It has been observed that Pakistan’s apprehensions were understandable because when the Taliban were in power in Kabul, Islamabad was directly affected by the development. However, the possibility that the communist movement could pose a fatal challenge to the status quo oriented system in Pakistan was too remote because it was too weak and the communists were disparate and disorganize. It has been commented that the point which was at the back of the mind of the ruling military elite in Pakistan was that the consolidation of the Revolution would intensify the Balouch insurgency in Pakistan .64 According to another observation after the April Revolution the principle objective of the incumbent military regime in Pakistan was to dismantle the

Revolution. 65

2.11. Revolutionary Initiatives

Having assumed power, the Revolutionary Government of Afghanistan issued a document containing ‘Basic Lines of the Revolutionary Duties of the Democratic ______63.Sadhan Mukerjee, Afghanistan: From Tragedy to Triumph (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House,1984), 108. 64. Yusufzai, Personal communication, January 2016. 65. Raja Anwar (An eminent journalist), in discussion with the author September 2015 57

Republic of Afghanistan. The stated purpose of the document was “to transform traditional Afghan society into a new flourishing one based on the principles of socialism and equality.” 66 In pursuance of the objective, the Revolutionaries introduced initiatives which, contemporary Afghan experts, regarded as reforms and they critically evaluated their impact accordingly, especially emphasized upon their structural and sociological limitations. Even the Soviets were of the view them as reforms and, according to Safronchuk, a spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, “they were harsh and they were turning the Muslim population against them. Land reforms which did not take into consideration the Afghan traditions.” 67

It is argued that reforms were a misnomer for measures initiated by the PDPA government because reforms are situational amendments which are introduced in the system to make it consistent with the objective requirements, whereas, the basic contours defining the identity of the system are kept intact. On the other hand, a successful revolution invariably aims at uprooting the archaic system and supplants it with the new one. Therefore, measures which a revolutionary regime introduced are revolutionary initiatives which represent complete break from the past. Besides, revolutions are regarded as specific-caused oriented and once they become successful are institutionalized into a new system. 68

From a very narrow political base, the PDPA regime set out to morph Afghan society and launched a number of initiatives which included land redistribution, cancellation of debts owed by peasants to rich landlords, improvement in the status of women, attempts at alleviating the country’s over 90 percent illiteracy rate and granting of rights to national minorities. They were meant to transform and model on socialist principles the traditional political and social power paradigm of the country “based on ______66. S. Iftikhar. Murshed, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years (London: Bennet and Bloom,2006), 27 67. K. Kirby, Cold War-Soldiers of God: 1977-1988[Documentary] (United States: Cable News Network (CNN), 2015) 68. Henry Kissinger, On China (London: Penguin, 2011),92.

the autonomy of tribes and other social groups that allowed the state to organize its political power and exercise its restricted authority.” 69

2.12. Land and Agrarian Initiatives

The most important-politically and economically- were land initiatives which were aimed to break down the traditional socio-economic structure of the Afghan society. According to Abdul Rashid Jalili, who was Minister of Education in Tarakai government, “The vast majority of people had no jobs. Afghanistan was an agricultural country. We thought it was best to introduce land reforms and give land to landless. It would enable them to work on their own land and raise their standard of living.” 70 The land initiatives institutionalized by the new Afghan government were one of the sources of resistance against it because they affected “some of the country’s most influential political, social and even religious leaders, such as the heads of the Mujddidi and Gillani clans.” 71 The last two named were the Mujahideen leaders who were based in Peshawar and heading resistance against the Kabul government.

2.12.1. Land Decrees

The Revolutionary government issued two decrees to give effect to the land reforms: Decree number six and Decree number eight. The first Decree pertained to abolishing of mortgage system and usury. It had two objectives: “the first was to break the vicious circle of continuous and ever increasing debt which was responsible for the impoverishment of growing number of small and medium landholders and landless peasants. The second aim of the Decree was to furnish the machinery for the implementation of this reform.” 72 According to Saleh Mohammad Zeary, Minister of ______69. Rais, War without winners ,1. 70. Kirby, Cold War-Soldiers of God: 1977-1988[Documentary]. 71. Rasanayagm, Afghanistan: A Modern History ,76.

72. Beverly Male, Revolutionary Afghanistan: A Reappraisal (London: Croom Helm, 1982),109.

Agriculture, the reform “benefitted 81 percent of rural families, returning the land of those who had lost it to money lenders, and giving all peasants and small landowners the chance of making a decent livelihood.” 73

The second Decree was more fundamental in its intent and content; that was why, its preparation and implementation had taken more time. It was promulgated on 30 November 1978 and pertained to redistribution of agricultural land. According to Article one, the objective of the Decree was to get “rid of feudal and semi-feudal conditions.” 74

The Revolutionary government believed that the purported redistribution of land would bring more arable land under cultivation because “under the old system, many big landowners had not bothered to cultivate all the arable land in their possession. It was estimated that only 40 percent of the arable land had been cultivated annually.” 75

2.13. Pakistan and Afghan Land Initiatives

Any successful implementation of radical land initiatives in a country so abutted to Pakistan as Afghanistan would have provided status quo inimical forces in Pakistan the template to strive for, and was a nightmare specter for the incumbent elite of Pakistan. And this was taking place when the ruling military government in Pakistan under General Zia-ul-Haq, in order to win the crucial support of the influential domestic economic class, had initiated steps to reverse the nationalization policies of the previous regime of Z. A. Bhutto. It had started a program intended to denationalize “several agricultural based industries and shelved Bhutto’s ambitious land reform agenda that was intended to ameliorate the social and economic disparities.” 76 On 2 September 1977, the military government announced denationalization of “rice-husking and large flour mills and 279 cotton ginning units, Later on, proclamation was issued regarding ______73. Male, op.cit ., 110. 74. Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (New York: Cambridge, 1985),86. 75. Male, Revolutionary Afghanistan , 112. 76. Hussain, Pakistan and the emrgence, 96.

handing over of 58 flour mills in Punjab to former owners, and returning of the remaining 300 cotton ginning mills to their original entrepreneurs.” 77

The point to emphasize is that Pakistan could not remain unaffected from successful institutionalization of revolutionary agrarian initiatives in Afghanistan, and, at a time when the regime in Islamabad itself was implementing ‘reverse nationalization’ policy of 1970; it was inconsistent with its interests to allow stabilization of radical revolution next door. The ruling elite invariably tend to view extraneous changes through the prism of their interests, and consequently map out a proportionate response which ensures their status in the domestic power structure. Therefore, it will not be an over comment that Pakistan had assumed the status of a ‘frontline state’ before the physical entry of the Soviet forces into Afghanistan; the introduction of the foreign military had merely internationalized the already extant status.

2.14. Soviet Military Entry into Afghanistan

The entry of the Soviet forces into Afghanistan in December 1979, which took the world by surprise, is regarded as one of the decisive developments in the final, terminal phase of the Cold War. The event was phenomenal in terms of its short-term and long-term implications. The presence of 80 000 foreign troops not only tinkered with the power equation but also laid the foundation of the collapse of the mighty Soviet empire in 1991. Apparently, Moscow sent troops to stabilize the rapidly deteriorating political- military situation in its newest client state. Jimmy Carter, the President of the United States, described “the implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War.” 78 Two consequences immediately followed from the event: first, the presence of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan practically eliminated the ‘buffer state’ status of ______77. “Rice-Husking and Flour Mills Denationalized ,” Pakistan Times , Lahore, September 02, 1977,1 78. Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address (January 23, 1980), retrieved from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33079 on 06-03-2015. 61

Afghanistan established since 1894. And with it, close to a century old pattern of political dynamics began to experience unraveling impact. The area became a center of international political gravity where contemporary superpowers were to fight a proxy war for nearly a decade. Secondly, and this was more important from Pakistan’s perspective, the situation changed dramatically and Islamabad was facing a more alarming set of circumstances. One commentator observed that the Afghan crisis had not assumed threatening magnitude before the Soviet interference; it was Moscow’s intervention that complexed the situation along the Durand Line and exposed Pakistan to new security threats. Afghanistan was the last line of defence for Pakistan from the north but the presence of USSR forces on Afghan soil practically extended the border of Soviet to Torkham.” 79

General Zia, the military ruler of Pakistan, commenting upon the development said in a press conference that the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan had been instrumental in bringing about a qualitative change in the region of Southwest Asia. “The event has resulted in a ‘total change’ in the power pattern in the region and the western world ought to realize this change that has brought the ‘hammer and the sickle over Afghanistan.” 80 Later on, while talking to visiting Indian reporters the General contended that the “presence of USSR’s troops in Afghanistan had exposed not only Pakistan but India, Iran, the Gulf and the Saudi Arabia. He termed it a global issue and suggested accordingly response to it.” 81

Pakistan’s unease at the introduction of huge number of foreign troops on Afghan soil was not unfounded if evaluated in the context of its historical relations with India. Islamabad feared that in the event of consolidation of Soviet hold on Afghanistan, it would be facing two-directional threat to her security: India, with whom it had hostile ______79. Pervaiz I. Cheema, “ The Afghan Crisis and Pakistan’s Security Dilemma,” in Asian Survey 23, no.3, (March, 1983):227-243. 80. “Soviet action has changed geo-political situation.” Pakistan Times, January 16, 1980, 1 81. Bhabani S. Gupta, The Afghan Syndrome, (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 118. 62

relations and already fought three wars, from the eastern flank and Soviet consolidated- Afghanistan from the western side. And more important was the fact that the Twenty Years Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between India and the Soviet signed in 1970 was in extant. Islamabad believed if it opted to silently acquiesce in the prevalent situation as a fiat accompli, the logical follow up could have been a replay or worse of what had happened on 16 December 1971. “Potentially, it was a highly dangerous situation. India and the Soviet Union were allies; should they combine, Pakistan faced the prospect of being squeezed out of existence.” 82

The United States Administration officials, realizing the gravity of the situation and its impact on Pakistan’s security, acknowledged that the presence of Soviet military on Afghan soil had made Pakistan very exposed. They feared that Moscow would attempt to destabilize Pakistan. They believed that “the security of Pakistan is of interest not only to Washington but to other nations in the region and beyond it.” 83 Later on, President Jimmy Carter, in his State of the Union address, said: “The United States will take action-consistent with our own laws-to assist Pakistan in resisting any outside aggression.” 84 Consequently, this set the stage for Pakistan and Afghanistan to become the battlefield where finale of the Cold War had to be enacted.

______82. M. Yususf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s untold story (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1992), 23-24 83. “Pakistan very exposed, says U.S.,” Pakistan Times , January 07, 1980,1 84. “Soviet action in the Gulf to be repelled with force,” Pakistan Times , January 25, 1980,1

Chapter Three

Post-Daoud Period-Phase One

The post-Daoud period (1978-2001, and hereinafter will be referred as ‘focal period’) constitutes a very important phase in the history of Pakistan and Afghanistan relations. In the wider historical context of their acrimonious ties, the focal period held huge significance for Islamabad because of the transformative political, ideological and strategic developments, and its traction to them due to their likely impact on its security.Pakistan’s key role in reversing them provided it with a leverage whereby it could have managed the tilt of the situation after 1989 to its favor but for its structural- deficits ridden policy which served as a bottleneck in the realization of its Afghan- centered objectives, and, later on, it paved the way for Afghanistan’s slide to civil war and accentuated strategic implications for Pakistan.

The focal period has been divided into two broad phases: the first begins with President Daoud’s gory exit from power and lasts till 14 January 1989, the day the last Soviet soldier crossed over the Amu River back into the Soviet Union. The phase was the most tumultuous period as it was characterized by exponential deterioration in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. The dominant theme was the presence of USSR forces in Afghanistan, its security implications for Islamabad and Pakistan’s active association with the Afghan jihad as a ‘frontline state’ and impact on Islamabad-Kabul relations. Notwithstanding the fact that the period was full of challenges for Pakistan but it also afforded it openings that could be employed to redress some of security concerns by smoothing the asperities of past bitter experience with regard to Afghanistan.

The chapter has been divided into two parts: the first part deals with Pakistan’s relations with PDPA (Khalq) regime in Afghanistan, its tenor, and the nature of their differences which dissipated the early propitious beginning. The second part is very significant in terms of the change that had overwhelmed Afghanistan, its nature, how it had converted Pakistan and Afghanistan into an area where contemporary superpowers came to wrestle for the protection of their vital interests. But the most important aspect 64

was that it was a period which incubated ‘structural deficits’ in Pakistan’s policy which deeply affected its relations and strategic interests in Afghanistan; and, secondly, served as a bottle neck in the realization of Islamabad’s political and strategic onjectives subsequent o the de-induction of Soviet military.

The second phase ushers in with the de-induction of the Soviet military forces from Afghanistan and snaps with the occurrence of the watershed incident on 11 September 2001. The period witnessed Afghanistan’s steep descent to civil war despite Pakistan’s efforts to help install a broad-based government in Kabul. Another characteristic of the period was the phenomenal emergence and the rise of the Taliban and installation of their government in Kabul in 1996. Their rule represented a purple phase in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. Islamabad not only reportedly assisted the Taliban in their ascension to power but, later on, sustained them too. Thus, it was the first government in Kabul which was Islamabad friendly and equally important was the fact that it shared some of Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives vis-à-vis India on the issue of Kashmir.

Part 1

3.1.Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations in the post-Daoud Period: First Phase (April 1978-December 1979) Pakistan-Afghanistan relations had, from 1947 to 1978, been influenced by their political difference regarding the Durand Line. Notwithstanding the traditional dynamics of their relations, before the beginning of the focal period the two countries were moving towards evolving a paradigm to better guide the course of their future ties but for the revolution. The Saur Revolution brought about a qualitative change in their relationship inasmuch as the political differences continued to exist but ideological perspective and associated changes, for a brief period, i.e. April 1978 to December 1979, became more pronounced due to communism inspired revolution in Afghanistan. New circumstances begotten by the development put a freeze on the constructive engagement initiated by President Daoud and President Zia-ul-Haq and injected ambiguation in the already complex relations of the two countries.

3.2. Pakistan and Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

The revolutionary Afghanistan espoused all those ideals which were diametrically inimical to Pakistan’s interests and it was, immediately after the water-shed development, clearly discomfited by the implications of the Saur Revolution. Islamabad’s response to the prevailing situation was dependent upon either of the following two options: first, in the face of objective uncertain situation in the post- Revolution Afghanistan it needed to wait and watch how the situation evolved but, in that case, it had to contend with volatile western border which it could not afford given its hostile relations with India, the eastern neighbor and its strategic implications for its security.The other avenue was to assess the environment, consult allies and eventually engage the new government so that its western border remained stable and peaceful.

3.3. Strategic Realism It was ‘Strategic Realism’ which provided Pakistan the framework to conduct its relations with Afghanistan from the Saur Revolution to the induction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. The term suggests that a stricken with security issues when confronts bidirectional, principal and auxiliary, threats is required to be as pragmatic as possible. The first corollary of the practical strategy is to focus on principal threat with maximum resources, and pursue policy of engagement with the relatively manageable auxiliary direction so as to prevent it, first, from adopting an inimical posture and, secondly, induce it not to form any threatening collaboration with the principal threat.

Pakistan was facing bi-directional security pressure at the time when it came into existence in 1947. The principal challenge to its security stemmed from its antagonistic relations with India; on the other hand, Afghanistan’s posture of refusing to acknowledge the Durand Line as an international border was a serious challenge but given Afghanistan’s relative military weakness the situation was less threatening but Karachi feared that Kabul-New Delhi nexus would be a formidable security challenge. Therefore, it opted to pursue an engagement policy with Afghanistan in order to avoid the harrowing prospect of being sandwiched between two hostile neighbors. But it was passive as Karachi did not utilize it to build upon cultural and historical depth for developing close ties with Afghanistan.

The situation was very fluid and Islamabad was cautiously assessing the role of the Soviet Union in the development but the PDPA government appeared to be in control of Kabul, a measure regarded as a standard of any Afghan government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the external world; besides, there was no large scale or threatening opposition to the new regime which seemed to have complete sway over the entire country. Having analyzed the pros and cons of the alternatives, Pakistan had

no option but to accept the Tarakai government as the legitimate.1 Consequently, it accorded diplomatic recognition to the new government in Kabul on 5 May 1978 hoping that “Saur changes will not make any difference in Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship,” 2 and it would improve with the return of stability in the country.

3.3.1. Afghanistan’s Response The very first task of revolutionaries, when they capture power, is to stabilize the revolution. To achieve the objective, they follow the principle of fewer counter revolutionaries and more friends; consequently, on the one hand, political and social mobilization campaign as a first resort is launched to blunt domestic opposition to the revolution and, on the other, overtures are either extended to external players or theirs are reciprocated. The new Afghan government had no option but to reciprocate Pakistan’s gesture and Noor Muhammad Taraki, the prime minister and president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, in his maiden press conference after the Revolution, said that “his Government will try to solve the border dispute with Pakistan peacefully.” 3 A few days later, he, in a broadcast on Radio Kabul, repeated his commitment to seeking a solution of Afghanistan’s border differences through ‘peaceful dialogue’ with Pakistan. Addressing the nation on Radio Kabul, Taraki spelled out the contours of his government’s relations with other countries which would be determined by the attitude of the neighboring countries. But he stressed that “his country would promote friendship and cooperation with the neighboring countries.” 4

Hafizullah Amin, the foreign minister in Taraki government, echoed same positive sentiments while giving an interview to the American magazine Newsweek. He said: ______1. Shamshaad A. Khan (former foreign secretary of Pakistan), in discussion with the author November 2015 2. “The Moment of Truth ,” Pakistan Time , January 01, 1980, 4. 3. “Border Dispute ,” Dawn , May 7, 1980, 1 4. “Taraqi spells out 30-point,” Pakistan Times , May 10, 1978, 1

““We will maintain friendly relations with Pakistan and Iran.” 5Later on, Agha Shahi, Advisor on Foreign Affairs to the incumbent military regime in Pakistan, while speaking at the United Nations, “welcomed Kabul’s policy statement on friendly ties with his country and assured that Pakistan would continue to follow its long-established policy of improving relations with Afghanistan and seeking solutions to any outstanding issues through negotiations.” 6 All in all, the second beginning was more propitious than the first one in 1947.

3.4. First Meeting between Two Heads of States

The meeting between the heads of state is often a significant event inasmuch as it is used to lay down the broad contours and general direction of relations of the states. The first official interaction that took place in September 1978 between the Heads of the states of Pakistan and Afghanistan was a brief affair. General Zia-ul-Haq, while on his way to Iran made a brief stopover, four hour, in Afghanistan to meet President Taraki on lunch. The meeting did not result in anything substantial as General Zia “failed to persuade Tarakai and Amin, to discuss the ‘one political difference’ that had already been brought within the reach of a settlement through negotiations with President Daoud before he was overthrown.” 7

Later on, the two leaders met at Havana, Cuba in September 1979 on the occasion of the Sixth Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement. The Zia-Taraki ‘exclusive meeting’ on the sidelines of the Conference could not achieve any substantial breakthrough though both leaders revealed that “they had a ‘heart to heart’ talks on the ways to improve Pakistan-Afghanistan relations including a resolution of the problem of ______5. “Afghanistan for friendly ties,” Pakistan Times , June 27, 1978, 1 6. “Ties with Kabul,” Pakistan Times ,June 9, 1978, 6 7. Nilofur Mehdi, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1971-1981: The Search for Security (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1999), 140.

problem of cross border incursions by the Afghan Mujahideen.” 8 The meeting was significant from another but revealing aspect for it was reported that during the meeting Taraki offered President Zia that “he was prepared to accept the Durand Line as an international border provided Pakistan closed its border for rebels and stopped aiding them. Zia, however, failed to respond the offer conclusively.” 9

3.5. Beginning of Deterioration in Relations

A single happening, even very small, has the potential to alter the trajectory of bigger events.* Likewise, positivity, no matter how small, can affect the course of relations of two states provided they are prepared to build upon it. The initial warmth exhibited by both the countries was encouraging but it proved to be ephemeral and could not be channelized to give positive direction to their relations. There may have been the following two reasons: the issue of Pashtunistan and ideological dissimilarity of the two heads of the states.

Revolutionaries exploit internal contradictions to capture power. And when they assume power they face the same dilemma; consequently, they externalize them. Islamabad apprehended that the Afghan government would revive the bogey of Pashtunistan soon, and it realized long before when on 9 May 1978 the Afghan President referred to the border dispute with Pakistan after meeting the ageing Pashtun leader Abdul Ghaffar Khan in Kabul. Later on, Islamabad’s apprehensions exacerbated further when Amin, the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, indicated to his Pakistani ______8.Hamid H. Kizilbash, ed., Pakistan’s Security and Foreign Policy (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988), 5 9. Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancyin Afghanistan (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005), 110-111. * The Butterfly Effect is a scientific theory which says that a single occurrence, no matter how small, can change the course of the universe. Initially, it was used with the weather prediction but later the term became a metaphor used in and out of science.

counterpart that the PDPA regime was not bound by any of the agreements that were made by Pakistan with President Daoud. 10 Besides, Amin’s hobnobbing with Indians further the element of irritation between the two countries as he confided to the visiting Indian Foreign Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, in September 1978: “Let us have a secret pact; you take one part of Pakistan and we take the other.” 11 From Pakistan’s perspective, it was clearly an unsettling specter in strategic terms because Islamabad had been making efforts from 1947 not to allow India to gain strong foothold in Afghanistan.

The second may have been the deep ideological divergence between Zia an Taraki as was evident from the following talk between President Zia and President Tarakai when the former met the latter:

Zia: As Muslims, we believe that all land belongs to Al-mighty Allah and man is his creation on earth. Taraki: All land belongs to the tiller.

Zia: Human beings must fear God.

Taraki: God is adil [just]. We don’t have to fear a just God.

Zia: People have certain obligations towards God and human beings.

Taraki: To serve people is to serve God. 12

3.6. Revolutionary Initiatives: Resistance and Repression

The principal objective of the Revolution is the complete overthrow of an established order and replaces it with a one which the revolutionaries believe can best serve the people.. Therefore, the disenchantment with the old system and desire to supplant it ______10. Hussain, op.cit ., 98 . 11. Mahdi, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1971-1981 , 141

12. Khalid M. Arif, Working with Zia: Pakistan’s Power Politics 1977-1988 (Karachi: Oxford, 1996), 308.

with new motivates the incumbent revolutionary regime to put into effect a policy of revolutionary initiatives for the transformation of the state and the social system. A successful revolution is a journey from idealism to realism and it brings into existence new, broadly speaking, bipartisan but contending forces: revolutionaries who assume power and counter-revolutionaries who are bent upon resisting it. The evolution of the Revolution depends upon, inter alia, the extent of pragmatism which the revolutionaries exercise in the implementation of initiatives which they believe would re-order society, and secondly, the quality, strength and organization of opponents and, for that matter, the support they receive from external opponents of the Revolution.

A reference here of relationship between revolutionary initiatives started by PDPA government, resistance by opponents and consequent repression is relevant to understand the dynamics of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the very initial phase of the focal period. Soon after assumption of power, the Afghan revolutionaries initiated an ambitious program of modernization of their country. It was aimed at improving status of Afghan women “through reform of the customs relating to marriage and encouraging them to pursue modern education. Later on, land reforms were introduced to break the traditional agricultural system; usury was abolished and debts incurred by poor families were cancelled.” 13

The PDPA’s leadership’s options in the implementation of initiatives represented two opposite strands of its leadership: the pragmatic Parchamites who were urging gradualism, i.e. step by step implementation of the reforms so as not to offend the cultural sensitivities of the Afghans; on the other hand, radicals, the Khalqis, wary of counter-revolutionaries were in favor of speedy implementation of the revolutionary initiatives so that they could be out-maneuvered. The factor that had to determine the option and consequently the future of the Saur Revolution and, for that ______13. Ishtiaq Ahmed, Pakistan-The Garrison State (Karachi: Oxford, 2013), 254.

matter, the trajectory of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations was who came out victor in the power struggle between the two factions. At the end, It was the Khalqis who came out winner and “adopted the second option after defeating the Parcham faction in a bitter and tense internal debate and almost all representative of the Parcham faction in the Cabinet and Revolutionary Council [ were] banished to ambassadorial * jobs.” 14

3.6.1. Implications of the Outcome

It is difficult to predict the trajectory of Saur Revolution had Parchamites came out successful in the internecine PDPA power struggle. But the actual outcome proved to be far more undermining for the future of the Revolution. Consequently, it produced three important implications: first, the speedy implementation of the initiatives fomented the pace of resistance against the PDPA government which resorted to repression to quell the counter revolutionaries; secondly, thousands of Afghan fled to Pakistan to avoid the revolutionary turmoil where they were provided sanctuary and training for resisting the regime and this deteriorated Kabul-Islamabad relations further, and finally the whole scenario began to present a situation of the likely collapse of the regime which induced the Soviet Union to send its forces into Afghanistan.

Soon after the assumption of power and in pursuance of the objectives, the Revoutionary regime in Kabul issued guidelines “for the redistribution of land, equity for the ethnic minorities, emancipation for women, and education for all.” 15 They were hailed as a commendable attempt inasmuch as they “were intended to redress the ______14.Bhabani S. Gupta, Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society (London: Francis Pinter, 1986), 67 *Amin who wanted speedy implementation of initiatives argued that if the revolution lost its offensive and retreated before the counter-revolution, it would lose precious ground and might be overpowered by counter-revolution. Therefore, he favored for quick implementation. On the other hand, gradualists like Karmal wanted cautious and moderate political line so that the traditional village leaders could be coopted, and secondly, an Islamic policy which would be broadly acceptable to the religious leaders. (Gupta, 1986, p.45)

15. Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (London: McMillan, 1988), 16

traditional feudal inequities and social obscurantism. 16 Notwithstanding their merits and genuineness with which they were announced and sought to be implemented, even the Soviets were skeptical and were of the view that reaction against them could produce a situation which could stoke the embryonic insurgency and provided Pakistan and the United States an opportunity to exploit the situation to undermine the PDPA regime. The observation was correct in so far as Islamabad made common cause with opponents of the new regime and those who were badly hit by initiatives especially land.

The initiatives were fiercely resisted by conservative Islamists and those vested groups who wanted to maintain sthe archaic and groslly iniquitous socio-economic system. They represented the rich who “were annoyed over the introduction of land reforms and increased official control of commercial activities… The Khans (local chiefs) and Mullahs (the priests) who owned large tracts of land resisted the implementation of land reforms.” 17 They played upon religious sensitivities and cultural norms of the Afghans by characterizing the initiatives as ‘un-Islamic and the Soviet support for the Khalq regime worked effectively in favor of the resistance. So pervasive was the resistance campaign that “within twenty months of the revolution nearly three- quarters of the country was in a state of rebellion.” 18

What’s more the Kabul regime instead of adjusting its policy and going for political and social mobilization in favor of the initiatives started repression, the use of last resort as the first, as a tool to quell the resistance. It is reported that the rule of Taraki and Amin was the most repressive for the Afghans in the annals of Afghanistan as thousands of people were either executed or disappeared without trial or trace. Figures released by the government of “Babrak Karmal in February 1980 acknowledged that more than 12000 people were killed during the period. However, this number ______16. Diego Codovez and Selig Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal (New York: Oxford, 1995), 30-31. 17. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema,”The Afghan Crisis,” in Asian Survey 23, no.3 (March, 1983):231. 18. Gupta, Afghan Politics, 66.

represented those who had disappeared in the prison of Pul-i-Charkhi. The total number, however, ranged between 50,000 to 100000.” 19

3.7. Resistance and Pakistan External opponents who fear that the consolidation of the Revolution will pose threat to their status quo oriented system invariably look for chinks in the revolution for undermining it from without. They make a common cause with internal dissidents, their natural allies, and provide them support in their quest for reversing the revolution. Pakistan, in collaboration with dissidents Afghan leaders*, set out to extend its common cause with the vested interests against the Kabul regime. The military regime in Pakistan was wary of developments across its north-western border and apprehended “that a Soviet-backed Afghanistan had the potential to unleash forces challenging the military dominance over an elitist state run with the connivance of a status quo coalition of semi-feudal rural gentry and the relatively small financial-industrial group.” 20 Therefore, it chalked out a two-pronged strategy to deal with the situation: At one level it initiated a policy designed to engage the PDPA regime in negotiations concerning improvement of bilateral ties, but juxtaposition to this policy opponents of the PDPA regime were allowed to move into Pakistan where they were provided sanctuaries and base and training for operations against the new government with a view to undermining the Revolution.

______19. Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (New York: Cambridge, 1986), 95. * Some Afghan leaders like Hekmatyar of Hizb-i-Islami and Ahmad Shah Maoud, who belonged to Jamiat-i-Islami-i-Afghanistan, one of the largest parties opposed to the Kabul regime, came to Pakistan in the early 1970s. They were trained in Pakistan and they started guerilla operations against the PDPA regime with the assistance of Islamabad. Some, however, came after the Saur Revolution and joined the growing bandwagon of growing resistance: Mawlawi Muhammad Yunus Khalis, leader of Hizb-i-Islami’s splinter faction, initiated operations in the summer of 1978.Sibghatullah Mujaddidi headed Jabha-i-Nejat-i- Melli-i-Afghanistan which opened its office in Peshawar in June 1978. Mawlawi Muhammadi Nabi Muhammadi was a Ghilzai Pashtun who came to Pakistan in late 1978 and formed his group in Quetta.

20. Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence , 102

3.8. Afghanistan’s Accusations

Afghanistan repeatedly accused Pakistan of allowing the rebels to use its territory and thus interfering in its internal affairs as was evident from Taraki’s statement that “reactionary circles of Pakistan and religious fanatics in Iran together with reactionary imperialist accomplices are interfering to a major extent in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.” 21 But Islamabad continued to deny that its territory was being used for training rebels and for supplying arms to them, but Washington Post reported on 2 February 1979 that “Afghan dissidents had been receiving guerilla training at a base twelve mile north of Peshawar.” 22 Even foreign correspondents, “having biased disposition towards the revolutionary regime, residing in Kabul pointed to the existence of training camps provided by the Pakistani Army for training guerillas.” 23

3.9. Friendship Treaty between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union

The Soviet Union managed to further its influence in Afghanistan when it entered into a Friendship Treaty with Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in December 1978.The Treaty was significant from two respects: firstly, it contained, inter alia, an article which stipulated that the “high Contracting Parties…shall take appropriate measures with a view to maintaining the security, independence and territorial integrity of both the countries.” 24 Implicitly, the provision of the Treaty invested authority to the Kabul government to call for direct military assistance from Moscow if need arose, and Moscow cited the same Treaty to justify its 25 December 1979 military escapade. ______21. Sadhan Mukerjee, Afghanistan: From Tragedy to Triumph (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing, 1984),138. 22. Mukerjee, op.cit., 135. 23. Kalim Bahadur, “Pakistan’s Policy towards Afghanistan,” in Afghanistan in Crisis , ed. K. P. Misra (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 96. 24. Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence , 107

Secondly, it was a sign that Kremlin wanted an “international framework that would enable it to deal with its own immediate and long term objectives. 25 However, it was a strategically ominous development and perturbed Pakistan because it was reminiscent of the Friendship Treaty between the USSR and India in 1970 which had decisively altered the power equation in favor of India and resulted in the disintegration of Pakistan in December 1971.

3.10. Taraki vs. Amin

Voltaire once remarked that “every revolution eats up its children, but the April Revolution ate not just its children, but its parents too.” 26 The Saur Revolution was no exception to this. It was heading towards collapse within twenty months of its happening due to two reasons: first, the exponential resistance against the regime by Peshawar- based Islamic opponents supported by Pakistan which exploited the discontent against initiatives; and, secondly, “power struggle within the PDPA was driving the Saur Revolution towards precipice.” 27 The first phase of internal power struggle resulted in the expulsion of Parcham faction of the PDPA, the second witnessed the physical elimination of the founder of the Saur Revolution, i.e., Noor Muhammad Taraki.* ______25. Tahir Amin, Afghanistan Crisis: Implications and Options for Muslim World, Iran and Pakistan (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1982), 76. 26. Raja. Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan: A First-Hand Account (London: Verso, 1988), 109. 27. Gupta, Afghanistan: Politics, 66.

* Two factors may be cited to be the underlying cause of rivalry between Tarakai and Amin. The first was Amin’s Amin’s personal penchant for number one position in the hierarchy of the PDPA government. The initial cabinet designed to give alternate ranking positions to both Khalqis and Parchmis: Taraki was prime minister, Karmal was senior deputy ptime minister, and Amin was foreign minister. After Parchamis banishment in early July 1978, Amin assumed the position of number two. Since Taraki was the ‘Father’ of the Revolution, it was not possible Amin to secure number one position. Secondly, it was the immediate cause which relates to direction of the Revolution and initiatives. Amin knew that the Soviets were not happy with the way revolution was moving under his stewardship. In September 1979, when Taraki was returning from Havana he stopped in Moscow and was warmly received by Kremlin. When Taraki reached Kabul and summoned Amin who initially exhibited reluctance but, later on, acquiesced in. When Amin arrived he was shot but managed to survive; Amin came to Presidential Palace a little later with his men and had Taraki captured and killed. It was announced on October 9 that Taraki had died from serious illness but it later transpired he was killed by Amin’s men.

3.11. Amin’s Rise and Fall

Amin succeeded Taraki but his tenure in government was too short to have any significant impact on the direction of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the focal period. He tried to improve relations with Pakistan which Kabul and Moscow had been blaming for providing training and supply logistic facilities. In his very first address to the nation on 16, September 16, 1979, he exhibited his “interest in resolving all differences with Pakistan.” 28 He renewed the invitation and “hoped President Zia and his de facto foreign minister, Agha Shahi, would visit Kabul as soon as possible to end misunderstanding.” 29

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Agha Shahi, did plan to visit Kabul on 22 November 1979 in a bid to reduce tension and induce rapprochement between Islamabad and Kabul. However, one report suggests that the planned visit of Agha Shahi was not aimed at addressing the contentious issues between the two countries “but to announce a new joint government with Hekmatyar to which Pakistan and the USA would stand guarantee.” 30 But before the purported visit materialized, the Soviet Union sent its forces into Afghanistan and had Amin killed by unit of its special forces. He was supplanted by Babrak Karmal, a Soviet protégé.

______28. M. Ahsan Chaudhri, Pakistan and the Troubled World (Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1993), 281. 29. Henry S. Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 63 30. Mukherjee, Afghanistan from Tragedy , 123.

Part 2

3.12. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations: Second Sub-Phase

The second sub-phase, i.e. December 1979 till 14 January1989 was the most turbulent phase in the history of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. The state of turmoil is ascribed to the entry of Soviet military forces into Afghanistan and their continued presence there for a decade and its strategic implications for Pakistan. The Soviet Union apparently sent its forces into Afghanistan with a view to prop up a fledgling regime and stabilizing its volatile security situation. However, far from stabilizing the security situation, the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan further fomented the resistance already waged by opponents of the Kabul regime. On the other hand, the Soviet military presence exacerbated the already dysfunctional equation of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.

3.13. Soviet Forces into Afghanistan

The sending of about 80,000 troops into Afghanistan was a development described by James R. Schlesinger, Defence and Energy Secretary in the Carter administration, as the “greatest peril since the darkest days of the World War II.” 31 Moscow’s military adventure morphed international politics as it brought the area, otherwise situated on the periphery of the Cold War center-stage, on the radar and shifted the focus of international political gravity from elsewhere to Pakistan and Afghanistan. The presence of Soviet troops on the Afghan soil served as a catalyst and by necessity drew the rival superpower-the United States- in the conflict. The development transformed Afghanistan into an area where the final battle of the Cold War had been fought and Pakistan and Afghanistan became part of it; therefore, their relations for the next decade need to be assessed in this context. 32 ______31. Kamal Matinuddin, Power Struggle in the Hindukush: Afghanistan (1978-1991) (Lahore: Wajidalis, 1991), 85. 32. Khan, Personal Communication, November, 2015.

3.14. Implications of the Development

Certain complicated implications stemmed from the fateful step of the Soviet Union: the immediate was that it had an acute impact on the strategic interests of Pakistan as the development accentuated the existing complexity between Islamabad and Kabul, and security considerations came to occupy to be the dominant theme in their relations for nearly a decade. Secondly, the period witnessed slide in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations as Islamabad, in line of its policy of not granting diplomatic recognition to governments propped up by a foreign power, opted not to maintain diplomatic relations with the Karmal government which the Soviet had installed after eliminating Hafizullah Amin. However, the change was significant in paradox terms too: notwithstanding the fact Pakistan felt vulnerable but resulted in so alignment of political dynamics that Pakistan gained, in the short-term, an enviable position which it could use later on to restructure its traditional awry relations with Afghanistan. And, finally, the presence of the Soviet military on the Afghan soil drew, due to expediencies of cold war, the rival power, the United States, into the conflict. This fact morphed Pakistan and Afghanistan relations into ‘proxy’ ties.

3.15. Why Soviet Forces in Afghanistan?

The Afghan crisis triggered a sort of international civil war involving not only the PDPA and its opponents in Afghanistan, but a number of external players, notably the Soviet Union, the United States, China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt and India. Pakistan and Afghanistan by committing themselves to rival power blocs submerged their independent and sovereign status to an extent and became proxies of the United States and the Soviet Union respectively. It is pertinent to mention here that detailed analyses of the factors that had stimulated the leadership in Moscow to go into Afghanistan have not been undertaken, and assessment will be limited to the extent of getting background analysis so as to find the impact of the development on Islamabad-Kabul relations and how it came to influence the strategic thinking of Pakistan.

The close character of the Soviet system coupled with the high degree of secrecy and the opaque nature of decision-making in Kremlin were the principal factors which made it difficult for experts and analysts to comprehend Soviet aims behind their choice to send military forces into Afghanistan. However, there may have been, broadly speaking, two possible alternate explanations for the decision: it may have been that the United States hatched a some kind of grand conspiracy to draw the Soviet Union into Afghanistan by providing covert assistance to early rebels and make the situation appear that the Revolution was crumbling in the face of steadily growing resistance. Or it was the first step of the Soviet Union’s own grand strategy to gain access to areas of strategic and economic importance because the development brought it to “300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Strait of Hormuz- a waterway through which much of the world’s oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.” 33

3.16. Theoretical Explanation It is said that “when people think seriously, they think abstractly; they conjure up simplified pictures of reality called concepts, theories, models, paradigms.” 34 Therefore, a number of theories had been expounded to find out the rhyme or reason of the gamble taken by Kremlin to send its forces into Afghanistan, a country known as the ‘graveyard of empires.’ They were “more a wide array of hypotheses and generalizations” 35 and may be regarded as attempts to fit facts and events in two major scenarios: one emphasized the defensive nature of the whole effort, and the other the offensive character of the enterprise.

______33. John Fullerton, The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1983), 38. 34. Samuel P. Huntington, “If Not Civilization, What?,” in Foreign Affairs 72, no.5 (Nov.-Dec. 1993), 186- 194. 35. Rasul B. Rais, War without Winners: Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition after the Cold War . (Karachi: Oxford, 1994), 66.

3.16.1. Prop-up Theory

The defensive apologists cited the ‘Prop Up’ theory as the principal explanation of the Kremlin’s decision to send Soviet forces into Afghanistan. The theory stipulates that widespread uprising by religious groups all over the country against the initiatives introduced by Khalq-led Kabul government had produced fears in Soviets that the Saur Revolution achieved at a tremendous cost might collapse. The situation was alarming because “by April 1979 large parts of the country were in open rebellion and by December the government had lost control of territory outside of cities.” 36 Consequently, Moscow decided to send forces into Afghanistan as the last resort to prop up a fledgling pro-Soviet regime.

The rising crescendo of insurgency against the Kabul government and its infirmity in dealing with the situation made Soviets believe that the Saur Revolution achieved at great cost might be crumbling. 37 It has, however, been commented that spreading insurgency did influence the Soviet decision but it was the adventurism and mismanagement of Taraki and Amin which brought the Saur Revolution on the verge of collapse and drew the Soviet forces into Afghanistan. Confronted with the possibility of witnessing the collapse of the revolutionary regime due to ever widening and deepening insurgency, the Brezhnev administration finally came to the conclusion that the reforming state could only be saved by simultaneously introducing Soviet forces and moving the PDPA away from its provocative social reforms. 38

______36. Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of political Islam. (Harvard: Harvard University Press,2002),138.

37.Rahimullah Yusufzai (An eminent journalist and expert on Afghan affairs), in discussion with the author January 2016. 38. Raja Anwar (Journalist, who was in Afghanistan when the Revolution took place and spent years in Afghan prison), in discussion with the author, September 2015.

3.16.2. Brezhnev Doctrine

Once it became apparent that the Saur Revolution which had been achieved at great cost was slipping to disintegration and protecting it became inevitable, the Brezhnev Doctrine was invoked as an ideological cushion to the decision of sending forces into Afghanistan. The doctrine, enunciated in 1968, stated that once a state became socialist it was no longer the concern of that country alone to stay socialist. It devolved upon all socialist nations to ensure its continuation of being socialist even if it meant the use of force. The apologists of intervention would contend that being the ideological epicenter it was the international duty of the USSR to extend military assistance to all those countries where the nationalist revolutions faced problems in connection with consolidation due to internal and external counter-revolutionaries. They contended that leaving the Afghan revolution to face the imperialist reaction would have resulted in its collapse and would have been a serious blow to the entire communist and national liberal movement. 39

3.16.3. Offensive Character

The opponents do not subscribe that the Soviet step was defensive in nature; they believe that the PDPA regime in Kabul was not facing an imminent threat of being overwhelmed by the raging insurgency. Archer K. Blood, Charge d Affaires of the American Embassy in Afghanistan in 1979, in an interview to Oral History in 1989 contradicted the 'prop up' theory. Reflecting on the Soviet invasion, he observed “that he was surprised by the actual invasion for two reasons. One, I didn't think the government of Afghanistan was in that much danger of being toppled. I mean they weren’t very close to a military defeat.” 40 They contend that the development was the first step on the part of Soviets to realize their grand strategy.

______39. Rais, War without Winners, 75. 40. Cordovez & Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 43.

3.16.4. Warm-Water Theory

When a phenomenon defies common sense logic, it lends itself to as many interpretations as possible. The proponents of the Warm-Water Theory regarded the Soviet Union’s military incursion in Afghanistan one more step towards realization of old age necessity of gaining access to the Indian Ocean. Analyzing Soviet policy in South and Southeast Asia, Chinese Premier Zhao said during his visit to Pakistan in 1982 that the “Soviets intended to drive southwards to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf and to reach the Malacca Straits in order to control the oil resources and oil routes of the world.” 41 The Theory was significant but by the end of 1970’s the Soviets had already managed to acquire shipping facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen in the west sand Kam Rahn in the east provided them the warm water ports; therefore, this historical necessity was no longer a tenable argument.

3.16.5. The Expansionist Theory

The Expansionist Theory posits that it was the Soviet desire to expand its sphere of influence southwards that had prompted it to enter into internal conflict of Afghanistan. Following the period of détente between the Soviet Union and the United States in the 1970s, the former appeared to be in an advantageous plane due to paralysis afflicted American foreign policy. This was evident from Moscow’s assertiveness in foreign affairs and its increased military, political, and economic support to pro-Marxist regimes in Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Yemen etc. The Soviet leadership may have realized that the time was ripe for expanding influence southwards. The Theory “rest on several assumptions about Soviet ideology, its political system and its role as a global power…Its goal of world socialist transformation… prompted her entry into internal conflict.” 42 ______41.Mehrunnisa Ali, “Soviet-Pakistan Ties Since the Afghan Crisis,” in Asian Survey 23, no.9 (September, 1983),1032. 42. Rais, War without Winners, 67.

3.16.6. Contemporary Developments

Crucial developments at the contemporary international scene must have influenced the decision of the Soviet leadership while deciding to induct their military into Afghanistan Moscow’s break with Beijing, the progressive showdowns with it on the issue of border, along with ideological competition had made the USSR understand that it had an imposing and antagonistic neighbor on its eastern flank. On the other hand, the exponential pace of improvement in Sino-American rapprochement had transformed the geopolitics of Asia. 43 This had evoked apprehension in the Russian circles that the Beijing-Washington pivot coordinated at it. According to Brzezinski, the U.S. National Security Adviser, the cooperation was aimed at “discouraging Soviet expansionism.” 44

3.16.7. President Amin- A Bete Noire

Whatever may have been the causes of the Soviet Union’s decision to send its forces into Afghanistan, the immediate factor, however, seemed to be the person of Amin and his policies. Moscow though had accorded recognition to Amin as the head of the country but it “could not disguise the fact that Amin’s victory in the power-struggle with Taraki was unwelcome to that superpower.” 45 But two broad factors seemed alienated Soviets from Amin: first, Amin’s penchant for nationalist variation of communism, his disregard of the Soviet advice regarding rational implementation of initiatives and his refusal to consent to Soviet proposal for a broad-based national government in which PDPA would participate in power sharing-all made Amin a bête noire in the Soviet eyes.

Secondly, Amin’s overtures to the United States were potentially explosives as they led the Soviet Union to fear that Amin was another Tito in the making who was looking ways to balance the domineering Soviet influence. They feared that Amin might

______43. Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History (London: Taurus, 2003), 83 44. Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence , 107. 45. Kizilbash, Pakistan Security , 5. 85

allow Americans to use Afghanistan for electronic intelligence along the Afghan-Soviet border, and this would pave the way for conversion of a nonaligned country into an imperialist base. They decided to pre-empt such an eventuality and asked Amin to hand power over to Moscow approved leadership. His refusal alienated his Soviets sponsors who decided to get rid of him. 46 A special KGB unit assaulted his place and killed him when he refused to acquiesce in. Major General Oleg Kalugin, who headed the dreaded KGB’s counter-intelligence wing for many years, admitted that Afghanistan’s dictator “Hafizullah Amin was murdered by the KGB in Kabul in December 1979 because of his suspected American CIA connection.” 47

3.16.8. Other Explanation

Another explanation, more revealing and enlightening, came from Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s National Security Chief. In an interview to the French weekly Nouvel Observateur in January 1998 he acknowledged that the purpose of the secret aid by the United States to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul was to induce the USSR to send its troops to Afghanistan. Ali (2002)writes

sQ: Despite this risk, you were an advocate of this covert action. But perhaps you yourself desired this Soviet entry into war and looked to provoke it?

B: It isn’t quite that. We didn’t push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the possibility that they would. 48 ______46.Bannet R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (Michigan: Book Crafters, 1995), 111 47.Qutbuddin Aziz, “Soviet Spymaster Reveals How Hafizullah Amin was Killed,” Pakistan Times , December 3, 1993.

48. Tariq Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity (London: Verso, 2002), 206

It was a classic case of strategic and tactical surprise based on deception. But it must be added here that Pakistan, along with other stake holders, played a vital role in the whole situation for “had Pakistan not played the base-area role it did, and had not the Chinese and Arabs provided their backing, it is much less likely that the Russians would have gone into Afghanistan directly.” 49

3.16.9. Difficult Decision

In the end the decision to dispatch a heavy contingent of the Soviet forces into Afghanistan was not an easy option as it was evident from the words of a high-ranking Soviet scholar. Evgenii Primakov, Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, while speaking in Rome four months after the development said: “This was in fact a very difficult decision. When all the positive and negative aspects were weighed from the point of view of revolutionary operation in Afghanistan and the general situation of the forces in the world, it became clear that it was necessary.” 50 General Vladimir Kruicbkov, the former Deputy Head of the KGB, had summed up the Soviet Union’s point of view on the issue thus: “If we did not go into

Afghanistan, some other countries would.” 51

3.16.10. Possible Explanation

History repeats itself, first, as a tragedy, second as farce. Russians were aware of the fact that Afghanistan has never been a favorable ‘hunting ground’ for those who had sought to subjugate it. Therefore, analyses of events leading to the development and available evidence suggest that the decision may have been influenced by deteriorating circumstances in Afghanistan. The point is substantiated by the fact that initially there ______49. Fred Halliday, Threat from the East (London: Penguin, 1982), 111 50. Gupta, Afghanistan: Politics, 94 51. K. Kirby, Cold War-Soldiers of God: 1977-1988[Documentary] (United States: Cable News Network (CNN),2015)

was a strong opposition to sending troops into Afghanistan despite the fact that the revolutionary Government of Afghanistan made repeated requests for direct Soviet help to counter the threat posed by the Chinese-Pakistan-US armed guerillas infiltrating from Pakistan but the Soviets did not relent on the issue as was evident from the Politburo meeting held from 17-19 March 1979. Yuri Andropov, the KGB chief, strongly opposed the introduction of Soviet forces was supported by other members too, especially Gromyko, who argued that the United Nations Charter barred the Soviet Union to deploy its troops inside Afghanistan. 52

3.16.11. Herat Rebellion

Even the Herat rebellion in March 1979 did not provoke the Soviet leadership to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. Forty Soviet advisers and their families were killed in the rebellion and their bodies were paraded through the streets was a shocking incident. In response to urgent appeals from Taraki and Amin the “Soviet Politburo decided to shore up the quantum of military aid and send more advisers but not Soviet forces.” 53 The Afghan issue and the introduction of Soviet forces into Afghanistan were discussed at a meeting of the Soviet Politburo held on May 24, 1970. Having assessed the situation in Afghanistan, the members though agreed to send military equipment but it was agreed that to explain to “Taraki again that there was no question of providing helicopters and transport planes with Soviet crews, or of sending paratroopers to Kabul.” 54 Notwithstanding the fact that the Soviet Union had a treaty with Afghanistan to assist, but “fearing a Vietnam-style quagmire it resisted to involve itself militarily and was not prepared to go into what appeared to be budding civil war and possible quagmire.” 55 ______52. Rasnayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History , 85 53. Cordovez & Harrison, Out of Afghanistan , 35-36 54. Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History, 87. 55. Bruce Riedel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the Future of the Global Jihad (Washington D.C: The Brookings Institution, 2011),23

3.17. Soviet Union’s Point of View

Even the Soviet Union’s explanation of the decision supports the view that the step had been taken save the revolution from collapse due to continuous external interference. The Soviet Union acknowledged its military involvement in Afghanistan for the first time by an article appeared in Pravada. Moscow contended that the step had been taken “to save Afghanistan from continuous interference and instigations of Afghanistan’s external enemies and to safeguard the effects of the Revolution of 1978.” 56 But the most explicit explanation as to why the Soviets decided to undertake military venture in Afghanistan came from no other source than Brezhnev himself. In a policy statement issued to justify the Soviet military escapade, he pointed that the extraneous armed counter-revolutionaries’ intervention and conspiracies had created a situation in consequence of which Afghanistan could lose its sovereign status and become an ‘imperialist military bridgehead’ on USSR’s southern flank. He observed that the Soviet troops were dispatched to assist the Kabul government in countering the foreign aggression and would be withdrawn when the objective would be completed. 57 Brezhnev had justified the decision of the Soviet leadership to send troops in Afghanistan by “citing US actions in Chile where Washington, in concert with the Chilean army had drowned the people’s freedom in blood. Such a development could not be allowed in Afghanistan, a state adjacent to Soviet Central Asia.” 58

The Soviet Union made first contact with Pakistan to take her into confidence regarding sending the Soviet forces into Afghanistan. The Soviet Ambassador, S. Azimov, called on President Zia on 28 December 1979 to convey an important message

______56. Humayun Adeeb, Pakistan: Foreign Policy Perspective Lahore: Aziz Publishers,1987), 305. 57. Ali, Soviet-Pakistan Ties , 1026-1027 58. Hussain. Pakistan and the Emergence, 113.

from the Soviet leadership. The Ambassador contended that

“the Soviet Union had been forced to send a limited contingent to Afghanistan for a limited time at the invitation of Afghan leadership for the limited purpose of assisting the government of Afghanistan in putting an end to the armed intervention from across Pakistan border. The contingent would be withdrawn as soon as the purpose for which it was dispatched was achieved.” 59

3.18. U.S.A’s Reaction

The military incursion of a buffer state by one of the powers surrounding it often draws other power by default in the conflict and consequently the conflict assumes international dimension. Notwithstanding the fact that the United States had been secretly providing assistance to Afghan Mujahideen with a view to preparing the ground for the Soviet Union to send its forces into Afghanistan, it believed that Moscow would not intervene because of the high cost. But USSR defied American assumption and, by dispatching its troops into Afghanistan, brought its relations with USA to the breaking point. The United States deemed the step an offensive enterprise to gain access to areas that were vital to the economies of the United States and other industrialized states of the world.

Jimmy Carter, the President of the United States, observed that “the explosiveness of the region, its great national wealth and the Soviet willingness to use the armed forces which have been developed during the Kremlin’s enormous military build up during the last 15 years are what combine to make invasion of Afghanistan so ______59. Kizilbash, Pakistan Security, 6..

unsettling to the future of international peace.” 60 In his address to the American people in response to the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan on 4 January 1980 he said “I have already recalled the United States Ambassador from Moscow back to Washington…have asked the United States Senate to defer further consideration of the SALT II treaty so that the Congress and I can assess Soviet actions and intentions.” 61 Later on, he, while delivering the State of the Union address, proclaimed the Carter Doctrine which envisaged that any attempt by an external power to secure the control of the Persian Gulf region “will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” 62

3.19. International Response

th The West viewed the development in the context of the 19 century ‘Great Game’ whereby “Russia sought access to the Indian Ocean and posed a threat to Western security, explicitly violating the world balance of power agreed upon at Yalta.” 63 Consequently, it evoked stiff international response. Foreign ministers from 34 Islamic countries gathered in Islamabad from 26-29 January 1980 and passed a unanimous resolution containing condemnation of the Soviet action and demanded the immediate urgent and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. 64 On the other hand, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution protesting the Soviet intervention by a vote of 104-18. 65 ______60. M. Aslam, “The Afghan Factor,” in Pakistan-American Relations, ed. R. M. Azmi (Karachi: Royal Book, 1994), 67-68. 61. Jimmy Carter, “ Address to the Nation in response to the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan ,” (January 4, 1980) retrieved from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32911 . 62. Jimmy Carter, “ State of the Union Address,” (January 23, 1980) retrieved from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33079 . 63. Kepel, Jihad, 138 64. “Extraordinary Meeting of the Islamic Foreign Ministers’ Conference,” Pakistan Times (January 30, 1980), caption 1 65. Kizilbash, Pakistan Security, 10-11 91

3.20. Pakistan and the Soviet Military in Afghanistan

A country which is situated in proximity of the accepted ‘buffer state’ becomes center of international political gravity when the ‘buffer’ is violated. Pakistan was directly affected and beneficiary of the development. The massive presence of the Soviet troops on the Afghan soil enhanced security anxiety of Pakistan was understandable if seen in the context of its belligerent relations with India and Afghanistan. Ever since coming into existence on 14 th of August 1947, Pakistan’s relations with its eastern neighbor, India, an enormous nation of 800 million Hindus with whom Islamabad had already fought three wars, had scarcely been peaceful. This proximity of the Soviet forces was unsettling also because the USSR had not only “longstanding warm relations with India, but also Moscow’s support for the fragmentation of Pakistan barely a decade ago.” 66 Soviet Union had signed a Friendship Treaty with India in 1971 which furnished the latter with decisive ammunition to win war with Pakistan and paved the way for the creation of Bangladesh. Turmoil in Afghanistan in the wake of the Soviet military entry had generated trapping fears inasmuch as “potentially, it was a highly dangerous strategic situation. India and the Soviet Union were allies; should they combine, Pakistan faced the prospect of being squeezed out of existence.” 67

3.20.1. Elimination of Buffer State Status

The serious fall out of the Soviet step was that it unraveled the close to a century old pattern of the region and eliminated the ‘buffer state’ status of Afghanistan. Consequently, strategically speaking, the Soviet border had stretched to the Durand Line. One Pakistani official, while commenting on the development, observed that “for all practical purposes, the Soviet Union now has a border with Pakistan. The United States must realize that there has been historic realignment in this part of the world and

______66. William Malley, The Afghanistan Wars . (Hampshire: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2002),70 67. M. Yususf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: The Silent Soldier (Lahore:Jang,1992), 23-24 92

act accordingly.” 68 Pakistan believed that this direct access of the Soviet armed forces to its borders was a grave security threat to its existence because it was “ill-prepared and ill-equipped to meet the military threat.” 69

The development presented Pakistan with more complicated and alarming set of circumstances as it feared that the effects of the development would not remain confined to Afghanistan, and following the historical direction “the extension of Russian power and influence in the direction of the India Ocean was inevitable. Moreover, the power equilibrium in the region had changed.” 70 Therefore, Islamabad sought to internationalize the impact of the development by playing up security implication in the wider context. General Zia-ul-Haq, the military ruler, in his chat with the visiting Indian journalists pointed that “not only Pakistan, but India too, faced great dangers to its security. The security of the entire region, including Iran, the Gulf, and even Saudi Arabia, was in jeopardy. It is not a regional matter. It is now a global problem. Russia is a superpower and to any action or reaction of a superpower there must be a regional

response.” 71

At the core of Pakistan’s anxiety was the existence of friendship treaty between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan signed in December 1978. The signing of similar treaty by the Soviet Union with Vietnam (1978) served as a precursor to the latter’s invasion of Cambodia. 72 The fact of the matter was that the Afghan Army itself did not pose any serious threat to Pakistan but the latter feared that the existence of the treaty and the presence of the foreign forces on the Afghan soil might furnish the Soviets with

______68. Beverly Male, Revolutionary Afghanistan: A Reappraisal , (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 145. 69. Farroq Hasnat, “Political Relations between Pakistan and the United States,” in In search of Peace and Security: Forty Years of Pakistan-United States Relations , ed. Rais Ahmad Khan (Karachi: 1990),62 70. Chaudhri, Pakistan and the troubled world , 220 71. Bhabani S. Gupta, The Afghan Syndrome ,(London: Croom Helm,1982), 147. 72. Anthony Arnold, The Soviet Invasion in Perspective . (California: Hoover, 1981), 80

an opportunity “to exploit the internal problems of arising from the activities of the dissident elements in the provinces of Baluchistan and N.W.F.P.” 73

3.20.2. Refugees Problem-Strategic Challenge Migration is not a new phenomenon inasmuch as people have been moving out from their countries to other places for different reasons. They may be economic, social, political or environmental. They may be divided into two broad classifications: ‘pull factors’ which induce people to leave their countries in search of better economic opportunities, or ‘push factors,’ like poverty persecution and more important internal violent conflict which influence peoples decision to migrate. Domestic violence or conflict produces one of the lasting fall outs, that is, forced migration or displacement of people from their home state to other safer places. This leads to not only burden on the receiving state but other complex situations. It was the violent internal conflict, or push factor, which was at the heart of the migration of thousands of Afghans into Pakistan which presented it with another form of security challenge and placed enormous burden on the economy of Pakistan. 74

The opposition to the Russian military presence in Afghanistan produced a spillover effect and more than three million Afghan refugees sought asylum in Pakistan. According to figures available “the number of refugees had risen from 4000 in 1980 to 2.7 million in 1983, 2.878 million in 1987, 3.156 million in 1988, 3.255 in 1989, and peaked at 3.272 million in 1990.” 75 The immediate escalation in the number of Afghan refugees put strains on the social and economic fabric of the border areas of Pakistan that were to intensify during the years ahead. This situation seriously affected Pakistan’s economic progress and caused grave socio-political tensions.

______73. Cheema, “ The Afghan Crisis ,” 238 74. Dr.Ilyas A. Chattha (Research Fellow, Southampton, UK), in personal discussion with the author November 2016. 75. Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History , 111 94

The initial wave of Afghan refugees was very thin because the resistance was in its embryonic phase, and consequently they were not as serious burden on the economy of Pakistan. Later on, when the insurgency on the country side intensified due to arrival and distribution of external aid, the Kabul regime began to retaliate in response. This led to more exodus of ordinary Afghans who began to pour into Pakistan in droves. The massive continuing influx of the refugees began to put strains on the fragile economy. The situation eased to a large extent when the international community realizing the gravity of the situation started providing financial assistance to Pakistan. 76

3.21. Pakistan’s Reaction

Pakistan’s initial response to the development which had incalculable grave strategic consequences was, surprisingly, a low-pitched concern and protest. The first statement issued two days later contained two features: it condemned the event and termed the “induction of foreign troops in Afghanistan as serious violation of the norms of peaceful co-existence and the sacrosanct principles of the sovereignty of states and non- interference in the internal affairs as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.” 77 Surprisingly, the statement did not contain any explicit reference of the Soviet Union. At the end of the statement, “Islamabad hoped that the foreign troops would be withdrawn forthwith.” 78 Later on, Pakistan’s representative at the United Nations, while addressing the session of the General Assembly, termed military intervention in Afghanistan as a “violation of the norms of coexistence and urged the Security Council to immediately respond to the grave situation in Afghanistan, calling for withdrawal of foreign troops

from that Islamic country.” 79 ______76. Mohmund, Personal Communication, September 2016. 77.Mehrunnisa Ali, Pak-Afghan Discord: A Historical Perspective-Documents 1955-1979 (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1990), 422. 78. Abdul Sattar, “‘Foreign Policy,” in Pakistan in Perspective 1947-1997, ed. Rafi Raza (Karachi: Oxford, 1997), 118. 79. “Pakistan urges pull-out of foreign troops,” Pakistan Times , January 5, 1980, 1

3.22. Pakistan’s Strategic Dilemma and Options

The Soviet military entry into Afghanistan generated ripples and unraveled the close to one century old pattern of the region. Addressing a press conference after the Soviet march into Afghanistan, President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan described the event an unprecedented occurrence and said: “the recent military intervention in Afghanistan had brought about a qualitative change in the region.” 80 Pakistan emerged a key state and its response to the development was critical in determining the future trajectory of its relations with Afghanistan, the future of the Soviet military stay in Afghanistan and the direction of contemporary superpowers’ relations.

A weaker state when confronts a situation which is proportionately more challenging faces a quandary regarding meeting it. It assesses the ambience, its implications and resources its disposal and, last but not least, options available both at policy and practical levels. The Soviet military incursion into Afghanistan presented Pakistan a far more acute strategic dilemma: It was facing an unprecedented situation because India, its hostile eastern neighbor which had played a decisive role in its dismemberment, now had a superpower ally with which it had a 20-Year Friendship Treaty on the its northern border.

At the policy level, Pakistan’s options to respond the situation boiled down to the following three alternatives: to confront behemoth of Russian military power alone, or submit to the circumstance as a fiat accompli forced by the Soviet Union with all its attendant security and political ramifications, or to challenge the Soviet activity for its infringement of acknowledged global norms in the international forums of the United Nations, the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement shy of encounter with this superpower, while looking to reinforce its security politically and its defense capacity without adjusting itself to one side or the other in the superpower dispute.

______80. “Soviet Action has changed geo-political situation,” Pakistan Times , January 16, 1980, 1. 96

Pakistan’s recourse to the first option was not feasible inasmuch as it entailed enormous material resources which Pakistan did not possess. Therefore, Pakistan’s direct involvement in the Afghan resistance movement stood ruled out. Apart from the resource shortage, Pakistan’s confrontation could have furnished India with a leverage which it could exploit for its advantage and to the detriment of Pakistan’s interest. Likewise, Pakistan’s submission and acceptance of the situation as a ‘fiat accompli’ would have a disastrous impact not only on the security of Pakistan but also on the region. If the Soviet forces were allowed to consolidate their hold in Afghanistan, sooner or later their next target could be Pakistan and Iran. The oil-rich Gulf region was just one country away from the Soviet Union. To subjugate Pakistan would fulfill the age-old Soviet desire to gain access to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea. The third option was cooperative in nature but the limitation was obvious, i.e. in a bipartisan world dominated by rival superpowers merely raising an issue on world forums had more a theoretical content; whereas, the situation required Pakistan to take more pragmatic and explicit approach towards the issue and act accordingly. As a matter of fact, Pakistan had only Hobson’s choice, that is, the situation entailed Islamabad to seek cooperation of the rival superpower, USA, to cope with the challenge, and this was what happened when it assumed the status of ‘frontline’ state in return for massive military and financial assistance.

3.23. Drivers of Pakistan’s Response: Theoretical Framework -Constructivism. The primary objective of every state is to protect and further its core interests whatever are the objective conditions. Realization of the aforementioned objective entails making of decisions in accordance with the objectives circumstances. Therefore, there can be no single theoretical framework to explain a state’s specific response to an international event although realism is regarded as popular explanation. A section of foreign policy theoreticians believe that foreign policy serves as link between the domestic and the external world, and it is the domestic system-its social and political environments, and 97

above all the ruling elites play a critical part in the determination and formulation of foreign policy than the other factors of the external system. The ruling elites view the happening of international events through the prism of their status in the domestic power structure. They map out policies which ensure their powers and positions in the domestic power structure. In many Third World states where representative institutions are weak and rulers are wanted in constitutional legitimacy which render their position untenable in the domestic power structure, the ruling elites seek to maintain their hold on power by maneuvering the forces of the external world to maintain, preserve and consolidate their hold over the domestic system.

3.23.1. General Zia-ul-Haq- The Military Ruler of Pakistan

The Soviet forces were sent into Afghanistan at a time when a military government under General Zia was at the helm in Islamabad. He was lacking in constitutional legitimacy inasmuch as he had overthrown the elected government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in a military coup on 5 May 1977. Subsequently, he had Bhutto hanged in a trumped charge of murder which polarized the opinion at home. Later on, he retracted his promise of holding elections for the return of civilian rule, and set up military courts to strengthen his dictatorship. His obvious zeal for religious rhetoric was an anathema to major western countries which phased Pakistan into international isolation. The economic condition of the country was equally dismal due to “accelerating inflation, mounting debt and a huge balance of payments deficit and skeptics believed he could not survive in office due to Pakistan’s bad economic situation.” 81

The crisis was a god-sent opportunity for the military dictator whose hold on power was precarious. Consequently, he exploited the situation to strengthen his position both domestically and internationally. First, through economic and military assistance he had strengthened his support-base in the civil and military bureaucracy; ______81. John Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism (London: Pluto, 1999),

and second, his strong support for Afghanistan had won him the backing of the various religious groups within the country. The economic growth in the country through the assistance from the various sources like World Bank and the countries of the western bloc enabled him to secure his position vis-à-vis the democratic forces in the country.

Internationally, the military dictator managed to break the stranglehold of pariah status; however, securing international recognition was one part of the profile. The other objectives were to secure sophisticated military hardware to upgrade Pakistan’s military capabilities seriously impaired due to restrictions imposed by Washington, and to stave off American pressure on country’s nuclear program. In this connection David McGiffert, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, who accompanied Brezezinski to Pakistan soon after the entry of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan observed that “what they [ the Pakistanis ] were really after was tanks and high- performance aircraft like F-16. It was perfectly clear that their orientation as far as equipment was concerned was what would be useful on the Indian border.” 82

3.23.2. Pakistan’s Nuclear Program

Pakistan’s nuclear program began to be a standing irritant between Islamabad and Washington when Pakistan started efforts to acquire nuclear reprocessing in the 1970s. The United States regarded Pakistan’s nuclear program as being defense oriented and pressurized her to abandon it. Pakistan, on the other hand, contended that the program was for peaceful purposes. In an interview to Time magazine in March 1978, General Zia described the obtaining phase of Pakistan- US relations as the ‘lowest point’, and he ascribed his country’s efforts to acquire nuclear reprocessing plant to the nadir state of their ties. 83

______82.Codovez & Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 57 83. Hasnat, Political Relations , 59.

The Carter Administration hoped to use the military aid leverage to dissuade Islamabad from developing its nuclear option. However, General Zia was not ready to accept aid with strings related to Islamabad’s internal politics or nuclear program. In an interview, General Zia firmly said that Pakistan would serve the ‘necessary conduit’ for channelizing stepped-up aid to Afghan resistance provided the Washington demonstrated its credibility and reliability as an ally by fulfilling three conditions. The most important condition was ‘giving up its opposition to Pakistani plan to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In other words, Islamabad wanted sophisticated military hardware but was not prepared to give up its nuclear program as a quid pro quo. 84

3.24. Pakistan: A Frontline State

The fall of the Shah of Iran in consequence of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 was a setback for America’s of Middle East’s security paradigm as it deprived Washington of a dependable ally in the region; later on, graft on the situation was the induction of Soviet forces in Afghanistan which it perceived as a geostrategic threat not only to Pakistan but also to the Persian Gulf and American interests. Therefore, Washington decided to bolster its regional security network in an attempt to contain communism. The first step was to align Pakistan and one White House source commented that “The US Administration officials point out that the Soviet Invasion has made Pakistan very exposed. For the first time, the Soviet troops will be on the Pakistan frontier and Moscow would attempt to intimidate or subvert Pakistan.” 85

In his State of the Union address on 4 May 1980, President Carter, exhibited his concern on the grave development and announced that “We will provide military equipment, food and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and ______84. Cordovez & Harrison, Out of Afghanistan , 66. 85. “Pakistan very Exposed ,” Pakistan Times , January 7, 1980, 1

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national security against the seriously increased threat from the north.” 86 Consequently, Pakistan was designated as the ‘frontline state’ to achieve the fruition of the objectives. Pakistan was lavished with massive economic and military aid to secure and support its role in the war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. And secondly, act as a conduit for channelizing assistance to Afghan resistance groups.

Why did Pakistan prefer to join the international bandwagon as a ‘frontline’ state? According to one version, Islamabad allowed itself to be coopted as a ‘frontline’ state because it had no other option. 87 This may be explained by neo-realism which stipulates that it is the relative distribution of power at the international level which affects state’s response to international situation. The contemporary international politics was divided into two blocs, the Soviet and the USA, and India, Pakistan’s hostile neighbor was an ally of the Soviet Union; therefore, it was but natural for Islamabad to become part of the western coalition to face the strategic challenge.

3.24. 1. National Security Culture

At the practical level, it is the national security culture of a state which determines its response to an international event that has direct bearings on its security. A small and weak state that lacks the military resources and strength when confronts a relatively more powerful threat, invokes a rival power to defend itself. In the past, Pakistan had endeavored to meet its security issues by securing a superpower backing to make up for its shortcoming and geographical exposure, as when it joined the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the mid- 1950's and turned into the beneficiary of expansive amounts of American military and financial help. However, sometimes the weak state so adjusts the contours of its policy that it opts to exercise neutrality in its relations with big powers but continue to align ______86. Carter, Address to the Nation, retrieved from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32911 87. Rasul B. Rais (Academician and commentator on Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations), in audience with the author March 2016.

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itself with middle level powers so as to ensure balance in relations with its adversaries. Islamabad adopted this policy in the late 1960's and all throughout most of the 1970's, by endeavoring to steer a more nonaligned course, and to look for outside backing from nations like China, Saudi Arabia, and France. The magnitude of the present crisis was such that Pakistan could not face it even with the help of middle powers, and the only way was to develop an alliance with the rival power, the United States.

There may be another elaborative explanation of Pakistan’s decision: Washington had clamped military sanctions on Pakistan since its 1965 war with India, and they had deeply impacted Pakistan’s military strength vis-à-vis India. Consequently, the disparity between Pakistan and India had been widening and New Delhi had exploited it in 1971 war and had Pakistan dismembered. The post-intervention situation was the best possible opportunity for Pakistan to redress the gap and secure necessary military supplies from America. According to available record, Islamabad received a large quantity of military hardware from 1980 to 1987. (See Annexure ‘A’)

3.24.2. Implications of ‘Frontline State’

It is difficult to predict what would have been the trajectory of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and international politics had Pakistan opted not to be a ‘frontline’ state in the international coalition stitched by the United States in its bid to put freeze on the likely Soviet expansion. But Pakistan’s acquiescing in proved to be far more eventful and was fraught with deeper and long-term implications which have been influencing the regional political dynamics even today. It not only set the tenor of its relations with Afghanistan till the exit of Dr. Najib in 1992 but also influenced the trajectory of Cold War and superpowers’ relations. It along with other factors laid the foundation of that chain reaction which culminated in the disintegration of the Soviet Union and consequently the dissolution of the world order.

Notwithstanding the fact that Islamabad received massive military and financial cushion in return but the most significant corollary was that it proved to be a major loser 102

in the long run. It was Pakistan’s strategic location that made it occupy an indispensable niche in American South Asian policy during the Cold War. Now with the dismemberment of the world system Pakistan lost the strategic significance it had been enjoying since its inception in 1947. It has been argued that Pakistan’s decision was justified because it had no other potent option at the time to protect its interests. Only by becoming a part of a much larger alliance could Islamabad further its interests. It sought to regain the position in the late 1990s by promoting the Taliban but it proved to be rather a counterproductive ploy. 88

3.25. Military and Economic Assistance

The development resulted in re-evaluation of American policy toward Southwest Asia. The new policy contained: support to Pakistan through military and economic assistance; secondly, aid to the Afghan freedom fighters in their war against the Soviet invasion, as well as to Afghan refugees in Pakistan; thirdly, no veto power to India over U.S. aid to Islamabad. 89 Therefore, in line of its policy of strengthening of Pakistan’s defense capabilities and addressing its economic foes, the United States prepared two comprehensive aid packages for Pakistan: the first six-year assistance package (1981- 1987) amounted to US $ 3.2 billion, equally divided between economic assistance and military sales. The United States also sold 40 F-16aircraft to Pakistan at a cost of $1.2 during 1983-1987 at a cost of $1.2 billion outside the assistance package. On March 1986, Washington announced that it had agreed with Islamabad “on a $ 4.02 billion aid package-$ 2.28 billion in economic assistance and $1.74 billion in military sales credits- for the ensuing six years.” 90 The ‘frontline state’ status also conferred upon Pakistan the prerogative of being the only conduit for financing, training and equipping Afghan Mujahideen engaged in resisting the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. ______88. Rais, Personal Communication , March2016 89. Theodore L. Eliot and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, The Red Army on Pakistan’s Border: Policy Implications for the United States (Virginia: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1986), V. 90. Eliot & Pfaltzgraff, op.cit, 73. 103

3.26. Pakistan: A Funneler

The fact that Pakistan was a ‘frontline’ state and thus by design playing a key role in organizing, developing and sustaining resistance movement against the Soviets by channelizing external assistance to the Mujahideen cast deep fractured impact on the nature and trajectory of its relations with Afghanistan. However, Islamabad never publically admitted the fact that the Pakistani Interservices Intelligence Directorate was working implicitly in tandem with the American CIA on training programs for insurgents and coordinating the Chinese, Saudi Arabian, Egyptian, and Kuwaiti aid. 91 The extent of Pakistan’s involvement in expediting the ‘Afghan Jihad ’ can be gauged from the fact that from 1984 through to 1987, the ISI not only arranged for training of some 80000 Mujahideen but “hundreds of thousands of tons of arms and ammunition were distributed, several billions of dollars were spent on this immense logistic exercise and ISI teams regularly entered Afghanistan alongside the Mujahideen .” 92

3.26.1. Support to Islamic Groups

Notwithstanding the fact that a number of Afghan nationalist parties were also engaged in resisting the Soviet intervention in their country but Pakistan’s policy of funneling assistance to Islamists only marginalized them. Islamabad’s support to the Islamic groups, especially that led by Hekmatyar , may be predicated, it seemed, first that the Pashtun -dominated Islamist parties were opposed to the idea of nationalism and Pakistan wanted to channelize this sentiment in reducing the significance of Pashtunistan issue in the post-Soviet phase. Secondly, it believed that the religion- based groups would remain loyal to Pakistan whereas nationalist groups would assert their independence from Pakistan as soon as it suited their interests. This assumption

______91.Taufeeq Jillani (Former officer in Pakistan Army who was closely associated with the Afghan Jihad ), in discussion with the author June 2015. 92. Yusuf & Adkin, The Bear Trap , 4

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of Pakistan proved presumptuous when Islamabad sponsored Peshawar-based Islamists refused to go along with General Zia on the issue of government of national reconciliation (discussed in chapter V) and later on they exhibited intransigence and political immaturity when Dr. Najib resigned and interim arrangement in Afghanistan was being discussed in Peshawar.

3.27. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations 1979-1989

States’ relations are not a zero-sum game in the sense that difference of perception on core contentious issued preclude them from establishing bilateral relations. It is the exigency of national interest that determines the approach to realization of national objectives in a given circumstance. Pakistan’s policy of not granting diplomatic recognition to the Soviet-propped regime set the tenor of its relations with Afghanistan for the next phase in their ties. Agha Shahi, adviser to the Government of Pakistan on Foreign Affairs, while delivering a speech on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security in the Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on 17 November 1980 said that his country’s policy of not according diplomatic recognition to the Kabul regime “stems from its principled .” opposition to foreign military intervention, no matter where it occurs 93 3.27.1. Nature of their Relations

The history of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations had been chequered since their inception till 1979 characterized by fluctuation from broadsides to breakdown in diplomatic ties and eventually realization by Afghan nationalists the necessity of developing some sort of understanding with Pakistan but the phase, 1979 to 1992, may be described as the most tumultuous which may be conceptualized as a period of ‘irrelational ties.’ They may be defined ‘a state of relationship between states when they lack a fundamental tier in the accepted paradigm regulating states’ relations.’ It happens when one of the ______93. Saeeduddin A. Dar, Selected Documents on Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan: 1947-198 5 (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University, 1986), 287 105

states is governed by an administration which does represent the people of that state and majority of people rise against it; rather, it is installed by an external power by force against the wishes and continues to sustain it by maintaining its forces there. Owing to this, other states prefer not to accord diplomatic recognition to such a government but continue to maintain trade relations with the state. Though the diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level did not exist between the two countries; pragmatism taught them that the current phase of ‘ambassadorial alienation’ would be a passing phenomenon therefore, they continued to maintain relations at the sub-ambassadorial plane. Consequently, people were coming and going; visas were issued and trade continued to be conducted between them. 94

3.27.2. Afghan Charges

The decade witnessed steep turbulence in the relations of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations which can be gauged from accusations and counter-accusations of interference in each other’s affairs. The Afghan government’s criticism usually was in connection with Pakistan’s alleged assistance to Afghan dissidents. Radio Kabul repeatedly alleged Pakistan’s involvement in the Afghan crisis. It was the Radio Kabul which was serving as the mouthpiece of the Kabul government. In one of the broadcasts, it was accused that Pakistani nationals were involved in demonstrations in Afghanistan on 22 February 1980. Islamabad categorically rejected the allegation. “Later on, in another statement on 25 February 1980 the Radio alleged that Saudi Arabia was providing money to Pakistan with a view to financing military units for subversive activities in Afghanistan.” 95

Mr. Shah Mohammad Dost, the Afghan representative at the United Nations, in his statement in the United Nations General Assembly on 23 September 1981 accused Pakistan of interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan. Responding to allegations, ______94.Ahmed Rashid (journalist and expert on Pakistan-Afghanistan and Central Asian affairs), in discussion with the author October 2016. 95. Dar, Selected Documents , 239. 106

Pakistani representative, Mr. Niaz A. Naik categorically rejected the allegations as baseless and said “the propaganda campaign unleashed against Pakistan accusing it of allowing its territory to be used as a base of operations by the Afghan Mujahideen or a conduit is totally unfounded.” 96 Again, in October 1983, the Afghan Foreign Minister complained to the UN General Assembly that “armed intervention against the DRA from

Pakistani territory is the root cause of the Afghan problem.” 97

3.27.3. Pakistan-Counter Accusations

Islamabad too accused Kabul of creating disturbances in Pakistan. According to Pakistani sources, there had been thousands of violations of its airspace and border areas by Afghan planes and artillery since 1983.General Zia in response to bomb blasts in different cities said that “The bomb blasts in Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Peshawar and Quetta have, in recent months, killed more than hundred innocent people were linked very much with the Afghan issue and Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan.” 98 Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Yaqub Khan, said at a Press Conference on 5 September 1984 at Islamabad Airport that “the serious violations of Pakistan’s territory from Afghanistan side take place on the eve of this Geneva round have resulted in the loss of innocent lives and damage to property.” 99

Pakistan alleged Khad, the Afghan secret agency, for escalation in widespread sabotage on its territory and charged Afghan Air and ground forces for air and ground violations. Khan(2005) writes:

______96. Dar, op.cit., 312. 97. James B. Amstutz, The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University,1986), 354 98. Chaudhri, Pakistan and the Troubled World , 281. 99. Dar, Selected Documnts, 355.

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“Until 1984 the average number of sir violations remained well below 100 a year, with ground violations near 30; by comparison, air violations in 1985, 1986, and 1987 were 251, 757, and 644 respectively, and ground violations in 1986 and 1987 rose to 170 and 244. In 1987, 377 people were killed by aerial bombardments inside Pakistan territory and 40 by artillery shelling. Incidents of subversion similarly escalated to 381 in 1986 and 414 in 1987.” 100

3.27.4. Relative Position on the Issue

Since both countries were affiliated with rival contemporary superpowers, Pakistan as a ‘frontline state’ and Afghanistan physically occupied by the Soviet forces, their relations, in whatever form, were not ties of independent, sovereign states; rather they were acting as proxies of their respective patrons. Their relations did witness slide in the 1950s and 1960s, but the decade from 1979 to 1989 was unprecedented because their ties were touching the nadir point. The relative position of the two countries in connection with the crisis represented antipode views: Kabul wanted direct talks, a bilateral agreement with Islamabad on non-interference and international guarantees limited to non-interference. It believed that the issue of withdrawal was beyond the purview of the United Nations negotiations. 101 On the other hand, Pakistan policy was based upon four points contained in successive UN General Assembly resolutions: immediate and total withdrawal of Soviet forces; restoration of independent and nonaligned status of Afghanistan; right of self-determination for the Afghan people, and finally, creation of political conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the Afghan refugees. 102 ______100. Riaz M. Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2005), 174 101. Khan, op.cit. 92. 102. Amstutz, The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation, 355.

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3.27.5. Afghan Overtures

The Babrak government made first overture to the Government of Pakistan in May 1980. In a major policy statement, it was stated that “the government of DRA proposes to the government of Pakistan the holding of Afghan-Pakistan negotiations with a view to working out bilateral agreements on the normalization of relations.” 103 The government of Pakistan turned down the offer inasmuch as it did not fully recognize the incumbent Kabul government. Later on, the Soviet sponsored Afghan regime made another attempt to induce Pakistan to accord recognition to the DRA government, and went to the extent of granting formal recognition to the Durand Line as international border provided Islamabad stopped assistance to Mujahideen. The Afghan Foreign Ministry on 17 January 1981 made an important policy statement which contained that “there is no dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan or between Afghanistan and Iran. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has no territorial claims whatsoever against these countries.” 104

3.28. Geneva Negotiations and Accords

One can do anything with a bayonet except one holding it cannot sit upon it. The space needed to ‘sit upon it’ is provided by political negotiations between the parties to the issue. The military aspect is one of the fundamental aspects of the issue but it provides temporary solution, whereas, basic issues which give rise to the conflict remain unresolved and thus lasting peace and harmony eludes. The other side is the political engagement between the parties to the dispute. The interesting aspect is that the political and military tracks run side by side. They use the ground position to strengthen their bargaining at the negotiating table. The Afghan cauldron was no exception to this rule; however, it took more than a year for parties to the conflict to realize this and signaling their intention to enter into negotiations. ______103. Amstutz, op.cit., 353. 104. Amstutz, op.cit., 354. 109

The initiative regarding the start of negotiations came from Pakistan, the country most affected by the development. On January 4, 1981 Agha Shahi, advisor on foreign affairs to the Government of Pakistan, wrote to Secretary General Kurt Waldheim urging him to promote a dialogue between Pakistan, Iran and the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. In response to Pakistan’s request, the Secretary General appointed Xavier Perez de Cuellar, a Peruvian diplomat, as his personal representative in February 1981. However, the prospects of early settlement of the conflict were not encouraging inasmuch as the conflict involved enormous complexities and maximalist positions representing ‘perception divergence’ between primary parties-Pakistan and Afghanistan-was wide enough. Graft on the situation was the role of the United States and the Soviet Union, the two superpowers indirectly linked with the conflict.

3.28.1. Proxy Relations

The ‘irrelational ties’ between Pakistan-Afghanistan from 1979 to 1992 was a bilateral phase in their relations; however, the start of Geneva negotiations represented a parallel period of ‘Proxy Relations’ between the two neighbors at the international level. They may be defined “a state of relations between two countries where one of them does not diplomatically recognize the government of the other but remains engaged with it by default by using the good offices of international organization for the resolution of a crisis which is the casus belli. The third party promotes negotiations between the two but in such a way that representatives of the states do not sit face to face.

3.28.2. Start of Negotiations

The negotiations at Geneva for an acceptable resolution of the Afghan imbroglio were long, hard and tedious because the record of conflict-resolution in the post-World War II era points that “situations of active conflict involving multiplicity of actors with expectations of high gains are much less amenable to negotiated settlements than

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those which are simpler and devoid of any possibility of instant strategic gains.” 105 They assumed further complexity when Pakistan refused to hold bilateral talks with Afghanistan as it would, Islamabad contended, tantamount to recognition of the Communist regime in Kabul and placed it in violation of resolutions adopted by theprestigious Islamic Conference, a representative forum embracing Islamic states of varying political hues. Therefore, a novel mechanism of ‘proximity talks’ was devised to compensate the recognition lacuna. Thereafter, the framework of the proximity talks was to regulate the political relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan till the conclusion of the talks and the signing of the Geneva Accords.

3.28.3. Second Round-April 1983

During the second round of the Geneva Talks held between 11 and 22 April 1983, substantial progress towards the political solution of the issue echoed to have been achieved. The success at the second round of the Geneva Talks inspired Diego Cordovez to indicate that ninety-five per cent of the draft agreement had already been drawn up. The remaining five per cent was related to guarantees of non-intervention that were to be furnished by the US and Moscow. Moscow had shown its willingness to sign the accords as a guarantor when in final shape. This generated optimism and many observers were of the view that the political settlement of the issue was possible after the second round of the talks. Eventually the likely political settlement could not take place.

There were conflicting views regarding the failure of the parties to arrive at political settlement: one view places the onus on Pakistan’s inability to act independently of the United States because it was observed that at the height of the second phase of the intense Cold War, America reportedly exerted pressure on the Zia regime to refrain from giving in to Soviet overtures for a negotiated settlement of the ______105. Riffat Hussain, “Pursuing peace in Afghanistan,” The News , May 19, 1998

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Afghan issue. Washington was aimed to give the Soviets a ‘dose’ of what it had faced in Vietnam.” 106 But apart from the United States pressure, there was another constraint: it has been commented that it was OIC resolution passed at the foreign ministers’ meeting in Islamabad in 1980 which morally bound Pakistan. 107 The second point was that it was the Soviet Union’s intransigence on treating the issue of withdrawal time- frame as a separate issue which was instrumental in killing the negotiated settlement in the second round because a “dour Gromyko firmly maintained that inclusion of withdrawal in a UN document was unacceptable. These were Soviet troops, not Afghan or Pakistani. As the Soviets had no right to negotiate Pakistan-Afghanistan differences, Pakistan could not discuss Soviet withdrawal.” 108 Whatever may have been the cause of the failure, it prolonged the Soviet stay in Afghanistan and further complexed the trajectory of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.

3.28.4. Ascendancy of Mikhail Gorbachev

It was the assumption of power by Mikhail Gorbachev after the death of Chernenko on 10 March 1985 and his restructuring of the Soviet foreign policy from ideological to nationalist lines produced thaw in rival superpowers’ relations. This melting paved the way for inter alia for the acceptable resolution of the Afghan crisis. It crystallized in the signing of the Geneva Accords on 4 April 1988 between Pakistan and Afghanistan. They stipulated that all Soviet troops would leave Afghanistan within nine months, and half of them to be removed in the first three months; secondly, they called for a ban on cross border activities. Both the super powers were to ensure one-year moratorium on arms deliveries. However, both of the super powers had the right to arm their ‘allies’ should there be a violation of the one-year moratorium on arms race. (Annexure B)

______107. Rasul B. Rais (Academician and commentator of Pak-Afghan affairs), in discussion with the author March 2016. 108. Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 121.

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3.28.5. Comments and Critique

The signing of the Geneva Accords was a watershed development which had facilitated the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan in an honorable and face saving manner. They represented what may be described in frank terms the retreat of the Brezhnev doctrine and the successful realization of the Regan doctrine, the two “doctrines that had dominated the final years of the Cold War. The former sought to protect neighboring communist regimes while the latter was built around support to insurgencies against such governments.” 109

3.28.6. Soviet Perspective

The new Moscow leadership under Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev realizing the grave issues involved in the further stay of Soviet military in Afghanistan decided to adopt a forward approach and consequently managed to secure withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan under a veil of UN diplomacy and thus cut its military losses. The Soviet Foreign Minister, Edward Shevardnadze, hailed the Accords “as a success of Gorbachev’s foreign policy.” 110 The Soviet leadership by concluding the Accords, first, attempted to repair the international diplomatic damage caused by military incursion to Soviet prestige, and, secondly, declared its intent of seeking improvement in ties with the Muslim world and the Third World countries. Commenting on the mis-escapade, Moscow Radio admitted that “the Afghan adventure cost us…political losses on a huge scale. The world regarded us an aggressor.” 111 However, the spokesman of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gennadi Gerasimov, was more frank and candid when he commented that “an intervention like this is not going to happen…we will think twice, thrice before we move in again.” 112 ______

109. S. Iftikhar Murshed Afghanistan: The Taliban Years , (London:Bennet & Bloom, 2006), 33 110. Agha Shahi, “The Geneva Accord,” in Pakistan Horizon XLI, no.3 (1988): 30. 111. Bradsher, Afghan Communism, 191. 112. Shahi, The Geneva Accord, 29.

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Notwithstanding the fact that Mikhail Gorbachev managed to extricate USSR from a war that it could not hope to win, the real winner in terms of political implications were the ‘hardliners’ in the establishment of the Reagan Administration. They by striking an ‘unlikely alliance’ with Afghan Islamic groups raised the cost of the Soviet stay in Afghanistan and successfully managed to pay back Moscow what Washington had to earn in Vietnam. The United States Secretary of State, George Schultz, though “did not consider the Geneva Accord to be perfect but ‘as practical people’ he thought it could ‘achieve important ends.” 113

3.28.7. Strategic Implications for Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations

That the Geneva Accords contained everything for the rival superpowers and nothing for their proxies will not be an underestimation of the value of the Accords. Even the de- induction of the Soviet forces under the Accords did not produce the spirit of accommodation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Though Article One of the Accords, which expressly forbade the two proxies from interfering in each other’s’ affairs. Apparently, the provision had negative content but still it could have been built upon to give positive direction to their ties because the two neighbors by signing the instrument had agreed to respect sovereignty of each other. Subsection Four of the Article was more candid in terms of addressing Pakistan’s strategic concerns as it binds each country “to ensure that its territory is not used any manner which would violate the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and national unity or disrupt the political, economic and social stability of the other High Contracting Party.” *

However, this entailed two things: first, it required dexterous evaluation of the existing situation by both Pakistan and Afghanistan; secondly, the onus of taking initiative in this connection appeared to be more on Pakistan because it was hosting

______

113. Matinuddin, Power Struggle in the Hindukush , 208-209 *See Annexure B for relative provision.

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more than three million Afghan refugees who were an enormous burden on its economy. On the other hand, it was Islamabad’s strategic interests which were at stake. But President Zia’s statement that “ Mujahideen ’ should and would not abandon their resistance and would topple the Afghan regime,” 114 not only make mockery of the Accords but also killed the likelihood of any such initiative. The explanation of Pakistan’s decision may have been that hitherto it had been pursuing policy of political realism, i.e., engaging Afghanistan; now it believed that the balance of power required that it should have gone for its ‘forward policy’, installing friendly regime.

3.28.8. Interim Government

The the document was not a comprehensive package was evident from the fact that the issue of interim government was not seriously attended to and consequently President Najib remained in office. It had been commented that the document contained serious lacunas which lead to negative implications. There was no mechanism to give effect to ceasefire between the warring Afghan parties nor was there any guarantee of conditions of safety and honor for the voluntary return of nearly six million Afghan refugees to their homes. 115 Gulbaddin Hekmatyaar , one of the Mujahideen leaders, explicitly “repeated in Lahore on 28 March that Pakistan had no business to negotiate in their behalf; and Mujahideen will not be bound by any commitment that Mr. Zain Noorani were to make.” 116

______114. Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence, 137 115. Shahi, The Geneva Accord , 31. 116. M.B. Naqvi, “Afghanistan: What After Geneva,” Dawn , April 7, 1988.

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Chapter Four

Post-Daoud Period: Phase Two

The Soviet military escapade in Afghanistan proved to be its ‘Waterloo’, and eventually more than eight years after they were sent into Afghanistan to prop up the fledgling pro- USSR regime, Soviet troops began their withdrawal under the provisions of the Geneva Accords signed in April 1988. The event heralded the beginning of the end of a long, bloody, and fruitless Soviet military adventure in Afghanistan. The incursion was a catalytic development too because it was one of the contributory factors in the disintegration of the Soviet Union which resulted in the transformation of geo-strategic realities of global politics by ending the Cold War between the rival superpowers which had kept hostage the whole world under the threat of a nuclear holocaust for half a century.

It may be commented that in the entire period of its existence this was the only occasion when Pakistan as a ‘frontline state’ played a key role and directly influenced the global history. The retreat of the Soviet Union was a phenomenal development: General Zia-ul-Haq, the man who steered the Afghan jihad, “had on several occasions said firmly that he did not expect to see Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan during his life time and if this happened, it would constitute the miracle of the twentieth century.” 1 The miracle did happen and left in its trail an environment which called for a policy reorientation by Pakistan towards Afghanistan: Islamabad needed all skills and dexterity to consolidate the gains it had earned during 1979-1988 and channelize them for the purpose of straightening the trajectory of its traditional awry relations with Kabul. ______1. Shahid M. Amin, Pakistan Foreign Policy: A Reappraisa, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 98

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4.1 Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations 1989-1992

The beginning of post-withdrawal phase produced a qualitative change in the region of Southwest Asia: the area which had been center of ‘international political gravity’ for a decade lost its centrality due to disengagement of the west in general and the United States in particular. But Pakistan emerged as a principal player which held key to the restoration of peace and stability in Afghanistan but, at the same time, it needed dexterous handling of the situation and upon which depended the nature of Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan and protection of its strategic interests. Islamabad had two options before it: to retreat in the background and help and guide Afghan leaders to work for a broad-based government acceptable for all Afghans or continued its support to the Peshawar-based Mujahideen groups unless they militarily defeat the government of Dr. Najib and form their own government..

4.1.1. First Option: Disengagement

The complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan produced significant implications for Pakistan which warranted Islamabad to take the initiative of disengagement from Afghan affairs and guide Afghan leadership in the restoration of peace: first, security considerations which came to influence Pakistan-Afghanistan relations during the decade long stay of the Soviet forces were no longer a factor to hostage the renewal of a new phase in their ties. Earlier Mr. Agha Shahi, Pakistan’s adviser on foreign affairs, speaking on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security in the Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on November 17, 1980 pledged that “Pakistan will have no hesitation in extending recognition to any government in power in Kabul once the foreign forces are completely withdrawn from Afghanistan.” 2 ______2. Saeeduddin A. Dar, Selected Documents on Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan, (Islamabad:Quaid- i- Azam University, 1986), 287

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Secondly, the most important factor that warranted Pakistan to take the initiative intended to improve ties with Kabul was the presence of more than three million Afghan refugees on Pakistani soil and their impact on socio-economic ecology on the country. Their early return was necessary because support for them had shrunk dramatically within one year of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.(See Annexure C) Therefore, a section of Pakistani military establishment was of the opinion that the Afghan situation had assumed complex trajectory in the wake of the Soviet pullout, therefore, Islamabad “should have detached itself from the Afghan imbroglio and used the knowledge of the country to guide the Afghan leadership inasmuch as Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence knew all of them.” 3

4.1.2. Continuous Support

Instead of exercising disengagement, hardliners in Pakistan Military Establishment, in order to protect country’s strategic interests, chose to pursue policy of offensive realism, i.e., they decided to re-activate ‘forward policy’ of installing friendly regime in Afghanistan. in the 1950s, when Pakistan-Afghanistan relations were touching the nadir point, Pakistan resolved to pacify the Durand Line by the same policy but forbade by the United States due to likely disturbance of strategic balance in the region. 4 Two factors may have influenced Islamabad’s thinking: first, the perception may have been that the Najib government would not survive long enough once the Moscow would completely de-induct its forces. In view of such an eventuality, Pakistan hoped to fill in the vacuum by a government of erstwhile Mujahideen. However, the Soviet Union continued the supply of aid and weapons * to its client regime of Dr. Najib in Kabul even after ______3. Cary Schofield, Inside Pakistan Army: A Woman’s Experience on the Frontline of War on Terror (London: Biteback ,2011),107 4. Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005), *The Soviet Union continued to provide military assistance to the Kabul regime after post-withdrawal phase under the positive symmetry which stipulated that the United States would continue extending assistance to the Mujhaideen as long as the Soviets provided assistance to the Najibullah’s government. It was in 1991 when the Soviet Union indicated to America that it was going to freeze aid to the Kabul regime. .

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complete de-induction of its troops from Afghanistan so that the Kabul government could fend off the resistance and survive in office. Rubin (1995) writes that Kremlin provided: “the Najib government with aid worth ‘$3-4 billion per year, until the end of 1991, when the United States and the now defunct Soviet Union agreed to end aid…In 1990 Moscow supplied Najibullah with 54 military airplanes, 380 tanks, 865 armored personnel carriers, 680 anti-aircraft guns, 150 r-17 rocket launchers and thousands of tons of fuel. The weapons also included over 500 SCUD missiles, estimated to cost $ 1 million each. Western sources estimated the

value of aid at $ 250-200 million per month.” 5

Consequently, President Dr. Najib defied expectations and continued to cling to power for another nearly four years.

4.1.3. Strategic Depth

The narrative of ‘strategic depth’ expounded by the Pakistani Military Establishment crystalized in a policy of seeking installation of a client regime in Kabul may have been the other factor taken precedence over all other alternate approaches. It was not the first time that Islamabad was seeking for a ‘friendly or favorable’ regime in Kabul. In the wake of cataclysmic developments in Afghanistan in April 1978, General Faiz Ali Chishti, a key member of General Zia’s cabinet, “proposed for the pursuance of ‘forward policy’ and secure installation of a favorable government by using friendly Pashtun tribes.” 6 But the proposal could not be materialized due to potentially explosive situation in Afghanistan.

______5. Bannet R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System . (Michigan: Book Crafters,1995), 147,149. 6. Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan and the emergence, 97.

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4.1.3.1. What is ‘Strategic Depth?

As a military concept, Strategic Depth may be defined to represent “the distance between actual or potential frontline and key centers of population, logistics and industrial and military production.” 7In case the distance is short, these key places remain vulnerable to enemy’s attack. The only alternate is to seek strategic depth which enables an army to absorb and withstand the initial thrust of the enemy and use the deep space for reorganization and counter attack. Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth implies that the geographical narrowness is so acute that vital population, industrial communication and military centers are situated close to the border and thus within the striking distance of India. The purpose of the strategic depth is to compensate spatial limitations and provide necessary space and resources to an army in time of war where it can retreat and regroup to mount a retaliatory attack.

4.1.3.2. Genesis of Strategic Depth

The concept of ‘Strategic Depth’ though had been articulated in the 1980s when General Aslam Baig, later the Chief of Pakistan’s Armed Forces, floated the idea of “creating ‘strategic depth’ by allaying with Afghanistan and Iran.” 8 However, its genesis is traced to the tragedy of 1971 when Pakistan got dismembered in consequence of its third war with India. The disintegration dawned upon the security managers in Islamabad the necessity of having favorable relations with Afghanistan on two accounts: first, Islamabad did not want to be sandwiched between two hostile neighbors, Kabul and New Delhi; and, secondly, the vast imbalance in traditional hard military framework between it and India is unbridgeable, and its nuclear cushion is vulnerable due to spatial limitations inherent in its geography. Therefore, in order to compensate its weakness, it

______7. S. Siddiqui, “ Strategic depth at the heart of Taliban arrests,” Asia Times, March 24, 2010 8. Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan: Its Army and the Wars within (Oxford: Oxford, 2008), 419.

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wants a friendly Afghanistan where it could deposit its nuclear hardware in case of nuclear war with India, and, later on, use it for reverse offensive. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the first elected prime minister of Pakistan, soon after assumption of office in the wake of the separation of East Pakistan, issued a secret memorandum to his Chief of Army Staff, “directing him to prepare for a two-front future war with India as Afghanistan would attack because there had been fears that it might during the 1971 war.” 9

4.1.3.3. Afghanistan as a Strategic Depth

For Pakistan, Afghanistan is a key to successful working of the idea of strategic depth, for it vitally requires that the Afghan government not only a close associate of Pakistan but also willing to help it fight India. At the point when the Taliban were in power in Kabul, they were seen as the ideal partner for the Pakistani military to realize its objective of the ‘strategic depth.’ Albeit generally seen in the West as medieval if not brutal, the Taliban administration was esteemed in Pakistan as wildly hostile to India and in this way meriting Pakistani arms and help. 10 It was commented that Pakistan’s policy of gaining strategic depth in Afghanistan is impractical and consequently it will not materialize because it requires not only friendly government but friendly population as well. Our Afghan policy is pro-Pashtun which has alienated other minorities in Afghanistan. Ironically, the situation has produced problems not only for Pakistan but also for Afghan Pashtuns. 11

4.1.3.4. Revisit of the Concept

The concept lost its relevancy when Pakistan detonated its nuclear tests in May 1998 and there was a need to revisit the connotation of the concept. According to Ashfaq

Pervaiz Kayani, the former Chief of Pakistan Army, “Pakistan wanted ‘strategic depth’ in ______9. Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times (New York: Oxford,1993), 185 10. William Dalrymple, “ A Deadly Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (Washington D.C: The Brookings Institution, June 25, 2013) 11. .Rahim Yusufzai (Eminent journalist and expert on Pak-Afghan affairs), in discussion with the author January 2016

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Afghanistan but did not want to control it. Peaceful, friendly and stable relationship with Afghanistan is necessary in order to ensure that Pakistan is not threatened with security problems on its western border.” 12 It has been commented that in the changed context the concept has now political connotations in the sense that Pakistan must engage Afghanistan to ensure that its territory must not be used against Islamabad by any country. 13

4.2 Jalalabad Fiasco

Pakistan’s objective in the period 1989-1990 centered on endeavors to help the Mujahideen “establish a foothold in Afghan territory to give AIG [ Afghan Interim Government ] firm status in its homeland.” 14 and the Jalalabad campaign was the first major attempt by Mujahideen , with the support of Pakistan, in the post-withdrawal phase to unseat, militarily, the relatively well entrenched Najib government. The failure of the Mujahideen to capture the city further deteriorated Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan, and it drove home the point that the policy of military solution of Afghan crisis was irrelevant and redundant due to change in the context and the “inability of the Mujahideen to conduct a set piece battle” 15 , and it revealed the primacy of talks among different Afghan groups for the resolution of crisis.

4.2.1 Selection of City and Rationale of the Operation

The city had been chosen because of its strategic significance as it is situated on the primary highway that connects Peshawar-Kabul interstate. Its seizure would have paved the way for the further advance on the capital. It was just 50 kilometers far from Pakistan’s outskirt and on the conventional course to and from Pakistan. The route from ______12. Zahid Hussain, “Kayani spells out term for regional stability,” Dawn , February 2, 2010. 13.Rasul B.Rais (Eminent academician and commentator on Pak-Afghan affairs), in discussion with the author March 2016. 14. Nawaz, Crossed Swords , 423. 15. Martin Ewan, Afghanistan: A New History (Surrey:Curzon Press,2001),174

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Kabul to Jalalabad “could have been effectively blocked as it went sthrough various pollutes and crevasses. Military support from Kabul for the Afghan armed forces would have been troublesome making the assignment simpler for the Mujahideen. ”16

After the complete de-induction of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989, political imperatives dictated by post-withdrawal dynamics called for the formation of an Afghan Interim Government (AIG), which could establish its presence inside Afghanistan. it was believed that believed that the formation of such a Government was necessary so that the “ Tanzeemat present a united front in response to the UN-initiated efforts to promote a government of national reconciliation, consistent with the UN commitment made at the time of the signing of the Geneva Accords.” 17 However, the battle was regarded an opening gambit of Pakistan’s plan for a friendly regime in Kabul because Islamabad wanted to install a new government under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar with its provisional capital based in Jalalabad.

4.2.2. Operation and its Failure

The beginning of the operation was successful because the Mujahideen managed to capture the heavily-defended Afghan Army garrison at Samarkhail and completely demolished the outer fortifications in the first two weeks. However, the Afghan army’s absorbing of the initial thrust and tenacious hold to inner defenses had “the attack bogged down and developed into a long siege.” 18 Two factors contributed to the stalemate that ensued: first, notwithstanding the fact that Mujahideen were quite adept

______16. Kamal Matinuddin, Power struggle in the Hindu Kush: Afghanistan (Rawalpindi: Services Book Club, 1991), 274. 17. Riaz M. Khan, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity (Karachi: Oxford, 2012), 17 18, Rasul B. Rais, War without winners: Afghanistan’s uncertain future (Karachi: Oxford, 1994), 208

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in guerrilla warfare, but they were not a regular force commissioned to mount coordinated attacks and able to fight long siege battles. Thus, “their inability to coordinate action further weakened the chances of success and by April the Jalalabad operation petered out.” 19 On the other hand, their opponents, the Afghan forces, were a regular, well organized and disciplined fighting force which was better equipped and protected by bunkers, barbed wire and minefields and trained to fight set piece battle. Besides, they had an air cover in the form of Afghan Air Force which flew up to 100 to 120 sorties a day over the battle field.

4.2.3. Implications of Jalalabad Fiasco

Victory has many fathers but defeat finds no mother. The Jalalabad adventure was a military defeat of a guerilla force pitched against a regular army. The failure caused a dip in the morale of the Mujahideen involved in the attack and consequently many local commanders of Hekmatyar and Sayyaf concluded truces with the government. The operation was severely criticized by some Mujahideen leaders who were critical of its political and strategic dimensions. They took umbrage on the selection of Jalalabad as a city for providing AIG political base inside Afghanistan because it “this appeared to be at odds with the historical realities of Afghanistan whose centre of gravity has always been Kabul.” 20 Abdul Haq, a famous Mujahideen leader, was of the view that coordinated guerilla warfare should have been employed because that would gradually weaken the communist regime and cause its collapse through internal divisions. He sarcastically commented: “How is that we Afghans, who never lost a war, must take military

instructions from Pakistan, who never won one.” 21 ______19. Khan, Afghanistan and Pakistan , 19-20. 20. Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 424 21. Roy Gutman, How We Missed the Story: Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban and the Hijacking of Afghanistan (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008), 304

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The outcome of the operation disappointed Pakistan because it compelled various Mujahideen groups for the formulation of provisional government and it hoped that it would be installed in Jalalabad after the capture of the city. Benazir Bhutto, who was the prime minister of Pakistan at the time of the Jalalabad operation, commented that “to some extent, it was partially our own mis-assessment of the intelligence situation. That we should have our own reports but we chose to go on what was said to us by the Mujahideen .” 22 The failure of Jalalabad operation must have served an eye- opener for those in Islamabad who were interested in military solution. As a matter of, the fall out was an explicit expression, first, that Pakistan’s perception of Afghanistan was no different than that of the humbled and retreating Soviets; and secondly, it pointed that the time was for political solution of the crisis.

4.2.4. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations after Jalalabad Attempt

During the Afghan jihad , Pakistan’s primary objective was to seek the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. With the departure of the Soviets, Islamabad needed a policy aimed at working with all Afghan stakeholders for the return of peace and stability in Afghanistan, and secondly, safe and early return of more than three million Afghan refugees could be secured. But Jalalabad Operation was the prime example of how Islamabad’s post-withdrawal policy faltered and not only brought havoc in Afghanistan but further slide in their ties. The Afghan government retaliated “by increasing scud missile attacks on Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and it became a a routine for Islamabad to protest the situation.” 23 Besides, the number of complaints lodged by both countries to the United Nations Good Offices Mission to Pakistan and Afghanistan made evident the trajectory of their ties: it was reported that “Kabul made ______22. C. Hooke, P. Jouvenal and E. Matthews (Producers) (1989) Afghanistan: The Squandered Victory: 1989 [Documentary] (United Kingdom: BBC, 1989) 23. S. Iftikhar Murshed, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years (London: Bennet & Bloom, 2006), 34

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7547 complaints of Islamabad’s violations of the Geneva Accords in 1990 alone. On the other hand, Islamabad lodged allegations that Afghan armed forces had violated its air space and bombed the bordering regions on 1317 occasions resulting in numerous casualties. 24

The biggest beneficiary, in the short-term, of the failed Jalalabad campaign was the Afghan President Najibullah who proved to be a thorn in Pakistan’s side. It has been commented that the abortive operation strengthened Dr. Najib’s position inside the country and he appeared to many Afghans a nationalist who was fighting for Afghanistan’s national interests. 25 Consequently, he continued to cling to power till 1992 when eventually he had to make way in consequence of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, what Pakistan achieved during the Afghan jihad as a ‘frontline state’ began to erode as many Afghans began to perceive that Pakistan was advancing American interests; therefore, these Afghans provided necessary cushion to the Najib government.

4.3. Collapse of Najibullah Regime

The fate of president Najib’s government was central to deciding, first, the future of Afghanistan, and secondly, the nature and direction of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, subsequent to the departure of Soviet troops. There was a widespread perception that the government of Dr. Najibullah would collapse as soon as the Soviet military de- induction would be completed. Some analysts even went to the extent that it would not survive the total withdrawal. Zalmay Khalilzad, an eminent U.S. expert on Afghanistan predicted “the quick overthrow of the Najibullah government by the Mujaheedin . Without ______24. Hussain, Pakistan and the emergence , 150. 25. Rustam Ali Shah Mohmund (former Commisioner of Directorate of Afghan Refugees and commentator on Pak-Afghan affairs), in discussion with the author September 2016.

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the Soviets, the Kabul government’s moral would plummet, the regime would disintegrate and the Mujaheddin would sweep victoriously forward.” 26 The impression got impetus when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) drew similar conclusion and even forecast the imminent collapse of Najibullah government: “We judge that Mohammed Najibullah’s regime will not long survive the completion of Soviet withdrawal even with continued Soviet assistance. The regime may fall before withdrawal is complete.” 27

But Fida Yunus, who was serving as Pakistan’s charge d’affaires in Afghanistan, was more prescience when he predicted soon after the signing of the Geneva Accords that the Najib government would not collapse “arguing that the groups within the Mujahideen Tanzeemat were deeply divided, lacking cohesion and without a common political platform.” 28 And much to the surprise of commentators and experts the Najib government went on to defy Western security prognosis by holding the country together for three years after the last Soviet soldier pulled out in February 1989.

4.4. Disintegration of Soviet Union and Exit of Dr. Najib

In December 1991, the world viewed in aghast the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and with it the end of the international political order which had been in extant since the end of the Second World War. The West regarded the breakup of the Soviet Union collapse of an ‘evil empire’ and a rival ideology which had hovered over the world for over four decades. As a matter of fact, the unraveling of the USSR ushered in a phase which morphed the entire world situation leading to a complete reformulation of political, economic and military alliances all over the world. However, one of the upshots was that it actualized the exit of president Najib from power.

______

26. Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyards of Empire: America’s war in Afghanistan (New York: Norton, 20090, 42. 27. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires , 42

28. Khan, Afghanistan and Pakistan , 17.

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Political convulsions and decline in economy rendered it difficult for the USSR to continue its commitments to Kabul: the year 1991 witnessed exponential slide in the Soviet economy and, finally, in September the Kremlin “announced that it would cut off supplies to the Afghan government after January 1, 1992.” 29 Towards the beginning of 1991, the three Baltic republics had declared their independence and Georgia stood aloof. In the summer of that year Gorbachev was negotiating a new Union treaty that would have devolved powers to the remaining constituent republics of the Soviet Union. On the eve of the signature came the communist hardliner coup in Moscow that attempted to scuttle the treaty and preserve Russian hegemony. After the failure of the coup and, later on, assumption of power by Boris Yeltsin, the fate of Dr. Najib’s government had been sealed.

President Najibullah had been successful in defending himself against Mujahideen assaults but mounting domestic challenges were eroding his grip on the country. Internally, he was facing factions within the PDPA, along with a number of coup attempts by the armed forces and militant resistance continued to threaten his regime. But it was not the internal problems that undermined his authority and brought about his collapse; rather, it was the, first, cessation of the Soviet Union’s support and later on the eventual dissolution of the USSR itself- the two factors that paved the way for his ouster “by a coalition of army’s generals and moderate rebel commanders in a Palace coup.” 30

4.4.1 Dilemma of a ‘Rentier State’*

One of the limitations of the ruling elite of a ‘rentier state’ is that their stay in power is conditioned with their ability to sustain the flow of resources in order to ensure the support of their people. Once the flow of resources dries up, their departure is ensured. The exit of Najib regime after his loss of Soviet aid was not a new phenomenon if seen ______29. Rais, War without winners, 156. 30. “Afghanistan: A Critical Phase ,” Pakistan Times , April 19, 1992, 6

* A ‘rentier state’ may be defined a “state which derives all or substantial part of its national revenue from the rent of its indigenous resources to external clients.

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in historical context: the Saddozai rulers of Afghanistan maintained their grip on power in Afghanistan by wealth coming from outside the country. Their loss of Indian territories to Sikhs deprived them of the wealth with which they had cemented their tribal coalitions. The loss of the revenue from outside the territory of Afghanistan had led to the loss of state control and the emergence of regional powers. The ignominious exit of

Najib in 1992 was the latest example. 31

The pro-government militias that had grown to replace the army in many of its assignments were faithful to the regime only so long as it could deliver enough weapons to enable them to conserve their power. With the end of the Soviet aid, the government could no longer satisfy these demands, and the loyalty of the militias began to waver. With the stoppage of Soviet money, arms and diplomatic support, the three piers upon which his government rest, “he placed his hopes on the endeavors of the United Nations to arrange for the tranquil transfer of power. Later on, the situation further complicated when his last loyal supporters, the ethnic and religious militias of the north, mutinied.” 32 Finally, after negotiations between communist General Dostum and Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Jumbish militia defected to the Mujahideen. This reversal of fortunes effectively turned the tables in favor of the resistance, and forced Najibullah to resign. 4.5. Post-Najib Situation

The state system that Ahmad Shah Abdali, the founder of the modern Afghan state, had established continued to exist till the exit of Najibullah in April 1992. The collapse of the Marxist regime on 16 April 1992 produced power vacuum as there was no central political force to replace the former Soviet propped-up regime in Kabul. The eventual ______31. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 46. 32. Riffat Hussain,”Pakistan’s Foreign Policy,” in The Anatomy of a conflict: Afghanistan and 9/11 ,(New Delhi: Roli Books, 2002), 190.

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impact of the emerged situation was that it triggered 'domino effects’, with the traditionally structured provincial and regional arrangements began to unravel. Consequently, diverse stakeholders like Mujahideen groups, deserted military commandants and local tribal and ethnic leaders assumed control of towns and urban areas everywhere throughout the country and hurriedly formed provisional arrangements to arrest the further deterioration in the situation. This may be the regular course in the circumstances, to fill the power gap appeared due to exit of the Marxist government. 33

4.5.1. Mujahideen’s Intransigence

Given the heterogeneous ethnicity of Afghanistan and its further tribal sub-division, the dynamics of the coalition thus formed was such that it contained no single group that had the potential to capture Kabul and govern the fragmented country. It now rest upon the Peshawar-based Mujahideen leadership how it responded to the latest development. The post-Najib complex exigencies demanded that they exhibit political acumen and act with maturity so that they could protect not only their own but respect the interests of various ethno-linguistic groups. Only then would they be able to construct that power structure which were viable and effective and accommodate each other’s sides of the bargain. 34

4.5.2. Issues Involved

There were two issues that were needed to be urgently addressed: the first was the formation of a broad-based transitional government, and the other was evolving a system whereby power centers emerged in the post-Najib phase at different tiers could be brought under the effective control of the central government. The Afghan guerillas had successfully been able to project a veneer of unity in their ranks for a decade as ______33. Rais, War without winners , 220. 34. Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History (London: Taurus, 2003), 141.

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they fought a protracted war against the the Soviet presence. But even then the tenuous nature of their coalition was pretty obvious. No sooner had the Soviets pulled-out, than the Mujahideen lost the focus of their unity. The fruition of the aforementioned objectives needed that the Mujahideen parties continued to exhibit unity, show compromises institutions and some experience of pluralistic politics. But they lacked in all essentials, and secondly, there was no constitutional framework that could help and guide them. To sum up, the Mujahideen showed they “had not prepared themselves fully to take over power in Kabul.” 35

The fast growing uncertainty and exponentially deteriorating situation in Afghanistan required urgent consensus among the Mujahideen leaders based in Peshawar regarding transitional arrangements to prevent their country’s slide into civil war. But none of the factions showed the statesmanship to place the national interest of Afghanistan above its petty selfish interests of personal gains and lust for power. It has been commented that though Pakistan worked very hard for a broad based government in Afghanistan but all the Mujahideen leaders were power hungry, rigid and foolish. Each one of them regarded him heavy weight and wanted more than what their rightful share should have been. 36

There was another view regarding delay in the formation of the interim government which argued that the situation arose because Pakistan did not put full weight and continued to play one faction against the other. Only when it became apparent that the continued intransigence of Mujahideen leaders over power sharing arrangements was prejudicially affecting its interests than Islamabad decided to exercise its influence, and had all the Afghan groups assembled in Peshawar in April ______35. Rais, War without winners, 220 36. Aziz Ahmad Khan (Pakistan’s ambassador to Kabul during the Taliban rule), in discussion with the author April 2016.

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1992. The meeting produced the Peshawar Accord which contained an agreement on power sharing arrangements and formation of an interim government. 37

4.5.3. The Peshawar Accord

The Peshawar Accord provided (Annexure D) for the ‘structure and process for the provisional period of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. It provided the framework for an interim government to be implemented in stages: the dispatch to Kabul of Mujaddedi, the leader of a small Pashtun party, as a compromise choice to head a two-month transitional government, to be followed by a four-month interim government to be headed by Rabbani, the leader of the Jamiat, as a prelude to the formation of a council that would act as an interim government for eighteen months before the holding of nationwide elections. All other cabinet positions were divided among the parties with the understanding that the top leaders would not be eligible for the positions. Thus the slot of the prime minister went to Hizb, but Gulbadin could not designate himself for the post. He nominated Commander Abdus Sabur Fareed for the post. The posts of Deputy prime ministers were allocated to three parties, those of Yunus Khalis, Sayed Gailani, and one in which the Shia groups joined as the Ittihad e Islami part. The most important office of the Minister of Defense was given to the Jamiat e Islami of Burhanuddin Rabbani, who wasted no time in nominating Ahmed Shah Masoud as its head.

4.5.4. Afghanistan’s Perspective The signing of the Peshawar Accord was a very significant step in the wake of Najibullah’s exit in a ‘Palace Coup’ sorchestrated by his military generals and moderate Mujahideen l eaders. It had provided a good starting point and “had engendered a certain optimism that the stalemate persisting since the Soviet withdrawal had ended ______37. Mohmund, Personal communication. September 2016.

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and that Afghanistan might finally be able to turn a new page for better.” 38 The historic development removed the principal obstacle to the formation of a broad-based legitimate government in Afghanistan. The Agreement arrested the likely slide, albeit temporarily, of the country to civil war as many feared that procrastination exhibited by Mujahideen in developing consensus regarding power-sharing could trigger bloodbath that would drown Kabul. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, hailed the agreement and termed it “the biggest achievement of the Afghan war and expressed the hope that Mujahidin coalition would smoothly take over power in Afghanistan.” 39

4.5.5. Pakistan’s Context

The Peshawar Accord was a critical development from Pakistan’s perspective too: Islamabad’s Afghan policy began to lose focus in the wake of the Soviet military de- induction from Afghanistan. There was a need of reappraisal and reorientation of approach on the part of Pakistan, but its insistence on military solution exhibited dearth of pragmatism. Subsequent to the Jalalabad fiasco, the policy was clearly floundering and was rudderless. It was the collapse of the Soviet Union which complicated the regional scenario and brought about geopolitical changes, particularly the terminal fate of President Najib’s government, which furnished Pakistan an opportunity to retrieve the space it had lost in Afghanistan.

4.6. Critique of the Accord

Notwithstanding the optimism the Agreement had generated, many analysts were skeptic regarding the success of it. The Peshawar Accord envisaged a government 40 which was manufactured in Pakistan for Afghanistan. Therefore, there were ______

38. Khan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, 46-47. 39. “Accord and after,” Pakistan Times , April 27, 1992, 6. 40. Yusufzai, Personal Communication, January 2016

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apprehensions regarding its success. It has been commented that though the signing of the Peshawar Accord was positive development and a step to halt the slide of Afghanistan to further chaos but it came late when the facts on the ground had changed. 41 The structural side of the Accord was criticized who believed that it had been signed in haste and contained no mechanism which could be resorted to in case of any dispute among the parties, which might arise in the course of implementation. 42 Moreover, the proposed provisional government comprised parties which had fundamental ideological and policy differences, and critics apprehended that they can be “expected to move towards a vicious power struggle in the political arena. The danger is that in the volatile situation that obtains in Afghanistan today even squabbling and posturing over spoils of power can trigger violence and bloodshed.” 43

Many Afghan nationalists and royalists too were quite vocal in criticizing the Peshawar Accord. They believed that the Accords contained a roadmap for their country drawn by extraneous powers not in accordance with the aspirations of Afghans but taking into consideration their geostrategic interests. Critics argued that the issue of Afghanistan’s future and the question of Afghan self-determination had been decided at the provincial headquarter of a foreign government and in a meeting where non- Afghans outnumbered Afghans. “The Accords were an indication that from now onwards the Afghans would have to deal with more than one ‘Soviet Union.” 44 The interesting aspect of the Peshawar Accord was that it stipulated that the first two presidents of Afghanistan would be non-Pashtun which was an anomaly as far as the political history of modern Afghanistan was concerned because since its creation in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, it had been ruled by Pashtuns who formed majority.

______41. yusufzai, op. cit, January, 2016 42. Muthahir Ahmad, “Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations,” in Afghanistan: Challenges and opportunities, ed. Warikoo (New Delhi: Pentagon, 2007), 395. 43. “Plodding towards peace,” Dawn April 26, 1992, 8. 44. M. Hassan Kakar, Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response (Berkley: University of California, 1995), 224-225.

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4.7. Spoilers vs. Tinkerers*

The transition from guerilla struggle to political and administrative management is the most difficult phase. At the heart of the successful transition is the readiness of movement leaders that how far they are prepared to exercise pragmatism. The Peshawar Accord could have been instrumental in bringing stability to Afghanistan and stalled its slide to civil war had the Mujahideen leaders exhibited necessary political maturity; but power struggle between ‘spoilers’- Gulbuddin Hekmatyaar - and ‘tinkerers’- Mujaddedi and Ahmad Shah Masood-brought notoriety to Mujahideen leaders and cataclysm to Afghanistan. This was evident from the inflexible attitude of Hekmatyaar , a protégé of Pakistan. He refused to become part of the signing contending that “the position of prime minister reserved for his party should not be subordinated to that of the president and the position of the defence minister (to which Massoud had been appointed by Mujaddedi) should fall under the control of the prime minister.” 45 His intransigence plunged the country into another bout of civil war and “the hydra-headed resistance forces had turned into a dragon ad were bent upon to swallow Afghanistan.” 46

______*Spoilers are individuals or groups who are opposed to compromise in a conflict and thus hinder the progress from war to peace. They may be limited, total, or greedy. Total spoilers are radical, ideological and pathological espouse non-negotiable goals. Limited spoilers have limited goals and they need concessions and could be made part of the peace process. Greedy spoilers are having goals that can be expanded or contracted in relation to cots. Hekmatyaar was a greedy as well as limited spoiler who wanted central role in the interim set up; and having failed to get it he resorted to undermining the Peshawar Accord. Tinkerers are a group or individuals who are part of the negotiation process and when negotiations are formalized into an agreement and implemented, they seek to manipulate it to their advantage. This was what Rabbani did when he refused to step down at the expiry of his stipulated period under the Peshawar Accord.

45. Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History, 142. 46.Ralph H. Magnus and Eden. Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid (Pakistan: Pak Book, 1998), 163.

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4.8. Islamabad Accord

The skeptics were not incorrect in their prognosis regarding the success of the Accord because it soon ran into difficulty when Rabbani refused to abide by the provisions of the Accord. He had succeeded Mujaddedi to the office of the president and had to arrange for the holding of elections of his successor after four months. But his refusal plunged Afghanistan into another phase of fighting. The fresh round of the fighting made the Saudi King, Fahd, issue an appeal for peace. Consequently, “Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia again joined hands to promote another accord among the Afghan leaders.” 47 On March 7, 1993, eight rival Afghan military factions signed, with the blessing of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, a peace agreement in Islamabad, known as the Islamabad Accord. The Accord called for the establishment of an interim government which was empowered to summon a constituent assembly to draft a constitution within eight months and hold elections within eighteen months. The composition of the cabinet to be formed by the Prime Minister in consultation with the President was not agreed upon. And finally, it stipulated Rabbani’s continuation as President and elected Hekmatyar as the Prime Minister. Though the Accord was signed through consensus among various Afghan groups, however, beneath the veneer it was quiet clear that “there was no trust among the leadership for each other and the accord collapsed.” 48

4.9. The Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA) 1992-1995

The assumption of power by Sibghatullah Mujaddedi as the President on 28 April 1992 ushered in the birth of the Islamic State of Afghanistan and ostensibly signaled the conclusion of the resistance’s struggle and the beginning of a period for the restoration of long awaited peace in the country. Ordinary Afghans were expecting that the new

______47. Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2009: A Concise History (Karachi: Oxford, 2010), 198. 48. Ahmad, Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations, 396.

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regime in Kabul would give “some hope to the war-ravaged Afghanistan that a breathing space may come.” 49 However, it was a different matter that their hopes for the restoration of law and order soon dashed with the onset of a civil war between Mujahideen leaders.

4.9.1. Characteristics of New State

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan since lacked all trappings of a state: the central authority in Kabul existed in name only and the state structure had broken down. Consequently, the ISA was everything but a state. Rubin (1995) has correctly remarked that the entity bore the insignia of Islamic but it could hardly be called a state. The new administration had practically no source of income. The central authority in Kabul was too weak to compel the regional warlords to send money accrued from major customs posts, the principal source of revenue since there was no foreign aid, nor was there revenue from the export of natural gas, to the government in the capital. 50

4.9.2. New Rulers of Afghanistan

A new class of rulers comprising leaders of the former anti-Soviet resistance formations came to occupy Afghanistan and established the Islamic State of Afghanistan. They, like their PDPA predecessors, did not belong to the traditional Afghan ruling class. They effectively replaced the sardars, khans and maliks that had traditionally represented the old aristocratic elites of Afghanistan. In the pre-1978 era, the local elites did not aspire to nor have the means to seek power at the national level. But the anti-Soviet jihad enabled new elite to emerge comprising the Mujahideen leaders and commanders who came from all of Afghanistan’s major ethnic groups.

______49. Hassan Akhtar, “Will Peace Return to Afghanistan,” Dawn , April 29, 1992, 1. 50. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan , 272

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The new Afghan rulers were less educated and, as Rubin notes, “less Westernized (or Sovietised) compared to their predecessors in the PDPA or the pre- 1978 regime. 51 But like their PDPA progenitors, they were ideologically motivated, however, their ideological inspirations were inversely oriented, i.e. they were identified with the theological class of the Afghan society and wanted to establish an Islamic state of Afghanistan, though most of the observers were of the view that the new rulers would create “a reasonably moderate state that would identify itself with progress, modern

technology and liberalism.” 52

4.10. Pakistan and the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA)

The establishment of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA) was a significant happening for it provided both Pakistan and Afghanistan an opening to bury their poisonous antecedents in order to inaugurate a ‘chapter of cooperative ties’ based on mutual respect and trust. Besides, the new dispensation represented what Islamabad had been endeavoring, i.e. installation of a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul. As a matter of fact, the two countries started the new period of their relations on a positive note. Pakistan was the first country to grant diplomatic recognition to the government of the Islamic

State of Afghanistan. It was the first government in Afghanistan in twelve years to which Pakistan had accorded diplomatic recognition. “Nawaz Sharif, the then prime minister of Pakistan, paid an official visit to Afghanistan on the very next day of Mujaddedi’s arrival in Kabul and presented the new government of Afghanistan a check of US $10 million.” 53

Pakistan believed that the new rulers of Kabul would be beholden to it and would cooperate with it to preserve its strategic interests vis-à-vis India in Afghanistan. Islamabad’s expectation was justified because, first, there was a dire need to establish ______51. Hussain, Pakistan and the emergence , 168. 52. Akhtar, Will peace return to Afghanistan, 1 53. Khan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, 47.

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effective central government and restore peace and order so that return of more than three million Afghan refugees could be administered. The new rulers had no prior administrative experience so they needed Islamabad’s assistance; secondly, and it was more significant, when Mujahideen , now rulers in Kabul, were fighting against the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, India had very strong and close economic and political relations with the Afghan governments. Now they needed to reciprocate Pakistan’s service to them. But a new and complex Afghanistan had emerged, and it required an in-depth evaluation of the objective situation certain initiatives from Pakistan. However, what happened in Afghanistan later on, and Pakistan’s alleged role in it not only slided Afghanistan to civil war but also imperiled Pakistan’s strategic interests.

4.11. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations under Rabbani

The initial enthusiasm generated by Mujjadedi’s assumption of power evaporated soon, and Pakistan-Afghanistan relations began to exhibit strains with the ascension of Rabbani to the office of the President. The underlying causes were Islamabad support for Hekmatyar, and Rabbani’s reluctance to abide by the terms of the Peshawar Accord. Later on, his pursuit of foreign policy bordering more on nationalism apparently but intended to balance Islamabad’s influence further deteriorated the ties of the two countries. Rabbani and his Defense Minister, Ahmad Shah Massud, were not happy with Pakistan’s support to their rival, Hekmatyar, during and after the war of resistance against the Soviets. They wanted to use Iran, Russia and India as new levers to contest Pakistan’s influence in Afghan politics.

4.11.1. Pakistan and Hekmatyaar

The progressive slide in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations under the Rabbani regime is ascribed, for one, to Islamabad’s alleged support to Gulbaddin Hekmatyar of extremist Hizb-i-Islami , the ‘spoiler.’ He was one of the early Islamist dissidents courted by the Pakistani government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in efforts to organize and influence the opposition against President Daud in Kabul. He came to Pakistan after the 1973 coup when the Daud government launched a crackdown against Islamist opponents of his 139

regime. The Islamists did not back Kabul’s policy on the territorial dispute with Pakistan and were also opposed to Afghanistan’s friendly relations with India. Hekmatyar had stayed on in Pakistan since 1973 and with Pakistan’s incitement, his group started low level operations against the PDPA administration in late 1978. Subsequent to the collapse of Dr. Najib’s regime, the Afghan geographical spectrum had polarized along ethnic lines, and, Islamabad’s “support to Hekmatyar further ethnicized the post-Soviet politics in Afghanistan.” 54

4.11.2. Hekmatyaar’s Ideal of Islamic State

It was Hekmatyaar’s ideal of an Islamic state which may be argued to win him the confidence of General Zia. He was deeply influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and wanted to establish a pure Islamic state by utilizing a highly disciplined organizational structure built around a small cadre of educated elites. His vision of the pure Islamic state encompassed reorientation of the Afghan society on a pattern that cut across traditional fabric of the Afghan society. The Ulema of Afghanistan valued the historical ideals of early Islamic history but, on the other hand, they were pragmatic and equally cognizant of traditional Afghan tribal structures like the jirga in stabilizing the society; therefore, they did not challenge them. Besides, they were also much more accommodating towards the ethnic minorities. The Islamists, like Hekmatyar in particular, did not approve of the tribal structure and pursued “ a radical political ideology in order to bring about an Islamic revolution in Afghanistan.” 55 Islamabad believed that his version of the Islamic state would submerge the nationalist sentiments which had remained the cause of the Pashtunistan issue.

There may other explanations as to why Hekmatyaar was the favorite of Islamabad. It has been commented that he had been granted special favor because his ______

54. Musa Khan Jalazai, The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Afghanistan, Kashmir & Internal Security Threats (Lahore: Ariana, 2003), 8 55. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (London: Taurus, 2000),19

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organization, Hizb-a-Islami, was relatively less corrupt than other resistance organizations. 56 There is another view which contradicts that Hekmatyaar was the major recipient of foreign assistance. It has been observed that it was not Hekmatyar who received bulk of the aid rather, according to the material evidence; it was Ahmad Shah Masood, a northern leader, who was the biggest beneficiary during the Afghan jihad. 57 There may be an alternate reason as to why Hekmatyaar was a favorite of Pakistan. Islamabad knew that his version of Islamic state was against the very spirit of Afghan culture; but once installed to power, he would be a weak ruler and would need external help, Pakistan, to stay in power. In other words, he was being groomed as a Babrak Karmal of Pakistan. The ISI, responsible for coordinating delivery of external supplies, “delivered the great bulk of the CIA’s dollars to Hekmatyar because he was their man who, one day they hoped, would run Afghanistan on their behalf.” 58

Subsequent to the fall of Dr. Najib’s regime in 1992 Pakistani security establishment feared that other ethnic groups would not acquiesce in to its dictates in the domain of foreign policy, therefore, it continued to promote Hekmatyar as its favorite because the Pashtun factor weighed heavily in his favor as he “was a Pashtun, though a detribalized, and close to twenty percent of the Pakistan army was made up of Pakistani Pashtuns; the pro-Pashtun and Islamic fundamentalist lobby within the ISI and the military viewed Pashtun victory in Afghanistan conducive to furthering the interests of Islamabad.” 59

______56. Yusufzai, Personal communication, Jan.2016 57. Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali (former Foreign Minister of Pakistan:1993-1996), in discussion with the author April 2016 58. Sandy Gall, War against the Taliban: Why it all went wrong in Afghanistan (London: Bloomsbury, 2012),11-12. 59. Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, 26

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4.11.3. Hekmatyaar and Post-Najib Afghanistan

The fall of Dr. Najib’s government in 1992 led to the signing of the Peshawar Accords which paved the way for the establishment of Mujahideen government in Kabul. Hekmatyaar had been invited to join the government. Later on, he was awarded the position of the prime minister as a result of the Islamabad Accord but he refused to share power with Rabbani who became President in June 1992 and Massoud who assumed the office of the Defense Minister. Instead, he initiated campaign against the government under the guise of driving out communist militias and launched massive rocket attack on Kabul. This triggered a devastating civil war in Afghanistan “in which rival factions divided along ethnic lines- Pashtuns in the south, Uzbek and Tajiks in the

north, and Shia Hazara in the centre- battled each other.” 60

Pakistan continued to provide covert assistance to Hekmatyaar hoping that he would be able to dislodge Rabbani administration and capture the capital. But by 1994 Hekmatyar had clearly failed, losing ground militarily while his extremism divided the Pashtuns, the majority of who loathed him. The failure of Hekmatyaar to wrest power from Rabbani and Massoud was a setback for Islamabad’s wider regional strategic plans. “The situation made Pakistan concludes, on the one hand, that he had become a serious liability and, on the other hand, Islamabad’s policy to secure installation of a friendly regime in Kabul for the settlement of the issue of the Durand Line had lacked viability.” 61

It has been commented that Pakistan’s choice of Hekmatyar was not appropriate because he was not a natural leader and did not have the personality or charisma to unite Pashtuns, let alone the whole of Afghanistan. He was brutal and responsible for ______60. Hussain, Pakistan and the emergence , 191-192. 61. Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival (London: Taurus, 2012), 222

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the killing of more Afghans than they died during the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Besides, it was Ahmad Shah Masood’s lust for a complete power which was responsible for the slide of Afghanistan to civil war. He observes further that Masood once told him that ‘if Pakistan do not cooperate with me and not recognize as the central figure; I’ll form a coalition against you of India, Iran and Russian Federation.’ 62

4.12. Rabbani as a Tinkerer The Peshawar Accords stipulated that Mujaddedi would hold the office of the President for two months and Rabbani would replace him at the expiry of the said period. The latter would stay for four months. After the expiry of the period, a Shura* was assigned to draw up plans for creation of a political system that would remain for two years, after which elections were scheduled to be held. The transition from Mujaddedi to Rabbani was relatively smooth as Mujaddedi stepped down as per the Peshawar Accord and handed the reign of the government over to Rabbani . He was needed to resign after the expiry of stipulated four-month period in order to pave the way for the Shura to decide on the constitutional system for Afghanistan. But he refused to step down toward the end of 1993 and this triggered the onset of a new phase of civil war in Afghanistan. The leadership council realizing the gravity of the situation provided reprieve to Rabbani on 28 October 1992 by “reluctantly extending the mandate for forty-five days on the ground that continued fighting and the destruction of Kabul had made it impossible for him to summon the Shura in the time designated. 63

______62. Ali, Personal Csommunication, April 2016 * It is a kind of consultative council in matters of governance 63. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan , 273.

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4.13. Pakistan and Northern Alliance

Pakistan’s policy to promote consensus among various power centers of the erstwhile resistance groups for a broad based government appeared to be heading towards collapse due to tension between Islamabad and Rabbani’s Northern Alliance dominated government. The basic reason of this friction was the suspicion of the Rabbani regime that Pakistan had been tilting towards Hekmatyar. Commenting upon Pakistan’s policy, Massoud said that “Pakistan is trying to subjugate Afghanistan and turn it into a colony by installing a puppet government. It won’t work because the Afghan people have always been independent and free.’64 Northern leaders wanted to operate independent of the Pakistanis and they were opposed to sustained Islamabad influence in Afghan affairs.

4.14. Rabbani’ s Independent Foreign Policy- Defiance of

Pakistan’s Chaperone Role

Pakistan has been wary of Indian influence in Afghanistan and it has been its policy to engage Kabul to countervail it. On the other hand, Afghanistan has been pursuing policy of ’Strategic Realism’, which implies that a weaker state seeks to balance the influence of a relatively strong neighbor by developing or invoking power powerful regional or external state. It has been Kabul policy to balance Islamabad’s influence by partnership with New Delhi, a hostile neighbor of Pakistan. Rabanni’s independent foreign policy with heavy Indian tilt was not a new phenomenon. But it had, during the 1990s, two reasons: first, it was Pakistan’s obsession with ‘Chaperone’ role in its relations with Afghanistan which was partly responsible for the frigidity which pushed Rabbani to give India a balancing role. Secondly, it has been commented upon Rabbani’s foreign policy

______64. Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam , 52.

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initiatives that Rabbani sincerely wanted to develop close and friendly relations with Pakistan, but not at the cost of an independent foreign policy. 65 But Islamabad seemed to have ignored the fact that Rabbani as a President of Afghanistan had more diplomatic options.

Islamabad was irked by pro-Indian dimension of Rabbani government’s policy. His regime’s decision to open a new chapter in Afghanistan’s relations with India, despite the Indian government’s good relations with the former Communist regime, was deciphered by Pakistan a step inimical to its strategic interests. Islamabad was clearly discomfited by Rabbani and Massud’s “inviting Indian technicians and intelligence operatives in air force and other military installations. The creeping back of Russian and

Indian influence in Afghanistan was the last thing Pakistan could expect to happen.” 66 Even the United States believed that the trajectory of both countries’ relations was taking deteriorating direction because according to a “State Department memo which described that Pakistan government was pursuing ‘ Rabbani must go at any price policy’ inasmuch as it feared that his regime’s continuation might produce emergence of

‘Tehran-Moscow-New Delhi axis.” 67

Pakistan and Afghanistan relations became frosty when, on 23 February 1994, Pakistan’s Embassy in Kabul had been attacked and burned by an officially inspired and directed Kabul mob. An Afghan employee of the embassy had been killed, and the ambassador and military attaché had been wounded. Pakistan demanded an official apology and money to rebuild the embassy. The protesters’ main grievance was the food blockade, which had been imposed by Hikmatyaar who controlled the route leading to Kabul from Pakistan since “many Afghans believed that Pakistan was supporting ______65. Yusufzai, personal communication, January 2016 66. Rais, War without winners, 41 67. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, 47.

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Hikmatyar in enforcing the blockade.” 68 Later on, Pakistan and Afghanistan relations further soured “when four Afghan nationals, who had hijacked a school bus in Islamabad, were shot dead by Pakistani commandos.” 69

4.14.1. Rabbani’s Re-election The re-election of Rabbani as President in June 1994 gave impetus to existing deterioration in Pakistan and Afghanistan relations. Islamabad accused the Afghan leader of perpetuating his power illegally. The blunt statement of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan that “anything that happens after June 1994 will have no legitimacy stoked anti-Pakistan sentiments in Kabul and provoked anti-Pakistan protests in Kabul, including rocket attack on the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul.” 70 The Kabul government interpreted the declaration “as a pronouncement from Pakistan challenging the

legitimacy of the rulers there.” 71

4.14.2. New Beginning but Late However, prospects of good relations seemed to emerge in early 1996 when Hekmatyar became part of Rabbani government. Islamabad welcomed the development “expressing hope that it would be a step towards the promotion of broader consensus among regional leaders leading to national unity.” 72 Later on, possibilities further strengthened when a visiting Afghan government delegation acknowledged “liability for the reconstruction of the embassy even though it pleaded lack of resources to discharge the responsibility.” 73 But the initiative was too late to reverse the slide of mistrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Besides, the Taliban movement had started to ______68. Fazul-ur-Rehman, “Power Struggle in Afghanistan,” in Strategic Studies XVI, NO.4 (Summer, 1994), 30 69. Hussain, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 191.. 70. Hussain, op.cit. 191 71. Mushahid Hussain, “Reversal in Afghanistan,” The Nation, July 03, 1994. 72. Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2009, ? 73. Sattar, op.cit., 199

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attract ordinary Afghan’s sympathies as was evident from the pace of their conquests. The fundamental point to this effect was shift in Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan: disappointed by Hekmatyar’s repeated failures to knock off the Rabbani regime, Islamabad switched over its policy to the Taliban’s support.

4.15. The Taliban Phenomenon

The phenomenal emergence of the Taliban on the Afghan scene in a highly dicey political environment added complexity to the situation. Afghanistan believed that the Taliban were the protégé of Pakistan and this further antagonized Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. Pakistan regarded the sudden rise of the Taliban phenomenon “as an indigenous product and a reaction to the internecine squabbling amongst the warlords.” 74 But the Rabbani government continued to accuse Pakistan of supporting and assisting the Taliban with equipment and manpower. Even Mujaddedi, Rabbani’s predecessor, blamed Islamabad for unrest in Afghanistan. He advised Pakistan that “You stop giving Taliban safe sanctuaries inside your borders, and the unrest will disappear overnight. It is only the help and support from Pakistan that sees them trying to keep Afghanistan unstable.” 75

In December 1995, during a United Nations General Assembly debate on Afghanistan, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, Abdul Rahim Ghafurzai, alleged Pakistan of supporting the Taliban with arms, military equipment logistics, and military intelligence. Not only accusing Islamabad of having had a hand in the Taliban success, Kabul also charged Pakistan of “underwriting the Taliban budget of $ 120 million per month. Pakistan rejected the charges and stated that the root cause of the

______

74. Sattar, Op. cit,, 199. 75. Marianaa. Baabar, “Pak-Afghan Dialogue: Future Problems and Prospects,” The News, June 15, 2004. .

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conflict in Afghanistan arose out of the failure of President Rabbani to quit his office long after the expiration of his legal term in early 1994.” 76

4.15.1. The Rise of the Taliban

The Peshawar Accords paved the way for power transition to the Peshawar-based Mujahideen parties. Ordinary Afghans were expecting the new rulers to restore law and order and stability in a country ravaged by a long war; but Afghanistan’s new leaders proved incapable of bringing peace to their war-torn country. Their Afghan rule from April 1992 to May 1996 can be described as a period of chaos, destruction, killing and deepening of intra-Afghan differences along ethnic and tribal lines. During the period, the country was locked into the power struggle of various resistance groups and “changing loyalties and alliances became the very fabric of Afghan politics.” 77

The Taliban movement is the only religio-political movement of the Twentieth century which had been extensively debated and probed. The sudden emergence of the Taliban from nowhere, rapid rise to power and successfully restoring law and order in a country ravaged by a prolong civil war was a phenomenal development. They came to power, to a large extent cashing in on the discontentment of war-weary Afghans who initially welcomed them and viewed them “as the desperately needed balm of peace and stability.” 78 The fact that they ensured a degree of political stability and order in Afghanistan surprised Afghan experts. In the beginning, international community including the United States remained silent over the Taliban phenomenon and they followed the policy of wait and see. They even tried to establish a rapport with the Taliban. ______76. Magnus & Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid, 190 77. Ahmad, Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations , 396 78. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, 60.

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4.15.2. Afghan Scenario

Every movement is a reaction to a malaise that has been plaguing the society in which it is born. Therefore, in order to understand its dynamics and peoples response, it is necessary to analyze the circumstances which provide the best answer why a particular idea or a movement appears. The Taliban are no exception to this rule. They appeared on the scene at a time when the state of Afghanistan was in the midst of devastating civil war on account of erstwhile Mujahideen and drifting towards virtual disintegration. The central authority was practically confined to the capital and warlords had the country divided among themselves; what is more they fought against one another, formed new alliances and fought again in a bewildering series of alliances, betrayals and bloodshed. The Taliban’s exponential capture of over 90 percent of the country, generated hopes that they could bring peace in a country fragmented along ethnic lines.

4.15.3. Genesis of the Taliban

The genesis of the Taliban is attributed to an offensive social behavior of a local commander in a remote village. The villagers, incensed by the behavior, approached the local mullah, Omar, to intercede with the authorities. Mullah Omar led a procession to the office of the local commander. “Unable to provide satisfaction or intimidate the angry crowd, the commander fled. The people proclaimed Mullah Omar as leader.” 79 It appeared to be a modest but dramatic beginning and drawing much of its strength from the general disillusionment snowballed into a genie that overwhelmed its rivals and captured two-thirds of Afghanistan. Their exponential success was an indication that they “struck a chord with the war- weary Afghan populace.” 80

It was the disillusionment due to factionalism and criminal activities of the erstwhile Mujahideen leaders which had prompted the early Taliban to pick up arms again and clean the Augustine stable. It has been commented that Mullah Omar, the ______79. Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2009, 199. 80. Ewan, Afghanistan: A New History , 18

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Taliban leader and, later on, the Amir ul Momineen of Afghanistan, in an interview, acknowledged that the decision to resort to guns again was not an extempore reaction to a particular event; rather, he spent many agonizing days before resolving to fight out former comrade-in-arms. 81 And he gave a simple explanation of his launching second jihad “We took up arms to achieve the aims of the Afghan jihad and save our people from further suffering at the hands of the so-called Mujahidin.” 82

4.15.4. Pakistan’s Role

However, a section of experts on Afghan affairs does not subscribe to the view which points out that “the Taliban had come out of the blue” 83 ; they do acknowledge the role of the internal conducive ambience in the Taliban’s rise but contend that their rise and success smacks “that its genesis was altogether more deliberate.” 84 Pakistan’s role in the creation of the Taliban and their rise to power has been extensively debated and researched. It has been commented that Pakistan had no favorites in Afghanistan and Islamabad had no role in the creation of the Taliban nor had it provided them any logistic and material support in their rise to power because there was plenty of

ammunition left by the Soviet after their withdrawal. 85

4.15.5. Not Subscribers

But despite Pakistan’s denials, few were willing to believe that the Taliban won so many victories on the basis of their own strength. The argument was that the exhibition of sophistication in the battlefield and the velocity and logistic of their advances “were not the hallmark of semi-literate madrassa students with rudimentary training in the use of ______81. Yusufzai, Personal Communication, January 2016. 82. Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam , 23. 83. Rahimullah Yusufzai, “The Taliban Years in Power,” in The anatomy of a conflict: Afghanistan and 9/11 (New Delhi: Roli Books,2002), 102 84. Ewan, Afghanistan: A New History, 182 85. Ali, personal communication, April 2016.

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small arms.” 86 Their conduct of military operations and exhibition of entirely alien tactics on the battlefields of Afghanistan lent credence to the point that they were foreign sponsored. Their exhibition of incredible versatility and adaptability, a preparation to embrace night operations and determination in assaulting a foe position until it was overrun and the backing by a productive correspondences and command-and-control system-were the characteristics which pointed that their successes could not have been possible without the support of professional trainers and planners. That is why, it is argued that the Taliban emergence was ably assisted by the ISI and the MI. 87 Pakistan’s reaction on the fall of Kandhar further strengthened this impression because it was celebrated by the then Pakistani government and Jamiat-e-Ulma-a-Islam, an Islamist party very close to the Taliban, strengthened the impression of Islamabad’s backing to the movement’s victory. Naseer Ullab Babar, the then Interior Minister of Pakistan took credit for the Taliban’s success, and was “telling journalists privately that the Taliban were ‘our boys.’” 88 Finally, the most explicit proof came from Musharrsf who admitted that “we had assisted in the rise of the Taliban after the Soviet Union withdrew from

Afghanistan.” 89

4.15.6. Why Pakistan supported the Taliban?

The absence of any clear cut explanation regarding the genesis of the Taliban and their exceptional rise on the Afghan horizon took many by surprise. By piecing together available material regarding their origin, the plausible explanation may be that their birth was extempore and, later on, when they snowballed into a momentum gaining movement and began to attract wider support Islamabad decided to throw its weight behind it so that the soft fragmentation of the country could be preempted. Benazir Bhutto, the former prime minister of Pakistan had remarked that “if the Taliban managed ______86. Hussain, Pakistan and the emergence, 204. 87. Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History, 146. 88. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (London: I.B. Taurus, 2000), 29. 89. Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 202.

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to unite Afghanistan, Pakistan would welcome the development.” 90 There may have been three drivers which influenced Pakistan’s policy of supporting the Taliban:

4.15.7. Strategic Interests: Friendly Afghanistan

For one, Pakistan groomed and supported the Taliban because Afghan experts in Pakistan were of the view that only “a friendly and amenable Pashtun-led post- communist regime in Kabul would pre-empt the revival of the calls for a ‘Greater Pashtunistan’ that had so bedeviled Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan since August 1947.” 91 Another explanation may have been countering of the rising Indian influence because, as discussed above, Rabbani’s hobnobbing with India had made Pakistan felt unsettled. Consequently, Islamabad provided material and financial assistance to the Taliban regime because it was broad based as well as Pashtun dominated. The all- powerful military establishment channelized its help to the Taliban through Pakistan Army’s XI Corps stationed in Peshawar. The Corps was assigned the task to provided substantial assistance to the Taliban operation. “The XI Corps was the primary support and logistic base for the Taliban. The Taliban’s superior command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I) systems clearly demonstrated that professional

military personnel were guiding the militia.” 92

4.15.8. Access to Newly Independent Central Asian Republics(CARs) The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1992 opened the vast area of Central Asia for the world. Pakistan believed that the independence six Central Asian Republics ( CARs ) was an opportunity to establish an economic bloc extending as far as Central Asia, with ______90. Peter Marsden, The Taliban: War and Religion in Afghanistan (London: Zed, 2002), 129. 91. Rasanayagam, Afghanistan:A Modern History, 135 . 92. Hussain, Pakistan and the emergence, 203.

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a friendly Afghanistan acting as a conduit for the flow of oil and gas and trade. The opening of the trade route would also bolster Pakistan’s hard-pressed economy. The principal spirit behind the plan was the Pakistani Interior Minister, General Naseerullah Babar, who believed that following the Soviet departure steps must be taken to open up an overland trade route to Central Asia.

4.15.9. United States key Regional Partner

The United States primary objective in engaging Pakistan as a ‘frontline state’ during the Soviet military presence on Afghan soil was to engage and contain USSR in Afghanistan. But the American interest had begun to dwindle with the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 had put Afghanistan off from the Washington’s priority list as its focus had shifted to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The readjustment in the United States policy cost Pakistan its status of being a key regional partner during the 1980s. Pakistan’s support and facilitation to the Taliban’s rise to power was guided by a consideration to retrieve its lost status of American vital regional strategic ally. “In the Pakistani perception, an Afghanistan under Pakistan’s tutelage could not only assist in enhancing US interest in the South and Central Asia but may, as well, transform Pakistan, once again, into Washington’s key regional strategic partner in the post-Cold War era” 93

4.16. Pakistan and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA)

The advent of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan turned a new and favorable leaf, from Islamabad’s perspective, in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. Their relationships during the Taliban regime in Kabul represented a phase in their ties when Pakistan’s influence

______93. Hussain, op.cit., 205.

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in Afghanistan began to swing towards apogee. It is described as “the highest point of Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan.” 94 From the beginning of their rule in 1996 to their abandonment by Pakistan in the wake of 9/11, the period can be described a stripe when Pakistan had finally managed to secure an objective of its foreign policy, i.e. installation of a favorable regime to protect its strategic interests in Afghanistan.

4.16.1. Nature of Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations

Pakistan accorded recognition to the Taliban regime on 25 May 1997, a day after they captured Mazar-e-Sharif. According to Gohar Ayub Khan, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, “We feel that the government of Islamic State of Afghanistan fulfilled the criteria for de jure recognition. It is now in effective control of most of the territory of Afghanistan, including capital Kabul, and is representative of all country.” 95 It has been observed that since Pakistan had been supporting the Taliban right from the beginning, relationships with them were friendly and cordial. Pakistan was the first country among the three which recognized the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the only country that had a resident Ambassador there. Pakistan continued with its support right to the end and after 9/11 tried to convince Taliban to understand the gravity of the situation and abandon its support to Osama bin Laden. Unfortunately Taliban declined our wise counsel and Pakistan had no choice but to act in support of the United Nations Security

Council resolutions and help the Coalition forces. 96

However, the issue was: What was the nature of their relations? As discussed earlier (3.3) that when a state confronts bidirectional, principal and auxiliary, threats, it focuses on principal threat with maximum resources, and prefers to pursue policy of engagement with the relatively manageable auxiliary direction so as to prevent it, first, from adopting an inimical posture and, secondly, induce it not to form any threatening ______94. Dalrymple, The Deadly Triangle 95. Murshed, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years, 82 96. Aziz A. Khan, Personal Communication, April 2016

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collaboration with the principal threat, and when balance of power permits, it pursues ‘forward policy’, i.e., installation of a friendly regime so as to secure itself. Its relations with the favorable government create patron-client perception.

There was a perception that Pakistan-Afghanistan relations during the Taliban regime bore the trappings patron-client states relations and the Taliban were regarded as “the surrogates of the Pakistan armed forces.” 97 The perception was reinforced when Agha Murtaza Poya, a cabinet member in Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1993-1996), in his interview to the CNN conceded that Pakistan “exercised a level of influence with the Taliban which was higher than the level of influence it had been exercising with other Afghan groups.” 98 That Islamabad deemed to wield critical influence was evident when the United States had exerted pressure on Pakistan “to persuade Kandahar to hand over the Arab Osama to Washington. That was the direct hint at what the United States thought of Islamabad’s relationship with the Taliban.” 99

4.16.2. Pakistan’s Contention

But Pakistan saw its relations with the Taliban Afghanistan through the prism of the Taliban’s ability to restore peace and stability in Afghanistan: It has been observed that Pakistan’s Taliban policy during the period needs to be evaluated in the context of contemporary chaotic Afghanistan and its likely impact on Pakistan. That the Taliban managed to end the civil war, restored law and order and stabilized the country on the verge of parceling was enough for Islamabad to extend assistance to them and ensure their stay in power. Secondly, the Taliban regime represented fruition of what Islamabad

______97.Murshed, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years, 157. 98. Israr Haq,”Taliabn’s victory: A Tragedy or a triumph,” The Nation , July 20, 1998, 6. 99. Kalim Bahadur, “Pakistan’s Policy in Afghanistan,” in Afghanistan: Challenges and Opportunities, ed. Warikoo (New Delhi: Pentagon, 2007), 390.

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had been striving for since 1992,that is, the installation of a broad based Pashtun- dominated government in Kabul. 100 The Taliban qualified Pakistan’s help because they controlled Kabul and nearly ninety five percent of “Afghan territory from 1996 until the end of 2001, they appointed eleven non-Pashtun governors, some of them in Pashtun provinces, and included four or five members of the minority ethnic groups in the cabinet.” 101

Pakistan’s support ot the Taliban, in the long-run, was based on strategic compulsions because they had no diplomatic relations with India and shared with Islamabad some foreign policy objectives, especially on Kashmir. Therefore, their ties during the period of 1997-2001 had regional dimensions: Rashid writes:

“Pakistan believes that a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan will be an ally and give its army strategic depth in its ongoing conflict with India. In particular, Islamabad considers support for the Taliban necessary because of its dispute with India over Kashmir. The Taliban, the Deobandi groups in Pakistan, and bin Ladin’s terrorist network all give major support to Kashmiri insurgents resisting New Delhi’s control of Indian Kashmir.” 102

Therefore, Pakistan had no option but to sustain the Taliban in power because the only alternative was the Northern Alliance which had more affinity with regional players who were opposed to the Taliban. Besides, the Alliance represented motley of ______100. Rais, personal communication, March 2016. 101. Murshed, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years,13 102. Ahmed Rashid, “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism,” in Foreign Affairs 78, no.6 (1999):28

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ethnic minorities. Pakistan, once settled them into power, continued to extend material and financial assistance to the Taliban to sustain their rule. It has been, observed that Islamabad not only guided the Taliban in the conduct of war but also provided manpower to sustain their rule as thousands of trained Pakistanis were sent into Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban between 1994 and 1999. Rashid observed that by 1997 the Pakistanis were providing the Taliban with $ 30 million in aid annually as well as free oil to run the country war machine. Pakistan assisted the Kabul regime in infrastructure, telecommunication, airports, public works, water and power development and technical support to the Radio Shariat. Islamabad provided a new communication network, refurbished Kandahar airport and supplied parts and armaments for helicopters and warplanes the Taliban had captured.103

4.17. Evaluation of Pakistan’s Policy in Regional Context

It has been observed that the Taliban world view was backward, obscurantist and extreme. They erroneously believed that their interpretation of Islam was the correct one and should have been imposed even if by force. Such way of thinking was dangerous and should have not been supported. But strategic expediencies guided Islamabad’s Taliban policy; however, it tried hard to convince the Taliban to change their world view and their rigidity in believing their archaic ideas was unchangeable. Pakistan’s prop to an obscurantist regime especially on the issue of human rights drew flak from international organizations and isolated it at regional and international levels. 104

New York-based Human Rights report described Islamabad’s persistence aid to the Taliban in the form of military supplies and men tantamount to violation of the United Nations sanctions against the Afghan regime. The United Nations Security Council

(UNSC ) finally decided to pass Resolution 1363 on 31 July setting up a team of

______103. Rashid, Personal Communication, October 2016. 104. Aziz A. Khan, Personal Communication, April 2016.

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monitors to be placed on Afghanistan’s border to ensure that the UN arms embargo was enforced. During the zenith of its rule, the Taliban regime was recognized by only three countries in the world. What is more, Pakistan’s best efforts failed to get the Kabul regime seat in the United Nations. And, finally, Islamabad’s all-weather friend, China, had not granted recognition to it. The situation “delivered a serious blow to the cause of regional cooperation within the framework of ECO, promoted extremism, obscurantism and even sectarian terrorism in Pakistan.” 105

4.17.1. Regional Dimension: Pakistan, Iran and the Taliban

Afghanistan’s overlapping ethnicity has been a source of traction for neighbors to vie for influence in its political affairs. When one state intrudes it triggers domino effect and others automatically follow suit. Pakistan’s close cooperation with the Taliban regime induced contiguous countries like Iran which had historical influence in western Afghanistan to vie with Pakistan for influence. Tehran managed to muster support of other regional players who did not share spatial borders with Afghanistan but were apprehensive of the spillover of the Taliban ideology. The Iranians, in particular, were not hesitant of showing their “distrust of the Taliban and had seen Pakistan’s hand in the phenomenal success of the students’ militia.” 106 Consequently, they arrived at an informal understanding to bolster the anti-Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Northern Alliance led by the veteran commander Ahmad Shah Massoud.

______105.Javaid Husain, “Improving Ties with Kabul,” Dawn, March 04, 2006, 7. 106. K. Akhtar, “New irritants on the Afghan scene,” The Muslim, December 10, 1995, 6.

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4.17.2. Iran and Soviet Military Incursion

Iran had condemned the Soviet military induction into Afghanistan but it did so discreetly though “it considered the intervention to have been instigated by the United States.” 107

Since it was engaged in its war with Iraq (1980-1988)*, it opted to exercise low profile regarding the Afghan conflict. But it continued to coordinate with Pakistan on the issue as was evident that it had been voting for the Pakistan sponsored resolution in the United Nations. Islamabad, on its part, kept Tehran informed regarding developments at Geneva negotiations. On the conclusion of Iran-Iraq War, Tehran, having taken stock of its Afghan policy, decided to renew its interest in Afghanistan. A State Department cable found that “the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in February 1989 and the fall of the communist regime in Kabul in April 1992, set the stage for a more or less open competition for influence in Afghanistan between Pakistan and Iran.” 108

4.17.3. Islamic State of Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran

It was after the installation of the Mujahideen’s Islamic government in Kabul in 1992 that Pakistan and Iran started observing that they had different agendas for Afghanistan and consequently both remained ‘perennially’ involved in the internal affairs of the country in the 1990s.Tehran was already skeptical of Islamabad’s collaboration with the United States and Saudi Arabia while sponsoring the Afghan Mujahideen and it was not pleased when the Afghan Shias were left out of Islamabad-sponsored Peshawar Accord on power-sharing between various Afghan factions. It wanted to “seek greater

______107. .Khan, Afghanistan and Pakistan , 32.

*The Iran-Iraq began on September 22, 1980 qne lasted til August 20, 1988. Apparently, the cause of the war was a long history of border disputed between the two neighbors but the underlying cause seemed to prevent the Revolution to consolidate itself because, in case of its consolidation, Iraq feared that Iraqi Shia majority, long suppressed under minority Sunni rule, might be inspired to challenge the Sunni dominance.

108. Jones, In the graveyard of Empires. 46.

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representation of the Shiite parties within the resistance as a whole and in the

Mujahideen successor regime in Kabul.” 109

It has been observed that it was not the sectarian issue that underpinned deterioration in Pakistan and Iran’s relations in the 1990s.Tehran was using the sectarian card for its strategic and economic interests; it wanted the exclusive use of Afghanistan for gaining access to newly independent Central Asian republics. It cooperated with Indians and Russians to block Pakistan’s efforts to gain overland access to Central Asia traversing Afghanistan. Having failed to realize its objective, Tehran, on the one hand, played the sectarian card as Hazaras* of Afghanistan were Shias, and, on the other hand, exploited its Persian connection in Herat to keep

Afghanistan boiling. 110

4.17.4. Taliban’s Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran

It was the emergence of the Taliban on the Afghan scene which further poisoned Islamabad-Tehran relations. Iran felt deep antagonism by Pakistan’s support to the Taliban and other Sunni militant outfits. It had serious reservations about the Taliban and was of the view that if they “are able to establish their own government in the whole of Afghanistan, it may become a Sunni state with little harmony with Tehran.” 111 But at the bottom was struggle for competition with Pakistan for gaining exclusive influence in Afghanistan. It has been observed that during the tenure of the Taliban in Kabul, Iran had been supporting the Northern Alliance by providing arm and money as a counter to the Taliban and by extension to Pakistan. But despite all misgivings regarding

Islamabad’s role in the creation of the taliban and in their sustenance, Pakistan took ______109. Rais, War without winners, 250.. *Hazaras are a Persian speaking Shia minority who mainly live in Central Afghanistan 110. Ali, Personal Communication, April 2016 111. K. Rehman, “Foreign powers interest in Afghanistan,” The Muslim , November 14, 1996

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pains to explain to Iran that Taliban were a reality and its relations with them were based on pragmatism and not directed against Iranian interests. It worked hard, unsuccessfully to convince Iran to open channels with Taliban. 112

4.17.5. Iran’s Concerns Tehran deciphered the emergence of the Taliban, “an orthodox Sunni sect, a conspiracy of its rivals, Saudi Arabia and the United States to encircle it, therefore, it wanted “its own people in Kabul.” 113 Iran’s principal concern was that the Taliban movement was the brainchild of the United States which had been bankrolled by Saudi petrodollars and it had enough evidence that they were trained and led by Pakistanis. The Iranians were of the view that the purpose of the movement was to undermine its security and stability because they “might instigate a Sunni uprising on its territory.” 114 As far as the issue of American connection with the Taliban movement was concerned, it became apparent when American diplomat, Nicholas Burns, publicly revealed after the fall of Kabul that the United States had been “carefully courting the Taliban for the last two years for countering Iran and Russia and had been holding regular meetings with them for the last two years in Pakistan.” 115

4.17.6. Taliban success and Iran’s Reaction The ascension of the Taliban witnessed the widening of distrust gap between Tehran and Islamabad. Iran’s reaction to the Taliban success in Afghanistan was one of anger. Locked in a struggle with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States for influence in Central Asia, Tehran viewed the Taliban victory as a part of a plot by Sunnis and the United States to isolate it. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme religious head of the country, called the “Taliban a disgrace to Islam, a remark that was formally protested to ______112. Aziz A. Khan, personal communication, April 2016 113. Ikram Sehgal, “Among the Taliban,” Nation , November 19, 1996, 5 114. Murshed, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years , 51. 115. Israr-ul-Haq, Taliban’s victory, Nation , July 20, 1998.

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the Iranian charge d’affair, who had remained in Kabul.” 116 Tehran viewed the Taliban gaining of power through the prism of its strategic, political, economic and sectarian agenda. The commander of the Revolutionary Guards had taken personal charge of the reorganization of Ismail Khan’s forces after the fall of Herat.

4.17.7. Iran’s Response

In pursuance of protecting its interests Iran decided to, on the one hand, extend support to the opponents of the Taliban, including the Rabbani government in Kabul. On the other hand, it sought to enlist cooperation of other regional states and hosted, on 29 October 1996, Iran hosted a regional conference on Afghanistan which was attended by Russia, India, Turkey, China and some Central Asian Republics. Pakistan would have no objection at all to Iran hosting a conference on Afghanistan. But it found it strange that India had been invited to the conference which has no common border with Afghanistan. Given the type of history of Indo-Pak relations, bringing into the circle of regional countries which should have a hand in solutions of the Afghan crisis was seen in Islamabad as giving New Delhi a chance to counter Islamabad in the region. 117 Iran contended that it “had, time and again sought to convey its misgivings to Pakistan but to no avail. If Pakistan did not want to cooperate, Iran would be left with no option but to

turn to Russia and India.” 118

4.17.8. Pakistan-Iran Relations

Pakistan and Afghanistan relations began to drift towards dip due to missteps of the Taliban regime in the domain of foreign policy. It was commented that Pakistan was deemed to be running the foreign policy wing of the Kabul regime. Consequently, every ______116. Magnus & Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah , 190. 117. Dr. S .M. Koreshi, “Whither Iran,” Nation, November 11, 118. Murshed, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years, 196.

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foreign policy initiative, and for that matter misstep, taken by the Taliban regime was seen by the external world through the prism of Pakistan’s influence on the Afghan government. For example, Pakistan-Iran relations received a jolt when the Taliban ordered Iran to close its embassy. Later on, Islamabad-Tehran ties dipped further when the Iranian diplomats posted at Mazar a Sharif were assassinated. Iran blamed Pakistan for the incident because it believed that the latter had assured the safety of the late diplomats. 119 Despite these relatively serious irritants, the two neighbors and contenders for influence in Afghanistan continued to maintain engagement without any major hiccup in their relations. The fall of the Taliban in consequence of the 9/11 incident proved to be a catalyst in repairing Pakistan-Iran’s damaged relations and open new era of improved bilateral relations.

4.18. Pakistan-Russia-Afghanistan

Notwithstanding the fact that the Afghan war was a contributory factor in the geographical demise of the Soviet Union, still Russia was an important state of the region which was anxious to maintain its influence on the northern border of Afghanistan. Therefore, it continued to station its military along the Afghan-Tajikistan border and supported the Rabbani regime but “its role was rather limited due to its past invasion and defeat in Afghanistan.” 120 Secondly, the geographical prolixity between Afghanistan and the physical borders of Russia due to independence of the Central Asian Republics in 1992 had made it rather complicated for it involved itself directly in the Afghan quagmire. Moscow viewed the situation in Afghanistan mainly through the prism of security threats to itself and its Central Asian republics. It regarded the area of “Central Asia its ‘near abroad’ and had a strategic and economic interest arising out of its policy of maintaining pre-eminence among the former Soviet republics.” 121 ______119. Rashid, Personal Communication, October 2016 120. Aziz A. Khan, Personal Communication , April 2016 121. Dr. Maqbool .A. Bhatty, “Afghan peace remains elusive,” Dawn , December 12, 1996

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4.18.1. Emergence of the Taliban Russia was though not directly affected by the rise of the Taliban; therefore, its policy regarding them lacked clarity and more equivocal. Initially, Russia appeared to be interested in preventing the Taliban’s military advance to the north along the borders of Central Asia republics because the Russians fear that the Taliban would export their fundamentalist ideology and “promote a further exodus of ethnic Russians from the Central Asian Republics to Russia.” 122 The fall of the communism in Central Asia though produced a vacuum and it was a potent and sufficient cause of traction for the fundamentalist Islam to fill in but the fact of the matter is that their apprehensions regarding spill-over affect, the export of extremist ideology and the influx of refugees never materialized. 123 It did not materialize because an expert on the region believed that strong family, tribal and ethnic ties were a factor that had prevented any Islamic fundamentalist movement to take root in the region. 124

Later on, when the Taliban managed to seize Kabul in September 1996, alarm bells rang across the region as it seemed that the clock had completed the full circle and the old issue of security of the southern borders was revived, not only by Russia but also by the successor states of the former Soviet Union. During the intra-Mujahideen war after the establishment of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, Russia supported Ahmed Shah Massoud because they had contacts with him in the Afghan jihad in the 1980s. After the fall of Kabul, Moscow along with India, Iran and some Central Asia States decided to continue support to Massoud . It is pertinent to mention here that when Russia was extending support to the anti-Taliban, Northern Alliance, the Taliban were providing sanctuary to Islamists who were escaping Central Asian States due to repressive measures. Consequently, it was “the presence of Islamist groups on the ______122. Marsden, The Taliban war , 137. 123 Murshed, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years, 207 124. Rashid, Personal Communication, October 2016

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Afghan soil which furthered hostility between Afghanistan and its neighbors and Russia. This was exacerbated when Taliban Afghanistan became the only country to recognize

Chechnya as an independent state.” 125

4.18.2. Pakistan and Russia

Notwithstanding the fact that Pakistan had been accusing that “the Russians are providing military expertise and the Iranians are providing the hard cash to the anti- Taliban military alliance.” 126 there was a broad consensus between Pakistan and Russia regarding the restoration of durable peace and stability in Afghanistan through an intra- Afghan political process leading to the formation of a broad-based government. It has been observed that during the Taliban Afghanistan though Russia was extending all out support to the opponents of the Taliban, the Northern Alliance, there was no serious

rupture in Pakistan’s relations with Russia. 127

4.19. The Taliban and the United States

For one, the Taliban were the logical product of the United States policy of abandoning the area subsequent to the withdrawal of Soviet forces to those who had neither the capacity nor knowhow nor financial resources to deal with the situation how to wrap up the Afghan jihad. Consequently, their impinging interests brought nothing but misery upon the ordinary Afghan people. In an interview published by the French weekly Le Nouvel Observateur of 15-21 January 1998, President Jimmy Carter’s National Security

Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, replied to a question thus:

______125. Khan, Afghanistan and Pakistan , 198-199 126. Nasim Zehra, “Islamabad-Moscow meet halfway,” Nation , April 17, 1997 127. Aziz A. Khan, personal communication, April 2016.

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“Q: And neither do you regret having supported

Islamic fundamentalism, having given arms and advice to future terrorists?

B: What is more important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? A few crazed Muslims or the liberation of

Central Europe and the end of the Cold War? 128

4.19.1. United States Response The United States response towards the Taliban witnessed slide careening from initial accommodative view of the Taliban to outright condemnation of them due to their obscurantist policies regarding education of women, and the presence of Osma Bin Laden and his organization’s, al-Qaeda, purported involvement in the bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Washington’s initial response was ‘wait and see’ but began to be explicit when the assistant secretary, Robin Raphel, during a UN conference in New York of countries with interest in Afghanistan observed that “the Taliban were purely an indigenous movement, that their success had little to do with military prowess, and that some of the policies pursued by the Taliban were extreme but this could be moderated by engaging them.” 129 Two factors are reported to have influenced American changed approach towards the Taliban regime: “first, the Iranian antipathy towards the Taliban, and second, a growing interest in pipeline from Central Asia to the Baluchistan coast in Pakistan, which depended on stable political conditions in Afghanistan.” 130 According to a US diplomat, “the Taliban will probably develop like the Saudis did. There will be Aramco, pipelines, an emir, no parliament and lots of sharia law. We can live with that.” 131

______128. Tariq Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalist: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity (London: Verso, 2002), 208 129. Murshed, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years, 51 130. Murshed, op. cit., 75 131. Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: The Modern History, 171.

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But the ‘more accommodative policy’ did not last long and with the assumption of office by Madeleine Albright as secretary of state in early 1997, the United States view towards the Taliban government began to drift towards condemnation on account of the Taliban’s obscurantist approach towards women’s rights. Washington’s policy became strident on the issue of Osama bin Laden’s presence in Afghanistan. However, the Taliban’s reluctance to grant an American company, UNOCAL, and tending to favor an Argentinian company, BRIDAS, the agreement to build oil and gas pipelines originated from Turkmenistan fields and across Afghanistan may have figured critically in influencing the United States policy towards the Taliban. The Taliban may have been unwilling to grant UNOCAL the contract “out of concern at potential American influence if UNOCAL secured the contract.” 132

Regarding the impact of Pakistan’s support to the Taliban on Islamabad- Washington relations, it has been observed their ties witnessed dip in the wake of Pakistan’s conducting of nuclear tests on May 28, 1998 in response to similar tests conducted ny India because the Clinton administration imposed sanction under Glenn amendment on both India and Pakistan; however, the United States preferred to maintain engagement with Pakistan on the issue of the Taliban due Islamabad’s ‘more apparent than real’ influence on the Kabul regime. 133

4.20. The Taliban and the Central Asian States (CARs)

No other country felt more apprehensions by the rise of the Taliban than the bordering states of Central Asia. There were two issues involved: first, the Central Asian Republics (CARs) feared the spillover effect of the Taliban radical ideology and believed that after the stabilization of government, the Taliban would embark upon a well- calculated program to spread Islamic revolution. Secondly, there was considerable, ______132. Marsden, The Taliban: War , 140. 133. Shamshaad, Personal Communication, November 2015.

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apprehension that the Taliban may have territorial ambitions and once they managed to take the whole of Afghanistan their stated policy of non-interference beyond the borders of Afghanistan might change though the President of Pakistan, Farooq Ahmad Leghari, while visiting Uzbekistan on October 19, 1996, was “reported to have assured the President that the Taliban had no territorial claims beyond Afghanistan’s borders.” 134

It has been observed that their fears were not unjustified because, first, they had achieved independence recently and with the retreat of communism they were open and felt themselves ideologically vulnerable. The other important issue was that they had no armed forces of their own and were relying for their security on the military presence of Russia. Consequently, the fall of Kabul to the Taliban produced enormous fear and trepidation in the region because CARs believed that the region could become conflict arena because after the stabilization the Taliban would embark upon a well- calculated plan to spread their ideology. 135

sSubsequent to the capture of Kabul by the Taliban, President Boris Yeltsin on 2 October 1996 called for a summit meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). His national security adviser said that “the victory of the Taliban posed a serious threat to the Central Asian Republics because it wanted to annex part of them.” 136 All the states, except Turkmenistan, were critical of the Taliban and were not prepared to regard the phenomenon substantive of Pakistan’s influence. Turkmenistan was the only state that had opted to follow a neutral course in the conflict of Afghanistan. Ashgabat’s main concern was its crippled economy which it desperately wanted to get revived by building pipelines to enhance gain for international markets for its gas and oil. Consequently, it “emphasized that it had no problems with the Taliban.” 137 On the other ______

134 . Marsden, The Taliban: War, 131 135. Rashid , Personal Communication, November 2016 136. Marsden , The Taliban: War, 130-131 . 137. Murshed , Afghanistan: The Taliban Years, 228

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hand, for Uzbekistan, the biggest of the CARs, the situation was worrying because of the ethnic Uzbek minority but its policy was that the “turmoil is the internal affair of Afghanistan and could only be resolved by the Afghan themselves without outside interference.” 138

4.20.1. Pakistan and the CARs

As the Taliban rose to power in Kabul, Pakistan’s relations with the Central Asian Republics began to drift towards weakening, especially with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan which believed that Pakistan was involved in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Islamabad wanted to have access to the vast economic Central Asian areas and re- opening of the old Silk Route but its support to the Kabul regime alienated the CARs except Turkmenistan which was not taking sides and Pakistan and Turkmenistan relations were relatively cordial. 139 Notwithstanding the fact that Pakistan had been trying to convince the remaining states that the Taliban’s had no territorial ambitions but it has been observed that they saw Pakistan in negative terms: they never talked about Afghanistan exporting extremism; rather, they believed that it was Pakistan which was springboard of extremism and sending it into Central Asia. 140

4.20.2. Engagement Issue of Taliban Government

Notwithstanding the fact that the Taliban espoused ‘Particularist’ variation of Islam which was understandably archaic and they were stubborn to the point of inflexibility in its implementation but none of its neighbors except Pakistan had tried to engage them early in their reign so that they might be influenced or persuaded in soft terms to moderate their views and accommodate other nationalities too for achieving more durable peace in Afghanistan and stability in the region. Their fervor or alleged design to export their version of Islam may have been the reason; but the argument lacked viability because the local culture and family structure in the CARs was strong enough ______139. Aziz A. Khan, Personal Communication, April 2016. 140. Rashid, personal communication, October 2016.

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to give space to the ‘Particularist’ ideology of the Taliban. 141 Besides, they had neither the technical capacity for effective propaganda machinery nor resources, and more important an attractive alternative social system, to pursue this venture. Later on, though, Russia agreed to cooperate with Pakistan on the issue of peace in Afghanistan but the initiative, at hindsight, appeared too late as political and military balance against the Taliban in the region had developed a specific direction.

The early engagement of Afghanistan’s neighbors with the Taliban may have been more fruitful in terms of peace and stability in the country; their preference to engage the Northern Alliance, the Taliban’s opponents, assumes more significance from another perspective because it prolonged the strife in the region and Afghanistan. Their pursuit of extending assistance may be ascribed to their perception that the Taliban might not be able to hold the country together for long and by aiding their opponents and applying a certain degree of international economic and poltical pressure they would crumble, This proved to be more counterproductive as it prolonged instability in the region, and it appears Afghanistan is still reeling under it.

4.21. After 9/11

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 changed the world. The world was shocked by the development and it was assumed that international community would extend full support to the United States in its quest for punishing the perpetrators of the attack. One immediate fall of the event was that it transformed the region of Southwest Asia again into an area of international political gravity. President Bush’s “depicting the episode as ‘Pearl Harbor of the twenty first century’ made completely clear for President Musharraf and the Pakistani Foreign Office the ramifications of the stunning assaults that were seen worldwide in real time.” 142 Fingers were instantly pointed at Osama bin Laden and his organization, al- ______141. Rashid, Personal Communication, November 2016. 142. Khan, Afghanistan and Pakistan , 88

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Qaeda. Owing to Pakistan’s role in the promotion of the Taliban and, later on, materially helping them sustaining in power, it was regarded as the only country to have substantial influence on the Taliban government, therefore, it was certain that Islamabad would have to make some difficult decisions in the days to come.

4.21.1. Pakistan’s Options

The ruling elite which decide a state’s response to an international situation tend to view the challenge through the prism of its dominant position in the domestic power structure. Therefore, the responsive strategy is designed in such a way as to ensure the dominant position of the ruling elite, and all other considerations stand subordinate to it. After 9/11, the issue how Pakistan should respond to the crisis was dependent upon options available to it. At that time, it was facing multiple internal and external challenges and it “looked like a state that had lost its way, with a stagnant economy, military government, international pariah status, and political and social institutions in disarray.” 143 The development posed a dilemma for the decision-makers of Pakistan: they were to affect synchronization between country’s national interests with the imperatives of international situation. The situation was grim and Islamabad seemed to have everything at stake and very little time to decide a viable course. Consequently, any indiscretion on the part of those who mattered could have been detrimental for the interests, especially strategic in Afghanistan vis-à-vis India, of the country.

Realistically speaking, Pakistan’s options could be reduced to two mutually exclusive courses: to shelve its pro-Taliban policy and join the United States in its war against Al Qaeda network based in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan or continue to support the Taliban and consequently face international wrath. In opting for a course Pakistan had to consider a number of questions: for example, what was the nature and impact of the development on international politics; the strength of the affected, the United States, and to what extent it could go in punishing the perpetrators; how far the ______143. Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 2005), 90

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world would go in its support to America in its quest for retribution; whether Islamabad had the potential to defy Washington and international community and continue its support to the Taliban regime in Kabul, and last, but not the least, could Pakistan afford to compromise its vital national interests including its nuclear assets and its Kashmir policy?

Pursuit of national interests is a complex game. It entails two things: first, prudent, detached and disinterested reflection because it is a matter which relates to millions of people and next generations. Secondly, it involves a single selection from diverse alternatives; therefore, it requires careful assessment of costs and benefits. But it has been mentioned earlier that the ruling elite invariably view international developments through the prism of their power in domestic power structure Consequently, they map out a response which ensures their status in the domestic paradigm. Following the 9/11 incident and impact it created, a careful and deep analysis revealed that Pakistan had no choice except to cooperate with the United States due to internal and external challenges. Pakistan alone could not face the wrath of the United States, and no other country appeared prepared to side with Islamabad in case it would have opted to persist in its pro-Taliban policy. The paramount aspect was to “pursue a strategy that would reduce the risks to Pakistan’s own security and strategic interests.” 144

4.21.2. President Pervaiz Musharraf

It was President General Parvaiz Musharraf of Pakistan whom the buck had stopped. Representing the ruling elite of the country, the onus was on him to make the decision how Islamabad should respond the crisis which had a direct bearings on Pakistan. It was a ‘god-sent’ opportunity for him because he, like his predecessor General Zia ul-

______144. Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: 1947-2009 , 270

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. Haq, was wanting in constitutional legitimacy inasmuch as both had overthrown elected governments and consequently facing the status of international pariah. It proved to be the ‘best of times’ for him because he utilized the development to his advantage and successfully channelized to win international support for his internationally outcast regime.

But it was ‘difficult of times’ too for Musharraf because he was more precariously placed than his predecessor: he was landed in a dilemma how to reconcile Pakistan’s national interest with the imperatives of obtaining international political environment decisively tilted against the Taliban government. If he opted to continue Pakistan’s support to the Afghan regime, Islamabad would have to face the wrath of the world ganged up against terrorism. But if he chose to cut off support to the Taliban, which he eventually had done, it would have entailed 180 degree reversal of a policy which Pakistan had been pursuing since 1992, i.e. establishment of a broad-based friendly regime in Afghanistan. Graft on the situation was a likelihood of backlash from a powerful conservative group of establishment and public outrage by the Taliban supporters in the country.

4.21.3. Indian Card

It was the issue of Indian offer of collaboration to the United and its allies and allowing the use of its airfields for sorties against the Taliban government that came handy and exploited by Musharaf to manipulate the support of the conservative section of the military. He “knew that if he did not accede to American demands, Washington had alternatives in South Asia. The new U.S.-India tie, forged by Clinton administration and extended by George W. Bush, gave America unprecedented leverage over Pakistan.” 145 ______145. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 91.

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If Pakistan had refused to extend cooperation to Washington, it feared it “might have endangered its strategic interests and Indians might have taken advantage of the situation and formed a nexus with the United States.” 146 In his address to the people of Pakistan, while highlighting Indian efforts, he said that “India, which has not shared borders with Afghanistan, has offered all its military bases, logistics and all kind of support to the US with san evil design to get Pakistan declared a terrorist state and harm Pakistan’s strategic assets and Kashmir cause.” 147

Having analyzed pros and cons of the situation and assessing the implications for Pakistan’s strategic interests, Islamabad finally decided to switch its policy of supporting the Taliban to siding with the international coalition against terrorism. Islamabad decided to cooperate with the United States and international coalition for military action against the Taliban regime in Kabul. It has been observed that Pakistan had no option but to dump the Taliban and extend cooperation to the United States because Washington had the support of the entire world community and the United Nations. Even Pakistan’s close friends like China and Middle Eastern Muslim countries supporting it. 148

Pakistan’s new policy, dictated by exigencies of the international environment geared up against terrorism, ushered in paradigm shift in Islamabad’s thinking towards the Taliban. Their status had slide down from strategic assets to a liability. It is argued that Pakistan’s decision was in consonance with principles of the nation state system: Pakistan’s foreign policy, like all nation states, is “guided by the considerations of national interests. It was in national interests to support the Taliban in 1990s, and then it was equally so when it withdrew its support from the Taliban.” 149 ______146. S. H. Zaidi, “The Taliban Venture and the Lessons for Pakistan,” in Pakistan Horizon 54,no.4 (2001):50 147.”Pak. Security comes First,” The News , September 20, 2001 148. Yusufzai, Personal Communication, Jan. 2016.

149. S.I. Dawar, “Pakistan’s Afghan Policy: Now and Then,” The News , August 23, 2004.

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4.21.4. Hindsight Evaluation of Pakistan’s U-Turn Policy a native poet has observed: ‘Bulleh Shah*, It makes no difference whether one believe in God or not; the important thing is whether one rise to the occasion or not.’ After 9/11, the Pakistani ruling elite, realizing the gravity of the situation and its strategic and political implications for the country, decided to turn-U in its Afghanistan policy and apparently rose to the situation which was the apparent by default option for them. Notwithstanding the fact that the response had been mapped out in a crisis situation when the momentum was not normal but it was not an openly debated decision as already pointed out that the man who approved the policy was lacking in constitutional legitimacy. Therefore, an element of underestimation of the situation with regard to its impact on country’s strategic interests can be expected.

A hindsight evaluation of the U-turn policy points to incongruity between the ruling elite’s perception of the post-9/11 challenge and its implications for the country and Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan has invariably preferred to calm Durand Line so that it may focus on the more volatile eastern border. Today the Durand Line is far from stable and Pakistan-Afghanistan relations present a reminiscent picture of 1950s when, at the height of the Cold War, they were touching the nadir point. Islamabad has posted a significant number of its troops along the Durand Line and skirmishes between the two countries are more often.

Secondly, and this is the most significant aspect, eversince the fall of the Taliban the successive governments in Afghanistan have been relying on India to balance Pakistan; consequently, there is a steep rise in Indian influence in Afghanistan is on the rise. New Delhi is using its economic strength and investing in different development projects in Afghanistan. Pakistan has been accusing India of using Afghan soil to ______*Bulley Shah (1680-1757) was a Mughal-era Punjabi Muslim poet.

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interfere in its internal affairs, particularly in Baluchistan. It may be commented that Islamabad’s U-turn policy fails to deliver required strategic dividends to Pakistan and its strategic interests in Afghanistan appear as vulnerable as they were after its independence in 1947.

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Chapter Five

Pakistan-Afghanistan-India

Few countries have seen their relations influenced by a third country as Pakistan-Afghanistan’s have been due to India’s role. Even in the contemporary context, the principal factor that has strained Pak-Afghan ties is the exponentially growing Indian ‘foothold’ in Afghanistan which Islamabad apprehends to be strategically inimical to its interests. Pakistan’s pre-occupation with India can be judged from the fact that it has invariably looked Afghanistan through the prism of its belligerent relations with India. It was the protection of the ‘Kashmir cause’ and countering Indian threat that Islamabad used as a justification for its strategic about-face in Afghan policy after 9/11 and declared its support for the US-sponsored ‘War on terror.’ Therefore, any research exercise that aims at evaluating Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship entails analysis of India’s role in shaping the trajectory of their ties.

India is a regional military and economic power which wants South Asia as its sphere of dominance and South East Asia, Middle East, Central Asia and East Africa as its sphere of influence. Pakistan is the only country in the region which not only claims equal status with India but is also engaged in a struggle with the later. Both have important interests in Afghanistan and have been contending for favorable position there. They are seen as competitors in Afghanistan and want a government that protects their interests: “India believes a secular, liberal, multi-ethnic regime in Kabul will be favorable for its interests, whereas, Pakistan’s policy centers on a fundamentalist, Islamic, Pashtun-dominated government in Afghanistan.” 1 Hamid Karzai, the former President of Afghanistan, during his visit to India in October 2011, remarked: “Pakistan is brother, India is a great friend.” 2 At the end of the day, it will be the extent of ‘brother- ______1. Jorge Heine & Partha Ghosh,”The elephant in the war: India and the Afghan-Pakistan link,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 17, no. 1 (June 2011): 55, DOI: 10.1080/11926422.2011.559105. 2. Sadika Hameed, Prospects for Indian-Pakistani Cooperation in Afghanistan (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2013).

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great friend’s’ preparedness for cooperation that will determine the future of peace in Afghanistan.

5.1. Indian Approach

India and Afghanistan have had steadily poised relations since the former’s independence from the British in 1947. India had been able to maintain its influence in Afghanistan which, however, diminished during the 1990’s civil war and was almost naught when the Taliban were in power in Kabul (1996-2000). During this period India had to close down its embassy and its presence there was virtually non-existent. But it established contacts with the Northern Alliance and extended assistance to it. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, India not only managed to retrieve its standing but also making huge investments with a view to promoting its ‘soft image’ in Afghanistan. Its stakes in Afghanistan are both strategic and economic: it fears that if Afghanistan again fell to the Taliban, it would be a breeding ground for radical Islamists who would get safe sanctuary there and would use Afghan soil for attacks against it in Kashmir. Therefore, it wants more permanent presence there as a means to ensure its security. Besides, it wants Afghanistan as a transit point between Central and South Asia.

At present, Indian objectives in Afghanistan rest upon the following three factors:

“first, to prevent the establishment of another safe haven for jihadi terrorist groups, as was the case in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001under the Taliban rule; secondly, to gain access to Central Asia and its energy, and finally, to curtail the growth of Afghanistan as a major illegal drug production centre.” 3 ______3. Heine & Ghosh, The Elephant in the War, 54-55.

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5.2. Pakistan’s View

Pakistan has, on the other hand, direct security stakes in Afghanistan and it wants peaceful, independent, friendly Afghanistan, free of foreign influence. Islamabad perceives an existential threat in any robust Kabul-New Delhi axis, and does not want India to gain strong influence in Afghanistan. It apprehends that New Delhi’s attempts to court Afghanistan are aimed at encircling it, and this will put its being in jeopardy . Ian Stephens, a British journalist and historian, had explained this threat perception by using the concept of ‘pincer movement’. According to it, India and Afghanistan would attack Pakistan from both sides simultaneously and squeezed it out of existence. 4 Therefore, any rise in Indian influence in Afghanistan is anathema and totally unacceptable to Islamabad as it will entail challenges to its security. Since the ouster of President Daoud in 1978 to to-date, it has been the kernel of Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan, first, to stall the emergence of any regime which is inimical to Islamabad’s interests, and secondly, seek for the establishment of a broad-based Pashtun dominated regime. It is India-Pakistan rivalry which is at the heart of the present crisis engulfing Afghanistan as both are vying for influence there. It has already been mentioned that Pakistan and Afghanistan are uniquely wedded with each other. Any development in one country affects the long term destiny of the other which makes it impossible for Pakistan to be complacent regarding anything that directly affects its security. Islamabad believes that if India manages to gain strong foothold in Afghanistan the qualitative change that follow would affect it irreparably. That is why, it has strong objections against Indian consulates in Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad and Mazar-i-Sharif. It has been observed that Indians by building their ‘soft image’ and using Strategic Partnership want to patronize and use Afghanistan as a center of pressure on Pakistan. 5 ______4. Nazir Hussain and Najam D.Farani, “Afghanistan as a factor in Indo-Pakistan Relations,” in Regional Studies XXXII, nO.2 (2011) 5. Rasul Buksh Rais (An eminent writer on Afghanistan and Academicians), in discussion with the author, March 2016.

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5.3. India-Afghanistan Relations

Before the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, the two countries were neighbors and the present Durand Line separated them. They had a strong history of long interactions with each other through commerce and through their many shared cultural values and commonalities. The division though snapped their land contiguity but India regards Afghanistan a very part critical part of “‘near abroad,’ that is, its extended neighborhood, and its strategic location makes it an especially critical component of the latter.” 6 Pandit Nehru, the first post-partition Prime Minister of India, remarked on the eve of Prime Minister Daoud of Afghanistan’s first visit to India in 1959:

“The partition of India separated direct boundaries and direct contact between the two countries. But that made little difference to our age-long community of interests and our old friendship survived. And ever since then, we have grown closer to each other for variety of reasons, among them being mutual interest which is always a

peaceful reason.”7

5.4. Friendship Treaty 1950

India’s historical and cultural ties with Afghanistan have evolved its ‘soft image’ and it has invariably relied on projects promoting its ‘soft image’ in Afghanistan, and economic cooperation is one of the components. Since the overthrow of the Taliban after 9/11, India has invested heavily in renewing its soft image in Afghanistan. It has focused on a ______6. Heine & Ghosh, The Elephant in the War, 54. 7. Angadipuram Appadorai and Mannaraswamighala S.Rajan, Indian Foreign Policy and Relations ( New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1985),155.

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number of projects which included infrastructure development, health and educational capacity building measures. At present Indian investment in Afghanistan has “reached to the tune of 2 billion which has made India the leading donor nations to Afghanistan and consequently the largest donor in the region.” 8

New Delhi has invested in various reconstruction and capacity building projects, includes major development initiatives; medical missions; children health and school feeding program; and training for civil servants, police and diplomats. The most significant infrastructure initiative has been the construction of a highway which has linked Afghanistan’s ring road to Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf and thus has reduced Afghanistan’s dependence on Pakistan for sea access. 9 According to Hamid Karzai, “The Western countries and the United States of America came to Afghanistan for their personal goals. There are also countries that, without having personal agenda, are here

for honest cooperation. One example is India.” 10

It was the Treaty of Friendship which had laid the foundation of Indo-Afghan cooperation in the post-British departure phase. Later on, the two countries signed a number of agreements which contained provisions relating to fostering of trade ties between them. The two countries signed Friendship Treaty on 4 January 1950 which contained a reference to ancient ties between the two countries but, more important, was their resolve to “establish peace between the two countries with a view to the common benefits of their people and the development of their respective countries and trade agencies in the other’s territory.“ 11 Later on, another Treaty of Trade and ______8. Embassy of India, Kabul, “ Indo-Afghan Relations:DevelopmentPartnership (2016)available at eoi.gov.in/Kabul/?0707?000. 9.. Ahmed Rashid (An eminent expert on Pakistan-Afghanistan affairs and Central Asia), in discussion with the author October 2016. 10. Shaida M. Abdali, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India :A Paradigm Shift (New Delhi: Pentagon, 2016) 11. Appadorai & Rajan, Indian Foreign Policy and Relations, 156.

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Commerce was entered into on 27 July 1950; moreover, New Delhi and Kabul inked another major trade agreement in July 1960 at the conclusion of trade talks in Kabul.

The signing of the treaties and the agreement in the early phase set the tenor of India-Afghanistan relations. They were followed by a series of high- level visits from India and Afghanistan which further strengthened their ties. King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan paid a 15-day State visit to India from 11-26 February 1958. His visit was followed by Prime Minister Daoud’s trip in February in 1959. Prime Minister Daoud established a separate portfolio for Border Areas in response to Pakistan’s setting up of a Ministry of Frontier Regions and Tribal Affairs. It was India which had financed the creation of new ministry by providing Rs. 40 million (about $4 million) to Daoud. 12 It was Pandit Nehru’s, Indian Prime Minister, State visit to Afghanistan in September 1959 that was the acme of India-Afghanistan relations in the initial peiod of their relations. Later on, Indira Gandhi, the daughter of Pandit Nehru and the then Indian Prime Minister, visited Afghanistan from 5-10 June 1969.

5.4.1. Strategic Partnership

A strategic partnership between two countries is a kind of bilateral relationship and its main objective is to facilitate the increase of power of the states involved. It is commonly identified with defense or security related matters, but its scope is not restricted to such matters as issues relating to health, economic development and even education are also included in it. Besides, there is a difference between strategic partnership and classical alliance in the sense that the former is not necessarily directed against the common rival; whereas, the classical alliance had invariably been aimed at seeking balance of power and addressing security concerns. 13 ______12. Raja Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan: A First-Hand Account (London: Verso, 1988), 71 13. Farooq Hasnat (A renowned Academician and commentator on Pakistan’s affairs), in discussion with the author March 2016.

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The Strategic Partnership Agreement signed on 4 October 2011 between India and Afghanistan was a significant development because it formalized Kabul’s intent to engage a country to help in its reconstruction and guarantee its security. The Agreement was intended to broaden and deepen friendly relations between the two countries by focusing on boosting trade, security and cultural ties. Before the signing of the Agreement, New Delhi had been keen on promoting its ‘soft image’ in Afghanistan and avoiding every military entanglement. It is the politico-security component of the Partnership which indicated that India “aims to propel the relationship beyond a mere aid-donor equation to a much higher plane with training of the Afghan National Security Forces and the Afghan National Police.” 14 Afghanistan is a difficult country due to its complex diverse ethnic composition, economic backwardness and, for that matter, its recent turbulent history. The kind of security challenges it has been facing subsequent to the fall of the Taliban regime have acute dynamism on account of their non-traditional mode, and their impact on region. Further, the drawdown of American forces in 2014 and Afghan army’s limited capacity to meet the security challenges seemed to have dawned upon New Delhi the necessity to prop up Afghanistan as a strong, independent, stable, prosperous and democratic state which is critical not only to Indian security interests but also for overall regional security.

5.4.2. Pakistan’s Concerns

Hamid Karzai, the then President of Afghanistan, though sought to allay Pakistan’s apprehensions by observing that the strategic partnership was not directed against any country and the agreement Afghanistan had signed with India would not adversely affect relations with Pakistan. 15 But Islamabad sees the ‘politico-security’ provision with ______14. Yow Peter Raiphea, “India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership: An Analysis of India, Afghanistan and Pakistan ,” International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications 3, issue 4 (April, 2013):2. 15. “Strategic Partnership with India not targeted against Pakistan,” The Hindu October 5, 2011 retrieved from http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/strategic-partnership-with-india-not-targeted-against- pak-karzai/article2514180.ece

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apprehensions and regards it detrimental to its interests because the Partnership gave India “a bigger role in training Afghan troops and security forces. Some observers worry that the greater involvement by India will lead to a ‘proxy war’ on Afghanistan soil between it and nuclear armed Pakistan. Pakistan has already exhibited its concerns regarding Indian influence in Afghanistan and sees the Strategic Partnership in the context of strong and bourgeoning strategic relations between India and the United States, and fears that erstwhile Moscow-Kabul-New Delhi nexus is going to be supplanted by Washington-Kabul-New Delhi nexus.

5.5. India and the Issue of Pashtunistan

The early leadership of Pakistan firmly held the view that Afghanistan’s questioning the status of the Durand Line as an international border and Indian ambiguous policy on the issue of Pashtunistan smacked of the existence of a nexus between Kabul and New Delhi’s grand design against it. It has been observed that the argument appeared to be tenable because Afghanistan was a poor, backward country which had not the capacity to raise the issue of Pashtunistan on its own. 16 It led to two implications: first, it enhanced Pakistan’s security apprehensions vis- à-vis India, and, secondly, lent the conflict a regional dimension because Afghanistan, following the principle ‘the enemy of your enemy is your friend,’ sought to enlist Indian support on the issue. Therefore, Karachi’s primary objective was to seek containing of New Delhi’s influence in Kabul to offset the feared eventuality of being ‘crushed by a sort of pincer movement’ involving Afghanistan stirring the ethnic cauldron in Pakistan and India stepping sin to undo the partition of the subcontinent.

______

16.Rahimullah Yusufzai (An eminent journalist and commentator on Pakistan-Afghanistan affairs), in dialogue with the author January 2016.

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5.5.1. Indian Position

Indian official position on the issue of Pashtunistan may have been evolved from ‘soft support’ in the early stage of the campaign to staying away from getting involved in the dispute. This was evident when a number of “ Pashtunistan days were celebrated in different Indian cities and championed by some Indians.” 17 Indian support was “motivated by New Delhi’s policy to keep Pakistan engaged in a conflict with Afghanistan as a means to serving India’s conflict with Pakistan, especially over Kashmir.” 18 But the Indian ‘soft support’ seemed to have dimmed and eventually ended when the Afghan government began to demand new plebiscite which contained independence offer as one of the choices because the Indian Government “had, after all, adopted a policy of firm rebuff to all suggestions that the fate of Kashmir be decided on such a basis. Perhaps as a result, their support for a Pashtun plebiscite waned in the

early 1950s.” 19

Dispelling the impression that India had been instigating Afghanistan to adopt an aggressive policy on the issue of the Durand Line, Pandit Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, said:

“We are continuously being charged with having intrigues with Afghanistan and bringing pressure upon her to adopt a policy in regard to Pakistan which she might not otherwise have done…That, of course, I regret to say is one of the numerous things

without foundation which emanates from Pakistan.” 20

______17. Aparna Pande, Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India (Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 65 18. Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival (London: Taurus, 2012), 122 19. Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective (California: Stanford, 1981), 29. 20. Saikal, Afghanistan, 122

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5.5.2. Moral and Contractual Compulsions

But ‘moral and contractual compulsions’ seemed to have served more potent constraints for India to adopt an explicit policy on the issue of Pashtunistan . First, New Delhi had rejected all suggestions which gave Kashmiris the option to decide their fate on the basis of plebiscite. Now promoting the cause of Pashtun independence by way of referendum but denying it to Kashmiris would have been not only contradictory but difficult to defend morally. As a result, “whatever measure of implicit support India was giving to the issue of Pashtunistan began to wean in the early 1950s.” 21 Further, the Further, the signing of the Delhi Pact, also known as the Nehru-Liaqat Pact, on 8 April 1950 was primarily meant to safeguard the rights of minorities but clauses 7 and 8 of section C devolved obligation on both the countries to respect territorial integrity and sovereignty of each other while discouraging any propaganda to this effect. This obligation hamstrung India to help Afghanistan on the issue of Pashtunistan . 22 Consequently, New Delhi preferred to maintain silence and did not support Kabul on Pashtunistan where the non-aligned Afghanistan needed its support against a common adversary, Pakistan. This Indian policy may have been one of the reasons of Afghanistan’s exercise of ‘benign neutrality’ in the 1965 and 1971 wars between India and Pakistan.

5.6. India and the People’s Democratic Republic of Afghanistan The April 1978 Saur Revolution which ushered in the birth of Peoples Democratic Republic of Afghanistan provided India with an opening to “regain its pre-eminence 23 place in Kabul.” The wide divergence in perception regarding the nature of the April

______21. Arnold, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion , 29 22. Hussain & Farani, Afghanistan as a factor 23. William Dalrymple, A Deadly Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (Washington: The Brookings Institution, June, 2013)

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development in Afghanistan between New Delhi and Islamabad was obvious: Pakistan regarded the new Afghan regime as Soviet sponsored; India, on the other hand, viewed the advent of the Taraki regime as the internal matter of Afghanistan, and regarded the PDPA regime “more as a government of a radical shade of Afghanistan nationalism than as a pro-Soviet Marxist one.” 24 Therefore, India was one of the first non-communist countries to accord diplomatic recognition to the post-Revolution Taraki government in Afghanistan. “Indian External Affairs Minister paid an official visit to Afghanistan in September 1978 and thus became the first major non-communist foreign dignitary to visit Kabul after the Revolution.” 25

India, in line of its policy of developing its ‘soft image’ in Afghanistan by focusing on economic ties, signed various agreements and protocols to promote cooperation with pro-Soviet regimes in Kabul which resultantly enhanced its influence in Afghanistan. In January 1979, India and Afghanistan signed a number of agreements whereby India pledged “to provide financial assistance for new projects in Afghanistan. The overthrow and assassination of Taraki had not prejudicially affected India’s relations with Afghanistan inasmuch as New Delhi preferred to avoid any comments that might have embarrassed the new government.” 26

5.7. Indian and the Soviet Intervention

The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, a nonaligned country, was an historical development which on account of its implications “drew a swift and resounding worldwide censure” 27 but it presented India with a foreign policy and moral dilemma, i.e. how to affect poise between its non-aligned state credentials and its traditional Soviet lopsided foreign policy. Broadly speaking, India had two options: as a proponent and a ______24. Bhabani S. Gupta, Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society (London: Frances Pinter, 1986), 141 25. Hasan Askari Rizvi, India and Afghanistan,” Regional Studies V, no. 4 (Autumn 1987),7

26. Rizvi, Op. cit., 7. 27. Riaz M. Khan, Untying the Afghan knot: Negotiating Soviet withdrawal (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2005), 7.

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leading member of the Non-Aligned movement, it needed to censure explicitly the Soviet step as was being done and stand by the majority of states and call for immediate and unconditional withdrawal of foreign forces; or, take a stock of its ties and dependencies on the Soviet Union and act accordingly. But the issue was that the domestic political situation was fluid and uncertain as the country was in the ‘throes’ of general elections and a caretaker government was at the helm of affairs.

5.7.1. Indian Response-Ambivalence to Blatant Criticism

During the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, India had to walk the tight rope, balancing its traditional ties with USSR on the one hand and its non-aligned status on the other. Therefore, its policy had been characterized by initial blatant criticism of the step through forthright USSR proclivity to subtle balancing of its relations with Moscow and maintaining its non-aligned nation profile. The initial Indian reaction was ambivalent reflected which had been described a domestic political confusion arising out of the transition from the first non-Congress regime to the re-emergence of Mrs. Gandhi. Besides, the dicey and uncertain situation in Afghanistan also contributed to Indian vague and non-committal posture.

As the ambience began to appear in proper perspective, only then New Delhi evaluated the implications of the development and issued its first official response. The incumbent Prime Minister of India, Mr. Charan Singh, issued a strong statement of condemnation and asked for the withdrawal of all the foreign troops from Afghanistan. He observed “that the continued presence of Soviet troops could have far-reaching consequences for the entire region.” 28 Later on, the Government of India communicated

to the Soviet Government, through its Ambassador in New Delhi, its “deep concern at ______28. Naveed Ahmad, “Indo-Soviet Relations since Mrs. Gandhi’s Re-election,” Pakistan Horizon XXXVI, no.1(1983): 78.

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the substantial involvement of Soviet military forces in ghanistan and sought their withdrawal as soon as possible.” 29

Indian government’s stiff reaction on the move was a blow for Moscow; consequently, it contacted New Delhi and appraised it of circumstances leading to sending of troops into Afghanistan. Andrei Gromyko, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, paid a visit to New Delhi in the second week of February 1980, and held discussions with Indian leaders on the situation in Afghanistan. The Indian viewpoint remained strident as it is reported that “in the course of their talks with him, the Indian leaders were reported to have tried to impress upon him the need to draw up a time table for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan as a part of Soviet contribution to normalizing the situation in the region.” 30

5.7.2. Middle Phase: Soft Approach

The middle phase of India’s post-intervention Afghan policy which is characterized by its soft approach on Soviet intervention in Afghanistan representing New Delhi’s long and close strategic and political relationship with Moscow, began with the assumption of office by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Her tenure witnessed careening of India’s Afghan policy to the Soviet side. It had been argued that New Delhi could not afford to oppose the Soviet action publicly because such a step would have entailed undermining of their long friendly relations. New Delhi had been maintaining close friendly relations with Russia since its independence and this had been the “corner stone of its foreign policy. After the signing of Friendship Treaty with Moscow in 1970, it had been carefully ______29. Bimal Prasad, “India and the Afghan crisis,” in Afghanistan in Crisis, ed. K. P. Misra (London: Croom Helm, 1981),77. 30.A.S.Mishra, India’s Foreign Policy: A Study in Interaction . (New Delhi: Meenakshi Prakashan,1982),205

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avoiding any criticism of Moscow though many Indians believed that the policy needed to be evenly poised.” 31

According to I.K. Gujral who was serving as India Ambassador to Moscow at the time of the Soviet intervention:

“We could tell the Soviets that they had committed a grave mistake by getting involved in the Afghani quagmire; we could not strain our relationships with them and be left alone in the midst of a deep regional crisis. Let us remember that the Soviet

Union was a vital source, for our arms purchases.” 32

Another explanation of Indian policy may have been that the situation was fluid and dicey; the resistance was in its embryonic phase and not strong enough to challenge the Government in Kabul, and New Dehli may have the impression that the Soviet military Juggernaut would have no difficulty in crushing the resistance, and consequently would destabilize Pakistan. But far from destabilizing Pakistan, the Soviet Union, when withdrew its forces in 1989, “offered Islamabad a significant opportunity to thwart future India efforts aimed at wooing Afghanistan.” 33 Therefore, it was but logical to stay on the side of a traditional ally. Consequently, India was the only non-communist country which had friendly and full diplomatic relations with the Soviet-sponsored Babrak government, including a residential ambassador. ______31. James B. Amstutz, Afghanistan: The First Five Yearsof Soviet Occupation (Washington: National Defence University, 1986), 365. 32. Indir K. Gujral, “Oral History: India’s Response to the Soviet Military intervention in Afghanistan,” Indian Foreign Affairs 1, no.1 (January- March 2006): 128 33. Lawrence Ziring, “Unraveling the Pakistan-Afghanistan riddle,” Asian Affairs 36, no.2 (2009):70.

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Even before the formal assumption of office, she issued a statement containing an implicit endorsement of the Soviet military action in Afghanistan. On 2 January 1980, she was reported to have said: “I am strongly against any interference. But in Afghanistan the Soviet interference is not one-sided.” 34 The initial official reaction of Gandhi’s government to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was that of adherence of the Moscow position, i.e. that the Soviets had been invited by the Kabul regime, and that they would depart as soon as the outside interference in Afghanistan stopped. Even the Indian representative at the United Nations echoed the same stance and its representative read out the following statement:

“The Soviet Union sent troops to Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan government. While India was against the presence of foreign troops and bases in any country, it had no reason to disbelieve a friendly country the Soviet Union when it said it would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan whe asked to by the Afghan

government.” 35

Consequently, India was the only non-aligned country which had granted diplomatic recognition to the Soviet propped regime and abstained from voting on the United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Indian response to the Soviet incursion was consistent with its national interests, but given the nature of Indo-Afghan relations the ______34. Ahmad, ” Indo-Soviet Relations since Mrs. Gandhi’s Re-election ,” 78-79. 35. Sangram .S. Sisodia, Foreign Policy of India: Indira Gandhi Era (New Delhi: Inter India, 1985),150- 151

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majority of Afghans who were affected by the development, and many of them were royalists and nationalists, were dismayed by the Indian soft approach towards the Soviet Union on the issue which they believed as grossly hostile. The Indian policy was shocking for them because they believed that India was using Afghan blood for getting military supplies and financial aid from the Soviet Union. It has been observed that the Afghans, were expecting that Indian view of the development would be consistent with its status as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement and would denounce the Soviet intervention. But Indian policy disappointed them. 36

5.7.3. Balancing Phase

One of the factors that evolve the stature and image of a country in international arena is the values it espouses and seeks to promote by predicating its foreign policy on them. India was a champion and leading member of the Non-Aligned Movement, expected to view the situation in Afghanistan objectively and adopt a policy consistent with its status. However, its flagrant soft approach was a shock to many countries. It has been observed that New Delhi having realized that its apparently pro-Soviet policy was conveying the impression that it was unmindful of the threats posed by the military presence of USSR and its stature was being tarnished, it finally decided to readjust it a little bit within the overall pro-Soviet posture. 37 And according to the modified policy, India sought to convey to the world that her refusal to condemn the Soviet Union did not mean that it supported Soviet action in Afghanistan.

But there may have been other cause that influenced New Delhi to revisit its policy: the stiff resistance by the Afghan Mujahideen was a surprise not only for the Soviets but also for India which regarded the Afghan situation a mopping up operation for the Soviet military might. Secondly, Washington’s decision to establish an unlikely ______36. Rustam Ali Shah Mohmund, (An eminent expert on Afghan Affairs), in discussion with the author September 2016 37. Shamshaad A. Khan (Former Foreign Secretary 0f Pakistan), in discussion with the author November 2015.

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alliance with the Islamic fundamentalist Afghan Mujahideen and provide them covert military and financial assistance evened the situation in Afghanistan and compelled India to assess its policy more rationally. Consequently, New Delhi had decided to take a more realistic view of the situation and modified its policy accordingly.

5.7.4. India-Pakistan and the Soviet Intervention Pakistan and India were in opposing camps: Pakistan as a ‘frontline state’ was part of the grand unofficial alliance formed against the Soviet military presence and channelizing assistance to opponents of the Kabul regime to which India had granted diplomatic recognition. At the United Nations Islamabad was “playing a leading role in mustering support for UNSC resolution every year against the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan.” 38 Pakistan feared that the situation along the Durand Line might tempt India to intimidate and destabilize it or launch a pre-emptive strike against its nuclear sites. On the other hand, Indian viewed that the situation in Afghanistan had brought the superpowers in the area where it wanted its unchallenged hegemony. 39

India’s soft approach policy not only provided necessary diplomatic cushion to USSR as New Delhi abstained from voting on the resolution in the Security Council pertaining to Afghan issue because “we did not wish to harm our abiding friendship with the Soviets on this issue.” 40 It was also critical of Pakistan’s role without realizing the implications of the development not only for Pakistan but for the region. In the perilous days of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, India not only refrained from condemning it but refused to acknowledge that the situation posed a serious threat to Pakistan and beyond. New Delhi continued to “accuse Islamabad of exploiting the Afghan crisis to obtain economic and military assistance from the West and conservative Islamic countries for strengthening its defense and undermining the ______38. Ahmed Rashid (An eminent expert on Central Asian affairs), in discussion with the author October 2016. 39. Khan, Personal Communication , November 2015. 40. Gujral, Oral History, 128.

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traditional pattern of power in the region and charged Islamabad for aiding and abetting insurgency in Afghanistan at the behest of the imperialist powers.” 41

India was more concerned with US arms supply to Pakistan than the real issue of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. It objected to American supply of arms to Pakistan arguing that it would result in heightening of tension, intensification of arms race and “would expose the region to active superpower conflict. Indian policy makers believed that the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan less threatening to the regional peace and security than the supply of American arms to Pakistan following the Soviet move.” 42 It condemned “US-Pakistan arms relationship and deciphered it a provocative, destabilizing and escalatory step and lobbied hard against the transfer of advance arms and equipment such as F-16 aircraft and Airborne Warning and Control Systems.” 43

Islamabad, on its part, rejected New Delhi’s accusations and objections contending that Indian pro-Soviet policy tantamount not accepting ground realities that point to “dangers Soviet military presence in Afghanistan posed to Pakistan; and declared Indian arguments regarding supply of American arms to Pakistan as propaganda and an attempt to divert attention from its own arms purchase from external sources.” 44 Islamabad contended that it required arms to reinforce its security arrangements and to cope with the pressure which had stemmed from the Soviet military intercession in Afghanistan. “Islamabad offered New Delhi a ‘No War Pact’ in order to allay latter’s professed fear of a military threat from augmentation of Pakistan’s military strength in consequence of military supplies from the United States.” 45 ______41. Rizvi, India and Afghanistan , 17. 42. Rizvi, Op. cit., 18.

43. Mahnaz Isphani, Pakistan: Dimensions of insecurity (International Institute for Strategic Studies: Brassy’s, 1989/1990) 44. Rizvi, India and Afganistan, 18.

45.Hamid H. Kizilbash, ed., Pakistan’ Security and Foreign Policy (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988), 5

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As a matter of fact, it was India’s policy of describing the Soviet military incursion into Afghanistan as reactive and justifying it without regarding the national sovereignty and non-aligned status of Afghanistan that revealed the infirmity of moral underpinnings of New Delhi’s policy. At the time of Moscow’s sending its troops into Afghanistan, India was projecting its image as non-aligned state and was against the interference of extraneous powers in the security matters of the region. The incumbent government did reproved the Soviet action but for a brief period, and once Mrs. Gandhi assumed power again, it remained silent and officially never uttered a word of condemnation on atrocities committed by foreign forces upon the Afghans. Indian policy was inherently contradictory: “On the one hand, it was claiming itself a non-aligned country and on the other hand it had totally aligned itself with the Kabul regime for extracting maximum military and economic benefits.” 46

5.8. India-Afghanistan Relations during Soviet Stay

The Soviet military incursion into Afghanistan provided India with an opening to further enhance its influence in Afghanistan. Throughout the 1980s there was an enormous increase in the quantum of New Delhi’s sway in Afghanistan because not many Third World countries were anxious to maintain relations with the Moscow propped regime in Afghanistan. On the other hand, Babrak Karmal government was equally interested in developing relations with New Delhi. Consequently, “India increased its investments in industrial, irrigation, and hydro-electric projects in Afghanistan. Besides, it extended cooperation in economic and technological fields, health and education sectors, and offered military training facilities to Afghan soldiers. The Indo-Afghan Commission was reactivated in 1985.” 47 However, India-Afghanistan relations were more fruitful for Kabul because not many third world countries were keen to maintain ties with the Soviet propped regime. ______46. Razia Sultana and Azmatullah, “The Role of Foreign Actors in Afghanistan during 1978-1992,” in Central Asian Journal (2010):

.47. Rizvi, India and Afghanistan , 19

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On the other hand, though New Delhi’s influence during the period was touching its zenith but it was playing its cards very carefully and dexterously, that is, not using it against Pakistan knowing that Pakistan’s roots in Afghanistan are quite deep; besides, Islamabad was part of a sort of international coalition. India was mindful of the fact that the Soviet military stay in Afghanistan would not be permanent because as the resistance was growing, the Soviets were finding it difficult to maintain their grip on the country. 48

5.9. Post-Withdrawal Phase

India’s pro-USSR policy during the decade of 1979-1989 and underestimating the gravity of the Soviet step had neutralized it in a major conflict in a region which it believes to be a part of its hegemonic sphere .On the other hand, Pakistan emerged as a far more potent regional actor due to its ‘frontline state’ role, winning considerable international approval. Secondly, the policy cost New Delhi whatever support among the Afghans it had earned on account of its friendship with Kabul since 1947. They were appreciative of India’s deep ties with the Soviet Union but were expecting it exhibit neutrality regarding the war in Afghanistan. Consequently, this precluded the possibility of India’s playing any constructive role in Geneva negotiations. 49

Later on, when it became clear that the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan had become a reality and New Delhi assumed that Dr. Najibullah would continue to rule the country inasmuch as Mujahideen would, due to exhaustion of war, accept his government, it decided to retune its policy with a view to reentering the Afghan scene as a friend of Afghans. There may have been two objectives: first, “to ______48. Mohmund , Personal Communication, September 2016. 49. Rais, Personal Communication , March 2016.

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maintain Indian influence in Afghanistan and preclude the possibility of any power vacuum; and secondly, to pre-empt Pakistan from enjoying closer relations with Afghanistan and prevent the latter’s emergence as a client state that could be used against it, as was the case during the Taliban regime.” 50

5.9.1. Post-Withdrawal Phase 1989-1996

With the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the situation drifted towards fluidity and uncertainty but India continued its diplomatic presence in Afghanistan. It maintained cooperation with the government of President Najibullah and provided it developmental assistance. Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, invited the Afghan President to Delhi and assured him of all possible help to win him international support President Najib visited New Delhi from 28 to 30 August 1990 and held wide ranging talks with the Indian leadership on political solution of the Afghan problem. During his visit, he signed an Agreement on Prevention of Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs. The ninth session of Indo-Afghan Joint Commission was held in June 1990 where a protocol covering areas like agriculture, commodity assistance and tele-communications was signed. 51

5.10. India and the Rabbani Government

The collapse of the Najibullah regime in 1992 and the assumption of power by Pakistan- based Mujahedeen leaders in consequence of the Peshawar Accord resulted in, albeit for a very brief period, nosedive in Indian influence in Afghanistan. However, later in 1992, with the assumption of the office of President by Rabbani and aided by predominantly non-Pashtun government Indian began to retrieve its influence. Pakistan’s endeavors for establishing a broad-based Pashtun dominated government headed by Gulbudin Hekmatyaar made President Rabbani undertake a reappraisal of his country’s ______50. Shahryar Sheikh, “Indian role in Afghanistan,” The News March 5, 1994, 8 51. Sheikh, op. cit., 8

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foreign policy. He, in order to counterbalance Pakistan’s influence in Afghan affairs, decided to engage Islamabad’s arch rival India. New Delhi reciprocated Rabbani’s overtures as “has been the case since Indian independence, New Delhi’s primary foreign policy objective in Afghanistan is to counter Pakistan.” 52 Consequently, India again became active in Afghanistan and provided humanitarian and technical assistance to the Afghan government.

If Islamabad’s pursuit of having a pro-Pakistan Pashtun dominated broad based government in Kabul contributed to Afghanistan’s slide to fierce civil war, President Rabbani’s revisit exercise of his country’s foreign policy and opening up with India to balance Pakistan was equally devastating for Afghanistan. The surge in New Delhi’s influence in Kabul was unacceptable for Islamabad which retaliated by covertly promoted the Taliban who eventually replaced the Kabul government. As a matter of fact, Rabbani’s rapprochement drive brought India and Pakistan, on the one hand, in an open competition for influence in Afghanistan, and on the other paved the way for other regional and extraneous players to vie for furtherance of their respective interests.

5.11. India and the Taliban

Later on, the rise of the Taliban phenomenon brought Kabul and New Delhi further closer. The Indian government launched a propaganda campaign aimed at convincing the world that the Taliban represented Pakistan’s proxy force and their assumption of power in Kabul would have serious implications. The Rabbani government sent, in February 1996, Masood Khalili as its envoy to India who relentlessly pleaded with India to help the Kabul government against the Taliban. The Taliban, armed with Pakistani weapons and conducted by its officers, were closing in on Kabul and India regarded the ______

52. Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s war in Afghanistan (New York: Norton, 2009), 47

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situation anathema to its interests inasmuch as “Kabul would lose all pretense of any independence under the Taliban. The two Ks-Kashmir and Kabul have always been

Pakistan’s regional goals.” 53

India decided to extend support to the Rabbani regime because it wanted to maintain its influence in Afghanistan, and secondly, to foreclose the emergence of any Pakistan-friendly regime in Kabul. New Delhi viewed the Taliban as an “extension of Pakistan’s policy of negating Indian efforts to expand its politico-economic influence in the region. India perceived that the Taliban’s rising power in Afghanistan would bolster cross-border incursions of Islamic insurgents fighting Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir.” 54 All pro-Rabbani countries stepped up military aid to it but India was in the forefront: it helped Kabul refurbish Afghan national airline, Ariana, which relocated its base in New Delhi, to provide the government with a reliable arms carrier. Besides, it also provided aircraft parts, new ground radars and money. 55 In addition to military assistance, the two countries focused on enhancing economic cooperation too as “a joint trade commission had been established to monitor the existing pace of economic cooperation and identify further avenues for expansion of bilateral trade.” 56

India continued to furnish military assistance to Northern Alliance under the command of Ahmad Shah Massoud, a Tajik leader who was receiving assistance from Iran and Russia. It was India’s military equipment support that helped the Northern Alliance to hold its own after President Rabbani had to leave Kabul in the face of the Taliban onslaught. New Delhi strengthened the defense of the Northern Alliance by ______53.I .A. Ali, “Afghanistan situation: Is Iran caught in the web of India?,” Pakistan Observer, November 23, 1995 54. Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan and the emergence of Islamic militancy in Afghanistan (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005), 209. 55. Ahmed Rashid,” Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (London: Taurus, 2000), 45 56. I.A. Ali, “The Indian involvement in Afghanistan’” The Frontier Post, April 09, 1996.

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providing high-altitude warfare equipment worth $ 10 million through its Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), and Indian defense advisers provided technical advice to the Alliance. In 2001 India built a hospital at their airbase in Farkhor on the Afghan-Tajik border so that there would be place to which they could ferry wounded Tajik soldiers for treatment. 57

5.11.1. India and Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA): The Taliban Rule The rise of the Taliban and their capture of Kabul on 27 September 1996 once again marginalized Indian influence and presented a stark challenge to India’s Afghan policy. Indian policy planners were cognizant of the impact of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan on India’s internal as well as regional security. India did not grant recognition to the Taliban government, and , therefore, was forced to close its embassy and all its consulates in Afghanistan. The Indian Foreign Minister announced that “under the conditions of continuing foreign interference in Afghanistan, the official recognition of the Taliban would mean to consenting to foreign interference.” 58

However, New Delhi continued to maintain close ties with the opposition of the Taliban, the Northern Alliance. While presenting Indian point of view on the issue of establishing relations with the Taliban regime, M. H. Ansari, its former ambassador to Afghanistan, said: “A relationship with the Taliban was not attempted…as a result of the treatment meted out to the Afghan Hindus and Sikhs. Much more serious in

Indian eyes were the Taliban pronouncements on ______57. Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, 45 58. Peter Marsden, The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan (London: Zed Books, 1998),132.

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Kashmir, the training of Kashmiris, Pakistanis, and foreign militants in camps in Kashmir…these touched the core of India’s vital interests and compelled New Delhi to strengthen its support and assistance to the predominantly non-Pashtun

Rabbani forces.” 59

India believed that the Taliban government of Afghanistan was in complicit with Pakistan in replicating anti-Soviet jihad strategy against India, and allowing Afghanistan to be used as a staging post against India. According to J.N. Dixit who served as ambassador to Afghanistan, “New Delhi was bothered by Taliban not only owing to their volatile Pashtun nationalism and Islamic orthodoxy but also because of their extensive aggressive engagement in sponsoring violence in Jammu and Kashmir.” 60 New Delhi knows that given its vast military and economic resources, it will not be possible for Islamabad to wrest Kashmir; therefore, Pakistan’s strategy would be to sustain “an intensified and unrelenting insurgency in Kashmir, anchored on Islamic symbols, would either force New Delhi to the conference table or, at the very least, move the international community to take the steps necessary to compel resolution of the problem.” 61

5.12 India and Post-Taliban Northern Alliance Nexus

Indian support to the Northern Alliance during the Taliban regime stood her in good stead when the Taliban were driven out of power by Americans in the wake of 9/11 because the Northern Alliance were the first to enter into Kabul. India reopened its

______59. Fahmida Ashraf, “India-Afghanistan Relations:Post 9/11,” in Strategic Studies XXVII, no.2 (Summer 2007): 92

60. Humera Iqbal, “New Delhi-Kabul Ties: Implications for the Region,” in Regional Studies XXVI, no.3 (Summer 2008):55

61. Lawrence Ziring, “Unraveling the Pakistan-Afghanistan Riddle,” in Asian Affairs 36, no.2 (2009): 59- 78.

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embassy in Kabul in December 2001 and since then Indian influence in Afghanistan has been rising steadily. Pakistan perceives India’s presence and influence in Afghanistan as a deliberate attempt to encircle it and to deny its legitimate pre-eminence in Afghanistan. India’s embassy in Kabul and its four consulates are often accused by the Pakistani government of carrying out clandestine operations against Pakistan in the “restive province of Baluchistan and the tribal areas. India is alleged to have provided training, arms and funds to Baluchi rebels, as well as funds, arms, ammunition, medical equipment and medicines to the TTP in the tribal areas.” 62

The rise in influence in Afghanistan is totally unacceptable to Pakistan as it will entail challenges to Pakistan’s security. Since the ouster of President Daud to to-date, it has been the kernel of Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan to engage Kabul to stall the emergence of any regime inimical to its national interests. India has been using the cushion of Northern Alliance to create a pocket of its influence in Afghanistan and this was evident when Hamid Karzai, the President of Afghanistan visited India and went to a University he surrounded himself with many Northern Alliance cadre that are close to India. According to Pervaiz Musharraf, “The danger for Pakistan is […] the Indian influence in Afghanistan. They (India) want to create an anti-Pakistan Afghanistan. if Indians are using some ethnic groups in Afghanistan, then Pakistan will use its own support, and our ethnic are certainly Pashtuns.” 63

It has been observed that Islamabad’s policy of patronizing Pashtuns in order to balance Indian influence in Afghan ethnic minorities may benefit it in the short-term but it will be counterproductive in the long-run not only for Pakistan but also for Afghan Pashtuns too. In the past, when the Pashtunistan issue was at its height Pakistan had been playing minority card against the Pashtuns. Instead of using one group against the

______62. Rahul Roy, “Pakistan,” in Afghanistan: To 2015 and beyond, ed. Toby Dodge & Nicholas Redman (Oxon: Routledge, 2011),174.

63. “Musharraf warns of proxy war with India in Afghanistan,” The Express Tribune, November 18, 2014.

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other, Pakistan had better map out and pursue an embracing Afghan policy. Besides, the selective tutelage will not help the Afghan Pashtuns because it will drive wedge between them and other minorities of the country. 64

Regarding India’s status, it has been observed that India is a big and an influential country in the region which at present does not share border with Afghanistan but it has some influence there which is not as deep as Pakistan’s, especially in the Pashtun population. Therefore, Pakistan must not be worried about Indian presence there. But any approach at the regional level aimed at addressing the issue of peace in Afghanistan, India and Pakistan equation must be kept straight. The United States must not ignore Islamabad’s legitimate concerns about India’s role in the region especially its overbearing strategic ascendency in the region and its unprecedented influence in Afghanistan with serious nuisance potential against Pakistan’s security. It is already involved in fueling subversion and instability in Pakistan’s tribal areas and Baluchistan. It is utmost important to avoid any policies that create strategic imbalances in the region and fuel an arms race between the two nuclear-capable neighbors with an escalatory effect on their military budgets and arsenals. The risk of a Pakistan-India proxy war in Afghanistan is fraught with perilous implications for regional and global peace. 65 ______64. Yusufzai , Personal Communication, January 2016 65. Khan, Personal Communication, November 2015

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Chapter Six Strategic Implications for Pakistan

Pakistan and Afghanistan relations are complexly disoriented despite the fact that they share fundamental historical, cultural and ethnic similarities. As a matter of fact, the commonalities must be used for frank and outright discussions on issues that have been undermining whatever little efforts the two neighbors have made for developing good relations. Constructive engagements have been few and far between the two though opportunities did arise but they had never been sought to be built upon for laying the foundation of cordial relations and the start of new era. For example, Afghanistan exercised gesture of ‘benign neutrality’ during Pakistan’s 1965 and 1971 wars with India; there was a need to harness this overture, especially by Islamabad, for erasing trust deficit and lack of confidence that had been characterizing their relations since 1947; however, it turned out to be a blip because the pervasive strain in their relations was too deep.

The second opening, potentially more favorable, arose when the Soviet Union inducted its forces into Afghanistan. The development had been universally decried and though generated security challenges for Pakistan but it placed Islamabad in an enviable position of being the only country having prerogative to channelize and distribute external military and financial assistance to the Mujahideen. However, more important was the fact that Pakistan hosted more than three million Externally Displaced Afghans in highly adverse circumstances. The hospitality brought the people of two countries together and earned Islamabad huge political goodwill amongst the Afghan populace. But Pakistan could not manage to capitalize on the political assets and squandered the opening due to ‘structural deficits’ which consequently produced negative strategic implications for it.

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6.1. Strategic Implications

By strategic implications means, first, how far Pakistan has been able to prevent India from gaining that degree of influence which could pose existential threat to Pakistan. Perception of Islamabad is that New Delhi’s strong and deep presence in Kabul is a direct threat to its security. Pakistan has invariably had a static view of Afghanistan: the latter is its backyard and its vulnerable or soft belly. And New Delhi will use its influence to pose security threat to it. Even today it claims that India is using the Afghan soil for fuelling insurgency in its restless province Baluchistan, which borders Afghanistan. Secondly, the Durand Line and Pashtunistan are the two other issues which Islamabad wishes should not be revived.

6.1.1. Negative Strategic Implications

Pakistan’s policy during the Afghan jihad and efforts subsequent to the exit of the Soviet forces were geared towards achieving these strategic objectives through establishment of a broad-based Pashtun government. Given the goodwill it had earned of ordinary Afghans during the period 1979-1988, it had a genuine possibility to achieving these objectives but for the structural deficits. Consequently, it may said that Pakistan- Afghanistan relations in the post-Daoud period produced negative implications for Pakistan. Today, Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan is reminiscent of 1950s when their ties were touching the nadir point.

Negative strategic implications mean that Pakistan, first, lost the initiative to realize its political and strategic objectives in Afghanistan in the wake of Soviet departure. Consequently, the Afghan crisis aggravated and morphed into an “ugly contest for power among the leaders of factions.” 1 The situation added uncertainty to already volatile Durand Line and increased Islamabad’s anxieties. Islamabad failed to ______1. S. Iftlkhar Murshed, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years (London: Bennet &Bloom, 2006), 9.

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contain Indian influence, except for a brief period of the Taliban rule and ,as a matter of fact, Indian presence in Afghanistan has increased manifold after 9/11 and New Delhi is using its economic leverage to its political and strategic advantage. Secondly, Pakistan’s economic interests, an important component of its strategic interests, present grim implications as the issue of transit-trade is deeply hurting their relations. And, finally, Pakistan became a victim of that Frankenstein of Islamic fundamentalism that it had created, harnessed and sustained with the help of the United States and its western and conservative Arab allies for the purpose of resisting the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. One fall out of Pakistan’s failure was the emergence of that tide of militancy in region in general and in Pakistan and Afghanistan which is threatening the very economic potential of the region.

6.2. Government of National Reconciliation It was the proposal of Government of National Reconciliation which first exposed the impact of ‘structural deficits’ in Pakistan’s policy. Before the Saur Revolution, it was the person of Afghan King who was the center of political authority in Kabul and had been providing stability to a multiethnic Afghan society. Later on, the advent of Republic in 1973 appeared to majority of Afghans as a continuation of the old central authority and they seemed to have accepted it. However, the political dynamics of Afghanistan had so transformed in 1989 that the traditional center of political authority had lost its appeal and there was a need for a broad based government so that transition from military struggle to political arrangement could be completed in order to restore peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Ironically, it was the USSR which in 1987 “had taken a strategic decision to withdraw from Afghanistan and had discreetly sounded out Pakistan for its help in pursuing a government of national reconciliation through dialogue between the

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Muhahideen leaders and Najibullah.” 2 But Pakistan rejected the proposal terming it a ploy to prolong the Soviet stay, and General Zia decided to go “along with the American demand that all Soviet elements must leave Afghanistan without precondition.” 3 Later on, he realized the mistake of not reciprocating the Soviet proposal because Washington and Moscow decided to have their own bilateral deal on the withdrawal date of the Red Army behind Pakistan’s back.

It was not possible for Islamabad to give consideration to the Soviet proposal because the incumbent military government had so tied itself to Washington, both economically and militarily, that it was hamstrung to take any independent decision. Politically, it was part of a much larger alliance comprising the West and the Muslim world, so there could no independent decision. The important aspect was that structural deficits not only led to negative implications but also hamstrung Islamabad to act independently. 4 However, there was an opinion that that Pakistan’s decision not to go with the Moscow proposal was correct inasmuch as it would have implicitly amounted to recognition of the Kabul regime. 5

Later on, when it became apparent that the issue of withdrawal period was going to be agreed upon between the United States and the Soviet Union, General Zia belatedly realize that the establishment of a national government was the only way to “avoid bloodshed between various Afghan factions.” 6Islamabad began to insist on the “formation of a provisional as a pre-condition for withdrawal and Zia-ul-Haq, the President of Pakistan, was even prepared to issue a statement in support of a Soviet ______2. Riaz M. Khan, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity (Karachi: Oxford, 2012), 16. 3. Kamal Matinuddin, “ The Afghan Quagmire ,” The News, September 04, 1994 4. Rasul Buksh Rais (An eminent writer on Afghanistan and Academicians), in discussion with the author, March 2016. 5. Rustam Ali Shah Mohmund (Expert on Afghan Affairs) in discussion with the author, September 2016 6. Matinuddin, The Afghan Quagmire

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military stay in Afghanistan till the formation of such a government.” 7 But the hard-line Mujahideen leaders rejected the idea by refusing to enter into any dialogue with the government of Dr. Najibullah. They contended that they had shed blood during all those years not for sharing power but to wrest power for themselves. It was observed the idea of national government was good; however, Mujahideen’s decision not to share power with communists was not correct because they were in power in Afghanistan and had deeply embedded footprints. Therefore, they could not be excluded from any purported political set up to be established in the wake of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. 8

6.3. Post-Withdrawal Political Framework

Pakistan’s policy regarding resolution of Afghan crisis appeared to be wanting in that pragmatism which emphasizes upon the dictum that ‘politics is the art of possible.’ It was less than sufficiently critical, at times vague, and, for that matter, was marred by complex ironies -the characteristics which came to inhibit realization of even short -term objectives of Islamabad in Afghanistan. It was the issue of formation of post-withdrawal political framework that seriously exposed the undermining potential of ‘structural deficits’ and was a striking example how policymakers in Islamabad had gravely misevaluated the direction of international politics once the extant superpowers decided to agree on a course of reconciliation.

6.4. Friendly Regime in Afghanistan-A Parochial Approach

Having failed to realize the formation of a government of national unity, Pakistan’s policy metastasized, after General Zia’s death, to securing establishment of a broad based ______

7. Khan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, 16 8. Rahimullah Yusufzai (An eminent journalist and expert on Afghan affairs) in communication with the author, January 2016

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friendly regime in Kabul. The primary objective of Pakistan was, first, peace and stability could be restored and an early return of more than three million Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan could be facilitated; and, secondly, establishing of conducive environment gain strategic interests. If Afghanistan’s obsession with its irredentist claim on Pashtun territories situated on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line was a factor which prejudicially affected its early relations with Pakistan, it was Islamabad’s Parochial Approach, i.e. obsession with protection of strategic interests only through a friendly regime in Afghanistan in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal proved to be a major

obstacle to the realization of objectives.

The Approach was based on self-centered perception that sacrifices made by it during the Afghan jihad had earned it the right to have a friendly government in Afghanistan and define its future. The claim though had a substance and acknowledged by Afghans: Younis Qanooni, an important member of the Northern Alliance, who served as finance minister in the administration of Rabbani government and, later on, minister in the interim regime of Hamid Karzai, while talking to a Pakistan’s representative praised “the help Pakistan had rendered to the Afghan people in their jihad against the Soviet occupation forces. His prayer was that God might give the

Afghans the opportunity to repay this debt.” 9

But Islamabad’s perception was not only inconsistent with Afghan sensibilities but also regional dynamic in the post-deinduction phase and had been criticized by Afghan intellectuals and elite who regarded it an attempt by Islamabad to impose its ‘diktat’ on Afghanistan. The following instance illustrates Afghans’ aversion to foreign dictation: During the 1970s, when the Soviet Union was the principal donor of Afghanistan, President Daoud defied Moscow on the issue of foreign policy. On the issue of NATO experts stationed in the northern parts of Afghanistan when the Soviet ______9. Murshed, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years, 9.

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leader, Brezhnev, objected their presence there and asked them to be removed, the Afghan President that “we will never allow you to dictate to us how to run our country and whom to employ in Afghanistan. How and where we employ the foreign experts will remain the excessive prerogative of the Afghan state.” 10

Islamabad’s policy on ‘friendly government’ has exhibited a consistent pattern of failure: according to one expert on Pakistan’s policy on Afghanistan in the 1990s, Islamabad’s pursuit for a ‘friendly Afghan’ government exhibited ‘former better than later syndrome;’ 11 for example, Pakistan felt the loss of Taraki because he was regarded better option than his successor, Amin; later on, when Babrak Karmal replaced Amin, the latter was now perceived ‘better than Karmal. Subsequent to the withdrawal ofSoviet forces from Afghanistan, Pakistan sought to install in Kabul a regime of its liking through its sponsored Peshawar-based Mujahideen and when they, Rabbani and Hekmatyaar, finally came to power Islamabad began efforts to dislodge them because they had somehow become ‘pro-India.’

6.5. Pragmatic Approach

The realization of the objective required clarity regarding dynamics of the objective situation, nature of issues involved and stakeholders and, for that matter, pragmatic approach. But it seemed that the retreat of the Soviet military without fulfilling the task for which it had been sent into Afghanistan had so swayed the thinking of decision- makers in Pakistan that they preferred to ignore a fundamental principle that ‘a policy which delivers success is for a set of related circumstances and not necessarily meant to provide desired results in changed conditions.’ And instead of approaching the issue politically, the modus operandi was the military solution because it seemed hardliners in ______10. Abdul S. Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider’s Account (Virginia: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988),179.

11. Mushahid Hussain, Taliban, Pakistan and the Region,” The Nation , October 13, 1996.

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Islamabad still had the sway on the Afghan policy. The botched Jalalabad operation, discussed at relative length in chapter three, was aimed at to dislodge the government of Afghan President, Dr. Najibullah so that the Pakistan-sponsored Afghan Interim Government, AIG, could have a foothold in Afghan territory and a firm status in its homeland.

Sophocles observes that “of all the ills afflicting men the worst is the lack of judgment.”* The operation was based on the assumption that the Kabul regime would collapse immediately following the withdrawal of Soviet forces. The former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, in one of interviews, said that it was General Hamid Gul, the then Director General of ISI who sought to convince her that “the city would fall within a week.” 12 The idea may have been well intentioned but, from the perspective of implications, it was inconsistent with the political realities of Afghanistan where Kabul had invariably been the center of power gravity. The campaign further weakened Pakistan’s position and exposed Islamabad’s myopic understanding of Afghan crisis.

6.6. Collapse of the Soviet Union

The administrative collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 paved the way for the dissolution of a world order characterized by its division into two blocks. Internally, the Soviet-propped regime of Dr. Najibullah, having lost the panoply of Moscow, crumbled and was the first casualty. The ignominious exit of the Kabul government produced a kind of power vacuum in the country, and Pakistan’s role became critical in putting together an acceptable and broad based coalition of Peshawar-based Mujahideen parties so as to halt the further slide of Afghanistan into chaos. The development though complicated the regional scenario but it provided Pakistan with an opening to rectify ______*Antigone is a tragedy written by Sophocles, one of the three ancient Greek tragedians, in or before 441 B.C. 12. Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army and the Wars within (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 424.

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anomalies in its Afghan policy and retrieve what it had lost strategically in Afghanistan since the Jalalabad debacle. The altered dynamics required Islamabad to pursue a pragmatic approach consistent with the objective circumstances.

6.7. Post-Najib Afghanistan and Structural Deficits

Vacuum is as pernicious in politics as in nature. The political vacuum that emerged in the wake of Dr. Najib’s removal from his office required Peshawar-based Mujhadeen to act swiftly and arrive at some sort of political understanding to provide alternate leadership to the war ravaged country and to prevent its slide to chaos. It has been commented that it was, partly, their intransigent attitude that hindered them to arrive at some sort of understanding to give alternate administration to war weary Afghans. Every party, irrespective of its strength, regarded itself a heavy weight and wanted a share disproportionate to its actual strength and contribution to resisting the Soviet presence. However, it is believed that Pakistan too did not put sufficient pressure on the

Peshawar-based Mujhahideen leaders. 13

6.7.1. Nature of Seven Parties-Not Political Alliance

The resistance leaders’ insensitivity to the prevalent situation in their country and their attitude to give preference to their parochial interests to wider national exigencies was sindeed deplorable. But the whole situation needs to be examined in the context in which the Mujahideen were forced to unite themselves into seven entities and consequently the logical corollary was that it exposed more blatantly the undermining effect of ‘structural deficits.’. During the very initial period of the Afghan jihad, Islamabad preferred to support fifty or more ideologically diverse Islamic resist ance groups instead of nationalists and monarchists. It has been commented that Pakistan preferred religious parties to nationalists and royalists because they were amenable and were prepared to do ISI’s bidding and the latter felt comfortable in working with them. 14 ______13. Mohmund, Personal Communication, September 2016. 14. Yusufzai, Personal Communication , January 2016.

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The point to emphasize is that their alliance was not natural; rather it was, first, the pressing momentum of the situation which had drifted these Islamic denominations to accept imposed unity. They were organized, not for political purposes, into seven groups but for better supply of arms and money to end users and effective coordination in the execution of fighting tasks inside Afghanistan. Nor did Islamabad allow them advertently to develop into a well-coordinated organization because a loose alliance was consistent with its interests. Because in the presence of such a set up, it may have been difficult for Islamabad to control the distribution of aid and extend disproportionate financial and military assistance to its favorite, Hekmatyaar.

6.7.2. Guerilla Movement Secondly, the Afghan resistance was not a democratic struggle; it was a guerilla struggle which was dynamically different from regular or open warfare. A guerilla needs a base, sanctuary, unhindered supply of weapons for conducting operations. This entails support of the local population; however, if he is based outside and in a neighboring country he is required to make compromises so long as the exigencies of objectives demand and is hedged by limitations imposed by a host country. The diverse Mujahideen groups based in Peshawar had no alternative but to accede to Pakistan’s directives regarding the conduct of the struggle and other appendages during the Soviet military stay in Afghanistan.

Yousaf who served as head of the Afghan Bureau of the Inter-Services Intelligence from 1983 to 1987 and thus had been in direct contact with the Seven Party Leadership, observes that they lived apart from one another and it was not possible to assemble them as they were not prepared to sit in the same room. They were, no doubt, devout Muslims but were fuelled by personal rivalries, prejudices and hatreds

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which often clouded their views and guided their actions. It was only after President Zia’s stern warning did they agree to the formation of the Alliance because they knew that without Pakistan’s support they would be finished. 15

This loose alliance continued to operate despite their differences so long as the expediencies of jihad favored, and when the momentum subsided due to departure of the Soviet forces, it unraveled and not only exposed the latent ‘structural deficits’ of Pakistan’s policy but proved to be an ominous obstacle when Mujahideen leaders needed to exhibit unanimity regarding formation of interim government. The next phase was reaping of political dividends of the decade long jihad which had different dynamics and exigencies and required mature approach but given acrimonious antecedents of the Mujhaideen leaders their intransigent attitude was logical.

6.8. Pakistan and Post-Peshawar Accord Situation

But Pakistan’s dys-judgment again was instrumental in undoing what it had managed to achieve due to the Peshawar Accord. This was reflective in two accounts: first, there was no qualitative difference between successive communist governments in Afghanistan from 1978 to 1992 and the interim Mujahideen government insofar as both dispensations were foreign sponsored and supported. This fact called for adjustment of contours of policy to the Afghan psychological sensitivities to foreign intervention in Afghanistan’s affairs. Secondly, and this was the logical corollary of the first, the dynamics of internal Afghan politics had so aligned that extraneous influence in the domestic politics of Afghanistan could be detrimental to the stability of Afghanistan. However, Pakistan buoyed by the retreat of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, continued to patronize its favorite, Hekmatyar of Hizb e Islami , whose forces relentlessly pounded Kabul and contributed to the slide of Afghanistan to fratricidal war. ______15. M. Yousaf, M. & M. Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story (Lahore: Jang, 1992), 38-40

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6.9. Civil War in Afghanistan: Obstacle to Strategic Interests During the period from 1992 to 1996, Afghanistan witnessed the deadliest civil war in its history which resulted in the death of more Afghans than they had been killed during the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. The situation internally represented power struggle between demographically dominant Pashtuns on the one side and ethnic minorities on the other side. But it represented Islamabad’s push for a favorable government in Afghanistan. The situation further poisoned Islamabad-Kabul relations and precluded the realization of Pakistan’s objectives. Besides realization of strategic interests, Islamabad anxiously wanted to see centuries old trade routes to the resource- rich Central Asian region to re-open but it required peaceful and stable Afghanistan free of foreign interference.

Most of the Afghans in general and many leaders of the Northern Alliance, in particular, were not happy with Pakistan’s interference in the internal affairs of their country, and they communicated to Islamabad that “in the absence of Pakistani involvement, Afghans would find common ground, and Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Hazaras and other would work through their differences.” 16 The argument had some substance because societies comprise diverse ethnic demography have been able to evolve a mutual accommodative mechanism. Though the process is difficult but practical considerations play their part in inducing the leaders to adopt flexible approach to issues involving collective interest.

But Pakistan preferred to not consider the proposal and continued to patronize its favored group. Consequently, Pakistan appeared more as a state which was using Afghan blood for protecting furthering its interests. It has been commented that the fundamental deficit in Pakistan’s Afghan policy has been that Islamabad has been ______16. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History (Lahore: Vanguard, 2004),225

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supporting one Afghan ethnic group against the other and this has not delivered and caused more harm to its interests in Afghanistan. Hekmatyaar’s forces were pounding Kabul and killing Afghans and there was a perception among ordinary citizens of Afghanistan that Pakistan was supporting him. Consequently, Islamabad appeared to many Afghans a spoiler supporting a person responsible for the killing of his compatriots. 17

Pakistan’s predilection for Gulbadin Hekmatyar, the chief of Hizb-e-Islami and detribalized Pashntun, during the Afghan jihad and, later on, in the interim set-up after 1992, may have had relevancy to Islamabad’s security interests in Afghanistan but, given his limited support base inside Afghanistan due to his stringent version of Islam that cut across Afghan tribal identities, it had a least chance of success. It has been commented that Hekmatyaar was not a natural leader. He was brutal and had neither the personality nor charisma to unite Pashtuns, let alone the whole of Afghanistan. He, however, observes that it was not Gulbuddin Hekmatyaar responsible for Afghanistan’s slide to civil war; rather it was Ahmad Shah Masoud’s lust for power that had degenerated Afghanistan to civil war. He, Masoud, was so obsessed with power that he once remarked that “If you (Pakistanis) do not cooperate with me; if you do not recognize me as the central leader, I’ll form a coalition against you of India, Iran and Russian Federation. However, he is of the view that, to put things in proper perspective, Pakistan’s leadership too was responsible for chaos in Afghanistan and deterioration in both countries’ relations as Islamabad took a dim view of Afghanistan.

6.10. Revival of Indian Influence and Implications

The most significant aspect of the negative implications was that it provided India an opportunity to arrest the slide of its influence in Afghanistan which began with the introduction of the Peshawar-based Afghan Mujhaideen’s government in Afghanistan ______17. Yusufzai, Personal Communication, January 2016.

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Kabul’s traditional policy had been to invoke New Delhi’s cooperation for balancing Islamabad’s pressures. Afghan President Burhanuudin Rabbani was, subsequent to his delinquency of the Peshawar Accord provisions, facing challenges from Pakistan. And in order to countervail Islamabad’s influence, he renewed Afghanistan’s ties with the old ally, India. This gave New Delhi influence a new lease. Later on, India’s position received impetus when Iran organized a regional conference on Afghanistan and New Delhi was invited to participate. Indian material and military cooperation with the Northern Alliance when it was fighting against the Taliban rule yielded her huge dividends as its leaders were the first entrants into Kabul after the fall of the Taliban regime in consequence of 9/11 and thus revived Indian sway which was almost non- existent when the Taliban were in power in Kabul.

6.11. The Taliban and Implications

The ascendancy of the Taliban with the implicit support of Pakistan was phenomenal development discussed in Chapter Three. They were credited with restoring peace and stability in a country ravaged by long war and was on the verge of disintegration on ethnic lines. From Pakistan perspective, the Taliban regime represents a purple phase in Islamabad-Kabul relations which were otherwise marred by breakdown in diplomatic ties, turmoil and broadsides. The most important aspect was that it was the fruition of Pakistan’s policy which it had been striving for since 1992, i.e., broad-based pro- Islamabad Pashtun dominated government in Kabul. Secondly, the Taliban, inter alia, shared Pakistan’s view on Kashmir, and their government came to be seen as the perfect partner by the Pakistani military.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Taliban had administrative control over ninety five percent of the territory but their rule transformed Afghanistan into center of regional political gravity. They espoused Particularist Islamic ideology with strict observance of the fundamentals. And arranged against them were regional actors who were apprehensive of the spillover effect of the Taliban’s ideology and were materially and politically supporting their opponents, i.e. the Northern Alliance which had barely five

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percent of the area under its control. However, Pakistan’s diplomatic recognition of the Taliban and support to sustaining them in power produced asperities in Islamabad’s relations with countries having stakes in Afghanistan. And, in case of Iran, the already strained ties began to move towards acute trajectory.

Secondly, the Taliban had a narrow international base because at the height of their power they were not universally recognized; even Pakistan’s closest ally in the region China preferred not to accord diplomatic recognition to them. Their rule though represented fruition of Islamabad’s political and strategic objectives but it was a Pyrrhic gain, and even that was for a limited period because what Islamabad achieved in the form of the Taliban regime, it lost its influence in the wake of 9/11. Consequently, two significant implications followed: when the Taliban regime collapsed and the Northern Alliance, the very nemesis of Pakistan and which had the support of Iran, Russia and particularly India, entered into Kabul and Islamabad’s influence came back to square one. The second implication was far more unsettling in its effect: Pakistan’s western border with Afghanistan which had been in relative calm since 1947 though vulnerable at times has become highly uncertain since the fall of the Taliban regime as is evident from the number of skirmishes between the two neighbors.

Another important aspect was that it provided wider territorial base to that Islamic denomination which was inspired by fundamentalist ideals and groomed during the Afghan jihad. The sanctuary, besides providing acolytes the opportunity to export their ideology, was a source of traction for international jihadis where they could assemble and, later on, coalesced “into al-Qaeda with reinforcements coming from the newly independent Central Asian Republics, the discontented Chechans and several Arab countries.” 18 It is difficult to project the trajectory of international and regional politics had the United States not attacked Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11. ______18. Pervaiz Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (London: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 275

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6.12. Negative Social Implications

Strategic policy objectives mapped out by Islamabad during the Afghan jihad not only remained unachieved but it had to face the reverse consequences of that Frankenstein that it had produced after December 1979 to resist the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The military dictator of Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq, exploited the theological differences among various denominations of Islam to strengthen his position on the domestic front, and converted Pakistan into a base camp for far-right Islamic forces resisting the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Consequently, Pakistan became traction for religious zealots who “came from Africa, Middle East, South East Asia and Central Asia to Pakistan.” 19 The most important aspect was the fact that the United States, the West and conservative Muslim countries of the Middle East stood in cohort with Zia during the Afghan jihad. They not only provided assistance to the Mujahideen resisting the Soviet presence in Afghanistan but also financed and promoted fundamentalist groups in Pakistan.

Highlighting the critical and pivotal role played by Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf remarked: “We did what Napoleon and Hitler could not do; we defeated Russia, with the help of our friends in the jihad . If you take Pakistan out of the picture, the jihad would never have been won.” 20 Later on, when the Soviets withdrew, Pakistan ‘structural deficits’ ridden policy became operative. For one, it gave way to the rise of fundamental militant Islam which is posing a serious challenge to the fabric of present digital civilization and which has divided the Pakistani society along sectarian and religious denominations. Islamabad had neither capacity nor resources and, above all, nor the will to chalk out strategy regarding the wrapping of Afghan jihad. There appeared to be no introspection how to channelize the fervor of fundamentalism to moderation because ______19. S.V. Salahuddin, Militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan: A Brief History of Causes and Effects (New Delhi: Pentagon, 2012), 102. 20. Musharrarf, In the Line of Fire, 276.

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“we did not stop to think how we would divert sthem sto productive life after the jihad was won.” 21

6.12.1. Growth of Madrassas (Religious Seminaries) Before the decade of 1980s, the number of religious seminaries was limited and their activities were confined to imparting religious education. But the Afghan jihad gave impetus to their growth and one result of the “money that poured in from Saudi Arabia was that the madras (religious schools) which had numbered about 5000 in 1973 reached 20,000 in 1986.” 22 This gave fundamentalism and religious intolerance an institutional form and morphed Pakistan into a religiously parochial society in the name of religion. These Madrassas provide particularist indoctrination to their students and thus spread it in society. It has been observed that Madrassas which were an instrument for keeping Islam alive during the British period were converted into jihadi factories for churning out manpower for resistance against the Soviets. 23 Their proliferation in Pakistan since 1977 has contributed to the sectarian divide. Since religious groups led the major forces fighting in Afghanistan, their militant character was transferred to Pakistan; many Pakistanis who fought in the Afghan war were the product of Madrassahs . As the character of these institutions changed from religious to political, their aim increasingly became political power. Subsequent to the Soviet departure they began to flex their muscles as they had tasted victory in Afghanistan.

Pakistan had neither institutional capacity nor technical efficiency and knowhow and, more important was the fact, nor financial resources to address the issue how to ______21. Musharrarf, op. cit., 208. 22. Salahuddin, Militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan , 100 23. Shamshad Ahmad Khan (Former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan) in communication with the author November 2015

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repatriate the international zealots. According to the South Asian Terrorism Portal, “more than five thousand lost their lives in sectarian attacks since 1989.” 24 Consequently, Pakistan is reeling under the short-term gains of the Afghan jihad even after a lapse of twenty seven years. Islamabad’s participation saw not only the influx of “more than three million refugees but stockpiles of arms and narcotics that has resulted in widespread menace of drug addiction but has produced vested interests in our 25 economy which are taking advantage of the weak writ of the state.” ______24. K. Jamal, “The Sectarian Dilemma in Pakistan ,” Foreign Policy , September 15, 2015.

25. Mushtaq Ahmad, Foreign Policy: Pakistan’s Options (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1995), 332

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Conclusion and Recommendations

For any country, it is important who its neighbors are, as their attitude, irrespective of their size or power, has a direct bearing on its personality and character, and issues of its security, development and resource allocation. A state’s attitude towards the neighbor is shaped by its view of national interest. Similar identification of the national interest will tend to promote collaborative interaction; on the other hand, the trajectory will be reverse where the states’ national interests impinge. This makes the dynamics of bilateral relations a complex subject inasmuch as states do possess power to change destiny but not neighbors. This constitutes a standing limitation to modern state’s power.

Pakistan and Afghanistan are cooperating in certain areas but not only the quantum is limited and it is not based upon shared similarities, rather they are engaged by default. This may be ascribed to the lack of trust between the two. If it is the casus belli to their prolonged estranged relations it can be taken as the starting point which can be built upon to find out what exactly is the reason of their awry ties. There is no denying of fact that the present state of their relations is complex and at the heart is indifferent perception regarding intrinsic nature of the two states which has been a critical factor in determining the trajectory of their relations ever since their inception in 1947. Consequently, there is a need to understand the nature of the two states and its impact on their policy. Simply speaking, there are two principal actors involved: Pakistan and Afghanistan.

1. Afghanistan- A Parentier State

Afghanistan is a ‘Parentier State’ and this has influenced not only the fate of its rulers but the nature of its relations with its neighbors, particularly with Pakistan. The term has been coined by the combination of two terms: a ‘rentier state’ and a ‘parasite state.’ The term ‘rentier state’ has already been defined in Chapter Three and, simply speaking, it is

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taken a state which rents out its indigenous resources to external clients and derives all or a substantial part of its national revenue therefrom. On the other hand, a ‘parasite state’ is a “state which has very little indigenous resources of its own, or if she has resources they are unexplored and cannot contribute to the national income, and, therefore, relies on external aid. When Afghanistan is referred to as a “Parentier State” it means ‘the portion of revenue which it derives from its indigenous resources forms a little part of its national income and is, therefore, insufficient. It relies upon external donors for financial assistance to meet its expenses. In the past, the rulers in Kabul had been able to stay in power so long as they managed to ensure the flow of revenue from external sources.

Afghan rulers successfully played the Czarist Russia against British imperialism in India because it shared borders with both and they had direct stakes in Afghanistan. Consequently, the rulers in Kabul managed to maintain the inflow of revenue from the British India after the 1893 Agreement which designated Afghanistan as a buffer state. Later on, during the cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States, Afghanistan sought to engage America as a balancer in its relations with the Soviet Russia. But the initiative did not yield desired result because of the political pragmatism of Washington, that is, unlike Great Britain, the United States had neither direct stakes in Afghanistan nor did it share physical border with it. Consequently, Kabul ended up with developing strong relations with Moscow.

Afghanistan has invariably used its relations with India to absorb and balance the pressures from big neighbors Iran and especially Pakistan. 1 The friendship has paid and is paying dividends to Afghanistan as is evident from the huge investment India is making in Afghanistan; but the fact of the matter is that India neither share borders with ______1. Ahmed Rashid (An eminent journalist and expert on Central Asian affairs), in discussion with the author October 2016.

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Afghanistan nor has any strong ethnic clout there; besides, its stakes in Afghanistan are more related to its soft image. On the other hand, Pakistan has direct stakes in Afghanistan which relate to its security, and its influence in the Pashtun population living on the afghan side is comparatively very strong.

2. Pakistan- A Fregoli* State

One of the factors which critically influence the trajectory of state’s external relations is that how its neighbors respond to coming into its existence. Broadly speaking, after the Second World War states came into existence either to a long struggle against colonial powers, or international powers that matter severe, for the protection of their interests, a significant chunk of area from the original territory and a new state appears on the map. In the case of former, neighboring states play a critical role in the liberation movement. Consequently, when a state comes into existence it seeks to maintain close and cooperative relations with its neighbors. For example, during the war of independence by Zimbabwe, independent neighboring states Zambia and Botswana provided key and sustained support to Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African

People’s Union (ZAPU).

Pakistan is a classic case of the state which came into existence by parceling out a sizable chunk of territory by the British in 1947; therefore, it is regarded as a live revolution cut out from the heart of the subcontinent history. The remainder, that is, India had not accepted Pakistan’s birth gleefully; they share linguistic, cultural, geographic and economic linkages but their ties have been marred by hostility and deficit of trust due to early scars of the partition which had a deep impact on the trajectory of Islamabad’s security and external relations. Later on, Indian acknowledged role in the dismemberment of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh in 1971 has so constructed Islamabad’s security apprehensions vis-à-vis New Delhi that they have assumed the form of ‘Fregoli delusion.’ ______*Fregoli syndrome is the delusional belief that one or more familiar persons, usually persecutors following the patient, repeatedly change their appearance.

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The term ‘Fregoli delusion’ is a psychological term which is characterized by obsessional belief by a person that different people are in fact a single person who changes appearance or is in disguise. The term has been used here in connection with Pakistan’s security paranoia vis-à-vis India. Islamabad seems to have been afflicted with the delusion when it comes to its relations with India, its archrival in the region. It believes that all its security challenges irrespective of their nature and direction concentrated in India; consequently, it tends to view its relations with other countries through the prism of its belligerent relationship with India. It regards New Delhi’s efforts for boosting its ‘soft image’ through economic penetration as a part of this delusional belief and consequently seeking to offset it by using its influence in Pashtun elements of Afghanistan.

However, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations cannot be evaluated without under – standing the role of India which may be regarded as a ‘fulcrum state’ and the dynamics of its relations with Afghanistan has cast critical impact on the trajectory of Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan. India has historical ties with Afghanistan, and it is utilizing them to promote and consolidate its influence in Afghanistan. It is this influence which unsettles Pakistan most. Given its highly unstable relationship with India and its role in the dismemberment of Pakistan in December 1971, Islamabad fears that this soaring influence may produce inimical strategic fall out for it, not very much dissimilar to 1971 episode. It has already accused New Delhi of interfering in its internal affairs by helping insurgents in the restive province of Baluchistan. The bottom-line is that the three countries need to realize what is at stake and themselves take the initiative of laying the foundation of that trust which is necessary for the sake of better future of the people of the region. A trilateral moot of India, Pakistan and Afghanistan needs to be organized where the leadership of the three countries discuss the nature of trilateral irritants and develop a strategy to overcome them.

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3. Recommendations

Afghanistan has been in turmoil for the last four decades. The overlapping interests of multiple stakeholders have so accentuated the complexity that peace appears elusive. With the shifting of focus from geo-strategic orientation to geo-economics considerations after the end of the Cold War, there is a dire need for peace in Afghanistan because its strategic position is such that it holds the key to connect the region of South Asia to Central Asia and beyond. Today, the international system is evolving, having had more than half a century experience of regionalism, to next phase: regional cooperation through economic integration. Peaceful and stable relations between states are a sine qua non for the realization of successful integration. Consequently, bilateral irritants between the states which are hurdle to regional connectivity need to be addressed at the regional level. Pakistan and Afghanistan relations are no exception because their troubled ties have been serving as a bottleneck in the integration of South Asian and Central Asian regions. The situation entails cooperative effort at the regional level in the form of regional conference.

But before moving towards regional solution which has its own merits, both countries need to take some preliminary steps to lay the foundation for wider regional cooperation. It is imperative for both the countries to understand that their traditional approaches- which they have been pursuing hitherto- will result only in prolixity of the present situation. Therefore, the sooner they realize it, the better it will be for both the countries. A construct for the solution of the present crisis in Afghanistan begins with the premise that it could not be resolved without accepting Pakistan’s vital role and engaging it. It is true and is due to the fact that it is so abutted with Afghanistan that its participation is deemed indispensable. But this is one component of the larger premise: the other is more significant and it is argued that the onus of stability, if it is thought rests upon Pakistan, equally devolves upon the political leadership of Afghanistan. The key issue is Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns vis-à-vis India in Afghanistan, and the bottom line is how far the Afghan leadership is prepared to address them. No state can be expected to compromise its national interests but the concept of absolute 226

sovereignty is as far from realism as the dictum ‘politics is the art of possible’ from idealism. The point to emphasize is that there is a need to avoid policies that may create strategic imbalance in a region which has two nuclear-capable neighbors.

Likewise, Pakistan must realize that its pursuit of engineering installation of a‘friendly regime’ in Kabul is a big underlying cause of present friction between the two countries. It was Pakistan’s hankering after of a ‘friendly government’ in the wake of the Soviet military pull out from Afghanistan which not only eroded the credibility of its goodwill amongst ordinary Afghans but also pushed the country to a deadly civil in the history of Afghanistan. Islamabad must understand that the policy is unachievable because it is contrary to Afghan national sensitivities, and secondly, it will entail automatic interference by other neighboring and regional countries of Afghanistan. Besides, Islamabad’s policy of playing one ethnic denomination against the other is not only tarnishing its image but also causing ethnic friction in Afghanistan.

As already pointed out earlier that the two countries are engaged by default: Afghanistan uses Pakistan seaports for the import of duty free goods; whereas, Pakistan cannot remain insulated from Afghanistan because whatever happens there directly affects Islamabad. However, there is a need to work out a mechanism and put in operation which could help both the countries to evolve the engagement to a level of

‘by design.’ At the heart of the relations of the two countries, the real issue is the lack of trust and efforts are being made to erase this anomaly by focusing on areas such as trade; for example, expansion in trade cooperation can promote further trust. The two countries realizing its importance had agreed in March 2016 to work out a facilitation package in order to boost bilateral trade to $ 5 billion in next few tears.

Likewise, confidence-building measures in other areas have been suggested such as counterterrorism, narcotics, people-to-people contacts, cooperation on sports and tourism, cultural exchanges, relaxed visa regimes and cultural exchanges. They have their potential and expected to provide necessary building blocks for more viable engagement and it is not intended to underestimate their value; however, there is a need to take the issue of connectivity at different level to address the issue of trust 227

deficit and to facilitate the smooth trajectory of their relations. The following confidence- building measures may help in this connection:

3.1. Transit Trade Issue (TTI)

The immediate irritant which is pushing Pakistan and Afghanistan towards precipice and which needs to be addressed on priority basis is the transit-trade issue. Budding trade relations can produce that understanding which can be built upon for developing a trust necessary for further improvement of ties. In this connection the two countries go for a gradualist approach, i.e., technical issues, such as banking and customs which are tractable and bilateral, must be settled initially so that necessary confidence generated thus could be channelized for resolving political issue of Afghanistan’s overland trade with India traversing Pakistan. Pakistan has allowed Afghanistan to carry its transit- trade with India through Wagah border; however, the same facility has not been given to India which is one of the hurdles in normalization of Islamabad-Kabul ties: Afghanistan insists that Pakistan give same facility to India.The two neighbors adopt international practices and negotiate irritants within the framework of international commitments. The second issue relates to allowing Indian incorporation in the Pak-Afghan transit-trade.

3.2. Pakistan Specific: (i) Policy for All Afghans

The fundamental flaw in Pakistan’s Afghan policy, according to most who have been interviewed during the course of the research, is that it has been selective in the sense that Islamabad has been playing ethnic card to further its interests in Afghanistan: when the issue of Pashtunistan was at its zenith in the 1950s and 1960s, Pakistan exploited ethnic minorities against Afghan Pashtuns ; today, it is supporting Pashtuns against the Northern Alliance because India had been assisting them when the Taliban were in power in Afghanistan. It is recommended that Pakistan’s policy must ‘All-Afghan Embracing’ instead of playing ethnic card because first, New Delhi cannot compete with Pakistani influence in Afghanistan; and secondly, it will rectify its image and Islamabad’s role as a peace maker will widen its influence in Afghanistan.

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3.3. Pakistan Specific: (ii) Use of Cultural Depth by Pakistan-Afghan Sufi Conference At present Pakistan and India are competing for influence in Afghanistan. New Delhi is using its ‘soft image’ predicated on economic cooperation to gain sway in Afghanistan. Afghanistan blames Pakistan for all the ills related to its security. Consequently, ordinary Afghans have a ‘hard image’ of Islamabad which it needs to address. It is suggested that Pakistan should use the ‘culture depth’ and needs to promote inherent similarities in ‘sufi culture’ of both the countries. Sufis are more connected with the populace and may help to bring people together at apolitical level. It is recommended that Islamabad must take the initiative and arrange Pak-Afghan Sufi Conference (PASC) with a view to giving soft message to ordinary Afghans.

3.4. Integration by ‘Joint Free Economic-Zones’ (JFEZ)

There is a need to take people-to-people contacts to the next stage and establishment of ‘joint free economic-zones’ may provide a fresh and viable platform for the businessmen of the two countries to integrate their business at a level which could be built upon for more expansive cooperation later on. The zones must hire labor, staff and management from both the states. This may foster a new class of stakeholders who could channelize their cooperation for developing understanding in other potentially effective areas; and, on the other hand, may influence their respective governments for more rational approach to irritants which have been plaguing their ties.

4. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: (CPEC)

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is being touted as the ‘game changes’ mega project in the region because of its multi-faceted effects and implications. For one it will provide a template for other countries in the region once Pakistan-China spatial integration will be completed. The Project should be ‘All inclusive,’ and Afghanistan should be coopted in at the first stage Kabul had already exhibited its desire to become part of the CPEC. According to Afghanistan’s Ambassador to Pakistan, “The CPEC is a great project that 229

is equally relevant to Afghanistan like Pakistan, and anything that will be good for Pakistan will be good for the entire region.” 2

Afghanistan’s spatial association with the CPEC will be beneficial for both the countries: first, it will benefit Islamabad because it will bring ‘softness’ in their traditional awry relations and will provide Pakistan the necessary breathing space which will help it to focus on its relations with India. Secondly, from Afghanistan’s perspective, the linking will result in economic development which could ease the present turmoil like situation to peace and stability. Besides, the generated revenue due to later linking of Central Asia to the Project will ease financial constraints of Afghanistan which it has been facing as a ‘rentier state,’ and lessen its dependence on external resources.

5. Regional Conference

States’ bilateral irritants remain substantive so long as their impact is confined to the concerned countries. But when their negativity transcends bilateral lines and they begin to affect the region in which the states are situated, the causes of conflict needs to be seen in the regional context and regional states need to play necessary role. The issues involved in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations are not bilateral because they are proving an obstacle to the realization of wider regional objectives relating to peace and preventing the economic integration of the South Asia and the Central Asian regions.

Secondly, Afghanistan’s overlapping ethnicity has been a source of traction for its neighbors to exert for influence in the country. Neighboring states have been wary of developments in Afghanistan, particularly Pakistan. The fundamental premise guiding Islamabad in its relations with Kabul has invariably been that politically unstable Afghanistan will not be in its favor as it will entail deterrence of its focus on more pressing security concerns on the Eastern border. Likewise, Iran which has historical roots in Afghanistan wants stable and peaceful Afghanistan. Consequently, there is a ______2. “Afghanistan desires for role in CPEC, says Afghan envoy,” Dawn October 14, 2016.

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need for a regional conference on Afghanistan. No doubt, it requires two things: first, an active cooperation of other countries like India, Central Asian Republics, Russia and China; and secondly, major tectonic adjustments, for example, some positive understanding on the issue of the Durand Line, and, for that matter, resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

5.1. Objectives

The ‘Regional Conference on Afghanistan’ should focus on the following objectives:

5.1.1. Neo-Buffer State

It seems that history and geography and the diverse ethnicity of Afghanistan have decided its fate in terms of Buffer. It had been a ‘Buffer State’, a sort of No Man’s Land on the periphery of two Great Empires which eventually provided stability in the region, and secondly, necessary relief to the British Government in India. Therefore, it seems that two regions can be integrated if Afghanistan’s traditional role is restored to it, i.e., it should be agreed upon and declared a ‘Neo-buffer state’ between its neighbors and other regional powers, each pledging that it will not interfere in its internal affairs.

5.1.2. Afghanistan Pledge

The idea of successful ‘Neo-Buffer State’ is largely dependent upon how the Afghan leadership views the future of their country. If they continue the policy of playing one state against the other with a view to counterbalancing the influence, then there is strong likelihood that the situation will remain mired in uncertainty. Therefore, it is the primary responsibility of the Afghan leadership to ensure, rather guarantee, that they will not allow any of its neighbors or regional or external power to use the Afghan soil against any of its neighbors, especially Pakistan.

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5.1.3. Pakistan Pledge

It is an issue of quid pro quo: the responsibility of ensuring peace and stability in Afghanistan equally devolves upon Pakistan to play its part: to guarantee that it will make every possible effort not to allow its Federally Administered Areas to be used against Afghanistan.

5.1.4. Regional Agreement

The issue of interference in Afghanistan is like a ‘Domino,’ i.e., when one state involves itself it produces a ‘Domino Affect’ and other states follow automatically. This can only be prevented if regional stakeholders are bound by an agreement among themselves that they will not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and allow Afghans to decide their future themselves.

5.1.5. Regional Monitoring Group

A regional monitoring group may be defined ‘a working group which is appointed to study and report on a particular question and make recommendations based on its findings.’ A regional monitoring body comprising members from regional stakeholders and the United Nations may be formed to oversee the implementation of the decisions taken at the regional conference on Afghanistan at quarterly basis.

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Annexure A List of Arms Supplied to Pakistan

Number Weapon designation Weapon description Year of Year of of order order delivery 5 E2C Hawkeye Airborne early warning aircraft 1986 1987 3 Model 204 U11 4B Helicopters 1986 1987 88 M109 A 2 155mm Self propelled Howitzer 1985 1986 87 110 M113 A2 Armoured personnel carrier 1985 1986 87 60 155mm Tracled Howitzer 1986 1987 1 AN IPO Tracking radar 1987 1987 500 AIM 7 Air to air Missiles 1985 1986 87 400 BGM 71C 1 TCW Air targeting mode (ATM) 1986 1987 86 BGM 71D TGW 3 ATM military aircraft 1987 1987 150 FIM 92 Stinger Surface to air missiles 1987 1987 40 F16 Fighting Falcon 1984 1986 3 P3s Maritime reconnaissance 1985 1985 2 Naval Ship Carrier class destroyers 1985 1985 21 Cobra Combat helicopters 1985 1986 10 Radars Ground based air defence radars 1985 1986 2 Naval Ship Gearing class destroyers 1985 1986 80 Naval Missile Harpoon 1985 1986 2 M198 Howitzers 1985 1986 100 M 1A1 Abrams & M 48 A5 Battle tanks 1984 1986 50 M113 Military Vehicles Armed personnel carrier 1984 1985 9000 SMAW anti armour rocket Shoulder ïňĄre rockets 1985 1986 50 Self propelled Self propelled artillery 1985 1986 100 AIM 9L Sidewinder Advanced air to air missile 1985 1986 2 Mohawk Observation aircraft 1986 1987

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560 AIM 7 Sparrow Air to air missile 1986 1987 200 AIM 9L Sidewinder Anti tank missiles 1986 1987 150 TOW Anti tank missile 1986 1987 124 TOW Air to air missiles 1987 1988

US arms supply to Pakistan during 198087 Sources: Commentary on US Military aid to Pakistan, Technical report FBIS-NES-88-004 Delhi General Overseas Service, 7 January 1988, p. 48, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer, Technical report Institute of Strategic Studies, Washington DC: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1991, p. 9, Richard F Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, 29 July 1994 and Michael T Klare, The arms trade: changing patterns in the 1980s , volume 9 Third World Quarterly, 1987

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ANNEXURE B

THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1988

(AFGHANISTAN)

ANNEX I

AGREEMENTS ON THE SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN

BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE ISLAMIC

REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL RELATIONS, IN PARTICULAR ON

NON-INTERFERENCE AND NON-INTERVENTION.

The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties,

Desiring to normalize relations and promote good-neighborliness and cooperation as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region,

Considering that full observance of the principle of non-interference and non- intervention in the internal and external affairs of States is of the greatest importance for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the fulfillment of the proposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

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Reaffirming the inalienable right of States freely to determine their own political, economic, cultural and social systems in accordance with the will of their peoples, without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever

Mindful of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the principle of non-interference and non-intervention, in particular the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,s of 24 October 1970, as well as the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, of 9 December 1981,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Relations between the High Contracting Parties shall be conducted in strict compliance with the principle of non-interference and non-intervention by States in the affairs of other States.

______

** All translations of these instruments from the original languages of submission may be subject to further revision by the Secretariat.

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Article II

For the purpose of implementing the principle of non-interference and non- intervention, each High Contracting Party undertakes to comply with the following obligations:

(1) to respect the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, security and non-alignment of the other High Contracting Party, as well as the national identity and cultural heritage of its people;

(2) to respect the sovereign and inalienable right of the other High Contracting Party freely to determine its own political, economic, cultural and social systems, to develop its international relations and to exercise permanent sovereignty over its natural resources. In accordance with the will of its people, and without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever;

(3) to refrain from the threat or use of force in any form whatsoever so as not to violate the boundaries of each other, to disrupt the political, social or economic order of the other High Contracting Party, to overthrow or change the political system of the other High Contracting Party or its Government, or to cause tension between the High Contracting Parties;

(4) to ensure that its territory is not used in any manner which would violate the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and national unity or disrupt the political, economic and social stability of the other High Contracting Party;

(5) to refrain from armed intervention, subversion, military occupation or any other form of intervention and interference, overt or covert, directed at the other High Contracting Party, or any act of military political or economic interference in the internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party, including acts of reprisal involving the use of force;

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(6) to refrain from any action or attempt in whatsoever form or under whatever pretext to destabilize or to undermine the stability of the other High Contracting Party or any of its institutions;

(7) to refrain from the promotion, encouragement or support, direct or indirect, of rebellious or secessionist activities against the other High Contracting Party, under any pretext whatsoever, or from any other action which seeks to disrupt the unity or to undermine or subvert the political order of the other High Contracting Party;

(8) to prevent within its territory the training, equipping, financing and recruitment of mercenaries from whatever origin for the purpose of hostile activities against the other High Contracting Party, or the sending of such mercenaries into the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accordingly to deny facilities, including financing for the training, equipping and transit of such mercenaries;

(9) to refrain from making any agreements or arrangements with other States designed to intervene or interference in the internal and external affairs of the other High Contracting Party;

(10) to abstain from any defamatory campaign, vilification or hostile propaganda for the purpose of intervening or interfering in the internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party;

(11) to prevent any assistance to or use of or tolerance of terrorist groups, saboteurs or subversive agents against the other High Contracting Party;

(12) to prevent within its territory the presence, harbouring, in camps and bases of otherwise, organizing, training, financing, equipping and arming of individuals and political, ethnic and any other groups for the purpose of creating subversion, disorder or unrest in the territory of the other High Contracting Party and

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accordingly also to prevent the use of mass media and the transportation of arms, ammunition and equipment by such individuals and groups.

(13) not to resort to or to allow any other action that could be considered as interference or intervention.

Article III

The present Agreement shall enter into force on 15 May 1988.

Article IV

Any steps that may be required in order to enable the High Contracting Parties to comply with the provisions of Article II of this Agreement shall be completed by the date on which this Agreement enters into force

Article V

This Agreement is drawn up in the English, Pashtu and Urdu languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

Done in five original copies at Geneva this fourteenth day of April 1988.

(Signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan).

DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America,

239

Expressing support that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have concluded a negotiated political settlement designed to normalize relations and promote goodneighbourliness between the two countries as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region;

Wishing in turn to contribute to the achievement of the objectives that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have set themselves, and wish a view to ensuring respect for their sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and nonalignment;

Undertake to invariably refrain from any form of interference and intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and to respect the commitments contained in the bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan don the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on NonInterference and Non-Intervention;

Urge all States to act likewise.

The present Declaration shall enter into force on 15 May 1988.

Done at Geneva, this fourteenth day of April 1988 in five original copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

(Signed by the USSR and the USA).

240

BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE ISLAMIC

REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN ON THE VOLUNTARY RETURN OF REFUGEES The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties,

Desiring to normalize relations and promote good-neighbourliness and cooperation as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region,

Convinced that voluntary and unimpeded repatriation constitutes the most appropriate solution for the problem of Afghan refugees present in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and having ascertained that the arrangements for the return of the Afghan refugees are satisfactory to them,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

All Afghan refugees temporarily present in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall be given the opportunity to return voluntarily to their homeland in accordance with the arrangements and conditions set out in the present Agreement.

Article II

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan shall take all necessary measures to ensue the following conditions for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees to their homeland:

(a) All refugees shall be allowed to return in freedom to their homeland;

241

(b) All returnees shall enjoy the free choice of domicile and freedom of movement within the Republic of Afghanistan;

(d) all returnees shall enjoy the right to participate on an equal basis in the civic affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan. They shall be ensured equal benefits from the solution of the land question on the basis of the Land and Water Reform;

(e) All returnees shall enjoy the same rights and privileges, including freedom of religion, and have the same obligations and responsibilities as any other citizens of the Republic of Afghanistan without discrimination.

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan undertake to implement these measures and to provide, within its possibilities, all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.

Article III

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall facilitate the voluntary, orderly and peaceful repatriation of all Afghan refugees staying within its territory and undertakes to provide, within its possibilities, all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.

Article IV

For the purpose of organizing, co-ordinating and supervising the operations which should effect the voluntary, orderly and peaceful repatriation of Afghan refugees, there shall be set up mixed commissions in accordance with the established international practice. For the performance of their functions the

242 members of the commissions and their staff shall be accorded the necessary facilities, and have access to the relevant areas within the territories of the High Contracting Parties.

Article V

With a view to the orderly movement of the returnees, the commissions shall determine frontier crossing points and establish necessary transit centres. They shall also establish all other modalities for the phased return of refugees, including registration and communication to the country of return of the names of refugees who express the wish to return.

Article VI

At the request of the Governments concerned, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will co-operate and provide assistance in the process of voluntary repatriation of refugees in accordance with the present Agreement, Special agreements may be concluded for this purpose between UNHCR and the High Contracting Parties.

Article VII

The present Agreement shall enter into force on 15 May 1988. At that time the mixed commissions provided in Article IV shall be established and the operations for the voluntary return of refugees under this Agreement shall commence. The arrangements set out in Articles IV and V above shall remain in effect for a period of eighteen months. After that period the High Contracting Parties shall review the results of the repatriation and, if necessary, consider any further arrangements that may be called for.

Article VIII

243

This Agreement is drawn up in the English, Pashtu and Urdu languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

Done in five original copies at Geneva this fourteenth day of April 1988.

(Signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan).

AGREEMENT ON THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION

RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN

1. The diplomatic process initiated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the support of all Governments concerned and aimed at achieving, through negotiations, a political settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan has been successfully brought to an end.

2. Having agreed to work towards a comprehensive settlement designed to resolve the various issues involved and to establish a framework for good-neighbourliness and cooperation, the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan entered into negotiations through the intermediary or the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General at Geneva from 16 to

June 1982. Following consultations held by the Personal Representative in Islamabad, Kabul and Teheran from 21 January to 7 February 1983, the negotiations continued at Geneva from 11 to 22 April and from 12 to 24 June 1983. The Personal Representative again visited the area for high level discussions from 3 to 15 April 1984. It was then agreed to change the format of the negotiations and, in pursuance thereof, proximity talks through the intermediary of the Personal Representative were held at

244

Geneva from 24 to 30 August 1984. Another visit to the area by the Personal Representative from 25 to 31 May 1985 preceded further rounds of proximity talks held at Geneva from 20 to 25 June, from 27 to 30 August and from 16 to 19 December 1985. The Personal Representative paid an additional visit to the area from 8 to 18 March 1986 for consultations. The final round of negotiations began as proximity talks at Geneva on 5 May 1986, was suspended on 23 May 1986, and was resumed from 31 July to 8 August 1986. The Personal Representative visited the area from 20 November to 3 December 1986 for further consultations and the talks at Geneva were resumed again from 25 February to 9 March 1987, and from 7 to 11 September 1987. The Personal Representative again visited the area from 18 January to 9 February 1988 and the talks resumed at Geneva from 2 March to 8 April 1988. The format of the negotiations was changed on 14 April 1988, when the instruments comprising the settlement were finalized, and, accordingly, direct talks were held at that stage. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran was kept informed of the progress of the negotiations throughout the diplomatic process.

3. The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan took part in the negotiations with the expressed conviction that they were acting in accordance with their rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and agreed that the political settlement should be based on the following principles of international law:

- The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of andy State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

- The principle that States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;

245

- The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

- The duty of States to co-operate with one another in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

- The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

- The principle of sovereign equality of States;

- The principle that States shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

The two Government further affirmed the right of the Afghan refugees to return to their homeland in a voluntary and unimpeded manner.

4. The following instruments were concluded on this date as component parts of the political settlement:

A Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-interference and Nonintervention;

A Declaration on International Guarantees by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America;

A Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees;

The present Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan.

246

5. The Bilateral Agreement on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Noninterference and Non-intervention; the Declaration on International Guarantees; the Bilateral Agreement on the Voluntary Return of Refugees; and the present Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan will enter into force on 15 May 1988. In accordance with the time-frame agreed upon between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Afghanistan there will be a phased withdrawal of the foreign troops which will start on the date of entry into force mentioned above. One half of the troops will be withdrawn by 15 August 1988 and the withdrawal of all troops will be completed within nine months.

6. The interrelationship in paragraph 5 above have been agreed upon in order to achieve effectively the purpose of the political settlement, namely, that as from 15 May 1988, there will be no interference and intervention in any form in the affairs of the Parties; the international guarantees will be in operation; the voluntary return of the refugees to their homeland will start and be completed within the time-frame specified in the agreement on the voluntary return of the refugees; and the phased withdrawal of the foreign troops will start and be completed within the time-frame envisaged in paragraph 5. It is therefore essential that all the obligations deriving from the instruments concluded as component parts of the settlement be strictly fulfilled and that all the steps required to ensue full compliance with all the provisions of the instruments be completed in good faith.

7. To consider alleged violations and to work out prompt and mutually satisfactory solutions to questions that may arise in the implementation of the instruments comprising the settlement representatives of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall meet whenever required.

A representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall lend his good offices to the Parties and in that context he will assist in the organization of the meetings and participate in them. He may submit to the Parties for their consideration

247 and approval suggestions and recommendations for prompt, faithful and complete observance of the provisions of the instruments.

In order to enable him to fulfil his talks, the representative shall be assisted by such personal under his authority as required. On his own initiative, or at the request of any of the Parties, the personnel shall investigate any possible violations of any of the provisions of the instruments and prepare an report thereon. For that purpose, the representative and his personnel shall receive all the necessary co-operation from the Parties, including all freedom of movement within their respective territories required for effective investigation. Any report submitted by the representative to the two Governments shall be considered in a meeting of the parties no later than forth-eight hours after it has been submitted.

The modalities and logistical arrangements for the work of the representative and the personnel under his authority as agreed upon with the Parties are set out in the Memorandum of Understanding which is annexed to and is part of this Agreement.

8. The present instrument will be registered with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It has been examined by the representatives of the Parties to the bilateral agreements and of the States-Guarantors, who have signified their consent with its provisions.

The representatives of the Parties, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have affixed their signatures hereunder. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was present. Done, at Geneva, this fourteen day of April 1988, in five original copies each in the English, Pashtu, Russian and Urdu languages, all being equally authentic. In case of any dispute regarding the interpretation the English text shall prevail.

(Signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan).

248

In witness thereof, the representatives of the States-Guarantors affixed their signatures hereunder

(Signed by the USSR and USA).

249

Annexure C

Gallup Pakistan History Project - Weekend Read 8 ‘Afghan Refugees in

Pakistan’ :

This is how the people of Pakistan assessed the refugee situation in 1979:

Should the Government help Afghan Refugees? (1980)

88%

6% 6%

Should Help Should not Help NR

How should the Government assist Afghan Refugees? (1980)

85%

6% 9%

Food, medical assistance, housing Others Should not assist

250

Afghan refugees are a burden Afghan refugees should be helped by on national economy (1982) the Government(1982)

46% 72%

30% 24%

19% 9%

Agree Somewhat Agree Disagree Agree Somewhat Agree Disagree

Majority of Afghan refugees are Every Pakistani should help Afgahn terrorists and Russian agents(1982) refugees(1982)

52% 74%

28% 20%

15% 11%

Agree Somewhat Agree Disagree Agree Somewhat Agree Disagree

Should Afghan refugees be permitted to stay in Pakistan? (1989) 70%

8% 2%

Refugees should be Refugees should not be Others Don't Know permitted to stay permitted to stay

251

Do you support or oppose the repatriation of Afghan refugeees? (1990) 53%

28% 19%

Support Oppose No Opinion

Will most Afghan refugees return Should the Government allow Afghan or stay? (1992) refugees to stay in Pakistan? (1992) 57%

59%

32% 30%

30%

11%

Return Stay No Opinion Should allow Should not allow No Opinion

Will the return of Afgahn refugees benefit Pakistan's economy? (1992)

71%

14% 10% 5%

Benefit the Harm the Other No Opinion economy economy

252

Should Pakistan impose sanctions on Do you favor or oppose the entrace of Afghan refugees' entrace into Afghan refugees in Pakistan? (2001) Pakistan? (2001) 50% 52%

36% 32%

16% 14%

Sanction No Sanction Don't Know Favor Disfavo

253

ANNEXURE D

Peshawar Accord

In the Name of Allah, the Most Beneficient, the Most Merciful 22.10.1412 (22 Shawal) 24 April 1992

Salutation and peace be upon the Great Messenger of Allah and his Progeny and Companions.

The structure and process for the provisional period of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, was formed as under:

1. It was decided that a 51 persons body, headed by Hazrat Sahib Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, would go inside Afghanistan so that they could take over power from the present rulers of Kabul, completely and without any terms and conditions during the two months period. The head of this body will also represent the Presidentship of the State during these two months. After this period, this body will remain as an interim Islamic Council, along with the Transitional State and its Chairmanship will be held by Hazrat Sahib. The period of this Council, will also be for four (4) months.

2. It was decided that Professor Rabbani will remain as the President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan and the head of the Leadership Council for four (4) months. He will commence his work officially at the time when the two months of the transfer of power will be elapsed.

3. The above mentioned period will not be extended even by a day.

254

4. The Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet will be appointed from the second grade members of the Tanzeemat, on the discretion of the heads of the Tanzeemat.

5. The Prime Ministership was assigned to the Hizb-e-Islami, Afghanistan.

6. The Deputy Prime Ministership and the Ministry of Interior, to Ittehad-e-Islami, Afghanistan.

7. The Deputy Prime Ministership and the Ministry of Education, to Hizb-e-Islamic of Maulvi Khalis.

8. The Deputy Prime Ministership and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the National Islamic Front.

9. The Ministry of Defence to Jamiat-e-Islami, Afghanistan.

10. The Supreme Court to Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami Organization. 11. It was also decided that the Leadership Council, in additional to making the division of appointments in the Ministries, will also determine Ministries for Hizb-e-Wahdat, Shura-e-Etelaf (Council of Coalition) Maulvi Mansoor and other brothers.

12. The total period of this process will be six months. As regards to Transitional Government, the Islamic Council, will make unanimous decision. The period of this Transitional Government will be two

(2) years.

255

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