ROMANIAN JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS VOL. 4 NO. 1, 2004

CHIRAC'S - WHY HAS BECOME THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE EFFORT TO BUILD AN AUTONOMOUS EUROPEAN DEFENCE

Marcel H. Van Herpen*

ABSTRACT. The author analyses Chirac's European defence policy and how it fits into the Gaullist tradition. He starts by sketching the original Gaullism of General De Gaulle which is based on four pillars: a national industrial policy, an independent foreign policy, the possession of a French nuclear deterrent and the ambition to build an independent European defence. His efforts in the last realm, however, are blocked by the US and its European NATO allies. In the Non-Gaullist Interregnum between 1974-1995 President Giscard d'Estaing jeopardised the Gaullist legacy, but President François Mitterrand became - against all expectations - a 'Socialist Gaullist' and it was he who realised one of De Gaulle's objectives by creating the Eurocorps. His successor, has conducted a highly volatile European policy. The author distinguishes no less than six different and often contradictory phases in Chirac's European defence policy. Despite the failures, some successes, however, have been booked, especially after the Saint-Malo Summit with Tony Blair. But much will depend in the coming years on how Chirac will succeed his balancing act between the EU-25, the French-German tandem and the 'Big Three'.

Introduction In the same way, Chirac wrote, twenty-five years ago, that 'our alliance During the stand-off on Iraq between with the ' was not only France and the United States many 'fundamental', but also 'beyond all commentators have drawn a parallel criticism'. „But the alliance,“ he between President Chirac and his continued, „is one thing, subordination is predecessor General De Gaulle. As De another. The United States tends to Gaulle before him, Jacques Chirac would exercise a hegemonic power (…). It is not have been driven by hidden anti-American a question of attacking them, but only of feelings, which would have induced him to confronting them, if necessary, with a conduct an anti-US foreign policy. But was friendly and firm refusal.“ (2) De Gaulle ant-American? De Gaulle's son, Jacques Chirac considers himself to be admiral Philippe De Gaulle, wrote in a the contemporary heir of the Gaullist recent book on his father: legacy. To understand Chirac's policies one „Why have they wanted him to be anti- should, therefore, go back to De Gaulle American? He often said:'Does it mean not and have a closer look at the basic to like the Americans when one thinks that principles of his doctrine. What are these they don't have to decide for France? Does principles and how did they influence De it mean to dislike them when one says that Gaulle's defence and foreign policy? And what they decide without us is not always how did they influence non-Gaullist good for France?'“ (1) presidents as Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and

* Marcel H. van Herpen is Director of the Cicero Foundation, a Pro-EU Think Tank.www.cicerofoundation.org

67

MARCEL H. VAN HERPEN

François Mitterrand? Finally, we will turn to l a strong, unified executive Chirac and analyse the six different phases l to be fully sovereign of his security and defence policy. Chirac is l to create new vehicles of power in known to be a volatile, impulsive and the post-colonial era populist politician. There are big The Fourth Republic with its weak, differences of temperament and character 'Italian-style' coalition governments was in between him and the General. In how far De Gaulle's eyes totally inappropriate for can he be considered a genuine Gaullist? the leading role France had to play in the world. For this reason, immediately after I. What is Gaullism? his comeback in 1958, he introduced a Let us start with the first question. What new constitution that gave supreme powers exactly is Gaullism? Gaullism has many to a directly elected President. He also aspects, but there is one basic aspect stressed France's sovereignty through an without which Gaullism loses its sense. independent foreign policy vis-à-vis the two This basic aspect is a deep belief in a superpowers, and immediately started to specific historical role of France. create new vehicles of power. In a period in France is not just a country, but it stands which France had just lost Algeria after a out among the other sovereign nations. This bloody colonial war, this was of extreme specific role of France is not so much due to importance. the fact that it is one of the oldest Building New Vehicles of Power independent nation-states in the world, nor that it is an established democracy, or that it What were the new vehicles of power, is one of the five or six richest industrial as conceived by De Gaulle? These were countries in the world - although all these fourfold: factors certainly help. Its unique position is l an independent 'national' industrial especially due to the fact that France is a policy carrier of universal values. France is a l an independent foreign policy country with a mission. It has a historical l an independent national nuclear role, a destin (destiny), which is to share its deterrent: the force de frappe values with other peoples and nations. The l Europe slogans of the French Revolutions: liberté, A National Industrial Policy égalité, fraternité were not only meant for A National Industrial Policy French citizens, they were meant for all After a more liberal beginning, a more people, citizens of Europe and beyond. This Colbertist, protectionist national industrial idea of a French mission is a core belief in policy was developed in the second half of Gaullism. We find it also back in Chirac's De Gaulle's Presidency, when, after the writings, when he speaks of 'la mission' and takeover of Simca by Chrysler, it became 'la grandeur' of the French people and of clear that France's industry could become France's 'eternal need of universality' (3) an easy prey for investors from the United In order to play this universal role States. In 1967 De Gaulle's government, France needed, according to De Gaulle, led by Prime Minister Georges Pompidou, three things: introduced investment controls that gave

68

CHIRAC'S GAULLISM - WHY FRANCE HAS BECOME THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE EFFORT TO BUILD AN AUTONOMOUS EUROPEAN DEFENCE the Ministry of Economy and Finance two ephemeral communist ideology of these months to forbid foreign investments. (4) states loomed the real actors: 'eternal' Russia and 'eternal' Germany. De Gaulle The Philosophical Foundations of died in 1970. It took only twenty years until De Gaulle's Foreign Policy history seemed to confirm his worldview. De Gaulle's second vehicle of power Communism was dead, as were the GDR was an independent foreign policy. But to and the , but 'eternal' understand the role which De Gaulle Germany - stronger after reunification - and attributed to foreign policy as an instrument 'eternal' Russia - weakened after the of national power, we first need to look at disintegration of the Soviet empire - were the philosophical foundations of his still on the world stage. worldview. These foundations were The only illogical element in his fourfold: 'Kissingerian' realist world view is the special l the international actors are the role he assigned to France, assigning it the nation-states role of an unselfish and idealist Jeanne d'Arc l the nation-states are led by self- in a bad, Hobbesian world that was led by interest and are in permanent self-interest. This, of course, is the most competition for power important flaw of De Gaulle's Gaullism and l a sceptical view of the role of of Gaullism in general. international law and international organizations. International De Gaulle's Foreign Policy in organizations - the UN included - Practice are artificial 'constructs' In conducting his foreign policy De l nation-states act on the basis of geopolitical interests which are Gaulle was led by two basic principles: permanent and are not affected by l the complete independence of changing ideologies. Ideologies are French foreign policy vis-à-vis the only temporary epiphenomena. two superpowers De Gaulle's worldview was deeply l French foreign policy had a global rooted in an almost Hobbesian, geopolitical reach realism. It is not difficult to recognise The independence of the French position similarities with the thinking of Henry was emphasised by De Gaulle in 1966 when Kissinger. With him De Gaulle shared not he left the military organisation of NATO only a distrust of idealist world visions, but and when in September of the same year he also a deep historical understanding of the gave his famous Phnom Penh speech, in political realities of his time. The only viable which he spoke out in favour of an actors in the international arena were for independent and neutral Vietnam, implicitly him the nation-states. The UN, therefore, criticising the US military intervention in this was a mere 'construct', as were country. He provoked the Anglo-Saxon ideologically defined states, such as the world even further, and without doubt German Democratic Republic and the unnecessarily, by his 'Vive le Québec Libre' Soviet Union. Behind the temporary and speech when he visited Canada in 1967.

69

MARCEL H. VAN HERPEN

But his critical stance was double- (CEA). (5) This had two results: first that the edged: visiting Poland in 1967 and acquisition by France of nuclear weapons Romania in 1968, he incited the leaders of was much more costly than for the UK, both countries - at that time the most which was able to buy its weapons off the independent countries in the Soviet bloc - shelf in the US. Second that - unlike Britain to take an even more independent position - France was totally independent as regards vis-à-vis their hegemon, the Soviet Union. the use of its deterrent. The global reach of French foreign But De Gaulle had to define a policy was clearly expressed by De Gaulle, philosophy and a strategy for this relatively when he, against the will of the US, small, non-allied French deterrent. recognised Communist China in 1964, and His underlying philosophy may be when he visited Mexico and ten other Latin summarised in two points: American countries in the same year, l the force de frappe is by its nature a making a diplomatic percée in what the US purely national deterrent. It is the considered as its exclusive backyard. The ultimate means for national survival. recognition of France as a global power No country will risk its national was (not without afterthoughts) given by the survival for another country. This Soviet Union during De Gaulle's official means that a broader role for French visit to Moscow in June 1966, as a result of nuclear weapons is not feasible. It which a direct hot line was installed means also that the US nuclear between the Kremlin and the Elysée - a guarantee for Europe is a promise privilege De Gaulle shared only with the which cannot be trusted. President of the United States. l the force de frappe is a medium sized deterrent and cannot match the huge The Force de Frappe nuclear arsenals of both De Gaulle knew, however, that an superpowers. This does not, independent French foreign policy was not however, jeopardise its function, i.e. enough. In a Hobbesian world this policy deterrence. Even if the French could easily become void and without nuclear force is capable of destroying substance if it was not based on real power. only ten big cities in the Soviet Union And real power meant . The and a quarter of its industrial decision to build a French nuclear force capability, then this will be sufficient was already taken by De Gaulle's to deter a Soviet attack on France. predecessors of the Fourth Republic after These principles of suffisance and of the Suez debâcle of 1956. But it was De the dissuasion du faible au fort will Gaulle who, with great energy, started the remain the founding principles of the build-up of the force de frappe. Unlike the French nuclear force until today. UK, which received direct support from the The French , as it was US, the US did not want to help France conceived by De Gaulle, can, equally, be realise its nuclear ambitions, because of summarised in two points: supposed and real presence of communists l The French deterrent was not in the Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique directed against a preconceived

70

CHIRAC'S GAULLISM - WHY FRANCE HAS BECOME THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE EFFORT TO BUILD AN AUTONOMOUS EUROPEAN DEFENCE

enemy. It was a deterrent against any build a partnership with Germany enemy, whoever and wherever he l The Anglo-Saxons should be kept out was. This meant that the force de of the European project frappe should be capable to strike in l No supranational Europe all directions, or, in French: tous l An intergovernmental European azimuts. (6) Defence and an intergovernmental l The small size of the French European Foreign Policy should be deterrent had a direct strategic built under French leadership implication: it could only play its De Gaulle conducted this European role in a all or nothing strategy. A policy with an iron consequence. In strategy of flexible response with a 1962 he signed with chancellor Konrad gradual escalation was not only Adenauer the Elysée Treaty, a friendship beyond the financial means of the treaty between the old foes France and French government, it tended to Germany. In the same period he came undermine the role of its deterrent. forward with the Fouchet Plan which The French official doctrine was, intended to make an intergovernmental therefore, . This Europe, run by a Council of Heads of remained so, even after the States and Government, and which introduction of the tactical encompassed far-fledged cooperation in missile. (7) the field of defence and foreign affairs. When these plans were blocked by Europe: A Vehicle for French Power Belgium and the Netherlands, De Gaulle Europe was De Gaulle's fourth vehicle retaliated by vetoing in 1963 British to strengthen France's power. But, although membership of the European he considered Europe vital for an enhanced Community. In 1966 France left the role of France in the world, he still had an military organisation of NATO. After ambivalent attitude towards Europe. De having lost the first battle for an Gaulle did not like any policy that tended intergovernmental Europe with the to build supra-national institutions. Not demise of the Fouchet Plan, De Gaulle only because such a supra-national entity prepared - as a good military officer - for would be another machin, an artificial the next battle. This battle came in 1965, construct that had nothing to do with the when he refused to implement articles living reality of nations, but especially 145 and 148 of the Rome Treaty to because in such a supra-national Europe, extend qualified majority voting to new France would become some kind of a areas, something what in his eyes came province or, at best, a federal state, which close to a creeping federalisation. He would contradict France's vocation to be a instructed his ministers to boycott the leading nation. De Gaulle's European Council meetings and, finally, had his policy, therefore, was based on five pillars: way when in the 'Luxembourg l Europe is a vehicle for France's Compromise' of January 1966 unanimity grandeur and leading role of decision-making, and thereby a l To play this role France needs to national veto, was maintained.

71

MARCEL H. VAN HERPEN

The balance sheet of De Gaulle's II. 1974 - 1995 The European policy, however, was mixed. He Non-Gaullist interregnum succeeded in building a solid partnership with Germany. He succeeded also in his Valéry Giscard d'Estaing: purpose to give France the leading The Gaullist Legacy Endangered political role in this Franco-German After Pompidou, who only reigned five tandem, leaving to Germany the role of years and represented a moderate form of economic leader. His two other Gaullism, presidential power in France was 'successes': keeping the Brits out and exercised by non-Gaullists. First by the stopping qualified majority voting, had Centrist Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (1974- more the character of Pyrrhic victories. 1981), then by the Socialist François Even a second veto in 1967 could not Mitterrand (1981 - 1995). prevent the UK from joining in 1973 - only Although Giscard can be placed in the three years after De Gaulle's death - and 'right' camp, he was the less 'Gaullist' of QMV became a normal procedure in these two. European decision-making. With Giscard, in fact, five cracks appear His greatest failure, however, and it is in the Gaullist legacy: certain that he himself has also felt this to l the first of these cracks appeared be so, was his failure to convince his when the Gaullist principle of a European counterparts to build a common strong, unified government was European defence. jeopardised. This happened when After the demise of the Fouchet Plan the first cohabitation took place and after the French retreat from the between Centrists and Gaullists from military integrated structure of NATO, 1974 to 1976. De Gaulle would European defence had become a political never have imagined that a Gaullist no go zone. The partners of France were prime minister (Jacques Chirac) unwilling to discuss defence matters in would serve under a Centrist the framework of the European president (Giscard d'Estaing). Not Community, which, for them, was only was the place of a Gaullist at the predominantly an economic organisation. helm of the state, but also his power Europe's defence was, according to them, had to be undivided. best guaranteed under the NATO l A second crack in the Gaullist legacy umbrella. It would take more than a appeared when under Giscard's decade before another French president Presidency a rapprochement took would restart De Gaulle's dream of place between France and the building a European defence, and, most United States. President Nixon and strange of all, it would not be a Gaullist his National Security Adviser Henry president, but a Socialist, someone who Kissinger wanted this had been De Gaulle's most ferocious rapprochement. The first result was critic during the 1960s: François that in the Ottawa Declaration of Mitterrand. 1974, NATO, for the first time,

72

CHIRAC'S GAULLISM - WHY FRANCE HAS BECOME THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE EFFORT TO BUILD AN AUTONOMOUS EUROPEAN DEFENCE

openly acknowledged the positive force de frappe in exchange for a role of the independent French French nuclear guarantee - an idea in nuclear deterrent. Even more flagrant contradiction with the surprising was the hidden support Gaullist dogma that a nuclear force given by the US during this period for could only have a national function. the modernisation of the French nuclear '' in the François Mitterrand: form of 'negative guidance' (8). A Socialist Gaullist? l A third crack appeared when under Mitterrand's Presidency meant a return the influence of this rapprochement to some of the basic principles of Gaullism. with the US the supreme commander This to the great surprise of many political of the French Army, General Méry, analysts, who had predicted that his wrote an article in the Revue de la Presidency would herald the end of the Défense Nationale of June 1976 in Fifth Republic. As De Gaulle had done, which he proposed to reintegrate Mitterrand acknowledged the vital role of French troops into NATO in case of Europe as a vehicle of France's interests. conflict. And - as De Gaulle - he saw the importance l A fourth crack appeared when the of a strengthened European defence Gaullist nuclear doctrine came under cooperation. fire. On 20 May 1975 President In fact one can discern three phases in Giscard d'Estaing openly expressed Mitterrand's policy to establish a European his doubts concerning the first use of defence cooperation: nuclear weapons. He proposed a l first, a multilateral phase doctrine of No First Use, a proposal l followed by a bilateral phase that was heavily criticised by the l ending in a bilateral 'plus' phase 'father' of the French nuclear The multilateral phase began in 1984, strategy, General Pierre Gallois, in when Mitterrand proposed a 'revitalisation' his book Le Renoncement of 1977, of the Western European Union, at that on the grounds that it would moment a 'sleeping' organisation with a jeopardise France's strategy du faible secretariat in London and a Parliamentary au fort. Assembly in Paris. The British government, l And, last but not least, there was the however, was not very enthusiastic about French-German nuclear flirtation of an upgrading of the WEU, because it feared 1979 when General Buis and that it could become a rival to NATO. Alexandre Sanguinetti, who was a Thereupon followed a bilateral phase, former president of the defence when on 12-13 November 1987 France committee of the French parliament, and Germany took the decision to set up both men close to President Giscard, the French-German Brigade, a unit that was wrote an article in Le Nouvel operational on 12 January 1989 and Observateur (9) concerning the consisted of 5000 troops: with mixed, as possibility that Germany would co- well as with national unities. finance the modernisation of the The French-German brigade had

73

MARCEL H. VAN HERPEN primarily a symbolic character. But this rule - to be the only real heir of the Gaullist changed when President Mitterrand and legacy, would build upon the foundations Chancellor Helmut Kohl on 22 May 1992 laid by his predecessor, but, strange in Rochelle decided to build the Eurocorps, enough, this was not the case. a real army with 50 000 troops and with its headquarters in Strasbourg. The Eurocorps III. Jacques Chirac: would be operational in 1995 and would A Volatile Gaullist be open for other member states. When Jacques Chirac was elected Belgium, Luxembourg, and Spain joined President in 1995, he was the first Gaullist this initiative. When these countries joined President in more than twenty years. the bilateral phase changed its character Jacques Chirac considered himself to be the and became a bilateral 'plus' phase. legitimate heir of . But NATO, and especially the United States, did he have also De Gaulle's broad was not pleased with this initiative. The US historical vision, his consistence and his feared that German troops could be pulled perseverance? Before he became a out of NATO's integrated command. President, Jacques Chirac had shown on Germany tried to reassure the US: the several occasions that he was a highly Eurocorps would not push Germany out of volatile politician, who could suddenly NATO, but would, instead, pull France change his course if confronted with an closer to NATO. adverse public mood. He seemed less to be On 21 January 1993 SACEUR Shalikashvili met with Lanxade and the man with a vision who wants to educate Naumann, the French and German supreme the public and try to explain his ideas, like commanders. It was agreed that in case of De Gaulle before him, but more a follower crisis French unities could be placed under of public opinion. An example of this operational command of NATO. This was a populism was, when during the presidential real breakthrough: since 1966 French troops campaign of 1995 he suddenly came up could only be placed under operational with the idea of organising a referendum on control (10). Operational control was only the introduction of the euro - a standpoint for specific missions, limited in space and totally opposed to international law, time. Operational command gave more because France had already committed power to SACEUR and the time and space itself to introduce the euro when it signed limits were less precise. and ratified the Maastricht Treaty. Mitterrands's Presidency had, therefore, It is, therefore, not surprising that we remarkable results in the field of defence: he find this volatility back in his policies as a made a genuine start with De Gaulle's President. project of building a European defence - but, In the nine years Chirac has been in at the same time, he avoided alienating the power we can discern at least six different United States. phases to further his ambition to establish a One would have expected that Jacques European defence cooperation, and, what Chirac, the next French President, who is more, these phases are often in open claimed - after two decades of non-Gaullist contradiction with each other.

74

CHIRAC'S GAULLISM - WHY FRANCE HAS BECOME THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE EFFORT TO BUILD AN AUTONOMOUS EUROPEAN DEFENCE

Chirac's Six Phases at an earlier date, when he wrote: „…the What are these six phases? use of thermonuclear weapons causes such tremendous destruction (…), that no l Phase I: Nuclear Unilateralism country in the world seems psychologically l Phase II: Atlantic Multilateralism capable to use them, except for its own l Phase III:Anglo-French Bilateralism survival.“ (12) l Phase IV:EU Wide Multilateralism The discussion on this subject, however, l Phase V: French-German Bilateral 'Plus' was quickly dropped when Germany did not show any interest in the idea. l Phase VI: The Formation of a French-German-British Directoire Phase II: Atlantic Multilateralism Phase I: Chirac's Nuclear An even more surprising tournure came Unilateralism immediately after Phase I, when Chirac When Chirac became President of suggested that France was prepared to France he neglected the Eurocorps. The reintegrate itself into military NATO Eurocorps was, in his eyes, the creation of structures if NATO was prepared to his Socialist predecessor and that was a reorganise its command structure. France reason not to like it. Chirac did not want to was especially interested to head the South continue the policies of President Command which had traditionally an Mitterrand. He wanted to immediately put American commander. This tour de force his stamp on the world. He did so by had a certain resemblance to De Gaulle's starting a series of nuclear tests in the open initiative of 1958, when he proposed that atmosphere, thereby exasperating public the US, Britain and France would form a opinion worldwide. This unilateral start of a directoire in NATO - a proposal that was President who later claimed to be a immediately rejected by the US and Britain. champion of international law and of The fact is that De Gaulle's proposal came multilateralism, was, at least, a bit strange. in a time when France was still an important Confronted with a wave of international NATO member and when the NATO criticism, he tried to woo his European headquarters were still in Fontainebleau. critics by coming up with a new concept: la Chirac's proposal came after a French dissuasion concertée, which was, in fact, a absence of almost thirty years and he had remake of the 1979 proposal of General even less trump cards to put on the table Buis and Alexandre Sanguinetti to extend than De Gaulle before him. We all know the French above what happened: after a period of haggling France's European partners. As it was the US was not prepared to give up the already mentioned above, this concept was South Command in the Mediterranean, a in total contradiction with De Gaulle's vulnerable and strategically important theory that the force de frappe was a purely region, where also the US Sixth Fleet is national deterrent.(11) This shift was all the stationed. Jacques Chirac not only made a more surprising, because President Chirac highly surprising tournure, he also played himself had fully adhered to Gallois' theory his - weak - cards badly.

75

MARCEL H. VAN HERPEN

Phase III: Anglo-French Phase IV: EU-Wide Bilateralism with Blair Multilateralism in Saint-Malo The bilateral tête-à-tête of Saint-Malo had Chirac's Atlantic adventure ended in a a multilateral follow-up. First of all the déconfiture. The way back into an influential German government needed to be reassured, position in NATO was blocked. His personal because the Germans, having not participated relationship with Chancellor Helmut Kohl in the summit, could feel excluded. The was rather cool and the French-German axis German Chancellor was informed in the seemed to be in shambles. Then he made a spring of 1999 by the French at the Franco- new - totally unexpected - move: he turned German summit in Toulouse. Shortly to Britain, traditionally considered by the afterwards, in June 1999, was the EU Cologne Gaullists as the Trojan horse of the US in Summit, just after the Kosovo War which had Europe. In a summit meeting with Tony Blair showed as never before Europe's military on 3-4 December 1998 in the French port of impotence: sixty percent of the sorties were Saint-Malo both men discussed the made by the US, even eighty percent of the possibility of strengthening European defence strike sorties. The Europeans had been almost cooperation. In their five-point Declaration totally dependent on US intelligence, US on European Defence they agreed that „the transport, and US communications and Union must have the capacity for logistics. Not only Germany, but also the autonomous action, backed up by credible other EU partners, including the neutrals, military forces, the means to decide to use were now a willing audience for the French- them, and the readiness to do so, in order to British proposals and the decision was made respond to international crises.“(13) They to incorporate the WEU (except its article V) added that „the Union must be given into the EU at the end of the year 2000. appropriate structures and a capacity for The Helsinki Summit of December 1999 analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, took the build-up of an EU defence identity and a capability for relevant strategic even further. A Headline Goal was formulated planning, without unnecessary duplication to build a Rapid Reaction Force of 60.000 (…).“ Immediately afterwards a debate troops, deployable within 60 days and started on the interpretation of the words sustainable for one year. A Capability Goal autonomous (How autonomous? Could the was added to improve the organisational EU only act after NATO refused to do so?) defence infrastructure by setting up a Political and duplication (What is unnecessary and Security Committee, a EU Military duplication? No duplication at all? Or could Committee, and an EU Military Staff. a certain duplication sometimes be Phase V: The End of necessary?). But this did not take away the Multilateralism: Back to French- enormous importance of this growing German 'Bilateralism Plus' convergence of the visions of Britain and France in the field of defence. Saint-Malo But this multilateral phase - which had, meant a real breakthrough and was a triumph without any doubt, many positive results - for both men, Blair and Chirac. ended suddenly in the summer of 2002,

76

CHIRAC'S GAULLISM - WHY FRANCE HAS BECOME THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE EFFORT TO BUILD AN AUTONOMOUS EUROPEAN DEFENCE when the preparations for the War in Iraq Phase VI: Building already cast their shadows. The US a European Directoire government became more and more In the autumn of 2003 Chirac's suspicious of the French-inspired European European Policy took suddenly a new defence plans. How 'autonomous' should direction, when British Prime Minister Tony EU's defence be? Could the EU act on its Blair was invited for an exclusive summit own without asking NATO first? with Chirac and Schröder in Berlin on 20 The Iraq War seemed for a moment to September. Healing the wounds was restore the old 'Gaullist' world: the UK chose certainly necessary after the Iraq crisis. But the side of the US, France opposed the US- the meeting was not alone about mending British intervention. The reemergence of the Franco-British rift meant also the end of fences: it was the beginning of a closer multilateralism. The EU was divided along the institutionalised cooperation between the lines of the French-British conflict when European 'Big Three' and the other EU Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg took members reacted immediately with overt the side of France, and most other EU suspicion. This suspicion grew when one member states, including the candidate month later the foreign ministers of the 'Big members, took the side of the UK and the US. Three' visited Tehran in an attempt to On 30 April 2003, the worst possible persuade the Iranian government to allow moment, because just after the end of the the International Atomic Energy Agency to War with Iraq, when US-French relations carry out unannounced inspections of were at their deepest, France, Germany, nuclear sites. This visit, proclaimed a Belgium and Luxembourg, came up with 'success' by its initiators, was not only plans for a European Security and Defence criticised, with reason, on material grounds Union with its own headquarters in as a new 'Munich' of three would-be Tervuren near Brussels. It meant a return of Chamberlains, it was also criticised on Chirac to the old French-German formal grounds, because this initative was bilateralism, with an extension to Belgium in flagrant contradiction with the rules of and Luxembourg. This 'Bilateralism Plus' the Common Foreign and Security Policy. meant in fact that Chirac, after eight Irritation of the other EU member states years,returned to the position of his grew further when a new summit of the 'Big predecessor, François Mitterrand, the Three' was planned on 18 February 2004 to creator of the 'Eurocorps'. prepare for the 'economic' European The three countries with which France Council meeting of 25-26 March. decided to build a 'European Security and Especially the governments of Italy and Defence Union' were not only the same Spain, two close allies of Blair, were furious countries that formed with France the so- to be excluded. José Maria Aznar took the called camp de paix during the Iraq crisis, initiative of the 'Letter of Six' which was they were also members of the Eurocorps. sent on 17 February, one day before the Only one Eurocorps member: Spain, was summit, to the Irish President of the lacking, because of the pro-US stance of the European Council and to Commission Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar. President Romano Prodi. In this letter the

77

MARCEL H. VAN HERPEN prime ministers of Italy, Spain, Poland, the IV. Conclusion Netherlands, Portugal and Estonia In how far can one distinguish a clear expressed their concern as regards the red line in Chirac's European defence and economic performance of the EU and security policy? We have seen that his implicitly attacked France and Germany, odyssey brought him first to the atols of that had both escaped sanctions for a Polynesia, from which he returned with the repeated breach of the deficit regulations of idea of the dissuasion élargie. An idea, the Stability and Growth Pact, by stressing however, that he dropped quickly in order that „sanctions must be applied in a to start a rapprochement to NATO, an consistent manner and on a non- organisation dominated by the American discriminatory basis.“ Although the word hyperpuissance and as such suspect to each 'directoire' was not used in this letter, it was self-respecting Gaullist. Being rebuked by a clear warning shot.(14) the US, he made a next, rather surprising, It is, however, still an open question ouverture when he started bilateral talks on how this new cooperation of the 'Big Three' European defence with Tony Blair in Saint- will develop. Will they be able to Malo. Strange enough this worked, not only overcome their differences of interests and because France and Britain had cooperated diverging views on the future of Europe or closely in the Balkan Wars, but also will their alliance only be temporary and because Blair was the most pro-European occasional in order to defend their - British Prime Minister in years. The Saint- common - big power interests in the debate Malo summit resulted in a EU-wide on the European Constitution? And what multilateralism at the summits of Cologne exactly is France's position in this and Helsinki. But this multilateral phase threesome? It is quite clear that a European ended suddenly in the autumn of 2002 with directoire that includes Britain is a far cry the preparation of the war in Iraq. This war from De Gaulle's vision of an exclusive caused a deep crisis in US-French relations French leadership role in Europe. As part of when the French Foreign Minister the French-German tandem France has Dominique De Villepin threatened to veto a always succeeded to push through its views Security Council resolution and personally and interests. In a trilateral group with a visited some of the African Security Council pro-Atlantic and free market oriented members in an attempt to actively organise Britain this will be less evident. Maybe that an anti-American coalition in the Security is the reason why Germany seems to be Council. Even De Gaulle, in his time more positive about the new tripartite considered an enfant terrible by the cooperation, because it enables it to escape Americans, would never have gone so far. a bit from the tight French embrace. France, On the contrary, in the international crises on the other hand, seems to be more which took place during his Presidency cautious and might show a tendency to (Cuba, Prague) he was one of the most only reserve a role for the 'Big Three' when steadfast allies of the US. the Franco-German axis is in need of Locked up in 'Old Europe'during the support.(15) Iraq crisis, Chirac's multilateral approach

78

CHIRAC'S GAULLISM - WHY FRANCE HAS BECOME THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE EFFORT TO BUILD AN AUTONOMOUS EUROPEAN DEFENCE was replaced by a new emphasis on the common big power interests in the EU. bilateral Franco-German axis, extended When German and British positions with the two other countries of the camp de do not coincide with French positions paix: Belgium and Luxembourg. With these the Directory has no role to play. countries Chirac launched his project for a Additionally, Britain, for being granted European Security and Defence Union. the right to enter (from time to time) So at the end of the Iraq crisis, the circle the salon exclusif of the French- was closed: Chirac arrived in 2003 where German tandem, has to pay a price Mitterrand had ended in 1994. He and that is to accept some kind of concluded that his natural allies where the French leadership. countries of the Eurocorps. l In case Britain would take a course But not all the countries of the that is considered by France as too Eurocorps participated in this initiative. pro-Atlantic, there is still the third Spain did not participate, because of the option of building a 'core' Europe pro-US stance of Prime Minister José Maria with Germany, Belgium, Aznar. (Spain would, however, close ranks Luxembourg, Spain and - eventually with France and Germany in March 2004, - other countries. after the victory of the Spanish socialists Like the French nuclear doctrine under Zapatero). Chirac's European strategy can be defined The European Security and Defence as tous azimuts. This impulsive and volatile Union of France with two small countries politician seems to move in all directions: and defence free rider Germany was not he opens doors and closes them, and can credible as long as Britain was not suddenly change his tactics, his allies, and involved. Not in the least place to save his even his ideas. European defence initiative from ridicule, But, nevertheless, his basic driving force Chirac, in the autumn of 2003, turned and his central aim remain always the same back to his former Saint-Malo ally in a and that is to develop an independent tripartite summit in which also German position for Europe in a multipolar world chancellor Schröder participated. This (16), based on military might, with France - was the start of a potential Directoire. and its President - in a leading position. What steps will follow? Most probably Chirac, therefore, can certainly be called a Chirac will continue to develop a three- Gaullist, be it a rather volatile and way approach: unpredictable one. l His first priority is to further NOTES: strengthen the Franco-German axis. l His second priority is to enlarge the (1) Philippe De Gaulle, „De Gaulle French-German tandem with Britain mon père - Entretien avec Michel into some kind of a directoire. The role Tauriac“, Paris 2003, p. 257 (my of this Directory should, however, in translation, MHvH). French eyes, remain restricted to (2) Jacques Chirac, „La lueur de initiatives in the field of defence and l'espérance - réflexion du soir pour le foreign policy and to the defence of matin“, Paris, 1978, p. 224.

79

MARCEL H. VAN HERPEN

(3) ibid., p. 223 Allemands,“, in: Le Nouvel (4) Serge Berstein, „Histoire du Observateur, 20 August 1979, gaullisme“, Paris, 2002, p. 301. pp.26-28. (5) The CEA was led by „Mister Curie“, (10) The NATO-France relationship was Mr. Joliot-Curie, who will later be since 1966 regulated by two fired because of his public arrangements : Ailleret-Lemnitzer engagement in favour of the French and Valentin-Ferber. In these Communist Party. (Cf. François agreements was only 'operational Valentin, „Regards sur la politique control' possible. de défense de la France de 1958 à (11) In the words of Pierre Gallois, the nos jours“, Paris, 1995, p. 47). main theorist behind this thesis: (6) The term 'tous azimuts' was coined „No government could take the by General Ailleret. risks involved in the use of arms of (7) When the French government mass destruction if it was not for his introduced tactical nuclear weapons own country.“ Pierre Gallois, in the 1970s, these were, therefore, L'Europe change de maître, Paris not conceived as a weapons system 1972, pp. 120-121 (My translation, of its own, between conventional MHvH). and strategic weapons, but as 'pre- (12) Jacques Chirac, La lueur de strategic' weapons, that were meant l'espérance - réflexion du soir pour to give a 'warning shot' before a le matin, o.c., p. 214 (my massive nuclear attack would be translation, MHvH). launched. (13) Declaration on European Defence, (8) Because positive support was British-French Summit, St. Malo, 3- officially forbidden, this US support, 4 December, 1998, Press office of was given in the form of 'negative the British Embassy in Paris. guidance'. The French government, (14) In an editorial comment the confronted with many problems in Financial Times of 17 February hardening missile heads, sent a list 2004 urged the 'Big Three' „to with questions to the US government. tread carefully“. „The big three The US government thereupon would (…) be well advised to keep answered which solutions were not their energies focused on policy adequate. Cf. Richard Ullman, „The areas that are either half-out of the Covert French Connection“, in: EU's remit, such as labour markets Foreign Policy, No. 75, Summer or pension and health systems, or 1989, pp. 3-33. In the second half-formed, such as EU foreign, volume of his memoirs President defence and immigration Giscard d'Estaing affirmed Ullman's policies.“ See also André findings (Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Le Fontaine, „Le style directoire“, Le pouvoir et la vie, Vol. 2, Monde, 2 February 2004. L'Affrontement, Paris 1991, p.179.). (15) Le Monde of 18 February 2004 (9) „Partager l'arme nucléaire avec les quotes 'someone close to Chirac' as

80

CHIRAC'S GAULLISM - WHY FRANCE HAS BECOME THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE EFFORT TO BUILD AN AUTONOMOUS EUROPEAN DEFENCE

saying: „A renewed European nationalinterest.com/Articles/ dynamism can emerge from this trio, Vol2Issue19/vol2issue19 but the 'Franco-German' vanherpenpfv.html (relationship) remains for us the Forthcoming publication (June, 2004): basis, the fundamental relationship.“ „European Union Perspectives on the War (16) For a critique on Chirac's concept of on Terrorism“, in: Hall Gardner (Ed.), a multipolar world, see my „France: NATO and the European Union - New Champion of a Multipolar World“, World, New Europe, New Threats, In the National Interest, Volume 2, (Ashgate) Issue 19, 14 May, 2003, © Marcel H. van Herpen, Paris, 2004 http://www.inthe- [email protected]

81