PB 80–96–1 January 1996 Vol. 9, No. 1
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Special Warfare The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School PB 80–96–1 January 1996 Vol. 9, No. 1 From the Commandant Special Warfare With the proliferation of sophisticated weapons systems and the increased efficien- cy of intelligence-gathering and information processing, technology offers a variety of options in dealing with our current ambigu- ous operations spectrum. Special-operations forces place a high pre- mium on technology — the nature of our operations demands that we take advan- tage of every means to provide an immedi- ate, effective response. In this issue, Steven Metz and Lieutenant Colonel James Kievit discuss how emerging technology and the ensuing revolution in military affairs can be applied to conflict short of war, an area in which SOF are often involved. But through siren song of technology, but we must a hypothetical scenario, they also show the remember that the main thing is to keep the hidden costs that such an application of main thing the main thing. technology might entail. The main thing is best stated by General While we consider the importance of tech- Dennis Reimer, when he says, “The idea of nology and the need to stay abreast of it, we war in the Information Age will conjure up must not become so enamored of technology images of bloodless conflict, more like a com- that we forget the reason behind our need puter game than the bloody wars we’ve for it: soldiers. We have always said that known in the past. Nothing could be further humans are more important than hardware. from the truth. Warfare may change — its We must never allow this human empha- impact on nations, armies and soldiers will sis to diminish. Soldiers are the strength of not. The fates of nations and armies will our special-operations force. As Larry Cable still be decided by war, perhaps more rapid- points out in his article, the intercultural ly than in the past. Losers may still spend skills of our Special Forces continue to be an generations recovering from the conse- important factor in the indirect-action roles quences of defeat. Soldiers will always be we face. Around the globe, whether on the the key to victory. Technology and the abili- Pacific Rim or in Latin America, the person- ty to handle it may be increasingly impor- to-person contact of our special-operations tant, but soldiers will always win or lose forces allows the U.S. to protect its interests wars. The battlefield will always be a dan- with a minimum of involvement. It also gerous, frightening and lonely place. Only builds friendships and earns host-nation soldiers of character and courage, well- respect. Special Forces soldiers such as the trained, ably led, and properly equipped, late Dick Meadows, who is profiled in this will survive there and win — tomorrow, as issue, exemplify the self-effacing perform- they have in the past.” ance of duty summed up in the term “quiet professional.” As we consider ways of dealing with our current and future conflict spectrum and what Metz and Kievit call its “frustration and indecisiveness,” we may be lured by the Major General William F. Garrison PB 80–96–1 Contents January 1996 Special Warfare Vol. 9, No. 1 Commander & Commandant Major General William F. Garrison Features Editor 2 The Siren Song of Technology and Conflict Short of War Jerry D. Steelman by Steven Metz and Lieutenant Colonel James Kievit Associate Editor 11 Straddling the Cultural Gaps: Special Forces in Sylvia McCarley the Indirect Action Environment Graphics & Design by Larry Cable Bruce S. Barfield 18 Army Special Operations Forces and the ‘Pacific Century’ Automation Clerk by Colonel Russell D. Howard and Major Mark A. Nelson Debra Thomas 28 Civil-Military Operations: Staff Support to Army Corps and Divisions 36 Joint Task Force Support Hope: The Role of the CMOC in Humanitarian Operations V E R TAS by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen O. Wallace I R T A E S LI B E T Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the 42 Dick Meadows: A Quiet Professional United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare by Captain Jay Ashburner Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special- operations forces by providing a forum for the examination 45 USACAPOC’s FOCUS Project: Waging the War of established doctrine and new ideas. for Information Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This by Brigadier General Joel G. Blanchette publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. 50 Civil-Military Seminars: 361st CA Builds Understanding Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare, Between the Americas USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone: by Captain Bethany L. Lenderman DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material. Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and the authors. Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special-operations units. Individuals desiring private subscriptions should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Dennis J. Reimer General, United States Army Departments Chief of Staff 54 Letters Official: 57 Officer Career Notes 58 Enlisted Career Notes Yvonne M. Harrison Administrative Assistant to the 60 Foreign SOF Secretary of the Army 62 Update 00686 64 Book Reviews Headquarters, Department of the Army The Siren Song of Technology and Conflict Short of War by Steven Metz and Lieutenant Colonel James Kievit mericans perceive conflict extremely lethal, usually standoff, hattan Project, current American short of war as a difficult precision-strike weapons systems strategists are not forced to rush Astate of affairs, whether it and automation-assisted systems headlong into the development and involves crisis response, peace of command, control and communi- the application of new military enforcement, counterinsurgency, cations, or C3.2 This fusion is technology. No immediate strategic antiterrorism or counternarcotraf- expected to allow smaller military threat is forcing haste, so we can ficking.1 In this environment of vio- forces to produce rapid, decisive carefully weigh the benefits and lent, shadowy grays and endless results through synchronized, the risks of applying the RMA to complexity, immense military near-simultaneous operations conflict short of war. Once this is advantage does not automatically throughout the breadth and depth done, hidden costs and unintended bring strategic success. “Soft” skills of a theater of war.3 side effects will become stark. such as psychological astuteness The implications and possible and political subtlety often have impacts of the RMA are important Benefits greater utility than do traditional to conventional and special-opera- At first glance, the benefits of warfighting virtues. Such a concept tions forces alike. Although most applying emerging technology to is counter to our nature: Americans thinking about the RMA is focused conflict short of war seem prefer the direct, the simple, the on conventional, combined-arms immense. For example, when used conclusive and the decisive. As a warfare, the technology, the organi- for attacks or raids during crises, result, we search desperately for zation, and the techniques spawned future autonomous, wide-ranging, some way to transcend the frustra- by the RMA may also apply to con- high-speed information-collecting tions of conflict short of war. flict short of war, thus offering us devices capable of on-board proc- Often, technology seems to offer the opportunity to transcend past essing will identify precise targets. just such a solution. The Gulf War frustrations and indecisiveness. Interactive simulations and virtu- provided shimmering evidence of Feasibility is always a prime factor al-reality devices will be used to the power and potential of modern in strategic decision-making, and train the forces and to rehearse technology, renewing American the RMA appears to greatly expand strikes. Automation-assisted C3 trust in the ability of military the realm of feasibility. systems will synchronize and con- power to achieve strategically deci- Applying new technology as trol lethal, standoff, precision-guid- sive results at an acceptable rapidly as possible is thus alluring, ed weapons systems in near-simul- human cost. Today, many military but “silver bullets” should always taneous attacks.4 In fact, informa- strategists believe we are in the be approached with caution. It is tion technology may conceal an initial stages of a historic revolu- easy to be awed by the potential of intent to strike and, later, provide tion in military affairs, or RMA, the RMA and to overlook its hidden evidence of a successful strike.5 centered on the fusion of sophisti- costs and unintended side effects. In noncombatant evacuation cated remote-sensing systems with Unlike the architects of the Man- 2 Special Warfare operations, or NEOs, every Ameri- radio-frequency guns and electro- Tracking and stopping high-speed can at risk could be equipped with magnetic-pulse transformer bombs) small craft in coastal waters is dif- an electronic individual position- to interdict narcotrafficking flights ficult today, but it could become locator device, or IPLD. The IPLD by damaging or destroying their routine with projected advances in could also act as a form of identifi- avionics equipment.10 Narcotraf- electronic sensors, directed-energy cation, provided U.S. military per- fickers tend to rely on radios, cellu- weapons and standoff, precision sonnel are equipped with appropri- lar telephones, fax machines and conventional munitions. Drugs ate challenge-and-response devices. computers, all of which are vulner- smuggled aboard commercial carri- Such a device might permit NEO able to electronic intelligence-gath- ers might be interdicted by hosts of notification to be performed covert- ering and disruption.